Etică icircn analiza de intelligence

MOTTO bdquoO acţiune nu poate fi justificată decacirct prin referinţă la o anumită tablă de valorirdquo (O Cotruş)

Activitatea analistului de intelligence similar altor profesii sau domenii de activitate este reglementată prin legi naţionale (aplicabile activităţii generale de intelligence) şi acte normative interne aferente domeniului analizei de informaţii Sintagma etica procesului de intelligence este descrisă drept un oximoron de către majoritatea autorilor dar este considerată valoroasă icircn susţinerea eforturilor de icircmbunătăţire a profesionalismului şi controlului serviciilor de informaţii

Etica diferă de lege icircn timp ce legile sunt icircntotdeauna formale etica poate fi informală funcţionacircnd pe baza unor principii care adeseori nu sunt codificate oficial legile sunt aplicate printr-un sistem juridic icircn vreme ce respectarea normelor etice este de obicei lăsată la latitudinea grupurilor profesionale sau a organizaţieiPrincipalele paliere de analiză a eticii procesului de intelligence suntbull relaţia dintre etică şi legebull nivele instituţionale şi individuale de responsabilitate eticăbull abordări etice ale procesului de intelligence21Icircn ceea ce priveşte nivelul de responsabilitate etică acesta poate fi individual şi instituţional Serviciile de informaţii sunt responsabile de demersul etic al organizaţiei ca icircntreg şi au obligaţia de a stabili parametri etici pe care angajaţii să icirci respecte22 La racircndul lor analiştii ca orice alt ofiţer de informaţii trebuie să-şi asume o conduită profesională aflată icircn deplină concordanţă cu normele şi principiile etice cu relevanţă pentru domeniul analizei de informaţiiActivitatea analitică valorizează icircndeosebi principii axiologice precum adevăr acurateţe exactitate obiectivitate Toate acestea constituie repere etice ale analizei informaţiei alături de coordonatele definitorii ale relaţiei cu beneficiarul icircncredere confidenţialitate disponibilitateDin această perspectivă codul etic şi deontologic al analistului de informaţii nu este un manual de proceduri şi nici un instrument disciplinarCodul etic şi deontologic al analistului contribuie esenţial la (1) asigurarea conduitei etice a analistului prin formarea şi promovarea unei culturi profesionale adecvate cultivarea personalului icircn spiritul acesteia prevenirea abaterilor comportamentale şi creşterea calitativă a activităţilor specifice (2) păstrarea echilibrului icircntre drepturile cetăţenilor interesele autorităţilor publice drepturile şi obligaţiile personalului instituţieiIcircn sensul precizărilor de mai sus ar putea fi considerate drept principii1048713 Conştientizarea gradului ridicat de responsabilitate cu care a fost investit icircn temeiulrolului pe care icircl deţine icircn ansamblul activităţii de informaţii Acest principiu presupune evaluarea imparţială a informaţiei de securitate icircn perspectiva implicaţiilor de amploare pe care le pot determina icircn plan social rezultatele activităţii analistului reflectate icircndocumentele de informare transmise beneficiarului Concluziile demersului analitic trebuie să se situeze ndash icircn orice situaţie ndash icircn afara oricăror interferenţe cu păreri şi presupuneri nefundamentate (opinii indusepreluate din exterior)

1

sau presiuni mai mult sau puţin explicite icircn vederea bdquoremodelăriirdquo conjuncturale a rezultatelor analizei1048713 Onestitatea icircn autoevaluarea propriilor limite bdquoanaliticerdquo Asumarea responsabilităţii icircn raport cu elementele de conţinut ale produsului analitic finit induce necesitatea unei evaluări oneste a limitelor de cunoaştere şi de icircnţelegere pe care orice analist le are icircnraport cu problematica de securitate pe care o abordează Consecinţa acestei atitudini se poate reflecta icircn decizia pe care analistul o adoptă la un moment dat de a nu se exprima icircn raport cu un subiect asupra căruia are o cunoaştere parţială ori nulă1048713 Imperativul responsabilităţii convergente Pe fiecare dintre trepteleetapele parcurse icircn fluxul procesării analiticepromovării produsului informaţional fiecare intervenţie a şefului profesional asupra conţinutului acestuia necesită nu doar o asumare explicită a responsabilităţii icircn raport cu modificările operate ci şi comunicarea către emitent a argumentului icircn temeiul căruia sa justificat o asemenea intervenţie Un asemenea imperativ se justifică inclusiv icircn procesul de revizuire a produsului finit de intelligence Realizată icircn mod judicios această operaţiune poate reprezenta una dintre cele mai eficiente modalităţi de prevenire a apariţiei distorsiunilor inerente oricărei etape aferente elaborării unui produs informaţional Din nefericire astfel de distorsiuni pot afecta icircnanumite situaţii icircnsăşi activitatea de revizuirePentru a preveni apariţia unor situaţii de această factură este util ca atunci cacircnd apar diferenţe majore icircntre textul iniţial şi cel rezultat la capătul fluxului de evaluare a acestuia pentru a putea fi remis beneficiarilor legali analistul să poarte discuţii cu membrii grupului de lucru (dacă a funcţionat un astfel de grup) şi cu şeful profesional care asigură activitatea de supervizare1048713 Tenacitate icircn susţinerea propriilor evaluări Ofiţerul analist trebuie să-şi susţină opiniile(fundamentate pe o cunoaştere profundă a problemei investigate) indiferent cacirct de bdquoinadecvatrdquo ar putea bdquosunardquo icircntr-o oarecare conjunctură concluziile demersului analiticO atitudine similară se impune a fi adoptată de către analist icircn demersul de reconsiderarereformulare a concluziilor atunci cacircnd apar noi elemente de natură să modifice datele iniţiale ale problemeiIcircncurajarea acestei atitudini se poate realiza prin promovarea tipurilor de activităţi care pun analiştii icircn confruntare cu perspective alternative consultarea cu experţi din exteriorul sistemului de securitate dezbateri analitice interdisciplinare analize concurente şa Această abordare este cu atacirct mai necesară cu cacirct deseori beneficiarii informării solicită ca produsul finit de intelligence să includă scenarii alternative pentru a se reduce cacirct mai mult elementele de incertitudine1048713 Creativitate şi spirit inovativ O condiţie sine qua non a asigurării adaptabilităţii sistemului de intelligence la valurile succesive de provocări ale mediului de securitate oreprezintă preocuparea icircn plan instituţional de a favoriza creativitatea şi spiritul inovativSituată icircn opoziţie cu rutina şi birocraţia excesivă creativitatea (şi complementul ei spiritul inovativ) icircn domeniul analizei informaţiilor se manifestă prin capacitatea de a pune icircn valoare ipoteze proiecte teme şamd poziţionate icircn afara bdquoparadigmei consacraterdquo şi prin utilizarea de metodologii nespecificeatipice care se dovedesc utile procesului analiticAspectele menţionate mai sus sunt doar cacircteva dintre elementele care pot articula un ansamblu de principii deontologice specifice analizei de intelligence Fără a avea

