G.R. No. 159507ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR., petitioner, vs. AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC.

FACTS:

Congressman SALUDO filed a complaint for damages against AMEX and its officers with the RTC of Maasin City, Southern Leyte. SALUDO alleged that he is a resident of Ichon,Macrohon, Southern Leyte. The complaint’s cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor of petitioner Saludo’s AMEX credit card and the supplementary card issued to his daughter. The 1st dishonor happened when petitioner Saludo’s daughter used hersupplementary credit card to pay her purchases in the United States. The 2nd dishonor occurred when petitioner Saludo used his principal credit card to pay his account at the Hotel Okawa in Tokyo, Japan while he was there with other delegates from the Philippines to attend the Congressional Recognition in honor of Mr. Hiroshi Tanaka. AMEX ET AL, in its answer, as affirmative defense says that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground that venue was improperly laid because none of the parties was a resident of Leyte, alleging that even SALUDO himself is not a resident of Leyte. SALUDO’s community tax certificate, which was presented when he executed the complaint’s verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at PasayCity Saludo’s complaint was prepared in Pasay City and signed by a lawyer of the said city.

The RTC-MAASIN favored SALUDO. It said that venue was proper since a man can have but one domicile, but he may have numerous places of residence. Here RTC said that although SALUDO is domiciled in Leyte, he has residence both in Pasay AND Leyte. Moreover, RTC said that as congressman of the province, his residence there can be taken judicial notice. AMEX ET AL’s MR DENIED. Hence, AMEX ET AL filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with CA.

The CA reversed the RTC’s decision. It declared that petitioner Saludo was not a resident of Leyte.

ISSUE:

Whether venue was improperly laid in RTC because not one of the parties,including petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff, was a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of the complaint.

HELD:

VENUE IS PROPER.

Petitioner Saludo’s complaint for damages is a personal action. As such, it is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. The term “residence” as employed in the rule on venue on personal actions filed with the courts of first instance means the place of abode whether permanent or temporary, of the plaintiff or the defendant, as distinguished from “domicile” which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention ofreturning.The definition of “residence” for purposes of election law is more stringent in that it is equated with the term “domicile”; When analyzed, the term “residence” requires two elements-(1) intention to reside in the particular place, and (2) personal or physical presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.For purposes of venue, the less technical definition of “residence” is adopted. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile; Since a congressman, or the lone representative of a particular district, has his residence (or domicile) therein as the term is construed

in relation to election laws, necessarily, he is also deemed to have had his residence therein for purposes of venue for filing personal actions.

The fact that a party’s community tax certificate was issued in a place other than where he claims to be a resident of is of no moment because the same does not preclude his having a residence in another locality for purposes of venue.

The same construction of the word resides as used in Section 1, Rule 73, of the Revised Rules of Court, was enunciated in Fule v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. L-40502) and Fule v. Hon. Ernani C. Pao, et al. (G.R. No. L-42670), decided on November 29, 1976. Thus, this Court, in the aforecited cases, stated:What does the term resides mean? Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term resides connotes ex vi termini actual residence as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. This term resides, like the terms residing and residence is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purposes of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word domicile still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms residence and domicile but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term inhabitant. In other words, resides should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.

AVELINO v. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino is a daughter and compulsory heir of the late Antonio Avelino, Sr., and his first wife private respondent Angelina Avelino.

The other private respondents, Sharon, Antonio Jr., Tracy, Patrick and Mark Anthony all surnamed Avelino are likewise compulsory heirs of Avelino, Sr. Sharon, an American, is the second wife of Avelino, Sr. The other private respondents are siblings of petitioner Ma. Socorro.

Ma. Soccoro filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, docketed as SP Proc. No. Q-91-10441, a petition for the issuance of letters of

administration of the estate of Antonio Avelino, Sr., who died intestate on April 10, 1989. She asked that she be appointed the administrator of the estate.

The respondents opposed by filing a motion to convert the said judicial proceedings to an action for judicial partition.

The RTC granted the motion to convert the proceedings to one for judicial partition. Soccoro’s MR was also denied by the RTC.

