Specpro Cases - Complete

Rule 72 Shalako R. Sta. Maria

LIM v. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. 124715. 24 January 2000

Facts:Pastor Y. Lim died intestate and was survived by his wife Rufina Luy Lim. Rufina, represented

by her nephew George Luy, filed a petition for the administration of the estate of Pastor before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. However, the inventory of the estate included properties registered under the name of certain corporations namely Auto Truck Corporation, Alliance Marketing Corporation, Speed Distributing, Inc., Active Distributing, Inc. and Action Company. The corporations then filed a motion for the lifting of lis pendens and motion for exclusion of certain properties from the estate of the decedent. The RTC of Quezon City granted the motion of the corporations.

Rufina then filed a verified amended petition averring that Pastor Lim is the owner of all the capital, assets and equity of the respondent corporations. The RTC acting on petitioner’s motion, ordered the Registry of Deeds to reinstate the annotation of lis pendens on the properties of the respondent corporations. Rufina Lim was then appointed as special administrator and Miguel Lim and Lawyer Donald Lee as co-special administrators. The respondents filed a motion for exclusion but the RTC acting as probate court denied such motion. Also, the probate court acting on the ex parte motion filed by the petitioner, ordered that the banks where Pastor Lim had accounts to produce their records of the savings and current accounts in the name of Pastor.

The respondent corporations filed a special civil action for certiorari[with an urgent prayer for a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, before the Court of Appeals questioning the orders of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a probate court. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents and set aside the ruling of the Regional Trial Court.

Hence this petition.

Issue:Whether a probate court has the power and authority to determine whether a certain property

should or should not be included in the inventory.

Held:As enunciated in the case of Pastor Jr. v. Court of Appeals “As a rule, the question of ownership

is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.”

However, it should be noted that the lands and properties in question are covered under the Torrens system and registered in the name of private respondent. The jurisprudence in the case of Bolisay v. Alcid is applicable in this case to wit "x x x. In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property covered by Torrens title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons named in the title. x x x"

Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the estate of the late Pastor Y. Lim are in the possession of and are registered in the name of private respondent corporations, which under the law possess a personality separate and distinct from their stockholders, and in the absence of any

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cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of private respondents should stand undisturbed.

Notwithstanding that the real properties were duly registered under the Torrens system in the name of private respondents, and as such were to be afforded the presumptive conclusiveness of title, the probate court included the properties in the inventory. By its denial of the motion for exclusion, the probate court in effect acted in utter disregard of the presumption of conclusiveness of title in favor of private respondents. Certainly, the probate court through such act transgressed the clear provisions of law and infringed settled jurisprudence on this matter.

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Rule 72Aran Jay G. Sicat

Vda de MANOLO v. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 129242. 16 January 2001

Facts:

Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1966 Maria Clara Street , Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children. At the time of his death the deceased left several real properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalo’s Machine Shop.

On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo, namely: Purita, Milagros, Belen, Rosalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda filed a petition with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.

The trial court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing on February 11, 1993 and directing the publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, and further directing service by registered mail of the said order upon the heirs named in the petition at their respective addresses mentioned therein. After the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court issued an order “declaring the whole world in default, except the government,” and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners therein on March 16, 1993. However, this order of general default was set aside by the trial court upon motion of herein petitioners (oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were granted ten (10) days within which to file their opposition to the petition. The opposition of the petitioner was admitted for the purpose of considering the merits thereof and the other prayers were denied.

On petition for certiorari the Court of Appeals dismissed the contention of the petitioner.

Issue:Whether or not SP. PROC No. 92-63626 is an ordinary civil action involving members of the

same family.

Held:The Supreme Court enunciated that it is a fundamental rule that, in the determination of the

nature of an action or proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief sought in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. A careful scrutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners’ claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fact of death of the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the time of his said death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest. The petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings.

The Supreme Court added further that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that are irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, sitting, as a probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of an action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the defenses contained in the

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answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple strategem. So it should be in the instant petition for settlement of estate. The oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was impleaded therein. The Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. The petitioners therein (private respondents herein) merely seek to establish the fact of death of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction.

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Rule 72 Shiela O. Imperial

NATCHER v. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 133000. 2 October 2001

Facts:Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land.

Upon the death of the latter, Graciano, together with his six children entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's estate.

Later on, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia. In 1985, Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as heirs.

The heirs of Graciano (six children) filed an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages before the before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, acting as a court of general jurisdiction. They alleged that upon Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale in her favor. As a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.

The Trial Court rendered a decision holding: The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano in favor of Natcher is prohibited by law and it is neither considered as a donation. But, it may however be regarded as an extension of advance inheritance of Natcher being a compulsory heir of the deceased.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower court's decision. Aggrieved, herein petitioner assails the appellate court's decision for being contrary to law and the facts of the case.

Issue:May a court of general jurisdiction, in an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with

damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person?

Held:An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters

relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.

Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir. Hence, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher.

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Rule 72Don Mikhail A. Siccuan

AGAPAY v. PALANGG.R. No. 116668. 28 July 1997

Facts: Miguel Palang contracted his first marraige(1949) with Carlina Vallesterol. They had one child,

Hermina Palang(1950). Miguel left to work in Hawaii a few months after the wedding. He returned in 1954 for a year. His next visit was in 1964. The trial court found evidence that as early as 1957, Miguel attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he came back for good in 1972, he refused to live with the PRs.

Miguel contracted a 2nd marriage with Erlinda Aglipay (1973). Two months earlier, M and E jointly purchased an agricultural land. They also bought a res. lot. In 1975, M and C executed a Deed of of all their conjugal prop to Herminia Palang. M and E produced a son(Kristofer). In 1979, they were convicted of concubinage. Miguel died 2 yrs later. RPs instituted an action for the recovery of ownership and poss with damages against pet in the RTC of Urdaneta. PRs sought to get back the riceland and the house and lot allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with the pet. The trial court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the respondent court reversed the trial court's decision.

Issues: 1. Ownership of the two pieces of property subject of this action; 2. Kristofer's heirship and filiation.

Held:

1. In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade us that she actually contributed money to buy the subject Riceland. On the date of conveyance, petitioner was only around twenty years of age and Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a pensioner of the U.S. Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price. Petitioner now claims that the riceland was bought two months before Miguel and Erlinda actually cohabited. In the nature of an afterthought, said added assertion was intended to exclude their case from the operation of Article 148 of the Family Code.

“inasmuch as questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action which is for recovery of ownership and possession."

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Rule 72Emmanuel L. Saavedra

PASCUAL v. COURT OF APPEALSAG.R. No. 120575. 16 December 1998

Facts:Don Andres Pascual died intestate. Dona Adela,his widow, as the administrator of the estate hired

the sevices of Atty. Jesus Santos as her counsel for a fee. While the settlement are still pending the administrator died. Six year thereafter the RTC awarded Atty. Santos his attorneys fee, and subsequently filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution for the paymentof said fees. However, the petitioners opposed the said attorneys fee. The opposition was dismissed, the CA held that the jurisdiction of the intestate court on the ground that, although not incurred by the deceased during his lifetime, the monetary claim was related to the ordinary acts of administration of the estate. The CA similarly declared that the petitioner had been accorded due process.

Issue:Wether the awarded attorney's fee was void ab initio because the intestate court had lost

juridiction over the person of Dona Adela, the attorney's client, due to her death.

Held:No,The basic flaw in the argument is the misapplication of the rules on the extinction of a civil

action in special proceeding. The death of Doña Adela did not ipso facto extinguish the monetary claim of private respondent or require him to refile his claim with the court hearing the settlement of her testate estate. Had her filed the claim against Doña Adela personally, the rule would have applied. However, he did so against the estate of Don Andres.

Its jurisdiction subsists because the proper party in this case is the estate of Don Andres, which is distinct and separate from that of Doña Adela who merely served as the former's administratrix. Doña Adela was merely a representative party. and the claim was an item of the administrative expenses of Don Andres' estate. It is well-settled that a monetary claim against the person administering an estate, in relation to his or her acts of administration, in its ordinary course, can be filed at the court where a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate is pending.

Hence, in spite of the death of the appointed administratrix, it was the duty of the intestate court to determine whether the private respondent's claim was allowable as administrative expense — if it was obtained in reference to the management of the estate; the performance of legal services which the administratrix herself could not perform; the prosecution or defense of actions or suits on behalf of or against the estate; or the discovery, recovery or preservation of properties of the estate. In other words, the intestate court has a mandate to resolve whether the said claim is a "necessary expense in the care, management and settlement of the estate." 23For the same reason, the fact that the private respondent's lien was recorded four months after the administratrix had died is of no moment.

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Rule 72Shalako R. Sta. Maria

NAZARENO v. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 138842. 18 October 2000

Facts:Spouses Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Pobleto had five children namely Natividad, Romeo,

Jose, Pacifico, and Maximino, Jr. Both died intestate. After the death of Maximino Sr. Romeo filed an intestate case before the RTC of Cavite. Romeo was appointed administrator of his father’s estate. During the intestate proceedings it was discovered that Spouses Nazareno executed on January 29, 1970 several deeds of absolute sale in favor of Natividad. Said deeds cover six lots in Quezon City and as such transfer certificates of title were issued in favor of Natividad. One of the said lots include Lot 3B, the lot being occupied by Romeo and his wife and Maximino Jr. Unknown to Romeo, Natividad sold Lot 3-B to Maximino, Jr. on July 31, 1972 for which reason the latter was issued TCT No. 293701 by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.

Upon knowing of the said sale, Romeo and his wife locked Maximino Jr out of the house thus prompting Maximino Jr to file an action for recovery of possession and damages with prayer for writs of preliminary injunction and mandatory injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. RTC ruled in favor of Maximino Jr.

Romeo, on behalf of the estate of Maximino Sr, then filed the present case for annulment of sale with damages against Natividad and Maximino, Jr. Natividad and Maximino, Jr. filed a third-party complaint against the spouses Romeo and Eliza. The issues were joined and a case was filed. Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals in its decision in CA-GR CV No. 12932 affirmed the decision of the trial court on the issue of action for recovery of possession filed by Maximino Jr against Romeo.

After hearing, the trial court then nullified the Deed of Sale made on January 29, 1970 in favor of Natividad. Other than Lots 3, 3-B, 13 and 14 which had passed on to third persons, the defendant Natividad shall hold the rest in trust for Jose Nazareno to whom the same had been adjudicated.

The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court and ruled that titles of Lot 3 (under the name of Romeo Nazareno) and Lot 3-B (in the name of Maximino Nazareno, Jr.), as well as to Lots 10 and 11 should be cancelled and ordered restored to the estate of Maximino Nazareno, Sr.

Natividad and Maximino Jr then filed a petition for review on certiorari decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 39441.

Issue:Whether the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 12932 which declared

Maximino Jr. as the owner of Lot 3B should be the controlling jurisprudence and should be followed in determining the true owner of the lots in question.

Held:No. The estate of a deceased person is a juridical entity that has a personality of its own. Though

Romeo represented at one time the estate of Maximino, Sr., the latter has a separate and distinct personality from the former. Hence, the judgment in CA-GR CV No. 12932 regarding the ownership of Maximino, Jr. over Lot 3-B binds Romeo and Eliza only, and not the estate of Maximino, Sr., which also has a right to recover properties which were wrongfully disposed.

Furthermore, Natividad’s title was clearly not an issue in the first case. In other words, the title to the other five lots subject of the present deed of sale was not in issue in that case. If the first case resolved anything, it was the ownership of Maximino, Jr. over Lot 3-B alone.

The Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 9, 1970 covering the six lots and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 31, 1982 covering Lot 3B are declared null and void. All the lots covered by the Deed of

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Absolute Sale dated January 9, 1970, except Lots 13 and 14 which is already in the hands of Ros-Alva Marketing, shall revert and form part of the estate of Maximino Sr.

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LIMJOCO v. INTESTATE OF FRAGRANTEG.R. No. L-770. 27 April 1948

Facts:

Pedro O. Fragrante applied for a certificate of public convenience to install, maintain, and operate a nice plant in San Juan, Rizal, where the Public Service Commission held that the public interest an convenience will be prompted in a proper and suitable manner” by authorizing the operation and maintenance of another ice plant of two and one-half tons in the municipality of San Juan, that the original applicant Fragnante was a Filipino citizen at the time of his death; and that his intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The commission issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased Fragnante, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate said plant. Petitioners claim that the granting of certificate applied for the estate is a contravention of law. Issue: Whether or not the estate of Fragnante can be considered as a person within the meaning of the Public Service Act? Whether or not citizenship of decedent extended to his estate? Held:

The Supreme Court held that the estate of P.O.F. should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purpose of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course, includes the exercise during the judicial administration of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his which survived after his death. The Supreme Court furthered that if by legal fiction the personality of P.O.F is considered extended so that any debts or obligations left by, and surviving rights may be exercised for the benefit of his creditors and heirs, there is no sound and cogent reason for denying the application of the same fiction of his citizenship, and for not considering it as likewise extended for the purposes of the aforesaid unfinished proceeding before the Public Service Commission.

The Supreme Court opined that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.

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Rule 72Shiela O. Imperial

RODRIGUEZ et.al v. de BORJAGR No. L-21993. 21 June 1966

Facts:Fr. Celestino Rodriguez was born in Parañaque, Rizal. He was the Parish priest in Bulacan, from

the year 1930 up to the time of his death in 1963. He left real properties in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and Bulacan.. On March 4, 1963, Pangilinan and Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez.

On March 8, 1963, petitioners (Rodriguez et.al), filed a petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged will, but before the Court could act on the petition, the same was withdrawn.

On March 12, 1963, petitioners filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging, among other things, that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of Parañaque, Rizal, and died without leaving a will and praying that Maria Rodriguez be appointed as Special Administratrix of the estate. On the same day, (March 12, 1963) Pangilinan and Jacalan filed a petition in this Court for the probation of the will delivered by them on March 4, 1963.

The movants (Rodriguez et.al) contend that since the intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while the petition for probate was filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the same date, the latter Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate.

Petitioners Pangilinan and Jacalan, on the other hand, take the stand that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case upon delivery by them of the will to the Clerk of Court on March 4, 1963, and that the case in this Court therefore has precedence over the case filed in Rizal on March 12, 1963.

Issue:Whether or not the trial court of Rizal can still hear the petition despite the pending estate

proceedings having been initiated in the Court of First Instance in Bulacan?

Held:The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto

of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 77, of the old Rules):

The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First Instance ahead of any other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a case of wrong venue by express provisions of Rule 73 (old Rule 75) of the Rules of Court, since the same enjoins that: the Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.

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LIM v. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. L-55201. 3 February 1994

Facts:The case involves the partition of the properties of the deceased spouse Tan Quico and Josefa

Oraa. Both died intestate. They left some ninety six (96) hectares of land located in the municipality of Guinobatan and Camalig Albay.

The late spouses were survived by four (4) children: Cresencia, Lorenzo, Hermogenes and Elias. Elias died on May 2, 1935 without issue. Cresencia died on December 20, 1967. The protagonists were the widower and children of Cresencia on one side, and Lorenzo and Hermogenes on the other side.

The late Cresencia and Lorenzo had contrasting educational background. Cresencia only reached the second grade of elementary school. She could not read or write in English. On the other hand, Lorenzo is a lawyer and a CPA.

Petitioners, heirs of Cresencia, alleged that since the demise of the spouses Tan Quico and Josefa Oraa, the subject properties had been administered by respondent Lorenzo. They claimed that before her death, Cresencia had demanded their partition from Lorenzo. 5 After Cresencia's death, they likewise clamored for their partition. 6 Their efforts proved fruitless. Lorenzo and Hermogenes adamant stance against partition is based on various contentions. Principally, they urge:

(1) that the properties had already been partitioned, albeit, orally; and (2) during her lifetime, the late Cresencia had sold and conveyed all her interests in said properties to respondent Lorenzo. They cited as evidence the "Deed of Confirmation of Extra Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Tan Quico and Josefa Oraa" 7 and a receipt of payment.

The trial court decided in favor of the petitioners. It voided the "Deed of Confirmation of Extra Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Tan Quico and Josefa Oraa and Sale" on the ground that it was not understood by the late Cresencia when she signed it.

Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the lower court. It held there was evidence to establish that the subject properties had been previously partitioned. It ruled that respondent Lorenzo was not shown to have exercised any undue influence over the late Crescencia when she signed the said Deed of Confirmation, etc.

Dissatisfied, petitioners filed this petition for review by certiorari.

Issues:1. Whether or not the subject properties had already been partitioned among the heirs of Tan Quico and Josefa Oraa.2. Whether or not the Deed of Confirmation of Extra Judicial Settlement of the Estate is valid.

HELD:1. The private respondents alleged that the properties had been orally partitioned in 1930. 10 Their evidence on this score, however, leaves much to be desired. It is only respondent Lorenzo who stubbornly insisted that the said properties had already been divided. However, brother Hermogenes, the other respondent, gave a different testimony.

The documentary evidence likewise support the conclusion that there was no such partition. The receipt speaks of the late Cresencia's pro-indiviso share of the subject properties or her share

before division. We also note that the subject lots are still covered by tax declarations in the name of their parents. If these lots had already been partitioned to the different heirs and then occupied by them, it appears strange that their tax declarations have not been adjusted to reflect their ownership considering the long time that has elapsed since 1930. Respondent Lorenzo testified that he took possession of the lot

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supposed to belong to the late Crescencia in 1966, yet, he himself did not cause any change in its tax declaration.

2.Article 1332 of the Civil Code: When one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is in language not understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the former."

The questioned Deed is written in English, a language not understood by the late Crescencia, an illiterate. It was prepared by the respondent Lorenzo, a lawyer and CPA. For reasons difficult to divine, respondent Lorenzo did not cause the notarization of the deed. Petitioners alleged that the Deed was signed by the late Crescencia due to mistake, fraud or undue influence. They postulated that respondent Lorenzo took advantage of the late Crescencia's trust and confidence.

Considering these circumstances, the burden was on private respondents to prove that the content of the Deed was explained to the illiterate Crescencia before she signed it. 17 In this regard, the evidence adduced by the respondents failed to discharge their burden.

This variance in testimony on a material matter works against the credibility of private respondents. Nor are we prepared to give full faith and credit to the testimony that respondent Lorenzo alone explained the text of the deed to the late Crescencia.

For one, the Deed as important as it is, was not caused to be notarized by respondent Lorenzo. The need for notarization could not have escaped respondent Lorenzo, a lawyer by profession. Article 1358 of the Civil Code requires that the Deed should appear in a public document. For another, respondent Lorenzo prepared the Deed in English language when he knew all along that the late Cresencia would not be able to comprehend its meaning. For still another, none of the alleged witnesses to the Deed was presented to testify on whether it was signed by the late Crescencia voluntarily and with clear comprehension of its content. Last but not the least, it is strange that the Crescencia signed the said Deed with full freedom and complete understanding of its legal significance.

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SANDEJAS v. LINAG.R. No. 141634. 5 February 2001

Facts:Elidoro Sandejas was appointed administrator of the estate of his wife Remedios. Allegedly the

administrator sold some parcels of from the estate to Lina under a Deed of Conditional Sale. However, the administrator died without transfering the ownership of the land . Hence Lina filed a Omnibus Motion to compel the heirs to execute a deed of absolute sale pusuant to the conditonal sale, to which the heirs filed an opposition.

Issue:Wether the intestate court has jurisdiction over ordinary civil action asking not merely to enforce

a sale but to compel performance of a contract which falls upon a civil court.

Held:Yes, Probate jurisdiction covers all matters relating to the settlement of estates (Rules 74 & 86-

91) and the probate of wills (Rules 75-77) of deceased persons, including the appointment and the removal of administrators and executors (Rules 78-85). It also extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of a probate court's recognized powers such as selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate. Indeed, the rules on this point are intended to settle the estate in a speedy manner, so that the benefits that may flow from such settlement may be immediately enjoyed by the heirs and the beneficiaries.16

In the present case, the Motion for Approval was meant to settle the decedent's obligation to respondent; hence, that obligation clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the settlement court. To require respondent to file a separate action -- on whether petitioners should convey the title to Eliodoro Sr.'s share of the disputed realty -- will unnecessarily prolong the settlement of the intestate estates of the deceased spouses.

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PIO BARRETO REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. L-62431-33. 31 August 1984

Facts:Nicolai Drepin died leaving a holographic will. Drepin’s estate is consist of 3 titled lands and a

parcel of land pending registration. Said lots are to be sold to pay for the debts of the estate and the balance shall be given to Drepin’s heir Cornelia Tejano.

During the probate proceedings, several showed intent to purchase the land including GM Management Phils. GM Management Phils, through its president Mr. Honor Moslares, showed a deed of sale with mortgage executed by Drepin in his favor. The document showed that Drepin sold 80.3980 hectares of land to Honor P. Moslares but only downpayment was given. In order to secure the payment of the balance Moslares mortgaged the land to Drepin. The parties further agreed not to register the sale yet.

Apparently, Drepin and Moslares entered into a joint venture whereby Drepin was registered as the owner of the subject land and Moslares as the developer. According to the said agreement, Moslares agrees to reserve the right of the Drepin to ask for immediate cash payment against an "Absolute Deed of Sale " on the said land on the amount of not less than P2.3M and if Drepin did not choose to be paid in the said amount the Joint Venture Agreement shall remain in force. If Drepin accepts then the Joint Venture Agreement shall be automatically cancelled. However, before the agreement has been implemented, Drepin died.

Upon knowing of the special proceeding involving the subject land, Moslares informed the judicial administrator than he is the owner of the land. He was allowed by the probate court to pay the balance on the sale with mortgage. He was given until February 28, 1979 to pay the balance, failure to comply shall deem the contract ineffective. Moslares requested for a revision of payment and extension of period of payment. However this was not acted upon by the probate court.

Even though the deadline for payment has already lapsed, Moslares and the Judicial Administrator still executed a Deed of Undertaking implement the Contract of Sale with Mortgage. Postdated checks were issued by Moslares. The counsel of Tejano, Atty. Ramon Encarnacion opposed the said payment. He then introduced Pio Barreto Realty Development, Inc. who also wanted to buy the property. After due hearing, the probate court ruled that administrator is authorized to enter into agreement with any other interested parties on a first paid first served basis without prejudice to G.M. Management Philippines to continue with its offer and make good the same in as an ordinary buyer on the same first paid first served basis.

Moslares questioned the jurisdiction of the probate court in ordering the rescission of the contract executed by Moslares and Deprin. GM Management likewise failed to tender payment because the checks bounced hence the Judicial Administrator executed a Deed of Sale in favor of Pio Barreto. A petition for certiorari was filed by Moslares before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Moslares and declared the sale to Pio Barreto null and void.

Hence this petition.

Issue:Whether the probate court has jurisdiction to rescind the Deed of Sale with Mortgage executed

between Moslares and Deprin.

Held:It cannot but be conceded that the limited jurisdiction of a probate court prohibits it from

determining rights to property left by a decedent which depends on the contract. However, actions of the probate court, in the case at bar, do not refer to the adjudication of rights under the contract entered into by the deceased during his lifetime. It is to be noted that the dealings of the respondent with the court

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arose out of the latter's bid to sell property under its authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber property of the estate to pay or settle against the estate (Rule 89, Revised Rules of Court). Thus, respondent bound himself under an agreement with the court separate and distinct from that which he had with the decedent. In rescinding such contract, the court merely seeks to enforce its right to put an end to an agreement which had ceased to be a working proposition. Surely, this is well within the power of the probate court. Though of limited and special jurisdiction, it cannot be denied, however, that when the law confers jurisdiction upon a court, the latter is deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise such jurisdicton to make it effective.

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McMICKING vs. BENITO SY CONBIENGG.R. No. L-6871. 15 January 1912

Facts:In 1902 one Margarita Jose, died and one Engracio Palanca was appointed administrator with the

will annexed of the estate of the said Margarita Jose, and Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco and Dy Cunyao became his sureties. After the execution of this bond said Palanca, as such administrator, took possession of all the property of the said Margarita Jose. In 1904, Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco died in the city of Manila. CFI made an order directing the Palanca to furnish a bond to take the place of the undertaking upon which said Mariano Ocampo and Dy Cuyao. The bond thus required was duly filed and the new sureties thereon being Juan Fernandez, Luis Saenz de Vismanos and Alejandro Palanca. In the same year Doroteo Velasco was appointed administrator of Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco and Mariano Velasco and Pio de la Guardia Barretto qualified as sureties of the said administrator. Doroteo Velasco, as administrator, filed with the court a complete report and inventory of the property of the deceased, together with a statement of all his debts and liabilities. As a part of this report and inventory said administrator filed an instrument signed by all of the persons interested in the estate of the said Mariano Ocampo agreeing to the partition of the estate among themselves without proceedings in court, at the same time assuming the payment of all obligations against the estate. The CFI, upon the request of the administrator and of all parties interested in the estate of the said Mariano Ocampo, entered an order in said agreement. Pursuant to such agreement and order of the court approving the same, Doroteo Velasco, as administrator, delivered to the devisees and legatees of Mariano Ocampo, all of the property of said decedent pursuant to the terms of said agreement of partition, leaving in the hands of the administrator no property or thing of value whatsoever belonging to the said estate. From that time forward said administrator has not had in his possession or control any of the assets of the said estate and has not had any participation in the management thereof. At the time the agreement for participation was made and signed and at the time of the distribution of the property of the estate pursuant thereto, no committee had been appointed to hear claims against the estate of the said Mariano Ocampo, and no notice had been published to creditors of the said deceased to present their claims against the said estate in the manner prescribed by law. In 1908, Palanca was removed from office as administrator of the estate of said Margarita Jose and Jose McMicking, was appointed in his stead. Palanca refused to render an account of the property and funds of the estate of the said Margarita Jose. Instead of so doing, he retained possession of said propertyand funds, absconded with the same, and never returned to the Philippine Islands. In 1909, Jose McMicking, as administrator, made an application to the court for the appointment of commissioners of the estate of said Mariano Ocampo for the purpose of hearing claims against the estate. The commission having been appointed and qualified, a claim was presented to it by the plaintiff based upon the defalcation of said Engracio Palanca, as administrator, which claim was allowed by said commission and later approved by the court, which directed that the said claim be paid by Doroteo Velasco, if he had sufficient funds to make such payment. No part of the sum thus found to be due by the commission has been paid to the representative of the estate of said Margarita Jose. In 1905, Pio de la Barretto died and letters of administration were issued to Benito Sy Conbieng. In 1909, upon the application of McMicking, a committee was appointed by CFI Manila to appraise the estate of the said Pio de la Guardia Barretto, deceased, and to hear claims presented against his estate. The claim so presented against the estate of Pio de la Guardia Barretto, deceased, was disallowed by the committee thereof. Upon these facts the court having heard the evidence and the arguments of counsel, rendered judgment in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, dismissing the complaint upon merits, without costs. Hence this appeal.

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Issue:Whether or not there can be administration of estate even after the partition and division has

already consummated.

Held:The Supreme Court ruled that after the partition and division provided for in sections 596 and 597

have been fully consummated, no further administration of the estate can be had unless there occur the following requisites: 1. There must have been discovered a claim against the estate "within two years after such settlement and distribution of estate."2. The creditor holding the claim must be the person who moves the court for the appointment of an administrator. In the case at bar:

1. No debt was discovered during the prescribed period. It was nearly four years after the partition of the estate and the taking possession by the heirs of their respective portions before it was even discovered that Palanca had been guilty of converting the property of the estate to his own use; and, so far as the records shows, it was nearly five years before the alleged claim against the estate of Mariano Ocampo was fixed; and

2. No creditor made his application. The necessary conclusion is that the appointment of commissioners to hear the claim above referred to was beyond the powers of the court and was without jurisdiction. The finding of the commissioners had no force or effect. It gave no right against the estate and none against the so-called administrator. This section creates a statute of limitations which deprives all debts which are not discovered within the prescribed time of the power of requiring an administration of the estate.

The partition proceedings are proceedings out of court. Consequently there is no prescribed method of ascertaining and settling claims. The appointment of commissioners, the publication of notice to creditors, and all the other proceedings necessary in cases of administration in court are not required in partition out of court It was not the intention of the law to pronounce the partition void of no effect simply because not all of the debts were paid before the partition was made. The fact of non payment cannot, then, because by the creditor as a reason for attacking the partition directly by asserting that, inasmuch as a payment of all the debts is a condition precedent to the right of partition, such partition cannot legally and validly take place while a debt is outstanding. The mere fact, therefore, that a creditor was not paid before the partition took place furnishes no ground for a revocation of the partition. It simply provides a fact which he may urge as a reason for the appointment of an administrator and the consequent administration of so much of the estate as may be necessary to pay the debt discovered.

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ILUSTRE v. ALARASG.R. No. L-6077. 16 November 1910

Facts:Franciso Calzado died on the 9th or 10th of December, 1903. It appears that at the time of his

death he was the owner of certain property. Calzado had no relatives, descendants or ascendants, but nephews, who being of lawful age divided among themselves the property in question and sold to the defendant (Alaras) the said property. The plaintiff (Ilustre) alleges, and the fact is not denied, that he was appointed as administrator of the estate of the said Francisco Calzado. The record fails to show when he was appointed.

Nearly six years after the death of Calzado, the plaintiff, as administrator, commenced the present action to recover the property to herein defendant (Alaras). The defendant demurred to the complaint, alleging: That the plaintiff was not the proper party to bring the action; Second. That the facts alleged were not sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

This demurrer was sustained and the plaintiff filed an amended petition. The amended petition did not change the character of the action. To the amended petition the defendant answered, denying generally and specifically all of the facts alleged in the complaint, and as a special defense alleged:

First. That at the time of the death of Calzado, he was the owner of the property described in the complaint;

Second. That at the time of the division of the estate among the heirs of the deceased and at the time the lands were sold, there were no debts against the estate of the said Francisco Calzado;

Third. That the plaintiff is not a creditor of the estate CalzadoDuring the trial the defendant showed by oral and documentary proof that he was in possession of

the land in question; that he had purchased the same from some of the nephews and heirs of the deceased Francisco Calzado; that he had purchased the interest of all the heirs except perhaps three. There was no proof adduced during the trial of the cause to show that any of the heirs of the deceased were minors or that there were any debts existing against the said estate. The lower court rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. From that judgment the defendant appealed.

Issue:Whether or not it is proper for the plaintiff administrator to intervene in the settlement and

partition of the estate of the decased?Held:

The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In the absence of debts existing against the estate, the heirs may enter upon the administration of the said property immediately. If they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to partition it among themselves and can do this by mutual agreement, they also have that privilege. The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be divided by a petition for partition in case they can not mutually agree in the division.

When there are no debts existing against the estate, there is certainly no occasion for the intervention of an administrator in the settlement and partition of the estate among the heirs. When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts, there is no reason why the estate should be burdened with the costs and expenses of an administrator.

The property belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the absence of existing debts against the estate, the administrator has no right to intervene in any way whatever in the division of the estate among the

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heirs. They are coowners of an undivided estate and the law offers them a remedy for the division of the same among themselves.

There is nothing in the present case to show that the heirs requested the appointment of the administrator, or that they intervened in any way whatever in the present action.

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HERNANDEZ v. ANDALG.R. No. L-273. 29 March 1947

Facts:The plaintiff, Cresencia Hernandez, the intervenors, Maria and Aquilina Hernandez, and Pedro

and Basilia Hernandez who are not parties here, are brother and sisters. They acquired in common by descent from their father a parcel of land. Intervenors sold 1800 square meters of this parcel, a portion which is particularly described in the deed of conveyance to Zacarias Andal, the defendant, and Andal's wife in consideration of P860.

After the sale the plaintiff attempted to repurchase the land sold to Andal. Andal, it is alleged, refused to part with the property. Cresencia Hernandez; the plaintiff, was the only witness to testify on her own behalf. Substantially she reiterated the allegations in her two complaints. Zacarias Andal, the defendant, also testified. He said that he was in possession of the land in question until he returned it to the intervenors. He declared that the plaintiff offered to repurchase the land from him long after he had bought it, that is when she was about to file her action.

Defendant and intervenors asked that evidence be allowed to prove that a parol partition among the five brother and sisters had been made. Counsel for the plaintiff objected asserting that "under the Rules of Court agreement affecting real estate may not be proved except by means of writing subscribed by the person against whom the p roof is offered." Upon this objection, the court ruled that under Rules 74 and 123 of the Rules of Court (Statute of Frauds) as well as under article 1248 of the Civil Code, parol evidence of partition was inadmissible, adding that to decide the case it had enough with the testimony and evidence offered by the parties.

Issue:Whether under Rules 74 and 123 of the Rules of Court (Statute of Frauds) as well as under article

1248 of the Civil Code, parol evidence of partition was inadmissible

Held:No. There is a conflict of authority as to whether an agreement of partition is such a contract as is

required to be in writing under the statute of frauds. One line of authorities holds the affirmative view; other authorities say no. The reason for the rule that excludes partition from the operation of the statute of frauds is that partition is not a conveyance but simply a separation and designation of that part of the land which belongs to each tenant in common. The differences in the conclusions reached are "due perhaps to varied phraseology of the statutes" in the several states. However the case may be, as enacted in the Philippines, first in section 335 of the former Code of Civil Procedure, and now in Rule 123, section 21, of the Rules of Court, the law has been uniformly interpreted in a long line of cases to be applicable to executory and not to completed or executed contracts. In this jurisdiction performance of the contract takes it out of the operation of the statute. The statute of frauds does not declare the contracts therein enumerate void and of no legal effect, but only makes ineffective the action for specific performance.

On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforced oral partition when it has been completely or partly performed.

"Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law, equity will in proper cases, where the parol partition has actually been consummated by the taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off to each, recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder. Thus, it has been he]d or stated in a number of cases involving an oral partition under which the parties went into possession, exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly performed the partition agreement, that

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equity will confirm such partition and in a proper case decree title in accordance with the possession in severalty.

"In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions may be sustained on the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of land divided by parol partition as to which possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the parties as between each other to hold their respective parts in severalty.

"A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition.

"A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part performance, or have stated that a part performance is necessary, to take a parol partition out of the operation of the statute of frauds. It has been held that where there was a partition in fact between tenants in common, and a part performance, a court of equity would have regard to and enforce such partition agreed to by the parties."

It is on the effects of rule 74, section 1, of the Rules of Court on a parol partition, that there are sharp divergences of opinion among the members of this Court. This section reads:

"If the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir or one legatee, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two years after the death of the decedent."

It is contended that under this rule a verbal partition is entirely void and cannot be validated by any acts of the parties short of the execution of a public document and its registration.

As a general proposition, transactions, so far as the affect the parties, are required to be reduced to writing either as a condition of jural validity or as a means of providing evidence to prove the transactions. Written form exacted by the statute of frauds, for example, "is for evidential purposes only." (Domalagan vs. Bolifer, 33 Phil., 171.) The decisions of this Court which we have noticed were predicated on this assumption. The Civil Code, too requires the accomplishment of acts or contracts in a public instrument, not in order to validate the act or contract but only to insure its efficacy so that after the existence of the acts or contracts has been admitted, the party bound may be compelled to execute the document (Hawaiian Philippine Co. vs. Hernaez, 45 Phil., 746.)

Is section 1 of Rule 74 constitutive and not merely evidential or partition? In other words, is writing the that confers legal validity upon the agreement? There no indications in the phraseology of this rule which justify an affirmative answer to these questions. It must be note that where the law intends a writing or other formality be the essential requisite to the validity of the transaction, it says so in clear and nequivocal terms. Thus, the statute of frauds as originally enacted in England and as enacted in some of the states, uses the words "utterly void" with reference to certain transactions. Under the terms of such state transactions required to be in writing are absolutely void and not merely voidable if not made in the manner indicated. Again article 633 of the Civil Code says that donation may be valid only when made in a public document. Article 146 of the Mortgage Law makes known its intention to have the execution of a public instrument and its registration in the registry indispensable to the validity of the contract by using this phrase: " in order that voluntary mortgages may be legally created in a valid manner." Article 1765 of the Civil Code also employs for the same purpose similar expression with reference to the execution of a public document: "in order that mortgage may be validly constituted." And with respect to the formalities of last wills and testaments, section 618 of Act No. 190 makes this emphatic statement: "No will shall be valid to pass upon any estate real or personal nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written etc." Other examples might be mentioned.

Section 1 of Rule 74 contains no such express or clear declaration that the required public instrument is to be constitutive of a contract of partition or an inherent element of its effectiveness as

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between the parties. And this Court had no apparent reason, in adopting this rule, to make the efficacy of a partition as between the parties dependent on the execution of a public instrument and its registration. On the other hand, the opposite theory is not without reasonable support. We can think of possible factors against the proposition that a public document and its registration were contemplated as necessary ingredients to give life to a contract of partition so that without them no oral partition can bind the parties.

1. In the first place, the Rules of Court of which the rule under consideration forms a part were promulgated by the Judicial Department under authority to deal with matters of procedure exclusively. For this court to prescribe what is to be a binding agreement between coheirs in the settlement of their private affairs which in no way affect the rights of third parties would be to transcend its rule-making power. We bring out this limitation upon the authority of this court to make rules, as an aid to interpretation, as a method of arriving at the conclusion that section 1 of Rule 74 was meant to be remedial and not a rule of substantive law of far-reaching importance and serious juridical and practical implications. It is to be presumed that the framers of the Rules of Court realized the bounds of this court's functions and did not intend to trespass on purely substantive rights of the parties to the partition. To the extent the execution and registration of a notarized instrument are made essential elements to validity to protect innocent third parties, the rule is legitimate and necessary; legitimate because decedents' estates are placed under the jurisdiction of the courts to administer and distribute. The interests of to parties eliminated, the rule loses its character as one of procedure and practice and invades the realm of substantive law.

Section 596 of Act No. 190, which is the precursor of section 1 of Rule 74, is enlightening and instructive. The former after stating that heirs may apportion and divided the estate among themselves as they may see fit by agreement duly executed in writing by all of them, adds the words "and not otherwise." These words, in our opinion, were expressive of an intention to make the written formality inherent element of the validity of a parol partition. But what is far, more to the point is that by logical process of deduction the elimination from the new rule of the words "and not otherwise" imports the casting away from the prescribed public document of its jural character which the document enjoyed in the former code. At the same time, the inclusion of the aforesaid words in the old provision series to emphasize the necessity of positive and clear language if a given contractual formality is to be the exclusive basis of the contract's binding effect on the parties. It is of course unnecessary to say that the attaching of jural character to the prescribed public instrument in section 596 of Act No. 190 is no argument for contending that such document must be clothed with the same raiment in the new Rules. Act No. 190 was a mixture of procedural and substantive provisions, having been enacted by the legislative body itself which, unlike this court, was unhampered and untrammelled, except by the fundamental law, in the choice of its subjects of legislation.

2. The civil law looks upon the role of public instruments ill acts and contracts with greater liberality with a view to better adaptation to human frailties and idiosyncrasies. In their blind faith in friends and relatives, in their lack of experience and foresight, and in their ignorance, men, in spite of laws, will make and continue to make verbal contracts. The advantages of an air-tight policy concerning such contracts fall far short of compensating for the resulting damage, injustice, inconveniences and confusion. So even though articles 1278, 1279 and 1280 of the Civil Code have made provision for public instrument for all transaction and contracts whose object is the creation, modification or extinction of real rights in immovables, it has been recognized and held that verbal contracts may be effective between the parties. A leading case on this subject is Tunga Chui vs. Que Bentec (2 Phil., 561), Mr. Justice Willard writing the decision. It was said in that case that when the essential requisites for the existence of a contract are present, the contract is binding upon the parties, and, although required to be in writing by article 1280 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff can maintain an action on the verbal agreement without first bringing an action under article 1279 to compel the execution of a written instrument. It says that "article 1279 does not impose an obligation, but confers a privilege upon both contracting parties, and the fact that the plaintiff has not made use of same does not bar his action." It further says that article 1279, far from making the enforceability of the contract dependent upon any special intrinsic form, recognized its enforceability by the mere act of granting the contracting parties an adequate remedy whereby to compel

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the execution of public writing or any other special form whenever such form is necessary in order that contract may produce the effect which is desired according to whatever its object. This doctrine was iterated and reiterated in a series of decisions perhaps longer than that on any other legal topic. And it has been extended even to verbal con tracts involving land registered under the Torrens Act. Do the Rules of Court adhere to this salutary principle? We can perceive no sufficient ground for the new Rules to depart from it. No considerations of public policy enter into a partition of hereditary estate among coheirs greater than those involved in a contract between strangers which operates to create, transmit, modify or extinguish property rights in land. If is between strangers the creation, transmission, modification or extinction of real rights may be lawfully effected by parol agreement notwithstanding the requirement that it be put in writing, the new rule could not be more intransigent when the transaction is between co-heirs and there is no change of ownership but simply designation and segregation of that part which belongs to each heir.

The requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has, in our opinion, for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. Note that the last sentence of the section speaks of debts and creditors. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice, and this means notice to others. It must follow that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when, as in this case, there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. No rights of creditors being involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by law.

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PADA-KILARIO v. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 134329. 19 January 2001

Facts:Jacinto Pada had six children. His estate included a parcel of land of residential and coconut land

located at Poblacion, Matalom, Leyte, denominated as Cadastral Lot No. 5581 with an area of 1,301.92 square meters. During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, Feliciano Pada, obtained permission from him to build a house on the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. When Feliciano died, his son, Pastor, continued living in the house together with his eight children. Petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, one of Pastor's children, has been living in that house since 1960. The heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into an extra-judicial partition of his estate. For this purpose, they executed a private document which they, however, never registered in the Office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte. Private respondent demanded that petitioner spouses vacate the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 so his family can utilize the said area. They went through a series of meetings with the barangay officials concerned for the purpose of amicable settlement, but all earnest efforts toward that end, failed. Petitioner spouses filed their Answer averring that the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 had already been donated to them by the heirs of Amador Pada. They contended that the extra-judicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada executed in 1951 was invalid and ineffectual since no special power of attorney was executed by either Marciano, Amador or Higino in favor of their respective children who represented them in the extra-judicial partition. Moreover, it was effectuated only through a private document that was never registered in the office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.

Issue:Whether the extrajudicial partition of estate under an unregistered private document is valid.

Held:Yes, We hold that the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada among his heirs made in

1951 is valid, albeit executed in an unregistered private document. No law requires partition among heirs to be in writing and be registered in order to be valid. The requirement in Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court that a partition be put in a public document and registered, has for its purpose the protection of creditors and the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities is not undermined when no creditors are involved. Without creditors to take into consideration, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution thereof in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by the rules from which, in the first place, nothing can be inferred that a writing or other formality is essential for the partition to be valid. The partition of inherited property need not be embodied in a public document so as to be effective as regards the heirs that participated therein. The requirement of Article 1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property, must appear in a public instrument, is only for convenience, non-compliance with which does not affect the validity or enforceability of the acts of the parties as among themselves. And neither does the Statute of Frauds under Article 1403 of the New Civil Code apply because partition among heirs is not legally deemed a conveyance of real property, considering that it involves not a transfer of property from one to the other but rather, a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance. The 1951 extrajudicial partition of Jacinto Pada's estate being legal and effective as among his heirs, Juanita and Maria Pada

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validly transferred their ownership rights over Cadastral Lot No. 5581 to Engr. Paderes and private respondent, respectively.


DE BORJA v. DE BORJAGR No. L-28040, GR No. L-285868, GR No. L-292611

Facts:When Josefa Tangco died, her husband Francisco de Borja filed a petition for the probate of her

will. The will was probated and Francisco de Borja was named as the executor and administrator of the estate. Later on, Jose de Borja, their son, was appointed as co-administrator. Francisco married Tasiana Ongsingco. When Francisco died, Tasiana Ongsingco instituted testate proceedings wherein she was later on appointed as the special administratix of Francisco’s estate. The validity of Francisco and Tasiana’s marriage was questioned.