2

pretenţia că acestea epuizează sfera unui posibil cadru deontologic icircn materie raţiunea pentru care au fost formulate este de a pune icircn valoare o perspectivă de abordare a fenomenului analitic specific serviciilor de informaţii situată dincolo de imperativele generate prin ansamblul normativ consacrat

Though several writers have discussed the morality of war and the ethics of the soldier2 few have specifically addressed the ethics of intelligence operations Perhaps this void in the literature exists because such operations do not fit neatly within the more traditional forms of foreign policy operationsmdashdiplomacy and military forcemdashbut instead lie somewhere in between we define lsquolsquointelligence servicesrsquorsquo to mean both (1) the collection and analysis of information about threats to the security and interests of the nation and (2) the use of clandestine resources to carry out the foreign policy of the nation The former category involves such activities as espionage and the use of intrusive technical sensors the latter includes such activities as propaganda psychological warfare the use of agents of influence deception disinformation and support for paramilitary or guerrilla forces Throughout our analysis we recognize the important distinction between mere information-gathering services which most people consider to be acceptable intelligence activities and covert activities that interfere with the internal affairs of other nations which are more difficult to justify on moral grounds Nevertheless we contend that some forms of intelligence operations that may be considered immoral are nevertheless justifiable in particular circumstances

intelligence can be viewed as an extension of diplomacy complete with rules that prevent certain forms of abuse although these are largely unacknowledged parameters and conventions23

Clandestine intelligence gathering covert action torture and targeted killingmdash all are dramatic yet familiar themes to seasoned observers of world history and international conflict Over the centuries rules governing such activities have evolved and restraints have been developed to regulate these darker aspects of human conflictWhere does one go for guidance on the tough moral choices that confront us today How do we calculate the trade-offs that are demanded by the imperfect world in which we live How do we evaluate the institutional arrangements of todayrsquos intelligence community and the actions of those professionals who must act within its systemSurprisingly there is no central address for reflection on the ethical dimensions of the intelligence profession Yet the direction is clear Institutional design is not merely aesthetic It is decisive in producing morally favorable results Proper oversight reporting and accountability procedures go a long way to tipping the balance toward creating intelligence agencies that yield morally desirable outcomes Similarly hiring and promoting people of integrity in the professionmdashmen and women with a strong moral compassmdashwill encourage morally favorable outcomes at the level of personal decision-makingPerhaps the most powerful force for ethics in the intelligence profession is open and honest reflection Free debate is the beginning of the education process Forthright discussion is what distinguishes the American approach from many others Self-criticism

3

makes us strong Analysis of tough cases becomes our ally as we think about the values and standards that will guide us in the future

The role of ethics in intelligence work has always been either misunderstood or poorly appreciated by both policymakers and the public leading to the stale joke that lsquolsquoethicsrsquorsquo and lsquolsquointelligencersquorsquo form an oxymoron In other words lsquolsquodoing whatrsquos rightrsquorsquo (ie doing your job which may require you to act immorally) should not interfere with doing lsquolsquothe right thingrsquorsquo (ie acting with moral principles) Of course most work done by intelligence professionals does not involve a moral dilemma such as providing accurate analysis or collecting information Sometimes however conflicting requirements and tasks impose significant ethical and moral dilemmas upon people doing their job Consequently public servants must make a decision or take an action that could be considered inappropriate or unethical for a similar circumstancein their private lives

The public is inundated with the perception that intelligence professionals will say or do anything to accomplish their jobs and that to be employed as an intelligence professional is to abandon any sense of moral judgment Bookstores and theaters are filled with stories of people who are sanctioned by the government and thus they have a lsquolsquolicensersquorsquo to lie cheat steal or kill This license is bestowed on the individual in the name of society to act as we dare not They are not responsible for their actions and morality be damned

Professionals in many fields have standards of ethical conduct with established codes of ethics to include psychologists (by the American Psychological Association) lawyers (by the American Bar Association) doctors (by the American Medical Association) organists (by the American Guild of Organists) music teachers (by the Music Teachers Association) real estate appraisers (by the Society of Real Estate Appraisers) funeral directors (by the Funeral Ethics Association) travel agents (by the American Society of Travel Agents) and speleologists (ie people who study caves by the National Speleological Society) The list goes on and on1 All these professions have a concern with the issues and ethical conflicts that those who work in that field may encounter These concerns may include problems of honesty confidentiality privacy impartiality accountability and conflicts of interest In the intelligence business these concerns are as real as in any other profession

Lacking legal directives or guidance intelligence professionals are left to decide for themselves how far they and the country they represent can go before losing the moral high ground And if it is legal is it ethical

Most ethics and intelligence education which is really training normally consists of management and leadership techniques learning the legal ramifications for conducting certain actions and decisions associating the intelligence profession with the military profession or learning from previous ethical mishaps through case studies Although all of these are excellent teaching tools they fail to take into consideration the moral underpinnings of this very volatile and possibly morally damaging profession

4

None of these pedagogical methods seeks to establish a theory upon which a code of ethics can be built a framework that can transcend the intelligence community

