Specpro Full Cases
-
Upload
espressoblue -
Category
Documents
-
view
244 -
download
0
Transcript of Specpro Full Cases
-
7/29/2019 Specpro Full Cases
1/89
SPECPRO FULL CASES
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-32281 June 19, 1975
PEDRO ERMAC, and his children, ELENA, CARLOS,
ANTONIO, LUCIANO, HILARIO, INDALECIO and FRANCISCA,all surnamed ERMAC, petitioners,vs.CENON MEDELO and JUDGE HERNANDO PINEDA aspresiding judge of Branch II of the LANAO DEL NORTE Courtof First Instance, respondents.
Anthony Santos & Teddy S. Rodriguez for petitioners.
Irene D. Jurado for respondents.
BARREDO, J.:
Petition forcertiorarito set aside the order of respondent court ofJune 25, 1970, in its Special Proceedings No. 1517, approvingthe project of partition filed by private respondent, pursuant to theorder of the same court providing for summary settlement of theintestate estate of the deceased spouses Potenciano Ermac and
Anastacia Mariquit as well as of the order of July 15, 1970denying reconsideration of the first order.
The above-named spouses both died leaving as the only propertyto be inherited by their heirs a parcel of land, Lot 1327, Cad. 292,
covered by OCT No. RP-355 (262) of the Register of Deeds ofIligan City, with an assessed value of P590.00. Accordingly,herein respondent Cenon Medelo, one of the grandchildren of thesaid spouses, (being one of the children of their predeceaseddaughter Digna Ermac) filed a petition for summary settlement ofsaid estate. All requirements having been complied with, andthere being no opposition thereto, on January 21, 1970,respondent court issued an order granting the same, enumeratingall the heirs entitled to participate in the inheritance and orderingpetitioner to present the proper project of partition of the lotaforementioned. On February 2, 1970, however, petitioner Pedro
Ermac, one of the children of the deceased spouses, moved forreconsideration of the order of settlement, praying for theelimination of Lot 1327 from the estate on the ground that itbelongs to him and his wife. This motion was denied, the courtruling that the proper remedy is a separate suit. Accordingly,petitioner, together with his children, filed the correspondingaction, Civil Case No. 1564 of the Court of First Instance of Lanaodel Norte. And when upon submission of the project of partition,the respondent court approved the same over his objectionpredicated on the pendency of Civil Case No. 1564, petitionermoved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied. Hence,the present petition.
The sole question to be resolved here is whether or notrespondent court exceeded its jurisdiction or gravely abused itsdiscretion in approving the project of partition covering Lot No.1327 notwithstanding that it is being claimed by petitioners in aseparate civil action to be their property and not of the estate.Such being the case, the petition cannot prosper.
The policy of the law is to terminate proceedings for thesettlement of the estate of deceased persons with the least loss
-
7/29/2019 Specpro Full Cases
2/89
of time. This is specially true with small estates for which the rulesprovide precisely a summary procedure dispensing with theappointment of an administrator together with the other involvedand cumbersome steps ordinarily required in the determination ofthe assets of the deceased and the persons entitled to inhirit
therefrom and the payment of his obligations. Definitely, theprobate court is not the best forum for the resolution of adverseclaims of ownership of any property ostensibly belonging to thedecedent's estate. 1While there are settled exceptions to this ruleas applied to regular administration proceedings, 2it is not properto delay the summary settlement of a deceased person justbecause an heir or a third person claims that certain properties donot belong to the estate but to him. 3Such claim must beventilated in an independent action, and the probate court shouldproceed to the distribution of the estate, if there are no other legalobstacles to it, for after all, such distribution must always besubject to the results of the suit. For the protection of the claimantthe appropriate step is to have the proper annotation of lispendens entered.
Accordingly, the instant petition is dismissed, without prejudice topetitioner having the proper annotation of lis pendens regardingCivil Case No. 1564 made on the title covering Lot 1327.
Costs against petitioners.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion Jr., JJ.,concur.
Footnotes
1 Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 7 SCRA 367.
2 Guzman vs. Anog, 37 Phil. 61.
3 The case of Gutierrez vs. Cruz, 24 SCRA 69,relied upon by petitioner did not involve asummary settlement.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-8492. February 29, 1956.]
In the Matter of the Declaration of the Civil Status of: LOURDES G. LUKBAN,Petitioner-ApOF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Appellee.
D E C I S I O N
This is a petition filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for a declaration that PetitionerisFrancisco Chuidian who is presumed to be dead and has no legal impediment to contract a subseque
The Solicitor General opposed the petition on the ground that the same is not authorized bypresented her evidence, the court sustained the opposition and dismissed the petition. Hence this ap
Petitionerherein, contracted marriage with Francisco Chuidian on December 10,Church, Manila. On December 27, of the same year, Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarrel abeen heard from despite diligent search made by her. She also inquired about him from his parentwas able to indicate his whereabouts. She has no knowledge if he is still alive, his last known addPaco, Manila. She believes that he is already dead because he had been absent for more than twent
intends to marry again, she desires that her civil status be defined in order that she may be relieved
We believe that the petition at bar comes within the purview of our decision in the case of Nicolai SSup., 243, wherein it was held that a petition for judicial declaration that Petitioners husband is prebe entertained because it is not authorized by law, and if such declaration cannot be made in a spethe present, much less can the court determine the status ofPetitioneras a widow since this matterupon the fact of death of the husband. This the court can declare upon proper evidence, but not topresumed to be dead. (Nicolai Szartraw, 46 Off. Gaz., 1st sup. 243).
The philosophy behind the ruling that such judicial pronouncement cannot be made in a proceedi
-
7/29/2019 Specpro Full Cases
3/89
se above-cited. Thus, we there said that A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final andll be a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subjectcement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competentt is, therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been
en years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage ofal.
t the remedy she is seeking for can be granted in the present proceedings because in the case of Hagansil., 880, it was declared that a special proceeding is an application or proceeding to establish the status
or a particular fact; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut, as already said, that remedy can be invoked if the purpose is to seek theof the husband, and not, as in the present case, to establish a presumption of death. If it can bethat the husband is dead, the court would not certainly deny a declaration to that effect as has beenof Nicolas Szartraw, supra.
s that the present petition can be entertained because article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in definingat a person commits that crime if he contracts a second marriage before the absent spouse has been
ely dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings and, it is claimed, the presentn the purview of this legal provision. The argument is untenable for the words proper proceedings usedly refer to those authorized by law such as those which refer to the administration or settlement of theperson (Articles 390 and 391, new Civil Code). That such is the correct interpretation of the provision in
rt in the case of Jones vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil., 179, wherein this Court made the following comment:
the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. Thece made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the takingecautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage,ly requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the secondpouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that each former spouse is generallynd the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage (section III, paragraph 2,
68).
d from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L. and Endencia,
THIRD DIVISION
ANGELITA VALDEZ,
Petitioner,
- versus -
G.R. No. 180863
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA,JJ.
