SPECPRO+CASE+DIGESTS+ rule 73 to 78

8/10/2019 SPECPRO+CASE+DIGESTS+ rule 73 to 78

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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests

RULE 73

GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH3D (2008-2009)

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RULE 73

SANDOVAL v. SANTIAGO (83 Phil 784)

VDA DE MANZANERO v. CFI of BATANGAS (61 Phil 850)FACTS:

1. Esteban Manzanero (Esteban) died in the provincial

hospital of Albay.

2. His brother, Fortunato filed a sworn application with

CFI of Batangas (CFI) pray ing for a summary

settlement of Estebans estate. He likewise alleged that

Esteban had no property except a life insurance policy

worth PhP5,000 and that Esteban was indebted to him

for PhP500. More importantly, he alleged that Estebanhad legal residence in Batangas.

3. CFI issued an order for hearing and directed that notice

be published in a newspaper in Batangas.

4. Petitioner (wife of Esteban) did not appear at the

scheduled hearing. Nevertheless, the judge ruled that

Esteban was a resident of Batangas, and that his

property (insurance policy worth PhP5,000) be

distributed after payment of PhP500 to Fortunato.

5. Thus, Filipinas Assurance Company was directed to pay

the heirs of Esteban, the proceeds of his insurancepolicy. Net proceeds of the insurance policy were sent

to the heirs, pursuant to the order.

6. Petitioner prayed that the money be returned and

delivered to her.

ISSUE: Whether questions of jurisdiction by reason of

residence may be raised by means of certiorari

RULING: (Not for this case.)

1. Under Section 603 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the

jurisdiction assumed by CFI for settlement of the

estate, so far as it depends on the place of residence ofthe person or location of his estate, shall not be

contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal

from that court, in the original case, or when the want

of jurisdiction appears on the record.

2. The want of jurisdiction, in this case, does not clearly

appear from the pleadings and records of the CFI.

3. The communication of the municipal treasurer of Albay

stating that Esteban was a registered voter therein,

and that he resided there before his death, does not

form part of the record of the CFI.

4. Since lack of jurisdiction does not appear from the

records, certioraridoes not lie.

5. Under the law, petitioner has a plain, speedy and

adequate remedy for the enforcement of her rights.

BENEDICTO v. JAVELLANA (10 Phil 197)

Facts:

MAXIMO Jalandoni- testator; will provides:

Hacienda Lantad- divided, to Maximo and other to

sisters. On the entire estate, an obligation was

imposed that all debts shall be paid, provided that of

the products which each parcel may yield shall be

devoted to the payment of debts and should the be

insufficient, 2/3 or total amount shall be applied; in


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case of balance of such products, it shall remain with

the administrator for settlement of other charges.

MAXIMINO- petitioned the administrator Javellana

that he be directed to pay MAXIMINO a sum in lieu of

land donated to him; products of the land had already

been applied to payment debts and liabilities

Issue: W/N MAXIMINO is entitled to payment in lieu of land

donated?

Held:

The will of MAXIMO must be complied with. All those

who are benefited have not received from the testator

a universal succession to his estate but merely as

legatees without right to receive their share of theproperty of the deceased until after his debts have

been paid.

Any challenge to the validity of a will, any objection

to the authentication and every demand or claim

which any heir, legatee or party in interest in a

testate or intestate succession may make, must be

acted upon and decided within same special

proceedings, not in a separate action.

CASIANO v. MALOTO (70 SCRA 232)

Facts:

- Adriana Maloto Died in Iloilo City on 10/20/63 her

place of Residence, and her niece and nephews

(Aldina, Constancio, Panfilo, and Felino) commenced

intestate proceedings believing their aunt died

intestate.

- The niece and nephews executed an extra-judicial

partition of Adrianas estate which was approved by

the court on 3/21/64, and each got share each

- On 4/1/67 a document dated 1/3/40 surfaced

purporting to be Adrianas Will, which shows that theniece and nephews still as heirs, but with Aldina and

Constancio getting a bigger share (w/ Asiso de Molo,

Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor as

devisees/legatees)

- Aldina and Constancio (together w/ the other

devisees/legatees of the Will) filed an MR to the

previous special proceedings No. 1736 for annulment

of such proceedings and allowance of the Will, this of

course was opposed by the other 2 nephews Panfilo

and Felino

- The court denied the MR for being filed out of time,

and the petitioners (Adriana, Constancio etc.) filed a

petition for certiorari and mandamus which was

likewise denied by the SC because the more

appropriate remedy is to initiate separate proceedings

for the probate of the alleged will in question

- Thus, the petitioners filed for the probate of the will,

now special proceedings No. 2176, and the oppositors

contested claiming the testatrix had revoked anddestroyed the will, and the previous intestate

proceedings constitute res judicata. The Probate Court

dismissed the proceedings on the ground of res

judicata, and the finding of the court in the previous

special proceeding No. 1736 that the will had been

destroyed and revoked.


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Issue:

Whether the court in intestate, special proceeding No. 1736

had jurisdiction to rule on the discovered will?

Whether the finding that the will was revoked and destroyedin special proceeding No. 1736 constitutes res judicata in

special proceeding No. 2176?

Held:

No to Both.

This Petition is meritorious. The motion to reopen proceedings

was filed out of time, and it is not proper to make a finding in

an intestate estate proceeding that the discovered will had

been revoked, it had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition

for probate of the alleged will. Thus, the finding in special

proceeding No. 1736 is not a bar to the present petition, and

the lower court is directed to proceed to hear the petition in

special proceeding No. 2176

CUIZON v. RAMOLETE (129 SCRA 495)

BERNARDO v. CA (7 SCRA 367)

Facts:Eusebio Capili died before her wife Hermogena Reyes.

Eusebios will was admitted to probate wherein he left his

properties to his wife and cousins. Hermogena Reyes then

during the pendency of the probate proceedings died

intestate, thus she was substituted by her collateral relatives

as petitioned by Bernardo, the executor of Eusebios estate

Bernardo then filed a project of partition in accordance with

the will of Eusebio which however was opposed by

Hermogenas relatives. They submitted their own project of

partition claiming that of the properties mentioned in the

will of Eusebio on the theory that the properties belonged notto Eusebio but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses. This

was questioned by Bernardo claiming that the properties

belonged exclusively to Eusebio and not to the conjugal

partnership because Hermogena donated to Eusebio her half

share of such partnership.

The probate court then issued an order declaring the donation

void as it is prohibited by law and disapproved both projects

of partition, ordering the executor to file another dividing the

property of Eusebio according to the will noting that such

properties were conjugal properties of the deceased spouses.

Issue:

Whether the probate court erred in applying the exception to

the general rule that it has no power to adjudicate title in a

probate proceedings?

Held: NO

Ratio:

The Court consistently held that as a general rule, question as

to title of property cannot be passed upon on testate or

intestate proceedings, except when one of the parties prays

merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the

property, in which case the probate court may pass

provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its final


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determination in a separate action. It has also been held that

when the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is

optional to them to submit to the probate court a question as

to title to property, and when so submitted said probate court

may definitely pass judgment thereon. Provided that interestsof third persons are not prejudiced.

In this case the matter in controversy is the question of

ownership of certain properties involved whether they

belong to the conjugal partnerships or to the husband

exclusively. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of

the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the

conjugal partnership in order to determine the state of the

decedent which is to be distributed among the heirs including

of course the widow represented by her collateral relatives

upon petition of the executor himself and who have appeared

voluntarily. There are no third parties whose rights may be

affected. Therefore the claim being asserted is one belonging

to an heir to the testator, and, consequently it complies with

the requirement of the exception that the parties interested

are all heirs claiming title under the testator.

