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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 143483 January 31, 2002

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PASAYCITY, petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FORMER 3RD DIVISION) AND AMADA H. SOLANO, assistedby her husband ROMEO SOLANO, respondents.

BELLOSILLO ,J .:

This petition forcertiorariseeks to nullify two (2) Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 12November 1998 and 4 May 2000 giving due course to the petition for annulment of judgment filed by

private respondent Amada H. Solano on 3 February 1997 and denying petitioner's motion forreconsideration.

For more than three (3) decades (from 1952 to 1985) private respondent Amada Solano served asthe all-around personal domestic helper of the late Elizabeth Hankins, a widow and a Frenchnational. During Ms. Hankins' lifetime and most especially during the waning years of her life,respondent Solano was her faithful girl Friday and a constant companion since no close relative wasavailable to tend to her needs.

In recognition of Solano's faithful and dedicated service, Ms. Hankins executed in her favor two (2)deeds of donation involving two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 7807 and 7808 of theRegistry of Deeds. Private respondent alleged that she misplaced the deeds of donation and were

nowhere to be found.

While the deeds of donation were missing, the Republic filed a petition for the escheat of the estateof Elizabeth Hankins before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City.1During the proceedings, amotion for intervention was filed by Romeo Solano, spouse of private respondent, and oneGaudencio Regosa, but on 24 June 1987 the motion was denied by the trial court for the reason that"they miserably failed to show valid claim or right to the properties in question."2Since it wasestablished that there were no known heirs and persons entitled to the properties of decedentHankins, the lower court escheated the estate of the decedent in favor of petitioner Republic of thePhilippines.

By virtue of the decision of the trial court, the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City cancelled TCT Nos.7807 and 7808 and issued new ones, TCT Nos. 129551 and 129552, both in the name of Pasay

City.

In the meantime, private respondent claimed that she accidentally found the deeds of donation shehad been looking for a long time. In view of this development, respondent Amada Solano filed on 28January 1997 a petition before the Court of Appeals for the annulment of the lower court's decisionalleging, among other, that3-
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13.1. The deceased Elizabeth Hankins having donated the subject properties to thepetitioner in 1983 (for TCT No. 7807) and 1984 (for TCT No. 7808), these properties did notand could not form part of her estate when she died on September 20, 1985. Consequently,they could not validly be escheated to the Pasay City Government;

13.2. Even assuming arguendo that the properties could be subject of escheat proceedings,

the decision is still legally infirm for escheating the properties to an entity, the Pasay CityGovernment, which is not authorized by law to be the recipient thereof. The property shouldhave been escheated in favor of the Republic of the Philippines under Rule 91, Section 1 ofthe New Rules of Court x x x x

On 17 March 1997 the Office of the Solicitor General representing public respondents RTC and theRegister of Deeds (herein petitioner) filed an answer setting forth their affirmative defenses, to wit:(a) lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action; and, (b) the cause of action was barred by thestatute of limitations.

Finding no cogent reason to justify the dismissal of the petition for annulment, the Court of Appealsissued on 12 November 1998 the first of its assailed Resolutions giving due course to the petition for

annulment of judgment and setting the date for trial on the merits. In upholding the theory ofrespondent Solano, the Appeals Court ruled that -

Herein petitioner invokes lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter on the part of respondentRTC to entertain the escheat proceedings x x x because the parcels of land have beenearlier donated to herein petitioner in 1983 and 1984 prior to the death of said Hankins; andtherefore, respondent court could not have ordered the escheat of said properties in favor ofthe Republic of the Philippines, assign them to respondent Pasay City government, order thecancellation of the old titles in the name of Hankins and order the properties registered in thename of respondent Pasay City x x x x The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure specifically laiddown the grounds of annulment filed before this Court, to wit: extrinsic fraud and lack of

jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and this jurisdiction isdetermined by the allegations of the complaint. It is axiomatic that the averments of the

complaint determine the nature of the action and consequently the jurisdiction of the courts.Thus whether or not the properties in question are no longer part of the estate of thedeceased Hankins at the time of her death; and, whether or not the alleged donations arevalid are issues in the present petition for annulment which can be resolved only after a fullblown trial x x x x

It is for the same reason that respondents espousal of the statute of limitations againstherein petition for annulment cannot prosper at this stage of the proceedings. Indeed,Section 4, Rule 91 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly provides that a person entitled tothe estate must file his claim with the court a quo within five (5) years from the date of said

judgment. However, it is clear to this Court that herein petitioner is not claiming anything fromthe estate of the deceased at the time of her death on September 20, 1985; rather she is

claiming that the subject parcels of land should not have been included as part of the estateof the said decedent as she is the owner thereof by virtue of the deeds of donation in herfavor.

In effect, herein petitioner, who alleges to be in possession of the premises in question, isclaiming ownership of the properties in question and the consequent reconveyance thereof inher favor which cause of action prescribes ten (10) years after the issuance of title in favor ofrespondent Pasay City on August 7, 1990. Herein petition was seasonably filed on February3, 1997 under Article 1144, to wit:


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Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time theright of action accrues: (1) Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an obligation created bylaw; (3) Upon a judgment.

And Article 1456, to wit:

Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is,by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the personfrom whom the property comes.4

In its Resolution of 4 May 2000 the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed bypublic respondents Register of Deeds of Pasay City and the Presiding judge of the lower court andset the trial on the merits for June 15 and 16, 2000.

In its effort to nullify the Resolutions herein before mentioned, petitioner points out that the Court ofAppeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (a) indenying petitioner's affirmative defenses set forth in its answer and motion for reconsideration, andin setting the case for trial and reception of evidence; and, (b) in giving due course to private

respondent's petition for annulment of decision despite the palpable setting-in of the 5-year statute oflimitations within which to file claims before the court a quoset forth in Rule 91 of the Revised Rulesof Court and Art. 1014 of the Civil Code.

Petitioner argues that the lower court had jurisdiction when it escheated the properties in question infavor of the city government and the filing of a petition for annulment of judgment on the ground ofsubsequent discovery of the deeds of donation did not divest the lower court of its jurisdiction on thematter. It further contends that Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure only provides for two (2)grounds for the annulment of judgment, namely: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. As such thediscovery of the deeds of donation seven (7) years after the finality of the escheat proceedings is anextraneous matter which is clearly not an instance of extrinsic fraud nor a ground to oust the lowercourt of its jurisdiction.

Petitioner also insists that notwithstanding the execution of the deeds of donation in favor of privaterespondent, the 5-year statute of limitations within which to file claims before the court a quo as setforth in Rule 91 of the Revised Rules of Court has set in.

The present controversy revolves around the nature of the parcels of land purportedly donated toprivate respondent which will ultimately determine whether the lower court had jurisdiction to declarethe same escheated in favor of the state.

We rule for the petitioner. Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of succession or assignment, wherebythe state, by virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and claims the real or personal property of a personwho dies intestate leaving no heir. In the absence of a lawful owner, a property is claimed by thestate to forestall an open "invitation to self-service by the first comers."5Since escheat is one of the

incidents of sovereignty, the state may, and usually does, prescribe the conditions and limits the timewithin which a claim to such property may be made. The procedure by which the escheated propertymay be recovered is generally prescribed by statue, and a time limit is imposed within which suchaction must be brought.