Many cases were ensued concerning the estates of Josefa Tangco and Francisco de Borja but they remained unresolved. Hence, the heirs entered into an agreement to finally settle the disputes and controversies. Said agreement was submitted by Jose de Borja for the Court’s approval. Tasiana opposed the agreement and she made this known to the respective Courts where the agreement was submitted. Its validity was contested by Tasiana Ongsingco saying that the heirs cannot enter into such agreement without first probating the will of Francisco de Borja.

Issue:Whether the agreement entered into by the heirs is valid.

Held:It is valid. There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among

the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or eventual in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee. And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. However, the aleatory character of the contract does not affect the validity of the transaction; neither does the coetaneous agreement that the numerous litigations between the parties are to be considered settled and should be dismissed, although such stipulation, as noted by the Rizal Court, gives the contract the character of a compromise that the law favors, for obvious reasons, if only because it serves to avoid a multiplicity of suits.

It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana Ongsingco was his compulsory heir under Article 995 of the New Civil Code. Wherefore, barring unworthiness or valid disinheritance, her successional interest existed independent of Francisco de Borja's last will and testament and would exist even if such will were not probated at all. Thus, the prerequisite of a previous probate of the will, as established in the Guevara and analogous cases, cannot apply to the case of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja.

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GUEVARA v. GUEVARAG.R. No. L-48840. 29 December 1943

Facts:Ernesto M. Guevarra and Rosario Guevara, ligitimate son and natural daughter of the deceased

Victorino L. Guevara, are litigating here over their inheritance from the latter. The action was commenced by Rosario Guevara to recover from Ernesto Guevara what she claims to be her strict legitime as an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased. Ernesto Guevara answered the complaint contending that whatever right or rights the plaintiff might have had, had been barred by the operation of law.

It appears that Victorino L. Guevara executed a will apparently with all the formalities of the law. On September 27, 1933, Victorino L. Guevarra died. His last will and testament, however, was never presented to the court for probate, nor has any administration proceeding ever been instituted for the settlement of his estate. Whether the various legatees mentioned in the will have received their respective legacies or have even been given due notice of the execution of said will and of the dispositions therein made in their favor, does not affirmatively appear from the record of this case. Ever since the death of Victorino L. Guevara, his only legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara appears to have possessed the land adjudicated to him in the registration proceeding and to have disposed of various portions thereof for the purpose of paying the debts left by his father.

In the meantime Rosario Guevara, who appears to have had her father's last will and testament in her custody, did nothing judicially to invoke the testamentary dispositions made therein in her favor, whereby the testator acknowledged her as his natural daughter and, aside from certain legacies and bequests, devised to her a portion of 21.6171 hectares of the large parcel of land described in the will. But a little over four years after the testor's demise, she commenced the present action against Ernesto M. Guevara alone for the purpose hereinbefore indicated; and it was only during the trial of this case that she presented the will to the court, not for the purpose of having it probated but only to prove that the deceased Victirino L. Guevara had acknowledged her as his natural daughter. Upon that proof of acknowledgment she claimed her share of the inheritance from him, but on the theory or assumption that he died intestate, because the will had not been probated, for which reason, she asserted, the betterment therein made by the testator in favor of his legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara should be disregarded. Both the trial court and the Court of appeals sustained that theory.

Issue:Whether or not the procedure adopted by Rosario Guevara legal.

Held:The Supreme Court ruled that the procedure adopted by the Rosario Guevara, is in violation of

procedural law and an attempt to circumvent and disregard the last will and testament of the decedent. The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, with notice by publication to the whole world and with personal notice to each of the known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. Although not contested the due execution of the will and the fact that the testator at the time of its execution was of sound and disposing mind and not acting under duress, menace, and undue influence or fraud, must be proved to the satisfaction of the court, and only then may the will be legalized and given effect by means of a certificate of its allowance, signed by the judge and attested by the seal of the court;

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and when the will devises real property, attested copies thereof and of the certificate of allowance must be recorded in the register of deeds of the province in which the land lies. It will readily be seen from the above provisions of the law that the presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and its allowance by the court is essential and indispensable to its efficacy. To assure and compel the probate of will, the law punishes a person who neglects his duty to present it to the court with a fine not exceeding P2,000, and if he should persist in not presenting it, he may be committed to prision and kept there until he delivers the will. In the instant case there is no showing that the various legatees other than the present litigants had received their respective legacies or that they had knowledge of the existence and of the provisions of the will. Their right under the will cannot be disregarded, nor may those rights be obliterated on account of

the failure or refusal of the custodian of the will to present it to the court for probate.

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Vda. De LOPEZ v. LOPEZGR .No. L-23915. 28 September 1970

Facts:Saturnina M. Vda. de Lopez, judicial administratrix of the estate of the deceased husband filed

with the lower court a project of partition adjudicating the whole to herself and her legitimate children with the deceased.

In an order dated March 30, 1964 the lower court approved the project of partition and declared the intestate proceeding "terminated and closed for all legal purposes." Seventeen days thereafter, or on April 16, 1964, the minors Dahlia and Roy, both surnamed Lopez, 1 represented by their mother, Lolita B. Bachar, filed a motion to reopen the proceeding, together with a petition claiming that they were illegitimate children of, the deceased Emilio Lopez, born out of his extra-marital relations with Lolita B. Bachar, and asking that their rights as such be recognized and their shares in the estate given to them.

The motion was opposed by the judicial administratrix on the ground that the proceeding had already been ordered terminated and closed and the estate was already in the hands of the distributees; and that the reopening of the intestate proceeding was not the proper remedy, which should be an independent action against the individual distributes.The Court finds that the said petition to reopen is not in order. In view thereof, the said petition to reopen is hereby denied for lack of merit.The movants asked for reconsideration, which was denied, and thereupon appealed directly to this Court.

Issues:1.) Whether or not the motion to reopen the estate proceeding is proper? 2.) Whether or not the motion to reopen the estate proceeding was filed too late?

Held:1.) Of vital importance is the fact that appellants' motion to reopen, as well as the petition attached thereto, is based on their claim that they are illegitimate children of the deceased. On the face of such claim they are legal heirs of the deceased and hence entitled to share in his estate. Having been omitted in the partition presented by the judicial administratrix — and approved by the Court, they were not bound thereby.

A judicial partition in probate proceedings does not bind the heirs who were not parties thereto. No partition, judicial or extrajudicial, could add one iota or particle to the interest which the petitioner had during the joint possession. Partition is of the nature of a conveyance of ownership and certainly none of the co-owners may convey to the others more than his own of such definitive character to stop all means of redress for a co-heir who has been deprived of his lawful share, such co-heir may still, within the prescriptive period, bring an action for reivindication in the province where any of the real property of the deceased may be situated.

2.) The motion to reopen was not too late. The court's order declaring the intestate proceeding closed did not become final immediately upon its issuance. It was no different from judgments or orders in ordinary actions. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 72 provides that "in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in Special Proceedings." And judgments

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or orders in ordinary actions become final after thirty (30) days from notice to the party concerned. In this case appellants' motion to reopen was led only seventeen (17) days from the date of the order of closure. The remedy was therefore invoked on time.


TOMIAS v. TOMIASG.R. No. L-3004. 30 May 1951

Facts:Eustaquio Tomias died intestate in 1920, leaving 7 children named Leon, Benita, Monica,

Bernabela, Toribia (alleged to known also as Enrica), Agustina, and Josefa, all surnamed Tomias. Possessed of property at the time of his death, he was succeeded in the possession and enjoyment thereof by his 7 children. Two of these, however later died, Leon in 1931 and Josefa in 1944. It is claimed that the latter was survived by a daughter named Josefa or Filomena Tomias. Leon, who had married twice, was survived by 4 children — Conrado Magdalena, Dolores, and Anicetas — the first two, by the first marriage, and the other two by the second marriage. It is claimed, however, that he has also had natural son named Filemon Tomias.

On January 19, 1948, Conrado Tomias and Magdalena Tomias (two of the children of the deceased Leon Tomias), in conjunction with their cousin Josefa or Filomena Tomias (only daughter of the deceased Josefa or Filomena Tomias (only daughter of the deceased Josefa Tomias), filed a complaint(registered as civil case No. 857 of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros) against their aunts Benita, Monica, Bernabela, Enrica, and Agustina, alleging that their deceased grandfather Eustaquio Tomias was the absolute owner of the 15 parcels of land (in Occidental Negros) of the total assessed value of P8,290 and that since the death of Leon Tomias the defendants had continued in possession of said land and had been refusing to divide it among the heirs and to give plaintiffs their share of the products. Plaintiffs, therefore, prayed for partition and accounting. For refusing to join as plaintiffs, Dolores Tomias and Anicetas Tomias (the other two legitimate children of Leon Tomias) were included as defendants. Through their counsel Atty. Jose M. Millares, the defendants appeared and filed their answer; but as this was merely a general denial, the plaintiffs moved for a judgment on the pleadings, whereupon the court rendered its decision, declaring plaintiffs and defendants owners in common of the 15 parcels of land described in the complaint, together with the improvements thereon, in the proportion of one--seventh each to Josefa, Benita, Monica, Bernabela,Enrica, and Agustina, all surnamed Tomias, and one--twenty--eighth to each of the 4 legitimate children of the deceased Leon Tomias, namely, Conrado Tomias, Magdalena Tomias, Dolores Tomias, and Anicetas Tomias. The court also ordered an accounting.

The above decision was rendered on April 21, 1948, and no appeal having been taken therefrom, it became final in due time. But some 5 months thereafter the defendants, together with Filemon Tomias, an alleged natural son Leon Tomias, sought to annul it by filing an action for that purpose(civil case No. 1063) on the ground (1) that the court did not have jurisdiction over the case because some of the parcels of land partitioned among the heirs did not belong to the deceased Eustaquio Tomias but to other persons not made parties to the suit, and (2) that not all of the heirs were represented in the suit because Filemon Tomias, an alleged natural child of Leon Tomias, had not been made a party therein.

On motion of the defendants the action to annul was dismissed by the court on the ground that it raised issues already raised and decided in the former case (civil case No. 857). Plaintiffs asked for a reconsideration of this ruling, alleging for the first time that Toribia Tomias, one of the children of the deceased Eustaquio Tomias, had not been served with summons implementing the allegation with the affidavit of Toribia Tomias to the effect that she had received a copy of the complaint in the partition case

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nor authorized Atty. Millares to appear for her in that case. Plaintiffs also filed an affidavit of Filemon Tomias to the effect that he was an acknowledge natural son of the deceased Leon Tomias.

Held:1. The judgment in the partition case may not be voided on the mere allegation that some of the parcels of land partitioned were the property of persons not made parties to the suit when none of those persons has come to the court to protest.2. There is no showing that Toribia Tomias has been prejudiced by the adjudication of one-seventh of the inheritance to Enrica Tomias, the court having found that Toribia and Enrica are one and the same person. There is no claim that Toribia is entitled to more.3. The claim of Filemon Tomias for a share in the inheritance as an alleged natural son of Leon Tomias does not call for the annulment of the decision in the partition case. That claim should be asserted in separate action against the four legitimate children of Leon Tomias to whom the latter's share in the inheritance was adjudicated in the partition.

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MARQUEZ v. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 125715. 29 Decemebr 1998

Facts:Spouse Rafael Sr. and Felicidad Marquez begot 12 children. The spouses acquired a parcel of

land. Felicidad died intestate . 30 years later Rafael Sr. executed an Affidavit of Adjudication vesting unto himself sole ownership of the parcel of land. A year after Rafael Sr. executed a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos covering the land in favor only to his three children. The other heirs, the petitioners, demanded their share but the respondents ignored. Hence, petitioners filed a complaint alleging that the affidavit ofadjudication and deed of donation were fraudulent.In their Answer, private respondents argued that petitioner’s action was already barred by the statute of limitations, since the same should have been filed within four years from the date of discovery of the alleged fraud.

Issue:Whether the action for reconveyance had expired.

Held:No, It must be noted that Felicidad Marquez died in 1952; thus, succession to her estate is

governed by the present Civil Code. Under Article 887 thereof, her compulsory heirs are her legitimate children, petitioners and private respondent herein, and her spouse, Rafael Marquez, Sr. Now, in 1982, Rafael Marquez, Sr. decided to adjudicate the entire property by executing an “Affidavit of Adjudication” claiming that he is the only sole and surviving heir of his deceased wife Felicidad F. Marquez.

As such, when Rafael Marquez, Sr., for one reason or another, misrepresented in his unilateral affidavit that he was the only heir of his wife when in fact their children were still alive, and managed to secure a transfer of certificate of title under his name, a constructive trust under Article 1456 was established.Constructive trusts are created in equity in order to prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold.

In this regard, it is settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribed in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. For the purpose of this case, the prescriptive period shall start to run when TCT No. 33350 was issued which was on June 16, 1982. Thus, considering that the action for reconveyance was filed on May 31, 1991, or approximately nine years later, it is evident that prescription had not yet barred the action. With the effectivity of the present Civil Code on August 30, 1950, the provisions on prescriptive period are now governed by Articles 1139 to 1155. Since implied or constructive trust are obligations created by law, then the prescriptive period to enforce the same prescribes in ten years.

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PEDROSA v. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 118680. 5 March 2001

Facts:Spouses Miguel and Rosalina Rodriguez adopted petitioner Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa.

Miguel died intestate. Rosalina and Maria Elena entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Miguel’s estate equally dividing the estate between them. However, herein private respondents questioned the adoption of Maria Elena but the lower court ruled in favor of petitioner. The case was brought to the Court of Appeals

While the case was still pending, the Rodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial settlement with Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel and his sister Pilar. Rosalina acted as representative of Miguel and the brothers and sisters of Pilar acted as her heirs. The said settlement involved 14 parcel of lands which were divided among Jose, Carmen, Mercedes, Ramon and heirs of Miguel, solely represented by Rosalina. The Rodriguezes were issued new Transfer Certificates of Title. The Rodriguezes then subsequently transferred portions of the parcel of land to other third parties, who were later on issued their own Transfer Certificates of Title.

The Rodriguezes then filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the adoption of Maria Elena Pedrosa but the Court of Appeals upheld the validity of her adoption. Pedrosa, thru her daughter Loreto Jocelyn then claied the share of their properties from the Rodriguezes but they refused.

Pedrosa filed a petition to annul the partition. The Regional Trial Court dismissed her complaint ruling that the act of Rosalina as representative of the heirs of Miguel estopped Pedrosa from questiong the validity of the partition and that the period to claim has already prescribed. Court of Appeals affirmed said decision.

Issue: Whether Pedrosa’s action against the respondents had already prescribed.

Held:No, said action has not yet prescribed. According to Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court – “The fact of the extrajudicial

settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.

Under said provision, without the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement cannot be binding on said persons. The rule contemplates a notice which must be sent out or issued before the Deed of Settlement and/or Partition is agreed upon, i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition, not after, which was when publication was done in the instant case. Since Maria Elena did not participate in the said partition, the settlement is not binding on her.

The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed of extrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled on the ground of fraud. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. Maria

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Elena is an heir of Miguel together with her adopting mother, Rosalina. Being the lone descendant of Miguel, she excludes the collateral relatives of Miguel from participating in his estate, following the provisions of Article 1003 of the Civil Code. The private respondent Rodriguezes cannot claim that they were not aware of Maria Elena's adoption since they even filed an action to annul the decree of adoption. Neither can they claim that their actions were valid since the adoption of Maria Elena was still being questioned at the time they executed the deed of partition. The complaint seeking to annul the adoption was filed only twenty six (26) years after the decree of adoption, patently a much delayed response to prevent Maria Elena from inheriting from her adoptive parents. The decree of adoption was valid and existing. With this factual setting, it is patent that private respondents executed the deed of partition in bad faith with intent to defraud Maria Elena.

To say that Maria Elena was represented by Rosalina in the partitioning is imprecise. Maria Elena, the adopted child, was no longer a minor at the time Miguel died. Rosalina, only represented her own interests and not those of Maria Elena. Since Miguel predeceased Pilar, a sister, his estate automatically vested to his child and widow, in equal shares. Respondent Rodriguezes' interests did not include Miguel's estate but only Pilar's estate.

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LEE v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITYG.R. No. 146006 23 February 2004

Facts: Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez incorporated the Philippine International Life Insurance Company, Inc. on July 6, 1956. At the time of the company’s incorporation, Dr. Ortañez owned ninety percent (90%) of the subscribed capital stock. When he died on July 21, 1980, he left behind a wife (Juliana) three legitimate children (Rafael, Jose and Antonio) and five illegitimate children by Ligaya Novicio (herein private respondent Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes and her siblings Jose, Romeo, Enrico Manuel and Cesar, all surnamed Ortañez).

Rafael Ortañez filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch a petition for letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Ortañez, docketed as SP Proc. Q-30884. Private respondent Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes and her siblings filed an opposition to the petition for letters of administration and, in a subsequent urgent motion, prayed that the intestate court appoint a special administrator.

Judge Ernani Cruz Paño, then presiding judge of Branch 85, appointed Rafael and Jose Ortañez joint special administrators of their father’s estate. Hearings continued for the appointment of a regular administrator.

It appears that decedent wife Juliana and his legitimate children sold the Philinterlife shares with right to repurchase in favor of Filipino Loan Assistance Group (FLAG), represented by its president, Jose C. Lee where ownership thereof was consolidated by petitioner FLAG in its name.

Ma. Divina Ortañez–Enderes and her siblings filed a motion for appointment of special administrator of Philinterlife shares of stockwhich the court granted. Enderes filed a motion to declare the deed of sale and memorandum of agreement involving the said shares void. The lower court declared the said sale void ab initio. Then Enderes moved to execute the said order of the court.

Thereafter petitioners Lee and Aggabao subsequently filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 59736. Petitioners alleged that the intestate court gravely abused its discretion in declaring that the ownership of FLAG over the Philinterlife shares of stock was null and void; ordering the execution of its order declaring such nullity and depriving the petitioners of their right to due process. The Court Appeals denied the petition. Hence this appeal.

Issue:Whether or not extrajudicially partitioning of the estate of the deceased ans subsequent selling of

the disputed shares without approval from the court valid.

Held:The Supreme Court held in the negative.It is clear that the heirs of the deceased invalidly entered into a memorandum of agreement

extrajudicially partitioning the intestate estate among themselves, despite their knowledge that there were other heirs or claimants to the estate and before final settlement of the estate by the intestate court. Since

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the appropriation of the estate properties by Juliana Ortañez and her children as invalid, the subsequent sale thereof by Juliana and Jose to a third party (FLAG), without court approval, was likewise void.

The law is clear that an heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under administration under Art. 533 of the Civil Code which provides that possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption from the moment of death of the decedent. However, an heir can only alienate such portion of the estate that may be allotted to him in the division of the estate by the probate or intestate court after final adjudication, that is, after all debtors shall have been paid or the devisees or legatees shall have been given their shares. This means that an heir may only sell his ideal or undivided share in the estate, not any specific property therein. In the present case, Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific properties of the estate in favor of petitioner FLAG. This they could not lawfully do pending the final adjudication of the estate by the intestate court because of the undue prejudice it would cause the other claimants to the estate, as what happened in the present case. The sale of any property of the estate by an administrator or prospective heir without order of the probate or intestate court is void and passes no title to the purchaser.

Furthermore the court enunciated that the probate court can execute its order nullifying the invalid sale. The intestate court has the power to execute its order with regard to the nullity of an unauthorized sale of estate property, otherwise its power to annul the unauthorized or fraudulent disposition of estate property would be meaningless. In other words, enforcement is a necessary adjunct of the intestate or probate court’s power to annul unauthorized or fraudulent transactions to prevent the dissipation of estate property before final adjudication. However in case where the nullity was affirmed by higher court in ordering the execution of the orders, respondent judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction and grossly violated settled law and jurisprudence, i.e., that the determination by a probate or intestate court of whether a property is included or excluded in the inventory of the estate being provisional in nature, cannot be the subject of execution.

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ESTATE OF OLAVE v. REYESG.R. No. L-29407. 29 July 1983

Facts:Southwest Agricultural Marketing Corporation (SAMCO) filed a Civil Case with the Court of

First Instance of Davao against respondents, Carlos and Matias, in their capacities as co-administrators of the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave, for the collection of an alleged indebtedness in the amount of P19,952. and for attorney's fees.

The Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV, issued an order directing the administrators to secure the probate court's approval before entering into any transaction involving the seventeen (17) titles of the estate.

The parties in Civil Case before the Court of First Instance of Davao submitted to the respondent court an Amicable Settlement whereby the property of the estate covered by OCT No. 0-27 was conveyed and ceded to SAMCO as payment of its claim.

The said Amicable Settlement was neither submitted nor approved by the then Court of First Instance of Manila, or notice thereof made to the beneficiaries and heirs in said special proceedings.

On November 10, 1967, respondent court(CFI Davao) despite the opposition of the other parties who sought to intervene in Civil Case and despite the utter lack of approval of the probate court in Manila, approved the said Amicable Settlement and gave the same the enforceability of a court decision which, in effect, ceded the property.

SAMCO and respondent judge, among other were made to answer. They contended that the Amicable Settlement need not be approved by the probate court, the same having been entered into in another independent action and in another court of co-equal rank.

Issue:Whether or not the CFI of Davao committed an error when it approved the amicable settlement

without authority from the CFI of Manila?

Held:It is clear that the main purpose of private respondent SAMCO in filing Civil Case in the Court of

First Instance of Davao was to secure a money judgment against the estate.The CFI of Manila has the exclusive jurisdiction over the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave. It was

a mistake on the part of respondent court to have given due course to Civil Case No. 4623, much less issue the questioned Order, dated November 10, 1967, approving the Amicable Settlement.

Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The law is clear that where the estate of the deceased person is already the subject of a testate or intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it without prior approval of the probate court.

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MANOTOK REALTY, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. L-39044. 3 January 1985

Facts:Felipe Carillo a builder in good faith with the right to remain in the questioned premises, free of

rent, until reimbursed by the petitioner for the necessary and useful expenses introduced on the land.There is no dispute that herein appellee is the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Tax

Declarations. It acquired the property from the Clara Tambunting, being the highest bidder in a sale conducted by the Probate Court. After having acquired said property, the appellee subdivided it, but could not take possession thereof because the whole area is occupied by several houses among which is the one belonging to the herein appellant Felipe Carillo. Demands to vacate and to surrender possession of the property were made by the appellee verbally and by publication and by circulars served to the appellant. In spite of such demands, the appellant continued to occupy the disputed lot and refused to surrender possession thereof to the appellee.

On the other hand, appellant's evidence tends to show that he acquired the lot in dispute from a certain Dayrit, pursuant to a deed of assignment that Dayrit in turn had acquired the property from the late Carla Tambunting by virtue of a Contract of Sale on Installment Basis that Dayrit had religiously paid the monthly installments as they fell due; that Dayrit could not continue paying the succeeding installments as they fen due because Vicente Legarda, the surviving spouse of Clara Tambunting, refused to receive any payment for the same and that it was only lately, more specifically on September 25, 1962, when Dayrit conveyed the lot to appellant Carillo.

After the petitioner failed in its attempts to take possession of the lot, it filed the reivindicatory action against the respondent.

The trial court decided the case in favor of the petitioner ordering defendant Felipe Carino to vacate and/or surrender possession to plaintiff Manotok Realty Inc. of the parcel of land and to pay plaintiff the rent and attorney's fees and to pay costs. Other party appealed to CA.

CA declared Felipe a builder in good faith with the right to remain in the premises, free of rent until reimbursed by the petitioner for the necessary and useful expenses introduced to the land.

Issue: Whether or not Felipe is a possessor in good faith?

Held:A possessor in good faith is one who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of

acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. The records show that when Dayrit executed the deed of' assignment in favor of the Felipe, the disputed lot was already registered and titled in the name of the Manotok. Such an act of registration served as a constructive notice to the whole world and the title issued in favor of petitioner made his ownership conclusive upon and against all persons including Dayrit and. herein respondent, although no personal notice was served on either of the latter. Therefore, the presumption of good faith in favor of the respondent cannot apply because as far as the law is concerned, he had notice of the ownership by the petitioner over said lot. It is also unthinkable that in the big

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Tambunting Estate beset with one of the most serious squatter problems in Metro Manila, any tenant or prospective buyer would be unaware that the petitioner acquired the estate as highest bidder at the sale ordered by the probate court. Furthermore, the respondent did not even bother to inquire about the certificate of title covering the lot in question to verify who was the real owner thereof, despite the fact that his transferor, Dayrit, never showed him any title thereto; a circumstance which should have put him upon such inquiry or investigation. His failure to exercise that measure of precaution which was reasonably required of a prudent man in order to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor precludes him from claiming possession in good faith.Rule 74Emmanuel L. Saavedra

Vda. DE GIL v. CANCIOG.R. No. L-21472. 30 July 1965

Facts:Carlo Gil Sr. died testate instituting as his exclusive heir his widow Isabel and in case death of the

latter the estate shall be inherited by the decedents adopted son Carlos Jr. Isabel and Carlos Jr secured a loan from Cancio a loan, and I payment thereof they agreed to transfer two lots from the estate. However, Carlos and later Isabel died without transferring the ownership of the two lots. Hence, Cancio filed a motion to execute the necessary deed of transfer. But Dolores, Carlos Jr widow and the new co-administrator filed an opposition on the ground that the late Isabel and Carlos entered into the agreement to sell the property without the authority of the court.

Issue:Whether an heir can sell is interest to the estate still under administration.

Held:Yes, It is true that the agreement between Isabel H. Vda. de Gil, Sr. and Carlos Gil, Jr. on the one

hand, and Agustin Cancio, on the other, concerning the transfer of the two lots in question in payment of the loan of P89,000.00 is conditioned upon the final adjudication of said properties to both or either of them, and here such adjudication has not been made in view of the early death of the two heirs; but this circumstance is now of no consequence considering that it is beyond dispute that the properties left by the late Carlos Gil, Sr. were inherited, first, by Isabel and, later, by the children of Carlos Gil, Jr. who inherited them through their father charged with the commitment in favor of Cancio. As a matter of fact, Dolores C. Vda. de Gil, Jr., co-administratrix of the estate, is now estopped from disputing the sale because she herself in her capacity as co-administratrix filed the petition in court asking for the approval of the same sale which she now disputes for reasons that do not appear in the record. And there is no doubt that an heir can sell whatever right, interest, of participation he may have in the property under administration, a matter which comes under the jurisdiction of the probate court.

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GODOY v. ORELLANOG.R. No. L-16584. 20 November 1917

Facts:Demetrio Orellano, Jose Orellano, Guillermo Orellano, Alfredo Orellano, Paz Orellano and Felisa

Pangilinan co-owned a dredge. Felisa Pangilinan armed with a power of attorney from her co-owners, executed a document giving Eusebio Godoy an option to buy the dredge for P10,000. According to their agreement, Godoy must pay the entire P10,000 within 20 days. However, the co-owners did not ratify the said sale. Before the lapse of the 20-day period, Godoy is ready to pay the entire amount but Felisa Pangilinan did not deliver the said dredge. Godoy failed a case against the Orellanos and Pangilinan.

The Orellanos denied the allegations and further claimed that the dredge was the property of the intestate estate of Julio Orellano and that Felisa Pangilinan is the administrator of said estate. They also alleged that Godoy knows this fact. Furthermore, Jose, Alfredo and Guillermo are all minors and Paz is married and did not obtained the consent of her husband when they executed the power of attorney to Pangilinan.

Pangilinan in her defense claimed that she believed that it was her obligation to comply with the deed in favor of Godoy and thus she applied to the probate court permission to sell the dredge for P10,000. While she was asking the court for permission, the Orellanos opposed claiming that there were higher bidders and thus the court ruled that the dredge be sold in public auction. The court authorized Pangilinan to sell the said dredge in public auction. Pangilinan also claimed that she never refused to deliver the dredge to Godoy rather the court would not give her authority to do so.

Issue:Whether Felisa Pangilinan, as judicial administratix, authorized to sell the property to Godoy.

Held:In the sale of the property of an intestate estate for the benefit of the heirs, it is necessary to

comply with the provisions of sections 717, 718, and 722 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The said sections prescribed the proceedings to be had before an administrator of an intestate or testate estate may sell personal or real property and also the conditions under which the personal or real property pertaining to an estate may be sold or disposed of by the administrator. Unless compliance is had with the provisions of these sections, the sale of the aforesaid dredge by the administratrix, or her promise to sell it is null and void.

Under the law, the court has exclusive jurisdiction to authorize the sale of properties like the one under consideration and the power of attorney executed by the heirs of Orellano in favor of the administratrix, without authority of court, has no legal effect, and this is the more so, since two of the said heirs are under age, and the others did not ratify the option contract.

The appellant was not, in her capacity as judicial administratrix of the intestate estate of Julio Orellano, legally authorized to sell, or contract to sell, any property belonging to said estate without the authority of the court, and the contract entered into by her with the plaintiff, without this authority, is null and void.

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BONAGA v. SOLERG.R. No. L-15717. 30 June 1961

Facts:Following the death of the spouses Alejandro Ros and Maria Isaac in 1935 and 1940,

respectively, intestate proceedings for the settlement of their estate were commenced in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. Juan Garza was appointed administrator of the estate and authorized by the probate court to sell certain parcels of land pertaining to the estate. Garza sold parcels of land in favor of Roberto Soler which sale was subsequently approved. On October 14, 1944, the heirs of the deceased wife, Maria Isaac, after having been declared as such sold all their shares and interests over certain parcels of land in favor of appellee Soler. During the war, the records of Special Proceeding No. 7194 were destroyed. Upon reconstitution of these records by court order, Julian Boñaga was issued letters of administration. On May 1952, the instant action was filed by Boñaga in his capacity as administrator, seeking to annul the sales in favor of Roberto Soler on the ground that said transactions were fraudulent made without notice to the heirs of Alejandro Ros of the hearing of the application to sell, and that the sales were not beneficial to the heirs for various reasons, and praying for reconveyance of the lands sold, since they were fraudulently registered under Act 496 in the name of Roberto Soler and for recovery of damages.

The court ordered the dismissal of the action, sustaining the contention that as administrator of the estate succeeding Juan Garza, Bonaga was estopped to file an action to annul the sales, and, moreover, that the action had prescribed. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:Whether or not the lower court erred in dismissing the action without a hearing on the merits.

Held:The Supreme Court ruled that a sale of properties of an estate as beneficial to the interested

parties, under Sections 4 and 7, Rule 90, must comply with the requisites therein provided, which are mandatory. Among these requisites, the fixing of the time and place of hearing for an application to sell, and the notice thereof to the heirs, are essential; and without them, the authority to sell, the sale itself, and the order approving it, would be null and void ab initio. Rule 90, Section 4, does not distinguish between heirs residing in and those residing outside the Philippines. Therefore, its requirements should apply regardless of the place of residence of those required to be notified under said rule.

The Court also held that the contention that the sale was made under Section 2, Rule 90 (wherein notice is required only to those heirs, etc., residing in the Philippines), is not substantiated by the record. Neither the deed of sale on August 30, 1944, nor the orders issued by the probate court in connection there with, show whether, as required by said Section 2, the personal properties were insufficient to pay the debts and expenses of administration. There is not even a showing, to start with, that the sale was made for the purpose of paying debts or expenses of administration (or legacies), a condition which circumscribes the applicability of that section. On the face of the re amended complaint at any rate, it does not appear that the contested sale was one under section 2 of Rule 90; and the same can not be

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invoked to sustain the motion to dismiss. Without reception of further evidence to determine whether the requisites of the applicable provisions of the Rules had been followed, the dismissal of the action was erroneous and improvident. Plaintiff should at least have been given a chance to prove his case.


MANG-OY v. COURT OF APPEALSGR No. L-27421. 12 September 1986

Facts:Tumpao had a first wife by whom he begot three children, who are the private respondents in this

case. Upon her death, he took to himself a second wife. They adopted two children according to the practice of the Igorots .

On September 4, 1937, Tumpao executed a last will and testament. He appointed his son Bando Tumpao to carry or fulfill his Testament. The contents of the document were read to the beneficiaries named therein who at the time were already occupying the portions respectively allotted to them. The beneficiaries in their agreement of September 7, 1937, affirmed and recognized the terms of such will.

When Tumpao died, the parties remained in possession of the lots assigned to them. But things changed unexpectedly in 1960.

On November 4, 1960, the respondents executed an extrajudicial partition in which they divided the property of among the three of them only, to the exclusion of the two other persons mentioned in the documents.

By virtue of this partition, Tumpao's title was cancelled and another one was issued in favor of the three respondents.

It is this title that is now being questioned by the petitioners, who are suing for reconveyance. They had been sustained by the trial court, which, however, was reversed by the Court of Appeals. They are before this Court to challenge that reversal.

The Court of Appeals held that the "will" executed by Old Man Tumpao was null and void because it had not been probated .The agreement of partition among the supposed beneficiaries of the will was nullified because it was a partition inter vivos and had not been approved by the Director of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes.

Issue: Whether or not the partition in acoordance with the last will and testament of Tumpao may be

sustained even if it was not validly probated?

Held: The settled principle, as announced in a long line of decisions in accordance with the Rules of Court, is that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved or allowed in court.

The will alone, would be inoperative for the simple reason that it was not probated, however, when the persons who were named therein as heirs and beneficiaries voluntarily agreed in writing to abide by its terms probably to save the expenses of probate. And furthermore, carried out its terms after the death of the testator until now, then it must be held to be binding between them.

Said agreement was not a disposal of inheritance by a prospective heir before the death of the testator, but an agreement to carry out the will. It was not contested by the defendants and after the lapse of 25 years their right, if any, to assail it has prescribed under Art. 1144 of the Civil Code.

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FERNANDEZ v. DIMAGIBAG.R. No. L-23638. 12 October 1967

Facts:Ismaela Dimagiba, submitted to the CFI a petition for the probate of the purported will of the late

Benedicta de los Reyes, executed on October 22, 1930. The will instituted the petitioner as the sole heir. Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio, Luisa, Mariano, Cesar, Leonor and Paciencia, all surnamed Reyes, filed oppositions to the probate on ground of forgery, vices of consent, estoppel by laches of the proponent and revocation of the will by two deeds of conveyance of the major portion of the estate made by the testatrix.

CFI held that the will was genuine and properly executed; Also, the trial Court resolved against the oppositors and held the will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes "unaffected and unrevoked by the deeds of sale." Whereupon, the oppositors elevated the case to the CA.

CA held that the, admitting the will to probate, had become final for lack of opportune appeal; Oppositors then appealed to this Court.

Issue: 1. Whether or not the decree of the CFI allowing the will to probate had become final for lack of appeal; 2. Whether or not the 1930 will of Benedicta de los Reyes had been impliedly revoked by her execution of deeds of conveyance in favor of the proponent.

Held:1. The probate order is final and appealable; and it is so recognized by express provisions of Sec. 1 of Rule 109, that specifically prescribes that "any interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment . . . where such order or judgment: (a) allows or disallows a will."

Appellants argue that they were entitled to await the trial Court's resolution on the other grounds of their opposition before taking an appeal, as otherwise there would be a multiplicity of recourses to the higher Courts. There being no controversy that the probate decree of the Court below was not appealed on time, the same had become final and conclusive. Hence, the appellate courts may no longer revoke said decree nor review the evidence upon which it is made to rest.

2. The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of conveyance in favor of the testamentary heir is plainly irrelevant to and separate from the question of whether the testament was duly executed. The revocation invoked by the oppositors-appellants is not an express one, but merely implied from subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly evidencing an abandonment of the original intention to bequeath or devise the properties concerned. As such, the revocation would not affect the will itself, but merely the particular devise or legacy. Only the total and absolute revocation can preclude probate of the revoked testament.

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PASTOR, Jr. v. COURT OF APPEAALSG.R. No. L-56340. 24 June 1983

Facts:Pastor Sr a spanish subject died survived by his wife, two legitimate children Pastor Jr and Sofia,

and an illegitimate child Quemada., Quemada filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged holographic will of Pastor, Sr. The Probate Court, upon motion of Quemada and after an ex parte hearing, appointed him special administrator of the entire estate of Pastor, Sr. whether or not covered or affected by the holographic will. On December 7, 1970, Quemada as special administrator, instituted against Pastor, Jr. and his wife an action for reconveyance of alleged properties of the estate, which included the properties subject of the legacy and which were in the names of the spouses Pastor, Jr. and his wife, Maria Elena Achaval de Pastor, who claimed to be the owners thereof in their own rights, and not by inheritance. On February 2, 1971, Pastor, Jr. and his sister Sofia filed their opposition to the petition for probate and the order appointing Quemada as special administrator. For two years after remand of the case to the Probate Court, Quemada filed pleading after pleading asking for payment of his legacy and seizure of the properties subject of said legacy. Pastor, Jr. and Sofia opposed these pleadings on the ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit with another branch of the Cebu Court of First Instance. All pleadings remained unacted upon by the Probate Court.

On March 5, 1980, the Pobate Court set the hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will for March 25, 1980, but upon objection of Pastor, Jr. and Sofia on the e ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit, no hearing was held on March 25. Instead, the Probate Court required the parties to submit their respective position papers as to how much inheritance Quemada was entitled to receive under the wig. Pursuant thereto, Pastor Jr. and Sofia submitted their Memorandum of authorities dated April 10, which in effect showed that determination of how much Quemada should receive was still premature. Quemada submitted his Position paper dated April 20, 1980. Atlas upon order of the Court, submitted a sworn statement of royalties paid to the Pastor Group from June 1966 (when Pastor, Sr. died) to February 1980. On August 20, 1980, while the reconveyance suit was still being litigated in Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, the Probate Court issued the now assailed Order of Execution and Garnishment, resolving the question of ownership of the royalties payable by Atlas and ruling in effect that the legacy to Quemada was not inofficious. The oppositors sought reconsideration thereof on the same date primarily on the ground that the Probate Court gravely abused its discretion when it resolved the question of ownership of the royalties and ordered the payment of Quemada’s legacy after prematurely passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will.

Issue:Did the court in its Probate Order resolved the issues of ownership and the intrinsic validity of the

will?

Held:No. In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the

extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. (Rules of Court, Rule 75, Section 1; Rule 76, Section 9.) As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be

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included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.

Nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of specific properties. On the contrary, it is manifest therein that ownership was not resolved. For it confined itself to the question of extrinsic validity of the win, and the need for and propriety of appointing a special administrator. Thus it allowed and approved the holographic win "with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having been duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law." It declared that the intestate estate administration aspect must proceed " subject to the outcome of the suit for reconveyance of ownership and possession of real and personal properties in Civil Case 274-T before Branch IX of the CFI of Cebu." [Parenthetically, although the statement refers only to the "intestate" aspect, it defies understanding how ownership by the estate of some properties could be deemed finally resolved for purposes of testate administration, but not so for intestate purposes. Can the estate be the owner of a property for testate but not for intestate purposes?] Then again, the Probate Order (while indeed it does not direct the implementation of the legacy) conditionally stated that the intestate administration aspect must proceed "unless . . . it is proven . . . that the legacy to be given and delivered to the petitioner does not exceed the free portion of the estate of the testator," which clearly implies that the issue of impairment of legitime (an aspect of intrinsic validity) was in fact not resolved. Finally, the Probate Order did not rule on the propriety of allowing Quemada to remain as special administrator of estate properties not covered by the holographic will, "considering that this (Probate) Order should have been properly issued solely as a resolution on the issue of whether or not to allow and approve the aforestated will. "

That the Probate Order did not resolve the question of ownership of the properties listed in the estate inventory was appropriate, considering that the issue of ownership was the very subject of controversy in the reconveyance suit that was still pending in Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.

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NUGUID v. NUGUIDG.R. No. L-23445. 23 June 1966

Facts:On December 20, 1962 Rosario Nuguid died single and without any descendant. She was

survived by her parents Felix and Paz Nuguid, and siblings namely Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto. On May 18, 1963 Remedios presented before the probate court a holographic will allegedly made by Rosario 11 years before she died. However, Felix and Paz opposed the probate of the said will. They argued that by the institution of Remedios as universal heir, they who are compulsory heirs of Rosario in the direct ascending line, were illegally preterited hence said institution is void. The court declared the will a complete nullity thus creating an intestacy of Rosario’s estate.

Issue:Whether there was preterition.

Held:Yes, there was preterition.The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced

heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will completely omits both of them: They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. The one-sentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir — nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate.

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REYES v. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 12099. 30 October 1997

Facts:On January 3, 1992, Torcuato J. Reyes executed his last will and testament. The will consisted of

two pages and was signed by Torcuato Reyes in the presence of three witnesses: Antonio Veloso, Gloria Borromeo, and Soledad Gaputan. Private respondent Julio A. Vivares was designated the executor and in his default or incapacity, his son Roch Alan S. Vivares. Reyes died on May 12, 1992 and on May 21, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for probate of the will before the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin. The petition was set for hearing and the order was published in the Mindanao Daily Post, a newspaper of general circulation, once a week for three consecutive weeks. Notices were likewise sent to all the persons named in the petition. On July 21, 1992, the recognized natural children of Torcuato Reyes with Estebana Galolo, namely Manuel, Mila, and Danilo all surnamed Reyes, and the deceased's natural children with Celsa Agape, namely Lyn and Marites Agape, filed an opposition with the following allegations: a) that the last will and testament of Reyes was not executed and attested in accordance with the formalities of law; and b) that Asuncion Reyes Ebarle exerted undue and improper influence upon the testator at the time of the execution of the will. The opposition further averred that Reyes was never married to and could never marry Asuncion Reyes, the woman he claimed to be his wife in the will, because the latter was already married to Lupo Ebarle who was still then alive and their marriage was never annulled. Thus, Asuncion can not be a compulsory heir for her open cohabitation with Reyes was violative of public morals.

The trial court declared that the will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. It, however, ruled that Asuncion Reyes, based on the testimonies of the witnesses, was never married to the deceased Reyes and, therefore, their relationship was an adulterous one. On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the probate court.

Issue:Whether or not probate court may pass upon intrinsic validity of the will.

Held:The Supreme Court ruled that as a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass

only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. Thus, the court merely inquires on its due execution, whether or not it complies with the formalities prescribed by law, and the testamentary capacity of the testator. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficacy of the will's provisions. The intrinsic validity is not considered since the consideration thereof usually comes only after the will has been proved and allowed. There are, however, notable circumstances wherein the intrinsic validity was first determined as when the defect of the will is apparent on its face and the probate of the will may become a useless ceremony if it is intrinsically invalid. The intrinsic validity of a will may be passed upon because "practical considerations" demanded it as when there is preterition of heirs or the testamentary provisions are of doubtful legality. Where the parties agree that the intrinsic validity be first determined, the probate court may also do so. Parenthetically, the rule on probate is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will.

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The case at bar arose from the institution of the petition for the probate of the will of the late Torcuato Reyes. Perforce, the only issues to be settled in the said proceeding were: (1) whether or not the testator had animus testandi; (2) whether or not vices of consent attended the execution of the will; and (3) whether or not the formalities of the will had been complied with. Thus, the lower court was not asked to rule upon the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will. As a result, the declaration of the testator that Asuncion "Oning" Reyes was his wife did not have to be scrutinized during the probate proceedings. The propriety of the institution of Oning Reyes as one of the devisees/legatees already involved inquiry on the will's intrinsic validity and which need not be inquired upon by the probate court.

The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the trial court relied on uncorroborated testimonial evidence that Asuncion Reyes was still married to another during the time she cohabited with the testator. The testimonies of the witnesses were merely hearsay and even uncertain as to the whereabouts or existence of Lupo Ebarle, the supposed husband of Asuncion.

The Court opined that the Petitioners tried to refute this conclusion of the Court of Appeals by presenting belatedly a copy of the marriage certificate of Asuncion Reyes and Lupo Ebarle. Their failure to present the said certificate before the probate court to support their position that Asuncion Reyes had an existing marriage with Ebarle constituted a waiver and the same evidence can no longer be entertained on appeal, much less in this petition for review. This Court would not try the case anew or settle factual issues since its jurisdiction is confined to resolving questions of law which have been passed upon by the lower courts. The settled rule is that the factual findings of the appellate court will not be disturbed unless shown to be contrary to the evidence on the record, which petitioners have not shown in this case.