URIARTE v. CFI NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (33 SCRA 252)

Facts:Don Juan Uriarte y Goite died. Vicente Uriarte filed with the

CFI of Negros Occidental a petition for the settlement of the

estate of the late Don Juan (Special Proceeding No. 6344)

alleging that, as a natural son of the latter, he was his sole

heir, and that, during the lifetime of said decedent, Vicente

had instituted a civil case in the same Court for his compulsory

acknowledgment as such natural son.

Higinio Uriarte, nephew of the deceased, filed an opposition

to the petition alleging that Don Juan had executed a Will in

Spain. He further questioned Vicente's capacity and interest to

commence the intestate proceeding. Juan Uriarte Zamacona,the other private respondent, commenced Special Proceeding

No. 51396 in the CFI of Manila for the probate of a document

alleged to be the last will of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite,

and on the same date he filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344

of the Negros Court a motion to dismiss the same on the

following grounds: (1) that, as the deceased Juan Uriarte y

Goite had left a last will, there was no legal basis to proceed

with said intestate proceedings, and (2) that Vicente Uriarte

had no legal personality and interest to initiate said intestate

proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural son of the

decedent.

Vicente Uriarte opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss

contending that, as the Negros Court was first to take

cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the deceased

Juan Uriarte y Goite, it had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over

same pursuant to Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. The

Negros Court sustained Juan Uriarte Zamacona's motion to

dismiss and dismissed the Special Proceeding No. 6344pending before it.

Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in Special Proceeding

No. 51396 pending in the Manila Court, asking for leave to

intervene therein; for the dismissal of the petition and the

annulment of the proceedings had in said special proceeding.

This motion was denied by said court.


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- Both proceedings in LINNIEs and CHARLES estates

proceeded independent of each other AVELINA acting as

admin for LINNIEs estate and PCIB for CHARLES.

- Both administrators hired lawyers and eventually had to pay

substantial amounts out of the estate. Both proceedings wenton independently until such time that conflicts arose between

administrators with respect to safekeeping the properties,

liquidating the estate, etc.

- The instant petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed by

PCIB against the court which handled both estate proceedings.

The judge (ESCOLIN) kept approving motions apparently from

both estates, which led to confusing or even conflicting issues.

ISSUE: (1) Whether there exists, still, LINNIEs estate (on the

theory that her estate is practically closed since she

bequeathed everything to her husband)?

(2) If so, how much does she still have that would go to

her siblings? Are the siblings entitled to anything (on the

theory that the will contained substitutions)?

RULING:

(1) Yes, LINNIEs estate still exists and the proceedings

therefor have not closed.

While it is true that LINNIE adjudicated her entire estate toCHARLES, she still had her own estate for which the

proceedings in which AVELINA is administratrix could proceed.

LINNIEs estate consists of those properties which are her part

in the conjugal partnership. However, given the murky factual

circumstances, the Court cannot make a final determination

which of the properties in the conjugal partnership belong to

LINNIEs estate.

(2) LINNIEs siblings (or representatives) are entitled to

LINNIEs estate which should not be less than one-fourth of the

community estate at the time of her death , minus whatever

CHARLES may have gratuitously disposed of during hisadministration and as sole heir. If CHARLES sold the properties

for consideration, such consideration shall continue to form

part of LINNIEs estate.

With regard to the alleged substitutions, there was no

legal substitution to begin with. CHARLES being named by

LINNIE as her sole heir (they had no other heirs), albeitsubject

to the condition that LINNIEs relatives would inherit whatever

is left, but CHARLES not having to preserve anything for the

subsequent heirs this setup is not the substitution

contemplated under the Civil Code. Neither is this prohibited

by law.

The Supreme Court stated that two hanging issues are better

left to the trial court since these are issues of fact: (a) whether

CHARLES indeed renounced LINNIEs inheritance and (b)

whether there is a conflict of applicable laws (laws of the

Philippines and that of Texas, where the couple has

properties), applying the renvoi doctrine and Art. 16 of the

Civil Code.

For the meantime, the Supreme Court advised both

the administrators to act in conjunction with the other and

never proceed with one estate independently.

DEL ROSARIO v. DEL ROSARIO (67 Phil 652)

FACTS:


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- RAMON del Rosario (husband) died in 1895 and

FLORENCIA Arcega (wife) in 1933.

- RAMON died intestate and FLORENCIA administered

the conjugal properties.- FLORENCIA acquired other properties using the fruits

of the conjugal ones.

- After RAMON died, his intestate was not commenced

and the conjugal properties were not liquidated until

FLORENCIA died, after which the latter's testamentary

proceedings were initiated and are now in progress.

- The heirs of both spouses brought this action to

recover their share not only in the conjugal properties

left by RAMON but also in those acquired by

FLORENCIA with the products of said properties.

- A demurrer (by other heirs) was interposed to the

complaint on the ground that there is another action

pending between the same parties and for the same

cause of action; that there is a defect of party plaintiffs

and party defendants, and that the complaint does not

allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

- The (probate) court sustained this demurrer and

dismissed the case. From this resolution an appeal was

taken.

ISSUE: Whether granting the demurrer was proper.

RULING:

Yes. The appealed judgment is affirmed.

Whatever law might be applicable the intestate of

RAMON del Rosario not having been commenced upon his

death in 1895 until his widow FLORENCIA Arcega also died in

1933, and the testamentary proceedings of FLORENCIA Arcega

having been subsequently initiated, wherein, among otherthings, the liquidation of her conjugal properties with the

deceased RAMON del Rosario should be made the

pendency of these testamentary proceedings of the deceased

wife excludes any other proceeding aimed at the same

purpose (Zaide vs. Concepcion and Quintana, 32 Phil., 403). At

any rate, the plaintiffs have a right to intervene in these

proceedings as parties interested in the liquidation and

partition of the conjugal properties of the deceased spouses .

DOLAR v. ROMAN CATHOLIC (68 Phil 727)

FACTS:

1. The deceased had two wives. He had 5 children from

his first marriage, and another 4 children from the

second.

2. He left a will, setting out his properties and distributing

the same to wife #2 and his children by both

marriages. He also left a legacy of PhP8,000 to be

spent for the altar of the church in Dumangas, ordering

that the sum be taken from the fruits of all theproperties before partition.

3. Wife #2 was appointed administratix. She filed a

project of partition which was not approved because

of opposition of certain heirs. Another project of

partition was filed which was also not approved

because of the opposition of the Bishop of Jaro, who

represented the Church of Dumangas. It should be


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noted that the second project of partition was not

concurred in by the heirs of the f irst marriage.

4. In disapproving the 2nd

project of partition, the court

ordered Wife #2 to take immediate possession of all

the properties and pay from the proceeds thereof, thelegacy of PhP8,000. Wife #2 and the heirs (by the 2

nd

marriage) appealed the disapproval of the project of

partition.

ISSUE: Distribution of the estate

RULING:

1. Unless wife #2 and the heirs by both marriages, as well

as the Bishop of Jaro and other creditors of the estate,

come to an agreement, the partition should be made

with the intervention of all the interested parties

according to law.

2. Thus

a. All debts and administration expenses shall first

be paid

b. Conjugal properties of 1st

marriage must be

liquidated to determine the shares of the

children (as heir of wife #1) and the deceased.

c.

Conjugal properties of 2nd

marriage must alsobe liquidated to determine the share of wife #2

and that of the deceased.

d. Properties corresponding to the deceased

(from process (b) and (c)) constitute his estate.

e. Estate shall be partitioned among the ff heirs

i. Children by 1st

and 2nd

marriage

ii. Wife #2

f. As there are forced heirs (yeah!), the legacy

should be taken from the free portion only

(remaining 1/3). The heirs may deliver to the

legatee (Bishop of Jaro) properties equivalent

to the 1/3 free portion since the legacy is byway of usufruct.

g. The fruits of the property already received or to

be received shall answer for the legacy with

respect to 1/3 portion only. The remaining 2/3

shall accrue to the heirs.

h. The legal usufruct of wife #2 shall be taken

from the third available for betterment.