Promulgated:
-
7/29/2019 Specpro Full Cases
4/89
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
September 8, 2009
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------x
DECISION
NACHURA,J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Camiling, Tarlac dated November 12, 2007
dismissing petitioner Angelita Valdezs petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of her husband, Sofio
Polborosa (Sofio).
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner married Sofio on January 11, 1971 in
Pateros, Rizal. On December 13, 1971, petitioner gave
birth to the spouses only child, Nancy. According to
petitioner, she and Sofio argued constantly because
the latter was unemployed and did not bring home any
money. In March 1972, Sofio left their conjugal
dwelling. Petitioner and their child waited for him to
return but, finally, in May 1972, petitioner decided to
go back to her parents home in Bancay 1st, Camiling,
Tarlac. Three years passed without any word from
Sofio. In October 1975, Sofio showed up at Bancay 1st.
He and petitioner talked for several hours and they
agreed to separate. They executed a document to that
effect.[1] That was the last time petitioner saw him.
After that, petitioner didnt hear any news of Sofio, his
whereabouts or even if he was alive or not.[2]
Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner
married Virgilio Reyes on June 20, 1985.[3] Subsequently, however, Virgilios application for
naturalization filed with the United States Department
of Homeland Security was denied because petitioners
marriage to Sofio was subsisting.[4] Hence, on March
29, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition before the RTC of
Camiling, Tarlac seeking the declaration of
presumptive death of Sofio.
The RTC rendered its Decision[5] on November 12,
2007, dismissing the Petition for lack of merit. The RTC
held that Angelita was not able to prove the well-
grounded belief that her husband Sofio Polborosa was
already dead. It said that under Article 41 of the
Family Code, the present spouse is burdened to prove
that her spouse has been absent and that she has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already
dead before the present spouse may contract a
subsequent marriage. This belief, the RTC said, must
be the result of proper and honest-to-goodness
inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of
the absent spouse.
The RTC found that, by petitioners own admission,
she did not try to find her husband anymore in light of
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn5 -
7/29/2019 Specpro Full Cases
5/89
their mutual agreement to live separately. Likewise,
petitioners daughter testified that her mother
prevented her from looking for her father. The RTC
also said there is a strong possibility that Sofio is still
alive, considering that he would have been only 61years old by then, and people who have reached their
60s have not become increasingly low in health and
spirits, and, even assuming as true petitioners
testimony that Sofio was a chain smoker and a
drunkard, there is no evidence that he continues to
drink and smoke until now.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.[6] She
argued that it is the Civil Code that applies in this case
and not the Family Code since petitioners marriage toSofio was celebrated on January 11, 1971, long before
the Family Code took effect. Petitioner further argued
that she had acquired a vested right under the
provisions of the Civil Code and the stricter provisions
of the Family Code should not be applied against her
because Title XIV of the Civil Code, where Articles 384
and 390 on declaration of absence and presumption of
death, respectively, can be found, was not expressly
repealed by the Family Code. To apply the stricterprovisions of the Family Code will impair the rights
petitioner had acquired under the Civil Code.
The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration in a
Resolution dated December 10, 2007.[7]
Petitioner now comes before this Court seeking the
reversal of the RTC Decision and Motion for
Reconsideration.
In its Manifestation and Motion,[8] the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) recommended that the Court
set aside the assailed RTC Decision and grant the
Petition to declare Sofio presumptively dead. The OSG
argues that the requirement of well-founded belief
under Article 41 of the Family Code is not applicable to
the instant case. It said that petitioner could not be
expected to comply with this requirement because it
was not yet in existence during her marriage to Virgilio
Reyes in 1985. The OSG further argues that before the
effectivity of the Family Code, petitioner alreadyacquired a vested right as to the validity of her
marriage to Virgilio Reyes based on the presumed
death of Sofio under the Civil Code. This vested right
and the presumption of Sofios death, the OSG posits,
could not be affected by the obligations created under
the Family Code.[9]
Next, the OSG contends that Article 390 of the Civil
Code was not repealed by Article 41 of the Family
Code.[10] Title XIV of the Civil Code, the OSG said, was
not one of those expressly repealed by the Family
Code. Moreover, Article 256 of the Family Code
provides that its provisions shall not be retroactively
applied if they will prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights.[11]
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn11 -
7/29/2019 Specpro Full Cases
6/89
The RTC Decision, insofar as it dismissed the Petition,
is affirmed. However, we must state that we are
denying the Petition on grounds different from those
cited in the RTC Decision.
Initially, we discuss a procedural issue. Under the
Rules of Court, a party may directly appeal to this
Court from a decision of the trial court only on pure
questions of law. A question of law lies, on one hand,
when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law
is on a certain set of facts; on the other hand, a
question of fact exists when the doubt or difference
arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts.
Here, the facts are not disputed; the controversy
merely relates to the correct application of the law orjurisprudence to the undisputed facts.[12]
The RTC erred in applying the provisions of the
Family Code and holding that petitioner needed to
prove a well-founded belief that Sofio was already
dead. The RTC applied Article 41 of the Family Code,
to wit:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person
during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be nulland void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger under the circumstances set
forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code,
an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting a subsequent
marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice
to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
It is readily apparent, however, that the marriages of
petitioner to Sofio and Virgilio on January 11, 1971 and
June 20, 1985, respectively, were both celebrated
under the auspices of the Civil Code.
The pertinent provision of the Civil Code is Article 83:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted
by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person with any person other than such first
spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or
dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the
absentee being alive, of if the absentee, though he has
been absent for less than seven years, is generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn12 -
7/29/2019 Specpro Full Cases
7/89
subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed
dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage
so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases
until declared null and void by a competent court.
Article 390 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being
unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he
shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for
those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the
purpose of opening his succession till after an absence
of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of
seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be
sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.
The Court, on several occasions, had interpreted the
above-quoted provision in this wise:
For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not
necessary to have the former spouse judicially
declared an absentee. The declaration of absence
made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil
Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of
the necessary precautions for the administration of the
estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil
marriage, however, the law only requires that the
former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive
years at the time of the second marriage, that the
spouse present does not know his or her former
spouse to be living, that such former spouse isgenerally reputed to be dead and the spouse present
so believes at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.[13]
Further, the Court explained that presumption of
death cannot be the subject of court proceedings
independent of the settlement of the absentees
estate.
In re Szatraw[14]
is instructive. In that case, petitionercontracted marriage with a Polish national in 1937.