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MANINANG vs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R.No. L-57848. 19 June 1982

Facts:On May 21, 1977, Clemencia Aseneta left a holographic will. Her will states that all her real

properties located in Manila, Makati, Quezon City and Legaspi City and all her personal properties shall be inherited upon her death by Dra. Soledad L. Maninang. And also according to the will, she does not consider Bernardo as her adopted son.

On June 9, 1977, petitioner Soledad Maninang filed a Petition for probate of the Will of the decedent with the CFI of Quezon City. On July 25, 1977, herein respondent Bernardo Aseneta, who, as the adopted son, claims to be the sole heir of decedent Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings with the CFI of Rizal.

The Testate and Intestate Cases were ordered consolidated before the respondent Judge. Bernardo then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case on the ground that the holographic will was null and void because he, as the only compulsory heir, was preterited and, therefore, intestacy should ensue. The lower Court ordered the dismissal of the Testate Case it also denied reconsideration and in the same Order appointed Bernardo as the administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased Aseneta.

Petitioners Maninang resorted to a certiorari Petition before respondent Court of Appeals alleging that the lower Court exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the Orders of dismissal of the Testate Case.

Respondent Court denied certiorari and ruled that the trial Judge's Order of dismissal was final in nature as it finally disposed of the Testate Case and, therefore, appeal was the proper remedy, which petitioners failed to avail of.

Issue:Whether or not the court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the Testate Case?

Held:The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public policy requires it, because unless the Will is

probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by Will may be rendered nugatory.

Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic validity. The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills. Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in Probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law. In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether under the terms of the decedent's Will, private respondent had been preterited or disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance. Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse concepts. Suffice it to state that in view of our finding that respondent Judge had acted in excess of his jurisdiction in dismissing the Testate Case, certiorari is a proper remedy.

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THE ESTATE RUIZ v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 118671. 29 January 1996

Facts:Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond, his

adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Montes, and his three granddaughters, all children of Edmond Ruiz. Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash component of his estate was distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private respondents in accordance with the decedent's will. For unbeknown reasons, Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for the probate of his father's holographic will.Four years after the testator's death, it was private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed before a petition for the probate and approval of Hilario Ruiz's will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz, Surprisingly, Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the will was executed under undue influence. Subsequently, one of the properties of the estate was leased out by Edmond Ruiz to third persons.

On May 14, 1993, Edmond withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will. Consequently, the probate court, admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond conditioned upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00.

Petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Release of Funds." It prayed for the release of the rent payments deposited with the Branch Clerk of Court. Respondent Montes opposed the motion and concurrently filed a "Motion for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs" and "Motion for Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will." Montes prayed for the release of the said rent and for the distribution of the testator's properties in accordance with the provisions of the holographic will.

The probate court denied petitioner's motion for release of funds but granted respondent Montes' motion in view of petitioner's lack of opposition. It further ordered the delivery of the titles to and possession of the properties bequeathed to the three granddaughters and respondent Montes upon the filing of a bond of P50K.

The probate court, on December 22, 1993, ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but only "such amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of administration and allowances for support" of the testator's three granddaughters subject to collation and deductible from their share in the inheritance.

Issue:1. WON testator's grandchildren are entitled to allowance pending probate proceedings.2. WON the court may order the release of the titles to heirs during proceeding.3. WON court can grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will.

Held:1. “Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. — The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by law.”

Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedent's estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not extend it to

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the deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity. It was error, therefore, for the appellate court to sustain the probate court's order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of the testator pending settlement of his estate.

2. In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made: (1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.

In the case at bar, at the time the order was issued the properties of the estate had not yet been inventoried and appraised.

3. Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the properties of his father is merely inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned. As executor, he is a mere trustee of his father's estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he is held to the duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order.31 He cannot unilaterally assign to himself and possess all his parents' properties and the fruits thereof without first submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal properties of the deceased, rendering a true account of his administration, the expenses of administration, the amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination by the court as to their veracity, propriety and justness.

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http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1996/jan1996/gr_118671_1996.html#fnt31

Rule 75Emmaunel L. Saavedra

In Re KAW SINGCOG.R. No. L-48444. 30 June 1943

Facts:The question involved in G.R. No. 43444, Sy Oa, administratrix-appellee, vs. Co Ho, oppositor-

appellant, not being one of jurisdiction over the subject-matter but rather of venue which in turn hinges on a question of fact, i.e., whether the deceased, at the time of his death, was residing in Camarines Sur on in the City of Manila.

Issue:Whether on not place of residence of deceased is an element of jurisdiction over subject matter.

Held:No, the law of jurisdiction - Act No. 136, Section 56, No. 5 - confers upon Courts of First

Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Since, however, there are many courts of First Instance in the Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600, fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. Thus, the place of residence of the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction of venue. And it is upon this ground that in the new Rules of Court the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled is properly called "venue."

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REYES v. DIAZG.R. No. L-48754. 26 November 1941

Facts:The case involves an election protest and questions the jurisdiction of the lower court. Herein

protestant-appellant Emilio Reyes filed a certificate of candidacy but its due filing is being questioned. The authority of the trial court to pass upon the validity of the ballots adjudicated to the protestant, which have not been challenged by Apolonio Diaz, is also questioned.

Issue:What is the jurisdiction of the trial court?

Held:Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class

to which the proceedings in question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court and defines its powers.

In the instant, case, there is no such question of jurisdiction as above described. Both parties agree that if the due filing of the protestant's certificate of candidacy is proven, the trial court has no jurisdiction except to dismiss the case. There is, therefore, no question between the parties as to what the jurisdiction of the trial court is according to law in either case. The real question between them is one of fact - whether or not the protestant's certificate of candidacy has been duly filed. And not until this fact is proved can the question of jurisdiction be determined.

Neither is the second question one of jurisdiction within the purview of the legal provisions above quoted. Whether certain ballots are or are not pertinent to the issue raised in the pleadings, is merely a question of relevancy of evidence. In order that a court may validly try and decide a case, it must have jurisdiction over the persons of the parties. But in some instances it is said that the court should also have jurisdiction over the issue, meaning thereby that the issue being tried and decided by the court be within the issues raised in the pleadings. But this kind of jurisdiction should be distinguished from jurisdiction over the subject-matter the latter being conferred by law and the former by the pleadings. Jurisdiction over the issue, unlike jurisdiction over the subject-matter, may be conferred by consent either express or implied of the parties. Although an issue is not duly pleaded it may validly be tried and decided if no timely objection is made thereto by the parties. This cannot be done when jurisdiction over the subject-matter is involved. In truth, jurisdiction over the issue is an expression of a principle that is involved in jurisdiction over the persons of the parties. At any rate, whether or not the court has jurisdiction over a specific issue is a question that requires nothing except an examination of the pleadings, and this function is without such importance as call for the intervention of this Court.

Furthermore, this question of jurisdiction is unsubstantial. It is well-settled rule that the institution of suffrage is of public, not private, interest, and the court may examine all the ballots after the ballot boxes are opened in order to determine which are legal and which are illegal, even though neither of the parties raised any question as to their illegality.

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BERNABE v. VERGARAG.R. No. L-48652. 16 September 1942

Facts:

This was an action for partition of an inheritance left by the deceased Victoriano Zafra. He was survived by three children: Benito Apolonia and Dominga, all surnamed Zafra. Benito and Apolonia died, the first leaving a daughter named Irinea, and the second, three children named Lucia, Hipolito, and Barbara. The plaintiff in the action for partition were the heirs of Benito and Apolonia Zafra and the defendants were Dominga Zafra and the persons to whom she sad sold her share in the common property; namely, Brigida Martinez, Amadeo Landicho and Marcelina Landicho. Dominga Zafra, in her answer, pleaded a counterclaim, alleging that she had paid certain debts contracted by Apolonia Zafra, the deceased mother of plaintiffs Lucia, Hipolito, and Barbara. These debts constituted an equitable lien upon the property left by said deceased Apolonia Zafra. At the trial, evidence was presented as to such debts, and the trial court in its decision awarded the plaintiffs Lucia, Hipolito, and Barbara one-third of the common property and, at the same time, ordered them to pay the debts of their deceased mother, Apolonia Zafra, in the amount of P350. Appeal was interposed by them from the judgment, and in the Supreme Court no question was raised as to the jurisdiction of the trial court to render a judgment in the said amount of P350. The Supreme Court accordingly assumed jurisdiction over the case and affirmed the judgment. Issue:

Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to render its judgment for the sum of money is unsubstantial. Held:

The Supreme Court enunciated that the trial court had such jurisdiction not only because there was a counterclaim wherein the amount adjudged was within the amount pleaded, but because the proceeding was in the nature of one for liquidation and partition of inheritance wherein debts left by the deceased ancestors may be determined and ordered paid if the creditors are parties, as was the case. Plaintiffs-appellees knew that the trial court had such jurisdiction as is shown by their omission to raise any question with respect thereto in their appeal to this Court. And such question may be deemed to have been passed upon impliedly by this Court when it acted on the case and decided the same on the merits.

Furthermore, the question of jurisdiction attempted to be raised in this case is not the kind of question that confers jurisdiction upon this Court. The jurisdiction involved is not one over the subject matter but at most over the issue or over the persons of the parties. A Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over the case involving P200 or more, and therefore the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija had jurisdiction to render judgment in the amount of P350. The question of whether or not there was a proper issue raised in the pleading as to said amount, is not a question of jurisdiction over the subject-matter, but jurisdiction over the issue.

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CASTRO v. MARTINEZG.R. No. L-3880. 9 March 1908

Facts:Marcelina Cuico y Rodis on the 17th of October, 1896, before a notary and the proper number of

witnesses executed a nuncupative will. She disposed of the house in which she lived, and of some furniture and credits of small importance.

Under the will Antonio Martinez Gallegos and Evaristo Rodis were appointed executors, and in compliance with clause 4 of the same they sold the house and ground for the price of 500 pesos to Pedro Ferragut .

Mateo, Quintin, and Constancia, and another of the name of Ignacio, together with Teopista Castro challenged the will.

The plaintiff Teopista Castro protested against the execution of the will as being fraud. Teopista Castro testified as to the mental incapacity of Marcelina. Her testimony is strongly corroborated by the declaration of Miguel Bondoc, an entirely disinterested witness."On the other hand, it has been proven by the testimony of the surviving witnesses to the will, Francisco Reyes and Brigido Famador, that the testatrix dictated her will to the notary, that she was in the full enjoyment of her mental faculties, that she was in the free use of her speech, and that she had asked the witness Casals to sign for her. And in the heading of the will the notary attests that the testatrix was in the free use of her intellectual faculties, and that in his judgment and in that of the witnesses, she had the necessary legal capacity to make her will and that she was in the free use of her speech; all of the foregoing antecedents are confirmed by the detailed testimony of the priest who administered the sacraments to the sick woman and by Evaristo Rodis, a relative of the testatrix, who was appointed one of the executors and declares that he conversed with her after the execution of the will.

This court having considered as a matter of fact, that the will was not only null and illegal but also fraudulent, it naturally results that all the transfers were null and illegal.

Issue:Whether or not the court erred when it declared that the will executed is null, illegal and

fraudulent.

Held:It is a legal doctrine established in several decisions of the supreme court of justice of Spain,

among them in those of October 28, 1864, and January 29, 1885, that "wills executed with the formalities of law are presumed valid."

It is also a legal doctrine established among others by the decision of the 31st of December, 1883, that "the normal condition of the faculties of the testator is presumed under the law."

And finally it is a legal doctrine, mentioned among other decisions in that of the 13th of February, 1889, "that is not proper to declare the nullity of a will if it be based on incapacity attributed to the testator when the notary who authorizes the instrument certifies that according to his judgment the testator, at the time of executing the will, was of sound mind."

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Consequently, neither directly nor indirectly, could the nullity of the will of Marcelina Cuico y Rodis have been declared either as a fact or as a conclusion of law.

For the above reasons the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed: First, in so far as it declares as canceled and annulled.


ACAIN v. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 72706, 27 October 1987

Facts:Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court a petition for the probate of the will of his

late Uncle, Nemesio Acain, on the premise that the latter died leaving a will in which the former and his brothers and sisters were instituted as heirs. After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court, Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson, a legally adopted daughter and the widow of the deceased respectively, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that: (1) Constantino Acain has no legal capacity to institute the proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been pretirited. Said motion was denied as well as the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Consequently, Fernandez and Diongson filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court. IAC granted Fernandez and Diongson’s petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for probate of the will. Due to the denial of Acain’s motion for reconsideration, he then filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issue:Whether or not Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson have been pretirited.

Held:Article 854 of the Civil Code:

The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation.

Preterition consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. However, the same thing cannot be said of the legally adopted daughter. Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will and that both the adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.

The universal institution of Acain together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.

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CODOY vs. CALUGAYGR No . 123486. 12 August 1999

Facts:On April 6, 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and

legatees of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, filed with the Regional Trial Court, a petition for probate of the holographic will of the deceased.In the petition, respondents claimed that the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, was of sound and disposing mind when she executed the will on August 30, 1978, that there was no fraud, undue influence, and duress employed in the person of the testator, and will was written voluntarily. Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an opposition5 to the petition for probate, alleging that the holographic will was a forgery and that the same is even illegible. This gives an impression that a "third hand" of an interested party other than the "true hand" of Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal executed the holographic will. Petitioners argued that the repeated dates incorporated or appearing on will after every disposition is out of the ordinary. If the deceased was the one who executed the will, and was not forced, the dates and the signature should appear at the bottom after the dispositions, as regularly done and not after every disposition. And assuming that the holographic will is in the handwriting of the deceased, it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries, or through fraud and trickery.1âwphi1.nêt Respondents presented six (6) witnesses and various documentary evidence. Petitioners instead of presenting their evidence, filed a demurre to evidence, claiming that respondents failed to establish sufficient factual and legal basis for the probate of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal.

Issue:Whether the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil Code are permissive or mandatory.

Held:Yes, The article provides, as a requirement for the probate of a contested holographic will, that at

least three witnesses explicitly declare that the signature in the will is the genuine signature of the testator.1âwphi1.nêtWe are convinced, based on the language used, that Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory. The word "shall" connotes a mandatory order. We have ruled that "shall" in a statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word "shall," when used in a statute is mandatory.

Laws are enacted to achieve a goal intended and to guide against an evil or mischief that aims to prevent. In the case at bar, the goal to achieve is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator.

So, we believe that the paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine the true intent of the deceased. An exhaustive and objective consideration of the evidence is imperative to establish the true intent of the testator.

It will be noted that not all the witnesses presented by the respondents testified explicitly that they were familiar with the handwriting of testator.

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Comparing the signature in the holographic will dated August 30, 1978, and the signatures in several documents such as the application letter for pasture permit dated December 30, 1980, and a letter dated June 16, 1978 the strokes are different. In the letters, there are continuous flows of the strokes, evidencing that there is no hesitation in writing unlike that of the holographic will. We, therefore, cannot be certain that ruling holographic will was in the handwriting by the deceased


DE ARANZ v. GALINGG.R. No. 77047. 28 May 1988

Facts:Montserrat R. Infante y G.Pola died leaving a Last Will and Testament. Joaquin Infante filed for

the probate of the said will. Herein petitioners were named as legatees and devisees. The probate court ordered the publication of the date of hearing in “Nueva Era” a newspaper of general circulation in Manila for three weeks. Since there were no opposition the court allowed Joaquin to present evidence ex parte. Joaquin was appointed as executor. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that as named legatees they were not given any notice of the hearing for the probation of the said will. The probate court denied the said motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner then filed before the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari but thus was referred to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the probate court. Hence, this petition.

Issue:Whether the personal notice of probate proceedings to known legatees and devisees is a

jurisdictional requirement in the probate of a will.

Held:Yes. According to Sec 4 of Rule 76: “Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or

personally. — The court shag also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines at their places of residence, and deposited in the post office with the postage thereon prepaid at least twenty (20) days before the hearing, if such places of residence be known. A copy of the notice must in like manner be mailed to the person named as executor, if he be not, the petitioner; also, to any person named as co-executor not petitioning, if their places of residence be known. Personal service of copies of the notice at least ten (10) days before the day of hearing shall be equivalent to mailing.”

It is clear from the aforecited rule that notice of the time and place of the hearing for the allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees residing in the Philippines at their places of residence, if such places of residence be known. There is no question that the residences of herein petitioners legatees and devisees were known to the probate court. The petition for the allowance of the wig itself indicated the names and addresses of the legatees and devisees of the testator. But despite such knowledge, the probate court did not cause copies of the notice to be sent to petitioners. The requirement of the law for the allowance of the will was not satisfied by mere publication of the notice of hearing for three (3) weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

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SUMILANG v. RAMAGOSAG.R. No. L-23135. 26 December 1967

Facts:Mariano Sumilang filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon a petition for the probate of a

document alleged to be the last will and testament of Hilarion Ramagosa, who died on December 1, 1959. Said document, written in Tagalog and dated February 26, 1949, institutes petitioner as sole heir of the testator. The petition for probate was opposed by two (2) of oppositors who questioned the due execution of the document, claiming that it was made under duress and was not really intended by the deceased to be his last will and testament. Oppositors Saturnino and Santiago Ramagosa claimed that they, instead of petitioner, were entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased. The other oppositors prayed only for the disallowance of the will.

At the hearings of the oppositors moved for the dismissal of the petition for probate mainly on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject-matter because the last will and testament of the decedent, if ever it was really executed by him, was revoked by implication of law six years before his death. Oppositors alleged that after making the will Hilarion Ramagosa sold to petitioner Mariano Sumilang and his brother Mario the parcels of land described therein, so that at the time of the testator's death the titles to said lands were no longer in his name.

The probate court denied the motion to dismiss filed by the oppositors for the allegations contained therein goes to the very intrinsic value of the will and other grounds stated on said motion to dismiss are without merit.itc-alf With respect to the motion to strike out opposition and all other pleadings of oppositors filed by the petitioner, it appears that oppositors have no relationship whatsoever within the fifth degree as provided by law and therefore the oppositors are totally strangers to the deceased whose will is under probate. This being so, the motion to strike out opposition and all other pleadings pertinent thereto is hereby ordered stricken out of the record.

Issue:Whether or not the motion to dismiss petition for probate may be granted on the ground that the

testator had impliedly revoked his will by selling, prior to his death, the lands disposed of therein.

Held:The Supreme Court held that the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for

probate. Probate is one thing the validity of the testamentary provisions is another. The first decides the execution of the document and the testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates to descent and distribution. The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of conveyance in favor of the testamentary heir is plainly irrelevant to and separate from the question of whether the testament was duly executed. For one, if the will is not entitled to probate, or its probate is denied, all questions of revocation become superfluous: in law, there is no such will and hence there would be nothing to revoke. Then, again, the revocation invoked by the oppositors-appellants is not an express one, but merely implied from subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly evidencing an abandonment of the original intention to bequeath

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or devise the properties concerned. As such, the revocation would not affect the will itself, but merely the particular devise or legacy.

In regard to relationship between the oppositors and the deceased the Court said that a person who has no relationship whatsoever within the fifth degree as provided by law and therefore are totally strangers to the deceased whose will is under probate. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an interested party has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor. The reason for the rule excluding strangers from contesting the will, is not that thereby the court may be prevented from learning facts which would justify or necessitate a denial of probate, but rather that the courts and the litigants should not be molested by the intervention in the proceedings of persons with no interest in the estate which would entitle them to be heard with relation thereto.

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FERNANDEZ v. TANTOCOG.R. No. 25489 . 8 September 1926

Facts:Basilia Tantoco executed an instrument purporting to be her will. It appears that the testatrix was

single and had no force heirs. She provided in her will that the property above referred to, indicated as item A in her will,

should be delivered to the parish priest for certain religious uses and for the assistance of a catholic school in Malolos, to be conducted by the authority of the catholic church under the administration of the priest. This item constitutes one of the principal clauses of the will.

When her final illness came upon her, testatrix expressed a desire to make some further changes in her will, and Sr. Platon therefore redrafted the entire document and carried it to the hospital for execution by her on September 9, 1925. Sr. Platon, as of the officiating attorney, was naturally charged with the duties incident to procuring the execution of the will. He undertook to procure Doctor Fidel Macapugay, a resident physician in the hospital.The other intending witness was one Placido Suarez.

At the time set for the submission of proof with respect to the execution of the will, the proponent introduced the three attesting witnesses to the instrument, namely, Vicente Platon, Fidel Macapugay, and Placido Suarez, as well as Aurea Gaspar, sister-in-law of the deceased who had been in attendance upon her at the hospital.

The trial judge refused to allow it to be probated, for the reason that the three attesting witnesses are not in harmony upon the point whether all three of said witnesses were present together at the time and place when the testatrix and the witnesses affixed their signatures to the document. No testimony was submitted by the opposition, and the criticisms made by the trial judge with respect to the sufficiency of the proof of execution arise exclusively upon the testimony of the witnesses for the proponent.

Hence an appeal.

Issue:Whether or not the trial judge committed an error when it denied the probate of the will.

Held:A careful examination of the transcript forces us to the conclusion that the will in question was in

every respect properly executed, and we are of the opinion that error was committed by the trial court in refusing probate.

The testimony of the attorney, Sr. Platon, is in our opinion in every effect respect worthy of credit, and he gives a detailed account of the incidents connected with the execution, which could in our opinion have been only by a person who had his attention fixed upon the occurrences connected therewith. He shows that the testatrix understood the contents of the instrument and that its provisions were found to be in conformity with her wishes. At the time of the execution of the instrument she was sitting up in her bed and was able to affix her signature in a clear and legible hand at the close of the will and upon each of its pages, as the law requires.

In weighing the testimony of the attesting witnesses to a will, the statements of a competent attorney, who has been charged with the responsibility of seeing to the proper execution of the

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instrument, is entitled to greater weight than the testimony of a person casually called to participate in the act, supposing of course that no motive is revealed that should induce the attorney to prevaricate. The reason is that the mind of the attorney, being conversant with the requisites of the proper execution of the instrument, is more likely to become fixed on details; and he is more likely than other persons to retain those incidents in his memory.

In case of opposition to the probate of the will the proponent is legally bound to introduce all of the subscribing witnesses, if available. They are therefore forced witnesses so far as the proponent is concerned, and he is not bound by their testimony to the same extent that a litigant is bound by the testimony of witnesses introduced in ordinary course. It follows that the proponent of a will may avail himself of other proof to establish the instrument, even contrary to the testimony of some of the subscribing witnesses, or all of them.

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Rule 78 - 90Don Mikhail A. Siccuan

GONZALES v. AGUINALDOG.R. No. 74769. 28 September 1990

Facts:This is an intestate proceeding of the estate of Gonzales Vda. de Favis. The court appointed

Beatriz F. Gonzales and Teresa Olbes as coadministratrices of the estate of Gonzales Vda. de Favis.While Beatriz was in the US, Olbes filed a motion to remove the former as co-administratrix, on

the ground that she is incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust and had committed acts and omissions detrimental to the interest of the estate and the heirs. The court issued an Order requiring Beatriz and the other parties to file their opposition. Only Asterio Favia opposed the removal of Beatriz as co-admistratrix, as the latter was still in the United States attending to her ailing husband. The Judge cancelled the letters of administration granted to Beatriz and retained Olbes as the administratrix of the estate. The court reasoned that Beatriz has been absent from the country as she is in the United States and she has not returned even up to this date and her removal is necessary so that the estate will be administered in an orderly and efficient manner.

Beatriz moved to reconsider the order. This was denied.

Issue: Whether the court’s Order should be nullified on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, as her

removal was not shown by Olbes to be anchored on any of the grounds provided under Section 2, Rule 82.

Held:The court is invested with ample discretion in the removal of an administrator. However, the

court must have some fact legally before it in order to justify a removal. There must be evidence of an act or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court, which it deems sufficient or substantial to warrant the removal of the administrator.

In the present case, the court a quo did not base the removal of Beatriz as co-administrratrix on any of the causes specified in Olbes's motion for relief of Beatriz. Neither did it dwell on, nor determine the validity of the charges brought against Beatriz by Olbes Olbes.

1. The court based the removal of Beatriz on the fact that in the administration of the estate, conflicts and misunderstandings have existed between Beatriz and Olbes which allegedly have prejudiced the estate.

Certainly, it is desirable that the administration of the deceased's estate be marked with harmonious relations between coadministrators. But for mere disagreements between such joint fiduciaries, without misconduct, one's removal is not favored. Conflicts of opinion and judgment naturally, and, perhaps inevitably, occur between persons with different interests in the same estate. Such conflicts, if unresolved by the coadministrators, can be resolved by the probate court to the best interest of the estate and its heirs.

Further, the court a quo failed to find hard facts showing that the conflict were unjustly caused by Beatriz, or that Beatriz was guilty of incompetence in the fulfillment of her duties, or prevented the

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management of the estate according to the dictates of prudence, or any other act or omission showing that her continuance as co-administratrix of the estate materially endangers the interests of the estate.

2. The court removed Beatriz also on the ground that she had been absent from the country. In her motion for reconsideration, Beatriz explained that her absence from the country was due to the fact that she had to accompany her ailing husband to the US. Also, Beatriz's absence from the country was known to Olbes, and that the latter and Beatriz had continually maintained correspondence with each other with respect to the administration of the estate during Beatriz's absence. As a matter of fact, Beatriz, while in the US, sent Olbes a letter addressed to the Land Bank authorizing her (Olbes) to receive, and collect the interests accruing from the Land Bank bonds belonging to the estate, and to use them for the payment of accounts necessary for the operation of the administration. These facts show that Beatriz had never abandoned her role as co-administratrix of the estate nor had she been remiss in the fulfillment of her duties. Suffice it to state, temporary absence in the state does not disqualify one to be an administrator of the estate.

Thus, as held in re Mc Knight's Will a temporary absence from the state on account of ill health, or on account of business, or for purposes of travel or pleasure is not such a removal from the state as to necessitate his removal as executor.

3. Finally, it seems that the court refuge in the fact that two (2) of the other three (3) heirs of the estate of the deceased have opposed the retention or re-appointment of Beatriz as co-administratrix of the estate. Suffice it to state that the removal of an administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate, nor on the belief of the court that it would result in orderly and efficient administration.

As the appointment of Beatriz Beatriz F. Gonzales was valid, and no satisfactory cause for her removal was shown, the court a quo gravely abused its discretion in removing her. Stated differently, Beatriz Beatriz F. Gonzales was removed without just cause. Beatriz is ordered reinstated as coadministratrix of said estate

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Rule 78-90Emmanuel L. Saavedra

Vda. DE MANALO v. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 129242. 16 January 2001

Facts: Manalo, died intestate survived by his wife and eleven children. Herein respondents, who are

eight (8) of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo, namely: Purita, Milagros, Belen, Rosalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda filed a petition with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.

The trial court issued an order “declaring the whole world in default, except the government,” and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners therein on March 16, 1993. However, this order of general default was set aside by the trial court upon motion of herein petitioners (oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were granted ten (10) days within which to file their opposition to the petition.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders of the

respondent trial court which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate despite the failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise involving members of the same family have been made prior to the filing of the petition but that the same have failed.

Held:Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 were to be

considered as a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person, Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-a-vis Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines would nevertheless apply as a ground for the dismissal of the same by virtue of Rule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court which provides that the “rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” Petitioners contend that the term “proceeding” is so broad that it must necessarily include special proceedings.

The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough, to wit:

Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035.

The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from the term “suit” that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or others in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. A civil action is thus an action filed in a court

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of justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.


RAMOS v. BAROTA.M. No. MTJ-00-1338. 21 January 2004

Facts:Rogelio Ramos and Dominador Ramos are the co-owners, possessors and cultivators of two

parcels of land covered by transfer certificate titles. On February 1997, certain individuals harvested the standing crops upon the unlawful orders of Atty. Nuelino Ranchez and Judge Eusebio Barot thus they submitted a complaint. The respondents where required to comment on the complaint. In his Comment, Judge Barot admitted that he acted as an attorney-in-fact of his uncle Florencio Barot, a claimant in a case involving the parcel of land owned by Ramos. According to Judge Barot, the case was resolved in favor of his uncle Florencio and ordered the cancellation of the title in the name of Ramos. But Judge Barot denied that he participated in the unauthorized harvesting of the rice crops.

The case was referred to Executive Judge Antonio Laggui. Position papers were passed. Judge Laggui found that Judge Barot violated Rule 5.06, Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Ethics. OCA affirmed the findings of Judge Laggui.

Issue:Whether or not Judge Barot can act as an attorney-in-fact.

Held:No. The Code of Judicial Conduct lays down the guidelines with respect to fiduciary activities

that judges may engage in. The thin line between what is allowed and what is not allowed is set forth in Rule 5.06, and therein made very specific. As a general rule, judges cannot serve as executor, administrator, trustee, guardian or other fiduciary, except if he acts in a fiduciary capacity for the estate, trust or person of a member of his immediate family. The Code defines "immediate family" as being limited to the spouse and relatives within the second degree of consanguinity. Clearly, respondent's paternal uncle does not fall under "immediate family" as herein defined. Hence, his appointment as attorney-in-fact for his uncle is not a valid exception to the rule.

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Rule 78 – 90 Aran Jay G. Sicat

TAN v. HON. GEDORIOG.R. No. 166520. 14 March 2008

Facts:Gerardo Tan died on leaving no will. The private respondents, who are claiming to be the

children of the deceased, filed with the RTC a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration. The Petition was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 4014-0. Petitioners, claiming to be legitimate heirs of Gerardo Tan, filed an Opposition to the Petition.

Private respondents then moved for the appointment of a special administrator, they prayed that their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo D. Lim, be appointed as the special administrator. Petitioners filed an Opposition to private respondents’ Motion for Appointment, arguing that none of the private respondents can be appointed as the special administrator since they are not residing in the country. Petitioners contend further that Romualdo does not have the same familiarity, experience or competence as that of their co-petitioner Vilma C. Tan who was already acting as de facto administratrix of his estate since his death.

Atty. Clinton Nuevo, as court-appointed commissioner, issued directives to Vilma, in her capacity as de facto administratrix. However Vilma did not comply with the directives. Hence Judge Eric Menchavez issued an order appointing Romulado as special administrator. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but denied by Executive Judge Gedorio.

Issue:Whether or not the petitioners’ must be given primacy in the administration of their father’s

estate.

Held:The Supreme Court ruled that the order of preference petitioners speak of is found in Section 6,

Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. However, the Court has consistently ruled that the order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator as provided in the afore-quoted provision does not apply to the selection of a special administrator. The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin refers to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special administrator, as the appointment of the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not appealable. Not being appealable, the only remedy against the appointment of a special administrator is Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which was what petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals. Certiorari, however, requires nothing less than grave abuse of discretion, a term which implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law.

The Court held that CA is correct that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge Gedorio in affirming Judge Menchavez’s appointment of Romualdo as special administrator. Judge Menchavez clearly considered petitioner Vilma for the position of special administratrix of Gerardo’s estate, but decided against her appointment.

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OCAMPO v. OCAMPOGR No. 187879. 5 July 2010

Facts:Leonardo, Renato and Erlinda M. Ocampo are the children and only heirs of the spouses Vicente

and Maxima Ocampo. Upon the death of Sps. Ocampo, respondent (Dalisay) and Leonardo jointly managed the estate of their parents.

Leonardo died in 2004. Upon his death, Respondent (Dalisay) managed the properties to the exclusion of the petitioners (Renato and Erlinda). Petitioners initiated a petition for intestate proceedings of the Estate of Sps. Ocampo, and Leonardo Ocampo.

Respondent (Dalisay) filed their Opposition and Counter petition contending that the petition was defective as it sought the judicial settlement of two estates in a single proceeding. In their counter-petition, respondents prayed that they be appointed as special joint administrators of the estate of Vicente and Maxima.RTC appointed Dalisay and Renato as special joint administrators of the estate of the deceased spouses.. Renato and Erlinda filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order, asserting their priority in right to be appointed as administrators being the next of kin of Vicente and Maxima. RTC revoked the appointment of Dalisay as co-special administratrix, substituting her with Erlinda. Erlinda and Renato filed a Motion for Exemption to File Administrators’ Bond due to their difficulty in raising the necessary amount. 8 months after the order appointing Erlinda and Renato as special joint administrators, petitioner (Dalisay) filed a Motion to Terminate or Revoke the Special Administration and to Proceed to Judicial Partition or Appointment of Regular Administrator. RTC granted the motion on account of their failure to comply with its Order, particularly the posting of the required bond, and to enter their duties and responsibilities as special administrators. RTC appointed Melinda (Leonardo’s daughter) as regular administratrix. It likewise found that judicial partition may proceed.

Respondents filed a petition for certiorari before CA, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in (a) declaring them to be unfit and to have failed to enter the office of special administration despite lapse of reasonable time and (b) appointing Melinda as regular administratrix, a mere granddaughter of Vicente and Maxima.

Court of Appeals ruled that the trail court gravely abused its discretion. It also denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition, ascribing to the Court of Appeals errors of law and grave abuse of discretion for annulling and setting aside the Regional Trial Court order.

Issue:Whether or not RTC committed an error when it removed Erlinda and Renato as joint special

administrators?

Held: It has long been settled that the selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by

the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. The probate court may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules at its discretion, such that the need to first pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness or unfitness and the application of

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the order of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78, as would be proper in the case of a regular administrator, do not obtain.

As long as the discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based on reason, equity, justice, and legal principles, interference by higher courts is unwarranted. Consequently, the RTC revoked respondents’ appointment as special administrators for failing to post their administrators’ bond and to submit an inventory and accounting as required of them, tantamount to failing to comply with its lawful orders. Given these circumstances, this Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC. Rule 78-90Don Mikhail A. Siccuan

DE GALA v. GONZALESG.R. No. L-30289. 26 March 1929

Facts:On November 23, 1920, Severina Gonzales executed a will in which Serapia de Gala, a niece of

Severina, was designated executrix. The testatrix died in November, 1926, leaving no heirs by force of law, and on December 2, 1926, Serapia, through her counsel, presented the will for probate. Apolinario Gonzales, a nephew of the deceased, filed an opposition to the will on the ground that it had not been executed in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On April 2, 1927, Serapia de Gala was appointed special administratrix of the estate of the deceased. She returned an inventory of the estate on March 31, 1927, and made several demands upon Sinforoso Ona, the surviving husband of the deceased, for the delivery to her of the property inventoried and of which he was in possession.

On September 20, 1928, the Court of First Instance ordered Sinforoso Ona to deliver to Serapia de Gala all the property left by the deceased. Instead of delivering the property as ordered, Sinforoso filed a motion asking the appointment of Serapia de Gala as special administratrix be cancelled and that he, Sinforoso, be appointed in her stead. The motion was opposed by both Apolinario Gonzales and by Serapia de Gala, but on March 3, 1928, it was nevertheless granted, Serapia was removed, and Sinforoso was appointed special administrator in her place, principally on the ground that he had possession of the property in question and that his appointment would simplify the proceedings.

The court below in an order dated January 20, 1928, declared the will valid and admitted it to probate. All of the parties appealed, Serapia de Gala from the order removing her from the office of special administratrix, and Apolinario Gonzales and Sinforoso Ona from the order probating the will.

The appointment of a special administrator lies entirely in the sound discretion of the court. The fact that no appeal can be taken from the appointment of a special administrator indicates that both his appointment and his removal are purely discretionary, and we cannot find that the court below abused its discretion in the present case.

Issues:(1) that the person requested to sign the name of the testatrix signed only the latter's name and not her own; (2) that the attestation clause does not mention the placing of the thumb-mark of the testatrix in the will; and (3) that the fact that the will had been signed in the presence of the witnesses was not stated in the attestation clause but only in the last paragraph of the body of the will.

Held:1. This is that the testatrix placed her thumb-mark on the will in the proper places. When, therefore, the law says that the will shall be 'signed' by the testator or testatrix, the law is fulfilled not only by the customary written signature but by the testator or testatrix' thumb-mark. The construction put upon the word 'signed' by most courts is the original meaning of a signum or sign, rather than the derivative

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meaning of a sign manual or handwriting. A statute requiring a will to be 'signed' is satisfied if the signature is made by the testator's mark.

The opinion quoted is exactly in point. The testatrix thumb-mark appears in the center of her name as written by Serapia de Gala on all of the pages of the will.

2 and 3. As will be seen, it is not mentioned in the attestation clause that the testatrix signed by thumb-mark, but it does there appear that the signature was affixed in the presence of the witnesses, and the form of the signature is sufficiently described and explained in the last clause of the body of the will. It maybe conceded that the attestation clause is not artistically drawn and that, standing alone, it does not quite meet the requirements of the statute, but taken in connection with the last clause of the body of the will, it is fairly clear and sufficiently carries out the legislative intent; it leaves no possible doubt as to the authenticity of the document.

The contention of the appellants Sinforoso Ona and Apolinario Gonzales that the fact that the will had been signed in the presence of the witnesses was not stated in the attestation clause is without merit; the fact is expressly stated in that clause.

In our opinion, the will is valid, and the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed without costs. So ordered.

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ROXAS v. PECSONG.R. No. L-2211. 20 December 1948

Facts:Pablo M. Roxas died leaving properties in Bulacan. The other respondents Maria and Pedro

Roxas, sister and brother respectively of the deceased, filed on August 3, 1946, a petition for the administration of the latter's estate, in special intestate proceeding No. 1707 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, and Maria Roxas was appointed special administratrix upon an ex-parte petition. On August 10, 1946, the petitioner Natividad Vda. de Roxas, widow of Pablo M. Roxas, filed a petition for the probate of an alleged will of her deceased husband, and for her appointment as executrix of his estate designated is said will, and the petition was docketed as special proceeding No. 172 of the same court.

The respondent judge rendered a decision denying the probate of the will presented by the petitioner on the ground that the attesting witnesses did not sign their respective names in the presence of the testator, from which the petitioner has appealed, and the appeal is now pending. The respondents Maria and Pedro Roxas renewed their petition for the appointment of Maria Roxas as special administratrix or special co-administratrix, and on May 5, 1948, the respondent judge rendered his resolution appointing the petitioner Natividad I. Vda. de Roxas as special administratrix only of all the conjugal properties of the deceased, and Maria Roxas as special administratrix of all capital or properties belonging exclusively to the deceased Pablo M. Roxas.

Issue:Whether or not, the CFI acted in excess of the court's jurisdiction in appointing two special co-

administratices of the estate of the deceased Pablo Roxas, one of the capital or properties belonging exclusively to the deceased, and another of his conjugal properties with his wife (now widow), the petitioner.

Held:Yes, It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of certain

persons to the appointment of administrator under section 1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory provisions as to causes for removal of an executor or administrator under section 653 of Act No. 190, now section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or removal of special administrator. (21 Am. Jur., 833; De Gala vs. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil., 104, 106.) As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special administrator and the qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity.

As under the law only one general administrator may be appointed to administer, liquidate and distribute the estate of a deceased spouse, it clearly follows that only one special administrator may be appointed to administer temporarily said estate, because a special administrator is but a temporary administrator who is appointed to act in lieu of the general administrator. "When there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of

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will, or from any other cause, the court may appoint a special administrator to collect and take charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators thereupon appointed," (sec. 1, Rule 81). Although his powers and duties are limited to "collect and take charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence and maintain suits as administrator, and may sell such perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased." (Section 2, Rule 81.)

In view of all the foregoing, we hold that the court below has no power to appoint two special administratices of the estate of a deceased husband or wife, one of the community property and another of the exclusive property of the decedent, and therefore the respondent judge acted in excess of the court's jurisdiction in rendering or issuing the order complained of, and therefore said order is hereby set aside, with costs against the respondents. So ordered.

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Rule 84 and 90Shalako R. Sta. Maria

SILVERIO, JR. v. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 178933. 16 September 2009

Facts:Beatriz Silverio died intestate and was survived by her husband Ricardo Silverio, Sr. Silverio, Sr.

filed an intestate proceeding. However, Silverio, Jr. and Ricardo Silverio filed a petition to remove Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate. Silverio, Sr. was replaced by Silverio, Jr. as administrator. Nelia Silverio-Dee filed a Motion of Reconsideration which was later on denied. Silverio, Jr. was authorized to immediately exercise his right as administrator of the estate. The court in its Omnibus Order also ordered Nelia Dee to vacate a property belonging to the estate. Silverio, Jr. was given letters of administration. Nelia Dee filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order. The RTC recalled its ruling and reinstated Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate. Silverio, Jr. filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied by the court. The court furthermore allowed that various properties of the estate be sold in order to partially settle estate taxes. One of the properties sold was the lot occupied by Nelia Dee. Dee filed a Notice of Appeal but this was contested by Silverio, Jr saying that the appeal was filed qo days beyond the reglementary period pursuant to Sec 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The RTC ruled in favor of Silverio, Jr. and reiterated its previous order to vacate the premises against Dee.

The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals. It overruled the decision of the Regional Trial Court. The Notice to Vacate against Nelia Dee was annulled and set aside.

Issue:Whether the possession of the property by Silverio-Dee is valid.

Held:No. The alleged authority given by Silverio, Sr.. for Nelia S. Silverio-Dee to occupy the property

is null and void since the possession of estate property can only be given to a purported heir by virtue of an Order from this Court as provided in Sec. 1 Rule 90 and Sec. 2 Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court. In fact, the Executor or Administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased only when it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration in accordance with Sec. 3 Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court. With this in mind, it is without a doubt that the possession by Nelia S. Silverio-Dee of the property in question has absolutely no legal basis considering that her occupancy cannot pay the debts and expenses of administration, not to mention the fact that it will also disturb the right of the new Administrator to possess and manage the property for the purpose of settling the estate’s legitimate obligations.

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Rule 78-90Aran Jay G. Sicat

SANCHEZ v. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 108947. 29 September 1997

Facts:

Rosalia S. Lugod is the only child of spouses Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca while Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn L. Ranises and Roberto S. Lugod are the legitimate children of Rosalia. Rolando , Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez, are the illegitimate children of Juan C. Sanchez.

Following the death of her mother, Maria Villafranca, on September 29, 1967, Rosalia filed on January 22, 1968, thru counsel, a petition for letters of administration over the estate of her mother and the estate of her father, Juan C. Sanchez, who was at the time in state of senility. Rosalia, as administratrix of the intestate estate of her mother, submitted an inventory and appraisal of the real and personal estate of her late mother. Before the administration proceedings in Special Proceedings No. 44-M could formally be terminated and closed, Juan C. Sanchez, Rosalia’s father, died on October 21, 1968.

On January 14, 1969 as heirs of Juan C. Sanchez, filed a petition for letters of administration over the intestate estate of Juan C. Sanchez, which petition was opposed by Rosalia. More than twenty years have elapsed the court ruled in favor of Juan C. Sanchez. On appeal the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28761 annulled the decision of the trial court and declared the compromise agreement among the parties valid and binding even without the said trial court’s approval.

Issue:Whether or not the court erred in annulling the decision of the lower court for the reason that a

compromise agreement or partition, executed by the parties on October 30, 1969 was void and unenforceable the same not having been approved by the intestate court and that the same having been seasonably repudiated by petitioners on the ground of fraud.

Held:The Supreme Court enunciated that under Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise

agreement as “a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced.” Being a consensual contract, it is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties. Judicial approval is not required for its perfection.

For a partition to be valid, Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, requires the concurrence of the following conditions: (1) the decedent left no will; (2) the decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left, all had been paid; (3) the heirs and liquidators are all of age, or if they are minors, the latter are represented by their judicial guardian or legal representatives; and (4) the partition was made by means of a public instrument or affidavit duly filed with the Register of Deeds. The court finds that all the foregoing requisites are present in this case. Hence affirm the validity of the parties’ compromise agreement/partition in this case.