To some the mere juxtaposition of ethics and intelligence may appear to be a contradiction in terms But at heart intelligence is rooted in the severest of ethical principles truth telling After all the end purpose of the elaborate apparatus that the intelligence community has become is to provide the policymaker with as close to a truthful depiction of a given situation as is humanly possible Anything less is not intelligence It may be useful opinionmdash in some cases it may even be more accurate than prevailing intelligencemdash but if it is the opinion maker is lucky or in the particular instance possessed of more facts and sharper judgmental skills than the professionalintelligence officer Even the CIA has long recognized the centrality of truth telling As a contributor to Foreign Affairs observed several years ago the motto of the CIA chosen by the doughty old Presbyterian Allen Dulles is lsquolsquoAnd the Truth Shall Make You Freersquorsquo1 To accept the approximation of truth as the purpose of intelligence is one thing To accept the methods by which truth can be obtained poses ethical dilemmas The truth after all is often a set of facts or concrete physical entities or intentions which the party with whom they are entrusted will guard jealously as a precious not to say sacred element of the national preserve Ferreting out the truth under these circumstances often requires means and techniques not ordinarily employed in human intercourseBut we are not all ethical absolutists Value trade-offs are probably the best that most people in an uncertain world will accept And it is because intelligence offers security that bizarre methods to obtain it are acceptable to most Foreign policy making without an intelligence input of some kind would be capricious in the uncharted waters of world crisis situations it would be scandalously foolhardy It follows that the more ambiguous the international situation the greater the value of intelligence in the decision-makingprocess Put another way of course this means that where intelligence does not add to international security but rather say to the obsessive comfort of knowing more about Ruritania than even the Ruritanians or where it merely facilitates the feeding of salacious tidbits about foreign leaders to inquisitive Presidents questionable methods to collect it are not acceptableThe security returns of intelligence are probably inestimable and they are welcomed by both world superpowers and tacitly condoned by almost all active participating nations on the world stage Satellites monitor the missiledevelopments of the superpowers microwave telephone messages between foreign embassies and capitals are intercepted for critical informationIn a world where the two great powers can no longer guarantee international stability and where weaponry is no longer the exclusive currency of power intelligence monitoring must sweep targets other than the principal antagonistmdasheg China or the Middle East It must also be as concerned with economic and energy considerations as missiles But the principle governing the choice of targets remains the same Intelligence must promoteinternational security or the ethical compromises necessary to accommodate the requisite collection methods cannot and should not be stomached Intelligence monitoring substitutes for full faith and credit between nations and technology provides a pitiful but

5

workable substitute for the joyful conditions of a distant One World The tensions of the nation-state system are in other words held in bounds not only by diplomacy and bymutual common sense but by carefully calibrated monitoring systemsAssuming then that intelligence can help toward security in a dangerous international order how can the intelligence function be carried out at the least risk to other values in our society To put this most succinctly how can a professional intelligence service operate so that officials within it perform their roles in an ethical manner Most public officials would prefer that this be the case certainly most private citizens expect nothing less

Foreign intelligence is not by and large conducted by people lacking the capacity to recognize ethical standards but standards are lowered to accommodate the perceived national purpose Once lowered they can be more easily lowered a second time or they can be lowered further and further as routine reduces ethical resistance to repugnant activities This is the area of human dynamics where yesterdayrsquos managers of the intelligence community have been the most irresolute Management rarely blew the whistle on subordinates When subordinates succeeded in operations of questionablemorality they were as often rewarded with promotions as reprimanded for using dubious methods

Most professions such as the law and medicine have for centuries provided themselves with fail-safe systems to ensure that ethical norms are not compromised out of existence or rusted from misuse Some of these systems work better than others some are susceptible to corruption themselves and a few are mere shams but the fact that they exist and generally are taken seriously by the members of the profession is critically significant At the very least it means that there are limits to a professionalrsquos freedom and thatthose limits are defined by ethical codes sanctioned by colleagues A profession whose end purpose it is to root out the truth cannot afford to resist asking where its limits should be set However the intelligence professional has in the past operated under the simple guideline lsquolsquodonrsquot get caughtrsquorsquo Recently there have been signs that suggest that the intelligence community is busily if somewhat ponderously groping toward a limitsetting policy for its professionalsHuman intelligence collection is a major preoccupation of the clandestine service Simply put this is the process of extracting from others information or national assets theywould not willingly part with under normal circumstances In some cases the creation of appropriate circumstances is relatively easyThis is where the source is a willing volunteer acting out of his own sense of patriotism Anti-Soviet eacutemigreacute Hungarians providing detailed information on Russian military units occupying their country fall into this category The clandestine officer must provide the means whereby the eacutemigreacute can return to his country By and large the clandestine officer can content himself with the knowledge that the Hungarian is as anxious to reenter his homeland illegally as he is anxious to have him make the effort But the highest art in tradecraft is to develop a source that you lsquolsquoown lock stock and barrelrsquorsquo According to the clandestine ethos a lsquolsquocontrolledrsquorsquo source provides the most reliable intelligence lsquolsquoControlledrsquorsquo means of course bought or otherwise obligated Traditionally it has been the aim of the professional in the clandestine service to weave a psychological web around any potentially fruitful contact and to tighten that web whenever possible

6

Opportunities are limited but for those in the clandestine service who successfully develop controlled sources rewards in status and peer respect are high The modus operandi required however is the very antithesis of ethical interpersonal relationships

Sometimes the information obtained by these methods can be important It is however rarely of critical importance At best it may provide a measure of confirmation of some already suspected development or fill in a missing piece of a complex mosaic of facts There have been occasions when controlled sources have been successful in snatching internal documents off high-level desks in their own governments but even in these instances the lsquolsquotakersquorsquo has not been earthshaking Perhaps the faintly disappointing recordof achievement by clandestine operatives is explainable in bureaucratic terms Well-placed officials with immediate access to critical policy-making circlesmdashand for the most part this means they are part of the policy-making processmdashare generally well rewarded by and well satisfied with their own governments If they were not they would not hold powerful positions The main targets for clandestine collectors are usually second- and third-level officials who may not be fully privy to policy developments