In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file his claim "within five (5) years fromthe date of such judgment, such person shall have possession of and title to the same, or if sold, themunicipality or city shall be accountable to him for the proceeds, after deducting the estate; but aclaim not made shall be barred forever."6The 5-year period is not a device capriciously conjured by
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the state to defraud any claimant; on the contrary, it is decidedly prescribed to encourage would-beclaimants to be punctilious in asserting their claims, otherwise they may lose them forever in a final

judgment.

Incidentally, the question may be asked: Does herein private respondent, not being an heir butallegedly a donee, have the personality to be a claimant within the purview of Sec. 4, Rule 91, of the

Revised Rules of Court? In this regard, we agree with the Solicitor General that the caseofMunicipal Council of San Pedro,Laguna v. Colegio de San Jose, Inc.,7is applicable at leastinsofar as it concerns the Court's discussion on who is an "interested party" in an escheatproceeding -

In a special proceeding for escheat under sections 750 and 751 the petitioner is not the soleand exclusive interested party. Any person alleging to have a direct right or interest in theproperty sought to be escheated is likewise an interested party and may appear and opposethe petition for escheat. In the present case, the Colegio de San Jose, Inc. and Carlos Youngappeared alleging to have a material interest in the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan; theformer because it claims to be the exclusive owner of the hacienda, and the latter becausehe claims to be the lessee thereof under a contract legally entered with the former(underscoring supplied).

In the instant petition, the escheat judgment was handed down by the lower court as early as 27June 1989 but it was only on 28 January 1997, more or less seven (7) years after, when privaterespondent decided to contest the escheat judgment in the guise of a petition for annulment of

judgment before the Court of Appeals. Obviously, private respondent's belated assertion of her rightover the escheated properties militates against recovery.

A judgment in escheat proceedings when rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusiveagainst all persons with actual or constructive notice, but not against those who are not parties orprivies thereto. As held inHamilton v. Brown,8"a judgment of escheat was held conclusive uponpersons notified by advertisement to all persons interested. Absolute lack on the part of petitioners ofany dishonest intent to deprive the appellee of any right, or in any way injure him, constitutes due

process of law, proper notice having been observed." With the lapse of the 5-year period therefore,private respondent has irretrievably lost her right to claim and the supposed "discovery of the deedsof donation" is not enough justification to nullify the escheat judgment which has long attainedfinality.

In the mind of this Court the subject properties were owned by the decedent during the time that theescheat proceedings were being conducted and the lower court was not divested of its jurisdiction toescheat them in favor of Pasay City notwithstanding an allegation that they had been previouslydonated. We recall that a motion for intervention was earlier denied by the escheat court for failure toshow "valid claim or right to the properties in question."9Where a person comes into an escheatproceeding as a claimant, the burden is on such intervenor to establish his title to the property andhis right to intervene.A fortiori, the certificates of title covering the subject properties were in the

name of the decedent indicating that no transfer of ownership involving the disputed properties wasever made by the deceased during her lifetime. In the absence therefore of any clear and convincingproof showing that the subject lands had been conveyed by Hankins to private respondent Solano,the same still remained, at least before the escheat, part of the estate of the decedent and the lowercourt was right not to assume otherwise. The Court of Appeals therefore cannot perfunctorilypresuppose that the subject properties were no longer part of the decedent's estate at the time thelower court handed down its decision on the strength of a belated allegation that the same hadpreviously been disposed of by the owner. It is settled that courts decide only after a close scrutinyof every piece of evidence and analyze each case with deliberate precision and unadulterated
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thoroughness, the judgment not being diluted by speculations, conjectures and unsubstantiatedassertions.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 12November 1998 giving due course to the petition for annulment of judgment, and its Resolutiondated 4 May 2000 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are SET ASIDE. The decision of

the RTC-Br. 114, Pasay City, dated 27 June 1989, is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-23096 April 27, 1972

MARTIN NERY and LEONCIA L. DE LEON, petitioners,vs.ROSARIO, ALFREDO, MARIANO, PACIFICO, ONOFRE, TEOFILO, LOLOY and TRINIDAD, allsurnamed LORENZO, respondents.

G.R. No. L-23376 April 27, 1972

DIONISIO, PERFECTO, MARIA REBECCA, ASUNCION, MAURO, and, LOURDES, all surnamedLORENZO,petitioners,vs.MARTIN NERY and LEONCIA L. DE LEON, respondents.

Salonga, Ordonez, Yap, Sicat & Associates for petitioners.

Estanistao A. Fernandez for respondents.

FERNANDO,J .:p

The point to be resolved in these two petitions for the review of a decision of the respondent Court ofAppeals dated April 30, 1964 is the extent of the rights acquired by the vendees, the spouses MartinNery and Leoncia L. de Leon 1 arising from a sale of a parcel of land, four (4) hectares more or less,situated in Malaking Kahoy, Paraaque, Rizal. The vendor, Bienvenida de la Isla, was the widow ofthe deceased Leoncio Lorenzo and guardian of their children, Dionisio, Perfecto, Maria Rebeeca,

Asuncion, Mauro and Lourdes, 2 who thereafter challenged the validity of such a transaction. It wastheir contention that notwithstanding an order authorizing the sale from the probate court on June 2,1953, it could be, impugned as they were not informed of such a move. Moreover, the guardianshipproceeding, instituted on December 7, 1950, was heard without the two elder children, Dionisio andPerfecto Lorenzo being notified although they were then more than 14 years of age. The heirs of

Silvestra Ferrer, who originally owned one-fourth of the property in question,

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intervened in suchaction. In the lower court decision, they were adjudged co-owners of the aforesaid one-fourth portionof the property, the sale by the widow being considered null and void insofar as they wereconcerned. The rights of the Children of Leoncio Lorenzo and Bienvenida de la Isla to one-half of thethree-fourths appertaining to such spouses were likewise accorded recognition.

The matter was then elevated to the respondent Court of Appeals by the spouses Martin Nery andLeoncia L. de Leon. Respondent Court in its decision, now subject of this review, declared valid thedeed of sale executed by the mother Bienvenida de la Isla in favor of the spouses Nery and de Leon


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as to the whole three-fourths, without prejudice however to the children demanding from their mothertheir participation in the amount paid for the sale of such property. It thus ignored the grave

jurisdictional defects that attended the challenged orders, starting with the two elder children notbeing notified of the petition for guardianship, even if they were already above 14, as pointed out andstressed in their petition for review. There is need then for the exercise of the corrective power of thisCourt. The original decision of the lower court has much more to recommend it. Thereby, the rights

of the children are fully respected. With a restoration in full of what was decided by the lower court,there is a corresponding modification of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. So we decide.

