PALAGANAS v PALAGANAS FACTS: Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), asthe executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S.Respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of Ruperta, filedwith the a petition for the probate of Ruperta’s will and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate. However, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas(Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed itThe RTC issued an order: (a) admitting to probate Ruperta’s last will; (b)appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto.Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that anunprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines. The CA affirmed order of the RTC, holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will. The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Courtdoes not require prior probate and allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be probated in the Philippines. The present case is different from reprobate, which refers to a will already probated and allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by different rules or procedures. ISSUE: Whether a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed. HELD: Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed. Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province. The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its execution.In insisting that Ruperta’s will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is presented for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners’ stance, since this latter rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established. Besides, petitioners’ stand is fraught with impractically. If the instituted heirs do not have the means to go abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good as depriving them outright of their inheritance, since our law requires that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless the will has been proved and allowed by the proper court.

SO v TACLA FACTS: Petitioner David E. So (So) filed the petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo on behalf of his daughter, Ma. Elena So Guisande (Guisande), accused of Qualified Theft in the criminal case pending before Judge Tacla. Petitioner So alleged, among others, that Guisande was under a life-threatening situation while confined at the NCMH, the government hospital ordered by the RTC Mandaluyong City to ascertain the actual psychological state of Guisande, who was being charged with a non-bailable offense. The case arose from the following facts. Prior to the institution of the criminal proceedings, Guisande was committed by So for psychiatric treatment and care at the Makati Medical Center (MMC). Thus, the return of the warrant for the arrest of Guisande, issued by Judge Tacla which states that the former was confined at MMC for Bipolar Mood Disorder and that she was "not ready for discharge". Judge Tacla ordered Guisande’s referral to the NCMH for an independent forensic assessment of Guisande’s mental health to determine if she would be able to stand arraignment and undergo trial for Qualified Theft. Subsequently, Judge Tacla, upon motion of the NCMH, ordered that accused Guisande be physically brought to the NCMH to have temporary legal custody of the accused, and thereafter, Judge Tacla would issue the corresponding order of confinement of Guisande in a regular jail facility upon the NCMHs determination that she was ready for trial. Eventually, claiming "life-threatening" circumstances surrounding her confinement at the NCMH which supposedly worsened her mental condition and violated her constitutional rights against solitary detention and assistance of counsel, accused Guisande and her father filed a Motion for Relief from Solitary Confinement and the present petition for the issuance of the writs of habeas corpus and amparo. The court granted the Motion for Relief. On the petition for habeas corpus and amparo, the court resolved to issue a joint writ of habeas corpus and amparo and refer the petition to the Court of Appeals for decision. Meanwhile, NCMH submitted its Evaluation Report according to which, Guisande is competent to stand the rigors of court trial. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari. During the pendency of these consolidated cases, various events occurred which ultimately led to the incident before this Court. Public respondent Judge ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case for Qualified Theft against Guisande. In view of such dismissal, Judge Tacla contends that the cases for issuance of the writs of habeas corpus and amparo and the petition for review on certiorari should be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic. ISSUE: WHETHER THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR HAVING BEEN RENDERED MOOT AND ACADEMIC HELD: The petition should be dismissed. The petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo was based on the criminal case for Qualified Theft against petitioner Sos daughter, Guisande.