3. After partition, the properties corresponding to the

heirs as legitime shall be delivered.

4.

As to the free third, it shall belong to all the forced

heirs in equal parts, subject to the legacy as to its

fruits.

ALFONSO v. NATIVIDAD (6 Phil 240)

Facts:

Alfonso: administrator of the estate of Pedro ANGELES;

sued NATIVIDAD and FLORES for the recovery of 2

separate parcels of land

NATIVIDAD land:

- ANGELES and wife obtained a loan from

NATIVIDAD and as security pledged the title deed.

Upon death of ANGELES and subsequently the

wife, NATIVIDAD waited for heirs to appear and

pay the debt.

- Claims that the property belonged wife


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FLORES land:

- Land belonged to conjugal partnership. Land was

sold to Alejandro with right to repurchase.

ANGELES failed to exercise right of repurchase.

After his death, wife (TOMASA) repurchased land

and sold to FLORES.

Issue: W/N Alfonso is entitled to maintain the action for the

recovery of the lands?

Held:

FLORES land: the repurchase of land by TOMASA gave

her the sole ownership; heirs of husband acquired no

rights by her repurchase.

NATIVIDAD land: in the absence of proof that moneywith which land was bought belonged to the wife,

declared to be conjugal property.

o Conjugal partnership dissolved by the death of

the husband. As to settlement of partnership

affairs: debts and obligations of the partnership

affairs shall be discharged, then of the net

proceeds be considered as the exclusive

property of the deceased spouse. It is necessary

to that the executor or administrator appointed

is the one entitled to the custody of the

property while settlement is being made

o No lien in favor of NATIVIDAD over the land nor

entitle him to retain it until his debt was paid

all other property of the partnership will be

held for payment of debts.

CRUZ v. DE JESUS (52 Phil 870)

Facts:

- This is an appeal made by the petitioners (including the

surviving husband) in which the court denied theircomplaint to liquidate and partition the property left

by the deceased Juliana Nabong

- The petitioners claim that Juliana Nabong left no debts,

and partition is asked for in the regular court

- This court ruled that the proper action for property

belonging to the conjugal partnership (especially since

the surviving spouse is a party) should be in an

intestate/testate proceeding for the settlement of the

deceaseds estate

Issue:

Whether or not an action lies for the liquidation and partition

of the property of a conjugal partnership dissolved by the

death of the wife, said property having been in the possession

of the surviving spouse for many years, without his having

made any inventory thereof, nor liquidated and partitioned it,

and it not appearing that there is any debt to pay?

Held:

Yes, an action lies for liquidation and partition.

Sec 685 of Act No. 190 established two methods of liquidating

the property of a conjugal partnership, if the marriage is

dissolved by the death of one of the spouses:

a) by testate/intestate proceedings


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b) by ordinary proceeding for liquidation and partition

When the marriage is dissolved by death of the wife, the

husbands power of management ceases and is shifted to the

administrator in the testate/intestate proceedings to the endthat there are any debts to be paid. If there are no debts, as in

this case the liquidation and partition may be made in

ordinary proceedings for that purpose.

DE LA RAMA v. DE LA RAMA (7 Phil 745)

VILLACORTE v. MARIANO (89 Phil 160)

Facts:

Leon Calimon married thrice. With his first wife Adriana Carpio

he had three children Canuta, Tranquilina, Maria and

Enriqueta. He then married Venacia Inducil who has a child by

previous marriage, Tiburcio Villacorta. Venancia and Leon did

not have any children. Leon thenafter married Macaria

Mariano, they did not have any children as well.

Petitioners here are the widow and daughter of Tiburcio

seeking to recover 38 parcels of land from Canuta and her

sisters and Macaria Mariano. Mariano in her answer claimed

that the lots were owned exclusively by Leon Calimon butlater on filed another answer asserting that all the realities has

been acquired during her coverture with Leon and she also

filed a cross claim against Canuta and her sisters demanding

the recognition of her rights as surviving spouse. She claimed

that through deceit, the sisters made her sign three

documents assigning to her a riceland, a fishpond and 2,400

and renouncing her interest and rights in the estate of Leon as

well as her participation in the conjugal partnership with him.

The sisters then after partitioned the properties, this was also

thumbmarked by their stepmother Macaria.

he Court then concluded that the three documents were validand binding and that as a consequence the Calimon sisters are

entitled to continue possessing the land and properties

assigned to them.

Issue:

Whether the lower court erred in finding that the properties

belong to the sisters without previously requiring an inventory

and liquidation of the conjugal properties of the deceased

Leon and Macaria.

Held: NO

Ratio:

It was unnecessary to prepare the inventory and make the

liquidation because the parties interested the widow and

the children, already reached a compromise. Macaria cannot

get away from her commitment and claim that she did not

know the contents of the documents she signed. The said

documents are valid and binding, and it was shown that onlywhen there was delay in the delivery of one of the properties

assigned to her did she question the validity of the

documents.

CALMA v. TANEDO (68 Phil 594)

Facts:


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The spouses Eulalio Calma and Fausta Macasaquit were the

owners of a certain property. They were indebted to

Esperanza Taedo, and these debts were chargeable against

the conjugal property. Fausta Macasaquit died leaving a will

wherein she appointed her daughter, Maria Calma, asadministratrix of her properties.

In the probate proceedings in the CFI of Tarlac, Maria Calma

was appointed judicial administratrix of the properties of the

deceased. While these probate proceedings were pending,

Esperanza Tanedo filed a suit for collection against Eulalio

Calma. The CFI of Tarlac rendered judgment for the payment

of this sum. In the execution of this judgment, despite the

third party claim filed by Fausta Macasaquit, the conjugal

property was sold by the sheriff. Maria Calma, as

administratrix of the estate of Fausta Macasaquit, brought an

action to ask that the sale made by the sheriff of the property

be annulled and that the estate of Fausta Macasaquit be

declared the sole and absolute owner thereof.

Held:

The sale of the property made by the sheriff in execution of

the judgment rendered against Eulalio Calma for the collection

of the indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal property,is void and said property should be deemed subject to the

testamentary proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit.

The probate proceedings were instituted in accordance with

Act No. 3176:

SEC. 685. When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the

husband or wife, the community property shall be

inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts

thereof shall be paid, in the testamentary or intestate

proceedings of the deceased spouse, in accordance with the

provisions of this Code relative to the administration and

liquidation and partition proceeding, unless the parties, beingall of age and legally capacitated, avail themselves of the right

granted to them by this Code of proceeding to an extrajudicial

partition and liquidation of said property.

In case it is necessary to sell any portion of said community

property in order to pay the outstanding debts and obligations

of the same, such sale shall be made in the manner and with

the formalities established by this Code for the sale of the

property of deceased persons. Any sale, transfer, alienation or

disposition of said property effected without said formalities

shall be null and void, except as regards the portion that

belonged to the vendor at the time the liquidation and

partition was made.

The testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit having

been instituted, the liquidation and partition of the conjugal

property by reason of her marriage to Eulalio Calma should be

made in these proceedings, to the exclusion of any other

proceeding for the same purpose.

When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the wife, the

legal power of management of the husband ceases, passing to

the administrator appointed by the court in the testate or

intestate proceedings instituted to that end if there be any

debts to be paid. Thus, Eulalio Calma having ceased as legal

administrator of the conjugal property had with his wife


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Fausta Macasaquit, no complaint can be brought against him

for the recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against said

conjugal property, and that the action should be instituted in

the testamentary proceedings of the deceased Fausta

Macasaquit in the manner provided by law, by filing it firstwith the committee on claims.