The antecedents of the case were set forth in the appealed decision thus: "After hearing theevidence, the lower court handed down decision on June 24, 1961, finding that in the guardianshipproceedings, the court acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the minors who were not notifiedof the petition, at least 2 of them being over 14 years of age; that as the inventory submitted by theguardian stated that the minors had no real estate, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the realproperty of the minors and could not have validly authorized its sale, and the total absence of therequisite notice necessarily rendered the order of sale, ... null and void, and the defendant, Martin S.Nery, a lawyer, could not be considered a purchaser in good faith of the one-half portion of the landbelonging to the minors; ... that as Silvestra Ferrer, one of the sisters of Florentino Ferrer, did notsign the deed of sale ... upon her death in 1952, her 1/4 portion of the land passed to her nearestrelatives, the third-party plaintiffs who are children of her sister, Tomasa Ferrer, whose action hadnot prescribed 'because from the death of Silvestra Ferrer in 1952 up to the filing of the third-partycomplaint on September 3, 1958, barely six yeaxs had elapsed'; and that the remaining 3/4 of theland in question was the conjugal property of Leoncio Lorenzo and his wife, Bienvenida de la Isla,1/2 of which, upon the demise of Leoncio, corresponding to Bienvenida and the other half to theirchildren, the herein plaintiffs, in equal shares." 4

Why respondent Court reached the decision it did on appeal was explained this way: "It isunquestioned that the property in question formerly belonged to Florentino Ferrer and his threesisters, Agueda, Tomasa and Silvestra, and brother, Meliton. When, after the death of Florentino,that is, on December 6, 1943, the document denominated 'Bilihan Ganap Nang Lupang-Bukid', ...was executed in favor of Leoncio F. Lorenzo, one of the children of Agueda and married to

Bienvenida de la Isla, by said Agueda, Tomasa and the children of Meliton, already deceased, saidLeoncio merely acquired the participation of said sellers, equivalent to 3/4 undivided part of saidland, and became a co-owner to that extent with Silvestra who did not execute said document and,therefore,did not sell her 1/4 undivided portion of the said land, which 1/4 undivided portion passed,upon her demise in 1952, to her nearest relatives who are the third-party plaintiffs Rosario, Alfredo,Mariano, Pacifica, Onofre, Teofilo, Loloy and Trinidad all surnamed Lorenzo, the children of herdeceased sister, Tomasa. Bienvenida de la Isla, then the wife of said Leoncio F. Lorenzo, knew ofthis purchase made by her deceased husband, and she had no right to mortgage the whole landwhich, for taxation purposes was declared in her husband's name, without the consent ofaforenamed successors-in-interest of Silvestra Ferrer, much less sell the same afterwards to thedefendant spouses, Martin S. Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon, even if authorized by the guardianshipcourt, said authority having been granted upon her misrepresentation, contained in her petition ofMay 26, 1953, that her minor children, the plaintiff's herein, were the owners in common of 1/2

portion of the land in question, the other 1/2 pertaining to her. However, inasmuch as the said minorplaintiffs were really the owners in common of 1/2 of 3/4 undivided part of the said land, and theother 1/2, to their mother and guardian, the orders of the guardianship court authorizing the guardianto sell the real property of the minors, and approving the deed of sale executed in accordance withsaid authority must be construed as referring to the correct real property of the said minors." 5

Hence its dispositive portion provided as follows: "[Wherefore], the appealed judgment is herebymodified by declaring that the deed of sale ..., executed by Bienvenida de la Isla in favor of thedefendants valid only insofar as the undivided 3/4 portion of the land in question is concerned, as to


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which portion, the defendants are declared owners, and that the third-party plaintiffs, Rosario,Alfredo, Mariano, Pacifica, Onofre, Teofilo, Loloy and Trinidad, all surnamed Lorenzo, are declaredowners in common of the remaining undivided 1/4 portion of the said land. In all other respects, theappealed judgment is hereby affirmed. No Costs." 6

The spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon and the children of the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo

and the vendor, Bienvenida de la Isla, not being satisfied with the above decision instituted thepetitions for review. As noted at the outset, the failure of respondent Court of Appeals to give dueweight to the grave jurisdictional defect that tainted the guardianship proceeding resulted in its

judgment suffering the corrosion of substantial legal error. The rights of the children of LeoncioLorenzo as upheld by the lower court must, to repeat, be maintained. In that sense, the decision ofthe respondent Court of Appeals is subject to modification. Insofar however as it affirmed the lowercourt decision sustaining the claim of the heirs of Silvestra Ferrer, 7 it is free from any infirmity.

1. What is indisputable in the light of the controlling legal doctrines is that it was the lower court andnot the respondent Court of Appeals that yielded obeisance to the applicable procedural rule. It isworded thus: "When a petition for the appointment of a general guardian is filed, the court shall fix atime and place for hearing the same, and shall cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to thepersons mentioned in the petition residing in the province, including the minor if above 14 years ofage or the incompetent himself, and may direct other general or special notice thereof to begiven." 8 The late Chief Justice Moran was quite explicit as to its jurisdictional character. These arehis words: "Service of the notice upon the minor if above 14 years of age or upon the incompetent, is

jurisdictional. Without such notice, the court acquires no jurisdiction to appoint a guardian." 9

The case cited by him in support of such view is Yangco v. Court of First Instance, 10 a 1915decision. As was therein made clear: "There is no need for interpretation or construction of the wordin the case before us. Its meaning is so clear that interpretation and construction are unnecessary.Our simple duty is to leave untouched the meaning with which the English language has endowedthe word; and that is the meaning which the ordinary reader would accord to it on reading asentence in which it was found. Where language is plain, subtle refinements which tinge words so asto give them the color of a particular judicial theory are not only unnecessary but decidedly harmful.

That which has caused so much confusion in the law, which has made it so difficult for the public tounderstand and know what the law is with respect to a given matter, is in considerable measure theunwarranted interference by judicial tribunals with the English language as found in statutes andcontracts, cutting out words here and inserting them there, making them fit personal ideas of whatthe legislature ought to have done or what parties should have agreed upon, giving them meaningswhich they do not ordinarily have, cutting, trimming, fitting, changing and coloring until lawyersthemselves are unable to advise their clients as to the meaning of a given statute or contract until ithas been submitted to some court for its 'interpretation and construction.' " 11

Respondent Court of Appeals cannot therefore be sustained in its assumption that the probate courtcould have authorized the sale in question. The jurisdictional infirmity was too patent to beovercome. It was the lower court that acted correctly. There is the more reason for deciding as wedo considering that the rights of minors are involved. It is a distinctive feature of our law, one that isquite commendable, that whenever their welfare may be affected, its solicitude is made manifest.The rights of young are not to be ignored. Precisely their stage of immaturity calls for everyprocedural principle being observed before their interest in property to which they have a claim couldbe adversely affected. It does not matter that their guardian is their mother. As far back as 1811,inSalunga v. Evangelista, 12 Chief Justice Arellano took note that even a mother could have an"interest opposed to that of her children." 13 That may not have been the precise situation in thiscase, but certainly from the facts as found by the Court of Appeals, the Lorenzo children would havebeen better protected if they were notified as is required by law. If there is any occasion then whythere should be a strict insistence on rule having the impress of a jurisdictional requirement, this is it.