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ESTATE OF HILARIO RUIZ v. COURT OF APPEALSGR No. 118671. 21 January 1996

Facts:Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his

adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three granddaughters, Cathryn, Albertine and Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. The testator named Edmond Ruiz as the executor of his estate.

Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for the probate of his father's holographic will. It was private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed before the Regional Trial Court, a petition for the probate and approval of the will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz. Consequently, the probate court, on May 18, 1993, admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond conditioned upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P50, 000.

Respondent Montes filed a "Motion for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs" and "Motion for Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will." Montes prayed for the release of the rent payments to Cathryn, Albertine and Angeline and for the distribution of the testator's properties,

The probate court granted respondent Montes' motion in view of petitioner's lack of opposition. It thus ordered the release of the rent payments to the decedent's three granddaughters. It further ordered the delivery of the titles to and possession of the properties bequeathed to the three granddaughters and respondent Montes upon the filing of a bond of P50,000.00.

The probate court, on December 22, 1993, ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but only "such amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of administration and allowances for support" of the testator's three granddaughters subject to collation and deductible from their share in the inheritance. The court, however, held in abeyance the release of the titles to respondent Montes and the three granddaughters until the lapse of six months from the date of first publication of the notice to creditors.Petitioner assailed this order before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the petition and sustained the probate court's order .Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of the estate's

debts and obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant support to the testator's grandchildren; (2) to order the release of the titles to certain heirs?Held:

Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedent's estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not extend it to the deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity.16 It was error, therefore, for the appellate court to sustain the probate court's order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of the testator pending settlement of his estate.

No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations abovementioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.

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http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1996/jan1996/gr_118671_1996.html#fnt16

In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the property to the private respondents after the lapse of six months from the date of first publication of the notice to creditors. The questioned order speaks of "notice" to creditors, not payment of debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate had not hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax is one of those obligations that must be paid before distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their respective shares in the inheritance. Notably, at the time the order was issued the properties of the estate had not yet been inventoried and appraised.It was also too early in the day for the probate court to order the release of the titles six months after admitting the will to probate.

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Rule 78-90Don Mikhail A. Siccuan

HEIRS OF ESCANLAR v. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 119777. 23 October 1997

Facts:Spouses Guillermo Nombre and Victoriana Cari-an died without issue. Nombre's heirs include his

nephews and grandnephews. Victoriana Cari-an was succeeded by her late brother's son, Gregorio Cari-an. The latter was declared as Victoriana's heir in the estate proceedings for Nombre and his wife (Special Proceeding No. 7-7279). After Gregorio died in 1971, his wife, Generosa Martinez, and children, Rodolfo, Carmen, Leonardo and Fredisminda, all surnamed Cari-an, were also adjudged as heirs by representation to Victoriana's estate. Leonardo Cari-an passed away, leaving his widow, Nelly Chua vda. de Cari-an and minor son Leonell, as his heirs.Two parcels of land, denominated as Lot No. 1616 and 1617 of the Kabankalan Cadastre with an area of 29,350 square meters and 460,948 square meters, respectively, formed part of the estate of Nombre and Cari-an.

Gregorio Cari-an's heirs, herein collectively referred to as private respondents Cari-an, executed the Deed of Sale of Rights, Interests and Participation worded as follows:

“NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the sum of P275,000.00, except the share of the minor child of Leonardo Cari-an, which should be deposited with the Municipal Treasurer of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, by the order of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch VI, Himamaylan, by those presents, do hereby SELL, CEDE, TRANSFER and CONVEY by way of ABSOLUTE SALE, all the RIGHTS, INTERESTS and PARTICIPATION of the Vendors as to the one-half (1/2) portion pro-indiviso of Lots Nos. 1616 and 1617 (Fishpond), of the Kabankalan Cadastre, pertaining to the one-half (1/2) portion pro-indiviso of late Victoriana Cari-an unto and in favor of the Vendees, their heirs, successors and assigns;xxx xxx xxxThat this Contract of Sale of rights, interests and participations shall become effective only upon the approval by the Honorable CFI Negros Occ.Pedro Escanlar and Francisco Holgado, the vendees, were concurrently the lessees of the lots

referred to above. They stipulated that they shall only pay P50,000 downpayment and the balance of the purchase price (P225,000.00) shall be paid on or before May 1979 in a Deed of Agreement executed by the parties.

Petitioners were unable to pay the Cari-an heirs' individual shares, amounting to P55,000.00 each, by the due date. However, said heirs received at least 12 installments from petitioners after May 1979. 5 Rodolfo Cari-an was fully paid by June 21, 1979. Generosa Martinez, Carmen Cari-an and Fredisminda Cari-an were likewise fully compensated for their individual shares, per receipts given in evidence. The minor Leonell's share was deposited with the Regional Trial Court on September 7, 1982. 7

Being former lessees, petitioners continued in possession of Lot Nos. 1616 and 1617. Interestingly, they continued to pay rent based on their lease contract. On September 10, 1981, petitioners moved to intervene in the probate proceedings of Nombre and Cari-an as the buyers of private respondent Cari-an's share in Lot Nos. 1616 and 1617. Petitioners' motion for approval of the September 15, 1978

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sale before the same court, filed on November 10, 1981, was opposed by private respondents Cari-an on January 5, 1982.

Subsequently, Cari-an sold their shares in eight parcels of land including Lot Nos. 1616 and 1617 to spouses Chua for P1,850,000.00. One week later, the vendor-heirs, including private respondents Cari-an, filed a motion for approval of sale of hereditary rights

Private respondents Cari-an instituted this case for cancellation of sale against petitioners (Escanlar and Holgado) for failure to pay the balance of the purchase price by May 31, 1979 and alleged that they only received a total of P132,551.00 in cash and goods.

On April 20, 1983, petitioners also sold their rights and interests in the subject parcels of land (Lot Nos. 1616 and 1617) to Edwin Jayme for P735,000.00 11 and turned over possession of both lots to the latter.

Trial court on December 18, 1991 in favor of cancellation of the September 15, 1978 sale. Said transaction was nullified because it was not approved by the probate court as required by the contested deed of sale of rights, interests and participation and because the Cari-ans were not fully paid. Consequently, the Deed of Sale executed by the heirs of Nombre and Cari-an in favor of Paquito and Ney Chua, which was approved by the probate court, was upheld.

Petitioners raised the case to the Court of Appeals. Respondent court affirmed the decision of the trial court on and held that the questioned deed of sale of rights, interests and participation is a contract to sell because it shall become effective only upon approval by the probate court and upon full payment of the purchase price. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent court on April 3, 1995. Hence, these petitions.

Held:1. SC disagree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the September 15, 1978 Deed of Sale of Rights, Interests and Participation is a contract to sell and not one of sale.

The distinction between contracts of sale and contracts to sell with reserved title has been recognized by this Court in repeated decisions-- In contracts to sell, ownership is retained by the seller and is not to pass until the full payment of the price. Such payment is a positive suspensive condition, the failure of which is not a breach of contract but simply an event that prevented the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force.

2. Under Art. 1318 of the Civil Code, the essential requisites of a contract are: consent of the contracting parties; object certain which is the subject matter of the contract and cause of the obligation which is established. Absent one of the above, no contract can arise. Conversely, where all are present, the result is a valid contract. However, some parties introduce various kinds of restrictions or modalities, the lack of which will not, however, affect the validity of the contract. In other words, only the effectivity and not the validity of the contract is affected.

Moreover, SC hold that the requisite approval was virtually rendered impossible by the Cari-ans because they opposed the motion for approval of the sale filed by petitioners 35 and sued the latter for the cancellation of that sale. Having provided the obstacle and the justification for the stipulated approval not to be granted, private respondents Cari-an should not be allowed to cancel their first transaction with petitioners because of lack of approval by the probate court, which lack is of their own making.

3. With respect to rescission of a sale of real property, Article 1592 of the Civil Code governs:In the sale of immovable property, even though it may have been stipulated that upon failure to

pay the price at the time agreed upon the rescission of the contract shall of right take place, the vendee may pay, even after the expiration of the period, as long as no demand for rescission of the contract has been made upon him either judicially or by a notarial act. After the demand, the court may not grant him a new term. In the instant case, the sellers gave the buyers until May 1979 to pay the balance of the purchase price. After the latter failed to pay installments due, the former made no judicial demand for rescission of the contract nor did they execute any notarial act demanding the same, as required under

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Article 1592. Consequently, the buyers could lawfully make payments even after the May 1979 deadline, as in fact they paid several installments to the sellers which the latter accepted. Thus, upon the expiration of the period to pay, the sellers made no move to rescind but continued accepting late payments, an act which cannot but be construed as a waiver of the right to rescind. When the sellers, instead of availing of their right to rescind, accepted and received delayed payments of installments beyond the period stipulated, and the buyers were in arrears, the sellers in effect waived and are now estopped from exercising said right to rescind.


OROLA v. THE RURAL BANK OF PONTEVEDRA (CAPIZ)G.R. No. 158566. 20 September 2005

Facts:On July 16, 1969, Trinidad Laserna Orola died intestate. She was survived by her husband

Emilio Orola and their six minor children, namely, 10-year-old Antonio, 12-year-old Josephine, 16-year-old Manuel, and other siblings, Myrna, Angeline and Althea. Emilio Orola was appointed guardian not only over the persons of his minor children but also over their property.

As such administrator of the estate, Emilio took possession of the said parcels of land. He opened an account in the name of the estate with the PNB. He embarked on a massive sugar production and, with prior approval of the court, negotiated with banking institutions for financing loans to purchase the required equipments. However, in 1976 and 1977, there was a sudden collapse of the sugar industry. Emilio Orola found it necessary to develop the swampy portion of the estate for the production of fish. To finance the endeavor, he needed at least P600,000.00. On September 11, 1980, Emilio Orola filed a motion in Sp. Proc. No. V-3639 for authority to negotiate a P600,000.00 loan from the Central Bank of the Philippines for the full and complete development of the fishpond portion of the estate, and to transfer the sugar account of the estate from the PNB to the Republic Planters Bank (RPB).

Emilio, thereafter, failed to pay the amortizations of the loans to the Rural Bank. the Rural Bank filed an application with the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgages over Lots 1071 and 1088. Josephine Orola and her siblings, Myrna, Angeline, Manuel, Antonio and Althea, filed a Complaint against the Rural Bank, their father Emilio and theEx-Officio Provincial Sheriff for the nullification of the Promissory Notes and Real Estate Mortgages executed by Josephine, Manuel and Antonio Orola, and the sale of the property subject of the said deed at public auction. They alleged therein that they became the sole owners of Lots 1088 and 1071 when their father executed a waiver of his rights over the said lots in their favor. They also alleged that the real estate mortgage contracts were null and void because the same were never submitted to and approved by the RTC. As such, the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgages and the sale of the property covered by the said deeds were null and void.

In its answer to the complaint, Rural Bank averred that the RTC in Sp. Proc. No. V-3639 authorized and even approved the amended contracts of sale executed by Antonio, Manuel and Josephine Orola and the defendant Emilio Orola. It further averred that the plaintiffs had agreed to the execution of the mortgages of the property subject of the said deeds, and conformed to the said amended contracts before the RTC in the intestate estate proceedings approved the same; they were also notified of the balance of their account, and of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgages, and the subsequent sale of the property covered by the said mortgages at public auction after they refused to pay their account despite demands. As such, the plaintiffs were estopped from assailing the real estate mortgages and the extrajudicial foreclosure thereof and the sale of the lots covered by the said deeds at public auction.

Issue:

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Whether or not the administrator of the estate is not required under Section 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court to secure prior authority to mortgage the real properties or otherwise encumber the same.

Held:No, Section 2, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court provides that, upon application of the administrator

and on written notice to the heirs, the court may authorize the administrator to mortgage so much as may be necessary of the real estate for the expenses of the administrator, or if it clearly appears that such mortgage would be beneficial to the persons interested. the Court agrees with the petitioners’ contention that respondent Orola failed to secure an order from the intestate estate court authorizing him to mortgage the subject lots and execute a real estate mortgage contract in favor of respondent Rural Bank. What the intestate estate court approved in its December 17, 1982 Order was the authority incorporated in the amended contracts of lease respondent Orola gave to petitioners Josephine, Manuel and Antonio Orola so that the said lots could be mortgaged to the respondent Rural Bank as security for the P600,000.00 loan under their respective names. In fine, the intestate estate court authorized the petitioners, not respondent Orola, to mortgage the said lots to respondent Rural Bank. Moreover, under Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, only the executor or administrator of the estate may be authorized by the intestate estate court to mortgage real estate belonging to the estate; hence, the order of the estate court authorizing the petitioners to mortgage the realty of the estate to the respondent Rural Bank is a nullity.

The respondents must have realized that the order of the intestate estate court authorizing petitioners Manuel, Antonio and Josephine Orola to mortgage the lots was void because respondent Emilio Orola caused the real estate mortgage contracts in favor of respondent Rural Bank to be executed by his children, petitioners Josephine, Manuel and Antonio Orola, “acting as attorneys-in-fact of the administrator of the estate.” However, the estate court had not appointed petitioners Antonio, Josephine and Manuel Orola as attorneys-in-fact of respondent Emilio Orola empowered to execute the said contracts. Hence, they had no authority to execute the said Real Estate Mortgage Contracts for and in behalf of respondent Orola, in the latter’s capacity as administrator of the estate.

Worse, respondent Orola failed to submit the real estate mortgage contracts to the intestate estate court for its consideration and approval. To give approval means to confirm, ratify, or to consent to some act or thing done by another. Unless and until the said contracts are approved by the intestate estate court, the same cannot have any binding effect upon the estate; nor serve as basis for any action against the estate and against the parcels of land described in the said contracts belonging to it.

It bears stressing that respondent Orola had no right or authority to mortgage the realty belonging to the estate. He derived his authority from the order of the estate court which had jurisdiction to authorize the real estate mortgage thereof under such terms and conditions and upon proper application. Any mortgage of realty of the estate without the appropriate authority of the estate court has no legal support and is void. The purchaser at public auction acquires no title over the realty. The real estate mortgage contracts, as well as the extrajudicial foreclosure thereof and the sale of the property described therein at public auction, can thus be attacked directly and collaterally.

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SIKAT v. VDA DE VILLANUEVAG.R. No. L-35925 10 November 1932

Facts:When Mariano P. Villanueva died, an intestate proceeding was instituted and Julio Quijano was

appointed as administrator. Julio Quijano also applied for the settlement of the estate of Pedro Villanueva, son of Mariano P. Villanueva. Quiteria vda. De Villanueva was assigned as administratix of the estate of Pedro Villanueva. Tomas Almonte and Pablo Rocha were appointed as commissioners to compose the committee on claims and reprisals. Julio Quijano, as the administratix of the estate of Mariano Villanueva filed to the committee a written claim. Quiteria vda. De Villanueva questioned the jurisdiction of the CFI of Albay over the intestate proceedings of the estate of Pedro Villanueva, hence the Almonte and Rocha abstained from making any report regarding the claim submitted by Julio Quijano. Nerique Kare was then named as the judicial administrator of the intestate estate of Mariano Villanueva. Kare filed his claim before the committee composed of Almonte and Rocha, saying that when Pedro Villanueva died, he owed the estate of Mariano Villanueva P10,192.92. The committee decided in favor of the estate of Mariano Villanueva. Quiteria vda de Villanueva appealed the decision. Kare was then replaced by plaintiff herein, Ricardo Sikat.

Issue:Whether the claim of Mariano P. Villanueva’s estate against Pedro Villanueva has already

prescribed.

Held:Yes, it has already prescribed. Sec. 49 of Act. 190 states: “SEC. 49. SAVING IN OTHER CASES. If, in an action commenced, or attempted to becommenced, in due time, a judgment for the plaintiff be reversed, or if the plaintiff fail otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited for the commencement of such action has, at the date of such reversal or failure, expired, the plaintiff, or, if he die and the cause of action survive, his representatives, may commence a new action within one year after such date, and this provision shall apply to any claim asserted in any pleading by a defendant.”

This provision of law speaks of an "action", which, according to section 1 of Act No. 190, "means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the redress or prevention of a wrong". According to this definition, the proceeding here in question is not an action but a special proceeding, which, according to the same section, is any other remedy provided by law. The very reference in section 49 to actions brought against debtors before their death clearly means ordinary actions and not special proceedings.

The saving clause, then, in section 49 of Act No. 190 does not directly apply to special proceedings.

The purpose of the law, in fixing a period within which claims against an estate must be presented, is to insure a speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased person and the early delivery of the property, to the persons entitled to receive it.

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The speedy settlement of the estate of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those entitled to the residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of administration have been paid, is the ruling spirit of our probate law.

Whenever a creditor's claim presented in the intestate proceedings of the estate of his debtor is not allowed because the court has no jurisdiction, and such creditor permits more than three years to elapse before instituting the same proceedings in the competent court, the claim is barred by laches, applying the provisions of section 49 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by analogy.

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DANAN v. BUENCAMINOG. R. No. L-57205. 14 December 1981

Facts:Dominador Danan died without a will. Service Engineers, Inc. which claimed to be a creditor of

the deceased filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga praying that letters of administrative of the intestate estate of Danan be issued in favor of Engineer Carlos B. Navarro. The petition was docketed as Special Proceeding No. G-22. It was, however, Adoracion F. Vda. de Danan, widow of the deceased, who was appointed administratrix of the estate.

Then on November 13, 1973, the court issued an order directing all persons having money claims against the estate to file them within six (6) months after the date of the first publication of the order which was December 10, 1973.Sx months after, Benito Manalansan and Ines Vitug Manalansan filed a contingent claim in anticipation of a deficiency after the spouses shall have foreclosed a real estate mortgage which the deceased and his wife had executed in their favor. The administratrix filed an answer to the contingent claim wherein she admitted the existence of the debt which was secured by a mortgage; however, she prayed that the contingent claim be denied because it had no basis for the mortgage had not yet been foreclosed and ergo there was no deficiency.

The trial court resolved the claim against the estate in favor of the Manalansans’. The admnistratrix filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order (which ordered payment of the claim of P 294,298.26) on the ground that the claim was exorbitant, shocking to the senses and that the same was filed out of time or beyond the reglementary period provided by law. The court denied the motion, hence this appeal.

Issue:Whether or not a trial Judge can adjudicate and render judgment on a contingent claim against the

Estate in an Intestacy Proceeding on the basis merely of the direct testimony of a claimant and can a claim against the Estate in an Intestacy Proceeding that is not supported by the evidence on record be awarded.Held:

The Supreme Court enunciated that the probate court gave opportunities to the administratrix to contest the contingent claim. Thus she filed an answer thereto on July 11, 1974; a hearing was held on September 2, 1974, but she did not appear; the hearing on October 3, 1974 was re-set to November 18, 1974 at her request but she failed to appear on the latter date; she did not interpose objection to the exhibits offered by the Manalansans as stipulated in the order of November 18, 1974; and lastly the administratrix was given ten days within which to file her comment to the Motion to Resolve Claim Against the Estate.

The Court believed that the opportunities given to the administratrix were not ample enough and do not meet the minimum requirements for due process. On June 12, 1974, when the claim was filed it amounted to only P98,411.17. However, on January 3, 1981, when the probate court approved the claim it had ballooned to the enormous amount of P294.298.26. Noteworthy by is the fact that the order approving the claim does not explain how it reached that amount. The probate court should not have been satisfied with merely asking for objections or comments from the administratrix but it should have conducted a full dress hearing on the claim by using its coercive powers if necessary.

Wherefore, the court a quo is directed to conduct a thorough and full dress hearing on the claim of the private respondents.

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Rule 78 – 90Shiela O. Imperial

ECHAUS v. BLANCOGR. No L-41295. 4 December 1989

Facts:Angelina Puentevella Echaus as Administratrix of the intestate estate of her deceased father Luis

Puentevella, filed a complaint against Charles Newton Hodges (C.N. Hodges) praying for an accounting of the business covering the Ba-Ta Subdivision, the recovery of her share in the profits and remaining assets of their business and the payment of expenses and moral and exemplary damages. Sometime thereafter, counsel for C. N. Hodges manifested that defendant C. N. Hodges died on December 25, 1962. The trial court ordered the substitution of the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), as administrator of the estate of deceased C. N. Hodges, as party defendant.

A petition for the settlement of the estate of C. N. Hodges was instituted before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. A notice to creditors was published in "Yuhum" a newspaper of general circulation.

On December 5, 1966, judgment was rendered by the trial court in favor of plaintiff Angelina F. Echaus, the dispositive portion of which states: the defendant, in its capacity as Administrator of the Estate of Charles Newton Hodges is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiffs the sum of (P851,472.83) with legal interest.The plaintiff filed a motion in Special Proceedings No. 1672 (estate proceedings of deceased C. N. Hodges) for the payment of the judgment.

Herein respondent Avelina A. Magno, as administratrix of the estate of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges (wife of C. N. Hodges) opposed the motion she also filed a petition for relief from judgment and a motion to intervene .It was however denied.

In a motion Angelina P. Echaus prayed for the resolution of her previous motion to direct payment of the judgment credit which was held in abeyance, stating that the petition for relief from judgment filed in Civil Case No. 6628 was dismissed by the trial court which dismissal has become final and executory in view of the failure of Avelina Magno to file a record on appeal on time.

On February 26, 1969, respondent Judge Ramon Blanco issued an Order reiterating his position that the motion to direct payment of the judgment credit cannot yet be resolved and holding in abeyance the resolution thereof in view of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Supreme Court .

Petitioner (ECHAUS) then filed the instant petition for mandamus dated April 21, 1969 seeking: a) to set aside respondent judge's order and to order PCIB to pay the judgment credit in Civil Case No. 6628.

It is the contention of petitioner that the judgment in Civil Case No. 6628 is now final and executory and the execution thereof becomes a matter of right. The duty to order the execution of a final and executory judgment is ministerial and the failure of respondent judge to issue such order is a proper case for mandamus.

Issue:Whether or not the remedy of mandamus is proper to execute the money judgment in favor of the

Plaintiff against the estate of the deceased?

Held:While the judgment in Civil Case No. 6628 has become final and executory, execution is not the

proper remedy to enforce payment thereof. The ordinary procedure by which to settle claims of indebtedness against the estate of a deceased person,is for the claimant to present a claim before the probate court so that said court may order the administrator to pay the amount thereof.

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Even if petitioners' judgment credit allowed as a claim against the estate, immediate payment thereof by the administrator of the estate, is not a matter of right. A judgment against the executor or administrator shall be that he pay, in due course of administrator, the amount ascertained to be due, and it shall not create a lien upon the property of the estate, or give the judgment creditor any priority in payment (Sec. 13, Rule 86, Revised Rules).

The time for paying debts and legacies is to be fixed by the probate court having jurisdiction over the estate of the deceased (Sec. 15, Rule 18). In the absence of any showing that respondent judge who is taking cognizance of the estate proceedings had already allowed the administrator to dispose of the estate and to pay the debts and legacies of the deceased, a writ of mandamus will not issue to compel him to order payment of petitioner's claim.

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SHEKER v. SHEKERG.R. No. 157912. 13 December 2007

Facts:The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter issued an

order for all the creditors to file their respective claims against the estate. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on October 7, 2002 a contingent claim for agent's commission due him amounting to approximately P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the estate, and the amount of P275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course of negotiating the sale of said realties.

The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the dismissal of said money claim against the estate on the grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a certification against non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the money claim was not filed and served personally.In 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice the money claim based on the grounds advanced by respondent.

Issue:Did the RTC err in dismissing petitioner's contingent money claim against respondent estate for

failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a certification against non-forum shopping?

Held:Yes. The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory

pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was initiated upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain exceptions. Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for creditors' claims to be recognized and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the estate.

Thus, the court directed to give due course and take appropriate action on petitioner's money claim in accordance with Rule 82 of the Rules of Court.

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Rule 78 to 90Emmaunel L. Saavedra

BRIONES vs. HENSON-CRUZG.R. No. 159139. 22 August 2008

Facts:The trial court then designated petitioner Atty. George S. Briones as Special Administrator of the

estate. Atty. Briones accepted the appointment, took his oath of office, and started the administration of the estate.

Atty. Briones submitted the Special Administrator’s Final Report for the approval of the court. He prayed that he be paid a commission of P97,850,191.26 representing eight percent (8%) of the value of the estate under his administration.

The respondents opposed the approval of the final report and prayed that they be granted an opportunity to examine the documents, vouchers, and receipts mentioned in the statement of income and disbursements.

The trial court handed down an order 1.Reiterates its designation of the accounting firm of Messrs. Alba, Romeo & Co. to immediately conduct an audit of the administration by Atty. George S. Briones of the estate of the late Luz J. Henson, the expenses of which shall be charged against the estate. 2. That suspends the approval of the report of the special administrator except the payment of his commission, which is hereby fixed at 1.8% of the value of the estate. the respondents filed an audit request with the trial court. Atty. Briones filed his comment suggesting that the audit be done by an independent auditor at the expense of the estate. the trial court granted the request for audit and appointed the accounting firm Alba, Romeo & Co. to conduct the audit.

Respondents filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari, the petition assailed the Order which appointed accounting firm Alba, Romeo & Co. as auditors and the Order which reiterated the appointment.

Prior the filing of the petition for certiorari, the heirs of Luz Henzon filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC assailing the Order dated April 3, 2003 insofar as it directed the payment of Atty. Briones’ commission. They subsequently filed their record on appeal.

Issue: Whether or not there was forum shopping in filling a petition for certiorari and ordinary appeal.

Held:

No, given that the subject matter of the audit is Atty. Briones’ Final Report in the administration of the estate of the decedent, itspreparatory character is obvious; it is a prelude to the court’s final settlement and distribution of the properties of the decedent to the heirs. In the context of what the court’s order accomplishes, the court’s designation of an auditor does not have the effect of ruling on the pending estate proceeding on its merits (i.e., in terms of finally determining the extent of the net estate of the deceased and distributing it to the heirs) or on the merits of any independently determinable aspect of the estate proceeding; it is only for purposes of confirming the accuracy of the Special Administrator’s Final Report, particularly of the reported charges against the estate. In other words, the designation of the auditor did not resolve Special Proceedings No. 99-92870 or any independently determinable issue therein, and left much to be done on the merits of the case. Thus, the April 3, 2002 Order of the RTC is interlocutory in so far as it designated an accounting firm to audit the petitioner’s special administration of the estate.

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In contrast with the interlocutory character of the auditor’s appointment, the second part is limited to the Special Administrator’s commission which was fixed at 1.8% of the value of the estate. To quote from the Order: the court hereby. . . 2. Suspends the approval of the report of the special administrator except the payment of his commission, which is hereby fixed at 1.8% of the value of the estate.” Under these terms, it is immediately apparent that this pronouncement on an independently determinable issue – the special administrator’s commission – is the court’s definite and final word on the matter, subject only to whatever a higher body may decide if an appeal is made from the court’s ruling. From an estate proceeding perspective, the Special Administrator’s commission is no less a claim against the estate than a claim that third parties may make. Section 8, Rule 86 of the Rules recognizes this when it provides for “Claim of Executor or Administrator Against an Estate.”Under Section 13 of the same Rule, the action of the court on a claim against the estate “is appealable as in ordinary cases.”Hence, by the express terms of the Rules, the ruling on the extent of the Special Administrator’s commission – effectively, a claim by the special administrator against the estate – is the lower court’s last word on the matter and one that is appealable.

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Rule 84 and 90Shalako Sta. Maria

SILVERIO, JR. v. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 178933. 16 September 2009

Facts:Beatriz Silverio died intestate and was survived by her husband Ricardo Silverio, Sr. Silverio, Sr.

filed an intestate proceeding. However, Silverio, Jr. and Ricardo Silverio filed a petition to remove Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate. Silverio, Sr. was replaced by Silverio, Jr. as administrator. Nelia Silverio-Dee filed a Motion of Reconsideration which was later on denied. Silverio, Jr. was authorized to immediately exercise his right as administrator of the estate. The court in its Omnibus Order also ordered Nelia Dee to vacate a property belonging to the estate. Silverio, Jr. was given letters of administration. Nelia Dee filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order. The RTC recalled its ruling and reinstated Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate. Silverio, Jr. filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied by the court. The court furthermore allowed that various properties of the estate be sold in order to partially settle estate taxes. One of the properties sold was the lot occupied by Nelia Dee. Dee filed a Notice of Appeal but this was contested by Silverio, Jr saying that the appeal was filed qo days beyond the reglementary period pursuant to Sec 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The RTC ruled in favor of Silverio, Jr. and reiterated its previous order to vacate the premises against Dee.

The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals. It overruled the decision of the Regional Trial Court. The Notice to Vacate against Nelia Dee was annulled and set aside.

Issue:Whether the possession of the property by Silverio-Dee is valid.

Held:No. The alleged authority given by Silverio, Sr.. for Nelia S. Silverio-Dee to occupy the property

is null and void since the possession of estate property can only be given to a purported heir by virtue of an Order from this Court as provided in Sec. 1 Rule 90 and Sec. 2 Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court. In fact, the Executor or Administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased only when it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration in accordance with Sec. 3 Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court. With this in mind, it is without a doubt that the possession by Nelia S. Silverio-Dee of the property in question has absolutely no legal basis considering that her occupancy cannot pay the debts and expenses of administration, not to mention the fact that it will also disturb the right of the new Administrator to possess and manage the property for the purpose of settling the estate’s legitimate obligations.

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VIZCONDE v. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 118449. 11 February 1998

Facts:Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde had two children, viz.,

Carmela and Jennifer. Estrellita, is one of the five siblings of spouses Rafael Nicolas and Salud Gonzales-Nicolas. The other children of Rafael and Salud are Antonio Nicolas; Ramon Nicolas; Teresita Nicolas de Leon, and Ricardo Nicolas, an incompetent. Antonio predeceased his parents and is now survived by his widow, Zenaida, and their four children.

Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land with an area of 10,110 sq. m. located at Valenzuela, Bulacan covered by TCT No. (T-36734) 13206 for One Hundred Thirty Five Thousand Pesos (P135,000.00), evidenced by a Lubusang Bilihan ng Bahagi ng Lupa na Nasasakupan ng Titulo TCT NO. T-36734. In view thereof, TCT No. V-554 covering the Valenzuela property was issued to Estrellita. Then Estrellita sold the Valenzuela property to Amelia Lim and Maria Natividad Balictar Chiu for Three Million, Four Hundred Five Thousand, Six Hundred Twelve Pesos (P3,405,612.00). On the same year, Estrellita bought from Premiere Homes, Inc., a parcel of land with improvements situated at Vinzon St., BF Homes, Parañaque using a portion of the proceeds was used in buying a car while the balance was deposited in a bank.

After the Vizconde Massacre occurred the petitioner entered into an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde With Waiver of Shares” with Rafael and Salud, Estrellita’s parents. The extra-judicial settlement provided for the division of the properties of Estrellita and her two daughters between petitioner and spouses Rafael and Salud. Ramon filed an opposition alleging, among others, that Estrellita was given the Valenzuela property by Rafael which she sold for not les than Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00) before her gruesome murder. Ramon pleaded for court’s intervention “to determine the legality and validity of the inter vivos distribution made by deceased Rafael to his children” Estrellita included. On May 12, 1993, Ramon filed his own petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. C-1699, entitled “In Matter Of The Guardianship Of Salud G. Nicolas and Ricardo G. Nicolas” and averred that their legitime should come from the collation of all the properties distributed to his children by Rafael during his lifetime. Ramon stated that herein petitioner is one of Rafael’s children by right of representation as the widower of deceased legitimate daughter of Estrellita.

The lower court ruled that the acquisition of the property from Rafael Nicolas was not for a valuable consideration. Accordingly, the transfer of the property at Valenzuela in favor of Estrellita by her father was gratuitous and the subject property in Parañaque which was purchased out of the proceeds of the said transfer of property by the deceased Rafael Nicolas in favor of Estrellita, is subject to collation.

Issue:Whether or not the transfer of the Valenzuela property from Rafael to Estrellita is null and void

and the Parañaque property be subject to collation.

Held:The Supreme Court find that the probate court, as well as respondent Court of Appeals,

committed reversible errors.

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Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced heirs who intervene in the division of the inheritance of an ascendant bring into the common mass, the property which they received from him, so that the division may be made according to law and the will of the testator. Collation is only required of compulsory heirs succeeding with other compulsory heirs and involves property or rights received by donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime of the decedent. The purpose for it is presumed that the intention of the testator or predecessor in interest in making a donation or gratuitous transfer to a forced heir is to give him something in advance on account of his share in the estate, and that the predecessor’s will is to treat all his heirs equally, in the absence of any expression to the contrary. Collation does not impose any lien on the property or the subject matter of collationable donation. What is brought to collation is not the property donated itself, but rather the value of such property at the time it was donated, the rationale being that the donation is a real alienation which conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence any increase in value or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee.

The Court ruled that the probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the intestate estate proceeding. The petitioner who was not even shown to be a creditor of Rafael is considered a third person or a stranger. As such, petitioner may not be dragged into the intestate estate proceeding. Neither may he be permitted or allowed to intervene as he has no personality or interest in the said proceeding, which petitioner correctly argued in his manifestation.

As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title or ownership of a property which may or may not be included in the estate proceedings. Such determination is provisional in character and is subject to final decision in a separate action to resolve title. In the case at bench, however, we note that the probate court went beyond the scope of its jurisdiction when it proceeded to determine the validity of the sale of the Valenzuela property between Rafael and Estrellita and ruled that the transfer of the subject property between the concerned parties was gratuitous. The interpretation of the deed and the true intent of the contracting parties, as well as the presence or absence of consideration, are matter outside the probate court’s jurisdiction.

The order of the probate court subjecting the Parañaque property to collation is premature. Records indicate that the intestate estate proceedings is still in its initiatory stage. We find nothing herein to indicate that the legitimate of any of Rafael’s heirs has been impaired to warrant collation. Even on the assumption that collation is appropriate in this case the probate court, nonetheless, made a reversible error in ordering collation of the Parañaque property. What was transferred to Estrellita, by way of a deed of sale, is the Valenzuela property. The Parañaque property which Estrellita acquired by using the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property does not become collationable simply by reason thereof. Indeed collation of the Parañaque property has no statutory basis. The order of the probate court presupposes that the Parañaque property was gratuitously conveyed by Rafael to Estrellita. The Parañaque property was conveyed for and in consideration of P900,000.00 by Premier Homes, Inc., to Estrellita. Rafael, the decedent, has no participation therein, and petitioner who inherited and is now the present owner of the Parañaque property is not one of Rafael’s heirs. Thus, the probate court’s order of collation against petitioner is unwarranted for the obligation to collate is lodged with Estrellita, the heir, and not to herein petitioner who does not have any interest in Rafael’s estate. As it stands, collation of the Parañaque property is improper for, to repeat, collation covers only properties gratuitously given by the decedent during his lifetime to his compulsory heirs which fact does not obtain anent the transfer of the Parañaque property. Moreover, Rafael, in a public instrument, voluntarily and willfully waived any “claims, rights, ownership and participation as heir” in the Parañaque property.

Finally, it is futile for the probate court to ascertain whether or not the Valenzuela property may be brought to collation. Estrellita, it should be stressed, died ahead of Rafael. In fact, it was Rafael who inherited from Estrellita an amount more than the value of the Valenzuela property. Hence, even assuming that the Valenzuela property may be collated collation may not be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela property has long been returned to the estate of Rafael. Therefore, any determination by the probate court on the matter serves no valid and binding purpose.

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Rule 78 - 90Shiela O. Imperial

QUASHA ANCHETA PENA v. LCN CONSTRUCTION CORP.GR No. 174873. 26 August 2008

Facts:Raymond Triviere passed away. Proceedings for the settlement of his intestate estate were

instituted by his widow, Consuelo Triviere, before the RTC of Makati City.Atty. Syquia Atty. Quasha of the Quasha Law Office, representing the widow and children of the

late Raymond Triviere, respectively, were appointed administrators of the estate of the deceased. As administrators, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha incurred expenses for the payment of real estate taxes, security services, and the preservation and administration of the estate, as well as litigation expenses.

Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha filed before the RTC a Motion for Payment of their litigation expenses. Citing their failure to submit an accounting of the assets and liabilities of the estate under administration, the RTC denied in May 1995 the Motion for Payment. Atty.Zapata took over when Atty. Quasha died.

Atty. Syquia and Atty. Zapata filed another Motion for Payment, for their own behalf and for their respective clients.LCN, as the only remaining claimant against the Intestate Estate of the Late Raymond Triviere filed its Comment /Opposition.

LCN argued that its claims are still outstanding and chargeable against the estate of the late Raymond Triviere; thus, no distribution should be allowed until they have been paid; especially considering that as of 25 August 2002, the claim of LCN against the estate of the late Raymond Triviere amounted to P6,016,570.65

RTC issued an order stating that:the co-administrator Atty. Syquia is authorized to pay to be sourced from the Estate of the deceased as follows:a) P450,000.00 as share of the children of the deceased b) P100,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses c) P150,000.00 as share for the widow.

LCN filed a Motion for Reconsiderationof the foregoing Order but it was denied by the RTC . LCN sought recourse from the Court of Appeals by assailing the order of the trial court. The Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision essentially ruling in favor of LCN. The Court of Appeals modified the Order of the RTC by deleting the awards of P450,000.00 and P150,000.00 in favor of the children and widow of the late Raymond Triviere, respectively. The appellate court adopted the position of LCN that the claim of LCN was an obligation of the estate which was yet unpaid and, under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court, barred the distribution of the residue of the estate.

Issue:Whether or not CA erred in ruling that the award in favor of the heirs of Taviere is already a

distribution of the residue of the estate?

Held:While the awards in favor of petitioner children and widow made in the RTC Order was not yet a

distribution of the residue of the estate, given that there was still a pending claim against the estate, still, they did constitute a partial and advance distribution of the estate. Virtually, the petitioner children and

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widow were already being awarded shares in the estate, although not all of its obligations had been paid or provided for.

In sum, although it is within the discretion of the RTC whether or not to permit the advance distribution of the estate, its exercise of such discretion should be qualified by the following: [1] only part of the estate that is not affected by any pending controversy or appeal may be the subject of advance distribution; and [2] the distributees must post a bond, fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of outstanding obligations of the estate. There is no showing that the RTC, in awarding to the petitioner children and widow their shares in the estate prior to the settlement of all its obligations, complied with these two requirements or, at the very least, took the same into consideration.Hence, the Court does not find that the Court of Appeals erred in disallowing the advance award of shares by the RTC to petitioner children and the widow of the late Raymond Triviere.

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GONZALES-ORENSE v. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 80526. 18 July 1988

Facts: The issue arose when, having been retained by the private respondent on July 1, 1982, to

represent her in the probate of her husband's will, the petitioner was subsequently dismissed on March 5, 1984. He claimed the stipulated attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the estate but the probate court, in its order dated December 8,1986, allowed him only P20,000.00 on the basis of quantum meruit. On December 19, 1986, he filed a notice of appeal from this order, and the probate court then transmitted the records of the case to the Court of Appeals, which notified the petitioner accordingly. On July 20, 1987, he submitted the brief for the appellant. The private respondent traversed with her brief for the appellee on September 8, 1987. On September 22, 1987, however, the Court of Appeals declared the petitioner's appeal abandoned and dismissed for his failure to submit his record on appeal as required under BP 129 and the Interim Rules and Guidelines. The petitioner then came on appeal by certiorari to this Court to ask that the said resolution be set aside as null and void. The petitioner contends that under the above rules it was not necessary for him to file a record on appeal because his appeal involves an ordinary claim for payment of attorney's fees which may be asserted against the private respondent either in the probate case or in a separate civil action. The appeal should therefore be covered by the general rule rather than by the exception. This was believed by the probate court, which directed the transmittal of the records in lieu of the record of appeal. The private respondent, for her part, supports the respondent court and argues that the above-cited provisions specifically exclude from the general rule special proceedings and other cases where multiple appeals are allowed. The period for appeal in these cases is retained at thirty days and the record on appeal is still necessary. This is a mandatory requirement which will lead to the dismissal upon failure to comply.

Issue: Whether, when an award of attorney's fees by the probate court is elevated to the Court of

Appeals, a record on appeal is necessary.

Held:It is settled that the fees of the lawyer representing the executor or administrator are directly

chargeable against the client for whom the services have been rendered and not against the estate of the decedent. However, the executor or administrator may claim reimbursement of such fees from the estate if it can be shown that the services of the lawyer redounded to its benefit.

As the petitioner's claim for attorney's fees is not a claim against the estate of the private respondent's husband, he could have filed it in an ordinary civil action, in which event an appeal therefrom will not be regarded as involved in a special proceeding requiring the submission of a record on appeal. It appears, however, that it was not filed in such separate civil action but in the probate case itself, which is a special proceeding and so should be deemed governed by Rule 109 on appeals from such proceedings. The appeal would come under Subsection (e) thereof as the order of the probate court

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granting the challenged attorney's fees "constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing." The consequence is that the exception rather than the rule in BP 129 and the Implementing Rules and Guidelines should be followed and, therefore, the record on appeal should be required.

In view of these circumstances, and in the interest of justice, the Court feels that the petitioner should be given an opportunity to comply with the above-discussed rules by submitting the required record on appeal as a condition for the revival of the appeal. The issue raised in his appeal may then be fully discussed and, in the light of the briefs already filed by the parties, resolved on the merits by the respondent court.

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SALONGA HERNANDEZ & ALLADO v. PASCUALG.R. No. 127165. 2 May 2006

Facts:Don Andres Pascual died intestate. An intestate proceeding for the settlement of his estate

was commenced by his widow Dona Adela. Don Andres and Doña Adela do not have any child but Don Andres have several nephews and niece. Olivia and Hermes Pascual, children of Eligio, brother of Don Andre, sought the support of Doña Adela to their claims as heirs of Don Andres. However, the other heirs of Don Andres entered into a Compromise Agreement, despite the objections of Olivia and Hermes. Three-fourths of the estate would go Doña Adela to one-fourth to the other heirs. The intestate court denied the claims of Olivia and Hermes.

Doña Adela later on died, leaving behind a last will and testament. Olivia Pascual was named as executrix as well as the principal beneficiary of her estate. Olivia engaged the services of Salonga Hernandez & Allado, a professional law partnership, in connection with the settlement of the estate of Doña Adela. According to their agreement the final professinal fee “shall be 3% of the total gross estate as well as the fruits thereof based on the court approved inventory of the estate.”

Olivia Pascual commenced a petition for the probate of the last will and testament of Doña Adela. Said petition was opposed by Miguel Cornejo, Jr, and his siblings who presented a purported will executed by Doña Adela in their favor. The court rendered a decision in favor of Pascual and letters testamentary were issued to her.

Herein petitioner then filed a Notice of Attorney’s Lien in accordance with the agrrement executed between petitioner and Pascual. Petitioner also filed a Motion to Annotate Attorney’s Lien on Properties of the Estate of Doña Adela vda. De Pascual.

Meanwhile, the Intestate Court rendered a decision giving judicial approval to the Compromise Agreement and partitioning of the estate of Don Andres. Petitioner filed a Motion for Writ of Execution for the partial execution of petitioner’s attorney’s fees. Pascual filed her comment and/or opposition to the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution and attorney’s fees and claiming that petitiner did not file a sufficient notice to all heirs and interested parties. The probate court denied the motion for writ of execution reasoning that the bulk of the estate of Doña Adela is still tied-up with the estate of Don Andres. Pascual then filed with the Probate Court a Motion to Declare General Default and Distribution of Testamentary Dispositions with Cancellation of Administrator’s Bond.

A petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed by petitioner assailing the prders of the Probate Court denying its motion for the immediate execution of its claims for attorney’s fees. The orders were however affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Issue:Whether petitioner can claim attorney’s fees from the estate of Doña Adela.