There is no affirmation of petitioner So’s claim that the confinement of accused Guisande at the NCMH was illegal. Neither were the respective acts performed by respondents Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente in ascertaining the mental condition of accused Guisande to withstand trial declared unlawful. On the contrary, the NCMH, a well-reputed government forensic facility, albeit not held in high regard by petitioner Sos and accused Guisandes family, had assessed Guisande fit for trial. The Rules on the Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo are clear; the act or omission or the threatened act or omission complained of - confinement and custody for habeas corpus and violations of, or threat to violate, a persons life, liberty, and security for amparo cases - should be illegal or unlawful. The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or place under some form of illegal restraint. If an individual’s liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant of the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed. In the cases at bar, the question before the CA was correctly limited to which hospital, the NCMH or a medical facility of accused’s own choosing, accused Guisande should be referred for treatment of a supposed mental condition. In addition, it was procedurally proper for the RTC to ask the NCMH for a separate opinion on accused’s mental fitness to be arraigned and stand trial. Certainly, with the dismissal of the non-bailable case against accused Guisande, she is no longer under peril to be confined in a jail facility, much less at the NCMH. Effectively, accused Guisande’s person, and treatment of any medical and mental malady she may or may not have, can no longer be subjected to the lawful processes of the RTC Mandaluyong City. In short, the cases have now been rendered moot and academic which, in the often cited David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, is defined as "one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value."

AMPATUAN v MACARAIG FACTS: Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department, was killed at the corner of M. H. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil Streets, Ermita, Manila. Investigation conducted by the Manila Police District Homicide Section yielded the identity of the male perpetrator as PO1 Ampatuan. Consequently, PO1 Ampatuan was commanded to the MPD District Director for proper disposition. Likewise, inquest proceedings were conducted by the Manila Prosecutor’s Office. On 18 April 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Guinto, rendered his Pre-Charge Evaluation Report against PO1 Ampatuan, finding probable cause to charge PO1 Ampatuan with Grave Misconduct (Murder) and recommending that said PO1 Ampatuan be subjected to summary hearing. Meanwhile, on 21 April 2008, the City Prosecutor of Manila recommended that the case against PO1 Ampatuan be set for further investigation and that the latter be released from custody unless he is being held for other charges/legal grounds. Armed with the 21 April 2008 recommendation of the Manila City’s Prosecution Office, petitioner, who is the wife of PO1 Ampatuan, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the RTC of Manila on 22 April 2008. On 24 April 2008, RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus commanding therein respondents to produce the body of PO1 Ampatuan and directing said respondents to show cause why they are withholding or restraining the liberty of PO1 Ampatuan. Seeking the reversal of RTC, the respondents averred that the filing of the administrative case against PO1 Ampatuan is a process done by the PNP and this Court has no authority to order the release of the subject police officer. The petitioner countered that the letter resignation of PO1 Ampatuan has rendered the administrative case moot and academic. Respondent however stressed that the resignation has not been acted by the appropriate police officials of the PNP, and that the administrative case was filed while PO1 Ampatuan is still in the active status of the PNP. The RTC reversed and dismissed the petition. ISSUE: THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE ARREST AND DETENTION OF PO1 BASSER B. AMPATUAN WAS MADE WITHOUT ANY WARRANT AND THEREFORE, ILLEGAL. HELD: The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person's detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive Custody. Republic Act No. 6975 (also known as the Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990), as

amended by Republic Act No. 8551 (also known as the Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998), clearly provides that members of the police force are subject to the administrative disciplinary machinery of the PNP. Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such constitutes a valid argument for his continued detention. This Court has held that a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty. Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor effective restraint that would call for the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary measure to assure the PNP authorities that the police officers concerned are always accounted for. In sum, petitioner is unable to discharge the burden of showing that she is entitled to the issuance of the writ prayed for in behalf of her husband, PO1 Ampatuan. The petition fails to show on its face that the latter is unlawfully deprived of his liberty guaranteed and enshrined in the Constitution.

CARAM v SEGUI

Writ of Amparo : Remedy available to victims of extra-judicial killings and enforced

disappearances and not to issues of child custody

xxx

Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child

custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has

been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.