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Moreover, where minors are involved, the State acts asparens patriae. To it is cast the duty ofprotecting the rights of persons or individual who because of age or incapacity are in an unfavorableposition, vis-a-vis other parties. Unable as they are to take due care of what concerns them, theyhave the political community to look after their welfare. This obligation the state must live up to. Itcannot be recreant to such a trust. As was set forth in an opinion of the United States SupremeCourt: "This prerogative ofparens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether

that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrarypowers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the peopleand the destruction of their liberties. On the contrary, it is a most beneficent function, and oftennecessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those whocannot protect themselves." 14

2. Much less could the decision arrived at both by the lower court and respondent Court of Appealsas to the heirs of Silvestra Ferrer15 being entitled toone-fourth of the property in question be set aside. At no time had the deceased Leoncio Lorenzoever denied that he was holding such property in the capacity of trustee for them. At the time thenthat the settlement of his estate was pending in the probate court, his widow, Bienvenida de la Isla,the vendor, could not assert any other right, except that traceable to her late husband. RespondentCourt of Appeals did note that petitioner Martin S. Nery is a lawyer. As a member of the bar, hecould not have been unaware that his vendor could not sell to him more than she rightfully coulddispose of. It is much too late in the day to depart from the well-settled principle as to a trustee beingincapable of acquiring interest opposed to that of his principal. So it was announced in Severino v.Severino. 16 That is in conformity with an overmastering requirement of equity and conscience. Heshould thus be held to the strictest degree of acccountability. The law would lay itself open to well-deserved criticism if a principle other than the above were followed. The Nery spouses ought to beaware that it would be unthinkable to deny its authoritative force whenever called for.

The spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon would demonstrate its inapplicability by the twoprincipal errors assigned, namely, that Silvestra Ferrer did sell her share of the property as far backas 1943 and that even if it were not so, the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo and thereafter his widow,Bienvenida de la Isla did assert rights of ownership therein. It is obvious that on the face of such

alleged errors that they are essentially factual. We are thus precluded from inquiring into theirveracity as on such a matter what was decided by respondent Court of Appeals is binding on us.Moreover, as to the alleged prescription, the issue was resolved satisfactorily by the lower court inthis fashion: "The action of said children of Tomasa Ferrer has not as yet prescribed because fromthe death of Silvestra Ferrer in 1952 up to the filing of the third-party complaint on September 3,1958, barely six years had elapsed. Moreover, there is no clear and satisfactory evidence thatLeoncio Lorenzo and his successors-in-interest had been in continuous, adverse, and openpossession, and under claim of ownership, of the one-fourth portion corresponding to SilvestraFerrer as to acquire same by acquisitive prescription." 17Consequently, it was appropriate for theCourt of Appeals to affirm the judgment of the lower court insofar as it recognized the rights of theheir of Silvestra Ferrer to one-fourth of the land sold.

WHEREFORE, premises considered with the modification as above set forth that Dionisio, Perfecto,Maria Rebecca, Asuncion, Mauro and Lourdes, all surnamed Lorenzo, children of the deceasedLeoncio Lorenzo and Bienvenida de la Isla are adjudged co-owners to the extent of one-half of thethree-fourths of the property in question, as was decreed by the lower court, the appealed decisionof the Court of Appeals is affirmed. With costs against Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon.

Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio,JJ., concur.


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Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 151243 April 30, 2008

LOLITA R. ALAMAYRI, petitioner,vs.

ROMMEL, ELMER, ERWIN, ROILER and AMANDA, all surnamed PABALE, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO,J .:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed bypetitioner Lolita R. Alamayri (Alamayri) seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision,2dated10 April 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133; as well as the Resolution ,3dated19 December 2001 of the same court denying reconsideration of its aforementioned Decision. TheCourt of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, upheld the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated 20February 1984, executed by Nelly S. Nave (Nave) in favor of siblings Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roiler

and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale (the Pabale siblings) over a piece of land (subject property) inCalamba, Laguna, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-3317 (27604); and, thus,reversed and set aside the Decision,4dated 2 December 1997, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofPasay City, Branch 119 in Civil Case No. 675-84-C.5The 2 December 1997 Decision of the RTCdeclared null and void the two sales agreements involving the subject property entered into by Navewith different parties, namely, Sesinando M. Fernando (Fernando) and the Pabale siblings; andordered the reconveyance of the subject property to Alamayri, as Naves successor-in-interest.

There is no controversy as to the facts that gave rise to the present Petition, determined by the Courtof Appeals to be as follows:

This is a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages filed by Sesinando M. Fernando,

representing S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation [Fernando] on February 6, 1984 before theRegional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna presided over by Judge Salvador P. de Guzman,Jr., docketed as Civil Case No. 675-84-C against Nelly S. Nave [Nave], owner of a parcel ofland located in Calamba, Laguna covered by TCT No. T-3317 (27604). [Fernando] allegedthat on January 3, 1984, a handwritten "Kasunduan Sa Pagbibilihan" (Contract to Sell) wasentered into by and between him and [Nave] involving said parcel of land. However, [Nave]reneged on their agreement when the latter refused to accept the partial down payment hetendered to her as previously agreed because she did not want to sell her property to himanymore. [Fernando] prayed that after trial on the merits, [Nave] be ordered to execute thecorresponding Deed of Sale in his favor, and to pay attorneys fees, litigation expenses anddamages.

[Nave] filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that she could not be ordered to execute the

corresponding Deed of Sale in favor of [Fernando] based on the following grounds: (1) shewas not fully apprised of the nature of the piece of paper [Fernando] handed to her for hersignature on January 3, 1984. When she was informed that it was for the sale of her propertyin Calamba, Laguna covered by TCT No. T-3317 (27604), she immediately returned to[Fernando] the said piece of paper and at the same time repudiating the same. Herrepudiation was further bolstered by the fact that when [Fernando] tendered the partial downpayment to her, she refused to receive the same; and (2) she already sold the property ingood faith to Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roller and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale [the Pabalesiblings] on February 20, 1984 after the complaint was filed against her but before she
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received a copy thereof. Moreover, she alleged that [Fernando] has no cause of actionagainst her as he is suing for and in behalf of S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation who is not aparty to the alleged Contract to Sell. Even assuming that said entity is the real party ininterest, still, [Fernando] cannot sue in representation of the corporation there being noevidence to show that he was duly authorized to do so.

Subsequently, [the Pabale siblings] filed a Motion to Intervene alleging that they are now theland owners of the subject property. Thus, the complaint was amended to include [thePabale siblings] as party defendants. In an Order dated April 24, 1984, the trial court denied[Naves] Motion to Dismiss prompting her to file a Manifestation and Motion stating that shewas adopting the allegations in her Motion to D ismiss in answer to [Fernandos] amendedcomplaint.

Thereafter, [Nave] filed a Motion to Admit her Amended Answer with Counterclaim andCross-claim praying that her husband, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo be impleaded as her co-defendant, and including as her defense undue influence and fraud by reason of the fact thatshe was made to appear as widow when in fact she was very much married at the time ofthe transaction in issue. Despite the opposition of [Fernando] and [the Pabale siblings], thetrial court admitted the aforesaid Amended Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-claim.