Quality of information obtained aside a fundamental ethical issue concerning clandestine human collection remains That issue is the impact on the clandestine officer of his relationship with his source The formerrsquos bread and butter is the subversion of the latterrsquos integrity The officer is painstakingly trained in techniques that will convert an acquaintance into a submissive tool to shred away his resistance and deflate his sense of self-worth Of course the source may be thoroughly cynical even a venal merchant of his countryrsquos privacy and in that case the task of the clandestine officer is less burdensomemdashalthough he may come to find the relationship just as repellent as if the source had slowly and resistingly been bent to complianceWhatever the chemistry between the two individuals collector and source or perhaps more pointedly dominant and dominated the biggest loser is the one whose ethical scruples are most damaged in the process Depending on the techniques he may have to use to bring the source under control and maintain that relationship the biggest loser may be the clandestine officerAnother prime concern of the clandestine services is the development of methodologies and devices to thwart the defensive measures of other intelligence agencies and other national political systems While much of this activity is purely technical electronic engineering a significant investment has also been made in such exotica as lsquolsquotruth drugsrsquorsquo complex psychological warfare strategies bizarre bugging devices and the like Some of these devices and techniques have been used with profit and success by clandestine officers operating overseas others have proved impractical in the field or have stalled on the drawing board as development costs got out of hand But the search for new ways to penetrate other societies goes on Todayrsquos drug experimenters (if there are indeed any left) may become tomorrowrsquos experts in longrange behavior-modification processesWhatever the state of these arcane arts they have two things in common First their purpose is almost always to facilitate the manipulation of man by man In this sense they are not dissimilar in effect and impact to the process of controlled source development Secondly the practitioners of these arts and the lsquolsquopsych warfarersquorsquo experts are obliged by

7

the very nature of their trade to presume that they are operating in hostile environments The end point of their efforts after all is to bypass normal authority or at the least to usesemi-legal means to overcome obstacles placed in their path by the authorities of other nations The professional premise of the officers engaged in these practices then is the constructive use of illegality

Many of the arguments used to question the efficacy and suitability of political operations can be applied to the process of human clandestine intelligence collection the product is not all that impressive the moral damage to the collectors is high intelligence tends to be collected as an end in itself and there is always the risk of exposure Nevertheless intelligence must be collected in selected areas and against specific subject targets Technology is now the workhorse of the collection business and it should remain so Thepresent Director has in effect recognized this evolution in collection methods he has justified his reduction of covert officers on this ground Photographic and audio satellites and other interception devices are immensely expensive but they have the advantage of doing only minimal damage to the ethical standards of the operators and processors As noted above technological intelligence collection is in at least one highly significant areamdashthat of arms limitation controlmdashtacitly accepted as essential to security by bothsuperpowers6Of course even with the phasing down of clandestine human collection the need will remain for residual capability in certain esoteric collection techniques Atmospheric conditions in some geographic locations may be so unfavorable that short-range collection devices will be needed to supplement lsquolsquostand-offrsquorsquo equipment such as satellites There will always be the need for personnel skilled in the techniques of situating these devices Similarly there must be those who can exploit the defector or the lsquolsquowalk-inrsquorsquo sourceCounterintelligence is another field of clandestine intelligence activity which probably cannot be dispensed with for some years to come But if counterintelligence is to survive it should be organized on a purely defensive basis as a protection against foreign penetration of the US intelligence services and their technical capabilities It should be a small lean component with a sophisticated understanding not only of the technological capabilities of major foreign intelligence services but also of those countriesrsquo politicaldynamics Far from being walled off from other Agency components as in the past it should be a vital part of Agency life as much to gain from exposure to varying points of view as to influence those points of view

Obviously action is facilitated if both intelligence and operations can be controlled under one organization but an offsetting merit of separation is that an intelligence unit is more likely to be impartial in its assessment of the success of operations if it is independent of any attempt by the operational side to interpret the evidence regarding success or failure too favorably For all these reasons I continue to stand for the independence of intelligence from operations both covert and overt to the highest possible level in

8

government organization although of course recognizing the need for the greatest possible understanding between intelligence and operational staffs

Puncte esentiale privind etica intelligence-ului

ASSASSINATIONHelms himself observed that lsquolsquowar corrupts and secret war corrupts secretlyrsquorsquo14 So it is easy to slip toward the acceptance of assassination as one of its techniques In 1940 there was a suggestion that there would be a specialBritish clandestine operation to attack the aircrews of the German pathfinderswho were causing us so much trouble in the Blitz They were to beambushed while being ferried by bus between their billets and the airfield atVannes before taking off for an attack This was vetoed by Sir Charles Portalthe Chief of Air Staff but as the war progressed feelings became less delicateLater at the time of the Suez crisis in 1956 there was even talkmdashitappearsmdashof attempting to assassinate President Nasser15 In America AllenDulles aware of the danger of the CIA slipping toward an acceptance ofassassination specifically forbade it when he was Director and an embargowas included in presidential directives on three occasions Nevertheless itwas sometimes attempted with disastrous results for the CIA when it cameto lightTORTURE AND DURESSTorture too was officially barredmdashat least to the extent of a rule being formulatedby Helms in 1955 under Dullesrsquos directorship lsquolsquoYou may not useelectrical chemical or physical duressrsquorsquo it read although as Powers thenwent on to point out lsquolsquopsychological duress was okayrsquorsquo16 We in World WarII certainly tried to bluff prisoners of war into thinking we knew muchmore than we did in the hope that this would mislead them into giving awaythings about which we knew little or nothing And it seemed not too unfairto lsquolsquofencersquorsquo psychologically with a prisoner and thus to trap him into sayingmore than he had originally intended But there had to be a limit such as forexample not playing on a manrsquos emotions by encouraging him to worryabout the safety of his family I take it that no such restraint is likely to bewidely observed todaylsquolsquoCHARACTER ASSASSINATIONrsquorsquoShort of killing a key individual on the opposing side his value to them maybe destroyed if his colleagues or countrymen can be misled into suspectingthat he is a secret agent for your own side or has some other motive forworking against his sidersquos interests This mischievous technique is only likelyto succeed when the individual in question is working in an organizationprone to mutual suspicion but in so far as it exploits a moral weakness inthat organization so lsquolsquohoisting the engineer with his own petardrsquorsquo it may beless repugnant than other measures