They lived together as husband and wife for three
years. Sometime in 1940, the husband, on the pretext
of visiting some friends, left the conjugal abode with
their child and never returned. After inquiring from
friends, petitioner found that her husband went
to Shanghai, China. However, friends who came
from Shanghai told her that the husband was not seen
there. In 1948, petitioner filed a petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of her husband
arguing that since the latter had been absent for more
than seven years and she had not heard any news
from him and about her child, she believes that he is
dead. In deciding the case, the Court said:
The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of
Nicolai Szatraw, because it does not appear that he
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn14 -
7/29/2019 Specpro Full Cases
8/89
possessed property brought to the marriage and
because he had acquired no property during his
married life with the petitioner. The rule invoked by
the latter is merely one of evidence which permits the
court to presume that a person is dead after the factthat such person had been unheard from in seven
years had been established. This presumption may
arise and be invoked and made in a case, either in an
action or in a special proceeding, which is tried or
heard by, and submitted for decision to, a competent
court. Independently of such an action or special
proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be
invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an
action or special proceeding. In this case, there is
no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed
for by the petitioner against her absent husband.
Neither is there a prayer for the final determination of
his right or status or for the ascertainment of a
particular fact (Hagans v. Wislizenus, 42 Phil. 880), for
the petition does not pray for a declaration that the
petitioner's husband is dead, but merely asks for a
declaration that he be presumed dead because he had
been unheard from in seven years. If there is any
pretense at securing a declaration that the petitioner'shusband is dead, such a pretension cannot be granted
because it is unauthorized. The petition is for a
declaration that the petitioner's husband is
presumptively dead. But this declaration, even if
judicially made, would not improve the petitioner's
situation, because such a presumption is already
established by law. A judicial pronouncement to
that effect, even if final and executory, would
still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still
disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be
the subject of a judicial pronouncement or
declaration, if it is the only question or matterinvolved in a case, or upon which a competent
court has to pass. The latter must decide finally the
controversy between the parties, or determine finally
the right or status of a party or establish finally a
particular fact, out of which certain rights and
obligations arise or may arise; and once such
controversy is decided by a final judgment, or such
right or status determined, or such particular fact
established, by a final decree, then the judgment on
the subject of the controversy, or the decree upon the
right or status of a party or upon the existence of a
particular fact, becomes res judicata, subject to no
collateral attack, except in a few rare instances
especially provided by law. It is, therefore, clear that a
judicial declaration that a person is
presumptively dead, because he had been
unheard from in seven years, being a
presumptionjuris tantum only, subject to
contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finalityor become final. Proof of actual death of the person
presumed dead because he had been unheard from in
seven years, would have to be made in another
proceeding to have such particular fact finally
determined. If a judicial decree declaring a person
presumptively dead, because he had not been heard
from in seven years, cannot become final and
-
7/29/2019 Specpro Full Cases
9/89
executory even after the lapse of the reglementary
period within which an appeal may be taken, for such
presumption is still disputable and remains subject to
contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is
useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit tothe petitioner.[15]
In Lukban v. Republic,[16] petitioner Lourdes G. Lukban
contracted marriage with Francisco Chuidian on
December 10, 1933. A few days later, on December
27, Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarrel. She
did not hear from him after that day. Her diligent
search, inquiries from his parents and friends, and
search in his last known address, proved futile.
Believing her husband was already dead since he hadbeen absent for more than twenty years, petitioner
filed a petition in 1956 for a declaration that she is a
widow of her husband who is presumed to be dead and
has no legal impediment to contract a subsequent
marriage. On the other hand, the antecedents in Gue
v. Republic[17] are similar to Szatraw. On January 5,
1946, Angelina Gues husband left Manila where they
were residing and went to Shanghai, China. From that
day on, he had not been heard of, had not written to
her, nor in anyway communicated with her as to his
whereabouts. Despite her efforts and diligence, she
failed to locate him. After 11 years, she asked the
court for a declaration of the presumption of death of
Willian Gue, pursuant to the provisions of Article 390 of
the Civil Code of thePhilippines.
In both cases, the Court reiterated its ruling
in Szatraw. It held that a petition for judicial
declaration that petitioner's husband is presumed to
be dead cannot be entertained because it is not
authorized by law.[18]
From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that, under the
Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by
law[19] and no court declaration is needed for the
presumption to arise. Since death is presumed to have
taken place by the seventh year of absence,[20] Sofio is
to be presumed dead starting October 1982.
Consequently, at the time of petitioners marriage to
Virgilio, there existed no impediment to petitionerscapacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under
paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code.
Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that
applies, proof of well-founded belief is not required.
Petitioner could not have been expected to comply
with this requirement since the Family Code was not
yet in effect at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. The
enactment of the Family Code in 1988 does not
change this conclusion. The Family Code itself states:
Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive
effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested
or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws.
To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family
Code requiring petitioner to exhibit well-founded
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/180863.htm#_ftn20 -
7/29/2019 Specpro Full Cases
10/89
belief will, ultimately, result in the invalidation of her
second marriage, which was valid at the time it was
celebrated. Such a situation would be untenable and
would go against the objectives that the Family Code
wishes to achieve.
In sum, we hold that the Petition must be
dismissed since no decree on the presumption of
Sofios death can be granted under the Civil Code, the
same presumption having arisen by operation of law.
However, we declare that petitioner was capacitated
to marry Virgilio at the time their marriage was
celebrated in 1985 and, therefore, the said marriage is
legal and valid.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the
Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------
SECOND DIVISION
JOSEPH CUA, G.R. No.156536
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO,J.,Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-
GUTIERREZ,
- versus - CORONA,AZCUNA, and
GARCIA,JJ.
Promulgate
d:
GLORIA A. VARGAS, AURORAVARGAS, RAMON
VARGAS, October 31, 2006MARITES VARGAS, EDELINAVARGAS AND GEMMA VARGAS,
Respondents.
x
-----------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------- x
DECISION
AZCUNA,J.:
-
7/29/2019 Specpro Full Cases
11/89
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the
decision[1] dated March 26, 2002, and the
resolution[2] dated December 17, 2002, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59869 entitled Gloria A.
Vargas, Aurora Vargas, Ramon
Vargas, Marites Vargas, Edelina Vargas
and Gemma Vargas v. Joseph Cua.