Still unsatisfied with her defense, [Nave] and Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo filed a Motion toAdmit Second Amended Answer and Amended Reply and Cross-claim against [the Pabalesiblings], this time including the fact of her incapacity to contract for being mentally deficientbased on the psychological evaluation report conducted on December 2, 1985 by Dra.Virginia P. Panlasigui, M. A., a clinical psychologist. Finding the motion unmeritorious, thesame was denied by the court a quo.

[Nave] filed a motion for reconsideration thereof asseverating that in Criminal Case No.1308-85-C entitled "People vs. Nelly S. Nave" she raised therein as a defense her mentaldeficiency. This being a decisive factor to determine once and for all whether the contractentered into by [Nave] with respect to the subject property is null and void, the Second

Amended Answer and Amended Reply and Cross-claim against [the Pabale siblings] shouldbe admitted.

Before the motion for reconsideration could be acted upon, the proceedings in this case wassuspended sometime in 1987 in view of the filing of a Petition for Guardianship of [Nave] withthe Regional Trial Court, Branch 36 of Calamba, Laguna, docketed as SP No. 146-86-C with

Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo as the petitioner. On June 22, 1988, a Decision was rendered inthe said guardianship proceedings, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"Under the circumstances, specially since Nelly S. Nave who now resides with theBrosas spouses has categorically refused to be examined again at the NationalMental Hospital, the Court is constrained to accept the Neuro-Psychiatric Evaluation

report dated April 14, 1986 submitted by Dra. Nona Jean Alviso-Ramos and thesupporting report dated April 20, 1987 submitted by Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, both ofthe National Mental Hospital and hereby finds Nelly S. Nave an incompetent withinthe purview of Rule 92 of the Revised Rules of Court, a person who, by reason ofage, disease, weak mind and deteriorating mental processes cannot without outsideaid take care of herself and manage her properties, becoming thereby an easy preyfor deceit and exploitation, said condition having become severe since the year 1980.She and her estate are hereby placed under guardianship. Atty. Leonardo C. Paneris hereby appointed as her regular guardian without need of bond, until further orders


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from this Court. Upon his taking his oath of office as regular guardian, Atty. Paner isordered to participate actively in the pending cases of Nelly S. Nave with the end inview of protecting her interests from the prejudicial sales of her real properties, fromthe overpayment in the foreclosure made by Ms. Gilda Mendoza-Ong, and inrecovering her lost jewelries and monies and other personal effects.

SO ORDERED."

Both [Fernando] and [the Pabale siblings] did not appeal therefrom, while the appealinterposed by spouses Juliano and Evangelina Brosas was dismissed by this Court for failureto pay the required docketing fees within the reglementary period.

In the meantime, [Nave] died on December 9, 1992. On September 20, 1993, Atty. VedastoGesmundo, [Naves] sole heir, she being an orphan and childless, executed an Affidavit ofSelf-Adjudication pertaining to his inherited properties from [Nave].

On account of such development, a motion for the dismissal of the instant case and for theissuance of a writ of execution of the Decision dated June 22, 1988 in SP No. 146-86-C

(petition for guardianship) was filed by Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo on February 14, 1996 withthe court a quo. [The Pabale siblings] filed their Opposition to the motion on grounds that (1)they were not made a party to the guardianship proceedings and thus cannot be bound bythe Decision therein; and (2) that the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by thelate [Nave] in their favor was never raised in the guardianship case.

The case was then set for an annual conference. On January 9, 1997, Atty. VedastoGesmundo filed a motion seeking the courts permission for his substitution for the latedefendant Nelly in the instant case. Not long after the parties submitted their respective pre-trial briefs, a motion for substitution was filed by Lolita R. Alamayre (sic) [Alamayri] allegingthat since the subject property was sold to her by Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo as evidenced bya Deed of Absolute Sale, she should be substituted in his stead. In refutation, Atty. VedastoGesmundo filed a Manifestation stating that what he executed is a Deed of Donation and not

a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of [Alamayri] and that the same was already revoked by himon March 5, 1997. Thus, the motion for substitution should be denied.

On July 29, 1997, the court a quo issued an Order declaring that it cannot make a ruling asto the conflicting claims of [Alamayri] and Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo. After the case was heardon the merits, the trial court rendered its Decision on December 2, 1997, the dispositiveportion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Declaring the handwritten Contract to Sell dated January 3, 1984 executed byNelly S. Nave and Sesinando Fernando null and void and of no force and effect;

2. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 20, 1984 executed by NellyS. Nave in favor of the [Pabale siblings] similarly null and void and of no force andeffect;

3. Recognizing Ms. Lolita P. [Alamayri] as the owner of the property covered by TCTNo. 111249 of the land records of Calamba, Laguna;


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4. Ordering the [Pabale siblings] to execute a transfer of title over the property infavor of Ms. Lolita P. [Alamayri] in the concept of reconveyance because the sale intheir favor has been declared null and void;

5. Ordering the [Pabale siblings] to surrender possession over the property to Ms.[Alamayri] and to account for its income from the time they took over possession to

the time the same is turned over to Ms. Lolita [Alamayri], and thereafter pay the saidincome to the latter;

6. Ordering [Fernando] and the [Pabale siblings], jointly and severally, to pay Ms.[Alamayri]:

a. attorneys fees in the sum of P30,000.00; and

b. the costs.6

S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation, still represented by Fernando, filed an appeal with the Court ofAppeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, solely to question the portion of the 2 December 1997

Decision of the RTC ordering him and the Pabale siblings to jointly and severally pay Alamayri theamount of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees.

The Pabale siblings intervened as appellants in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133 averring that the RTC erredin declaring in its 2 December 1997 Decision that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 20 February1984 executed by Nave in their favor was null and void on the ground that Nave was foundincompetent since the year 1980.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 10 April 2001, granted the appeals of S.M. FernandoRealty Corporation and the Pabale siblings. It ruled thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal filed by S. M. Fernando Realty Corporation,

represented by its President, Sesinando M. Fernando as well as the appeal interposed byRommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roller and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale, are hereby GRANTED.The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 119 in Civil Case No. 675-84-C is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one rendered upholding the VALIDITYof the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 20, 1984.

No pronouncements as to costs.7

Alamayri sought reconsideration of the afore-quoted Decision of the appellate court, invoking theDecision,8dated 22 June 1988, of the RTC in the guardianship proceedings, docketed as SP.PROC. No. 146-86-C, which found Nave incompetent, her condition becoming severe since 1980;and thus appointed Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her guardian. Said Decision already became finaland executory when no one appealed therefrom. Alamayri argued that since Nave was already

judicially determined to be an incompetent since 1980, then all contracts she subsequently enteredinto should be declared null and void, including the Deed of Sale, dated 20 February 1984, whichshe executed over the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings.

According to Alamayri, the Pabale siblings should be bound by the findings of the RTC in its 22 June1988 Decision in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, having participated in the said guardianship proceedingsthrough their father Jose Pabale. She pointed out that the RTC explicitly named in its orders JosePabale as among those present during the hearings held on 30 October 1987 and 19 November
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1987 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C. Alamayri thus filed on 21 November 2001 a Motion to ScheduleHearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence so she could mark and submit as evidence certain documentsto establish that the Pabale siblings are indeed the children of Jose Pabale.