To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-

judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of

whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee or a

private individual. It is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the right to life, liberty

and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life.

xxx

SANTOS v SANTOS (2014)

REPUBLIC v COSETENG

“x x x. A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.[1] Respondent’s reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds, however. The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines.[2] In Alfon, the Court allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use the name that she had been known since childhood in order to avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She merely sought to use the surname of her mother which she had been using since childhood. Ruling in her favor, the Court held that she was lawfully entitled to use her mother’s surname, adding that the avoidance of confusion was justification enough to allow her to do so. In the present case, however, respondent denies his legitimacy. The change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant respondent’s supplication. Labayo-Rowe v. Republic[3] categorically holds that “changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate . . . are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings . . .” Since respondent’s desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, Rule 108 applies. It reads: SECTION 1. Who may file petition.—Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for thecancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto,with the [RTC] of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. x x x x

SEC. 3. Parties.—When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar andall persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding. SEC. 4. Notice and publication. –Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied) Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns one’s civil status should be filed in the civil registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected – that of Makati in the present case, and “all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby” should be made parties to the proceeding. As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati where his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City. And as the above-mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent before the RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties thereto. X x x.”

ONDES v CIVIL REGISTRAR OF LAS PINAS

Under RA 9048, clerical or typographical error or change of first name in the birth certificate

of a person can now be done administratively by the local Civil Registrar or by the Consul

General without the need of a judicial order. This is explained in this case of Francis.

Francis is the son of Jaime and Teresita. In his birth certificate, his name is listed as Franc

while his mother’s name is Tess and that his parents were married on the date and placed

specified theiren.

Since there are errors in his first name and that of his mother and since he is really an

illegitimate child, he filed a Petition for Correction of Entries before the Regional Trial Court

(RTC) pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court praying that his name be corrected from

Franc to Francis and his mother’s name from Tess to Teresita. He also asked the court to

delete the date and place of marriage of his parents and instead enter therein the words “not

married.”

The RTC however dismissed his petition. It ruled that the correction in the first name of

Francis and his mother can be administratively done by the civil registrar pursuant to RA

9048 while the other correction deleting the date and place of marriage of his parents and

entering instead the words “not married” can be done only in an adversarial proceedings

since the correction is substantial in nature and would affect Francis’ status as a legitimate

child.

Francis however insisted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court allows substantial corrections so

he should be allowed to present proof that his parents were not married, during the trial, not

during the filing of the petition.

Was Francis correct?

No. RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of

clerical or typographical errors which may consist of errors in the first name of the child or

his parents. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of the firstname from the

coverage of the Rules of Court until and unless an administrative petition is first filed and

subsequently denied.

On the other hand correcting the entries on the birth certificate of Francis on the date and

place of marriage of his parents and changing it to “not married” is a substantial correction

requiring adversarial proceedings. Substantial or controversial alterations include those on the

citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage. So, strict

compliance with the requirements of the Rules of Court is mandated by impleading as parties

to the proceedings not only the local civil registrar but also all persons who have or claim any

interest which would be affected by the correction.

In this case therefore, Francis should at least implead his father and mother since the

substantial correction he is seeking will also affect them.

REPUBLIC v CAGANDAHAN

FACTS:

Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in her Certificate of Live Birth. During her

childhood years, she suffered from clitoral hypertrophy and was later on diagnosed that her

ovarian structures had minimized. She likewise has no breast nor menstruation.

Subsequently, she was diagnosed of having Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a

condition where those afflicted possess secondary male characteristics because of too much

secretion of male hormones, androgen. According to her, for all interests and appearances as

well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. She filed a petition at RTC

Laguna for Correction of Entries in her Birth Certificate such that her gender or sex be

changed to male and her first name be changed to Jeff.

ISSUE:

Whether correction of entries in her birth certificate should be granted.

HELD:

The Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of

intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. SC is of the view that

where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender

classification would be what the individual, having reached the age of majority, with good

reason thinks of his/her sex. As in this case, respondent, thinks of himself as a male and

considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones, there is preponderant

biological support for considering him as being a male. Sexual development in cases of

intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that

the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.

GAPUSAN v CA

FACTS:

• Felisa Gapusan Parcon died intestate on April 6, 1966.