The facts are as follows:
A parcel of residential land with an area of 99
square meters located in San
Juan, Virac, Catanduanes was left behind by the
latePaulina Vargas. On February 4, 1994, a notarized
Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was executedby and among Paulina Vargas heirs, namely Ester
Vargas, Visitacion Vargas, Juan
Vargas, Zenaida V. Matienzo, Rosario V. Forteza,
Andres Vargas, Gloria Vargas,Antonina Vargas
and Florentino Vargas, partitioning and adjudicating
unto themselves the lot in question, each one of them
getting a share of 11 square meters. Florentino,
Andres, Antonina and Gloria, however, did not sign
the document. Only Ester, Visitacion,
Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed it. The Extra
Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was published in
the Catanduanes Tribune for three consecutive weeks.[3]
On November 15, 1994, an Extra JudicialSettlement Among Heirs with Sale[4] was again
executed by and among the same heirs over the same
property and also with the same sharings. Once more,
only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario
signed the document and their respective shares
totaling 55 square meters were sold to Joseph Cua,
petitioner herein.
According to Gloria Vargas, the widow of
Santiago Vargas and one of respondents herein, she
came to know of the Extra Judicial Settlement Among
Heirs with Sale dated November 16, 1994 only when
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn4 -
7/29/2019 Specpro Full Cases
12/89
the original house built on the lot was being
demolished sometime in May 1995.[5] She likewise
claimed she was unaware that an earlier Extra Judicial
Settlement Among Heirs dated February 4,
1994 involving the same property had been published
in the Catanduanes Tribune.[6]
After knowing of the sale of the 55 square
meters to petitioner, Gloria Vargas tried to redeem the
property, with the following letter[7]
sent to petitioneron her behalf:
29th June 1995
Mr. Joseph Cua
Capilihan, Virac, Catanduanes
Sir:
This is in behalf of my client, Ms. AuroraVargas,[8] (c/o Atty. Prospero V. Tablizo) one ofthe lawful heirs of the late Paulina Vargas,
original owner of Lot No. 214of Virac, Poblacion covered by ARP No. 031-
0031 in her name.
I understand that a document Extra Judicial
Settlement Among Heirs with Sale was
executed by some of my clients co-heirs andalleged representatives of other co-heirs, by
virtue of which document you acquired by
purchase from the signatories to the said
document, five (5) shares with a total area offifty-five square meters of the above-describedland.
This is to serve you notice that my client shall
exercise her right of legal redemption of said five
(5) shares as well as other shares which you maylikewise have acquired by purchase. And you are
hereby given an option to agree to legalredemption within a period of fifteen (15) days
from your receipt hereof.
Should you fail to convey to me your agreement
within said 15-day-period, proper legal actionshall be taken by my client to redeem said shares.
Thank you.
Very truly yours,(Sgd.)
JUAN G. ATENCIA
When the offer to redeem was refused and after
having failed to reach an amicable settlement at the
barangay level,[9] Gloria Vargas filed a case for
annulment of Extra Judicial Settlement and Legal
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn9 -
7/29/2019 Specpro Full Cases
13/89
Redemption of the lot with the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Virac, Catanduanes against petitioner and
consigned the amount of P100,000 which is the
amount of the purchase with the Clerk of Court on
May 20, 1996.[10] Joining her in the action were her
children with Santiago, namely, Aurora,
Ramon, Marites, Edelina andGemma, all surnamed
Vargas.
Subsequently, Carlos Gianan, Jr. andGloria Arcilla, heirs of the alleged primitive owner of
the lot in question, Pedro Lakandula, intervened in the
case.[11]
Respondents claimed that as co-owners of the
property, they may be subrogated to the rights of the
purchaser by reimbursing him the price of the sale.
They likewise alleged that the 30-day period
following a written notice by the vendors to their co-
owners for them to exercise the right of redemption of
the property had not yet set in as no written notice
was sent to them. In effect, they claimed that the Extra
Judicial Settlement Among Heirs and the Extra
Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale were null
and void and had no legal and binding effect on them.[12]
After trial on the merits, the MTC rendered a
decision[13] in favor of petitioner, dismissing the
complaint as well as the complaint-in-intervention for
lack of merit, and declaring the Deed of Extra Judicial
Settlement Among Heirs with Sale valid and binding.The MTC upheld the sale to petitioner because the
transaction purportedly occurred after the partition of
the property among the co-owner heirs. The MTC
opined that the other heirs could validly dispose of
their respective shares. Moreover, the MTC found that
although there was a failure to strictly comply with
the requirements under Article 1088 of the Civil
Code[14] for a written notice of sale to be served upon
respondents by the vendors prior to the exercise of the
formers right of redemption, this deficiency was
cured by respondents actual knowledge of the sale,
which was more than 30 days before the filing of their
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn14 -
7/29/2019 Specpro Full Cases
14/89
complaint, and their consignation of the purchase
price with the Clerk of Court, so that the latter action
came too late. Finally, the MTC ruled that
respondents failed to establish by competent proof
petitioners bad faith in purchasing the portion of the
property owned by respondents co-heirs.[15]
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 42, of Virac, Catanduanes affirmed the MTC
decision in a judgment dated November 25, 1999. Thematter was thereafter raised to the Court of Appeals
(CA).
The CA reversed the ruling of both lower courts
in the assailed decision dated March 26, 2002,
declaring that the Extra Judicial Settlement Among
Heirs and the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs
with Sale, dated February 4, 1994 and November 15,
1994, respectively, were void and without any legal
effect. The CA held that, pursuant to Section 1, Rule
74 of the Rules of Court,[16] the extrajudicial
settlement made by the other co-heirs is not binding
upon respondents considering the latter never
participated in it nor did they ever signify their
consent to the same.
His motion for reconsideration having been
denied, petitioner filed the present petition for review.
The issues are:
Whether heirs are deemed
constructively notified and bound,regardless of their failure to participate
therein, by an extrajudicial settlement and
partition of estate when the extrajudicialsettlement and partition has been duly
published; and,
Assuming a published extrajudicial
settlement and partition does not bindpersons who did not participate therein,whether the written notice required to be
served by an heir to his co-heirs in
connection with the sale of hereditaryrights to a stranger before partition under
Article 1088 of the Civil Code[17] can be
dispensed with when such co-heirs have
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn17 -
7/29/2019 Specpro Full Cases
15/89
actual knowledge of the sale such that the30-day period within which a co-heir can
exercise the right to be subrogated to the
rights of a purchaser shall commence
from the date of actual knowledge of thesale.
Petitioner argues, as follows:
Firstly, the acquisition by petitioner of the
subject property subsequent to the extrajudicialpartition was valid because the partition was duly
published. The publication of the same constitutes due
notice to respondents and signifies their implied
acquiescence thereon. Respondents are therefore
estopped from denying the validity of the partition
and sale at this late stage. Considering that the
partition was valid, respondents no longer have the
right to redeem the property.
Secondly, petitioner is a possessor and builder
in good faith.
Thirdly, the MTC had no jurisdiction over the
complaint because its subject matter was incapable of
pecuniary estimation. The complaint should have
been filed with the RTC.