9

INTERVENTIONIn parallel with the ethical problem of the humane limits of conduct towardindividuals there is the problem of the extent to which any one state canbe justified in attempting to interfere in the internal affairs of another ThelsquolsquoIrangatersquorsquo affair and the clandestine mining of Nicaraguan harbors underCIA auspices are cases in point In discussing such questions StansfieldTurner in Secrecy and Democracy17 quotes John Stuart Millrsquos A few words onnon-intervention (1859)The doctrine of non-intervention to be a legitimate principle of morality mustbe accepted by all governments The despot must consent to be bound by it aswell as the free state Unless they do the profession comes to this miserableissuemdashthat the wrong side may help the wrong but the right must not help theright

INTERNAL INTELLIGENCEBesides the ethical questions concerning how a nation and its officials andagents should restrain their activities in gaining information about anothernationrsquos secrets or in attempting to interfere in its internal affairs there areother questions that will arise when a nationrsquos officials have to seek out activitieswithin its own borders that could jeopardize its security

PRIVACYWhile any decent individual instinctively reacts against break-ins and lessviolent infringements of privacy a state legitimately requests some detailsabout each of its individual citizens for a wide range of social purposes suchas taxation educational planning transport facilities and potential for militaryand other forms of public service It might therefore be asked why we set so much store by a right to privacy Apart from the nightmare of a lsquolsquoBigBrotherrsquorsquo state there is an instinctive dislike of surveillance even parentalsurveillance and there may well be an apprehension based deeply back in theevolutionary process arising from a feeling of vulnerability while executingbodily functions or in sickness and of latent trouble from a stalking predatorwhose staring eyes betray his intentions More rationally I for one wouldhave little objection to any authority having any information it wished aboutmy actionsmdashor even my thoughtsmdashprovided that I could be sure that itwould not misinterpret the information to come to false conclusions aboutmeJust as technology is tending to modify concepts of sovereignty (from athree-mile limit for territorial waters based on the range of a gun to a limitof 200 miles today and the free movement of satellites over the territories ofother nations for example) so also it is tending to change the balancebetween the rights of individuals and the states of which they are membersThe complex organization of a modem state needs to know more about itsindividuals for optimum functioning and this is all the easier to achievebecause of the technical advances in handling and storing information and

10

unfortunately it will be only too easy for zeal to replace judgment in theprocess

MINIMUM TRESPASSTwo final points on ethics are worth making The first is that despite all theopportunitiesmdashand temptationsmdashthat it offers for malpractice intelligencecan be an honorable pursuit Indeed by improving the assessment by onenation of another it can on occasion contribute to international stabilityOn less happy occasions of course the children of light will be at a disadvantageunless they know enough of the ways of the world to forestall orcounter any unworthy exploitation of those ways by the children of thisworld There need be absolutely no dishonor in trying to ascertain what apotential or actual opponent is likely to attempt be it by external armedthreat or by internal subversion The risk of disrepute will depend on theextent to which the individual intelligence officer or his organization departsfrom the norms of morality in uncovering an opponentrsquos activitiesThe second point follows from the first One of the canons governing militaryor police action is the doctrine of minimum force and a parallel canonshould govern intelligence it should be conducted with the minimum trespassagainst national and individual human rights This canon applies to allforms of intelligence both external and internal that a civilized state mayfind it necessary to undertake

ETHICAL DIMENSIONS FOR INTELLIGENCEOPERATIONS IN GENERALSpying as a form of statecraft is as old as recorded history Babylonian tablets reportedly contain passages about spying3 and the Bible has several passages about the use of intelligence agents4Modern times also are replete with spy sagas of all kinds5 This legacy of intelligence operations by nations throughout history is evidence of a long-standing acceptance of such activity by many diverse cultural groupsHowever while many people may feel intuitively that at least some form of intelligence activity is morally justifiable it is somewhat difficult to articulate exactly what the ethical foundation is for such activity We will approach this task first by presenting a set of guidelines that should define the morality of both open and clandestine information-gathering operations

Information-Gathering ActivitiesWe submit that the following principles provide an ethical basis for the use of information-gathering services by a democratic government for foreign policy purposes First because a state has the responsibility to its citizens to protect their lives welfare and property it must take steps to understand the foreign threats if there are any to those citizens as well as to the nation as a whole In order to do this the state must gather informationmdash openly if possible but by using secret methods if necessary In a world in

11

which many societies are closed or in which information does not circulate completely freely the state must engage in clandestine informationgathering to protect against foreign threats to its security Our second principle is that the state should use the least intrusive means of collecting information That is one should not spy when information can be gathered in an open way Further the information to be gathered ought to be related to advancing the goals of the state as a whole rather than the private interests of individualsThird intelligence data must be presented to policymakers without bias or political taint Those who report the information must not manipulate it to drive policy or to justify further intrusive intelligence collection Finally one should recognize the need for the state to employ counterintelligence to protect its own national security information from being stolen All nations generally agree that the state has the right to punish those it catches in the act of spying Thus one countryrsquos hero is bound to be anotherrsquos traitor one countryrsquos intelligence success is ipso facto anotherrsquos counterintelligence failureIt is important to note here that what is morally acceptable behavior for the government in protecting the nation as a whole may not necessarily be acceptable for the individual in fact quite the opposite may be true While nations may sometimes use intrusive measures to collect information individuals may not Thus espionage as a form of acceptable statecraft would be considered mere theft if practiced by individuals

Covert ActivitiesWhile most people recognize the statersquos need to possess the capability of gathering information by clandestine means a significant number are troubled by the use of intelligence resources to interfere in the internal activities of another nation In wartime one might condone this interference as a preferred alternative to direct military action and defining the enemy is easier in wartime In peacetime however internal interference with other nations may seem less acceptable Under what circumstances then does a nation especially a free and open society that professes to follow the rule of law have the right to interfere with a foreign government or even to seek to change its nature when that nation would find such activity totally unacceptable even hostile if done to itGiven the adversarial relationship between East and West since the end of World War II some pragmatists might argue that a governmentrsquos foreign policy cannot function without some degree of covert activities with questionable ethical aspects7 This argument is similar to the one made by Niccolo Machiavelli that rulers must sometimes be immoral in establishing and maintaining the states8 While pragmatists may be content with the Machiavellian rationale it has extreme results when the preservation of the statersquos power conflicts with other highly esteemed values Can a nation espouse such moral positions on freedom democracy and human rights as does the United States and still support actions that contravene these ideals Only the most extreme political or religious leaders would reject the pragmatic line in these areas Yet these same leaders might argue that under certain circumstances a state may be justified in using convert activities to carry out foreign policy