• Petitioner Ligaya Gapusan-Chua, claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter of the

deceased, instituted judicial proceedings for the settlement of the latter’s estate.

• The Court appointed Ligaya as Special Administratrix of Felisa Parcon’s estate.

• Prospero Parcon, Felisa’s surviving husband denied that Ligaya was an acknowledged

natural child of the deceased wife.

• Ligaya presented among other proofs, the following documents: a) Felisa’s sworn

statement of assets and liabilities wherein Ligaya was named and described as daughter of

Felisa; b) Felisa’s application for GSIS life insurance in which Ligaya is set out as her

daughter; c) GSIS check in the sum of P505.50 paid to Ligaya as her share in the death

benefits due the heirs of Felisa; d) a family photograph, showing Ligaya beside the

deceased.

• Responded averred that : petitioner cannot claim that she was acknowledged as a natural

child of the deceased as she was named by the same a “adopted daughter” in various

documents. The probate court ruled in favor of Ligaya while the Court of Appeals set the

lower court’s decision aside.

ISSUE:

Whether Felisa's sworn statement of assets and liabilities and her application for insurance

are "authentic writings" which effectively operated as a recognition of Ligaya Gapusan-Chua

as her natural child, even if no action was brought by the latter to compel the former, during

her lifetime, to recognize her as such.

RULING:

• Ligaya Gapusan Chua must be held to be a voluntarily acknowledged natural child of

Felisa.

• Recognition of natural children may be voluntary or compulsory. Judicial approval is not

needed if a recognition is voluntarily made —1) of a person who is of age, only his

consent being necessary; or2) of a minor whose acknowledgment is effected in a record

of birth or in a will.

• On the other hand, judicial approval is needful if the recognition of the minor is effected,

not through a record of birth or in a will but through a statement in a court of record or an

authentic document. In any case the individual recognized can impugn the recognition

within four years following the attainment of his majority.

• Each of these writings is undoubtedly an "authentic writing" within the contemplation of

Article 278. "An authentic writing' for purposes of voluntary recognition . . . (is)

understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the father" (or mother), including "a

public instrument" (one acknowledged before a notary public or other competent official

with the formalities required by law) and, of course, a public or official document in

accordance with Section20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

• The acknowledgment was made in authentic writings , and hence, conformably with the

legal provisions above cited, judicial approval thereof was needed if the writings had

been executed during Ligaya's minority. In other words, the question of whether or not

the absence of judicial approval negated the effect of the writings as a mode of

recognition of Ligaya is dependent upon the latter's age at the time the writings were

made.

• The consent required by Article 281 of a person of age who has been voluntarily

recognized may be given expressly or tacitly. Assuming then that Ligaya was of age at

the time of her voluntary recognition, the evidence shows that she has in fact consented

thereto. Her consent to her recognition is not only implicit from her failure to impugn it at

any time before her mother's death, but is made clearly manifest and conclusive by her

assertion of that recognition in the judicial proceeding for the settlement of her mother's

estate as basis for her rights thereto. Assuming on the other hand, that she was a minor at

the time of her recognition, and therefore judicial approval of the recognition was

necessary, the absence thereof was cured by her ratification of that recognition, after

having reached the age of majority, by her initiation of the proceedings for the settlement

of her deceased mother's estateon the claim precisely that she was the decedent's

acknowledged natural daughter.

LAHOM v SIBULO

Adoption, Being In The Best Interest Of The Child, Shall Not Be Subject To Rescission By

The Adopter…

May a person who adopted a child rescind the decree of adoption?

Diosdado and Isabelita’s marriage was not blessed with a child, hence, they took care of

Isabelita’s nephew, Jose Melvin, to bring up as their own child. Finally, they decided to

adopt Jose Melvin. On May 5, 1972, the Civil Registrar of Naga changed the surname of

Jose Melvin from “Sibulo” to “Lahom” in keeping with the court order granting the adoption.