Fourthly, there was a non-joinder of
indispensable parties, the co-heirs who sold theirinterest in the subject property not having been
impleaded by respondents.
Fifthly, the appeal to the CA should have been
dismissed as it was not properly verified by
respondents. Gloria Vargas failed to indicate that she
was authorized to represent the other respondents
(petitioners therein) to initiate the petition. Moreover,
the verification was inadequate because it did not state
the basis of the alleged truth and/or correctness of the
material allegations in the petition.
-
7/29/2019 Specpro Full Cases
16/89
The petition lacks merit.
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74
is an ex parteproceeding. The rule plainly states,
however, that persons who do not participate or had
no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be
bound thereby.[18] It contemplates a notice that has
been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement
and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling
all interested parties to participate in the said deed ofextrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after
such an agreement has already been executed[19] as
what happened in the instant case with the publication
of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among
heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not
constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no
knowledge or did not take part in it because the same
was notice after the fact of execution. The
requirement of publication is geared for the protection
of creditors and was never intended to deprive heirs of
their lawful participation in the decedents estate. In
this connection, the records of the present case
confirm that respondents never signed either of the
settlement documents, having discovered their
existence only shortly before the filing of the present
complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial
settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition
made without their knowledge and consent is invalid
insofar as they are concerned.
This is not to say, though, that respondents co-
heirs cannot validly sell their hereditary rights to third
persons even before the partition of the estate. The
heirs who actually participated in the execution of the
extrajudicial settlements, which included the sale to
petitioner of theirpro indiviso shares in the subject
property, are bound by the same. Nevertheless,
respondents are given the right to redeem these shares
pursuant to Article 1088 of the Civil Code. The right
to redeem was never lost because respondents were
never notified in writing of the actual sale by their co-
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn19 -
7/29/2019 Specpro Full Cases
17/89
heirs. Based on the provision, there is a need for
written notice to start the period of redemption, thus:
Should any of the heirs sell hishereditary rights to a stranger before the
partition, any or all of the co-heirs may besubrogated to the rights of the purchaser by
reimbursing him for the price of thesale, provided they do so within the period ofone month from the time they were notified
in writing of the sale by the
vendor. (Emphasis supplied.)
It bears emphasis that the period of one month
shall be reckoned from the time that a co-heir is
notified in writing by the vendor of the actual
sale. Written notice is indispensable and mandatory,[20] actual knowledge of the sale acquired in some
other manner by the redemptioner notwithstanding. It
cannot be counted from the time advance notice isgiven of an impending or contemplated sale. The law
gives the co-heir thirty days from the time written
notice of the actual sale within which to make up his
or her mind and decide to repurchase or effect the
redemption.[21]
Though the Code does not prescribe any
particular form of written notice nor any distinctivemethod for written notification of redemption, the
method of notification remains exclusive, there being
no alternative provided by law.[22] This proceeds from
the very purpose of Article 1088, which is to keep
strangers to the family out of a joint ownership, if, as
is often the case, the presence of outsiders be
undesirable and the other heir or heirs be willing and
in a position to repurchase the share sold.[23]
It should be kept in mind that the obligation to
serve written notice devolves upon the vendor co-
heirs because the latter are in the best position to
know the other co-owners who, under the law, must
be notified of the sale.[24] This will remove all
uncertainty as to the fact of the sale, its terms and its
perfection and validity, and quiet any doubt that the
alienation is not definitive.[25] As a result, the party
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn25 -
7/29/2019 Specpro Full Cases
18/89
notified need not entertain doubt that the seller may
still contest the alienation. [26]
Considering, therefore, that respondents co-
heirs failed to comply with this requirement, there is
no legal impediment to allowing respondents to
redeem the shares sold to petitioner given
the formers obvious willingness and capacity to do
so.
Likewise untenable is petitioners contention
that he is a builder in good faith. Good faith consists
in the belief of the builder that the land the latter is
building on is ones own without knowledge of any
defect or flaw in ones title.[27] Petitioner derived his
title from the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs
With Sale dated November 15, 1994. He was verymuch aware that not all of the heirs participated
therein as it was evident on the face of the document
itself. Because the property had not yet been
partitioned in accordance with the Rules of Court, no
particular portion of the property could have been
identified as yet and delineated as the object of the
sale. This is because the alienation made by
respondents co-heirs was limited to the portion which
may be allotted to them in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership. Despite this glaring
fact, and over the protests of respondents, petitioner
still constructed improvements on the property. For
this reason, his claim of good faith lacks credence.
As to the issue of lack of jurisdiction, petitioneris estopped from raising the same for the first time on
appeal. Petitioner actively participated in the
proceedings below and sought affirmative ruling from
the lower courts to uphold the validity of the sale to
him of a portion of the subject property embodied in
the extrajudicial settlement among heirs. Having
failed to seasonably raise this defense, he cannot,
under the peculiar circumstances of this case, be
permitted to challenge the jurisdiction of the lower
court at this late stage.While it is a rule that a
jurisdictional question may be raised at any time, an
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn27http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn27 -
7/29/2019 Specpro Full Cases
19/89
exception arises where estoppel has already
supervened.
Estoppel sets in when a party participates in all
stages of a case before challenging the jurisdiction of
the lower court. One cannot belatedly reject or
repudiate its decision after voluntarily submitting to
its jurisdiction, just to secure affirmative relief against
one's opponent or after failing to obtain such relief.
The Court has, time and again, frowned upon the
undesirable practice of a party submitting a case fordecision and then accepting the judgment, only if
favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction
when adverse.[28]
Petitioners fourth argument, that there is a non-
joinder of indispensable parties, similarly lacks
merit. An indispensable party is a party-in-interest
without whom there can be no final determination of
an action and who is required to be joined as either
plaintiff or defendant.[29] The party's interest in the
subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought is so
inextricably intertwined with the other parties that
the formers legal presence as a party to the
proceeding is an absolute necessity. Hence, an
indispensable party is one whose interest will be
directly affected by the court's action in the litigation.
In the absence of such indispensable party, there
cannot be a resolution of the controversy before the
court which is effective, complete, or equitable.[30]
In relation to this, it must be kept in mind that
the complaint filed by respondents ultimately prayedthat they be allowed to redeem the shares in the
property sold by their co-heirs. Significantly, the right
of the other heirs to sell their undivided share in the
property to petitioner is not in dispute. Respondents
concede that the other heirs acted within their
hereditary rights in doing so to the effect that the latter
completely and effectively relinquished their interests
in the property in favor of petitioner. Petitioner
thus stepped into the shoes of the other heirs to
become a co-owner of the property with respondents.