Atty. Gesmundo, Naves surviving spouse, likewise filed his own Motion for Reconsideration of the10 April 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, asserting Naves

incompetence since 1980 as found by the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, and his right to thesubject property as owner upon Naves death in accordance with the laws of succession. It must beremembered that Atty. Gesmundo disputed before the RTC the supposed transfer of his rights to thesubject property to Alamayri, but the court a quo refrained from ruling thereon.

In a Resolution, dated 19 December 2001, the Court of Appeals denied for lack of merit the Motionsfor Reconsideration of Alamayri and Atty. Gesmundo.

Hence, Alamayri comes before this Court via the present Petition for Review on CertiorariunderRule 45 of the Rules of Court, with the following assignment of errors:

I

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FINDING THAT NELLY S.NAVE WAS INCOMPETENT IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 146-86-C ON JUNE 22, 1988CANNOT RETROACT TO AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF THE DEED OF SALE SHEEXECUTED ON FEBRUARY 20, 1984 IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS PABALES.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECISION IN SPECIALPROCEEDING NO. 146-86-C DATED JUNE 22, 1988 IS NOT BINDING ONRESPONDENTS PABALES.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION TO SCHEDULEHEARING TO MARK DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS IN EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THEIDENTITY OF JOSE PABALE AS THE FATHER OF RESPONDENTS PABALES.9

It is Alamayris position that given the final and executory Decision, dated 22 June 1988, of the RTCin SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C finding Nave incompetent since 1980, then the same fact may no longerbe re-litigated in Civil Case No. 675-84-C, based on the doctrine ofres judicata, more particularly,the rule on conclusiveness of judgment.

This Court is not persuaded.

Res judicata literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing ormatter settled by judgment." Res judicata lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decreerendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon anymatter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all otheractions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points andmatters in issue in the first suit.10
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It is espoused in the Rules of Court, under paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 47, Rule 39, whichread:

SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final orderrendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or finalorder, may be as follows:

x x x x

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudgedor as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive betweenthe parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of theaction or special proceeding, litigating the same thing and under the same title and in thesame capacity; and

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only isdeemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon itsface to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or

necessary thereto.

The doctrine ofres judicata thus lays down two main rules which may be stated as follows: (1) Thejudgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the parties and theirprivies to the litigation and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause ofaction either before the same or any other tribunal; and (2) Any right, fact, or matter in issue directlyadjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court inwhich a judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment thereinand cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claims ordemands, purposes, or subject matters of the two suits are the same. These two main rules markthe distinction between the principles governing the two typical cases in which a judgment mayoperate as evidence.11In speaking of these cases, the first general rule above stated, and whichcorresponds to the afore-quoted paragraph (b) of Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, is

referred to as "bar by former judgment"; while the second general rule, which is embodied inparagraph (c) of the same section and rule, is known as "conclusiveness of judgment."

The Resolution of this Court in Calalang v. Register of Deeds provides the following enlighteningdiscourse on conclusiveness of judgment:

The doctrine res judicata actually embraces two different concepts: (1) bar by formerjudgment and (b) conclusiveness of judgment.

The second concept conclusiveness of judgment states that a fact or question whichwas in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a courtof competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties

to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated inany future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court ofconcurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgmentremains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in oneaction can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same partiesor their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point or question is inissue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of thatparticular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies willbe final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and
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adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity ofcause of action is not required but merely identity of issues.

Justice Feliciano, in Smith Bell & Company (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (197 SCRA201, 210 [1991]), reiterated Lopez vs. Reyes (76 SCRA 179 [1977]) in regard to thedistinction between bar by former judgment which bars the prosecution of a second action

upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action, and conclusiveness of judgment whichbars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same partieson a different claim or cause of action.

The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions which werein issue and adjudicated in former action are commonly applied to all mattersessentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation. Thus, it extends toquestions necessarily implied in the final judgment, although no specific finding mayhave been made in reference thereto and although such matters were directlyreferred to in the pleadings and were not actually or formally presented. Under thisrule, if the record of the former trial shows that the judgment could not have beenrendered without deciding the particular matter, it will be considered as having settledthat matter as to all future actions between the parties and if a judgment necessarilypresupposes certain premises, they are as conclusive as the judgment itself.12

Another case, Oropeza Marketing Corporation v. Allied Banking Corporation, further differentiatedbetween the two rules ofres judicata,as follows:

There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the judgment wasrendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties,subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first caseconstitutes an absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree ofthe court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties,as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same causeof action before the same or other tribunal.

But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity ofcauses of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually anddirectly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This isthe concept ofres judicata known as"conclusiveness of judgment." Stated differently, anyright, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determinationof an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits isconclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between theparties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of thetwo actions is the same.13

In sum, conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation in a second case of a fact or question

already settled in a previous case. The second case, however, may still proceed provided that it willno longer touch on the same fact or question adjudged in the first case. Conclusiveness of judgmentrequires only the identity of issues and parties, but not of causes of action.

Contrary to Alamayris assertion, conclusiveness of judgment has no application to the instantPetition since there is no identity of parties and issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and CivilCase No. 675-84-C.

No identity of parties
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SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was a petition filed with the RTC by Atty. Gesmundo for the appointmentof a guardian over the person and estate of his late wife Nave alleging her incompetence.

A guardian may be appointed by the RTC over the person and estate of a minor or an incompetent,the latter being described as a person "suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who arehospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of

unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, butby reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, takecare of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit andexploitation."14

Rule 93 of the Rules of Court governs the proceedings for the appointment of a guardian, to wit:

Rule 93

APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS

SECTION 1.Who may petition for appointment of guardian for resident. Any relative,

friend, or other person on behalf of a resident minor or incompetent who has no parent orlawful guardian, or the minor himself if fourteen years of age or over, may petition the courthaving jurisdiction for the appointment of a general guardian for the person or estate, or both,of such minor or incompetent. An officer of the Federal Administration of the United States inthe Philippines may also file a petition in favor of a ward thereof, and the Director of Health,in favor of an insane person who should be hospitalized, or in favor of an isolated leper.

SEC. 2.Contents of petition. A petition for the appointment of a general guardian mustshow, so far as known to the petitioner:

(a) The jurisdictional facts;

(b) The minority or incompetency rendering the appointment necessary orconvenient;

(c) The names, ages, and residences of the relatives of the minor or incompetent,and of the persons having him in their care;

(d) The probable value and character of his estate;

(e) The name of the person for whom letters of guardianship are prayed.

The petition shall be verified; but no defect in the petition or verification shall render void theissuance of letters of guardianship.

SEC. 3.Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof. When a petition for the appointmentof a general guardian is filed, the court shall fix a time and place for hearing the same, andshall cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons mentioned in the petitionresiding in the province, including the minor if above 14 years of age or the incompetenthimself, and may direct other general or special notice thereof to be given.

SEC. 4.Opposition to petition. Any interested person may, by filing a written opposition,contest the petition on the ground of majority of the alleged minor, competency of the alleged
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incompetent, or the unsuitability of the person for whom letters are prayed, and may praythat the petition be dismissed, or that letters of guardianship issue to himself, or to anysuitable person named in the opposition.