OCAMPO v. POTENCIANO (89 Phil 160)

FACTS:

1) Edilberto Ocampo, husband of Paz Yatco (plaintiff Ocampo),

executed a deed of sale w/ pacto de retro on a town lot w/

house in favor of Conrado Potenciano (defendant) and his

wife. Edilberto also made a document where vendees where

leasing to him house and lot during the redemption period.

2) House and lot conjugal property in reality, even if reg in

husband's name only

3) One year repurchase period was "extendible to another

year" but extensions were granted. Period lapsed w/o

repurchase so defendant Potenciano consolidated title w/ RD

of Laguna.

4) Potenciano gave plaintiff Paz Ocampo option to repurchase

property w/in 5 years + 5 yr lease. Paz sought to exercise

option by tendering payment to Potenciano but tender was

rejected. Paz deposited money in court and brought action as

administratrix of husband's estate to have property reinstated

to them.

5) Potenciano's children, Victor and Lourdes, intervened by

filing cross-complaint alleging that option to purchase null and

void as to share of their dead mom because they inherited her

share and as to their dad, Victor and Lourdes were exercising

right of redemption as co-owners of property.

6) Paz amended complaint:

a)pacto de retrosale was really a mortgage

b) option agreement was really extension of the mortgage

c) valid tender of payment w/in the period

7) CFI gave judgment in favor of Paz and kids (sub after herdeath). CA found that pacto de retro sale was really a

mortgage so Potencianos had no right to consolidate title over

the property. However, CA said that mortgage novated by

option agreement for the repurchase of mortgaged property.

Potenciano siblings argue that this was error because

Potenciano dad had no authority to enter into agreement

after wife's death. SC agrees.

ISSUE: W/n CA erred in supposing that surviving spouse had

such authority as de factoadministrator of conjugal estate?

HELD: YES, CA erred, Potenciano dad no authority to enter

into option ag'mt.

1) The decisions laying down the rule that, upon the

dissolution of the marriage by the death of the wife, the

husband must liquidate the partnership affairs, are now


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obsolete. PRESENT RULE: when the marriage is dissolved by

death of either husband or wife, the partnership affairs must

be liquidate in the testate or intestate proceedings of the

deceased spouse (Rule 75, Sec. 2)

2) Option agreement was nothing more than mere extension

of time for payment of mortgage debt since the real

transaction was the equitable mortgage

3) Tender and consignation of Paz must be held to produce

their legal effect, to relieve debtor from liability.

4) Thus, Victor and Lourdes (appellant children) Potenciano

acquired nothing because ownership of property never passed

to their parents

PRADO v. NATIVIDAD (47 Phil 776)

DE LA RAMA v. DE LA RAMA (25 Phil 437)

Facts:

The plaintiff Agueda charged her husband with

adultery and prayed for a divorce, alimony pendente

liteand division of the conjugal partnership.

Defendant Esteban denied the charge of adultery andcountered by charging his wife with adultery as well.

Judgment was rendered in favor of Agueda granting

her the sum of P81,042.76 as her share in the conjugal

share.

Upon appeal to SC of the Phils, the decision was

overturned based on the reasoning that the evidence

showed both spouses were guilty of adultery and

therefore divorce was not available to either party.

Appeal to the SC of US resulted in upholding the

decision of the lower court as to granting the divorce

prayed for by the plaintiff. However, as to the other

issues (alimony, share in the conjugal partnership) the

case was remanded back to the SC of the Phils forfurther proceeding.

Plaintiff insists that SC of the Phils should merely affirm

the judgment of CFI as per SC of US judgment.

Defendant on the other hand states that error was

incurred in fixing the amount of the half of said alleged

conjugal property at P81,042.75, without having

examined the necessary antecedents and data

Held:

SC of US merely decided on the issue of adultery and

did not touch on the issue regarding division of the

conjugal partnership. It remanded the case to SC of

Phils precisely to decide on the issues it did not

address.

CFI erred in fixing the amount at P81,042.75.

Article 1418 provides, except in certain cases, an

inventory shall at once be made.

We have held in the case of Alfonso vs. Natividadthat

when the partnership is dissolved by the death of the

husband this inventory must be made in theproceedings for the settlement of his estate.

In the case of Prado vs. Lagera we ruled that the

inventory thus formed must include the bienes

parafernalesof the wife.

It is very evident from the provisions of the Civil Code

that the inventory includes the capital of the husband,

the dowry of the wife, the bienes parafernales of the


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wife, and all the property acquired by the partnership

during its existence.

After this inventory has been made it is provided by

article 1421 that there shall be first paid the dowry of

the wife, in the second place the bienes parafernales ofthe wife, in the third place the debts and obligations of

the conjugal partnership, and in the fourth place the

capital of the husband

Conjugal property which is to be divided when the

partnership is dissolved is determined not with

reference to the income or profits which may have

been received during the partnership by the spouses,

but rather by the amount of the actual property

possessed by them at such dissolution after making the

deductions and payments aforesaid. This is positively

provided by article 1424.

An examination of the decision of the Court of First

Instance shows that no attempt was made to comply

with any one of these statutory provision. (No

inventory, no paying of the wifes bienes parafernales,

etc.) and their decision was based on the profits made

by conjugal partnership after its formation.

The theory of the Civil Code is that the conjugal

property is the actual property which is left at thedissolution of the partnership. It can, therefore, never

be determined by adding up the profits, which had

been made each year during its existence, and then

saying that result is the conjugal property.

The case is remanded to the court below for the purpose of

liquidating the conjugal partnership

FULGENCIO v. GATCHALIAN (21 Phil 252)

Facts:

Plaintiff Josefa Fulgencio was the administratrix of the

intestate estate of Dionisio Fulgencio (deceased).

Defendant Gatchalian was the second wife of deceased.Gatchalian and the other defendants had control of the

properties of the deceased and were sued by Fulgencio in

order to be compelled delivery of the said properties to the

latter (Fulgencio, who was the administratrix).

Fernando Fulgencio, legitimate son of the deceased by the

latters first marriage, intervened in the suit in order to

protect his rights in the estate of the deceased.

Gatchalian claimed that she should not be compelled to

deliver the entirety of the properties demanded because

some of it were her own and not part of the conjugal

partnership.

Note that there was an agreement between the parties

conceding that certain properties (drygoods store, bakery,

cigar and cigarette stand, bazaar) were paraphernal properties

of the deceased.

Issue:

Whether Gatchalian could be compelled to deliver all the

properties demanded from her.

Held:

YES.

Article 1407 of the Civil Code provides: All the property of the

marriage shall be considered as partnership property until it is

proven that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the

wife.


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If it be not proven conclusively that the property claimed by

the administratrix is paraphernalia and belongs exclusively to

the defendant Benita Gatchalian, it must be deemed to be

conjugal partnership property, liable for the debts of the

conjugal partnership, and therefore, by virtue of thepreinserted agreement, the administratrix has a right to be

placed in possession of the same for the purpose of its

inventory in the special proceedings, without prejudice to the

rights of the widow Benita Gatchalian in relation to her own

property or to that of the nature of paraphernalia, for, once

the inventory of the property of the intestate estate has been

made, the latter will have the same opportunity to claim the

exclusion of the property belonging to her exclusively and that

of the nature of paraphernalia.

LUKBAN v. REPUBLIC (98 Phil 574)

Facts:Petitioner Lourdes G. Lukban contracted marriage with

Francisco Chuidian on Dec. 10, 1933. On dec. 27 of the same

year, Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarreland since

then he has not been heard from despite diligent search made

by her. She believes that he is already dead for he has been

absent for more than 20 years and because she intends to

marry again, she desires that her civil status be defined in

order that she be relieved of any liability under the law.A petition was filed in the Court of first instance of Rizal for a

declaration that petitioner Lourdes is the widow of her

husband Francisco who is presumed to be dead and has no

legal impediment to contract a subsequent marriage.