As a result, only petitioners presence is absolutely
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn30 -
7/29/2019 Specpro Full Cases
20/89
required for a complete and final determination of the
controversy because what respondents seek is to be
subrogated to his rights as a purchaser.
Finally, petitioner contends that the petition
filed by respondents with the CA should have been
dismissed because the verification and certificate of
non-forum shopping appended to it were defective,
citing specifically the failure of respondent Gloria
Vargas to: (1) indicate that she was authorized to
represent her co-respondents in the petition, and (2)state the basis of the alleged truth of the allegations.
The general rule is that the certificate of non-
forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or
petitioners in a case and the signature of only one of
them is insufficient.[31] Nevertheless, the rules on
forum shopping, which were designed to promote and
facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should
not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to
subvert their own ultimate and legitimate objective.
Strict compliance with the provisions regarding the
certificate of non-forum shopping merely underscores
its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be
altogether dispensed with or its requirements
completely disregarded.[32] Under justifiable
circumstances, the Court has relaxed the rule
requiring the submission of such certification
considering that although it is obligatory, it is not
jurisdictional.[33]
Thus, when all the petitioners share a common
interest and invoke a common cause of action or
defense, the signature of only one of them in the
certification against forum shopping substantially
complies with the rules.[34] The co-respondents of
respondent Gloria Vargas in this case were her
children. In order not to defeat the ends of justice, the
Court deems it sufficient that she signed the petitionon their behalf and as their representative.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for
lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn32http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn33http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn34http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn32http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn33http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/156536.htm#_ftn34 -
7/29/2019 Specpro Full Cases
21/89
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 118680. March 5, 2001]
MARIA ELENA RODRIGUEZ
PEDROSA,petitioner, vs. THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE, CARMEN,
MERCEDES & RAMON, all surnamedRODRIGUEZ, ROSALINA
RODRIGUEZ, CHAN LUNG FAI, MATEO
TAN TE, TE ENG SUY, LORETA TE,
VICTORIO S. DETALIA, JEROME
DEIPARINE, PETRONILO S. DETALIA,
HUBERT CHIU YULO, PATERIO N. LAO,
LORENSITA M. PADILLA,
IMMACULATE CONCEPCION
COLLEGE AND LILIAN EXPRESS, INC.
and TIO TUAN, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition assails the decision of the Court of Appealsdated May 23, 1994 which affirmed the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, of Ozamiz City in Civil Case
No. OZ-1397.
The facts of this case are as follows:
On April 8, 1946, the spouses Miguel Rodriguez andRosalina J. de Rodriguez initiated proceedings before the CFI
of Ozamiz City for the legal adoption of herein petitioner,Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa. On August 1, 1946, the CFI
granted the petition and declared petitioner Pedrosa the adopted
child of Miguel and Rosalina.
On April 29, 1972, Miguel died intestate. Thereafter,
petitioner and Rosalina entered into an extrajudicial settlement
of Miguels estate, adjudicating between themselves in equalproportion the estate of Miguel.
On November 21, 1972, private respondents filed anaction to annul the adoption of petitioner before the CFI of
Ozamiz City, with petitioner and herein respondent Rosalina asdefendants docketed as OZ 349.
On August 28, 1974, the CFI denied the petition andupheld the validity of the adoption. Thereafter, the private
respondents appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals.
On March 11, 1983, while said appeal was pending, theRodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial settlement with
respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Migueland of another sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as the
representative of the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez. Pilar had no
heirs except his brothers and sisters.
The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition
covered fourteen parcels of land covering a total area of
-
7/29/2019 Specpro Full Cases
22/89
224,883 square meters. These properties were divided amongJose, Carmen, Mercedes, Ramon and the heirs of Miguel,
represented solely by Rosalina. The heirs of Miguel were
given 226 square meters of parcel 2, and 9,567 square metersand 24,457 square meters of parcels 7 and 9, respectively.[1] The total land area allocated to the heirs of Miguel was34,250 square meters.
Armed with the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement andPartition, respondents Rodriguezes were able to secure new
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) and were able to transfer
some parcels to the other respondents herein. [2]
Lots 504-A-6, 504-B-3 and 504-C-4, portions of Parcel 3,
designated as Lot 504, were transferred to respondents ChuanLung Fai,[3]but not included in the Deed of Settlement and
Partition, were transferred to respondent Lilian Express, Inc.
and are now registered under TCT No. T-11337. Parcel 6, Lot560, was subdivided among Ramon, Jose, Carmen and
Mercedes and was designated as Lots 560-A, 560-B, 560-C,560-D and 560-E. Lot 560-A covering 500 square meters was
transferred to respondent Victorino Detall[4] and wassubsequently transferred to Jerome Deiparine who registered it
under his name under TCT No. T-10706. Lot 560-B with 500
square meters was transferred to respondent PetroniloDetalla[5] and was later transferred to respondent Hubert Chiu
Yulo who registered it under his name under TCT No. T-11305. Lot 560-C was transferred and registered under the
name of respondent Paterio Lao with TCT No. T-10206. Lot
560-D was sold to and subsequently registered in the name ofLorensita M. Padilla under TCT No. T-10207. The remaining
portion, Lot 560-E consisting of 43,608 square meters wasbought by respondent Immaculate Concepcion College and
was registered in its name under TCT No. T-10208.[6]
On June 19, 1986, the parties in the appeal which sought toannul the adoption of petitioner Pedrosa filed a joint Motion to
Dismiss. On June 25, 1986, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the appeal but upheld the validity of the adoption of petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner sent her daughter, Loreto Jocelyn, toclaim their share of the properties from the Rodriguezes. Thelatter refused saying that Maria Elena and Loreto were not
heirs since they were not their blood relatives.