Just War Theory

12

Some authors have used the existing literature on just war theory to establish a moral basis for clandestine intelligence operations10 Although just war theory is concerned with permissible acts of the state during wartime some aspects of the theory may indeed contribute to our understanding of the morality of peacetime covert intelligence activitiesJust war theory posits that there are times when conflict is morally justified It painfully seeks to discern the difference between a just and an unjust cause Simply defined a just war is a conflict that is fought either in selfdefense or in collective defense against an armed attack There is an assumption that the opposing party is in the wrong and that its attack is unjustifiedOf course there are numerous examples of conflicts in which both sides claimed to be the morally correct party and accused the other of aggression11 It is important to emphasize that the function of just war theory is not to justify warfare itself but rather to judge conflicts The standard method under the theory is to lay down common criteria by which to measure wars The criteria encompass intentions as well as the actual acts and consequences of wars One can successfully incorporate intelligence activitymdashboth espionage and covert interference with internal affairs of foreign nationsmdashunder the penumbra of just war theory if one understands that governments use such activities as a means for government survival

MORAL CONSIDERATIONS CONFRONTING THE INDIVIDUAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERHaving explored the moral constructs that support an intelligence system as a whole we now examine the ethical considerations that confront the individual intelligence officer Are these considerations different from what they would be for other civil servants military officers or members of the private sectorEthics are often defined as behavior relating to professional standards of conduct As in any other profession such standards exist in the field of intelligence even if these standards require behavior that is unacceptable for private citizens Dr David Hunter has argued that lsquolsquofor intelligence professionals to disregard the national values they are committed to defend is to ignore the fundamental reason for being in the gamersquorsquo33 Indeed American intelligence agencies are required by executive order to collect information in a manner that is lsquolsquorespectful of the principles on which the United Stateswas foundedrsquorsquo34There are several key differences between intelligence professionals and their counterparts in other areas of government service or private business Professional standards require intelligence professionals to lie hide information or use covert tactics to protect their lsquolsquocoverrsquorsquo access sources and responsibilities The Central Intelligence Agency expects teaches encourages and controls these tactics so that the lies are consistent and supported (lsquolsquobackstoppedrsquorsquo) The CIA expects intelligence officers to teach others to lie deceive steal launder money and perform a variety of other activities that would certainly be illegal if practiced in the United States They call these tactics lsquolsquotradecraftrsquorsquo and intelligence officers practice them in all the worldrsquos intelligence services35In other contexts intelligence officers must be as honest and forthright as those who work in the private sector or other parts of government Intelligence officers must always

13

tell the truth about their activities to their superiors Otherwise they may find themselves suspected of betraying the organization to which they owe their loyalty Honesty is especially important in intelligence because many officers operate in settings where theiractions cannot be observed36Intelligence analysts must never alter intelligence judgments to fit the desires of policymakers who might prefer different conclusions Forcing the facts to fit policy warps the purpose of intelligence operations37 Intelligence officers must be scrupulous in managing funds or equipment with which they are entrusted Care in this area is especially important because funds are often lsquolsquounvoucheredrsquorsquo (not subject to outside audit) and equipment is deliberately designed to prevent its identification with the officer or service concerned38Intelligence officers must give up certain rights of privacy so that they may be trusted with secrets They are subject to examinations of their private and professional activities during their careers and must accept some restrictions on their behavior even after leaving the service for example they must continue to protect secrets they learned while on duty39The United States military has long recognized that individual soldiers are obligated to follow the lawful orders of their superiors in fact soldiers must swear that they will do so40The military also recognizes that following illegal or unlawful orders is not acceptable The so-called Nuremberg defensemdashthat one is not accountable for onersquos actions if merely following ordersmdashis not acceptable The question for intelligence professionals is whether they have the same kinds of obligationsIn the authorsrsquo view government servants whether military or civilian have an obligation to tell their superiors about matters they consider illegal immoral or ill-conceived If in the judgment of the superior the questionable order must stand the junior official has the choice of carrying out the unacceptable order appealing to a higher authority or ultimately resigningWhat is not possible in the realm of intelligencemdashalthough it might be possible in other areas of United States government servicemdashis to lsquolsquogo publicrsquorsquo with the issue in question Intelligence officials have the obligation to keep secret issues properly classified and thus public discussion is not possible without a gross violation of classification rules and the professional ethics of the intelligence officer41In reality such ethical disputes rarely arise As in most enterprises superiors want to develop the loyalty and trust of their juniors and also want to be advised when things seem to be going awry Thus strong disagreement often leads to compromise rather than confrontation

CONCLUSIONEthics and morality in intelligence are integral parts of operating a secret intelligence service in a free democratic and moral society A free democratic government has the obligation to protect the interests and security of the people it serves If the world were perfect intelligence operations would be unnecessary Given the depravity of the world

14

around us however free societies have no choice but to engage in intelligence activities if they are to remain free