Ma. Socorro filed before the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus alleging grave abuse of discretion. The respondent appellate court rendered the assailed decision, stating that the "petition is DENIED DUE COURSE" and accordingly dismissed.

Hence, the instant case.

Petitioner submits that: First, no partition of the estate is possible in the instant case as no determination has yet been made of the character and extent of the decedent's estate. She points to the Court's ruling in Arcilles v. Montejo, 26 SCRA 197 (1969), where we held that when the existence of other properties of the decedent is a matter still to be reckoned with, administration proceedings are the proper mode of resolving the same.[4] In addition, petitioner contends that the estate is in danger of being depleted for want of an administrator to manage and attend to it.

Second, petitioner insists that the Rules of Court does not provide for conversion of a motion for the issuance of letters of administration to an action for judicial partition. The conversion of the motion was, thus, procedurally inappropriate and should be struck down for lack of legal basis.

ISSUE: whether respondent appellate court committed an error of law and gravely abused its discretion in upholding the trial court's finding that a partition is proper.

HELD:

When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish the bond required by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be judicially administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified administrator in the order established in Section 6 of Rule 78.[5]The exceptions to this rule are found in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 74[6] which provide:

"SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. - If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives

duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition.. Scs daad

"SEC. 2. Summary settlement of estates of small value.- Whenever the gross value of the estate of a deceased person, whether he died testate or intestate, does not exceed ten thousand pesos, and that fact if made to appear to the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction of the estate by the petition of an interested person and upon hearing, which shall be held not less than one (1) month nor more than three (3) months from the date of the last publication of a notice which shall be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, and after such other notice to interested persons as the court may direct, the court may proceed summarily, without the appointment of an executor or administrator, and without delay, to grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if any there be, to determine who are the persons legally entitled to participate in the estate and to apportion and divide it among them after the payment of such debts of the estate as the court shall then find to be due; and such persons, in their own right, if they are lawful age and legal capacity, or by their guardians or trustees legally appointed and qualified, if otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to receive and enter into the possession of the portions of the estate so awarded to them respectively. The court shall make such order as may be just respecting the costs of the proceedings, and all orders and judgments made or rendered in the course thereof shall be recorded in the office of the clerk, and the order of partition or award, if it involves real estate, shall be recorded in the proper register's office."

The heirs succeed immediately to all of the rights and properties of the deceased at the moment of the latter's death.[7] Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, allows heirs to divide the estate among themselves without need of delay and risks of being dissipated. When a person dies without leaving pending obligations, his heirs, are not required to submit the property for judicial administration, nor apply for the appointment of an administrator by the court.[8]

We note that the Court of Appeals found that in this case "the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age."[9] With this finding, it is our view that Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court should apply.

We find, however, that a complete inventory of the estate may be done during the partition proceedings, especially since the estate has no debts.

The basis for the trial court's order is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. It provides that in cases where the heirs disagree as to the partition of the estate and no extrajudicial settlement is possible, then an ordinary action for partition may be resorted to, as in this case. We have held that where the more expeditious remedy of partition is available to the heirs, then the heirs or the majority of them may not be compelled to submit to administration proceedings.[10] The trial court appropriately converted petitioner's action for letters of administration into a suit for judicial partition, upon motion of the private respondents.

FELIX AZUELA, Petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO substituted by ERNESTO G. CASTILLO, Respondents

PRINCIPLE:

A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all three defects is just aching for judicial rejection.

FACTS:

The case stems from a petition for probate filed on 10 April 1984 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The petition filed by petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo, which was notarized on 10 June 1981. Petitioner is the son of the cousin of the decedent.

The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo (Geralda Castillo), who represented herself and that the decedent was actually survived by 12 legitimate heirs, namely her grandchildren, who were then residing abroad.

Oppositor Geralda Castillo also argued that the will was not executed and attested to in accordance with law. She pointed out that decedent’s signature did not appear on the second page of the will, and the will was not properly acknowledged. These twin arguments are among the central matters to this petition.

RTC decision- admitted the will to probate on the ff. grounds:

1. On the oppositor’s contention that the attestation clause was not signed by the subscribing witnesses at the bottom thereof, this Court is of the view that the signing by the subscribing witnesses on the left margin of the second page of the will containing the attestation clause and acknowledgment, instead of at the bottom thereof, substantially satisfies the purpose of identification and attestation of the will.