Issue: Whether or not the petition filed be Petitioner Lourdes

has merit.

Held: No. A petition for judicial declaration that petitioners

husband is presumed to be dead cannot be entertained

because it is not authorized by law, and if such declaration

cannot be made in a special proceeding, much less can thecourt determine the status of petitioner as a widow since this

matter must of necessity depend upon the fact of death of the

husband. This the court can declare upon proper evidence,

but not to decree that he is presumed to be dead.

The philosophy behind this ruling of the Court is that judicial

pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executor,

would still be prima facie presumption only. It is still

disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of

judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only

question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a

competent court has to pass. It is therefore clear that a

judicial declaration that a person presumptively dead, because

he had been unheard from in seven years, being a

presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof,

cannot reach the stage of finality or become final.

Regarding Petitioners reliance on the Hagans vs. Wislizenus,

alleging that the remedy she is seeking for can be granted in

the present proceedingwhile it is true that a special

proceeding is an application or proceeding to establish thestatus, right of a party or a particular fact, that remedy can be

invoked if the purpose is to seek the declaration of death of

the husband, and not, as in the present case, to establish a

presumption of death. If it can be satisfactorily proven that

the husband is dead, the court would not certainly deny a

declaration to that effect.


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UTULO v. VDA DE GARCIA (66 Phil 302)

Facts:

Juan Garcia Sanchez died intestate leaving his spouse

Leona and 3 children Juan, Patrocinio and Luz

During the pendency of the administration

proceedings of the fathers estate, Luz died w/o any

legitimate descendants; her only forced heirs were

her mother and husband Pablo Utulo

The only property Luz left was her share in her fathers

estate

Pablo Utulo commenced the judicial administration of

Luzs estate; he asked the court to be the

administrator

Leona opposed saying that since the deceased left no

indebtedness, there was no occasion for judicial

administration; and if there is, she had better right

Pablo claims that it was necessary for him to be named

the administrator so that he may have legal capacity

to appear in the intestate proceedings of Juan

Pablo was named administrator; Leonas appeal wasgranted; thus the petition

Issue:

whether there was a need for appointment of

administrator

Held: There was no need for appointment of administrator

As a general rule, when a person dies and fails to leavea will or he had left one but failed to name an

executor, the competent court should appoint a

qualified administrator

Exceptions: (1) when all the heirs are of lawful age and

there are no debts due from the estate of the

deceased, the heirs may agree in writing to partition

of the property without instituting the judicial

administration; (2) where the property left does not

exceed P6,000, summary partition may be had

without instituting the judicial administration and theappointment of an administrator

In these instances, the heirs are not bound to submit

the property to judicial administration or to apply for

the appointment of an administrator in court it is

costly, superfluous, and unnecessary since the heirs

own the property from the moment of death of the

decedent

Pablos appointment as administrator was not

necessary in order that he may have standing in theproceedings of Juans estate; he could appear by right

of representation

HERNANDEZ v. ANDAL (78 Phil 196)

Facts:

-PF (Cresencia Hernandez), intervenors (Maria and Aquilina

Hernandez) and Pedro and Basilia Hernandez who are not


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parties here, are brother and sisters. They acquired in

common from their father a parcel of land.

-Intervenors sold 1800 sq. m. of this parcel to DF Zacarias

Andal and his wife for P860. This portion purports to be the

combined share of the intervenors in the larger parcelpursuant to an alleged verbal partition among the siblings.

-After the sale, PF attempted to repurchase the land sold to

Andal offering P150 which she said was the amount DF had

paid for intervenors shares, but it is alleged that DF refused.

-PF filed a supplemental complaint wherein she announced in

open court that she was willing to repurchase said property

for P860 plus expenses.

-However, on a certain date, DF executed a deed of sale for

P970 in favor of intervenors.

-In trial, when asked whether the land described in PFs

complaint was the object of partition among the co-owners,

PFs counsel objected on the ground that the best evidence

was the document of partition itself, asserting that under ROC,

agreement affecting real estate may not be proved except by

means of writing subscribed by the person against whom the

proof is offered.

-Court ruled that under Rules 73 and 123 of the ROC (statute

of frauds) and art. 1243 of Civil Code, parol evidence of

partition was inadmissible. It declared that the resale of theland by DF to intervenors were illegal and in bad faith. To this,

DF and intervenors appealed.

Issues:

[1.]W/N lower court erred in refusing to admit oral evidence

for proving a contract of partition among the heirs on the

ground that it was not admissible.

[2.]W/N appeal should be dismissed since the findings and

conclusions in the appealed decision were not assigned as

errors.

Held:[1.] Yes. There is a conflict of authority as to whether an

agreement of partition is such a contract as is required to be

in writing under the statute of frauds. The reason for the rule

that excludes partition from the operation of the SOF is that

partition is not a conveyance but simply a separation and

designation of that part of the land which belongs to each

tenant in common.

-the law has been uniformly interpreted to be applicable to

executory and not to completed or executed contracts.

Performance of the contract takes it out of the operation of

the statute. SOF does not declare the contracts therein

enumerated void and of no legal effect but only makes

ineffective the action for specific performance.

-On gen. principle, courts of equity have enforced oral

partition when it has been completely or partly performed.

-Sec. 1 of Rule 74 contains no express or clear declaration that

the public instrument therein required is to be constitutive of

a contract of partition or an inherent element of its

effectiveness as between the parties. The requirement that apartition be put in a public document and registered has for its

purpose the protection of the creditors and the heirs

themselves against tardy claims. Hence, the intrinsic validity

of the partition not executed with the prescribed formalities is

not affected when there are no creditors or the rights of the

creditors are not affected, as in this case.


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[2.] No. An unassigned error closely related to an error

properly assigned, or upon which the determination of the

question raised by the error properly assigned is dependent,

will be considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the

failure to assign it as error.-in this case, the evidence on parol partition tendered by DF

and intervenors was ruled out and the complain of this

exclusion as error. In this manner, the assignment of error

squarely meets and attacks the opinion and judgment of the

trial court. An analysis of the case will show that on the

validity of the alleged partition hangs the result of the entire

litigation and on the validity depends in turn the competence

of the excluded evidence.

TORRES v. TORRES (10 SCRA 185)

FACTS:

- PAZ E. Siguion Torres died intestate on December 18,

1959.

- ALBERTO S. Torres (petitioner), claiming to be one of the four

legitimate children of Paz, petitioned to be administrator of

the properties left by the decedent (aggregate value of about

P300,000.00). He also claimed he was not aware of any debt

left by the decedent.

- ALBERTOSpetition was opposed by CONCHITA Torres, oneof the heirs, on the ground that on January 27, 1960, the heirs

of the deceased (including petitioner) had already entered

into an extrajudicial partition and settlement of the estate,

pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 74.

- The extrajudicial deed of partition of the estate

contains the following provisions:

1. That they (ALBERTO, ANGEL, EDUARDO

and CONCHITA, all surnamed Torres) are

the only legitimate children who survive the

deceased Paz Siguion Vda. de Torres;

x x x x x x x x x3. That the said decedent died without

leaving any will and her only surviving heirs

are the aforementioned parties who are her

legitimate children;

4. That the deceased left no debts;

x x x x x x x x x

6. That pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of

the Rules of Court and in view of the

difficulty of making a physical division of the

above properties, the parties have agreed to

settle the aforementioned estate by

continuing the co-ownership on all the

above properties in the following

proportion:

ALBERTO Torres undivided interest

ANGEL Torres undivided interest

EDUARDO Torres undivided interest

CONCHITA Torres undivided interest

(Emphasis supplied.)- ALBERTO, while admitting that such extrajudicial partition

was signed by the heirs, contended that attempts at the actual

designation of their respective shares had failed thus needing

the court's intervention. He also claimed that some properties

of considerable value were not included in said extrajudicial

partition. In another pleading, he claimed that the decedent

had an outstanding debt of P50,000.