Bibliografie

Instrumente web

1 httpethicsiiteducodes

Carti

1 JAN Goldman Ethics of Spying A reader for the intelligence professional Editura Scarecrow Press Oxford 2006

2 IONEL Nitu Ghidul Analistului de Intelligence Editura Academiei Nationale de Informatii Mihai Viteazul Bucuresti 2011

15

sau presiuni mai mult sau puţin explicite icircn vederea bdquoremodelăriirdquo conjuncturale a rezultatelor analizei1048713 Onestitatea icircn autoevaluarea propriilor limite bdquoanaliticerdquo Asumarea responsabilităţii icircn raport cu elementele de conţinut ale produsului analitic finit induce necesitatea unei evaluări oneste a limitelor de cunoaştere şi de icircnţelegere pe care orice analist le are icircnraport cu problematica de securitate pe care o abordează Consecinţa acestei atitudini se poate reflecta icircn decizia pe care analistul o adoptă la un moment dat de a nu se exprima icircn raport cu un subiect asupra căruia are o cunoaştere parţială ori nulă1048713 Imperativul responsabilităţii convergente Pe fiecare dintre trepteleetapele parcurse icircn fluxul procesării analiticepromovării produsului informaţional fiecare intervenţie a şefului profesional asupra conţinutului acestuia necesită nu doar o asumare explicită a responsabilităţii icircn raport cu modificările operate ci şi comunicarea către emitent a argumentului icircn temeiul căruia sa justificat o asemenea intervenţie Un asemenea imperativ se justifică inclusiv icircn procesul de revizuire a produsului finit de intelligence Realizată icircn mod judicios această operaţiune poate reprezenta una dintre cele mai eficiente modalităţi de prevenire a apariţiei distorsiunilor inerente oricărei etape aferente elaborării unui produs informaţional Din nefericire astfel de distorsiuni pot afecta icircnanumite situaţii icircnsăşi activitatea de revizuirePentru a preveni apariţia unor situaţii de această factură este util ca atunci cacircnd apar diferenţe majore icircntre textul iniţial şi cel rezultat la capătul fluxului de evaluare a acestuia pentru a putea fi remis beneficiarilor legali analistul să poarte discuţii cu membrii grupului de lucru (dacă a funcţionat un astfel de grup) şi cu şeful profesional care asigură activitatea de supervizare1048713 Tenacitate icircn susţinerea propriilor evaluări Ofiţerul analist trebuie să-şi susţină opiniile(fundamentate pe o cunoaştere profundă a problemei investigate) indiferent cacirct de bdquoinadecvatrdquo ar putea bdquosunardquo icircntr-o oarecare conjunctură concluziile demersului analiticO atitudine similară se impune a fi adoptată de către analist icircn demersul de reconsiderarereformulare a concluziilor atunci cacircnd apar noi elemente de natură să modifice datele iniţiale ale problemeiIcircncurajarea acestei atitudini se poate realiza prin promovarea tipurilor de activităţi care pun analiştii icircn confruntare cu perspective alternative consultarea cu experţi din exteriorul sistemului de securitate dezbateri analitice interdisciplinare analize concurente şa Această abordare este cu atacirct mai necesară cu cacirct deseori beneficiarii informării solicită ca produsul finit de intelligence să includă scenarii alternative pentru a se reduce cacirct mai mult elementele de incertitudine1048713 Creativitate şi spirit inovativ O condiţie sine qua non a asigurării adaptabilităţii sistemului de intelligence la valurile succesive de provocări ale mediului de securitate oreprezintă preocuparea icircn plan instituţional de a favoriza creativitatea şi spiritul inovativSituată icircn opoziţie cu rutina şi birocraţia excesivă creativitatea (şi complementul ei spiritul inovativ) icircn domeniul analizei informaţiilor se manifestă prin capacitatea de a pune icircn valoare ipoteze proiecte teme şamd poziţionate icircn afara bdquoparadigmei consacraterdquo şi prin utilizarea de metodologii nespecificeatipice care se dovedesc utile procesului analiticAspectele menţionate mai sus sunt doar cacircteva dintre elementele care pot articula un ansamblu de principii deontologice specifice analizei de intelligence Fără a avea

2

pretenţia că acestea epuizează sfera unui posibil cadru deontologic icircn materie raţiunea pentru care au fost formulate este de a pune icircn valoare o perspectivă de abordare a fenomenului analitic specific serviciilor de informaţii situată dincolo de imperativele generate prin ansamblul normativ consacrat

Though several writers have discussed the morality of war and the ethics of the soldier2 few have specifically addressed the ethics of intelligence operations Perhaps this void in the literature exists because such operations do not fit neatly within the more traditional forms of foreign policy operationsmdashdiplomacy and military forcemdashbut instead lie somewhere in between we define lsquolsquointelligence servicesrsquorsquo to mean both (1) the collection and analysis of information about threats to the security and interests of the nation and (2) the use of clandestine resources to carry out the foreign policy of the nation The former category involves such activities as espionage and the use of intrusive technical sensors the latter includes such activities as propaganda psychological warfare the use of agents of influence deception disinformation and support for paramilitary or guerrilla forces Throughout our analysis we recognize the important distinction between mere information-gathering services which most people consider to be acceptable intelligence activities and covert activities that interfere with the internal affairs of other nations which are more difficult to justify on moral grounds Nevertheless we contend that some forms of intelligence operations that may be considered immoral are nevertheless justifiable in particular circumstances

intelligence can be viewed as an extension of diplomacy complete with rules that prevent certain forms of abuse although these are largely unacknowledged parameters and conventions23

Clandestine intelligence gathering covert action torture and targeted killingmdash all are dramatic yet familiar themes to seasoned observers of world history and international conflict Over the centuries rules governing such activities have evolved and restraints have been developed to regulate these darker aspects of human conflictWhere does one go for guidance on the tough moral choices that confront us today How do we calculate the trade-offs that are demanded by the imperfect world in which we live How do we evaluate the institutional arrangements of todayrsquos intelligence community and the actions of those professionals who must act within its systemSurprisingly there is no central address for reflection on the ethical dimensions of the intelligence profession Yet the direction is clear Institutional design is not merely aesthetic It is decisive in producing morally favorable results Proper oversight reporting and accountability procedures go a long way to tipping the balance toward creating intelligence agencies that yield morally desirable outcomes Similarly hiring and promoting people of integrity in the professionmdashmen and women with a strong moral compassmdashwill encourage morally favorable outcomes at the level of personal decision-makingPerhaps the most powerful force for ethics in the intelligence profession is open and honest reflection Free debate is the beginning of the education process Forthright discussion is what distinguishes the American approach from many others Self-criticism

3

makes us strong Analysis of tough cases becomes our ally as we think about the values and standards that will guide us in the future