Petitioner, then, filed a complaint to annul the 1983
partition. The said complaint was filed on January 28,
1987. Said complaint was later amended on March 25, 1987 toinclude the allegation that earnest efforts toward a
compromise were made between the plaintiffs and thedefendants, but the same failed.[7]
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellatecourt affirmed the decision of the trial court. Its ruling was
premised on the following grounds:[8]
1) that the participation of Rosalina has already estoppedher from questioning the validity of the partition, andsince she is already estopped, it naturally follows thatMaria Elena, her successor-in-interest, is likewiseestopped, applying Article 1439 of the Civil Code;
2) that the appeal of Maria Elena and her claim that thepartition is null and void is weakened by herinconsistent claim that the partition would have beenalright had she been given a more equitable share;
3) the action is essentially an action for rescission and hadbeen filed late considering that it was filed beyond the 4year period provided for in Article 1100 of the Civil
Code;[9]
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn9 -
7/29/2019 Specpro Full Cases
23/89
4) that fraud and/or bad faith was never established.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution datedDecember 20, 1994.[10]
Hence, this petition wherein the petitioner asserts that thefollowing errors were allegedly committed by the Court of
Appeals in -
I. FINDING THAT THE EXTRAJUDICIALSETTLEMENT AND PARTITION ENTERED INTOBY DEFENDANT JUREDINI AND DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS RODRIGUEZES WAS VALID ANDBINDING UPON THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTWHO DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN SAIDTRANSACTION
II. CONCLUDING THAT THE CLAIM OFPLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAVE ALREADYPRESCRIBED TWO (2) YEARS AFTERPUBLICATION OF THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT AND PARTITION IN THENEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION
III. ...CONCLUDING THAT THE CLAIM OFPLAINTIFF-APPELLANT IS BARRED OR
ESTOPPED IN FILING THIS CASE (sic) IN VIEWOF THE DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL IN CIVIL
CASE NO. OZ 349 INTERPOSED BY HEREINDEFENDANTS-APPELLEES WHO WERE THENPLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS IN AC[C]-G.R. NO. SP-00208
IV. SUSTAINING THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEES CLAIM THAT AS THEY HAVE NOTAS YET RECOGNIZED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTAS AN ADOPTED DAUGHTER OF MIGUELRODRIGUEZ IT WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR
THEM TO HAVE HER PARTICIPATE IN THEEXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT, EXHIBITS S
AND I
V. CONCLUDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT HAD NOT CONCLUSIVELY SHOWNTHAT MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ WAS A CO-OWNEROF THE LANDS SOLD AND HENCE IT FOLLOWSTHAT SHE HAS NO RIGHT OF REDEMPTION OFTHOSE LANDS
VI. FINDING THAT PORTION OF LOTS NOS. 504AND 560 SOLD TO THE OTHER DEFENDANTSAPPELLEES WERE CLEAN AND FREE FROMENCUMBRANCES OR ANY FLAWS HENCE WEREVALID
VII. FINDING THAT THE PLANTIFFAPPELLANT NEVER APPEARED IN COURT TOTESTIFY OR REBUT THE ASSERTIONS OF THEDEFENDANTSAPPELLANTS THAT THERE WASA VALID PARTITION
VIII. AWARDING PLAINTIFFAPPELLANTDAMAGES FOR THE INCOME OF HER SHARE INTHE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION[11]
In sum, the issues to be resolved in our view are (1)whether or not the complaint for annulment of the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition had already prescribed;(2) whether or not said deed is valid; and (3) whether or not the
petitioner is entitled to recover the lots which had already beentransferred to the respondent buyers.
Petitioner argues that the complaint for annulment of the
extrajudicial partition has not yet prescribed since theprescriptive period which should be applied is four years
following the case ofBeltran vs. Ayson, 4 SCRA 69
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn11 -
7/29/2019 Specpro Full Cases
24/89
(1962). She also avers that Sec. 4, Rule 74 which provides fora two-year prescriptive period needs two requirements. One,
the party assailing the partition must have been given notice,
and two, the party assailing the partition must have participatedtherein. Petitioner insists these requirements are not present in
her case,[12] since she did not participate in the Deed ofExtrajudicial Settlement and Partition. She cites Villaluz vs.
Neme, 7 SCRA 27, 30 (1963), where we held that a deed ofextrajudicial partition executed without including some of the
heirs, who had no knowledge and consent to the same, is
fraudulent. She asserts that she is an adoptive daughter andthus an heir of Miguel.[13]
Petitioner also contends that the respondent buyers werebuyers in bad faith since they failed to exercise the necessary
due diligence required before purchasing the lots in question.[14] In the alternative, petitioner wants to redeem the said lots as a co-ownerof respondent Rodriguezes under the provisions of Article 1620 of the New
Civil Code.[15]
Lastly, petitioner asserts that she will suffer lesion if the
partition would be allowed. She asks for the rescission of thesaid partitioning under Articles 165-175 of the Civil Code.[16]
Respondents, in response, claim that the action ofpetitioner had already prescribed. In addition, they argue that
petitioner, Maria Elena, and Rosalina already have their shares
in the estate of Miguel Rodriguez reflected in the compromiseagreement they entered into with the respondent Rodriguezes
in AC- G.R. SP 00208. Finally, respondents aver that the non-participation of Maria Elena in the extrajudicial partition was
understandable since her status as an adopted child was then
under litigation. In any case, they assert that the shares ofMiguels heirs were adequately protected in the said partition.[17]
Section 4, Rule 74[18] provides for a two year prescriptiveperiod (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had
notice of the extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when
the provisions of Section 1[19] of Rule 74 have been strictlycomplied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent
have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or arerepresented by themselves or through guardians.[20]
Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in theextrajudicial partition. Patently then, the two-year prescriptive
period is not applicable in her case.
The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years asprovided in Gerona vs. De Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964),
which held that:
[The action to annul] a deed of extrajudicialsettlement upon the ground of fraud...may be filed
within four years from the discovery of the fraud. Suchdiscovery is deemed to have taken place when said
instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds andnew certificates of title were issued in the name of
respondents exclusively.[21]
Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed
on January 28, 1987, or three years and ten months after thequestioned extrajudicial settlement dated March 11, 1983, was
executed, we hold that her action against the respondents onthe basis of fraud has not yet prescribed.
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the applicablerule on publication of extrajudicial settlement. It states:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn21 -
7/29/2019 Specpro Full Cases
25/89
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration
shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation
in the manner provided in the next succeedingsection;but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding
upon any person who has not participated therein or hadno notice thereof.[22]
Under said provision, without the participation of allpersons involved in the proceedings, the extrajudicial
settlement cannot be binding on said persons. The rule
contemplates a notice which must be sent out orissued before the Deed of Settlement and/or Partition is agreed
upon, i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate inthe said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition,
not after, which was when publication was done in the instantcase. Following Rule 74 and the ruling inBeltran vs.Ayson, since Maria Elena did not participate in the said
partition, the settlement is not binding on her.
The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply
when the deed of extrajudicial partition is sought to be annulledon the ground of fraud. A deed of extrajudicial partition
executed without including some of the heirs, who had no
knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent andvicious. [23]Maria Elena is an heir of Miguel together with her
adopting mother, Rosalina. Being the lone descendant ofMiguel, she excludes the collateral relatives of Miguel from
participating in his estate, following the provisions of Article1003 of the Civil Code.[24] The private respondent Rodriguezes
cannot claim that they were not aware of Maria Elenas
adoption since they even filed an action to annul the decree ofadoption. Neither can they claim that their actions were valid
since the adoption of Maria Elena was still being questioned at
the time they executed the deed of partition. The complaintseeking to annul the adoption was filed only twenty six (26)
years after the decree of adoption, patently a much delayed
response to prevent Maria Elena from inheriting from heradoptive parents. The decree of adoption was valid and
existing. With this factual setting, it is patent that privaterespondents executed the deed of partition in bad faith with
intent to defraud Maria Elena.