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- On July 21, 1961, the court, finding that an extrajudicial

settlement had already been entered into by the heirs,

dismissed ALBERTOSpetition.

ISSUE: Whether administration or a special proceedingfor the settlement of the estate is necessary.

RULING: No.

The claim of the decedents debts is unsubstantiated.

ALBERTO did not specify from whom and in what manner the

said debt was contracted. The bare allegation that "the estate

has an existing debt of P50,000.00 from third persons" cannot

be considered as concise statement to constitute a cause of

action.

If other properties are not included in the deed of

extrajudicial partition in the possession of one of the heirs, the

questions such as the titles and their partition if proven to

belong to the intestate can be properly and expeditiously

litigated in an ordinary action of partition and not in an

administration proceeding.

Thus, where the decedent left no debts and heirs or

legatees are all of age, as in this case,there is no necessity for

the institution of special proceedings and the appointment

of an administrator for the settlement of the estate, becausethe same can be effected either extra-judicially or through an

ordinary action for partition. If there is an actual necessity for

court intervention in view of the heirs' failure to reach an

agreement as to how the estate would be divided physically,

the heirs still have the remedy of an ordinary action for

partition under Rule 74.

ARCILLAS v. MONTEJO (26 SCRA 197)

FACTS:

1. 2 petitions were filed in relation to the LOT owned by

the decedent Arcillas.

2.

Petition #1 was filed by Geronimo (one of the heirs) inorder to cancel the TCT covering said LOT and the

issuance of a new TCT in the names of the heirs in the

corresponding portions alleged in the petition. This

petition was based on a claim that several other heirs

executed separate sales of their respective shares and

participation in said LOT to Vicente (one of the private

respondents).

3. Petition #2 was filed by the other children of the

deceased praying for issuance of letters of

administration in favor of PETITIONER preparatory to

the final settlement of the deceaseds estate.

4. PETITIONER opposed Petition #1 inasmuch as the

subject matter thereof was included in the estate of

the deceased for which a petition for administration

was awaiting resolution (Petition #2).

5. Geronimo, on the other hand, opposed Petition #2

arguing that inasmuch as the LOT was the only

property of the deceased, and that the deceased left

no debts, the petition for administration was improper.6. Court denied Petition #2 and instead, gave due course

to Petition #1.

7. PETITIONER filed for certiorari with mandamus and

preliminary injunction.


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ISSUES:

1. Whether the administration proceedings (Petition #2),

upon the averment that the estate left no debts and all

the heirs are of age, was properly dismissed

2.

Whether the cadastral action (Petition #1) was themore proper proceeding under the circumstances

RULING: The Special Proceeding (Petition #2) should be

reinstated.

1. No. Section 1, Rule 74 provides that if the decedent

left no will and no debts and the heirs and legatees are

all of age, the parties may, without securing letters of

administration, divide the estate among themselves by

means of a public instrument filed in the Register of

Deeds. In case of disagreement, they may do so in anordinary action of partition.

The aforementioned rule is not mandatory or

compulsory, as may be seen from the use of the word

may. Thus, the rule does not preclude the heirs from

instituting administration proceedings despite the fact

that the estate left no debts and that all the heirs are

of legal age.

2. No. Petition #2 was premised on Section 112 of Act

496, which authorizes a person in interest to ask the

court for any erasure, alteration, or amendment of a

certificate of title upon the ground that registered

interests of any description, whether vested,

contingent, expectant or inchoate have terminated

and ceased.

However, said relief can only be granted if

a. There is unanimity among the parties, or

b. There is no adverse claim or serious objection on

the part of any interested party

Absent the foregoing, the case becomes controversial

and should be threshed out in an ordinary case or in

the case where the incident properly belongs.

ERMAC v. MEDELO (64 SCRA 359)

Facts:

Spouses Ermac and Mariquit both died leaving a

parcel of land as the only property to be inherited by

heirs

MEDELO: grandson filed petition for summary

settlement of the estate.

ERMAC: moved for reconsideration of the order of

settlement claiming the land as belonging to him and

his wife.

Issue: W/N the approval of the project of partition was valid

despite the claim of ERMAC in a separate civil action?

Held:The policy of the law is to terminate proceedings for

the settlement of the estate of the deceased persons

with the least loss of time.

o Small estates: summary procedure dispensing

with appointment of administrator


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Not proper to delay the summary settlement of a

deceased person just because an heir or a third person

claims that certain properties do not belong to the

estate; properly ventilated in an independent action

and probate court should proceed to the distribution

of the estate (subject to the results of suit).

Appropriate step: proper annotation of lis pendens

CARREON v. AGCAOILI (1 SCRA 521)

Facts:

- During the marriage of Bonifacio Carreon and Celerina

Dauag the registered land subject of this case was

acquired. After the death of Carreon, his widow

Celerina executed an affidavit adjudicating to herself

alone the said land

- She declared she was the only heiress of her husband.

The OCT was cancelled and a TCT was issued in her

name.

- There was however annotated on her certificate a lien

to the effect that her title was subject to Section 4 of

Rule 74 of the Rules of Court (if within 2 years an heir

deprived of his share in the estate reappears such heir

may compel settlement)- Celerina mortgaged the property for 1,200 to PNB,

when her loan was due she sold the property for 3,000

to Agcaoili, thus the mortgage was paid and the land

transferred to herein respondent

- the children of Celerina with the deceased husband

filed a complaint against the spouses Agcaoili seeking

to have the deed of sale executed by their mother

declared as one of mortgage and to recover one half

pro-indiviso of the land described in the complaint,

they claimed that Agcaoili was in bad faith knowing

that Celerina was not the only heir of her husband, and

thus he was holding the land in trust for them- Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment upon

the plea that the main averments of the complaint

even if admitted do not constitute a cause of action

and supported their plea with certain documentary

evidence. The court ruled in favor of Agcaoili stating

the petitioners averments had no basis

Issue: Was Agcaoili a buyer in bad faith? Using Sec 4 Rule 74,

do the petitioners have a lien on the tit le?

Held: No to Both

Agcaoili is not expected to know Celerinas relatives even if he

is a townmate. There is no clear proof he knew of the

existence of petitioners.

The lien petitioners speak of is effective only for a period of

two years. From September 28, 1946, when a TCT was issued

to Celerina, to September 8, 1949 when the deed of sale in

favor of Agcaoili was issued and registered, more than twoyears had elapsed

The right to have such lien cancelled became vested on

appellee Agcaoili and that the same had become functus

oficio.

Also, there being no fraud in the transaction on the part of

Agcaoili, nor proof that he knew of any legal infirmity in the


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title of his vendor, he is not deemed to be holding the land in

trust for the children of Celerina Dauag

McMICKING v. SY CONBIENG (21 Phil 211)

FACTS:- When Margarita JOSE died, his estate was administered by

PALANCA with Dy CUNYAO and Mariano Lao SEMPCO as

sureties.

- When Mariano LAO SEMPCO died, his estate was

administered by Doroteo VELASCO, and Mariano VELASCO and

BARRETO were the sureties.

- When BARRETO died SY CONBIENG administered his estate.

- Along the way PALANCA absconded with about 4/5 of JOSEs

estate.

- The court then appointed MCMICKING who then tried toclaim on the surety LAO SEMPCO.

- But since LAO SEMPCOs estate cannot pay, MCMICKING

brought an action to claim against LAO SEMPCOs surety

BARRETO (whose estate is administered by SY CONBIENG).