Many years later, Isabelita, now a widow, filed an action to rescind the adoption of Jose

Melvin, on the following grounds:

1. Jose refused to change his surname, and her husband while still living, out of frustration,

has already decided to rescind the adoption but was only prevailed upon by her;

2. In all his professional dealings and records, Jose Melvin still uses the name “Sibulo”

instead of “Lahom”;

3. Jose Melvin only visits her once a year, when she is alone in the city and only lives with

her household helps;

4. He is indifferent, callous, and jealous of the other nephews and nieces of the petitioner.

Jose Melvin filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that under the new laws on adoption,

Republic Act 8552, the adopter cannot rescind anymore the decree of adoption.

The trial court dismissed the petition for lack of cause of action, citing the provisions of

Section 19 of Republic Act 8552 which reads:

“SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. — Upon petition

of the adoptee, with the assistance of the Department if a minor or

if over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as

guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the

following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated

physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having

undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c)

sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure to

comply with parental obligations.

“Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be

subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s)

may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of

the Civil Code.” (emphasis supplied)

The Supreme Court, in denying the appeal filed by Isabelita, ruled that;

“It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to

revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law,22 had already

abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to

rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the Court should

now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by

petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued.

Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is

subject to the five-year bar rule under Rule 10023 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter

would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise

of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements

of a vested right entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged that a person has no

vested right in statutory privileges.24 While adoption has often been referred to in the context

of a “right,” the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a

right merely created by statute.25 It is a privilege that is governed by the state’s

determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child.26

Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the

adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the State.27 Concomitantly, a right of action

given by statute may be taken away at anytime before it has been exercised.28

While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to

rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be

undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura

lex sed lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is

still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of

adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise

accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an

adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely

exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.”

REPUBLIC v HERNANDEZ

Change of name

It is necessary to reiterate in this discussion that a person’s name is a word or combination of

words by which he is known and identified, and distinguished from others, for the

convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. It

is both of personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name.

Authority to change names

By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a person’s birth must be entered in the civil register. The

official name of a person is that given him in the civil register. That is his name in the eyes of

the law. And once the name of a person is officially entered in the civil register, Article 376

of the Civil Code seals that identity with its precise mandate: no person can change his name

or surname without judicial authority. In 22 March 2001, however, Republic Act No. 9048

was passed, providing for an exception: for clerical or typographical errors and change of

first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal

civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its

implementing rules and regulations. Still, it would still hold true that the State has an interest

in names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification

Clerical errors

Under Republic Act No. 9048, clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or

nickname can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or

consul general.

What constitutes clerical or typographical error

A "clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of

clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is

harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like,

which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed

only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction

must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner.

Change of name under Rule 103

For purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376 of the Civil Code and

correlatively implemented by Rule 103, the only name that may be changed is the true or

official name recorded in the civil register. As earlier mentioned, a petition for change of

name being a proceeding in rem, impressed as it is with public interest, strict compliance with

all the requisites therefor in order to vest the court with jurisdiction is essential, and failure

therein renders the proceedings a nullity.

Nature of proceedings

A change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the

court which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of a change of name and to

deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown. Before a person can be authorized to

change his name, that is, his true or official name or that which appears in his birth certificate

or is entered in the civil register, he must show proper and reasonable cause or any

convincing reason which may justify such change.

Grounds to support the petition

Jurisprudence has recognized, among others, the following grounds as being sufficient to

warrant a change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely

difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence of

legitimation or adoption; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has

continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of

alien parentage; (e) when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to

erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and (f)

when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of

name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public

interest.

Contrarily, a petition for change of name grounded on the fact that one was baptized by

another name, under which he has been known and which he used, has been denied inasmuch

as the use of baptismal names is not sanctioned. For, in truth, baptism is not a condition sine

qua non to a change of name. Neither does the fact that the petitioner has been using a

different name and has become known by it constitute proper and reasonable cause to legally

authorize a change of name. A name given to a person in the church records or elsewhere or

by which he is known in the community - when at variance with that entered in the civil

register - is unofficial and cannot be recognized as his real name.