Held:

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As a general rule, it is the executor or administrator who is primarily liable for attorney's fees due to the lawyer who rendered legal services for the executor or administrator in relation to the settlement of the estate. The executor or administrator may seek reimbursement from the estate for the sums paid in attorney's fees if it can be shown that the services of the lawyer redounded to the benefit of the estate. However, if the executor or administrator refuses to pay the attorney's fees, the lawyer has two modes of recourse. First, the lawyer may file an action against the executor or administrator, but in his/her personal capacity and not as administrator or executor. Second, the lawyer may file a petition in the testate or intestate proceedings, asking the court to direct the payment of attorney's fees as an expense of administration. If the second mode is resorted to, it is essential that notice to all the heirs and interested parties be made so as to enable these persons to inquire into the value of the services of the lawyer and on the necessity of his employment.

The instant claim for attorney's fees is precluded by the absence of the requisite notices by petitioner to all the interested persons such as the designated heirs, devisees, legatees.

The requisite notice to the heirs, devisees, and legatees is anchored on the constitutional principle that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. The fact that these persons were designated in the will as recipients of the testamentary dispositions from the decedent establishes their rights to the succession, which are transmitted to them from the moment of the death of the decedent. The payment of such attorney's fees necessarily diminishes the estate of the decedent, and may effectively diminish the value of the testamentary dispositions made by the decedent. These heirs, devisees, and legatees acquire proprietary rights by reason of the will upon the moment of the death of the decedent, incipient or inchoate as such rights may be. Hence, notice to these interested persons of the claims for attorney's fees is integral, so as to allow them to pose any objections or oppositions to such claim which, after all, could lead to the reduction of their benefits from the estate.

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Rule 69 and 90Shalako R. Sta. Maria

FIGURACION-GERILLA V. VDA. DE FIGURACIONG.R. No. 154322. 22 August 2006

Facts:Spouses Leandro and Carolina Figuracion had six children namely Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla,

Elena Figuracion-Ancheta, Hilaria Figuracion, Felipa Figuracion-Manuel, Quintin Figuracion and Mary Figuracion-Ginez. Leandro executed a deed of quitclaim over his properties in favr of his six children. When he died, he left two parcels of land. Said lots were inherited by Leandro from his parents. When Leandro was still alive, he sold a portion of one of the lots to Lazaro Aviento. The TCT covering the sold portion was under the name of Lazaro Adviento but the entire lot was still in the name of Leandro according to the Tax Declaration in year 1985.

Meanwhile, Eulalio Adviento owned another parcel of land, Lot 707 covered by a OCT under his name. When Eulalio died, his daughters Agripina Adviento and Carolina Adviento, the wife of Leandro, inherited said lot. Later on, Agripina executed a quitclaim in favor of petitioner Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla over the half portion of Lot 707. Agripina died without any issue. But before Agripina died, Carolina adjudicated unto herself via Rule 74 of the Rules of Court the entire Lot 707 which she later sold to her daughters Felipa and Hilaria. A TCT was then granted in their favor.

Emilia and her family lived in the United States for 10 years. When she returned home, she built a house on the eastern portion of Lot 707 and continued paying her share of realty taxes.

Emilia then sought the extrajudicial partition of all the properties held in common by her and her siblings. She later filed a complaint in the RTC of Urdaneta City for partition, annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting of title and damages against respondents. Respondents said that Leandro’s estate should first undergo settlement proceedings before partition among the heirs could take place.

The Regional Trial Court nullified Carolina’s affidavot of self-adjudication and deed of absolute sale of Lot 707. It declared the other two lots as exclusive properties of Leandro Figuracion and therefore part of his estate. However, it dismissed the complaint of Emilia. The Court of Appeals also dismissed the action of the petitioner. But it reversed the decision of the lower court regarding the self-adjudication and deed of sale executed by Carolina as far as her portion is concerned.

Issue:Whether or not there is a need for prior settlement of Leandro’s intestate estate (that is, an

accounting of the income of Lots 2299 and 705, the payment of expenses, liabilities and taxes, plus compliance with other legal requirements, etc.) before the properties can be partitioned or distributed.

Held:There are two ways by which partition can take place under Rule 69: by agreement under Section

2 and through commissioners when such agreement cannot be reached, under Sections 3 to 6.

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Neither method specifies a procedure for determining expenses chargeable to the decedent’s estate. While Section 8 of Rule 69 provides that there shall be an accounting of the real property’s income (rentals and profits) in the course of an action for partition, there is no provision for the accounting of expenses for which property belonging to the decedent’s estate may be answerable, such as funeral expenses, inheritance taxes and similar expenses enumerated under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court. In a situation where there remains an issue as to the expenses chargeable to the estate, partition is inappropriate. While petitioner points out that the estate is allegedly without any debt and she and respondents are Leandro Figuracion’s only legal heirs, she does not dispute the finding of the CA that “certain expenses” including those related to her father’s final illness and burial have not been properly settled. Thus, the heirs (petitioner and respondents) have to submit their father’s estate to settlement because the determination of these expenses cannot be done in an action for partition. In estate settlement proceedings, there is a proper procedure for the accounting of all expenses for which the estate must answer. If it is any consolation at all to petitioner, the heirs or distributees of the properties may take possession thereof even before the settlement of accounts, as long as they first file a bond conditioned on the payment of the estate’s obligations.

Hence, the petition is denied.

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COMMISIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 123206. 22 March 2000

Facts:Pedro Pajonar, a member of the Philippine Scout, Bataan Contingent, during the World War ll,

was a part of the infamous Death March by reason of which he suffered shock and became insane. His sister Josefina Pajonar became the guardian over his person, while his property was placed under the guardianship of the Philippine National Bank (PNB) by the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 31, in Special Proceedings No. 1254. He died on January 10, 1988. He was survived by his two brothers Isidro P. Pajonar and Gregorio Pajonar, his sister Josefina Pajonar, nephews Concordio Jandog and Mario Jandog and niece Conchita Jandog.

After Pedro’s death PNB filed an accounting of the decedent's property under guardianship valued at P3,037,672.09 in Special Proceedings No. 1254. However, the PNB did not file an estate tax return, instead it advised Pedro Pajonar's heirs to execute an extrajudicial settlement and to pay the taxes on his estate. On April 5, 1988, pursuant to the assessment by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), the estate of Pedro Pajonar paid taxes in the amount of P2,557.

The trial court appointed Josefina Pajonar as the regular administratrix of Pedro Pajonar's estate.On December 19, 1988, pursuant to a second assessment by the BIR for deficiency estate tax, the

estate of Pedro Pajonar paid estate tax in the amount of P1,527,790.98. Josefina Pajonar, in her capacity as administratrix and heir of Pedro Pajonar's estate, filed a protest on January 11, 1989 with the BIR praying that the estate tax payment in the amount of P1,527,790.98, or at least some portion of it, be returned to the heirs. Josefina Pajonar filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), praying for the refund of P1,527,790.98, or in the alternative, P840,202.06, as erroneously paid estate tax.The case was docketed as CTA Case No. 4381. On May 6, 1993, the CTA ordered the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to refund Josefina Pajonar the amount of P252,585.59, representing erroneously paid estate tax for the year 1988.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the CTA's decision questioning the validity of the deductions. The Court of Appeals denied the Commissioner's petition.

Issue:Whether or not Section 79 of the National Internal Revenue Code (Tax Code) which provides for

the allowable deductions from the gross estate of the decedent or whether the notarial fee paid for the extrajudicial settlement in the amount of P60,753 and the attorney's fees in the guardianship proceedings in the amount of P50,000 may be allowed as deductions from the gross estate of decedent in order to arrive at the value of the net estate.

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Held:The Supreme Court held that the deductions from the gross estate permitted under section 79 of

the Tax Code basically reproduced the deductions allowed under Commonwealth Act No. 466 (CA 466), otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue Code of 1939, and which was the first codification of Philippine tax laws. Section 89 (a) (1) (B) of CA 466 also provided for the deduction of the "judicial expenses of the testamentary or intestate proceedings" for purposes of determining the value of the net estate. Philippine tax laws were, in turn, based on the federal tax laws of the United States. In accord with established rules of statutory construction, the decisions of American courts construing the federal tax code are entitled to great weight in the interpretation of our own tax laws.

The Court added further that judicial expenses are expenses of administration. Administration expenses, as an allowable deduction from the gross estate of the decedent for purposes of arriving at the value of the net estate, have been construed by the federal and state courts of the United States to include all expenses "essential to the collection of the assets, payment of debts or the distribution of the property to the persons entitled to it.” In other words, the expenses must be essential to the proper settlement of the estate. Expenditures incurred for the individual benefit of the heirs, devisees or legatees are not deductible.

The Court in Lorenzo v. Posadas the Court construed the phrase "judicial expenses of the testamentary or intestate proceedings" as not including the compensation paid to a trustee of the decedent's estate when it appeared that such trustee was appointed for the purpose of managing the decedent's real estate for the benefit of the testamentary heir. In another case, the Court disallowed the premiums paid on the bond filed by the administrator as an expense of administration since the giving of a bond is in the nature of a qualification for the office, and not necessary in the settlement of the estate. Neither may attorney's fees incident to litigation incurred by the heirs in asserting their respective rights be claimed as a deduction from the gross estate.

Hence, notarial fee paid for the extrajudicial settlement is clearly a deductible expense since such settlement effected a distribution of Pedro Pajonar's estate to his lawful heirs. Similarly, the attorney's fees paid to PNB for acting as the guardian of Pedro Pajonar's property during his lifetime should also be considered as a deductible administration expense. PNB provided a detailed accounting of decedent's property and gave advice as to the proper settlement of the latter's estate, acts which contributed towards the collection of decedent's assets and the subsequent settlement of the estate.

Wherefore, the Court of Appeals did not commit reversible error in affirming the questioned resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals.

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Rule 78 – 90Shiela O. Imperial

REYES v. BARETO – DATUGR No. 17818. 25 January 1967

Facts:Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. When Bibiano died, he left his share of his

properties in a will to Salud Barretto and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa and Felisa Barretto and his nephew and nieces.

The usufruct of the fishpond situated in Bulacan was reserved for his widow, Maria Gerardo. In the meantime Maria Gerardo was appointed administratrix. By virtue thereof, she prepared a project of partition, which was signed by her in her own behalf and as guardian of the minor Milagros Barretto. Said project of partition was approved by the Court of First Instance of Manila.

The distribution of the estate and the delivery of the shares of the heirs followed forthwith. As a consequence, Salud Barretto took immediate possession of her share and secured the cancellation of the original certificates of title and the issuance of new titles in her own name.

Everything went well since then. Nobody was heard to complain of any irregularity in the distribution of the said estate until the widow, Maria Gerardo. Upon her death, it was discovered that she had executed two wills, in the first of which, she instituted Salud and Milagros, both surnamed Barretto, as her heirs; and, in the second, she revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of Milagros Barretto alone. Thus, the later will was allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso Reyes, as guardian of the children of Salud Barretto, the lower court held that Salud was not the daughter of the decedent Maria Gerardo by her husband Bibiano Barretto. This ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the same.

Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo, as a legitimate heir of Maria Gerardo, plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of the estate of the deceased Bibiano Barretto, which was given in usufruct to his widow Maria Gerardo. Hence, this action for the recovery of one-half portion, thereof.

The defendant contends that the Project of Partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond in question is void ab initio and Salud Barretto did not acquire any valid title thereto, and that the court did not acquire any jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, who was then a minor.'

Finding for the defendant (now appellee), Milagros Barretto, the lower court declared the project of partition submitted in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Bibiano Barretto to be null and void ab initio because the distributee, Salud Barretto, predecessor of plaintiffs (now appellants), was not a daughter of the spouses Bibiano Barretto and Maria Gerardo.

The nullity of the project of partition was decreed on the basis of Article 1081 of the Civil Code of 1889 (then in force) providing as follows: A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir, without being so, has been included, shall be null and void.

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Issue:Whether or not the partition of the property by the heirs of Balbino was valid?

Held:At any rate, independently of a project of partition which, as its own name implies, is merely a

proposal for distribution of the estate, that the court may accept or reject, it is the court alone that makes the distribution of the estate and determines the persons entitled thereto and the parts to which each is entitled ; Rule 90, Rules of 1940; Rule 91, Revised Rules of Court), and it is that judicial decree of distribution, once final, that vests title in the distributees. If the decree was erroneous or not in conformity with law or the testament, the same should have been corrected by opportune appeal; but once it had become final, its binding effect is like that of any other judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.

It is thus apparent that where a court has validly issued a decree of distribution of the estate, and the same has become final, the validity or invalidity of the project of partition becomes irrelevant.

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CHIN AH FOO v. CONCEPCIONG.R. No. L-33281. 31 March 1930

Facts:Chan Sam was charged with the murder of Chin Ah Kim. The trial judge dismissed the case on

the ground of insanity. Chan Sam was then ordered to be confined in San Lorenzo Hospital. He was confined for two years and during said period efforts were done to obtain his release. He was permitted to leave without the acquiescence of the Director of Health.

According to Article 8, Paragraph 1 of the Penal the permission of the court who orders the confinement of one accused of a grave felony in an insane asylum is a prerequisite for obtaining release from the institution. The respondent judge has based his action in this case on this provision of the law. On the other hand, section 1048 of the Administrative Code grants to the Director of Health authority to say when a patient may be discharged from an insane asylum. There is no pretense that the Director of Health has exercised his authority in this case, or that the head of the Philippine Health Service has been asked to express his opinion. vi

Issue:Whether a judge who ordered the confinement of an insane person in an asylum may permit the

same to leave the asylum without the opinion of the Director of Health.

Held:No. Article 8 of the Penal Code and section 1048 of the Administrative Code can be construed so

that both can stand together in such a way that the powers of the courts and of the Director of Health are complimentary to each other.

The Director of Health is without power to release, without proper judicial authority, any person confined by order of the court in an asylum pursuant to the provisions of Article 8 of the Penal Code. Conversely, any person confined by order of the court in an asylum in accordance with Article 8 of the Penal Code cannot be discharged from custody until the views of the Director of Health have been ascertained as to whether or not the person is temporarily of permanently cured or may be released without danger.

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ZAGALA v. ILUSTREG.R. No. L-23999 21 November 1925

Facts:Gregorio Zagala was convicted for violating Act No. 1780 and light treats before the Court of

First Instance of Batangas and sentenced to pay fines. The counsel of the defendant, Atty. Cipriano Sarmiento went to the office of clerk of the Court of

First Instance to manifest his intention of paying the fines but without tendering money. The clerk told him that should he wish to pay the fine, the amount that he would give would be first applied to the costs before then upon the fines. Since there was no payment either of the fines or the costs, the case was then brought to the sheriff. The counsel then brought the matter to the judge.

Gregorio Zagala then filed a petition for habeas corpus. He prayed that after the proper proceedings, the clerk of court should immediately release the accused and receive the fines. The clerk of court denied that the accused had offered to pay the fines and rejected the acceptance of said payment.

Issue:Whether the petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus is the proper remedy in this case.

Held:No. The clerk of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, as a ministerial officer who acts in

accordance with the mandate of the law, has no authority to detain any accused for any reason whatsoever, and consequently he cannot deprive the accused of his liberty, and should he do so against the latter's will, he would be criminally liable.

There was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of liberty of the defendant by the respondent. In order that the special remedy of habeas corpus may be invoked, it is necessary that there should exist a true restraint or deprivation of liberty. A nominal or moral restraint is not sufficient.

It is used only to determine the question of jurisdiction and test the legal authority of the warden to have the petitioner under his custody.

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GONZALES v. VIOLAG.R. No. 43195. 23 August 1935

Facts:Felipe Gonzales was placed under arrest by order if Florentino Viola and detained in the

municipal jail of San Miguel, Province of Bulacan. A criminal complaint was then filed by Valentin Maniquis against Gonzales in the justice of the peace of court of the municipality. Gonzales filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Gonzales was later on released on bail. When the hearing on the petition for a writ of habeas corpus was conducted, Gonzales was already out on bail.

Issue:Whether the petition for a writ of habeas corpus should still be heard.

Held:The petition is without merit. In passing upon a petition for a writ of habeas corpus a court or

judge must first inquire whether the petitioner is restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Only where such restraint obtains is the court required to inquire into the cause of detention, and if the alleged detention is found to be unlawful then the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged.

The law is well settled that a person out on bail is not so restrained of his liberty as to be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. The restraint of liberty which would justify the issuance of the writ must be more than a mere moral restraint; it must be actual or physical. “There is no very satisfactory definition to be found in the adjudged cases, of the character of the restraint or imprisonment suffered by a party applying for the writ of habeas corpus, which is necessary to sustain he writ. The extent and character if the restraint which justifies the writ must vary according to in whose behalf the writ is prayed.

In the present case, the court would have been justified in refusing the writ solely on the ground that the Gonzales was not, within the meaning of Section 525 of the Code of Civil Procedure, deprived or restrained of his liberty.

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MONCUPA v. ENRILEG.R. No. L-63345. 30 January 1986

Facts:Efren Moncupa was arrested on April 22, 1982. He was brought to MIG-15 Camp Bago Bantay,

Quezon City where he was detained. Allegedly he was a National Democratic Front staff member. After investigation, it was ascertained that Moncupa was not a member of any subversive organization. It was recommended that MOncupa be charged only with illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of subversive documents under PD No. 33.

Moncupa was excluded from the charge under the Revised Anti-Subversion Law. A petition for habeas corpus was filed by the petitioner. During the pendency of said petition, his arraignment and further proceedings have not been pursued. His motions for bail were also denied by the lower court.

However, on August 30, 1983, the respondents filed a motion to dismissing stating that on May 11, 1983, Moncupa was temporarily released from detention in orders of the Minister temporary of National Defense with the approval of the President. It should be noted that several restrictions were imposed upon him during said release.

Issue:Whether the petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic in view of the petitioner's

temporary release.

Held:No, the petition has not become moot and academic. The reservation of the military in the form of

restrictions attached to the temporary release of the petitioner constitute restraints on the liberty of Mr. Moncupa. Such restrictions limit the freedom of movement of the petitioner. It is not physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus.

A release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must be one which is free from involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the light of subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ.

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CRUZ v. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONSGR No. 6497. 3 November 1910

Facts:Juan M. Cruz was imprisoned in Bilibid Prison after he was found guilty of two criminal cases.

He was first sentenced of imprisonment for a term of three years and subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in paying the fines and then a term of two years imprisonment for the second case. Juan Cruz had already finished serving his sentence and is now asking to be freed but the warden of the Bilibid prison refused to o so.

Juan Cruz then filed a writ of habeas corpus. The warden explained that the five year term was already finished but Juan Cruz must still serve the subsidiary imprisonment on account of his failure to pay the fine in his first case.

Issue:Whether Juan Cruz should be released.

Held:Yes. Prior to the passage of Act No. 1732, Courts of First Instance had no authority to impose

subsidiary imprisonment for failure to pay fines in cases of conviction for violations of the Acts of the Philippine Commission, and such errors when committed have been corrected by this court in those cases which were appealed.

In the case at bar the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction of the offense described in the complaint for which the petitioner was tried. It had jurisdiction of the prisoner who was properly brought before it. It had jurisdiction to hear and decide upon the defense offered by him, but it did not have power to sentence the petitioner to subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in the payment of the fine imposed. It is therefore clear that that part of the judgment is void. This court at this time has no power to correct this error committed by the court below, neither has it power to remand the case to the trial court for that purpose. The courts uniformly hold that where a sentence imposes a punishment in excess of the power of the court to impose, such sentence is void as to the excess, and some of the courts hold that the sentence is void in toto; but the weight of authority sustains the proposition that such a sentence is void only as to the excess imposed in case the parts are separable, the rule being that the petitioner is not entitled to his discharge on a writ of habeas corpus unless he has served out so much of the sentence as was valid.

The petitioner has served out, according to the return of the respondent to the order to show cause, the entire part of the sentences which the court below had power to impose, and adhering to the rule that that part of the sentences imposed by the court below in excess of its jurisdiction is void, the petitioner is entitled to his release.

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OLAGUER v. MILITARY COMMISSIONG.R. No. L-54558. 22 May 1987

Facts:Eduardo Olaguer and others were arrested by military authorities on December 24, 1979. They

were detained at Camp Crame in Quezon City. The others were then transferred to the detention center in Camp Bagong Diwa in Bicutan except Olaguer who remained in Camp Crame.

They were charged for subversion. Later on, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines created the Military Commission to try the criminal case filed against the petitioners. They were charged with seven offenses, namely: 1) unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary devices; 2) conspiracy to assassinate the President and Mrs. Marcos; 3) conspiracy to assassinate Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; 4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Rono and Onofre Corpus; 5) arson of nine buildings; 6) attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and 7) conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion and inciting to rebellion.

The petitioners then filed a Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus. They sought to enjoin the Military Commission from trying their case and their release from detention.

Issue:Whether the petition for habeas corpus should be granted.

Held:The petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic because by the time the case

reached the Supreme Court Olaguer and his companions were already released from military confinement. “When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus was filed is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic. Inasmuch as the herein petitioners have been released from their confinement in military detention centers, the instant Petitions for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed for having become moot and academic.”

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AQUINO v. THE MILITARY COMMISSIONG.R. No. L-37364. 9 May 1975

Facts:After the proclamation of Martial Law, Benigno Aquino, Jr. was arrested for complicity in a

conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and to take over the Government. He was detained at Fort Bonifacio. Two days later, he filed a writ of habeas corpus and he also questioned the legality of the proclamation of martial law.

Aquino challenged the jurisdiction of military commissions to try him for illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives, for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act and for murder.

Issue:Whether the military commission has jurisdiction over the case of Aquino.

Held:Yes. In a martial law situation, the martial law administrator must have ample and sufficient

means to quell the rebellion and restore civil order. Prompt and effective trial and punishment of offenders have been considered as necessary in a state of martial law, as a mere power of detention may be wholly inadequate for the exigency. Martial law creates an exception to the general rule of exclusive subjection to the civil jurisdiction, and renders offenses against the law of war, as well as those of a civil character, triable by military tribunals. Public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial process. The immunity of civilians from military jurisdiction must, however, give way in areas governed by martial law. When it is absolutely imperative for public safety, legal processes can be superseded and military tribunals authorized to exercise the jurisdiction normally vested in courts.

The guarantee of due process is not a guarantee of any particular form of tribunal in criminal cases. A military tribunal of competent jurisdiction, accusation in due form, notice and opportunity to defend and trial before an impartial tribunal, adequately meet the due process requirement. Due process of law does not necessarily mean a judicial proceeding in the regular courts.

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GAMAUA v. ESPINOGR No. L-36188-37586. 29 February 1980

Facts:Ty Ben Seng was kidnapped by allegedly the group of a certain Sgt. Cordova. Gumaua aided

Cordova them in his sari-sari store. After surveillance, Gumaua’s house was raided and he was arrested. The event happened during martial law. Gamaua was held under the custody of the military court.

Gumaua petitioned for prohibition and mandamus with restraining order and preliminary injunction against Major General Romeo Espino as Chief of Staff of the AFP and Military Commission No. 2, challenging the validity of the creation and jurisdiction over him as a civilian of respondent Military Commission No. 2. He also filed for habeas corpus.

Issue:Whether Gamua and his co-accused can be tried in military tribunals.

Held:Yes, the military tribunals can try the accused. The declaration of Martial Law is valid. The

proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus. Thus it gives the President as the Commander-in-Chief the authority to promulgate proclamations, orders and decrees during the period of martial law essential to the security and preservation of the Republic, to the defense of the political and social liberties of the people, and to the institution of reforms to prevent the resurgence of rebellion or insurrection or secession or the threat thereof as well as to meet the impact of a worldwide recession, inflation or economic crisis which presently threatens all nations including highly developed countries. Moreover, as legislator during the period of martial law, the President can legally create military commissions or courts martial to try, not only members of the armed forces, but also civilian offenders, for specified offenses including kidnapping.

There is likewise ample proof that Sgt. Aguinaldo Cordova and Sgt. Barbelonio Casipi, co-accused of petitioners in the kidnapping charge, belonged to the armed forces at the time of the commission of the crime, in much the same way that the evidence demonstrates that petitioner Gumaua himself is a retired PC non-commissioned officer. Consequently, the trial of petitioners Gumaua and Halasan before the respondent Military Commission No. 2, along with the two other accused who are members of the Armed Forces is valid under General Orders Nos. 8.

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BUSCAYNO v. ENRILEG.R. No. L-47185. 15 January 1981

Facts:Bernardo Buscayno was arrested in Barrio Sto. Rosario as leader of the New People’s Army. He

was accused for violation of RA 1700 and for murder, both pending with the Military Commission. He also has a rebellion case filed against him pending in another Military Commission. Buscayno then filed a petition for habeas corpus.

Issue:Whether the military tribunals can try individuals who are not members of the Armed Forces of

the Philippines.

Held:Yes, the military tribunals can try the individuals. The respondent Military Commission has been

lawfully constituted and validly vested with jurisdiction to hear the cases against civilians, including the petitioner. The Court has previously declared that the proclamation of Martial Law (Proclamation No. 1081) on September 21, 1972, by the President of the Philippines is valid and constitutional and that its continuance is justified by the danger posed to the public safety. To preserve the safety of the nation in times of national peril, the President of the Philippines necessarily possesses broad authority compatible with the imperative requirements of the emergency.

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SISON v. ENRILEG.R. No. L-49579 15 January 1981

Facts:Jose Maria Sison and the other petitioners are civilians accused of rebellion. The case against the

petitioners was filed before the Military Commission. Some of the petitioners were released for humanitarian reasons and the rest are still detained. The petitioners contend that they are illegal detained because 1) Military Commissions have no jurisdiction since their creation is unconstitutional; 2) petitioners are civilians and hence not subject to military laws and not under the jurisdiction of the military commissions; 3) there should be adherence to the “open court rule” among others. Sison together with his co-accused then filed a petition for habeas corpus. Issue:

Whether the military tribunals can try civilians.

Held:The continued existence of these military tribunals and the exercise by them of jurisdiction over

civilians during the period of martial law are within the contemplation and intendment of Section 3, paragraph 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. These are tribunals of special and restricted jurisdiction created under the stress of an emergency and national security. The pro-procedure before the military commissions as prescribed in Presidential Decree No. 39, assures observance of the fundamental requirements of procedural due process, due notice, an essentially fair and impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for the preparation of the defense.

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DE GUZMAN v. LEOPANDOG. R. No. 62798. 22 December 1983

Facts:An officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and several other persons were charged with

Serious Illegal Detention before the Court of First Instance of Maguindanao sometime in October, 1982. The military officer sought to effect the transfer of the case against him to the General Court Martial for trial pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1850. The trial court disallowed such transfer for the reason that the said Decree is unconstitutional inasmuch as it violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, as well as the constitutional provisions on social justice, the speedy disposition of cases, the republican form of government, the integrity and independence of the judiciary, and the supremacy of civilian authority over the military.Issue:

Whether Presidential Decree 1850 is constitutional.

Held:When the matter was elevated to this Court by way of a Petition for certiorari, prohibition and

mandamus, the Court decided that a ruling on the constitutional issues raised was not necessary. With the view that practical and procedural difficulties will result from the transfer sought, this Court resolved to dismiss the Petition for lack of merit.

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ANIMAS v. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSEG.R. No. 51747. 29 December 1986

Facts:Rodolfo Animas and other petitioners were charged with murder in connection with the killing of

Diosdado Yanson, a candidate for Mayor of Pulupandan, Negros Occidental. The accused were arrested almost a year after the proclamation of Martial Law.

A summary preliminary investigation was conducted by a PC Captain. The petitioners were recommended for prosecution before the Military Tribunal, considering that one of them, petitioner Sgt. Rodolfo Animas is a military personnel. On February 16, 1978, the Minister of National Defense referred the case to the Military Tribunal's Branch of the Judge Advocate General.

Issue:Whether the military tribunal has jurisdiction over the case.

Held:The military tribunal does not have jurisdiction over the case. The crime for which the petitioners

were charged was committed on November 10, 1971 long before the proclamation of martial law. There was no question about the case being prosecuted by civilian fiscals and tried by civil courts at the time. Now that it is already late 1986, and martial law is a thing of the past, hopefully never more to return, there is no more reason why a murder committed in 1971 should still be retained, at this time, by a military tribunal. The reason given by the August 14, 1979 marginal notation on the letter of Mrs. Nelly M. Yanson for retention of jurisdiction by military courts, "In order to calm the fears of injustice by the aggrieved party", even assuming it to be true, can be overcome through a careful monitoring by all interested parties to insure that the trial court is indeed responsive to the demands of justice. At any rate, this Court does not doubt that in the 1970s when this case was supposed to go to trial, the judges of the Courts of First Instance would have been able to administer better justice than any military court or tribunal constituted under martial law. The expectations for independent courts fearlessly dispensing impartial and humane justice are at their highest now.

The jurisdiction given to military tribunals over common crimes and civilian accused at a time when all civil courts were fully operational and freely functioning constitutes one of the saddest chapters in the history of the Philippine judiciary.

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CHAVEZ v. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. L-29169. 19 August 1968

Facts:According to Roger Chavez, Ricardo Sumilang wants to buy a Thunderbird car. He saw Johnson

Lee’s car and asked if this was for sale. Lee said yes. Chavez informed Ricardo Sumilang then he found a Thunderbird car which is for sale. But Sumilang no longer wants to buy the car. Instead, Sumilang wanted to mortgage his Buick car in order to pay an indebtedness in Pasay. The two went to Luis Asistio for help. Asistio created a plan to raise money for Sumilang without him selling his car. They are to introduce Sumilang as a buyer to someone who was selling a car and after the deed of sale is signed they would run away with the car. Asistio would then register it and sell it to a third person for profit. With this plan in mind, Chavez called Lee and set up a meeting with Sumilang. On the same day, they drew up a deed of sale signed by Sumilang as the vendee, Dy Sun Hiok (cousin of Lee and owner of the Thunderbird) as vendor. Payment was to be made in Eugene’s restaurant. Sumilang devised a plan wherein he could leave the premises with the deed of sale and without paying for the car.

On the other hand, Sumilang told the Court that Chavez told him that there was a Thunderbird car for sale. The sale price is between P20,000.00 and P22,000.00 but a down payment of P10,000.00 is enough. Sumilang agreed to buy the car. Nena Hernaez de los Reyes lend Sumilang P5,000.00. Sumilang then asked two more persons for a P10,000.00 loan. Several loans were later on made by Sumilang and he gave the money to Chavez as payment for the car. After sometime Chavez told Sumilang that the car is ready if the latter can pay the balance. Sumilang was then informed that Lee and Dy Sun Hiok already bought the car and that they would be the vendors. Sumilang agreed. They went to Eugene’s Restaurant and got the deed of sale from Lee and Dy Sun Hiok. Several weeks later, Asistio saw Sumilang’s Thunderbird and asked if this was for sale. Sumilang agreed since Asistio’s offer is higher than what he paid. It was then that the car was impounded by the police.

During the trial, Sumilang and Asistio were cleared but found Chavez guilty of qualified theft. According to the court, Chavez offered no defense and his testimony as witness for the prosecution establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. An appeal was filed before the Court of Appeals which affirmed the ruling of the lower court.

Chavez then filed a petition for habeas corpus claiming that he should be freed since his constitutional right against self-incrimination was violated during the trial.

Issue:Whether Chavez’ constitutional right against self-incrimination was violated when he was

imprisoned using his own testimony.

Held:Chavez’ constitutional right against self-incrimination was violated. He was forced to be a

witness of the prosecution despite his objections. Petitioner was enveloped by a coercive force; they deprived him of his will to resist. With all these, we have no hesitancy in saying that petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness; on the contrary, he claimed the right upon being called to testify.

There is no waiver of the privilege. "To be effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal, and intelligently, understandably, and willingly made; such waiver following only where liberty of choice has been fully accorded. After a claim a witness cannot properly be held to have waived his privilege on

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vague and uncertain evidence.The course which petitioner takes is correct. Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is

traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused’ constitutional rights are disregarded. A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. The petition is granted and the accused is ordered to be released.

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SANTIAGO v. ALIKPALAG.R. No. L-25133. 28 September 1968

Facts:S/Sgt. Jose Santiago was charged with violation of two provisions of the Articles of War

committed on or about December 18, 1960. On December 17, 1962 the petitioner was arraigned for the purpose of avoiding prescription pursuant to Article of War 38. Before the arraignment, no written summons or subpoena was issued addressed to the accused or his counsel. In lieu of the summons, Col. Eladio Samson called First Sergeant Manuel Soriano to send petitioner to Headquarters Philippine Constabulary, Camp Crame under escort for arraignment only. Upon arrival at Camp Crame, petitioner was instructed to appear before the General Court-Martial composed of herein respondents. It was on the same day that petitioner found out that he will be arraigned for alleged violation of Articles of War 85 and 97 after being informed by Capt. Cuadrato Palma as Trial Judge Advocate. It was also alleged that there was no special order published by the HPC creating or directing the said General Court-Martial.

Petitioner’s counsel object to the arraignment of the accused stating that the general court-martial was without jurisdiction. Respondents overruled the objection. The counsel of the petitioner then complained to the Chief of Constabulary against the proceedings on the ground of its nullity. The Chief of Constabulary said that he could not rule on the said complaint until the records of the case has been forwarded to him. The trial before the General Court-Martial ensued.

Hence, a petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed by the petitioner.

Issue:Whether the General Court-Martial is vested with jurisdiction.

Held:No, the General Court-Martial is not vested with jurisdiction on due process grounds. The basic

objection was the absence of a special order "designating respondents to compose a general court-martial to convene and try the case of petitioner". It was expressly stipulated that the respondents were convened to try the case of a certain Capt. Egmidio Jose and not that filed against petitioner. Such departure from what the law and regulations prescribe is offensive to the due process clause. The petitioner should be sustained in his plea for a writ of certiorari and prohibition, as clearly the denial of the constitutional right would oust respondents of jurisdiction, even on the assumption that they were vested with it originally.

In Harden v. The Director of Prisons, Justice Tuason, speaking for the Court, explicitly announced that "deprivation of any fundamental or constitutional rights" justify a proceeding for habeas corpus on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Abriol v. Homeres is even more categorical. In that case, the action of a lower court, denying the accused the opportunity to present proof for his defense, his motion for dismissal failing, was held by this Court as a deprivation of his right to due process. As was made clear by the opinion of Justice Ozaeta: "No court of justice under our system of government has the power to deprive him of that right. If the accused does not waive his right to be heard but on the contrary — as in the instant case — invokes the right, and the court denies it to him, that court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed; it has no power to sentence the accused without hearing him in his defense; and the sentence thus pronounced is void and may be collaterally attacked in a habeas corpus proceeding.

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PAGUNTALAN v. DIRECTOR OF PRISONSG.R. No. L-37959. 31 August 1932

Facts:Ignacio P. Paguntalan is a prisoner who filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus. He prayed

that the Director of Prisons be ordered to release him immediately on the ground that he is being illegally detained. According to the petitioner, he is not a habitual criminal as defined in Article 62, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code. He alleged that he had already served four years, nine months, sixteen days of imprisonment.

Issue:Whether Paguntalan is not a habitual delinquent and thus being illegally detained.

Held:Petitioner is not being illegally detained. In the present case the petitioner does not invoke the

benefit of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, giving retroactive effect to penal provisions so far as they are favorable to the accused, provided he is not an habitual criminal, but seeks the review of a sentence which has proved erroneous in view of a subsequent doctrine laid down by this court the error consisting in that, instead of counting the various convictions as one only, due to the proximity and almost simultaneity of the commission of the several crimes of which the petitioner was convicted, the same were considered as separate convictions for the purposes of the law establishing habitual delinquency. This error could have been corrected by appeal, for it was rather an error of judgment and not an undue exercise of judicial powers which vitiates and nullifies the proceeding. This court has repeatedly held that mere errors of fact or law which do not nullify the proceedings taken by a court in the exercise of its functions, having jurisdiction over the crime and over the defendant, cannot be corrected through the special remedy of habeas corpus.

The petition is denied.

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PEOPLE v. SIMONG.R. No. 93028. 29 July 1994

Facts:Martin S. Simon sold four tea bags of marijuana to a Narcotics Command poseur-buyer. Upon

examination, the said tea bags were found positive of marijuana. Simon was charged with violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 otherwise known as Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Of the four bags, he is only prosecuted for the two tea bags of marijuana.

Issue:Whether the patently favorable provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 should be given retroactive

effect to entitle Simon to the lesser penalty provided thereunder, pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.

Held:Although Republic Act No. 6425 was enacted as a special law, albeit originally amendatory and

in substitution of the previous Articles 190 to 194 of the Revised Penal Code, it has long been settled that by force of Article 10 of said Code the beneficient provisions of Article 22 thereof applies to and shall be given retrospective effect to crimes punished by special laws. The execution in said article would not apply to those convicted of drug offenses since habitual delinquency refers to convictions for the third time or more of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification.

Since, obviously, the favorable provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 could neither have then been involved nor invoked in the present case, a corollary question would be whether this court, at the present stage, can sua sponte apply the provisions of said Article 22 to reduce the penalty to be imposed on appellant. That issue has likewise been resolved in the cited case of People vs. Moran, et al., ante., thus:

. . . . The plain precept contained in article 22 of the Penal Code, declaring the retroactivity of penal laws in so far as they are favorable to persons accused of a felony, would be useless and nugatory if the courts of justice were not under obligation to fulfill such duty, irrespective of whether or not the accused has applied for it, just as would also all provisions relating to the prescription of the crime and the penalty. That issue has likewise been resolved in the cited case of People vs. Moran, et al., ante., thus:

If the judgment which could be affected and modified by the reduced penalties provided in Republic Act No. 7659 has already become final and executory or the accused is serving sentence thereunder, then practice, procedure and pragmatic considerations would warrant and necessitate the matter being brought to the judicial authorities for relief under a writ of habeas corpus.

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PAREDES v. SANDIGANBAYANG.R. No. 89989. 28 January 1991

Facts:Ceferino Paredes is the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sul. He was granted a free patent for a

lot located in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. Eight years later, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of San Francisco requested the help of Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur o recover said lot from Atty. Paredes. The said lot has been designated as a school site. A perjury case was filed against Atty. Paredes and a civil case for the annulment of Paredes’ title over the lot was filed. During the pendency of the civil case, former Vice Mayor Teofilo Gelacio filed a criminal complaint against Atty. Paredes for violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gelacio alleged that Paredes influenced, persuaded and induced Armando Luison, the Land Inspector to favorably indorsed Paredes’ free patent application.

The case was forwarded to Fiscal Ernesto Brocoy for preliminary investigation. Fiscal Brocoy proceeded with the preliminary examination of the complainant and his witnesses without the presence of accused since the summon was erroneously served. The fiscal found a prima facie case against Paredes. Paredes then filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. While this was ongoing, Paredes was elected as Governor of Agusan del Sur and the free patent was returned to the public domain. Information was filed and a warrant of arrest was issued against Paredes. Paredes refused to post bail and instead filed a petition for habeas corpus was filed by Paredes’ wife. They alleged that the arrest of Paredes was void because the preliminary investigation was void, and, that the crime charged in the information had already prescribed.

Issue:Whether the petition for habeas corpus is the proper remedy to ascertain the validity of the arrest

and detention of the Paredes after a preliminary investigation was without notice to him and in invoking that the crime against him has already prescribed.

Held:The petitioner alleges that the information against Governor Paredes is invalid because the

preliminary investigation was invalid and the offense charged has already prescribed. Those circumstances do not constitute valid grounds for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

The arrest and detention are valid. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case nor impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective (People vs. Casiano, L-15309, February 16, 1961; People vs. Figueroa, L-24273, April 30, 1969). The remedy of the accused in such a case is to call the attention of the court to the lack of a preliminary investigation and demand, as a matter of right, that one be conducted. The court, instead of dismissing the information, should merely suspend the trial and order the fiscal to conduct a preliminary investigation.

As to the ground of prescription, the defense of prescription of the offense charged in the information should be pleaded in the criminal action otherwise it would be deemed waived. It is a proper ground for a motion to quash which should be filed before the arraignment of the accused for whether the crime may still be prosecuted and penalized should be determined in the criminal case not in a special proceeding of habeas corpus.

All questions which may arise in the orderly course of a criminal prosecution are to be determined by the court to whose jurisdiction the defendant has been subjected by the law, and the fact that a defendant has a good and sufficient defense to a criminal charge on which he is held will not entitle

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him to his discharge on habeas corpus.


KELLY v. DIRECTOR OF PRISONSG.R. No. 20478. 14 March 1923

Facts:Sixteen Russians who were members of the crew of a fleet of boats are confined in the Bilibid

Prison. They were detained at the request of Admiral of the Russian ships pursuant to the orders of the Governor-General. Amzi B. Kelly, a member of the Philippine Bar filed a petition for habeas corpus in their behalf. However, the sixteen Russians denied wanting to file said petition and decided to accept and abide by the order of the Governor-General.

Issue:Whether the petition filed which is against the wishes of the prisoners is valid.

Held:No, the petition is invalid. The writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted by a person unlawfully

imprisoned or restrained of his liberty. Where the application is made in the prisoner’s behalf by a third person, and where the prisoner repudiated the action taken, the writ will be denied. The writ of habeas corpus ought not to issue if the restraint is voluntary because unnecessary.

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SALVANA v. GAELAG.R. No. 34115. 21 February 1931

Facts:Felicisima Salvana, is a 15-year old single girl who is in the custody of Leopoldo Gaela She is the

daughter of Francisco Salvana and Modesta Saliendra. Salvana filed a petition to recover the custody of Felicisima. During the trial, it was found out that Felicisima had chosen the home of Leopoldo Gaela in her own free will. She found it convenient for her own interest to remain in said home since her parents maltreated her and wants her to marry a young man named Ambrosio Daza. The lower court then dismissed the petition of herein petitioners. It ruled that a guardian must be appointed as soon as possible.

Issues:1) Whether habeas corpus will lie for the recovery of the custody of an unemancipated minor daughter who us under the custody of a third person of her own free will.2) Is the fact that the Leopoldo neither actually detains nor has any intention of detaining the minor, but that she insists upon remaining in his power of her own free will, a hindrance to the issuance of the writ?

Held:1) Section 525 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto, except in cases expressly excepted.

Article 154 of the Civil Code provides that the father or, in his default, the mother may exercise parental power over their unemancipated legitimate children; and article 155 imposes upon them the duty of keeping such children in their company, educating and instructing them. Section 553 of the Code of Civil Procedure recognized this parental power in providing that the parents are the natural guardians of their minor children entitled to their custody and care for their education.

Since the petitioners-appellants are entitled to the custody of their minor daughter Felicisima Salvana, they are also entitled to recover her by habeas corpus, in accordance with the provision of section 525 of the Code of Civil Procedure cited above.

2) The fact, then, that a minor daughter is in the custody of a third person of her own free will, and without said person's having the slightest intention of detaining her, is no hindrance to the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to enable her parents to regain custody of her person.

If the contention of counsel for petitioners is correct, that they are entitled to the custody of their minor child by virtue of the mere fact that they are his natural parents and are not shown otherwise to be improper persons to be entrusted with the custody of such minor, petitioners should prevail unless there is something in the contention of respondents that they are not holding said minor under any physical restraint. In this, as in probably most cases where a minor is abiding with persons who as to him are in loco parentis, no physical restraint is necessary, for the natural inclination of the child does away with any necessity of force. But where, as in this case, a right to the possession of the minor is claimed, the right to retain such possession by such force as may be necessary may be assumed and that, if necessary, it would be exercised. Proceedings in habeas corpus have so frequently been resorted to determine the right to the possession of a minor that the question of physical restraint need be given little or no consideration where a lawful right is asserted to retain possession of the child.