SEC. 5.Hearing and order for letters to issue. At the hearing of the petition the allegedincompetent must be present if able to attend, and it must be shown that the required notice

has been given. Thereupon the court shall hear the evidence of the parties in support of theirrespective allegations, and, if the person in question is a minor or incompetent it shallappoint a suitable guardian of his person or estate, or both, with the powers and dutieshereinafter specified.

x x x x

SEC. 8.Service of judgment. Final orders or judgments under this rule shall be servedupon the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the minor or incompetent personresides or where his property or part thereof is situated.

A petition for appointment of a guardian is a special proceeding, without the usual parties, i.e.,

petitioner versus respondent, in an ordinary civil case. Accordingly, SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C bearsthe title: In re: Guardianship of Nelly S. Nave for Incompetency, Verdasto Gesmundo y Banayo,

petitioner, with no named respondent/s.

Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 93 of the Rules of Court, though, require that the petition contain thenames, ages, and residences of relatives of the supposed minor or incompetent and those havinghim in their care, so that those residing within the same province as the minor or incompetent can benotified of the time and place of the hearing on the petition.

The objectives of an RTC hearing a petition for appointment of a guardian under Rule 93 of theRules of Court is to determine, first, whether a person is indeed a minor or an incompetent who hasno capacity to care for himself and/or his properties; and, second, who is most qualified to beappointed as his guardian. The rules reasonably assume that the people who best could help thetrial court settle such issues would be those who are closest to and most familiar with the supposedminor or incompetent, namely, his relatives living within the same province and/or the persons caringfor him.

It is significant to note that the rules do not necessitate that creditors of the minor or incompetent belikewise identified and notified. The reason is simple: because their presence is not essential to theproceedings for appointment of a guardian. It is almost a given, and understandably so, that they willonly insist that the supposed minor or incompetent is actually capacitated to enter into contracts, soas to preserve the validity of said contracts and keep the supposed minor or incompetent obligatedto comply therewith.

Hence, it cannot be presumed that the Pabale siblings were given notice and actually took part in

SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C. They are not Naves relatives, nor are they the ones caring for her.Although the rules allow the RTC to direct the giving of other general or special notices of thehearings on the petition for appointment of a guardian, it was not established that the RTC actuallydid so in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C.

Alamayris allegation that the Pabale siblings participated in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C rests on twoOrders, dated 30 October 198715and 19 November 1987,16issued by the RTC in SP. PROC. No.146-86-C, expressly mentioning the presence of a Jose Pabale, who was supposedly the father ofthe Pabale siblings, during the hearings held on the same dates. However, the said Orders by
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themselves cannot confirm that Jose Pabale was indeed the father of the Pabale siblings and that hewas authorized by his children to appear in the said hearings on their behalf.

Alamayri decries that she was not allowed by the Court of Appeals to submit and mark additionalevidence to prove that Jose Pabale was the father of the Pabale siblings.

It is true that the Court of Appeals has the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receiveevidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases fallingwithin its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials orfurther proceedings. In general, however, the Court of Appeals conducts hearings and receivesevidence priorto the submission of the case for judgment.17It must be pointed out that, in this case,

Alamayri filed her Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence on 21 November 2001.She thus sought to submit additional evidence as to the identity of Jose Pabale, not only after CA-G.R. CV No. 58133 had been submitted for judgment, but afterthe Court of Appeals had alreadypromulgated its Decision in said case on 10 April 2001.

The parties must diligently and conscientiously present all arguments and available evidences insupport of their respective positions to the court before the case is deemed submitted for judgment.

Only under exceptional circumstances may the court receive new evidence after having renderedjudgment;18otherwise, its judgment may never attain finality since the parties may continually refutethe findings therein with further evidence. Alamayri failed to provide any explanation why she did notpresent her evidence earlier. Merely invoking that the ends of justice would have been best served ifshe was allowed to present additional evidence is not sufficient to justify deviation from the generalrules of procedure. Obedience to the requirements of procedural rules is needed if the parties are toexpect fair results therefrom, and utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harkingon the policy of liberal construction.19Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate theadjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. Andwhile the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress,was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. Theliberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only to proper cases and under

justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is

equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure toinsure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.20

Moreover, contrary to Alamayris assertion, the Court of Appeals did not deny her Motion toSchedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence merely for being late. In its Resolution, dated 19December 2001, the Court of Appeals also denied the said motion on the following grounds:

While it is now alleged, for the first time, that the [herein respondents Pabale siblings]participated in the guardianship proceedings considering that the Jose Pabale mentionedtherein is their late father, [herein petitioner Alamayri] submitting herein documentaryevidence to prove their filiation, even though admitted in evidence at this late stage, cannotbind [the Pabale siblings] as verily, notice to their father is not notice to them there being no

allegation to the effect that he represented them before the Calamba Court .

21

As the appellate court reasoned, even if the evidence Alamayri wanted to submit do prove that theJose Pabale who attended the RTC hearings on 30 October 1987 and 19 November 1987 in SP.PROC. No. 146-86-C was the father of the Pabale siblings, they would still not confirm his authorityto represent his children in the said proceedings. Worth stressing is the fact that Jose Pabale wasnot at all a party to the Deed of Sale dated 20 February 1984 over the subject property, which wasexecuted by Nave in favor of the Pabale siblings. Without proper authority, Jose Pabales presence
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at the hearings in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C should not bind his children to the outcome of saidproceedings or affect their right to the subject property.

Since it was not established that the Pabale siblings participated in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, thenany finding therein should not bind them in Civil Case No. 675-84-C.

No identity of issues

Neither is there identity of issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-Cthat may bar the latter, by conclusiveness of judgment, from ruling on Naves competency in 1984,when she executed the Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor the Pabale siblings.

In SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, the main issue was whether Nave was incompetent at the time of filingof the petition with the RTC in 1986, thus, requiring the appointment of a guardian over her personand estate.

In the cross-claim of Nave and Atty. Gesmundo against the Pabale siblings in Civil Case No. 675-84-C, the issue was whether Nave was an incompetent when she executed a Deed of Sale of the

subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings on 20 February 1984, hence, rendering the said salevoid.

While both cases involve a determination of Naves incompetency, it must be established at twoseparate times, one in 1984 and the other in 1986. A finding that she was incompetent in 1986 doesnot automatically mean that she was so in 1984. In Carillo v. Jaojoco,22the Court ruled that despitethe fact that the seller was declared mentally incapacitated by the trial court only nine days after theexecution of the contract of sale, it does not prove that she was so when she executed the contract.Hence, the significance of the two-year gap herein cannot be gainsaid since Naves mental conditionin 1986 may vastly differ from that of 1984 given the intervening period.

Capacity to act is supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been declared incapable,

and such capacity is presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not proved; that is, that at themoment of his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out of his mind.23The burden of provingincapacity to enter into contractual relations rests upon the person who alleges it; if no sufficientproof to this effect is presented, capacity will be presumed.24

Nave was examined and diagnosed by doctors to be mentally incapacitated only in 1986, when theRTC started hearing SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C; and she was not judicially declared an incompetentuntil 22 June 1988 when a Decision in said case was rendered by the RTC, resulting in theappointment of Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her guardian. Thus, prior to 1986, Nave is still presumedto be capacitated and competent to enter into contracts such as the Deed of Sale over the subjectproperty, which she executed in favor of the Pabale siblings on 20 February 1984. The burden ofproving otherwise falls upon Alamayri, which she dismally failed to do, having relied entirely on the22 June 1988 Decision of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C.