2. With regard to the oppositor’s argument that the will was not numbered correlatively in letters placed on upper part of each page and that the attestation did not state the number of pages thereof, it is worthy to note that the will is composed of only two pages. The first page contains the entire text of the testamentary dispositions, and the second page contains the last portion of the attestation clause and acknowledgement. Such being so, the defects are not of a serious nature as to invalidate the will. For the same reason, the failure of the testatrix to affix her signature on the left margin of the second page, which contains only the last portion of the attestation clause and acknowledgment is not a fatal defect.

3. As regards the oppositor’s assertion that the signature of the testatrix on the will is a forgery, the testimonies of the three subscribing witnesses to the will are convincing enough to establish the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix and the due execution of the will.8

CA’s decision- reversed the trial court and ordered the dismissal of the petition for probate.9 The Court of Appeals noted that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in the will, thus rendering the will void and undeserving of probate.10

ISSUE:

WON the will was executed in accordance with the law (Art. 805 and 806 of Civil Code).

RULING:

NO.

Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.

Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.

The appellate court, in its Decision, considered only one defect, the failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages of the will. But an examination of the will itself reveals several more deficiencies.

1 st error: As admitted by petitioner himself, the attestation clause fails to state the number of pages of the will.12 There was an incomplete attempt to comply with this requisite, a space having been allotted for the insertion of the number of pages in the attestation clause. Yet the blank was never filled in; hence, the requisite was left uncomplied with.

the document might easily be so prepared that the removal of a sheet would completely change the testamentary dispositions of the will and in the absence of a statement of the total number of sheets such removal might be effected by taking out the sheet and changing the numbers at the top of the following sheets or pages.

The case of "Manuel Singson versus Emilia Florentino, et al., supra, is not applicable in this case since" although the attestation in the subject Will did not state the number of pages used in the will, however, the same was found in the last part of the body of the Will.

Following Caneda, there is substantial compliance with this requirement if the will states elsewhere in it how many pages it is comprised of, as was the situation in Singson andTaboada. However, in this case, there could have been no substantial compliance with the requirements under Article 805 since there is no statement in the attestation clause or anywhere in the will itself as to the number of pages which comprise the will.

2 nd error: the attestation clause was not signed by the instrumental witnesses. While the signatures of the instrumental witnesses appear on the left-hand margin of the will, they do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause which after all consists of their averments before the notary public.

An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof negatives their participation.

The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the three witnesses on the left-hand margin conform substantially to the law and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause. This is untenable, because said signatures are in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be signed on the left-hand margin of all its pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the witnesses.39

3 rd error: The requirement under Article 806 that "every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses" has also not been complied with.

In lieu of an acknowledgment, the notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista, wrote "Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila."40 By no manner of contemplation can those words be construed as an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed.41 It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signor actually declares to the notary that the executor of a document has attested to the notary that the same is his/her own free act and deed.

As the express requirement of Article 806 is that the will be "acknowledged", and not merely subscribed and sworn to. The will does not present any textual proof, much less one under oath, that the decedent and the instrumental witnesses executed or signed the will as their own free act or deed. The acknowledgment made in a will provides for another all-important legal safeguard against spurious wills or those made beyond the free consent of the testator.

All told, the string of mortal defects which the will in question suffers from makes the probate denial inexorable.

WHEREFORE, petition is denied.

SHORT DIGEST:

FACTS:

The case stems from a petition for probate filed before RTC by Felix Azuela, son of the testator’s cousin. This was opposed by Castillo, atty-in-fact of the heirs of the deceased (the grandchildren). She pointed out that decedent’s signature did not appear on the second page of the will, and the will was not properly acknowledged.

RTC admitted the will to probate. CA reversed the decision on the ground that that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in the will, thus rendering the will void and undeserving of probate.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON the will was executed in accordance with the law.

RULING:

NO. SC found that the will consists of several errors. Such as:

1. the attestation clause fails to state the number of pages of the will.2. the attestation clause was not signed by the instrumental witnesses.3. Not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses"

All told, the string of mortal defects which the will in question suffers from makes the probate denial inexorable.