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MACAZO v. NUNEZG.R. No. L-12772. 24 January 1959

Facts:Susana Macazo was about 18 years of age at the time the petition was filed and was still so at the

rendition of the decision appealed from, dated August 20, 1957; she is single, without parents, and a deaf-mute. Sometime during the year 1954, Teofilo Macazo, her oldest brother, requested the respondent Benildo Nunez to take her in his employ as a laundry-woman; that since then up to the present, she has been staying wit the respondents in Mallig, Isabela, in the latter's conjugal home; that for her services to the couple, she is receiving an average wage of P1.00 daily and is given free quarters and food: that the couple are not related by consanguinity to the petitioner; that Susana, during the time that she was already living with the respondents, gave birth to Pacita Nunez, the paternity of the child having been admitted in open court by Benildo Nunez himself to be his; and that petitioner is the second oldest brother of Susana. The lower court denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that it will only lie on two grounds:(1) when someone is deprived of liberty; or (2) is wrongfully prevented from exercising the legal custody to which he is entitled, over another person.

Issue:Whether or not Teofilo Macazo can exercise substitute parental authority to his minor sister.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that the case should not have been dismissed. The lower court should not have overlooked that by dismissing the petition, it was virtually sanctioning the continuance of an adulterous and scandalous relation between the minor and her married employer, respondent Benildo Nunez, against all principles of law and morality. It is no excuse that the minor has expressed preference for remaining with said respondent, because the minor may not choose to continue an illicit relation that morals and law repudiate.

That Teofilo Macazo, wielding substitute parental power, originally places his minor sister in the employ of the respondents is no evidence that he would agree to continue such employment after the same has degenerated into adulterous connection. Should it so appear, then the court has ample power to take steps to protect the minor; since, "upon petition filed by some reputable resident" the court may order the one misusing his parental power to show cause why the child's custody should not be taken from him and to entrust her to a more suitable person as the facts may warrant (Rule 100, section 7; Civil Code, Art. 332).

The minor's welfare being the paramount consideration, the court below should not allow the technicality, that Teofilo Macazo was not originally made a party, to stand in the way of its giving the child full protection. Even in a habeas corpus proceeding the court had power to award temporary custody to the petitioner herein, or some other suitable person, after summoning and hearing all parties concerned. What matters is that the immoral situation disclosed by the records be not allowed to continue. While it may be requisite that matters pertaining to the guardianship of an infant be determined by proceedings in courts established expressly to exercise jurisdiction in such matters, this does not preclude the rendition of an order awarding temporary custody of a child in a habeas corpus proceeding, and such order continue in force until a court with jurisdiction of a proceeding in the guardianship of such child appoints a guardian of his person.

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REAL v. TROUTHMANG.R. No. L-23074. 24 May 1967

Facts:Policarpio Real, litigating as a pauper, filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of First

Instance of Manila against Jessie Trouthman, a married man, allegedly persuaded his daughter, Lilian Real, by means of deceit, force, threats, intimidation and misrepresentation, to elope and live with him, without the knowledge and consent of her parents, and that she has since then been detained by Trouthman and prevented from returning to appellant in violation of Article 403 of the Civil Code. An order was issued for Trouthman to appear before it and produce the said Lilian Real. In his answer the respondent alleged that Lilian Real went voluntarily with him and that at the Police station, she herself, in the presence of her parents, explained that she voluntarily left home to go with him, thus causing the Police authorities to consider the case closed. After hearing, the lower court found that Lilian Real had attained the age of majority on May 16, 1964 and that respondent was not detaining her nor restraining her liberty or freedom nor preventing her from returning to her parents, hence the lower court dismissed the case. Issue:

Whether or not the fact that Lilian Real attained the age of majority is a valid ground for the dismissal of the petition. Held:

The Supreme Court enunciated that Article 403 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 403. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding article, a daughter above twenty-one but below twenty-three years of age cannot leave the parental home without the consent of the father or mother in whose company she lives, except to become a wife, or when she exercises a profession or calling, or when the father or mother has contracted a subsequent marriage.

The Court has left with no other alternative but to order the dismissal, because as of now, 1967, Lilian Real is already more than 24 years of age and hence is unquestionably beyond the coverage of Article 403.

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RAFAEL,SR. v. PUNOGR No. L-44861. 27 March 1977

Facst:Arturo Rafael Sr. and Esperanza Rafael, residents of Manila, received an order from Judge

Benigno Puno, requiring them to appear before Branch IV of the CFI of Bulacan , sitting at Baliuag, Bulacan to produce the person of minor named Rommel Corpus, and to show cause why the Petition of Ricardo Corpus for the custody of the said minor should not be granted. Spouses Rafael through counsel contested the jurisdiction of the CFI of Bulacan over the case and asked the court to dismiss the case based on lack of jurisdiction. The court a quo denied the motion and ordered the arrest of spouses Rafael. Motion for reconsideration was also denied.

Issue:Whether or not the CFI of Bulacan has jurisdiction over the case considering that spouses Rafael

are resident of Manila which lies within the Sixth Judicial District and outside Bulacan.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that: the writ of habeas

corpus may be granted by the SC... and may also be granted by a CFI, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only WITHIN HIS JUDICIAL DISTRICT.

In the case at bar, it appears from the petition for habeas corpus in SP No. 723-B of CFI of Bulacan that the spouses Rafael are residents of Manila as evidenced by some court processes. Manila is within the Sixth Judicial District , hence they are beyond the reach of the writ of habeas corpus that was issued against them by Judge Puno of CFI of Bulacan which is within the Fifth Judicial District.

Wherefore, the petition for prhibition is granted.

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MEDINA v. YANG.R. No. L-30978. 30 September 1974

FactsIn the morning of November 23, 1968 Fortunato Medina, a Filipino citizen who was in Saigon,

South Vietnam, employed as a laborer in an American company, was arrested and apprehended by the South Vietnam Police and some members of the Philippine Civic Action Group (PHILCAG) at the instance of the Philippine Military Attache in that city, and kept in custody until when he was flown to Manila. At the Manila International Airport , he was met and arrested by a team of Intelligence Service Officers of the Philippine Constabulary and taken to Camp Aguinaldo , Quezon City , where he was interrogated and kept in custody. November 24, 1968, when he was turned over to the lst PC Zone Headquarters at Camp Olivas , San Fernando , Pampanga. In the early morning of November 27, 1968 Medina was transferred to the custody of the 174th PC Command Officer at Bano, Arayat, Pampanga then he was delivered to the custody of the Chief of Police of Arayat, Pampanga, in view of the absence of the Municipal Judge. On November 29, 1968 Medina , through counsel, filed a petition for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court to secure his release from confinement in the Office of the Chief of Police of Arayat. The Supreme Court, acting on the petition, issued the writ of habeas corpus, made returnable to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch.

The Honorable Judge Honorato B. Masakayan, Presiding Judge, Branch V, Quezon City branch, Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered a decision ordering the respondents or whoever acts in their place and stead, to immediately set free and release petitioner Fortunato Medina from custody.The Solicitor General as counsel for the respondent, filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals "on the ground that the said decision is not in accordance with law and the evidence adduced in the case." A "Motion for Certification of Appeal to the Supreme Court," was filed by Medna's counsel which was opposed by the Office of the Solicitor General on the ground that since questions of fact are involved in the appeal, the proper appellate jurisdiction lies with the Court of Appeals. The motion for certification of appeal to the Supreme Court was denied by the respondent Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, Atty. Amelito R. Mutuc filed an "Urgent Motion for Release" without bond, of the petitioner Medina . The motion and subsequent motion for reconsideration were denied.

Issue: Whether or not a petition for habeas corpus has been originally filed with the Supreme Court, and

the Court makes the writ returnable to a lower court, the role of the lower court is just to receive evidence for the Supreme Court, hence, any appeal from the judgment of the court to which the writ was made returnable, must be taken to the Supreme Court, not to the Court of Appeals, and the case would be before the Supreme Court by virtue of its original jurisdiction and not on account of its appellate jurisdiction. Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that the court to which this Court (SC) makes the writ returnable, does not thereby become merely a recommendatory body, whose findings and conclusion are devoid of effect, unless and until this Court decides to act on the "recommendation", but that such court acquire the authority and the duty to inquire into the facts and the law pertinent to the legality or illegality of petitioner's detention and to order his discharge from confinement should it find that he is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained. The court or the judge to whom the writ is made returnable takes the case for

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determination on the merits and its findings, either for the release of the detainee or for sustaining his custody, if not appealed on time, can become final just as it may in ordinary case. It is clear that when this Supreme Court issued the writ of habeas corpus making the same returnable before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City branch, said court acquired the power and authority to determine the merits of the case, and not merely to act as a referee, in the same manner as the SC would have if the writ had been returnable before this Court.

Considering that the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City branch, had jurisdiction to try the habeas corpus case and render judgment thereon as though the same was originally filed with it, any judgment rendered by it is appealable to the proper appellate court which, in this case, is the Court of Appeals, appellants having signified in their notice of appeal their intention to raise both questions of law and fact.

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SAULO v. CRUZG.R. No. L-14819. 19 March 1959

Facts:

Alfredo Saulo (petitioner) filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus praying that a writ be issued, and that, after appropriate proceedings, the petitioner be discharged, upon the ground that he is illegally detained and deprived of his liberty.

The Supreme Court issued a resolution, ordering respondent Brig. Gen. Pelagio Cruz, Commanding General of the Philippine Constabulary, to file, within five (5) days from notice, an answer returnable to the Court of First Instance of Manila. In due course, thereafter, or on January 14, 1959, said court issued an order stating that the facts set forth in the petition with the exception of the conclusion therein made, relative to the alleged illegality of petitioner's detention had been substantially admitted in the answer of said respondent, who, however, assailed the jurisdiction of said Court of First Instance.

Issue: Whether or not CFI has jurisdiction over Habeas Corpus cases filed directly to the SC.

Held:

The SC enunciated that under Section 2 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court the writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and many be made returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial district. Pursuant to this provision, the writ of habeas corpus may be granted, either by an appellate court, or any member thereof, or by a court of first instance. The case at bar falls under the first alternative, the writ of habeas corpus herein having been issued by this Court. Conformably with the first sentence of said section 2 the writ was made returnable before the Court of First Instance of Manila.

In cases where an original petition for habeas corpus is filed in the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court shall have the power either to decide on the face of the petition filed that no case has been made for the issuing of a writ, or should such a case appear by the allegations of the petition, to issue the writ and make the same returnable and direct the hearing, either before the Supreme Court as a whole, or any judge thereof, or any judge of a Court of First Instance.

The writ of habeas corpus plays a role somewhat comparable to a summons, in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of said writ, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent. Once authority over the latter has thus been established, the appellate court issuing the writ, or the court of first instance to which the writ has been made returnable acting in place of the appellate court may render a decision, which like other decisions of the Supreme Court and of courts of first instance may be enforced anywhere in the Philippines.

The Court of First Instance of Manila may validly inquire in to legality of petitioner's restraints and issue such orders, in connection therewith, as may be proper, in the light of the facts proven and the law applicable thereto. In the case at bar the Court held that the Court of First Instance of Manila should adjudicate the case, inasmuch as: (1) said court has already acquired jurisdiction thereon, owing to the writ made returnable, and returned, thereto, and (2) said court has been conducting, and is still conducting, the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 46410 thereof, against petitioner herein, which respondent

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invokes in justification for his (petitioner's) detention, so that the lower court is better situated, than we are, to ascertain the pertinent facts and to make a reasonable appraisal thereof. Rule 102Aran Jay G. Sicat

VILLACICENCIO v. LUKBANG.R. No. L-14639. 25 March 1919

Facts:Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police,

took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latter’s consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street , in the district of Sampaloc.

That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao instead. The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions; for the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1 ) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present.

Issue:Whether or not the writ of Habeas Corpus filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the

respondent produce around 170 women whom proper. Held:

The Supreme Court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. The Court enunciated that the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao , the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila . The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.

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GONZALES v. VIOLAG.R. No. L-43195 . 23August1935

Facts:On January 18, 1935, at about 11:30 a.m., Gonzales was placed under arrest by order of the Viola

et.al. and detained in the municipal jail of San Miguel, Province of Bulacan; that a few hours later a criminal complaint was filed by the Maniquis against the appellant in the justice of the peace court of the aforesaid municipality; and that on the same day, at about 8 p.m., he was released on bail. When the hearing on the petition for a writ of habeas corpus was had in the court below Gonzales was already out on bail. The Court of First Instance of Bulacan denies the petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Gonzales. The order of denial was entered by the court below after due hearing, on the ground that Gonzales was legally detained.

Issue:Whether or not Gonzales was legally detained.

Held:The Supreme Court held that in passing upon a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, a court of

judge must first inquire whether the petitioner is restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Only where such restraint obtains is the court required to inquire into the cause of the detention, and if the alleged cause is found to be unlawful then the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged. The law is well settled that a person out on bail is not so restrained of his liberty as to be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. The restraint of liberty which would justify the issuance of the writ must be more than a mere moral restraint; it must be actual or physical. "There is no very satisfactory definition to be found in the adjudged cases, of the character of the restraint or imprisonment suffered by a party applying for the writ of habeas corpus, which is necessary to sustain the writ. This can hardly be expected from the variety of restraints for which it is used to give relief. Confinement under civil and criminal process may be so relieved. Wives restrained by husbands, children withheld from the proper parent or guardian, persons held under arbitrary custody by private individuals, as in a mad-house, as well as those under military control, may all become proper subjects of relief by the writ of habeas corpus. Obviously, the extent and character of the restraint which justifies the writ must vary according to the nature of the control which is asserted over the party in whose behalf the writ is prayed. ... Something more than moral restraint is necessary to make a case for habeas corpus. There must be actual confinement or the present means of enforcing it."

Under the circumstances of the present case, the court below would have been justified in refusing the writ solely on the ground that the Gonzales was not, within the meaning of section 525 of the Code of Civil Procedure, deprived or restrained of his liberty; and upon that very ground the order appealed from is affirmed.

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ONG SEE HANG v. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATIONG.R. No. L-9700. 28 February 1962

Facts:Petitioners who are Chinese nationals are natives of Amoy , China . They left Amoy to live in

Hongkong but with intentions to return to their native place. Their desire to return to Amoy was, however, frustrated when the Chinese communists took over the Chinese mainland. While in Hongkong, they made a trip to Japan and on their return to Hongkong, they passed through the port of Manila where they arrived on November 3, 1952. They were allowed by the Philippine Immigration authorities for the purpose of taking another means of transportation to Hongkong, for which they were given up to November 28, 1952. Despite the period of time given them within which to leave the Philippines , and notwithstanding the availability of surface and air transportation to Hongkong, petitioners failed to comply with the condition imposed for their temporary stay in the Philippines .

On November 29, 1952, warrants for their arrest were accordingly issued by the Immigration authorities, but the warrants were, subsequently, lifted upon representations made that petitioners would leave for Formosa , through the Chinese Embassy in the Philippines , but up to this date no action had been taken on the said application by the Chinese Nationalist government in Taipeh. Petitioners having failed to leave the Philippines pursuant to the condition the Immigration authorities, on April 20, 1953, issued warrants for their arrests. After due investigation, during which they were allowed to bail, the Board of Commissioners of Immigration found that petitioners have violated the condition of their temporary stay, thus rendering themselves subject to deportation accordingly, the Board rendered a decision ordering their deportation: Pursuant to the said decision, the First Deputy Commissioner of Immigration issued warrants of deportation against petitioners who are presently confined in the Detention Station of the Bureau of Immigration Engineer Island, Manila, under the custody of the said detention station. Petitioners Tan Chi Piek and Lee Kim Hua have been under detention since April 21, 1954; and the rest of the petition since April 12, 1954. The trial court denied petitioners' petition for habeas corpus, but allowed their provisional release on bail pending their actual deportation in its decision dated June 11, 1954. Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners' has the right to bail.

Held:The Supreme Court ruled that aliens in deportation proceedings, as a rule, have no inherent right

to bail and that a person arrested or detained cannot be released on bail, unless that right is granted expressly by law.

The right to bail guaranteed by the Constitution may not be invoked in favor of petitioners, considering that deportation proceedings do not constitute a criminal action and the order of deportation is not a punishment for a crime, it being merely for the return to his country of an alien who has broken the conditions upon which he could continue to reside within our borders.

The fact that petitioners herein instituted the present habeas corpus proceeding before the Court of First Instance of Manila does not place them in the custody of said court, so as to deprive the Commissioner of Immigration of his supervision over them and of his discretionary power to grant bail. The Court pointed out that in Collector of Customs vs. Harvey, et al., 34 Phil. 503:

The writ of habeas corpus which was presented in the lower court did not put the relator into the custody of the court. The courts can not enlarge the rights of Chinese aliens simply because they have

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presented a writ of habeas corpus. If they are not entitled to bail during the pendency of the petition for the writ of habeas corpus, they are much less entitled to it after the court has denied their petition. And in the instant case, the lower court denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.Rule 102Aran Jay G. Sicat

TUNG CHIN HUI v. RODRIGUEZG.R. No. 141938. 2 April 2001

Facts:Petitioner, a "Taiwanese national," arrived in this country on November 5, 1998, as a temporary

visitor. A few days later, he was arrested by several policemen, who turned him over to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner was duly charged. In due course, the Bill Board of Commissioners issued a Summary Deportation Order dated November 25, 1998, finding him guilty of possessing a tampered passport earlier cancelled by Taiwanese authorities. The petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila a Petition for Habeas Corpus on the ground that his detention was illegal. In their Return of Writ, respondents denied petitioner's claim. The trial court granted his Petition and ordered his release. Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

Respondents, who received the trial court's January 29, 1999 Order on February 11, 1999, then filed a Notice of Appeal on February 16, 1999. In an Order dated February 18, 1999, the RTC rejected petitioner's Opposition and granted due course to the Notice of Appeal. The appellate court held that petitioner was not entitled to the writ of habeas corpus, because the BID Board of Commissioners had found him guilty of violating Section 37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. Issue:

Whether or not the reglementary period within which to appeal in habeas corpus cases forty-eight hours from notice of the Decision appealed from or is it 15 days similar to other cases from notice of the Decision. Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that the reglementary period for filing an appeal in a habeas corpus case is now similar to that in ordinary civil actions and is governed by Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules, which provides:

“SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.'

In this light, the appeal was seasonably filed within the 15-day reglementary period.Habeas corpus is a writ directed to a person detaining another, commanding the former to

produce the body of the latter at a designated time and place. Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued.

In the present case, petitioner's confinement is in accord with Section 37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. Herein petitioner was properly charged before the Bureau of Immigration for illegally entering the Philippines with the use of a passport issued to another person and cancelled by the Taiwanese government in 1995.

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LEE YICK HON v. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMSG.R. No. L-16779. 30 March 1921

Facts:

A petition for the writ of habeas corpus was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila by one Lee Yick Hon, alleging he had lately arrived from China at the port of Manila with a view to entering the Philippine Islands, but was presented from so doing by the Insular Collector of Customs, who was detaining him for deportation. Upon the presiding in Sala IV of said court, cited the collector to appear and show cause in writing why the writ of habeas corpus should not be issued as prayed. This citation was served at which house arrangement had already been perfected for the deportation of Lee Yick Hon on a boat scheduled to leave Manila for Hongkong at noon on the same day; and either by oversight or design the Insular Collector failed to contermand the order for his embarkation on that boat. The result was that Lee Yick Hon was deported within two or three hours after the Insular Collector had been served with the citation to show cause in the habeas corpus proceeding. Thereupon contempt proceedings were instituted against the Insular Collector which the latter was fined. Issue:

Whether or not defendant is guilty of contempt for "disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of the court or injunction granted by a court or judge. Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that there was no lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of the court or judge below was disobeyed or resisted by the appellant. The citation that was served upon the appellant required him to appear at a stated time in the Court of First Instance of Manila and show cause if any there might be, why the writ prayed for should not issue. That citation was literally complied with when the Attorney-General, on behalf of the Insular Collector, filed his answer, wherein it was in effect stated that the case of Lee Yick Hon had been regularly passed upon by the special Board of Inquiry, and that it had been found that he had entered the Philippine Islands in contravention of the Immigration and Exclusion Acts, wherefore the Insular Collector had ordered his deportation. That answer, so far as appears in this case, has not been found to be false or insufficient; and the sole ground relied upon to sustain the judgment finding the appellant guilty to contempt is that by allowing Lee Yick Hon to be deported under the conditions stated he has frustrated the possible issuance of the writ of habeas corpus for which application had been made The order to show cause, a copy of which was served on the Insular Collector of Customs on July 23, 1920 is not the peremptory writ of habeas corpus, unconditionally commanding the respondent to have the body of the detained person before the court at a time and place therein specified. The requisites of the peremptory writ of habeas corpus are stated in section 533 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and appropriate forms are supplied in section 534 of said Code and in section 82 of General Orders, No. 58. The order served in the case before us was merely a preliminary citation requiring the respondent to appear and show cause why the peremptory writ should not be granted.

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GALVEZ v. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 114046. 24 October 1994

Facts:

Separate information for homicide and two frustrated homicide were filed against Galvez an incumbent mayor of one of the towns in Bulacan for the alleged shooting of the Vinculados. Said information were later withdrawn in a Motion by the prosecutor, but on the same day, filed four separate information which involved the same three plus illegal possession of firearms. The lower court ordered the arrest of the petitioners since no bail was recommended.

Issue: Whether or not the petition for Habeas Corpus was properly filed together with the present

petition for certiorari and mandamus

Held:The Supreme Court ruled that the writ of habeas corpus and certiorari may be ancillary to each

other where necessary to give effect to the supervisory powers of the higher courts. The writ reaches the body and jurisdictional matters while certiorari reaches the record. But habeas corpus does not lie where petitioner has the remedy of appeal or certiorari because it will not be permitted to perform the functions of a writ of error or appeal for the purpose of reviewing mere errors or irregularities in the proceedings of a court having jurisdiction over the person and subject matter. The writ of habeas corpus cannot be granted in the case at bar since petitioners failed to adduce any justification or exceptional circumstances which would warrant the grant of such writ. The writ is not ordinarily available in advance of trial to determine jurisdictional questions that may arise. In the absence of exceptional circumstances, the orderly course of trial should be pursued & the usual remedies exhausted before the writ may be invoked. Petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial.

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REPUBLIC v. BELMONTEG.R. No. 189476. 2 February 2011

Facts:Anita Po alias Veronica Pao, a resident of Baguio City, filed with the then Court of First Instance

of Baguio and Benguet a Petition for the change other name from Anita Po to Veronica Pao. For this purpose, she also sought court permission to have her birth records corrected in that her father's name appearing as PO YU be corrected to PAO YU and her mother's name recorded as PAKIAT CHAN be changed to HELEN CHAN. At the time the litigation was commenced, the petitioner was a 16-year old minor. Thus, she was assisted in the case by her mother.

The petitioner alleged before the trial court that the maiden name of her mother is Helen Chan and that the given name Pakiat written on her birth certificate is actually the given name of her maternal grandmother. The petitioner also asserted that the name of her father is Pao Yu and not Po Yu as erroneously written in her birth certificate and as such her real surname is Pao. She assigns these alleged errors to the common misunderstanding of Chinese names. The petitioner also averred that she had been baptized by a Catholic priest and that she was christened as Veronica Pao, the first being her Christian given name and the latter being the correct spelling of her surname; that since her childhood up to the present, she had always been known and referred to as Veronica Pao and not Anita Po.

Trial court to allow her change of name and to order the correction of her records in the Local Civil Registrar's Office at La Trinidad, Benguet to conform to the name Veronica Pao. She also asked the trial court to order the correction of her father's name recorded in her birth certificate from Po Yu to Pao Yu, as well as her mother's name appearing as Pakiat Chan changed to Helen Chan.

Solicitor General presented its Opposition to the Petition and sought the dismissal of the same. The thrust of the said Opposition is that the remedies prayed for by the petitioner cannot be allowed by the mere submission of the said Petition, as petition for change of name is filed under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court and a petition for correction or cancellation of entries in the Civil Register is filed under Rule 108 of the same Rules. Rule 103 and Rule 108 are distinct and separate from each other and each provides for different requirements that must be satisfied in order that a person may avail of any one of them.

Issue:Can a petition for a change of name and the correction of certain entries in the civil registry be

joined in the same proceeding?

Held:The petitioner seeks more than just the correction of a clerical error to avail Rule 103. Hence,

Rule 108 should also be applied. Section 3 of Rule 108, when cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought,

the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby should be made parties to the proceeding. An inspection of all the pleadings filed by the petitioner with the trial court shows that the local civil registrar concerned was never made a party to the proceeding. Said civil registrar being an indispensable party, a final determination of the case cannot be made.

The procedure recited in Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct. They may not be substituted one for the other for the sole purpose of expediency To hold otherwise would render nugatory the provisions of the Rules of Court allowing the change of one's name or the correction of entries in the

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civil registry only upon meritorious grounds. If both reliefs are to be sought in the same proceedings all the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 must be complied with.

Supreme Court hold that the Petition filed with the trial court is not sufficient in form and substance and should have been dismissed by the trial court for lack of merit.

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BAYBAYAN v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. L-20717. 18 March 1966

Facts:Direct appeal on points of law from a decision of the CFI of Pangasinan, the dispositive part of

which is as follows:In view of the foregoing, decision is hereby rendered ordering the Local Civil Registrar of

Bugallon, Pangasinan, to make the proper corrections in the certificate of live birth of Bartolome C. Baybayan, Jr., by crossing out the word "American" under No. 8 in the certificate of live birth, and inserting therein in red ink the word "Filipino", and by crossing also the word "Balungao" under No. 10, birthplace "Urdaneta", and to furnish a copy of said corrected certificate of live birth with the office of the Civil Registrar General, Bureau of Census and Statistics, Manila.

The foregoing judgment was entered upon petition of Consuelo Calicdan Baybayan, filed in the court aforesaid on October 12, 1962, praying that the certificate of birth of her son, Bartolome Calicdan Baybayan, Jr., be corrected "to make it appear in said certificate that the place of birth of his father, Bartolome E. Baybayan, is Urdaneta, Pangasinan, and his citizenship is Filipino" (Rec. on App., p. 3) on the ground that petitioner's mother, Valentina Garcia, whom she had requested to register the birth of the boy in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bugallon, Pangasinan, made a mistake in giving the birthplace of her husband as Balungao, Pangasinan, and his citizenship as American.

The Solicitor General and the Provincial Fiscal, opposed the petition, claiming that the court had no jurisdiction to order such substantial changes as those prayed for in a summary proceeding under Article 412 of the Civil Code, as repeatedly decided by this Supreme Court.

Overruling the opposition, the court a quo declared that upon proof of mistake it did have power to order the changes sought, and did so. Wherefore, the State appealed.

Held: The decision must be reversed. Substantial alterations, such as those affecting the status and

citizenship of a person in the Civil Registry records, cannot be ordered by the court unless first threshed out in an "appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented" (see Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court), and that the summary proceedings under Article 412 of the Civil Code only justify an order to correct innocuous or clerical errors, such as misspellings and the like, errors that are visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding.

For the information of the parties concerned, and for the guidance of the public in general, we may venture the opinion that the clerical errors which might be corrected through judicial sanction under Article 412 of the New Civil Code, would be those harmless and innocuous changes, such as, correction of a name that is clearly misspelled, occupation of the parents, etc.; but for changes involving the civil status of the parents, their nationality or citizenship, those are grave and important matters which may have a bearing and effect on the citizenship and nationality not only of said parents, but of the offsprings, and to seek said changes, it is necessary to file a proper suit wherein not only the State, but also all parties concerned and affected should be made parties defendants or respondents, and evidence should be submitted, either to support the allegations of the petition or complaint, or also to disprove the same so that any order or decision in the case may be made with due process of law and on the basis of facts proven. Then and only then may the change or changes be made in the entry in a civil register that will affect or even determine conclusively the citizenship or nationality of a person therein involved.

The impropriety of the appealed judgment becomes all the more patent when it is considered that the party whose domicile and citizenship are sought to be altered, Bartolome E. Baybayan, does not

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appear to have been served with a copy of the petition, nor has he appeared in court to be heard and manifest his conformity or objections. Constitutional due process requires that he be given opportunity to present his side of the question, particularly because the petition itself manifests that the purpose of the correction of the entries sought is "to entitle said baby boy to a living allowance from his father, Bartolome E. Baybayan", i.e., to lay a foundation for future litigation against him.

The order appealed from is reversed, and the petition ordered dismissed. No costs.

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YU v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. L-20752. 25 November 1967

Facts:Joselito Yu, represented by his guardian ad litem Juan S. Barrera, filed a petition to have his

name changed to Ricardo Sy. Petitioner avers in his petition that he is a minor of 13 years, and a Chinese citizen who has been a resident of Manila for more than three years prior to the filing of the petition. As grounds for the change of name he alleges that as far as he can remember has been using the name "Ricardo Sy," that he grew up under the care and custody of Juan Sy Barrera, his guardian ad litem; that he is enrolled in school under the said name and that he was baptized "Ricardo Sy with his real name also stated."

Without a hearing being had, the court motu propio dismissed the petition on the ground that Rule 103 of the Revised Rules of Court may not be invoked by aliens.

Held: Rule 103 does not say that only citizens of the Philippines may petition for a change of

name. Section 1 provides that "a person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the Court of First Instance of the province in which he resides, or, in the City of Manila to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court." Here the word "person" is a generic term which is not limited to Filipino citizens, but embraces all natural persons. The rule does not even require that the citizenship of the petitioner be stated in his petition. It is enough that the petition be verified, signed by the petitioner or some other person in his behalf, and set forth (a) that the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of filing; (b) the cause for which the change of name is sought; and (c) the name asked for (Section 2). The rule is clear and affords no room for interpretation. It sets forth all the requirements, and Filipino citizenship is not one of them.

The Court a quo ruled that since the use of surnames is based on family rights, and since under Article 15 of the Civil Code laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad, the converse of the principle must be recognized, that is to say, the same matters in respect of an alien must be governed by the laws of his own country. The major premise of the proposition may be true in a general sense: one's surname is usually that by which not only one as an individual but one's family as well is known. Thus Title XIII of the Civil Code (Articles 364 to 373) contains provisions for the use of surnames by legitimate, legitimated, illegitimate, and adopted children, as well as by women who are married, widowed or legally separated from their husbands. But a change of name as authorized under Rule 103 does not by itself define, or effect a change in, one's existing family relations, or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom; nor does it create new family rights and duties where none before were existing. It does not alter one's legal capacity, civil status or citizenship. What is altered is only the name, which is that word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from others and which he bears as the label of appellation for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him (38 Am. Jur. 596). The situation is no different whether the person whose name is changed be a citizen or an alien.

140


ONG HUAN TIN v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. L-20997. 27 April 1967

Facts:Petition to change the name of Ong Huan Tin to Teresita Tan (Special Proceeding 03521,

Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court). Due publication was had. The petition was set for hearing. But, before the petition could be heard on the merits, the court, motu proprio, in its order of November 6, 1962 expressed the opinion "that an alien cannot avail himself of the provisions of our Rules of Court relating to change of name" and thereupon denied the petition. A move to reconsider was rejected in the court's order of November 24, 1962. Offshoot is the present appeal.

Issue:Whether an alien may petition for a change of name.

Held:In the Petition for the Change of Name of JOSELITO YU, G.R. L-20874, May 25, 1966, SC held

that Philippine citizenship of the applicant is not a prerequisite for a petition to change name; and, that, accordingly, an alien may petition for a change of name. There, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Makalintal, declared:

Rule 103 does not say that only citizens of the Philippines may petition for a change of name. Section 1 provides that "a person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the Court of First Instance of the province in which he resides, or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court." Here the word "person" is a generic term which is not limited to Filipino citizens, but embraces all natural persons. The rule does not even require that the citizenship of the petitioner be stated in his petition. It is enough that the petition be verified, signed by the petitioner or some other person in his behalf, and set forth (a) that the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of filing; (b) the cause for which the change of name is sought; and (c) the name asked for (Section 2). The rule is clear and affords no room for interpretation. It sets forth all the requirements, and Filipino citizenship is not one of them.

Nonetheless, we pause to consider whether every alien in this country may petition for a change of name.

The broad general doctrine is that the status of an alien individual is governed and controlled by the lex domicilii. Implicit in this precept is that an alien may be allowed to change his name here only if he be domiciled in the Philippines. And "domicile" means "permanent home, the place to which, whenever absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent.”

An alien who temporarily stays in the Philippines may not there avail of the right to change his name. For, what good will that be if, after all, his stay will be for a short period of time? It would not be of much benefit to him; court proceedings for the purpose could yet be a useless ceremony; that salutary effects flowing from a change of his social relation and condition may not thus be achieved. And then, stock should be taken of the fact that in a change of name, third persons and the State are concerned. Correct, then, it is to say that change of name is not temporary in nature; the new name may not be shunted aside at will.

141


NG YAO SIONG v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. L-20306. 31 March 1966

Facts:Petitioner, a Chinese resident of Dumaguete City, bears a number of names:1 (1) Jesus Ng, in his

birth certificate and certificate of residence, (2) Jesus Uy, Keng Lee, in his school records, (3) Uy Keng Lee Jesus, also in his school records, (4) Keng Lee Uy, to his friends and to the general public, (5) Uy Keng Lee, in his income tax returns, and (6) Jesus Ng Yao Siong, in his alien certificate of registration. These divers names, so his petition avers, "had caused much confusion in his school records and unnecessary delay and embarrassment to him in his dealing with the public". To obviate all these, petitioner would want to be known only by one name — Keng Lee Uy — and accordingly petitioned that the Negros Oriental court authorize the change of all the other names to Keng Lee Uy.

The city attorney of Dumaguete opposed the petition, alleged that there is no necessity for the change of name and that petitioner is guilty of a violation of the laws regarding the use of names and surnames. The judgment — after hearing — went for petitioner. The Republic appealed.

Held:Change of name is a judicial proceeding in rem . Jurisdiction to hear and determine a petition

therefor, by law, is acquired after publication of the "order reciting the purpose of the petition" and the "date and place for the hearing thereof" But, for that publication to be effective, it must give a correct information. To inform, the publication should recite, amongst others, the following facts: (1) the name or names of the applicant, (2) the cause for which the change of name is sought, and (3) the new name asked for.

Change of name is a matter of public interest. Petitioner might be in the gallery of wanted criminals; he could be in hiding to avoid service of sentence or compliance with a judgment in a criminal case; he could have escaped a penal institution into which he had been confined. If an alien, he might have given cause for deportation or might be one against whom an order of deportation had actually been issued.

We therefore rule that for purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376 of the Civil Code, the only name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil register.

*With the foregoing guidelines, let us now examine petitioner's application, and the order of publication and the actual publication thereof. The order of publication herein — based on the petition — was published in "The Negros Time", a weekly newspaper in Dumaguete City. The title of this case was there printed as follows: "In the matter of the change of name of Jesus Ng Yao Siong, Jesus Ng Yao Siong, petitioner." But Jesus Ng Yao Siong the name appearing in the petition, the order of publication, and the publication itself, is not the true name of petitioner. As heretofore stated, his name appearing in the civil register is merely "Jesus Ng" without the Yao Siong. The name is to be changed, if any, Jesus Ng — not Jesus Ng Yao Siong. It thus results that there is no name to be changed in the petition.

It is our view that this failure in the heading of the application to give the true name sought to be changed is fundamental; such failure is non-compliance with the strict requirements of publication; it is fatal; and the court did not acquire jurisdiction to hear the case.

The probability is that the portions in the publication heretofore quoted will escape the reader's notice. The purpose of which the publication is made, that is, to inform, may thus be unserved. We accordingly hold that for a publication of a petition for a change of name to be valid, the title thereof should include, first, his real name, and second, his aliases, if any.

142


RENDORA v. REPUBLICG.R. No. L-26198. 16 October 1970

Facts:Susana Rendora filed below a petition for authority to change the surname of her minor children

known is Cesar UN, Norberto ON and Ursulina ON, to TIU — the surname of their father.The State appealed and prays for the reversal of the above decision and for the dismissal of the

petition, claiming that the lower court had not acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition and that petitioners had failed to prove a proper and reasonable cause to justify the change of their respective surnames.

Held:It is to be borne in mind in this connection that, for legal purposes, the true name of a person is

that given him in the Civil Register, and that for the purpose of a petition such as the one filed by petitioners, what is or may be chanced is their true or official name as recorded in the Civil Register. Consequently, the publication required by law, must give that true or official name of the petitioners to enable the State to undertake the proper investigation regarding the truth of the allegations made in their petition (Jesus Ng, etc. vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-20306, March 31, 1966). As the order published in connection with the present proceeding did not give the true or correct surnames of the petitioners, said publication was rendered ineffective in law.

Testifying in support of the petition, Susana Rendora, mother of the minors whose surnames are sought to be changed, testified that she wants them "to bear the family name of TIU but then proceeded to answer the question of what was the family name of her husband by saying that it was TIU HONG. Moreover, the alien certificate of her husband shows that he was also known under an alias, to wit, TIU SONG PIN. Moreover, while Susana Rendora claims to be married to TIU HONG, no marriage contract was presented as part of the evidence, nor did her husband testify. Neither was evidence presented that TIU HONG was authorized to use the alias TIU SONG PIN, or that he is the same person as the one whose name was given in the birth certificates of their children as YUTIAN UN, ON HIO TIAN and ON HIA TIAN.

Upon the foregoing, SC are of the opinion and so hold, that the evidence of record is utterly insufficient to support the decision appealed from. Petition for Change of name must be dismissed.

144


REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. TAÑADAG.R. No. L-31563. 29 November 1971

.Facts:

Lua Ong, father of the then minor Baby Ong, with CFI Cebu Judge Tañada presiding, a petition for change of the name of his son Baby Ong to Lua An Jok. The court issued an order setting the petition for hearing and directing the publication of the said order in the Cebu Advocate, a newspaper of general circulation in Cebu City and in the province of Cebu, once a week for three consecutive weeks.

On the day of the hearing, because no one, not even the provincial fiscal in representation of the Solicitor General, appeared to interpose any objection to the petition, the respondent judge referred the case to his deputy clerk of court, requiring him to submit a report on the evidence adduced.

The respondent judge issued an order granting the petition, authorizing Baby Ong to use the name An Joc Lua and directing the local civil registrar of Cebu City to cause the proper entry to be made. The assistant provincial fiscal, on behalf of the Government of the Republic, interposed an appeal to this Court. Subsequently, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the Government of the Republic, filed the present petition for review on certiorari.

Issues: 1. The caption of the published order and the title of the respondent's petition failed to include the name An Joc Lua, the name allowed by the court a quo for use by applicant. 2. Assuming that the court a quo acquired jurisdiction over the petition for change of name still, the Government argues, the said petition should have been denied because the respondent offered no proper and reasonable cause or compelling reason to warrant the change of name.

Held:1. The non-inclusion of the name An Joc Lua, or properly, the name of Lua An Jok, in the caption of the published order and in the title of the petition, constitutes a jurisdictional omission, and hence the respondent judge erred in assuming jurisdiction to hear and determine the respondent's petition. Notices published in the newspapers often appear in the back pages thereof or in pages least read or paid attention to. The reader, as usually happens, merely scans these pages and glances fleetingly at the captions of the published orders or the titles of the petitions. Only if the caption or the title strikes him does the reader proceed to read on. And the probability is great that the reader does not all notice the other names and/or aliases of the applicant if these are mentioned only in the body of the order or petition. The non-inclusion of all the names and/or alias of the applicant in the caption of the order or the title of the petition defeats the very purpose of the required application.

2. To justify a change of name there must exist a proper and reasonable cause or compelling reason. The following have been held to constitute proper and reasonable causes or compelling reasons: (1) a ridiculous name, a name tainted with dishonor, a name extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) a change of civil status; and (3) need to avoid confusion.

In the case at bar, Lua is his family name, Ong his first name. The attending midwife was apparently never advised by the child's parents of the name the latter gave to it. So, perfunctorily accomplishing the required report to the civil registrar, the midwife found it expedient to place therein the name "Baby Ong." The resulting mistake was obviously engendered by an erroneous impression on the part of the reporting midwife that "Ong" is the family name of the father, because "Ong" follows "Lua." Hence the name "Baby Ong." Under the circumstances above stated, the insistence of the respondent that the entry "Baby Ong" in the civil registry be changed to "Lua An Jok" could very well be motivated, there being no evidence to the contrary, solely by an honest desire to make the civil registry speak the truth.

145

The above notwithstanding, the petition below cannot be given due course because of the fatal failure, hereinbefore adverted to, on the part of the respondent to comply with jurisdictional requirements.

146


REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARCOS G.R. No. L-31065. 15 February 1990

Facts:A petition for change of name of the minor child May Sia alias Manman Huang, also known as

Mary Pang to be changed to Mary Pang De la Cruz. Respondent Judge issued an order setting the hearing of the petition inviting all interested persons to appear and show cause, if any, why the petition should not be granted. The order also directed that it be published at the expense of the petitioner in the Baguio and Midland Courier, a newspaper of general circulation in Baguio City and Mountain Province, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, the first publication to be made as soon as possible. The order also commanded that the Solicitor General and the City Attorney of Baguio be furnished copies of the order and petition.

When the petition was called for hearing, nobody opposed it. Finding the petition meritorious, respondent Judge issued an order on February 12, 1969 authorizing the change of name.The Government, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the Supreme Court on the ground that the court's order is contrary to law.

Issues:1. Whether or not respondent Judge had acquired jurisdiction over the case; 2. Whether respondent Judge erred in granting the petition although private respondent Pang Cha Quen failed to adduce proper and reasonable cause for changing the name of the minor "May Sia" alias Manman Huang."

Held: 1. The Government pointed out that the captions of the petition and of the published order of the court did not include the name "Mary Pang" as one of the names that the minor has allegedly been using, hence, the petition and the published order contain a fatal jurisdictional defect.

The omission of her other alias-- "Mary Pang"-- in the captions of the court's order and of the petition defeats the purpose of the publication.

2. The second ground for the Government's appeal is the failure of the petitioner below, Pang Cha Quen, to state a proper and reasonable cause for changing the name/names of her daughter.As may be gleaned from the petition filed in the lower court, the reasons offered for changing the name of petitioner's daughter are: (1) that her daughter grew up with, and learned to love and recognize Alfredo de la Cruz as her own father.; (2) to afford her daughter a feeling of security; and (3) that Alfredo de la Cruz agrees to this petition, and has signified his conformity at the foot of this pleading. Clearly, these are not valid reasons for a change of name. The general rule is that a change of name should not be permitted if it will give a false impression of family relationship to another where none actually exists.

3. Another reason for disallowing the petition for change of name is that it was not filed by the proper party. The petition for change of name must be filed by the person desiring to change his/her name, even if it may be signed and verified by some other person in his behalf. In this case, however, the petition was filed by Pang Cha Quen not by May Sia. Hence, only May Sia herself, alias Manman Huang, alias Mary Pang, when she shall have reached the age of majority, may file the petition to change her name. The decision to change her name, the reason for the change, and the choice of a new name and surname shall be hers alone to make. It must be her personal decision. No one else may make it for her. The reason is obvious. When she grows up to adulthood, she may not want to use her stepfather's surname, nor any of the aliases chosen for her by her mother.

147


SAN ROQUE v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. L-22035. 30 April 1968

Facts:San Roque filed Petition To Correct Name In The Birth Certificate Of Leoncia San Roque",

alleging, among other things, that the name appearing on her birth certificate on file with the office of the Local Civil Registrar of Polo, Bulacan, is Lucia San Roque; that since birth, she had been using, and had always been known by the name of Leoncia San Roque and not as Lucia San Roque”. Thereupon, the court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on April 20, 1960 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning and requiring the publication of said order in the Central Luzon Post — a newspaper edited and published in Cabanatuan City and of general circulation in the province of Bulacan, once a week for three successive weeks before the date set for the hearing. This order was duly complied with.

Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan, in representation of the Solicitor General, filed an opposition to the petition contending that, as it did not allege that a clerical error bad been committed in the recording of the name "Lucia" in the civil registry, its correction could not be made in the proceedings commenced by the petitioner ( Rule 103) but must be on Rule 108.