In the case ofSegura vs. Segura, the Court held:
This section [referring to section 4, Rule 74] provides in
gist that a person who has been deprived of his lawfulparticipation in the estate of the decedent, whether as
heir or as creditor, must assert his claim within two
years after the extrajudicial or summary settlement ofsuch estate under Sections 1 and 2 respectively of the
same Rule 74. Thereafter, he will be precluded fromdoing so as the right will have prescribed.
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the
partition in question which was null and void as far as
the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers onlyvalid partitions. The partition in the present case was
invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs whowere entitled to equal shares in the partitioned
property. Under the rule, no extrajudicial settlementshall be binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice thereof. As thepartition was a total nullity and did not affect the
excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn24 -
7/29/2019 Specpro Full Cases
26/89
hold that their right to challenge the partition had
prescribed after two years from its execution in 1941.[25]
To say that Maria Elena was represented by Rosalina in
the partitioning is imprecise. Maria Elena, the adopted child,was no longer a minor at the time Miguel died. Rosalina, onlyrepresented her own interests and not those of Maria
Elena. Since Miguel predeceased Pilar, a sister, his estate
automatically vested to his child and widow, in equalshares. Respondent Rodriguezes interests did not include
Miguels estate but only Pilars estate.
Could petitioner still redeem the properties from
buyers? Given the circumstances in this case, we areconstrained to hold that this is not the proper forum to decide
this issue. The properties sought to be recovered by thepetitioner are now all registered under the name of thirdparties. Well settled is the doctrine that aTorrens Title cannot
be collaterally attacked. The validity of the title can only beraised in an action expressly instituted for such purpose.[26]
Petitioner asks for the award of damages. No receipts,
agreements or any other documentary evidence was presentedto justify such claim for damages. Actual damages, to be
recoverable, must be proved with a reasonable degree ofcertainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture
or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages.[27] The same is true for moral damages. These cannot be
awarded in the absence of any factual basis.[28] The
unsubstantiated testimony of Loreto Jocelyn Pedrosa is hearsayand has no probative value. It is settled in jurisprudence that
damages may not be awarded on the basis of hearsay evidence.[29] Nonetheless, the failure of the petitioner to substantiate her
claims for damages does not mean that she will be totally
deprived of any damages. Under the law, nominal damages areawarded, so that a plaintiffs right, which has been invaded or
violated by defendants may be vindicated and recognized.[30]
Considering that (1) technically, petitioner sustained injury
but which, unfortunately, was not adequately and properlyproved, (2) petitioner was unlawfully deprived of her legalparticipation in the partition of the estate of Miguel, her
adoptive father, (3) respondents had transferred portions of theproperties involved to third parties, and (4) this case has
dragged on for more than a decade, we find it reasonable to
grant in petitioners favor nominal damages in recognition ofthe existence of a technical injury.[31] The amount to be awarded
as such damages should at least commensurate to the injurysustained by the petitioner considering the concept and purpose
of said damages.[32]
Such award is given in view of the peculiarcircumstances cited and the special reasons extant in this case.[33] Thus, the grant of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P100,000.00) PESOS to petitioner as damages is proper inview of the technical injury she has suffered.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assaileddecision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSEDand
SET ASIDE. The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and
Partition executed by private respondents on March 11, 1983is declared invalid. The amount of P100,000.00 is hereby
awarded to petitioner as damages to be paid by privaterespondents, who are also ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, andDe Leon, Jr.,JJ., concur.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn27http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn32http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn33http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn27http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn32http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/118680.htm#_edn33 -
7/29/2019 Specpro Full Cases
27/89
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23445 June 23, 1966
REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant,vs.FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors andappellees.
Custodio O. Partade for petitioner and appellant.Beltran, Beltran and Beltran for oppositors and appellees.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30,1962, single, without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate.Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and PazSalonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and sisters, namely:
Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, allsurnamed Nuguid.
On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Courtof First Instance of Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed by
Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years beforeher demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probateand that letters of administration with the will annexed be issuedto her.
On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid,concededly the legitimate father and mother of the deceasedRosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will.Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of petitionerRemedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors
who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the directascending line were illegally preterited and that inconsequence the institution is void.
On August 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition for
probate and objection thereto, oppositors moved to dismiss onthe ground of absolute preterition.
On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to themotion to dismiss.1wph1.t
The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will inquestion is a complete nullity and will perforce create intestacy ofthe estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed thepetition without costs.
A motion to reconsider having been thwarted below, petitionercame to this Court on appeal.
1. Right at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged ourattention. The case is for the probate of a will. The court's area ofinquiry is limited to an examination of, and resolution on,the extrinsicvalidity of the will. The due execution thereof, thetestatrix's testamentary capacity, and the compliance with therequisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are thequestions solelyto be presented, and to be acted upon, by thecourt. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not calledupon to rule on the intrinsicvalidity or efficacy of the provisions ofthe will, the legality of any devise or legacy therein.1
A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shuntedaside the question of whether or not the will should be allowedprobate. For them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity ofthe will. Normally, this comes only after the court has declaredthat the will has been duly authenticated.2 But petitioner andoppositors, in the court below and here on appeal, travelled onthe issue of law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically a nullity?
-
7/29/2019 Specpro Full Cases
28/89
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probateof the will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigationwill be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in theevent of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability existsthat the case will come up once again before us on the same
issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste oftime, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practicalconsiderations that induce us to a belief that we might as wellmeet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the willin question.3 After all, there exists a justiciable controversy cryingfor solution.
2. Petitioner's sole assignment of error challenges thecorrectness of the conclusion below that the will is a completenullity. This exacts from us a study of the disputed will and theapplicable statute.
Reproduced hereunder is the will:
Nov. 17, 1951
I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind andmemory, having amassed a certain amount of property, dohereby give, devise, and bequeath all of the property which I mayhave when I die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34,residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I havesigned my name this seventh day of November, nineteenhundred and fifty-one.
(Sgd.) Illegible
T/ ROSARIO NUGUID
The statute we are called upon to apply in Article 854 of the CivilCode which, in part, provides:
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or allof the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living atthe time of the execution of the will or born after the deathof the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but thedevises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious. ...
Except for inconsequential variation in terms, the foregoing is areproduction of Article 814 of the Civil Code of Spain of 1889,which is similarly herein copied, thus
Art. 814. The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs inthe direct line, whether living at the t