WHEREFORE, petition is denied.

Pacioles Jr. vs. Chuatoco-ching

GR. No. 127920

Facts:

On March 13, 1992, Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties. She was survived by her husband, petitioner herein, and their two minor children.

Consequently, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified petition for the settlement of Miguelitas estate. He prayed that (a) letters of administration be issued in his name, and (b) that the net residue of the estate be divided among the compulsory heirs.

Miguelitas mother, Miguela ChuatocoChing, herein respondent, filed an opposition, specifically to petitioners prayer for the issuance of letters of administration. Afterwards, she also filed a motion for her appointment as special administratrix.

In her omnibus motion, respondent nominated her son Emmanuel Ching to act as special administrator.The intestate court issued an order appointing petitioner and Emmanuel as joint regular administrators of the estate. Both were issued letters of administration after taking their oath and posting the requisite bond.

Thereafter, petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelitas estate. Emmanuel did not submit an inventory.

Petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion praying, among others, that an Order be issued directing partition and distribution of the estate among the declared heirs.

Respondent opposed petitioners motion on the ground that the partition and distribution of the estate is premature and precipitate, considering that there is yet no determination whether the properties specified in the inventory are conjugal, paraphernal or owned in a joint venture.

Respondent claimed that she owns the bulk of Miguelitas estate as an heir and coowner. Thus, she prayed that a hearing be scheduled.

On January 17, 1996, the intestate denied petitioners prayer for partition and distribution of the estate, holding that it is indeed premature. The intestate court ratiocinated as follows:

On the partition and distribution of the deceased properties, among the declared heirs, the Court finds the prayer of petitioner in this regard to be premature. Thus, a hearing on oppositors claim as indicated in her opposition to the instant petition is necessary to determine whether the properties listed in the amended complaint filed by petitioner are entirely conjugal or the paraphernal properties of the deceased, or a co-ownership between the oppositor and the petitioner in their partnership venture.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Thereafter, he filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the intestate courts Order which denied petitioners prayer for partition and distribution of the estate for being premature, indicating that it (intestate court) will first resolve respondents claim of ownership.

The Appellate Court dismissed the petition for certiorari, holding that in issuing the challenged Order and Resolution, the intestate court did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

Issue:

May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedents estate?

Ruling:

The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises special and limited jurisdiction.

A wellrecognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. In such situations the adjudication is merely

incidental and provisional.

Under the said principle, the key consideration is that the purpose of the intestate or probate court in hearing and passing upon questions of ownership is merely to determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. The facts of this case show that such was not the purpose of the intestate court.

Respondents purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate court a ruling of what properties should or should not be included in the inventory. She wanted something else, i.e., to secure from the intestate court a final determination of her claim of ownership over properties comprising the bulk of Miguelitas estate.

The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the

court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial court.[21] Jurisprudence teaches us that:

[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good, but if

there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.

Hence, respondents recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general jurisdiction. The intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the resolution of her adverse claim of ownership over properties ostensibly belonging to Miguelita's estate.

ALABAN vs CA

Facts:

Respondent Francisco Provido filed a petition for the probate of the Last Will and Testamment of the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado (decedent) who died on October 26 2000 in Janiuay, Iloilo. He alleged that he was the heir of the decedent and the executor of the the latter’s will. The RTC allowed the probate of the will and directing the issuance of the letters testamentary to respondent.More than 4 months later, petitioners (who are nephews and nieces of the decedent) filed a motion for the reopening of the probate of the will. They claimed that they are the intestate heirs of the decedent. They also claimed that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition due to non-payment of docket fees, defective publication, and lack of notice to the other heirs. They alleged that the will could not have been probated because its signature was forged and it was not executed in accordance with law. Petitioners prayed that the letters testamentary issued to respondent be withdrawn and the estate of the decedent disposed of under intestate succession.The RTC denied the petitioners’ motion for being unmeritorious. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition with an application for preliminary injunction with the CA, seeking the annulment of the RTC’s decision. They argued that the RTC decision should be annulled and set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC. The CA dismissed the petition. It found that there was no showing that petitioners failed to avail of or resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies through no fault of their own.Hence, they filed a petition with the SC asserting that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed their petition for the alleged failure to show that they have not availed of or resorted to the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment or other remedies through no fault of their own, and held that petitioners were not denied their day in court during the proceeding in RTC.Meanwhile, respondent charges petitioners of forum-shopping, since the latter have a pending suit involving the same issues filed before the RTC of General Santos City and subsequently pending appeal before the CA.It appears that Dolores Flores, one of the petitioners, filed a petition for letters of administration with the RTC of Gen. San. City, claiming that the decedent died intestate without issue, survived by five groups of collateral heirs. The RTC dismissed her petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction stating that the probate court in Janiuay, Iloilo has jurisdiction since the venue for a petition for the settlement of the estate of a decedent is the place where the decedent died. This is also in accordance with the rule that the first court acquiring jurisdiction shall continue hearing the case to