Held:It is obvious from all the foregoing that the present case does not concern appellee's civil status,

much less her citizenship. The petition with which the present proceedings were commenced was, of course, entitled as one "to correct name in the birth certificate of Leoncia San Roque" and prayed that petitioner's name appearing in her birth certificate be corrected and the same be made to appear as Leoncia San Roque, but the body of the petition affirmatively alleged that while her name appearing on her birth certificate on file with the office of the Local Civil Registrar of Polo, Bulacan was Lucia San Roque, petitioner "since her birth ... has been using and has always been known as Leoncia San Roque and not as Lucia San Roque; even in the performance of important civil actions like marriage". Essentially, therefore, the petition admitted that appellee's real name was Lucia San Roque which, according to the Chomi case, was her true name because it was the one appearing in the Civil Register, but that this notwithstanding, she had been using continuously since birth and had been known under the name of Leoncia San Roque. These allegations were not only not denied by the oppositor but were duly proven during the hearing. Ultimately, therefore, notwithstanding the imperfection of language employed, the petition was, in essence, one to secure judicial authority for appellee to change her name from Lucia to Leoncia — a petition which falls reasonably within the provisions of Rule 103. That the petition was entitled one "to correct name in the birth certificate of Leoncia San Roque" and prayed that petitioner's name appearing in her birth certificate be corrected accordingly did not necessarily make the petition fall under the provisions of Rule 108, because even under the provisions of Rule 103 the judgment or order rendered in connection with said Rule shall be furnished the Civil Registrar of the municipality or city where the Court who issued the same is situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.

148

Rule 103Don Mihail A. Siccuan

HAW LIONG v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. L-21194. 29 April 1966

Facts:Petitioner seeks to change his name from Haw Liong to Alfonso Lantin in a petition filed before

the Court of First Instance of Leyte. He wants to change his name to Alfonso Lantin because he is called by his Filipino friends as Alfonso and the name of his father is Placido Lantin; that he wants to have a Filipino name because he will soon be a Filipino citizen; that he came to the Philippines in 1925 and since then his Filipino friends have been calling him Alfonso; that there is no pending case against him as Haw Liong; and that in the event a case will arise against him as Haw Liong he is willing to appear and answer the same.

After hearing, the court a quo allowed petitioner to change his name from Haw Liong to Alfonso Lantin. The government has appealed.

Issue: Whether or not there is a valid ground for the change of name prayed for.

Held:A change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right. So that before a person can be

authorized to change the name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry he must show proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied

Petitioner has not shown any proper or compelling reason that may justify the request for a change of name other than his desire to adopt the name Alfonso for the reason that he has always been known by that name by his Filipino friends and associates and because that is the family name of his father which he desires to follow to conform with the customs and traditions in the Philippines. But this claim which is merely supported by his own testimony cannot overcome the fact that the name given him from the very beginning as Haw Liong as in fact this is the name that appears in his landing certificate.

149


CHIU HAP CHIU v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. L-20018. 30 April 1966

Facts:Chiu Hap Chiu seeks to change his name to Lo Hap Chiu in a petition filed before the Court of

First Instance of Davao. That the name given him at birth was Lo Hap Chiu; that during his school days, or from elementary school to college, he was called by his classmates as Lo Hap Chiu for which reason he desires to have said name adopted instead of Chiu Hap Chiu to avoid confusion in the use of his name; and that the name given him in his alien certificate of registration is Chiu Hap Chiu.

After the reception of the evidence, the court a quo granted the petition. It found that petitioner was born on February 1, 1930 at Kulagsu, Fuken, China; that he is a Chinese citizen holding an alien certificate of residence; that he is a physician by profession and has no criminal record; that he has paid all his taxes to the government; that he desires to change his name from Chiu Hap Chiu to Lo Hap Chiu for the reason that the latter is the name he used while studying in the school and because his present name and surname are the same. The government opposed the petition in view of its failure to find sufficient justification for the change of name desired by petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not there is sufficient justification for the change of name desired by petitioner

Held:Petitioner has not shown any proper or compelling reason that may justify the request for change

of name other than his desire to use the name Lo Hap Chin on the alleged reason that that is the name given him in his birth certificate and in the schools he attended, but his claim was not satisfactorily proven, for aside from his own testimony and a photostatic copy of a certification issued in his favor as Doctor of Medicine by the University of Santo Tomas wherein it appears that his name is Lo Hap Chiu, there is nothing in the record to show that he used said name from grade school to college for he failed to present any documentary evidence to prove it. The truth is that he was registered in the Bureau of Immigration as Chiu Hap Chiu and in all the clearances secured by him from said Bureau the name used therein was Chiu Hap Chiu thereby indicating that he considered himself as such as regards the public. He has not shown that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name, and as a matter of fact he was referred to as Dr. Chiu Hap Chiu in his clearance from the Court of First Instance of Davao. Since the State has an interest in the name borne by an individual, especially an alien, and the latter's identity as a rule is established by the name appearing in his alien certificate of registration, we find no plausible reason for authorizing the change of name desired by petitioner.

150

Rule 103 Emmanuel L. Saavedra

ALFON v. REPUBLIC G.R. No. L-51201. 29 May 1980

Facts: This is verified petition filed on April 28, 1978 by petitioner Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva

Duterte through her counsel, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez, praying that her name be changed from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon.

However, the evidence submitted shows that the change of name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon is not proper and reasonable with respect to the surname. The fact that petitioner has been using a different surname and has become known with such surname does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to legally authorize and change her surname to Alfon. The birth certificate clearly shows that the father of petitioner is Filomeno Duterte. Petitioner likewise admitted this fact in her testimony. To allow petitioner to change her surname from Duterte to Alfon is equivalent to allowing her to use her mother's surname. Article 364 of the Civil Code provides: Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.

If another purpose of the petitioner is to carry the surname of Alfon because her uncle who reared her since childhood has the surname "Alfon" then the remedy is not a petition for change of name.

Issue:

Whether or not there is a sufficient reason to grant the change of name. Whether or not the mother’s name be used as the plaintiff name.

Held: Yes, the only reason why the lower court denied the petitioner's prayer to change her surname is

that as legitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon she should principally use the surname of her father invoking Art. 364 of the Civil Code. But the word "principally" as used in the codal provision is not equivalent to "exclusively" so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother to which it is equally entitled.

In the case at bar, it has been shown that petitioner has, since childhood, borne the name Estrella S. Alfon although her birth records and baptismal certificate show otherwise; she was enrolled in the schools from the grades up to college under the name Estrella S. Alfon; all her friends call her by this name; she finished her course in Nursing in college and was graduated and given a diploma under this name; and she exercised the right of suffrage likewise under this name. There is therefore ample justification to grant fully her petition which is not whimsical but on the contrary is based on a solid and reasonable ground, i.e. to avoid confusion.

151


ANG CHAY v. REPUBLICG.R. No. L28507. 31 July 1970

Facts: Josefina Ang Chay and Mercedita Ang Chay prayed for the change of their respective names to

Josefina Hernandez and Mercedita Hernandez. The petition was opposed by the government, on the ground that the reason adduced therefor was not proper and reasonable.

Petitioners' mother Paz Sta. Ana, a Filipino citizen, was the widow of one Jose Hernandez when she contracted marriage for the second time on 13 September 1934, with Alejandro Ang Chay, a Chinese. 2 Of this second marriage, two daughters were born; Josefina Ang Chay, on 19 March 1935, 3 and Mercedita Ang Chay, on 23 August 1938. 4 In 1939, however the spouses Paz and Alejandro agreed to live separately from each other, with the two children remaining with the mother. When the Ang Chay girls, who allegedly were not told of their Chinese forbear reached the school age, they were enrolled at the F. Calderon Elementary School in Manila by one of Paz's daughters by her first marriage as "Josefina Hernandez" and "Mercedita Hernandez".

Petitioners had always been of the belief that they were Filipinos until January, 1966, when their mother disclosed to them that their father is a Chinese and their true surname is Ang Chay.

Issue: Use of the Filipino name since childhood without knowledge of alien parentage may be a ground

for change of name.

Held:It is a ruling of long standing in this jurisdiction that change of name is not a matter of right; that

being a privilege, before it can be authorized, the person petitioning for such change must first show proper cause of compelling reason therefor.

In the present proceeding, there is valid reason to justify the continued use by petitioners of the names by which they have been known, and with which they have always conducted, in good faith, their various social and business activities. Notable is the failure of the oppositor to controvert petitioner's claim that until January, 1966, they had no knowledge whatsoever that their father is a Chinese and that their surnames properly should be Ang Chay. On the contrary, there is overwhelming evidence that from childhood, petitioners have been carrying the family name, "Hernandez"; that they finished their schooling and got employments, voted in the local and national elections, and paid their income taxes, under that surname. it is not difficult to understand that for them to start using the family name "Ang Chay at this time would cause no little amount of confusion and trouble in the lives of these girls, who do not appear to have any hand at all in creating the situation they now find themselves in. Besides there is nothing on the record to intimate that herein petitioners' use of the surname "Hernandez" would cause damage or prejudice, either to the government or to any other private party, including their mother's children by the first marriage. For, as this Court has succinctly declared, a mere change of name would not cause a change in one's existing family relations, nor create new family rights and duties where none exists before. Neither would it affect a person's legal capacity, civil status or citizenship. What would only be altered is the word or group of words by which he is identified and distinguished from the rest of his fellow men. 1 6 Thus, this Court, in some meritorious cases, granted the applications of naturalized Filipinos for change of their foreign names to Filipino-sounding ones, in order that the handicap in their social and business dealings, posed by their alien names, may be removed and thus enable their full integration into the Philippine society where they now belong.

152


UY v. REPUBLICG.R. No. L-22712 29 November 1965

Facts:Petitioner is a Filipino citizen by naturalization, . Still bearing the Chinese surname "Uy,"

however, he is frequently mistaken for and identified as a Chinese citizen, according to him, to his chagrin, embarrassment and disappointment. Accordingly, he filed the aforementioned petition in order to have a Filipino surname. The Republic, through the Assistant Provincial Fiscal, appeared to oppose the petition on the ground that there was no sufficient showing that petitioner will be prejudiced by the continued use of his present name.

Issue:Whether petitioner has shown a "proper and reasonable cause" to warrant his change of name

under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.

Held:Yes, in granting or denying petition for change of name, the question of "proper and reasonable

cause" is left to the sound discretion of the court.The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the Court and not all best evidence available.

In the present case the trial court found to its satisfaction that petitioner was in earnest in his desire to do away with all traces of his former Chinese nationality and henceforth to be recognized as a Filipino. Such desire is in line with the policy of our naturalization laws that applicants for naturalization should fully embrace Filipino customs and traditions and socially mingle with Filipinos.

It is true, as appellant points out, that the surname Uy is used by native born Filipinos prominent in government and prosperous in business. The fact remains that it is basically Chinese. And in the community where petitioner resides said surname has been shown to be the source of his being taken for a Chinese in view of his ancestry. So much so that his business suffers from time lost in having to explain in his dealings, especially with government agencies, that he is naturalized Filipino. Similarly, it has proved a social liability, causing much difficulty for him in entering civil organizations, such as the Lions Club.

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LAPERAL v. REPUBLIC G.R. No. 18008. 30 October 1962

Facts: That petitioner's maiden name is ELISEA LAPERAL; that on March 24, 1939, she married Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria; that in a partial decision entered on this Honorable Court on January 18, 1958, in Civil Case No. 356 of this Court, entitled 'Enrique R. Santamaria vs. Elisea L. Santamaria' Mr. Enrique Santamaria was given a decree of legal separation from her; that the said partial decision is now final;

That during her marriage to Enrique R. Santamaria, she naturally used, instead of her maiden name, that of Elisea L. Santamaria; The petition was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that the same violates the provisions of Article 370 (should be 372) of the Civil Code, and that it is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court. The court denied the petition for the reason that Article 372 of the Civil Code requires the wife, even after she is decreed legally separated from her husband, to continue using the name and surname she employed before the legal separation. Upon petitioner's motion, however, the court, treating the petition as one for change of name, reconsidered its decision and granted the petition on the ground that to allow petitioner, who is a businesswoman decreed legally separated from her husband, to continue using her married name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. Hence, this appeal by the State.

Issue: Legal separation alone not ground for wife’s change of name; Mandatory language of Article

372, New Civil Code. – A woman’s married status is not affected by a decree of legal separation, there being no severance of the vinculum and under Article 372 of the New Civil Code, she must continue using the name and surname employed by her before the separation.

Held: No, under ART. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her

name and surname employed before the legal separation. Note that the language of the statute is mandatory that the wife, even after the legal separation has been decreed, shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation. This is so because her married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. It seems to be the policy of the law that the wife should continue to use the name indicative of her unchanged status for the benefit of all concerned.

The appellee contends, however, that the petition is substantially for change of her name from Elisea L. Santamaria, the one she has been using, since her marriage, to Elisea Laperal, her maiden name, giving as reason from the petition quoted in full at the beginning of these opinion, the only reason relied upon for the change of name is the fact that petitioner is legally separated from her husband and has, in fact, ceased to live with him for many years. It is doubtful, to say the least, whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general, may prevail over the specific provisions of Article 372 of the New Civil Code with regards to married women legally separated from their husbands. Even, however, applying Rule 103 to this case, the fact of legal separation alone which is the only basis for the petition at bar is, in our opinion, not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of herein petitioner, for to hold otherwise would be to provide an easy circumvention of the mandatory provisions of Article 372.

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JOHNSTON v. REPUBLICG.R. No. L-18264. 30 April 1963

Facts: On June 24, 1960, petitioner-appellant Isabel Valdes Johnston, filed a petition for the adoption of

one Ana Isabel Henriette Antonio Concepcion Georgiana, 2 years and 10 months old, the lower court rendered a decision granting the petition, with the following dispositive part. With the corresponding change of surname VALDES, which is the surname of petitioner.

The petitioner-appellant filed a motion on October 24, 1960, praying that the surname given to the minor be "Valdes Johnston", instead of "Valdes" only, but this motion was denied by the lower court in its order of October 31, 1960.

The Solicitor General in reply argues that while it is true that a married woman is permitted to add to her surname her husband's surname, the fact remains that appellant's surname is Valdes and not Johnston; that a married woman has a surname of her own to which may be added her husband's surname if she so chooses; that if the minor be permitted to use the surname Valdes Johnston, much confusion would result because the public would be misled into believing that she was adopted by appellant's husband also, which is not true in this case.

Issue: Whether or not the adopter’s new name, by reason of marriage, may also be used by the adopted

minor.

Held: No, the provision of law (Art. 341, par. 4, Civil Code) which entitles the adopted minor to the use

of the adopter's surname, refers to the adopter's own surname and not to her surname acquired by virtue of marriage. Petitioner-appellant's real surname is Valdes and not Johnston, and as she made the adoption singly without the concurrence of her husband, and not as a married woman, her name as adopter was her maiden name. The adoption created a personal relationship between the adopter and the adopted, and the consent of Raymond Johnston, Isabel Valdes' husband, to the adoption by her individually, did not have the effect of making him an adopting father, so as to entitle the child to the use of Johnston's own surname.

Since adoption gives the person adopted the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter (Art. 341, par. 1, Civil Code), much confusion would indeed result, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, if the minor child herein were allowed to use the surname of the spouse who did not join in the adoption.

For one thing, to allow the minor to adopt the surname of the husband of the adopter, would mislead the public into believing that he had also been adopted by the husband, which is not the case. And when later, questions of successional rights arise, the husband's consent to the adoption might be presented to prove that he had actually joined in the adoption.It is to forestall befuddling situations pointed out above and other possible confusing situations that may arise in the future, that this Court is inclined to apply strictly the provision of the Civil Code to the effect that an adopted child use the surname of the adopter himself or herself, and not that which is acquired by marriage.

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MOORE v. REPUBLICG.R. No. L-18407. 26 June 1963

Facts: Elaine A. Moore filed a petition before the Court of First Instance of Rizal praying that her child

by a former marriage, William Michael Velarde, be permitted to change his name so as to read William Michael Velarde Moore.

After said decree became final, petitioner contracted a second marriage with Don C. Moore, and thereafter the minor lived continuously with the spouses up to the present time. In view of this harmonious relation it is petitioner's desire that the minor be able to use the name Moore after his family name Velarde.

Issue: Whether under our laws a minor may be permitted to adopt and use the surname of the second

husband of his mother; (2) whether justifiable reasons exist to allow such change of name; and whether petitioner, as mother of the minor, has the authority or personality to ask for such a change.

Held:Anent the first issue, the government sustains a negative stand for the reason that our laws do not

authorize a legitimate child to use the surname of a person who is not his father, for, as a matter of fact, Article 364 of Civil Code specifically provides that legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their father. Mention is also made of Article 369 of the same Code which provides that in case of annulment of avoidable marriage the children conceived before the annulment she principally use the surname of the father, and considering by analogy the effect of a decree of divorce, it concluded that the children who are conceived before such a decree should also be understood as carrying the surname of the real father, which, in this case, is Velarde. We find tenable this observation of government's counsel. Indeed, if a child born out of a lawful wedlock be allowed to bear the surname of the second husband of the mother, should the first husband die or be separated by a decree of divorce, there may result a confusion to his real paternity. In the long run the change may redound to the prejudice of the child in the community.

Another factor to be reckoned with is the fact that the child concerned is still a minor who for the present cannot fathom what would be his feeling when he comes to mature age. Any way, if the time comes, he may decide the matter for himself and take such action as our law may permit. For the present we deem the action taken by petitioner premature.

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LLANETA v. AGRAVAG.R. No. L-32054. 15 May 1974

Facts: Teresita's mother, one Atanacia Llaneta, was once married to Serafin Ferrer with whom she had

but one child named Victoriano Ferrer. In 1942 Serafin Ferrer died, and about four years later Atanacia had relations with another man out of which Teresita was born. Shortly after Teresita's birth, Atanacia brought her and Victoriano to Manila where all of them lived with Atanacia's mother-in-law, Victoria vda. de Ferrer. Teresita was raised in the household of the Ferrer's, using the surname of Ferrer in all her dealings and throughout her schooling. When she was about twenty years old, she applied for a copy of her birth certificate in Irosin, Sorsogon, where she was born, as she was required to present it in connection with a scholarship granted to her by the Catholic Charities. It was then that she discovered that her registered surname is Llaneta — not Ferrer — and that she is the illegitimate child of Atanacia and an unknown father.

On the ground that her use thenceforth of the surname Llaneta, instead of Ferrer which she had been using since she acquired reason, would cause untold difficulties and confusion, Teresita petitioned the court below on March 18, 1969 for change of her name from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer. After trial duly had, the respondent judge denied her petition; hence the present recourse.

Issue: Whether illegitimate child be allowed to bear surname of husband of mother.

Held: Yes, the respondent court places reliance on the doctrine, expounded in three decisions of this

Court, 3 that disallows such change of name as would give the false impression of family relationship. The principle remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community in general. In the case at bar, however, the late Serafin Ferrer's widowed mother, Victoria, and his two remaining brothers, Nehemias and Ruben, have come forward in earnest support of the petition. Whether the late Serafin Ferrer, who died some five years before Teresita was born, would have consented or objected to her use of his surname is open to speculation. One thing, however, is beyond cavil: those living who possess the right of action to prevent the surname Ferrer from being smeared are proud to share it with her.

The petition of Teresita Llaneta for change of her name to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer is hereby granted.

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Rule 103Emmanuel L.Saavedra

MA ING CHAO v. REPUBLICG.R. No. L-28051 28 July 1970

Facts:

The record shows that on June 29, 1966, Ma Ing Chao filed with said Court, a Petition for the aforementioned change of name, upon the ground that, prior thereto, said petitioner had adopted Chik Tong, a minor, then 4 years of age; that the full name of the adopted minor should, therefore, be Ma Chik Tong; that his Alien Certificate of Registration however, in the name of Ma Chik Kin; that since the minor began schooling in 1955, he had been using the name Ma Chik Kin and is known by that name by his friends and schoolmates; that petitioner had "lately ... discovered," before the institution of the present case, that such name is not in accordance with the aforesaid order of adoption and that petitioner want his adopted son to "continue using the name, Ma Chik Kin, not only because it is the name by which he is commonly known to his friends, acquaintances and schoolmates, but, also because it is the name appearing in his alien registration certificate,

Indeed, the title of the case at bar is: "In the matter of the change of name of Ma Chik Kin, a minor." The order of the trial court, directing the publication of the corresponding notice, bore the same title, which is, also, that of the notice published accordingly.

Issue:

Whether or not the title of the publication is sufficient to confer jurisdiction.

Held:No, we have, however, held that the true name of the party whose name is sought to be changed

should be set forth in the title of the case and of the notice published in connection therewith, and that failure to do so is fatal to the application for a change of name and precludes the Court from having jurisdiction to entertain the same .

As above indicated, the name given in the title of the case at bar and of the notice published in connection therewith is Ma Chik Kin, not the true name of the adopted son of herein petitioner, which, according to the latter, is either Chik Tong, or Ma Tong, of Ma Chik Tong. Consequently, the appealed decision is null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

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AQUINO v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. L-32779. 25 May 1979

Facts: This is a petition for review of the decision dated September 9, 1970 of the Court of First Instance

of Nueva Ecija, Cabanatuan City, granting the petition of John Li Kan Wa for change of name.Records disclose that John Li Kan Wa filed a petition for change of his name to John Sotto,

alleging (a) change of his status from Chinese to Filipino as a result of his election of Filipino Citizenship; and (b) the previous confusion resulting from being registered as John Li Kan Wa and using a different name since childhood which is John Sotto. Finding the petition sufficient in substance, the court issued an order giving notice to all interested parties to appear before the court and state their objections, and directed that the order be published in the Monday Post, a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Nueva Ecija and Cabanatuan City. The Republic filed an opposition to the petition. After due hearing, the court granted the petition for change of name.

Issue: Whether or not the failure to include the name sought in the title of the petition is substantial is

jurisdictional infirmity.

Held: Yes, Under Section 2, Rule 103 of the New Rules of Court, the petition for change shall set

forth inter alia, the name asked for. The requirement is mandatory and compliance therewith is essential, for it is by such means that the court acquires jurisdiction. It was held in Republic vs. Reyes, 1 that failure to include the name sought to be adopted in the title of the petition, and consequently in the notices published in newspapers is a substantial jurisdictional infirmity. As enunciated in Go Chill Beng vs. Republic, 2 for publication to be effective, it must give a correct information. To inform, the publication should recite, among others, the following facts: (a) the name or names of applicant; (b) the cause for which the change of name is sought; and (c) the new name asked for. The rationale of the requirement to include in the title of the petition the name sought to be adopted was expressly made clear, thus:

Notices in the newspaper, like the one under consideration, usually appears in the back pages. The reader as is to be expected, merely glances at the title of the petition. It is only after he has satisfied himself that the title interests him that he proceeds to read down further. The probability that the portion heretofore quoted will escape the reader's notice. The purpose, of which the publication is made, that is, to inform, may thus be served.

It appears from respondent's exhibits 3-A and 3-B that only the name Li Kan Wa was given in the title, and the name John Sotto was not mentioned. Omission in the title of the petition of the name asked for is fatal, and the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. Non-compliance with the rules did not vest the court with authority to act on the petition and therefore, the questioned decision is null and void.

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REPUBLIC v. JUDGE OF BRANCH III OF THE CFI OF CEBUG.R. No. L-35605. 11 October 1984

Facts: Here in respondent Andrew Barretto filed Special Proceeding No. 2742-R with the Court of First

Instance of Cebu for the change of his name from Andrew Barrette to Andrew Velez, alleging as reason for his petition that Velez is the surname of his stepfather with whom he was living.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines Med an opposition to the petition, alleging that the proposed change of name is unwarranted in the absence of any showing that the present surname of respondent Andrew Barretto is ridiculous and/or tainted with dishonor. It was also contended that the ground given for the proposed change of name does not constitute proper and reasonable justification for the grant of the petition.

The trial court rendered a decision granting the petition of respondent Andrew Barretto to change his surname to Velez.

Issue:Whether or not the desire of the petitioner to change his surname to that of his step-father not

sufficient ground for change of name.

Held:No, the petition for change of name and the order of publication and hearing thereon must contain

in its title or caption [a] the applicant's real name, [b] his aliases and other names, if any, [c] and the name he seeks to adopt and this notwithstanding that the body of the petition or of the order includes also the cited information. Finally, there must be effective publication, i.e., such publication reciting, among others: [a] the name or names of the applicant, [b] the cause for which the change of name is sought, and [c] the new name asked for. Failure to comply with the aforementioned requirements results in the lower court acquiring no jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition.

The name sought to be adopted does not appear in the title of the petition. Also, the same does not appear in the title of the order of publication. These are jurisdictional defects. The order of publication is defective for another reason: it does not cite the cause for which the change of name is sought.

Consequently, the publication itself is defective on three counts: (1) the name Andrew Barretto appearing therein may not be the petitioner's real name; (2) the cause for which the change of name is sought does not appear therein; and (3) the name sought to be adopted does not appear in the title or caption of the published order.

We may add here that the publication of the proposed name in the title of the order also preempts the possibility of any mercenary interest on the part of the alleged step-father who may become the heir of the minor-applicant. Said step-father may become the guardian of the applicant's person and property during the latter's minority, and thereby enjoy the administration of applicant's property and its fruits. In his petition, Andrew Barretto states that "he desires to change his name to ANDREW VELEZ because it is the surname of his step-father Magin V. Velez with whom he is living at present.The reason alleged by Andrew Barretto is not compelling enough to warrant the change of name prayed for. The surname "Barretto" is his mother's surname. He is the illegitimate child of Lucy Barretto (p. 15; rec.). But he is not a natural child of Magin V. Velez, The circumstances of his illegitimate filiation are not known.

Magin V. Velez had children of his own before he married the applicant's mother. Magin V. Velez and Lucy Barretto also have their own children. To warrant the change of name herein sought will

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necessarily invite confusion as to paternity, to the prejudice of Magin V. Velez, the applicant's mother, as well as their common and separate offspring’s.


GO CHIU BENG v. REPUBLICG.R. No. L-29574.18 August 1972

Facts: Upon a review of the records, it is manifest therefrom that the decision appealed from must be set

aside as null and void for want of jurisdiction to entertain appellee's petition for change of name, it being undisputed, as it appears from petitioner's Exhibit "A", that the only name given in the title of the notice of the order about the filing of appellee's amended petitions was that of Go Chiu Beng; that no other name was given in said title, despite the fact that, in both his original and amended petition, appellee alleged that he had "always" been known, "since his arrival in the Philippines," as "Reynaldo"; and that his own certificate of naturalization, Exhibit "B", shows that he is likewise known as "Jimmy Go."

Issue:Whether or not there is want of jurisdiction for failure to include all aliases of applicant in the

title of petition.

Held:Yes, in said ease of Ng Yao Siong, his other names, although not mentioned in the title of his

petition and in the notice published in connection therewith were set forth in the body of the petition. Yet it was ruled that all aliases should be included in the title of the petition, not only in the body thereof, because the reason for this is obvious. Notices in the newspapers, like the one under consideration, usually appear in the back pages. The reader, as is to be expected, merely glances at the title of the petition. It is only after he has satisfied himself that the title interests him, that he proceeds to read down further. The probability is that the portions in the publication hereto quoted will escape the reader's notice. The purpose which the publication is made, that is, to inform, may thus be unserved." The Court then ruled that "for a publication of a petition for a change of name to be valid, the title thereof should include, first, his real name, and, second, his aliases, if any.Indeed, in a subsequent case, this Court explained-

Notices published in the newspapers often appear in back pages thereof or in pages least read or paid attention to. The reader, as usually happens, merely scans these pages and glances fleetingly at the captions of the published orders or the title of the petitions. Only if the caption or the title strikes him does the reader proceed to read on. And the probability is great that the reader does not at all notice the other names and/or aliases of the applicant if these are mentioned only in the body of the order or petition. The non-inclusion of all names and/or aliases of the applicant in the caption of the order or the title of the petition defeats the very purpose of the inquired publication.

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SECAN KOK v. REPUBLICG.R. No. L-27621. 30 August 1973

Facts: On May 18, 1964, appellee Secan Kok filed a petition to change his name and that of his daughter

Marilyn Se respectively to Antonio Cuakok and Gloria Cuakok, although his petition mentions his other minor children, namely Perfecto, Romeo, Betty, Tomas, Daniel and Antonio, Jr., as having been born out of his marriage in the Catholic church on August 2, 1947 at Cotabato City, without, significantly, mentioning the name of his wife. Petitioner-appellee filed a motion for supplemental judgment, alleging that the Bureau of Immigration refused to change the surname of his wife Lucia O. Tee and their aforesaid six (6) minor children to Cuakok who were then registered in the Bureau of Immigration with the surname of Cua. the government, thru the Assistant City Fiscal, opposed the motion on the ground that (a) the order dated July 28, 1965 of the trial court authorizing the change of his name from Secan Kok to Antonio Cuakok, and the name of his daughter from Marilyn Se to Gloria Cuakok has long become final and therefore can no longer be supplemented; and (b) that his wife Lucia O. Tee, being of age, should file a separate petition to change her name, such a petition being an individual and personal matter and not a collective one, petitioner-appellee replied to the said opposition contending that legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their father (Article 264, Civil Code of the Philippines) and that the wife has the right to use the surname of her husband

Issue: Whether or not the change of name of wife and minor children of husband-father can be made on

mere motion.

Held: No, the rules are very explicit. Section 2 of Rule 103 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that

a petition for a change of name shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name to be changed, or some other person in his behalf. There is need therefore for a separate petition to be filed by the wife Lucia O. Tee, who is already of age, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children.

To allow the change of name of the wife and other minor children of petitioner-appellee, upon a mere motion as an incident in the proceedings for the change of name of petitioner-appellee, will not only deprive the government of the required filing fees therefor but will also dispense with the aforesaid essential requirements respecting the recitals in the title of the petition and the publication to apprise persons, who may be in possession of adverse information or evidence against the grant of the petition, so that they will come forward with such information or evidence in order to protect public interest as well as the interest of private individuals who may be prejudiced by the change of name of the petitioner.

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REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 97906. 21 May 1992

Facts: Private respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala, Sr. and Segundina Y.

Alcala. When he was but two and a half years old and then known as Maximo Alcala, Jr., and his sister Margaret Alcala, was then nine years old, they were, with the consent of their natural parents 3 and by order of the court in Special Case No. 593 4 issued on September 9, 1967, adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized Filipinos. Hoong Wong, now deceased, was an insurance agent while Concepcion Ty Wong was a high school teacher. They decided to adopt the children as they remained childless after fifteen years of marriage. The couples showered their adopted children with parental love and reared them as their own children.

Upon reaching the age of twenty-two, herein private respondent, by then married and a junior Engineering student at Notre Dame University, Cotabato City, filed a petition to change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. It was averred that his use of the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community, and he wants to erase any implication whatsoever of alien nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus hampering his business and social life; and that his adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to revert to his former surname.

The Solicitor General contends that private respondent's allegations of ridicule and/or isolation from family and friends were unsubstantiated and cannot justify the petition for change of name. He claims that for private respondent to cast aside the name of his adoptive father is crass ingratitude to the memory of the latter and to his adoptive mother who is still alive, despite her consent to the petition for change of name. Further, the Solicitor General posits that the reversion of Maximo Wong to his old name violates Articles 341 and 365 of the Civil Code, which requires an adopted child to use the surname of the adopter, and would identify him with his parents by nature, thus giving the impression that he has severed his relationship with his adoptive parents.

In refutation, private respondent argues that he did as the law required, that is, upon adoption he used the surname of the adopter. However, being already emancipated, he can now decide what is best for and by himself. It is at this time that he realized that the Chinese name he carries causes him undue ridicule and embarrassment and affects his business and social life. In fact, his adoptive mother, being aware of his predicament, gave her consent to the petition for change of name, albeit making it clear that the same shall in no way affect the legal adoption, and even underwent the rigors of trial to substantiate her sworn statement. If his adoptive mother does not take offense nor feel any resentment, abhorrence or insecurity about his desire to change his name, private respondent avers that there can be no possible prejudice on her, much less the State.

Issue: Whether or not the reasons given by private respondent in his petition for change of name are

valid, sufficient and proper to warrant the granting of said petition.

Held: The purpose of the law an allowing of change of name as contemplated by the provisions of Rule

103 of the Rules of Court is to give a person an opportunity to improve his personality and to provide his

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best interest. (Calderon vs. Republic, 19 SCRA 721). In granting or denying the petition for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available is required. In the present case, we believe that the court a quo had exercised its discretion judiciously when it granted the petition.

From the testimony of petitioner-appellee and of his adopter mother Concepcion Ty-Wong, We discern that said appellee was prompted to file the petition for change of name because of the embarrassment and ridicule his family name "Wong" brings in his dealings with his relatives and friends, he being a Muslim Filipino and living in a Muslim community. Another cause is his desire to improve his social and business life. It has been held that in the absence of prejudice to the state or any individual, a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of a former alien nationality which only hamper(s) social and business life, is a proper and reasonable cause for change of name. Justice dictates that a person should be allowed to improve his social standing as long as in doing so, he does not cause prejudice or injury to the interest of the State or other persons (Calderon vs. Republic, supra). Nothing whatsoever is shown in the record of this case that such prejudice or injury to the interest of the state or of other persons would result in the change of petitioner's name.

In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available. Summarizing, in special proceedings for change of name, what is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the courts.

While it is true that the statutory fiat under Article 365 of the Civil Code is to the effect that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter, it must nevertheless be borne in mind that the change of the surname of the adopted child is more an incident rather than the object of adoption proceedings. The act of adoption fixes a status, viz., that of parent and child. More technically, it is an act by which relations of paternity and affiliation are recognized as legally existing between persons not so related by nature. It has been defined as the taking into one's family of the child of another as son or daughter and heir and conferring on it a title to the rights and privileges of such. The purpose of an adoption proceeding is to effect this new status of relationship between the child and its adoptive parents, the change of name which frequently accompanies adoption being more an incident than the object of the proceeding. The welfare of the child is the primary consideration in the determination of an application for adoption. On this point, there is unanimous agreement.

The Solicitor General maintains the position that to sustain the change of name would run counter to the behest of Article 365 of the Civil Code and the ruling inManuel vs. Republic that "one should not be allowed to use a surname which otherwise he is not permitted to employ under the law," and would set a bad example to other persons who might also seek a change of their surnames on lame excuses.

While we appreciate the Solicitor General's apprehensions and concern, we find the same to be unfounded. We do not believe that by reverting to his old name, private respondent would then be using a name which he is prohibited by law from using. True, the law prescribes the surname that a person may employ; but the law does not go so far as to unqualifiedly prohibit the use of any other surname, and only subjects such recourse to the obtention of the requisite judicial sanction. What the law does not prohibit, it permits.

If we were to follow the argument of the Solicitor General to its conclusion, then there will never be any possibility or occasion for any person, regardless of status, to change his name, in view of the supposed subsequent violation of the legal imperative on the use of surnames in the event that the petition is granted. Rule 103 of the Rules of Court would then be rendered inutile. This could hardly have been the intendment of the law.

A petition for change of name is a remedy allowed under our law only by way of exception to the mandatory provisions of the Civil Code on the use of surnames. The law fixes the surname that may be

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used by a person, at least inceptively, and it may be changed only upon judicial permission granted in the exercise of sound discretion. Section 1 of Rule 103, in specifying the parties who may avail of said remedy, uses the generic term "persons" to signify all natural persons regardless of status. If a legitimate person may, under certain judicially accepted exceptional circumstances, petition the court for a change of name, we do not see any legal basis or logic in discriminating against the availment of such a remedy by an adopted child. In other words, Article 365 is not an exception, much less can it bar resort, to Rule 103.

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REPUBLIC v. HERNANDEZG.R. No. 117209. 9 February 1996

Facts:On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent spouses, Van Munson y Navarro and Regina

Munson y Andrade, filed a petition to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran, duly alleging therein the jurisdictional facts required by Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, their qualifications as and fitness to be adoptive parents, as well as the circumstances under and by reason of which the adoption of the aforenamed minor was sought. In the very same petition, private respondents prayed for the change of the first name of said minor adoptee to Aaron Joseph, the same being the name with which he was baptized in keeping with religious tradition, and by which he has been called by his adoptive family, relatives and friends since May 6, 1993 when he arrived at private respondents’ residence.

At the hearing on April 18, 1994, petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption. In its formal opposition dated May 3, 1995, petitioner reiterated its objection to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petitions should be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings.

It is the position of petitioner that respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he additionally granted the prayer for the change of the given or proper name of the adoptee in a petition for adoption.

Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from and are not related to each other, being respectively governed by distinct sets of law and rules. In order to be entitled to both reliefs, namely, a decree of adoption and an authority to change the given or proper name of the adoptee, the respective proceedings for each must be instituted separately, and the substantive and procedural requirements therefor under Articles 183 to 193 of the Family Code in relation to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, and Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for change of name, must correspondingly be complied with.

A perusal of the records, according to petitioner, shows that only the laws and rules on adoption have been observed, but not those for a petition for change of name. Petitioner further contends that what the law allows is the change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with that of the adopter and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the change of the registered given or proper name, and since this would involve a substantial change of one’s legal name, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites therefor being conformably satisfied.

Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption with a prayer for change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted and vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no prohibition in the Rules against the joinder of adoption and change of name being pleaded as two separate but related causes of action in a single petition. Further, the conditions for permissive joinder of causes of action, i.e., jurisdiction of the court, proper venue and joinder of parties, have been met.

The trial court adopted a liberal stance in holding that –Furthermore, the change of name of the child from Kevin Earl Bartolome to Aaron Joseph

should not be treated strictly, it appearing that no rights have been prejudiced by said change of name. The strict and meticulous observation of the requisites set forth by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court is indubitably for the purpose of preventing fraud, ensuring that neither State nor any third person should

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be prejudiced by the grant of the petition for change of name under said rule, to a petitioner of discernment.

The first name sought to be changed belongs to an infant barely over a year old. Kevin Earl has not exercised full civil rights nor engaged in any contractual obligations. Neither can he nor petitioners on his behalf, be deemed to have any immoral, criminal or illicit purpose for seeking said change of name. It stands to reason that there is no way that the state or any person may be so prejudiced by the action for change of Kevin Earl’s first name. In fact, to obviate any possible doubts on the intent of petitioners, the prayer for change of name was caused to be published together with the petition for adoption.

Issue: Whether or not the court a quo erred in granting the prayer for the change of the registered proper

or given name of the minor adoptee embodied in the petition for adoption.

Held: Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the

adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptee’s surnameto follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.

However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee’s registered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.

The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be used in the adoption proceedings in order to vest the court with jurisdiction to hear and determine the same, and shall continue to be so used until the court orders otherwise. Changing the given or proper name of a person as recorded in the civil register is a substantial change in one’s official or legal name and cannot be authorized without a judicial order. The purpose of the statutory procedure authorizing a change of name is simply to have, wherever possible, a record of the change, and in keeping with the object of the statute, a court to which the application is made should normally make its decree recording such change.

The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing therein, If a change in one’s name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined.

Under Rule 103, a petition for change of name shall be filed in the regional trial court of the province where the person desiring to change his name resides. It shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name to be changed or by some other person in his behalf and shall state that the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three years prior to such filing, the cause for which the change of name is sought, and the name asked for. An order for the date and place of hearing shall be made and published, with the Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city prosecutor appearing for the Government at such hearing. It is only upon satisfactory proof of the veracity of the allegations in the petition and the reasonableness of the causes for the change of name that the court may adjudge that the name be changed as prayed for in the petition, and shall furnish a copy of said judgment to the civil registrar of the municipality concerned who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.

A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an

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independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system.

The Solicitor General correctly points out the glaring defects of the subject petition insofar as it seeks the change of name of the adoptee, all of which taken together cannot but lead to the conclusion that there was no petition sufficient in form and substance for change of name as would rightfully deserve an order therefor. It would be procedurally erroneous to employ a petition for adoption to effect a change of name in the absence of the corresponding petition for the latter relief at law.

Neither can the allowance of the subject petition, by any stretch of imagination and liberality, be justified under the rule allowing permissive joinder of causes of action. Moreover, the reliance by private respondents on the pronouncements in Briz vs. Briz, et al. and Peyer vs. Martinez, et al. is misplaced.

A restatement of the rule and jurisprudence on joinder of causes of action would, therefore, appear to be called for.

By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action, is meant the uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in one action, the statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration. It is the union of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under certain circumstances join several distinct demands, controversies or rights of action in one declaration, complaint or petition.

As can easily be inferred from the above definitions, a party is generally not required to join in one suit several distinct causes of action. The joinder of separate causes of action, where allowable, is permissive and not mandatory in the absence of a contrary statutory provision, even though the causes of action arose from the same factual setting and might under applicable joinder rules be joined. Modern statutes and rules governing joinders are intended to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to promote the efficient administration of justice wherever this may be done without prejudice to the rights of the litigants. To achieve these ends, they are liberally construed.

While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party litigant, Section 5, Rule 2 of our present Rules allows causes of action to be joined in one complaint conditioned upon the following requisites: (a) it will not violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and (b) the causes of action arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation between the parties, or are for demands for money or are of the same nature and character.

The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits where the same parties and subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one action a complete determination of all matters in controversy and litigation between the parties involving one subject matter, and to expedite the disposition of litigation at minimum cost. The provision should be construed so as to avoid such multiplicity, where possible, without prejudice to the rights of the litigants. Being of a remedial nature, the provision should be liberally construed, to the end that related controversies between the same parties may be adjudicated at one time; and it should be made effectual as far as practicable, with the end in view of promoting the efficient administration of justice.

The statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of causes of action is to encourage joinder of actions which could reasonably be said to involve kindred rights and wrongs, although the courts have not succeeded in giving a standard definition of the terms used or in developing a rule of universal application. The dominant idea is to permit joinder of causes of action, legal or equitable, where there is some substantial unity between them. While the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims as he may have, there should nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and a common question of law and fact involved, subject always to the restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Unlimited joinder is not authorized.

Our rule on permissive joinder of causes of action, with the proviso subjecting it to the correlative rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties and requiring a conceptual unity in the problems presented. effectively disallows unlimited joinder. Turning now to the present petition, while it is true that

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there is no express prohibition against the joinder of a petition for adoption and for change of name, we do not believe that there is any relation between these two petitions, nor are they of the same nature or character, much less do they present any common question of fact or law, which conjointly would warrant their joinder. In short, these petitions do not rightly meet the underlying test of conceptual unity demanded to sanction their joinder under our Rules. As keenly observed and correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General –

”A petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from each other. Each action is individually governed by particular sets of laws and rules. These two proceedings involve disparate issues. In a petition for adoption, the court is called upon to evaluate the proposed adopter’s fitness and qualifications to bring up and educate the adoptee properly (Prasnickvs. Republic, 99 Phil. 665). On the other hand, in a petition for change of name, no family relations are created or affected for what is looked into is the propriety and reasonableness of the grounds supporting the proposed change of name.

Hence, the individual merits of each issue must be separately assessed and determined for neither action is dependent on the other.

The rule on permissive joinder of causes of action is clear. Joinder may be allowed only if the actions show a commonality of relationship and conform to the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties (Section 5,Rule 2, Rules of Court).

These conditions are wanting in the instant case. As already pointed out in our Petition, an action for adoption and an action for change of name are, in nature and purpose, not related to each other and do not arise out of the same relation between the parties. While what is cogent in an adoption proceeding is the proposed adopter’s fitness and qualifications to adopt, a petition for change of first name may only prosper upon proof of reasonable and compelling grounds supporting the change requested. Fitness to adopt is not determinative of the sufficiency of reasons justifying a change of name. And similarly, a change of first name cannot be justified in view of a finding that the proposed adopter was found fit to adopt. There is just no way that the two actions can connect and find a common ground, thus the joinder would be improper.

The practically unrestricted freedom of the natural parent to select the proper or given name of the child presupposes that no other name for it has theretofore been entered in the civil register. Once such name is registered, regardless of the reasons for such choice and even if it be solely for the purpose of identification, the same constitutes the official name. This effectively authenticates the identity of the person and must remain unaltered save when, for the most compelling reasons shown in an appropriate proceeding, its change may merit judicial approval.