- Trial court ruled in favor of SY CONBIENG and dismissed

MCMICKINGs claim. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether MCMICKING can claim from BARRETOs

estate.

HELD: No.

The court based its ruling on these:

SEC. 596. Settlement of intestate estates, without legal

proceedings, in certain cases. Whatever all the heirs of

a deceased person are of lawful age and legal capacity,

and their are no debts due from the intestate estate,

or all the debts have been paid by the heirs, the heirs

may, by a family council as shown under Spanish law,

or by agreement between themselves, duly executed

in writing, apportion and divide the estate amongthemselves, as they may see fit, without proceedings in

court.

SEC. 597. In such case distributees liable for debts. But

if it shall appear, at any time within two years after

such settlement and distribution of the estate, that

there are debts outstanding against the estate which

have not been paid, any creditor may compel the

settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner

hereinafter provided, unless his debt shall be paid,with interest; and the administrator appointed by the

court may recover the assets of the estate from those

who have received them, for the purpose of paying the

debts; and the real estate belonging to the deceased

shall remain charged with the liability to creditors for

the full period of two years after such distribution,

notwithstanding any transfers thereof that may have

been made.

We are of the opinion that the judgment must be affirmed.

We base our affirmance upon the ground that Doroteo

Velasco, for whom the deceased Pio de la Guardia Barretto

was surety, would not have been liable himself had this action

been commenced against him. If the principal is not liable

upon the obligation, the surety cannot be.


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- For the court ruled that VELASCO having performed his

original obligation partitioning the estate was from that point

on free from liability; and so it follows that his sureties were

also free.

- And that any new claim arising within the two yearsnecessitates the appointment of a new administrator and new

sureties. For the original sureties secured only one obligation

and not two.

- The court then explained that MCMICKING seemed to argue

that if the estate has any outstanding debts after partition

that the partition itself is invalid. It is not so.

In answer the court explained:as already seen, in order that it be a reason for such

appointment and administration, the claim must be presentedwithin two years [it was presented in 5] from the date of the

partition and distribution.

Summarizing, we have seen that lack of opportunity,

either by want of notice or otherwise, and the consequent

failure to present a claim before partition, is, under the

sections we are discussing, of no consequence whatever in so

far as the validity of the partition is concerned.

We have also seen that the fact that there were debts

outstanding and unpaid at the time the partition took place isof no importance so far as the validity of the partition is

concerned, leaving out account the question of fraud to which

we have already adverted and left undecided.

We have also seen that the fact such claim exists and is

valid and subsistent against the estate is of no consequence

whatever with respect to the right of its holder to require an

administration of the estate unless such claim is discovered

and presented within two years.

The fact that the claim in the case at bar was, during a

certain period, a contingent one is of no importance. The

sections under discussion make no distinction between claims.The creditor himself is not without duties. In the case

at bar it was five years after the petition before the alleged

creditor made any attempt whatsoever to "discover" or

present his claim. He knew of the death of OCAMPO very soon

after it occurred. He knew that it was among the possibilities

that OCAMPO'S estate might be called upon to respond for

the failure of PALANCA to perform his duty as administrator. It

was his duty to see to it that he would be protected in that

event. Nevertheless he permitted the estate of OCAMPO to be

partitioned and distributed without protest and without thepresentation of his contingent claim, and sat quiet and passive

for nearly five years thereafter knowing that it was very

probable that the property of the estate was being consumed,

incumbered, and transferred by the persons among whom it

had been distributed.

PERIERA v. CA (174 SCRA 154)

Facts:

Andres Periera died intestate, with no debts. He was survivedbe his wife of 10 months Victoria Periera who is a nurse in

London and his sister Rita Nagac. Rita instituted as special

proceeding for the issuance of letters if administration in her

favor pertaining to the estate of the deceased which is said to

include his death benefits from PAL, bank accounts in PNB and

PCIB and a 300 sq mt land in Las Pinas. Victoria filled a motion

to dismiss the petition alleging that there is no estate of the


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deceased for purposes of administration or that if there is an

estate letters of administration be issued in her favor as

surviving spouse. The trial court appointed Rita as

administrator which Victoria is now questioning.

Issue:

Whether a judicial administration proceeding is necessary

where there are no debts left by the decedent as in this case?

Held: NO

Ratio:

As a general rule, when a person dies leaving property, the

same should be judicially administered and the competent

court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the orderestablished in Sec 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will

or in case he left one should he failed to name an executor. An

exemption to this rule is established in Section 1 of Rule 74,

when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts

due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the

property without instituting the judicial administration or

applying for appointment of an administrator.

Section 1 of Rule 74 however does not preclude the heirs frominstituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has

no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good

reasons to an ordinary action for partition. Where partition is

possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be

burdened with an administration proceeding without good

and compelling reasons.

It has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without

leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of

age of not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial

administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for

the appointment of an administrator by the Court. It has beenuniformly held that in such case the judicial administration

and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and

unnecessary proceedings.

In this case, the only two surviving heirs are the spouse and

sister who are both or age. They admit that there are no

debts. The estate is also not substantial. What is apparent is

that these two heirs are not in good terms and that Rita wants

to administer the estate because she wants to take possession

of the properties, this is not a compelling reason which willnecessitate a judicial administration of the estate of the

deceased.

JEREZ v. NIETES (30 SCRA 905)

Facts:

In 1960 Nicolas Jalandoni died. A special proceeding for the

settlement of his estate was filed before the CFI of Iloilo, and

his widow, Lucrecia Jerez, was appointed as administratrix. In

1966, a project of partition and final accounting wassubmitted, and the respondent Judge Nietes approved the

same.

Lucilo Jalandoni, alleging that he is an acknowledged natural

child of the late Nicolas Jalandoni, and Victoria Jalandoni de

Gorriceta, alleging that she is an illegitimate daughter, sought

to be allowed to intervene on the ground that they were


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RULES 7576

FERNANDEZ v. DIMAGIBA (21 SCRA 428)

FACTS:

1) Ismaela Dimagiba (respondent) submitted petition for probateof purported will of Benedicta delos Reyes as the sole heir of

deceased. Later, heirs Dionisio Fernandez, et. al. (oppositors) filed

opposition to the probate on grounds of forgery, vices of consent,

laches, and revocation of the will on deeds of sale.

2) CFI found will genuine and properly executed but deferred

resolution on estoppel and revocation grounds until intrinsic

validity will be passed upon. Oppositors insisted that estoppel and

revocation issues be considered but CFI overruled claim until

opportune time. Later, CFI ruled that Benedictas will was

unrevoked by deeds of sale.

3) CA admitted will to probate and upheld finality for lack of

opportune appeal, that it was appealable independently of issue

of revocation, affirmed CFI.

ISSUES:

1) W/n decree of CFI allowing probate had become final for lack

of appeal?

2) W/n order overruling estoppel had become final?

3) w/n Benedictas will had been impliedly revoked by her deedsof sale?

HELD:

1) YES, CA correct, CFI decree allowing probate is final.

Finality of probate decree: A probate decree finally and

definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the

testator and proper execution and witnessing of his last will and

testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and

unenforceable or otherwise. As such, the probate order is final

and appealable, and it is so recognized by express provisions of

Sec. 1 of Rule 109 (see enumeration of 6 instances when appealmay be taken in specpro)

2) YES, CA correct, order overruling estoppel final. Estoppel

cannot be raised in probate proceedings: The presentation and

probate of a will are requirements of public policy, being primarily

designed to protect the testators expressed wishes , w/c are

entitled to respect as a consequence of the decedents ownership

and right of dispossession within legal limits. It would be a non

sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of

estoppel. W/n the order overruling the allegation of estoppel is

still appealable or not , the defense is patently meritorious.3) NO, revocation of will doubtful; CA correct, existence of any

change from original intent of testatrix Benedicta is rendered

doubtful by the circumstance that subsequent alienations made in

favor of legatee Dimagiba and she paid no consideration

whatsoever, making it more doubtful that in conveying property

to legatee, testatrix Benedicta merely intended to comply in

advance with her testament, rather than a departure therefrom.