CASTRO v GREGORIO

GARCIA v DRILON

RA 9262; Temporary Protection Order (TPO); The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot be challenged as violative of the right to due process. x x x. Section 15 of RA 9262 provides: SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders. – Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs) refers to the protection order issued by the court on the date of filing of the application after ex parte determination that such order should be issued. A court may grant in a TPO any, some or all of the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The court shall schedule a hearing on the issuance of a [Permanent Protection Order] PPO prior to or on the date of the expiration of the TPO. The court shall order the immediate personal service of the TPO on the respondent by the court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents for the service. The TPO shall include notice of the date of the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO. In Garcia v. Drilon,wherein petitioner therein argued that Section 15 of RA 9262 is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, we struck down the challenge and held: A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support. The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the petitioner thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since “time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,” the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to recur. There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses’ affidavits to the petition.

The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is protection of women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security. It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days from service on the respondent. Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice. The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued. It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. x x x. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. “To be heard” does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.” x x x “Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that “the Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.” Hence, the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any law is primarily the function of the legislature. The act of Congress entrusting us with the issuance of protection orders is in pursuance of our authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights.”

DABALOS v QUIAMBAO

RA 9262: It Is Immaterial Whether The Relationship Had Ceased For As Long As There Is

Sufficient Evidence Showing The Past Or Present Existence Of Such Relationship Between

The Offender And The Victim When The Physical Harm Was Committed…

Karlo was charged with violation of Republic Act 9262 because he allegedly used physical

violence against ABC, her former girlfriend. When the Information was filed against him by

the Office of the City Prosecutor, and a warrant of arrest issued against him, he filed a

Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and to Quash Information. According

to him, he cannot be charged with violation of Republic Act 9262 because the incident

subject of the case happened after their break-up, which ABC admitted in her affidavit, hence

there is no more “dating relationship” which will make the case fall under Republic Act

9262, and the appropriate case should be slight physical injuries only cognizable by the

MTC. His motion was denied by the RTC, hence he filed a Rule 45 petition directly with the

Supreme Court on pure question of law.

Can Karlo be charged with violation of Republic Act 9262 even if the alleged incident took

place after their break-up as lovers?

“The Court is not persuaded. Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262 reads:

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act, (a) “Violence against women and their

children” refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who

is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or

dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether

legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to

result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including

threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.

x x x.

The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of acts

to be considered as a crime of violence against women through physical harm, namely: 1) it

is committed against a woman or her child and the woman is the offender’s wife, former

wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a

common child; and 2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering.

In Ang v. Court of Appeals, the Court enumerated the elements of the crime of violence

against women through harassment, to wit:

1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;

2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment

against the woman; and

3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.

Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with

the offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of

violence be a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation be

inferred. Hence, applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not

distinguish, neither should the courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of

violence against women with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship.

As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as

long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of such relationship

between the offender and the victim when the physical harm was committed. Consequently,

the Court cannot depart from the parallelism in Ang and give credence to petitioner’s

assertion that the act of violence should be due to the sexual or dating relationship.

Neither can the Court construe the statute in favor of petitioner using the rule of lenity

because there is no ambiguity in RA 9262 that would necessitate any construction. While the

degree of physical harm under RA 9262 and Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code are the

same, there is sufficient justification for prescribing a higher penalty for the former. Clearly,

the legislative intent is to purposely impose a more severe sanction on the offenders whose

violent act/s physically harm women with whom they have or had a sexual or dating

relationship, and/or their children with the end in view of promoting the protection of women

and children.

The Court will not read into Republic Act (RA) No. 9262 a provision that would render it

toothless in the pursuit of the declared policy of the State to protect women and children from

violence and threats to their personal safety and security.

ARANETA v ARANETA