Alamayri capitalizes on the declaration of the RTC in its Decision dated 22 June 1988 in SP. PROC.No. 146-86-C on Naves condition "having become severe since the year 1980."25But there is nobasis for such a declaration. The medical reports extensively quoted in said Decision, preparedby: (1) Dr. Nona Jean Alviso-Ramos, dated 14 April 1986,26and (2) by Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, dated20 April 1987,27both stated that upon their examination, Nave was suffering from "organic brainsyndrome secondary to cerebral arteriosclerosis with psychotic episodes," which impaired her

judgment. There was nothing in the said medical reports, however, which may shed light on whenNave began to suffer from said mental condition. All they said was that it existed at the time Nave
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was examined in 1986, and again in 1987. Even the RTC judge was only able to observe Nave,which made him realize that her mind was very impressionable and capable of being manipulated,on the occasions when Nave visited the court from 1987 to 1988. Hence, for this Court, the RTCDecision dated 22 June 1988 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C may be conclusive as to Navesincompetency from 1986 onwards, but not as to her incompetency in 1984. And other than invokingthe 22 June 1988 Decision of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, Alamayri did not bother to

establish with her own evidence that Nave was mentally incapacitated when she executed the 20February 1984 Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings, so as to renderthe said deed void.

All told, there being no identity of parties and issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and CivilCase No. 675-84-C, the 22 June 1988 Decision in the former on Naves incompetency by the year1986 should not bar, by conclusiveness of judgment, a finding in the latter case that Nave still hadcapacity and was competent when she executed on 20 February 1984 the Deed of Sale over thesubject property in favor of the Pabale siblings. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not commit anyerror when it upheld the validity of the 20 February 1984 Deed of Sale.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED. TheDecision, dated 10 April 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, ishereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioner Lolita R. Alamayri.

SO ORDERED.

Summary: 2nd wife of great grandfather of minor contested the orders in the guardianship proceedings because there was no notice

given to her (she alleging that she owned the said properties)

*NEXT OF KIN def (citing LOPEZ V. TEODORO)

Facts:-Ignacia Zabate was the step-grandmother (2nd wife of minor's great grandfather).-Minor was JOSE PONCE-there was an ongoing guardianship proceeding of the minor JOSE PONCE. NO NOTICE was given to them-she thus filed a MOTION FOR ANNULMENT OF PREVIOUS ORDERS:

1. Authorizing mortgage of minor's interests in 2 lots2. Sale of the minor's interests in the 2 lots

GROUND: lack of noticeTC: Denied motionThe movant being merely the step-grandmother, not a relative, she is not entitled to notice of the guardianship proceedings

WON a step-grand-grandmother is entitled to receive notice in a guardianship proceeding? NO.1. only the NEXT OF KIN OF THE WARD are entitled to notice of the guardianship proceedings-NEXT OF KIN (LOPEZ v. TEODORO): those relatives whose relationship is such that they are entitled to share in the minor'sestate as distributees-HERE: IGNACIA is the 2nd wife of the minor's great grandfatherso ABSOLUTELY NO INTEREST - not even a remote heir in case of the minor's death (not related by blood to the minor)2. Even if true that the properties mortgaged and sold belonged to her and her children, she should have filed a separate action in thecourt of proper jurisdictionLopez vs. Teodoro

Summary: Sister of incapacitated ward contested the sale of the only property of the ward, alleging that there was no notice norhearing first conducted by the court before authorizing the said sale. The court held that she, not being an heir or a creditorprejudiced by the said sale, is not entitled to notice nor to contest the said sale.*NEXT OF KIN [R95.2]: not the next of kindred but those relatives who share in the estate according to the statute of distribution,

including those claiming per stripes or by representation

*Only the children have an interest in the land of their father, besides the creditors, and only they or the creditors who may have

been prejudiced by the sale have a right to object thereto. [Opposition to sale or encumbrance, by whom filed, R95.2]


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*Appeal, not certiorari or mandamus, is the proper remedy against an order of the court authorizing the sale of the wards property

[Remedy against order of the court authorizing the guardian to sell the wards property, R96.4]Facts:-Eulalio Lopez, Sr. is already incapacitated. He is under the judicial guardianship of Eulalio Lopez, Jr. But is under the actual careand custody of his sister SALVACION LOPEZ-EL Sr. owned absolutely a hacienda in SILAY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL.-there were claims against the estate of the ward by the Gamboas (Senen and Adelaida) which amounts to P7,312 plus 12%. These

loans were properly authorized by the court.TC: allowed the payment of the court, and if no funds to pay the debt, guardian was ordered to take the necessary steps for the saleof some of the property of the guardianship*said order authorized the sale of some of the property w/o notice to the next of kin of the ward and all persons interested in theestate*no hearing to show cause why the sale should not be allowed*no specification WON sale should be done privately or publicly-pursuant to the order, EL Jr. sold the hacienda, the only property of EL Sr., to JESUS JALBUENA. JALBUENA bound himself topay the mortgage debt and other obligations of the said property.-Salvacion Lopez (sister of EL Sr. and who had actual care and custody of EL Sr.) filed MR of court's order authorizing sale: it wasprejudicial to EL Sr.'s interest>>>MR DENIED>>>SO SALVACION filed PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS

WON CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION WAS THE PROPER REMEDY FOR CONTESTING THE ORDER? NO

- Without deciding the legality or illegality of the sale, or whether this matter should be ventillated in an ordinary action instead of in a

proceeding for certiorari, it is evident that appeal and not certiorarior mandamus is the proper remedy. Unquestionably, the court of first

instance in which the guardianship proceedings were pending had jurisdiction to order the questioned sale. The court's jurisdiction is not

disputed. Nor was there an abuse of discretion, judging from the averments in the answers. It appears that the outstanding indebtedness of the

guardianship properly and legally incurred amounted to P36,833.66, part of which was due the petitioner for the support and maintenance of

the incapacitated.

WON the order of the court authorizing the sale w/o hearing the next of kin of the ward was proper? YES1. The outstanding debt of the ward at the time of sale was P36,833.66. Part of this was due to SALVACION for support and

maintenance of EL Sr.2. SALVACION had no legal interest in her complaint.a. She is only the ward's sister - not a forced heir so not prejudiced by the sale she seeks to impugnb.

Even if she was a creditor, her credit was not impaired but was in fact paid

WON SALVACION IS A "NEXT OF KIN" WHICH IS ENTITLED TO TAKE PART IN THE PROCEEDINGS FOR THEDETERMINATION OF THE PROPERNESS OF THE SALE? NO-NEXT OF KIN:-relatives whose relationship is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees-not the next of kindred but those relatives who share in the estate according to the statute of distribution including those claimingstripes or by representation

*here, sale was not opposed by the children nor the creditors. If ever there were creditors prejudiced, they have the right to object tothe sale

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