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MERCADO v. SANTOS (66 SCRA 215)

FACTS:

Mercado filed in CFI Pampanga a petition for probate of

will of deceased wife Ines Basa. Without any opposition and upon

testimony of witness Gabino (attesting witness), admitted toprobate. THREE YEARS LATER, five invtervenors moved ex parteto

reopen the probate alleging lack of jurisdiction. DENIED because

of ex parte. Second filing of the motion to open the proceeding,

again denied.

SIXTEEN MONTHS AFTER THE PROBATE OF THE WILL,

intervenor Basa de Leon filed with Justice of Peace of San

Fernando, Pampanga a complaint against Mercado for falsification

or forgery of the will. Mercado was arrested. Complainant

withdrew complaint.

THREE MONTHS later, same intervenor charged Mercadofor same offense in Mexico, Pampanga. The complaint was

dismissed after investigation, at the instance of complainant due

to his poor health.

NINE MONTHS later, same charge against same person.

This time filed by fiscal of Pampanga in Justice of Peace Court of

Mexico. Case dismissed after investigation because will was

already probated.

Provincial Fiscal moved in CFI Pampanga for

reinvestigation. CFI Granted. FOURTH TIME, Mercado wasarrested.

Mercado filed a demurrer on ground of probate.

Overruled. Case proceeded to trial. He filed with CA an injunction.

CA issued injunction.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the probate of petitioners deceased wifes will is a

bar to prosecution of forgery. YES.

2. Whether petitioner was denied constitutional right to speedy

trial.YES.

HELD:

Several foreign decisions were cited. Can go either way. Others

saying that can be impugned on ground of fraud. Sec. 306 of Code

of Civil Procedure said that in an action or special proceeding, the

judgment or order is conclusive upon the title of the thing, the will

or administration or condition or relation of the person provided

that only be a prima facieevidence of the death of the testator

conclusive as to its DUE EXECUTION (Sec. 625). Sec. 625 was taken

almost bodily from Statutes of Vermont. Conclusive as to its due

execution against the whole world (in rem), reason whypublication is a prerequisite. Conclusive presumption that

judgment or order of a court when declared by this Code of Civil

Procedure are conclusive. State v. McGlynn (U.S. case). Although

in said case the information was filed by the State to set aside the

probate on forgery, we do not see difference in principle. ONLY A

SUBTLE DISTINCTION between setting aside a probate decree and

declaring probated will to be forgery. You would still disturb the

decree.

No fixed standard and conflict of authorities so the Courtchose the most consistent with statutory law. Here, forgery is

discovered after probate and prosecution before the prescription.

Code provides an adequate remedy to any party adversely

affected by probate application for relief within reasonable

time but no case exceeding SIX MONTHS after court judgment.


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Criminal action will not lie against forger of a will which

had been admitted to probate by a court of competent

jurisdiction.

SUMILANG v. RAMAGOSA (21 SCRA 1369)Facts:

Mariano Sumilang filed for the probate of alleged last will

and testament of Hilarion Ramagosa.

The petition was opposed by two sets of oppositors,

appellants herein, who questioned the due execution of

the document.

After petitioner presented evidence and rested his case,

oppositors moved for the dismissal of the petition on the

ground that decedent revoked his will by implication of

law six years before his death by selling the parcels of landdescribed therein to his brother.

On the other hand, petitioner moved to strike out

oppositors pleadings on the ground that the oppositors

have no interest in the probate of the will as they have no

relationship with the decedent within the fifth degree.

The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioner stating that

the allegations of the oppositors goes to the very intrinsic

value of the will and since the oppositors have no standing

to oppose the probate of the will as they are strangers,their pleadings are ordered stricken out from the record.

Held:

The petition below being for the probate of a will, the

court's area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity

thereof. The testator's testamentary capacity and the

compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities

prescribed by law are the only questions presented for the

resolution of the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic

validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will or the

legality of any devise or legacy is premature (Nuguid vs.

Nuguid)

To establish conclusively as against everyone and once forall, the facts that a will was executed with the formalities

required by law and that the testator was in a condition to

make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings . . . for

the probate of a will. The judgment in such proceedings

determines and can determine nothing more. (Alemany, et

al. vs. CFI of Manila)

True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal

of the petition for probate. Probate is one thing the

validity of the testamentary provisions is another.iThe first

decides the execution of the document and thetestamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates

to descent and distribution

The revocation invoked by the oppositors-appellants is not

an express one, but merely implied from subsequent acts

of the testatrix allegedly evidencing an abandonment of

the original intention to bequeath or devise the properties

concerned. As such, the revocation would not affect the

will itself, but merely the particular devise or legacy.

BALANAY v. MARTINEZ (64 SCRA 452)

Facts:


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Testator Leodegaria Julian (Julian) died at the age of 67. She was

survived by her husband and six children. In her will, she stated

that:

(a) That she was the owner of the southern half of 9

conjugal lots;(b)That she was the absolute owner of 2 parcels of land

which she inherited from her father;

(c)

That it was her desire that her properties should not be

divided among her heirs during her husbands lifetime and

that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of

her properties.

(d)That after her husbands death, that her paraphernal and

all conjugal lands be divided in the manner set forth in the

will.

In effect, Julian disposed of in her will her husbands conjugalassets.

Her son, Felix Balanay, Jr. (Balanay Jr.) filed a petition for probate

of the will. This was opposed by his father (Balanay Sr.) and

Avelina Antonio on the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity,

undue influence, and preterition. Balanay Sr. later withdrew this

opposition through a Conformation of Division and Renunciation

of Hereditary Rights wherein he waived and renounced his

hereditary rights in her estate in favor of their six children.

The probate of the will was further opposed by Atty. Montaa

(who purported to be a lawyer of Balanay Jr) and two others,

saying that the will was void because it effected a compromise on

future legitimes and that no notice to creditors were issued. The

probate court listened to them and converted the testate

proceeding into an intestate proceeding.

Issue:

1.

Whether it was correct to pass upon the intrinsic validity

of the will before ruling on its allowance or formal validity.

2.

Whether the probate court was correct in declaring thatthe will was void and in converting the testate proceeding

into an intestate proceeding.

3.

Whether it was correct to issue notice to creditors without

first appointing an executor or regular administrator.

Held:

1. YES. The probate court acted correctly in passing upon the

wills intrinsic validity even before its formal val idity has

been established. The probate of a will might become an

idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsicallyvoid. Where practical considerations demand that the

intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it

is probated, the court should meet the issue.

2.

NO. The will should have been upheld, considering that its

alleged defects have been cured by the husbands

conformity. The husbands conformity had the effect of

validating the will, without prejudice to the rights of

creditors and legitimes of compulsory heirs.

The rule is that the invalidity of one of severaldispositions contained in a will does not result in the

invalidity of the other dispositions if the first invalid

disposition had not been made. An interpretation that will

render a testamentary disposition operative takes

precedence over a construction that will nullify a provision

of the will.


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GEOFF

-DAVS

-WENG

-JAM

-LYRA

-WILL

GAN

-JENN

-JONEP

-CHAR

-DARWIN

-KAY

-KIT

S-ELAINE

-TOM

-ETHEL

-VIDA

-TRISH

3D (2008-2009)

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Thus, with respect to provision (a) above, the illegal

declaration does not nullify the will. It may be disregarded.

As to provision (c), it would at most be effective only from

the date of her death unless there are compelling reasons

for terminating the co-ownership.3. NO. A notice of creditors is not in order if only a special

administrator has been

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