the exclusion of other courts. (Sec. 1, RULE 73)Issues:Whether or not the RTC of Iloilo acquired jurisdiction over the petitioners.Whether or not there was extrinsic fraud.Ruling:Yes. The RTC of Iloilo acquired jurisdiction over the petitioners.It has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding publication of the petition the court’s jurisdiction extends to all person interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent. Publication is the notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. Thus, even though petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate, they eventually became parties thereto as a consequence of the publication of the notice of hearing.No. There was no extrinsic fraud.According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known heirs, legates, and devisees of the testator. A perusal of the will shows that respondent was instituted as the sole heir of the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate heirs who are entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings und the Rules. Respondent had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to personally notify them of the same. Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the purported infirmity is cured by the publication of the notice. After all, personal notice upon the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite.The non-inclusion of petitioners’ names in the petition and the alleged failure to personally notify them of the proceedings do not constitute extrinsic fraud. Petitioners were not denied their day in court, as they were not prevented from participating in the proceedings and presenting their case before the probate court.

FLUEMER, vs. HIX G.R. No. L-32636 March 17, 1930

Principle:

The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts.

FACTS:

The special administrator of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix appeals from a decision of Judge Tuason denying the probate of the document alleged to be the last will and testament of the deceased. Appellee is not authorized to carry on this appeal. We think, however, that the appellant, who appears to have been the moving party in these proceedings, was a "person interested in the allowance or disallowance of a will by a Court of First Instance," and so should be permitted to appeal to the Supreme Court from the disallowance of the will

ISSUE:

Whether or not the laws of foreign jurisdiction need not be proven in our domestic courts.

SC RULING:

No. The laws of foreign jurisdiction need to be proven in our courts.

Petitioner alleged that the will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Verginia Code, and as certified to by the Director of the National Library. But this was far from a compliance with the law. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts.

In this case, the requirements of the law were not met. There was no was printed or published under the authority of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the sale of the State of West Virginia. No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed.

In addition, the due execution of the will was not established. The only evidence on this point is to be found in the testimony of the petitioner. Aside from this, there was nothing to indicate that the will was acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two competent witnesses, of that these witnesses subscribed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other as the law of West Virginia seems to require. On the supposition that the witnesses to the will reside without the Philippine Islands, it would then the duty of the petitioner to prove execution by some other means.

It was also necessary for the petitioner to prove that the testator had his domicile in West Virginia and not establish this fact consisted of the recitals in the CATHY will and the testimony of the petitioner. Also in beginning administration proceedings originally in the Philippine Islands, the petitioner violated his own theory by attempting to have the principal administration in the Philippine Islands.

The application for the probate of the will in the Philippines was filed on February 20, 1929, while the proceedings in West Virginia appear to have been initiated on June 8, 1929. These facts are strongly indicative of an intention to make the Philippines the principal administration and West Virginia the ancillary administration. However this may be, no attempt has been made to comply with Civil Procedure, for no hearing on the question of the allowance of a will said to have been proved and allowed in West Virginia has been requested. There is no showing that the deceased left any property

at any place other than the Philippine Islands and no contention that he left any in West Virginia.

Judgment appealed is affirmed.