While the right of a natural parent to name the child is recognized, guaranteed and protected under the law, the so-called right of an adoptive parent to re-name an adopted child by virtue or as a consequence of adoption, even for the most noble intentions and moving supplications, is unheard of in law and consequently cannot be favorably considered. To repeat, the change of the surname of the adoptee as a result of the adoption and to follow that of the adopter does not lawfully extend to or include the proper or given name. Furthermore, factual realities and legal consequences, rather than sentimentality and symbolisms, are what are of concern to the Court.

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ANSALDO v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. L-10226. 14 February 1958

Facts:On April 5, 1954, a baby was born to Virginia Ansaldo, a Filipina, and Henry H. Wang, a

Chinese, both single. The following day, the parents of the baby gave to the Chief Nurse of the Samplaloc General Hospital , Manila , where the baby was born, the information and data about the child and its parents which are made to appear on the child's birth certificate. On February 10, 1956, the mother of the child, Virginia Ansaldo, filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a "Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate", seeking to change the word "Chinese" under the child's name James A. Wang and opposite the word "Nationality", in the birth certificate, to word "Filipino". The petition was opposed by the Solicitor General in representation of the Republic of the Philippines , on the ground that entries in the civil register can be corrected only if the alleged mistakes are clerical in nature, not those that would affect the status or nationality or citizenship of the person involved. The lower court issued the order of September 13, 1955, denying the petition. Appellant contends that the correction sought by her in the birth certificate of her son, James A. Wang, does not affect his nationality or citizenship, for the reason that her child under the law, is a Filipino, with or without the correction of his birth certificate, because his mother is a Filipino citizen, and although his father is a Chinese, the child was born out of wedlock, as further shown by the birth certificate, that being an illegitimate child, it follows the citizenship of its mother. Issue:

Whether or not the contention of the petitioner is correct. Held:

The SC citing the case of Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic of the Philippines held that the petition under the consideration does not merely call for a correction for a clerical error. It involves a matter which concerns the citizenship not only of petitioner but of his children. It is therefore an important controversial matter which can and should only be threshed out in appropriate action. The philosophy behind this requirement lies in the fact that `the books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained' (Article 410, new Civil Code), and if the entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through a mere summary proceeding, and not through an appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represent, we would set wide open the door to fraud or other mischief the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching. For the information of the parties concerned, and for the guidance of the public in general, we may venture the opinion that the clerical errors which might be corrected through judicial sanction under Article 412 of the New Civil Code, would be those harmless and innocuous changes, such, correction of a name that it clearly misspelled, occupation of the parents, etc.; but for changes involving the civil status of the parents, their nationality or citizenship, those are grave and important matters which may have a bearing and effect on the citizenship and nationality not only of said parents, but of the offspring’s, and to seek said changes, it is necessary to file a proper suit wherein not only the State, but also all parties concerned and affected should be made parties defendants or respondents and evidence should be submitted, either to support the allegations of the petition or complaint, or also to disprove the same so that any order or decision in the case may be made with due process of law and on the basis of facts proven, Then and only then may the change or changes be made in the entry in a civil register that will affect or even determine conclusively the citizenship or nationality of a person therein involved

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CHUA WEE v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. L-27731. 21 April 1971

Facts:Chua Wee and Pacita Topenio filed a petition with the Manila Court of First Instance for the

correction of the birth records in the office of the local civil registrar of their four children by changing their nationality from Chinese to Filipino, and their civil status from legitimate to illegitimate. They alleged in their petition that Chua Wee is a Chinese citizen, while Pacita Topenio is a Filipino citizen, both of legal age, single and residing at 1400 F. Doroteo St., Sta. Cruz, Manila; that they have been living as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage; that out of their common-law marital relations, four children were born in Manila, that the entries in the records of the Manila civil registrar to the effect that the aforesaid children are Chinese citizen and, except the fourth child, are their legitimate children, are wrong; because the petitioners are not legally married and that the aforesaid four children being all illegitimate should follow the citizenship of their mother Pacita Topenio who is a Filipino citizen.

The Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the entries sought to be corrected are very substantial and controversial, affecting as they do the citizenship and status of the children of petitioners, and that such petition for the correction is not the appropriate remedy, which remedy can only be secured in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issue involved. The court sustained the motion to dismiss and accordingly dismissed the petition as well as denied the motion for reconsideration.

Issue:Whether or not Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court as proceeding in rem which requires the

publication of the petition once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation and therefore covers controversial issues.

Held:The Supreme Court held that Article 412 of the New Civil Code is the only substantive law

covering the alteration or correction of entries in the civil register which alteration or correction can only be effected through a judicial order. From the time the New Civil Code took effect until the promulgation of the Revised Rules of Court, there was no law nor rule of court prescribing the procedure to secure judicial authorization to effect the desired innocuous rectifications or alterations in the civil register pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court now provides for such a procedure which should be limited solely to the implementation of Article 412, the substantive law on the matter of correcting entries in the civil register. If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, said Rule 108 would thereby become unconstitutional for it would be increasing or modifying substantive rights, which changes are not authorized under Article 412 of the New Civil Code.

It may be stated at this juncture that Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the cancellation or correction of the entries in the Civil Registry relating to civil status. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the Civil Registry, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto. The entries which may be cancelled or corrected are specifically enumerated. While "birth" is mentioned as one of the entries that may be corrected or cancelled, this includes only such particulars as are attendant to birth. Other details, such as nationality or citizenship are not included. Rule 108 also covers citizenship but only as regards its election, loss or recovery. But this certainly has no relevance to the instant petition, which, as hitherto stated, seeks a judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship.

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VDA. DE CASTRO v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. L-28520. 17 January 1985

Facts:Saturnina V. Vda. de Castro filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition praying that

an order be issued "declaring that Ramon V. Castro, George F. Castro and Ramon George Castro, Jr., to be the names of one and the same person, namely that of Ramon V. Castro and directing the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila to make the necessary correction in the records of the Civil Registry changing the name of George F. Castro to Ramon V. Castro." Saturnina V. Vda. de Castro in her petition alleged that her son Ramon V. Castro was born on August 31, 1946 at St. Luke's Hospital; that said Ramon V. Castro is also known as Ramon George Castro, Jr. in the baptismal certificate and George F. Castro in the birth certificate; that Ramon V. Castro is her child's true and lawful name since childhood affixing said name in all transactions both in private and official documents; and that confusion arose when in choosing the name to be given to Ramon V. Castro upon his birth three names were proposed, namely: Ramon V. Castro, Ramon George Castro, Jr. and George F. Castro, the third name being erroneously recorded in the Civil Registry of Manila. The trial court granted the petition. Hence an appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the correction prayed for is "correction of entries in the civil registry

contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil Code refers to clerical mistakes. Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that the decision must be reversed. It has been the consistent ruling of the Court "that substantial alterations, such as those affecting the status and citizenship of a person in the Civil Registry Records, can not be ordered by the court unless first threshed out in an 'appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented' and that the summary proceedings under Article 412 of the Civil Code only justify an order to correct innocuous or clerical errors, such as misspellings and the like, errors that are visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding. Article 412 of the New Civil Code contemplates mere corrections of mistakes that are clerical in nature, like misspelled names or occupations of the parents, etc., but not those which may affect the civil status, or the nationality or citizenship of the persons involved, for in such cases it is necessary to file the proper action wherein not only the State but also an the parties concerned should be made parties defendants.

In the case at bar, where it is admitted that the name placed in the certificates of birth is not the name of a different person but the alias name of the petitioner himself and the name of the child was her real name, so that it cannot be contended that a mistake has been committed in giving the information to the local civil registry, while the changes sought for may affect the status of the petitioner or the paternity and filiation of his children, it is held that the lower court erred in granting the petition under Article 412 of the New Civil Code. Indeed, the mistake in the case at bar is not the mistake or error contemplated under Article 412 of the New Civil Code which justifies the correction of the birth certificate.

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GO v. MUNICIPALITY OF MALABON RIZALG.R. No. L-29544. 31 May 1971

Facts:Appellants filed a petition Special Proceeding No. 195 pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rule of

Court, in relation to Art. 412 and Art. 413 of the Civil Code. Appellants alleged that they, as well as Anita, Rosalinda, Mercedes and Alberto, all surnamed Go, are the children of Jesus Go, a Chinese citizen, and Cristeta Miranda, a Filipino citizen. Their parents were both single when they began to live together as husband and wife, without the benefit of marriage.

The following errors were committed in their birth certificates, as regards their family name, citizenship and legitimacy, and the number of children born of their mother, namely: a.) Benito Go should named Benito Miranda, and his citizenship should be "Filipino," instead of "Chinese"; b.) Juanito Go should be named Juanito Miranda; his citizenship should be "Filipino," instead of "Chinese"; and his filiation should be "illegitimate," instead of "legitimate";

After appropriate proceedings, the lower court issued the appealed order, denying the petition, upon the ground that the same embraces, not merely clerical errors, but "controversial matters" concerning "citizenship and civil status," not in this summary proceeding, under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Hence, this appeal by Benito and Juanito Go.

Issue:Whether or not ART. 412 of the Civil Code shall apply in the correction of the appellants name

and citizenship in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Held:It is reiterated the that only "clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature," not those

"involving civil status, nationality or citizenship, which are substantial and or controversial," may be corrected under the provisions of said Art. 412 of the Civil Code, in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court.

For changes involving the civil status or nationality, it is necessary to file a proper suit wherein not only the State, but also all parties concerned and affected should be made parties defendants or respondents, and evidence should be submitted, either to support the allegations Then and only then may the change or changes be made in the entry in a civil register that will affect or even determine conclusively the citizenship or nationality of a person therein involved. 2

Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, governing the "cancellation of correction of entries in the Civil Registry," was promulgated precisely to permit corrections other than those authorized in said provision of the Civil Code. The pretense is manifestly untenable. Said Rule 108 did not and cannot expand, enlarge or broaden the class of corrections permitted by the Civil Code, for the simple reason that this would entail an amendment of a substantive law, which is beyond the authority of the Supreme Court.

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. DELA CRUZG.R. No. L-34079. 2 November 1982

Facts:Petitioner Felicisima Velarde and Lee Tieng, had been living together as common-law spouses

and without benefit of marriage since June, 1952 up to the filing of the petition.She filed with the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Special Proceedings No. 1115 for

correction of certain entries in the birth certificates of her minor children in the Civil Registry of births for Naga City. The certificates of birth of petitioner's children: Cynthia, Reynaldo, Roger, Rolando and Romeo recorded as "married" instead of "single" and all said children were likewise recorded as "legitimate" and "Chinese" citizens; and the maternal surname was erroneously spelled "Olbila" and "Orbita"in the birth certificates of her two sons Roger Lee and Rolando Lee, respectively, when it should have been "Orbita";

The Republic of the Philippines filed its opposition to the petition, alleging that the changes in the civil registry sought therein are not merely clerical, but vital and substantial, and for this reason, they cannot be made in a summary and non-adversary proceeding under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Petitioner filed her reply to the Republic's Opposition, contending that the petition filed by her under Rue 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is an adversary proceedings for the corrections in the civil registry sought in her petition.

After hearing, the lower court issued a Decree directing the correction of the entries in the Civil Registry of Birth for Naga City "in accordance with the prayer embodied in the petition

The oppositor Republic of the Philippines appealed this Honorable Court by a petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:Whether or not the lower court erred in ordering corrections in the Civil Registry affecting the

civil status, filiation and citizenship of the persons involved under the Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Held:In line with the numerous decisions of this Court on the matter of cancellation or correction of

entries in the Civil Registry, We must reverse the judgment under review except insofar as it allowed (a) the change of the middle name of the mother from "Olbila" to "Olbita" in the birth certificate of Roger Lee .

The law on the matter of said cancellation or correction is Article 412 of the New Civil Code which provides: "No entry in the civil registry shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial order." This legal provision has been invariably interpreted since 1954 as an authority for the Court to direct the correction of mistakes that are clerical in nature, i.e. those harmless and innocuous changes, such as, correction of a name that is clearly misspelled, occupation of the parents, etc. 10 or those that are visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding or "an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing." 11 It does not extend to important controversial matters, such as those which affect the civil status or the nationality or citizenship of the persons involved.

On the other hand, Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is the procedural law on the matter and as such is limited solely to the implementation of Article 412.

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WING v. ABUBAKARG.R.No. L-25168. 31 January 1981

Facts:Kumala Sal Wing filed a petition for the correction in the certificate of live birth of minor Bio

Heong Wing by changing the letter "M" appearing on the space for sex 'F' to mean female which is the true sex of said minor child.

The fact that Bio Heong, the daughter of the petitioner with Wing Siong, is a female child and not a male child is supported by corroborative oral testimonies, besides documents, which this Court holds as credible.The court issued a judgment ordering the Civil Registrar of Jolo, Sulu, Philippines, to make the necessary correction in the certificate of live birth of minor Bio Heong Wing by changing the letter "M" appearing on the space for sex 'F' to mean female which is the true sex of said minor child.

It was further stated in the courts order that an appropriate proceeding was conducted in the hearing of the petition whereby all parties concerned, including the government and its agencies, whose interest may be affected were either heard or given their opportunity to oppose said petition. Considering the publication made, this petition is not summary in nature, but it is undoubtedly an appropriate proceeding, where the matter proved was threshed out in a regular trial on the merits.

A reversal of a lower court decision is sought by appellant Civil Registrar on the allegation that a grave procedural defect was committed.It is contended that to justify the correction of such an entry in the Civil registry, there must be an adversary proceeding, not one summary in nature.

Issue:Whether or not the court committed an error when it ordered the correction of the entries.

Held:If the purpose of the petition is merely to correct a clerical error then the court may issue an order

in order that the error or mistake may be corrected. It refers to a substantial change, which affects the status or citizenship of a party, the matter should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issue involved.

In the case of petitioner herein, however, the proceedings were not summary, considering the publication of the petition made by order of the court in order to give notice to any person that might be interested, including direct service on the Solicitor General himself. The appealed decision is affirmed.

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ROSALES v. CASTILLO ROSALESG.R. No. L-31712. 28 September 1984

Facts:Appellant filed a petition for the correction and or cancellation of entries in the Civil Registrar

before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, alleging that his wife respondent Asuncion Z. Castillo Rosales had illicit adulterous relationship with one Vidal Rivera.

As a result of such illicit relationship, four children were born. There are errors in the records of birth of the two (2) minors, Cecilia Rosales and Emmanuel C. Rosales.

The name of the father listed in their records of birth is that of appellant Ernesto Rosales and not that of respondent-appellee Vidal Rivera since the two minors are not his legitimate children but are the illegitimate children of the respondents-appellees Vidal Rivera and Asuncion Castillo Rosales.

Appellant prayed that the Court declared the four 4 respondent children as not the children of the petitioner and the Court order the Civil Registrar of Cebu City to correct the birth records of defendants children Cecilia and Emmanuel so that the surname Rosales shall no longer be used by them.

Respondent-appellee Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City filed a motion to dismiss. It argued that the correction sought by the appellant is untenable under Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 since said correction is not clerical but substantial, involving as it does the paternity and filiation of the four children.

The court a quo issued an order dismissing petitioner-appellant's petition.

Issue:Whether or not the trial court erred in holding that the errors sought to be corrected being

substantial should not be threshed out in the instant petition under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court. Held:

The changes or corrections authorized under said Article 412, which envisions a summary procedure therefor, relate only to harmless and innocuous alterations such as misspellings or errors that are visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding.

Changes in the citizenship of a person or in his status from legitimate to illegitimate or from married to not married are substantial as well as controversial, which can only be established in an appropriate adversary proceeding as a remedy for the adjudication of real and justiciable controversies involving actual conflict of rights the final determination of which depends upon the resolution of the issues of nationality, paternity, filiation or legitimacy of the marital status for which existing substantive and procedural laws as well as other rules of court amply provide.

From the time the New Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950 until the promulgation of the Revised Rules of Court on January 1, 1964, there was no law nor rule of court prescribing the procedure to secure judicial authorization to effect the desired innocuous rectifications or alterations in the Civil register pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court now provides for such a procedure which should be limited solely to the implementation of Article 412, the substantive law on the matter of correcting entries in the civil register.

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SISON v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. L-58087. 27 December 1982

Facts:Petitioners, assisted by their grandmother, Gertrudes Reyes, as they were minors, submitted a

Petition to respondent Court for correction of their surnames from "de la Cruz", as entered in their respective Birth Certificates, to "Sison".

The Trial Court issued an Order setting the case for hearing on April 6, 1979 and citing all interested persons to show cause, if any, why the petition should not be granted. Copy of this Order was served on the Civil Registrar and on the Solicitor General.

The Order was duly published in the Evening Express, a newspaper of general circulation, once a week for three consecutive weeks as required by the same Order.

The State, through the Solicitor General, filed an Opposition alleging that the corrections requested were substantial or controversial in nature and that the summary procedure for correction of entry in the Civil Registry under Art. 412 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is confined to mere clerical errors.

The Trial Court promulgated a Decision denying the Petition on the grounds raised in the Government's opposition. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was similarly denied. Hence, the instant recourse.

Issue:Whether or not the proceeding for the correction of the entries is summary in nature.

Held:The only way by which a name can be changed legally is by appropriate proceeding under Rule

103; that is, through a petition for Change of Name, since a person's legal name is what appears in the civil register, not the name by which he was baptized or by which he has been known in the community.

In this case, the proceedings below were not summary pursuant to the rulings in the Matias case and in the more recent one of Kumala Salim Wing vs. Ahmad Abubakar. The proceedings were not summary, considering the publication of the petition made by order of the court in order to give notice to any person that might be interested, including direct service on the Solicitor General himself.

In his "Manifestation/Motion in Lieu of Respondents' Brief", the Solicitor General has departed from his posture below in the light of the Kumala Salim Wing case, and has recommended that the Decision appealed from be reversed. The recommendation is well taken.WHEREFORE, the Decision of respondent Judge, dated March 31, 1980, is hereby set aside, and another one rendered granting the prayer for the change of petitioners' surname entered as "de la Cruz" in their respective records of birth with the Civil Registrar of San Juan, to "Sison", which is their true surname

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WONG v. REPUBLIC et.al.G.R. No. L-29376. 30 July 1982

Facts: Mariano Wong, in his own behalf and as guardian of his minor children, namely, Mariano, Jr.,

Audrey and Richardson, all surnamed Wong, filed in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, a verified petition for the correction of their nationality from "Filipino" to "Chinese" in the Iloilo City Civil Registrar pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code.

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court issued an order directing the publication of the petition and the date of the hearing thereof in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof duly served on the City Fiscal of Iloilo City, for and in behalf of the Solicitor General, and the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.

At the hearing, petitioner testified that he is a Chinese citizen as shown by his Alien Certificate of Registration; that he and his wife Ma. Sylvia Gustilo, a Filipina, were married before the Archbishop of Jaro, Iloilo, on April 25, 1959; that in his marriage contract, his citizenship was erroneously indicated as "Filipino" instead of "Chinese"; that this mistake was committed by his father who undertook the preparation of the necessary documents relating to his marriage.

The said error was committed without petitioner's knowledge or consent; and that he became aware of these mistakes only when he asked for certified copies of the birth certificates of his children in connection with his petition for naturalization.

The lower court held that the "errors were committed in good faith and without any bad faith or malicious intent" and, consequently, granted the petition. Hence, this appeal by the State.

Issue:Whether or not the court committed an error when it allowed the correction of the entries on the

basis of good faith.

Held:Errors involving substantial and controversial matters such as those which affect the civil status

or the nationality or citizenship of persons cannot be corrected under said summary proceedings, but should be threshed out in an appropriate action wherein the State as well as persons who may be affected by the change should be notified or represented.

In the instant case, the mistakes sought to be corrected cannot be categorized as mere clerical errors, for they involve controversial matter affecting the citizenship not only of petitioner Mariano Wong, but of his minor children as well.

Petitioner emphasizes that he merely seeks the change of his nationality from "Filipino" to "Chinese." To this We say, if this Court were to allow the desired correction in a proceeding that is purely summary in nature, then the Court must also have to yield, despite the existence of the legal obstacle aforestated, to a similar petition in the reverse, i.e., from "Chinese" to "Filipino". The abuses that can be committed under such a procedure need not here be mentioned.

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF DAVAOG.R. No. L-31748. 20 August 1979

Facts:Samuel Yu, represented by his mother and natural guardian, filed in the Court of First Instance of

Davao Oriental, a petition for correction of registrationIn the registration of the birth of the Petitioner in the Local Civil Registry of the Municipality of

Baganga, Province of Davao, his nationality or citizenship was erroneously recorded as "Chinese" and his status as "legitimate" child of Petitioner's natural guardian and respondent Yu Se Guan

The Court a quo issued an order on April 30, 1968 setting the hearing of the case. In compliance with this order, petitioner Yu Caused the same to be published.

On the date of the hearing, petitioner Yu, through counsel, presented Valerio P. Diaz, the Local Civil Registrar of Baganga, Davao Oriental, who testified on the absence of the record of marriage of Cresencia B. Bual and Yu Se Guan in the registry book of marriages under his custody. Likewise, he presented both of his parents who testified to the fact that they are not legally married.

On the basis of these evidence which the lower court found to have been uncontroverted, the petition was granted. Hence, this instant petition for review on certiorari of the Solicitor General assigning errors.

Issue:Whether or not the lower court erred in granting the petition despite the fact that the change of

citizenship and status applied for is not within the purview of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Held:Deeply entrenched and unswervingly followed in this jurisdiction is the rule that changes in the

citizenship of a person or in his status from legitimate to illegitimate are substantial as well as controversial and may not therefore be changed pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. Neither may these changes be effected under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court which only prescribes the judicial procedure on the matter and which, moreover, limits the entries subject to cancellation or correction to those enumerated in Section 2 thereof.

Article 412 of the New Civil Code does not extend to important controversial matters, such as those which affect the civil status or the nationality or citizenship of the persons involved. Such matters should be threshed out in appropriate actions wherein not only the State but also all persons who may be affected by such change should be notified or represented.

Rule 108 is the procedural law on the matter of cancellation or correction of entries in the civil register. As such, it cannot be distinct and separable from Article 412 of the New Civil Code. Much less can it enlarge the judicial power under said substantive law. Further, Rule 108 also covers citizenship but only as regards its election, loss or recovery. But this certainly has no relevance to the instant petition, which, as hitherto stated, seeks a judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship.

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TAN v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. L-27735. 26 December 1984

Facts:Lamberto Tan filed with the then Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for correction of

entry in his certificate of birth alleging that:on registering his birth, said Saturnina Luarca, believing that petitioner's father was a Chinese citizen so gave out said information as a consequence of which it now appears in the records of the Local Civil Registry and on petitioner's Birth Certificate that he is a Chinese citizen as his father is also a Chinese citizen

The trial court issued an Order setting the case for hearing pursuant to Section 4, Rule 108 of the New Rules of Court and directing the publication.

The Solicitor General registered his opposition on the ground that the correction prayed for is not a correction of a clerical mistake which may be done under Article 412 of the Civil Code in relation to the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.REPLY to said opposition, counsel for petitioner contends that his client does not ask the court to declare him a Filipino for he is already a Filipino; and that he merely asks for the correction of an erroneous entry in his birth certificate.

The court a quo denied the petition and dismissed the case ruling that "it has no authority under Article 412 of the Civil Code, upon which the present petition is based, to order the correction of the same, which is not a mere clerical error.Instant appeal was made by way of certiorari contending that the trial court erred in ordering said judgment.

Issue:Whether or not the court erred in holding that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is not applicable in

the case at bar.

Held:Petitioner's appeal is without merit. Consequently, the decision sought to be reviewed must be

affirmed. There can be no question that the alleged errors sought to be corrected in the instant case are not merely clinical, harmless or innocuous in nature. Rather, they are substantial and/or controversial since they involve a change of citizenship. Correction therefore cannot be effected in a summary proceeding but through an appropriate action where all the parties adversely affected thereby must be notified or represented.

While admitting that the correction sought and prayed for is substantial and/or controversial, appellant however contends that the procedure undertaken by him is not summary in character but a contentious one. And this is so because his petition was filed not merely pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code but under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court thereby observing all the formalities prescribed and procedure laid down by the said Rule.Appellant's aforesaid submission fails to persuade the court. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is merely an implementing rule of procedure on matters dealt with and covered by Article 412 of the Civil Code and this has been made succinctly clear in the case of Chua vs. Republic.

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TOLENTINO v. PARASG.R. No. L-43905. 30 May 1983

Facts:Amado Tolentino had contracted a second marriage with private respondent herein, Maria

Clemente, while his marriage with petitioner, Serafia G. Tolentino, celebrated on July 31, 1943, was still subsisting. His death certificate carried the entry "Name of Surviving Spouse — Maria Clemente.

In Special Proceedings No. 1587-M for Correction of Entry, petitioner sought to correct the name of the surviving spouse in the death certificate from "Maria Clemente" to "Serafia G. Tolentino", her name. The lower Court dismissed the petition "for lack of the proper requisites under the law" and indicated the need for a more detailed proceeding,

Conformably thereto, petitioner filed the case below against private respondent and the Local Civil Registrar of Paombong, Bulacan, for her declaration as the lawful surviving spouse, and the correction of the death certificate of Amado.

In an Order, dated October 21, 1976, respondent Court, upon private respondent's instance, dismissed the case, stating: the Court has not acquired proper jurisdiction because as prescribed under Art. 108, read together with Art. 412 of the Civil Code — publication is needed in a case like this, and up to now, there has been no such publication.

Thus, petitioner's present recourse mainly challenging the grounds relied upon by respondent Court in ordering dismissal.

Issue: Whether or not the court did not acquire jurisdiction by reason of lack of publication as

prescribed in Rule 108.

Held:First, for the remedy. Although petitioner's ultimate objective is the correction of entry

contemplated in Article 412 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, she initially seeks a judicial declaration that she is the lawful surviving spouse of the deceased, Amado, in order to lay the basis for the correction of the entry in the death certificate of said deceased.

The suit below is a proper remedy. It is of an adversary character as contrasted to a mere summary proceeding. A claim of right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it.

Private respondent, as the individual most affected; is a party defendant, and has appeared to contest the petition and defend her interests. The Local Civil Registrar is also a party defendant.

The publication required by the Court below pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is not absolutely necessary for no other parties are involved. After all, publication is required to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. Besides, even assuming that this is a proceeding under Rule 108, it was the Court that was caned upon to order the publication but it did not. in the ultimate analysis, Courts are not concerned so much with the form of actions as with their substance.

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MACLI-INGG.R. No. L-57211. 18 March 1985

Facts:Private respondents sought to correct the entries in the respective Registries of Birth of Oscar Sy

and Jose Sy. The entry sought to be corrected in the birth record of Oscar Sy is the name of his father from "Esteban Sy" to "Sy Piao" upon the claim that "Esteban" is only his father's nickname. And as to the birth record of Jose Sy, it is prayed that the name "Joe" therein be corrected to read "Jose".

Petitioner opposed the corrections requested on the ground that the remedy availed of was improper considering that the changes sought are substantial in nature.

After a full-dress hearing, respondent Court authorized the corrections prayed for, hence, this appeal in so far as the correction of the entry in the record of birth of Oscar Sy is concerned. Thus, the correction ordered entered in the birth record of Jose Sy has become final and executory.

The principal ground relied upon in this appeal is that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court upon which private respondents anchor their Petition is applicable only to changes contemplated in Article 412 of the Civil Code, which are clerical or innocuous errors, or to corrections that are not controversial and are supported by indubitable evidence.

Issues:1.Whether or not the evidence presented is enough to warrant correction of entries.2.Whether or not there was a substantial compliance with the procedure.

Held:It is true that the change from Esteban Sy to Sy Piao would necessarily affect the Identity of the

father. In that sense, it can be said to be substantial. However, we find indubitable evidence to support the correction prayed for.We find no reason to doubt that "Sy Piao" and "Esteban Sy" are one and the same person.

The proceedings below, although filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, were not summary. The Petition was published by order of the lower Court once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in accordance with law. The Solicitor General was served with copy of the Petition as well as with notices of hearings. He filed his Opposition to the Petition. The Local Civil Registrar of the City of Baguio was likewise duly served with copy of the Petition. A Fiscal was always in attendance at the hearings in representation of the Solicitor General. He participated actively in the proceedings, particularly, in the cross-examination of witnesses.

And, notwithstanding that all interested persons were cited to appear to show cause why the petition should not be granted, no one appeared to oppose except the State through the Solicitor General. But neither did the State present evidence in support of its Opposition.

In sum, no doubt has been cast on the credibility of private respondents' allegations nor upon the evidence adduced by them. Noteworthy also is the fact that neither the citizenship, paternity, filiation, or status of Oscar and Jose, nor that of their father is in issue.

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VALENCIAG.R. No. L-32181. 5 March 1986

Facts:Leonor Valencia filed a petition for cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth of Bernardo

Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu. Pursuant to the order of the trial court dated February 4, 1970, the said petition was published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in the, Cebu Advocate, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Cebu. Notice thereof was duly served on the Solicitor General. the Local Civil Registrar and Go Eng.

The order likewise set the case for hearing and directed the local civil registrar and the other respondents or any person claiming any interest under the entries whose corrections were sought, to file their opposition to the said petition. An opposition to the petition was consequently filed by the Republic on February 26, 1970. Thereafter a full blown trial followed with respondent Leonor Valencia testifying and presenting her documentary evidence in support of her petition. The Republic on the other hand cross-examined respondent Leonor Valencia

The trial court issued a judgement granting the instant petition and ordering the Local Civil Registrar of the City of Cebu to make the necessary cancellation and/or correction on the following entries:

Oppositor-appellant Republic of the Philippines appealed by way of this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in ordering the correction of the Petitioners citizenship and

civil status and also that of he minor children.

Held:It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical

errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature.

However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. As a matter of fact, the opposition of the Solicitor General dated February 20, 1970 while questioning the use of Article 412 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court admits that "the entries sought to be corrected should be threshed out in an appropriate proceeding.

If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as "summary". There can be no doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to be cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversary proceedings.

To follow the petitioner's argument that Rule 108 is not an appropriate proceeding without in any way intimating what is the correct proceeding or if such a proceeding exists at all, would result in manifest injustice.

It would be a denial of substantive justice if two children proved by the facts to be Philippine citizens, and whose five sisters and brother born of the same mother and father enjoy all the rights of

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citizens, are denied the same rights on the simple argument that the "correct procedure" not specified or even intimated has not been followed.

We are, therefore, constrained to deny the petition.

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CHIAO BEN LIM v. ZOSAG.R. No. L-40252. 29 December 1986

Facts:Respondent judge dismissed a petition for the correction of an allegedly wrong entry in the birth

records of Kim Joseph describing him as a Chinese national instead of a Filipino citizen. The petitioner had offered to prove the error through several pieces of evidence, among them an

earlier birth certificate of Kim Joseph describing him as a Filipino citizen, the birth certificates of his seven brothers and sisters all describing them as Filipinos, and a decision of the Court of Appeals recognizing their grandfather as a Filipino citizen.

On opposition by the local civil registrar of Cebu, however, the respondent judge dismissed the petition and sustained the contention that only clerical errors were allowed to be corrected in the summary proceedings authorized under Article 412 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Substantial issues like citizenship were not covered. In effect, it was held the petition was for a judicial declaration of citizenship, which was not allowed under existing rules.

Issue: Whether or not the court is correct in declaring that the petition for the correction of entries is

summary in nature, hence it should be dismissed.

Held:If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or

cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as “summary”.There can be no doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to be cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversary proceedings.

We are of the opinion that the petition filed by the respondent in the lower court by way of a special proceeding for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register with the requisite notice and publication and the recorded proceedings that actually took place thereafter could very well be regarded as that proper suit or appropriate action.

The Valencia ruling has in effect adopted the above-stated views insofar as it now allows changes in the birth entry regarding a person’s citizenship as long as adversary proceedings are held. Where such a change is ordered, the Court will not be establishing a substantive right but only correcting or rectifying an erroneous entry in the civil registry as authorized by law. In short, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides only the procedure or mechanism for the proper enforcement of the substantive law embodied in Article 412 of the Civil Code and so does not violate the Constitution. We note that in the case at bar the petition was dismissed outright without a trial being held, on the justification that it was not permitted. In the light of the Valencia ruling, the Orders of the respondent judge must now be reversed, to give way to the appropriate proceedings necessary to the resolution of the substantial issue raised by the petitioner.

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FLOJOG.R. No. L-49703. 31 July 1987

Facts:Private respondent Inocencio P. Carag filed a verified petition with the Court of First Instance of

Cagayan, docketed therein as Sp. Proc. No. II-401, to correct an entry in his register of birth wherein he was erroneously registered as a "Chinese" instead of a Filipino citizen.

After due notice to the Solicitor General and publication of the notice of hearing, dated 22 August 1978, in the Cagayan Valley Weekly Journal, the parties were heard.Accordingly the respondent Judge found, and so ruled, that Inocencio P. Carag is a Filipino citizen so that the necessary correction should be made in his record of birth.1

The Republic of the Philippines now questions the Order on the ground that it is "contrary to the well-settled doctrine that the only mistakes in the entries in the Civil Register which can be corrected under Art. 412 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court are those that are merely clerical in nature and not those which affect the civil status or citizenship of the person involved.

Issue:Whether or not rhe court order is contrary to the well settled doctrine that only mistakes in the

entries in the Civil Register which can be corrected under Art. 412 of the Civil Code and Rule 108.

Held:The contention is without merit. While the Court has, indeed, previously ruled that the changes or

corrections authorized under Art. 412 of the Civil Code, which envisions a summary procedure, relate only to harmless and innocuous alterations, such as misspellings or errors that are visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding and that changes in the citizenship of a person or his civil status are substantial as well as controversial, which can only be established in appropriate adversary proceedings, the rule has been relaxed. In Republic vs. Valencia5 the Court said:

However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.

In view of the foregoing, the respondent judge had jurisdiction to order the correction of the subject defective entry in the civil register.

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http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1987/jul1987/gr_l-49703_1987.html#fnt5

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BAUTISTAG.R. No. L-35316. 26 October 1987

Facts:Private respondent Imelda Mangabat Sorensen sought to correct and change the word "American"

into the word "Danish" in the birth certificate of her minor son, Raymund Mangabat Sorensen to reflect the true nationality of Bo Huage Sorensen, her husband and the father of said minor child.

Upon compliance with the jurisdictional requirements set forth in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry, the petition was set for hearing.

Petitioner Imelda Mangabat Sorensen in substance testified that she is married to Bo Huage Sorensen, a Danish citizen.Bo Huage Sorensen testified that he was born of a Danish father, on April 22, 1944, at Vejle Denmark, and presented a certification issued by the Royal Danish Consulate of Manila

The Republic of the Philippines opposed the aforesaid petition and moved for the dismissal on the ground that a correction of entry in the Civil Registry is allowed only when the same refers to mere clerical errors or mistakes, but not to substantial changes affecting the civil status, nationality or citizenship of the person concerned.

Thereafter, the court a quo opposed rendered the assailed decision ordering the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City as prayed for to make the necessary corrections in the entry of birth of minor Raymund Mangabat Sorensen.

Upon denial of its motion for reconsideration, oppositor Republic of the Philippines appealed to this Court

Issue:Whether or not the challenged decision which involves the question of citizenship is a matter

which can legally be treated under the provision of Article 412 of the Civil Code, in conjunction with Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Held:We are constrained to deny the instant petition for review. The issue now before Us has been

resolved in the well-written and exhaustive ponencia in Republic vs. Valencia 4 wherein the Court, speaking through Justice Gutierrez, Jr., held in effect that proceedings under Article 412 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court may either be summary or adversary in nature.

In the case of Republic vs. Valencia, the court postulated that the appropriate remedy may well be a petition filed by way of special proceeding for the cancellation and/or correction of substantial entries in the civil register with the requisite parties, notices, publications and the proceedings to be taken thereafter pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Rule 108 because then the proceedings will be adversary in character.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby denied for lack of merit and the decision of the court a quo in Special Proceedings No. 2191-P is affirmed.

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ELEOSIDA v.LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITYG.R. No. 130277. 9 May 2002

Facts:

Ma. Lourdes Eleosida filed a petition before the RTC-QC seeking to correct the following entries in the birth certificate of her son, Charles Christian: first, the surname "Borbon" should be changed to "Eleosida;" second, the date of the parents' wedding should be left blank; and third, the informant's name should be "Ma. Lourdes B. Eleosida," instead of "Ma. Lourdes E. Borbon." In support of her petition, petitioner alleged that she gave birth to her son out of wedlock; that she and the boy's father, Carlos Borbon, were never married; and that the child is therefore illegitimate and should follow the mother's surname.

The trial court motu proprio dismissed the petition for lack of merit stating that it is an established jurisprudence that, only CLERICAL ERRORS OF A HARMLESS AND INNOCUOUS NATURE like: misspelled name, occupation of the parents, etc., may be the subject of a judicial order (Article 412 of NCC), authorizing changes or corrections and: NOT as may affect the CIVIL STATUS, NATIONALITY OR CITIZENSHIP OF THE PERSONS INVOLVED, as it is what the petition appears.

Petitioner fled the instant petition for review. Also, the OSG submitted comment that even substantial errors in the civil registry may be corrected provided that the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. Thus it argued that even if the petition seeks the correction and eventual change in the civil status of Charles Christian, the same can be ordered by the court as long as all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified and represented. Held:

Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings under Rule 108 may either be summary or adversary in nature. If the correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner are not merely clerical or harmless errors but substantial ones as they would affect the status of the marriage between petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as well as the legitimacy of their son, Charles Christian. Changes of such nature, however, are now allowed under Rule 108 in accordance with our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia provided that the appropriate procedural requirements are complied with. Petition have satisfy all the requirements of Rule 108 to make it an adversary proceeding. It was therefore an error for the trial court to dismiss the petition motu proprio without allowing the petitioner to present evidence to support her petition and all the other persons who have an interest over the matter to oppose the same.

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LEE v. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 118387. 11 October 2001

Facts:

This is a story of two (2) sets of children sired by one and the same man but begotten of two (2) different mothers. One set, the private respondents herein, are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and his lawful wife, Keh Shiok Cheng. The other set, the petitioners herein, are allegedly children of Lee Tek Sheng and his concubine, Tiu Chuan. Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the false and erroneous entries in all pertinent records of birth of petitioners by deleting and/or canceling therein the name of "Keh Shiok Cheng" as their mother, and by substituting the same with the name "Tiu Chuan", who is allegedly the petitioners' true birth mother.

On record, Tiu Chuan became Lee Tek Sheng's mistress. As a result of their illicit relations, Tiu Chuan gave birth to petitioners. Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents, every time Tiu Chuan gave birth to each of the petitioners, their common father, Lee Tek Sheng, falsified the entries in the records of birth of petitioners by making it appear that petitioners' mother was Keh Shiok Cheng. The tides turned after Keh Shiok Cheng's demise on May 9, 1989. Lee Tek Sheng insisted that the names of all his children, including those of petitioners', be included in the obituary notice of Keh Shiok Cheng's death that was to be published in the newspapers. It was this seemingly irrational act that piqued private respondents' curiosity, if not suspicion.

Acting on their suspicion, the private respondents requested the NBI to conduct an investigation into the matter. After investigation and verification of all pertinent records, the NBI prepared a report that pointed out, among others, the false entries in the records of birth of petitioners. In view of the foregoing facts, the NBI concluded that in conclusion, as per Chinese General Hospital Patients Records, it is very obvious that the mother of these 8 children is certainly not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but a much younger woman, most probably TIU CHUAN. Upon further evaluation and analysis by these Agents, LEE TEK SHENG, is in a quandary in fixing the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG possibly to conform with his grand design of making his 8 children as their own legitimate children, consequently elevating the status of his 2nd family and secure their future. The doctor lamented that this complaint would not have been necessary had not the father and his 2nd family kept on insisting that the 8 children are the legitimate children of KEH SHIOK CHENG.

It was this report that prompted private respondents to file the petitions for cancellation and/or correction of entries in petitioners' records of birth with the lower courts.The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss both petitions on the grounds that: (1) Resort to Rule 108 is improper where the ultimate objective is to assail the legitimacy and filiation of petitioners; Issue:

Whether or not Rule 108 can be applied to change/correct substantial rights.

Held:While the petitioners contend that in making the proceedings adversarial does not give trial

courts the license to go beyond the ambit of Rule 108 which is limited to those corrections contemplated by Article 412 of the New Civil Code or mere clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature. The petitioners point to the jurisprudence on prohibiting the extension of the application of Rule 108 beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections. Petitioners contend that as held in Go, et al. vs. Civil Registrar, allowing substantial changes under Rule 108 would render the said rule unconstitutional as the same would have the effect of increasing or modifying substantive rights. However, far from petitioners' theory, this Court's ruling in Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic does not exclude recourse to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to effect substantial changes or corrections in entries of the civil register. The only requisite is that the proceedings under Rule 108 be an appropriate adversary proceeding if it

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shall affect substantial rights as contra-distinguished from a summary proceeding if merely clerical or typo errors.

Moreover, clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register are now to be corrected and changed without need of a judicial order and by the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general. The obvious effect is to remove from the ambit of Rule 108 the correction or changing of such errors in entries of the civil register. Hence, what is left for the scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil register.

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DAIS v. GARDUNOG.R. No. L-25523. 29 July 1926

Facts:

Altavas filed a motion in the intestate proceedings of Serapion Dais, asking that the administrator of the estate be ordered to pay him the sum of P5,000 in settlement of his fees for legal services rendered and to be rendered in the said intestate proceedings. The court, after hearing ordered the same.

Petitioners filed and gave notice of their intention to appeal from that order as well as from that of November 28th, requesting at the same time that the court fix the amount of the appeal bond.

This motion was denied, the court refusing to fix the appeal bond and to admit the appeal interposed by the petitioners, on the ground that the orders merely interlocutory and not appealable.Hence, the present case.

In the meantime, the parcels designated in the orders from which the petitioners sought to appeal were, without further notice to said petitioners, sold by private sale for P4,000 and on the following day the proceeds of the sale were paid over to the respondent Altavas, who thereupon on May 17th moved the dismissal of the present proceedings on the ground that, in view of the sale of the property and the payment made to him, the matters at issue had become moot questions.

The granting of this motion is opposed by the petitioners on the ground that if it is decided that the payment to the respondent Altavas of the proceeds of the sale was improvidently made, the money may be ordered refunded. This point is well taken and the motion for a dismissal of the present proceedings must therefore be denied. Issue:

The principal question to be determined, whether the appeal from the orders are to be considered as merely interlocutory, and if they were not interlocutory, the appeal must be admitted. Held:

An interlocutory order is one which does not of itself definitely settle or conclude any of the rights of the parties to the action. Applying this test it is clear that the orders here in question were not of that kind; if carried out they would operate to divest the estate of important property rights and amount to a final determination of these rights.

The court below may possibly have been misled by the provision in section 123 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that no ruling, order or judgment shall "be the subject of appeal to the Supreme Court until final judgment is rendered for one party or the other." This provision applies to ordinary civil action, but that it cannot be accepted literally in regard to probate proceedings, is best shown by the extensive provisions for special appeals contained in sections 773 to 783 of the same Code."

For the reasons stated, the petition for a writ of mandamus is granted, and it is ordered that the respondent judge fix the amount of the bond for the petitioners' appeal in the intestate proceedings of the deceased Serapion Dais, Civil Case No. 988 of the Court of First Instance of Capiz, and that upon filing and approval of such bond, said appeal be admitted.

It is further ordered that the respondent Jose Altavas turn over to the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Capiz the sum of P4,000, the amount of the proceeds of the sale of the real property above mentioned and paid to him by the administrator on February 16, 1926, said sum to be held in deposit by said clerk until the termination of the litigation aforementioned.

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