The role of ethics in intelligence work has always been either misunderstood or poorly appreciated by both policymakers and the public leading to the stale joke that lsquolsquoethicsrsquorsquo and lsquolsquointelligencersquorsquo form an oxymoron In other words lsquolsquodoing whatrsquos rightrsquorsquo (ie doing your job which may require you to act immorally) should not interfere with doing lsquolsquothe right thingrsquorsquo (ie acting with moral principles) Of course most work done by intelligence professionals does not involve a moral dilemma such as providing accurate analysis or collecting information Sometimes however conflicting requirements and tasks impose significant ethical and moral dilemmas upon people doing their job Consequently public servants must make a decision or take an action that could be considered inappropriate or unethical for a similar circumstancein their private lives

The public is inundated with the perception that intelligence professionals will say or do anything to accomplish their jobs and that to be employed as an intelligence professional is to abandon any sense of moral judgment Bookstores and theaters are filled with stories of people who are sanctioned by the government and thus they have a lsquolsquolicensersquorsquo to lie cheat steal or kill This license is bestowed on the individual in the name of society to act as we dare not They are not responsible for their actions and morality be damned

Professionals in many fields have standards of ethical conduct with established codes of ethics to include psychologists (by the American Psychological Association) lawyers (by the American Bar Association) doctors (by the American Medical Association) organists (by the American Guild of Organists) music teachers (by the Music Teachers Association) real estate appraisers (by the Society of Real Estate Appraisers) funeral directors (by the Funeral Ethics Association) travel agents (by the American Society of Travel Agents) and speleologists (ie people who study caves by the National Speleological Society) The list goes on and on1 All these professions have a concern with the issues and ethical conflicts that those who work in that field may encounter These concerns may include problems of honesty confidentiality privacy impartiality accountability and conflicts of interest In the intelligence business these concerns are as real as in any other profession

Lacking legal directives or guidance intelligence professionals are left to decide for themselves how far they and the country they represent can go before losing the moral high ground And if it is legal is it ethical

Most ethics and intelligence education which is really training normally consists of management and leadership techniques learning the legal ramifications for conducting certain actions and decisions associating the intelligence profession with the military profession or learning from previous ethical mishaps through case studies Although all of these are excellent teaching tools they fail to take into consideration the moral underpinnings of this very volatile and possibly morally damaging profession

4

None of these pedagogical methods seeks to establish a theory upon which a code of ethics can be built a framework that can transcend the intelligence community

To some the mere juxtaposition of ethics and intelligence may appear to be a contradiction in terms But at heart intelligence is rooted in the severest of ethical principles truth telling After all the end purpose of the elaborate apparatus that the intelligence community has become is to provide the policymaker with as close to a truthful depiction of a given situation as is humanly possible Anything less is not intelligence It may be useful opinionmdash in some cases it may even be more accurate than prevailing intelligencemdash but if it is the opinion maker is lucky or in the particular instance possessed of more facts and sharper judgmental skills than the professionalintelligence officer Even the CIA has long recognized the centrality of truth telling As a contributor to Foreign Affairs observed several years ago the motto of the CIA chosen by the doughty old Presbyterian Allen Dulles is lsquolsquoAnd the Truth Shall Make You Freersquorsquo1 To accept the approximation of truth as the purpose of intelligence is one thing To accept the methods by which truth can be obtained poses ethical dilemmas The truth after all is often a set of facts or concrete physical entities or intentions which the party with whom they are entrusted will guard jealously as a precious not to say sacred element of the national preserve Ferreting out the truth under these circumstances often requires means and techniques not ordinarily employed in human intercourseBut we are not all ethical absolutists Value trade-offs are probably the best that most people in an uncertain world will accept And it is because intelligence offers security that bizarre methods to obtain it are acceptable to most Foreign policy making without an intelligence input of some kind would be capricious in the uncharted waters of world crisis situations it would be scandalously foolhardy It follows that the more ambiguous the international situation the greater the value of intelligence in the decision-makingprocess Put another way of course this means that where intelligence does not add to international security but rather say to the obsessive comfort of knowing more about Ruritania than even the Ruritanians or where it merely facilitates the feeding of salacious tidbits about foreign leaders to inquisitive Presidents questionable methods to collect it are not acceptableThe security returns of intelligence are probably inestimable and they are welcomed by both world superpowers and tacitly condoned by almost all active participating nations on the world stage Satellites monitor the missiledevelopments of the superpowers microwave telephone messages between foreign embassies and capitals are intercepted for critical informationIn a world where the two great powers can no longer guarantee international stability and where weaponry is no longer the exclusive currency of power intelligence monitoring must sweep targets other than the principal antagonistmdasheg China or the Middle East It must also be as concerned with economic and energy considerations as missiles But the principle governing the choice of targets remains the same Intelligence must promoteinternational security or the ethical compromises necessary to accommodate the requisite collection methods cannot and should not be stomached Intelligence monitoring substitutes for full faith and credit between nations and technology provides a pitiful but

5

workable substitute for the joyful conditions of a distant One World The tensions of the nation-state system are in other words held in bounds not only by diplomacy and bymutual common sense but by carefully calibrated monitoring systemsAssuming then that intelligence can help toward security in a dangerous international order how can the intelligence function be carried out at the least risk to other values in our society To put this most succinctly how can a professional intelligence service operate so that officials within it perform their roles in an ethical manner Most public officials would prefer that this be the case certainly most private citizens expect nothing less

Foreign intelligence is not by and large conducted by people lacking the capacity to recognize ethical standards but standards are lowered to accommodate the perceived national purpose Once lowered they can be more easily lowered a second time or they can be lowered further and further as routine reduces ethical resistance to repugnant activities This is the area of human dynamics where yesterdayrsquos managers of the intelligence community have been the most irresolute Management rarely blew the whistle on subordinates When subordinates succeeded in operations of questionablemorality they were as often rewarded with promotions as reprimanded for using dubious methods

Most professions such as the law and medicine have for centuries provided themselves with fail-safe systems to ensure that ethical norms are not compromised out of existence or rusted from misuse Some of these systems work better than others some are susceptible to corruption themselves and a few are mere shams but the fact that they exist and generally are taken seriously by the members of the profession is critically significant At the very least it means that there are limits to a professionalrsquos freedom and thatthose limits are defined by ethical codes sanctioned by colleagues A profession whose end purpose it is to root out the truth cannot afford to resist asking where its limits should be set However the intelligence professional has in the past operated under the simple guideline lsquolsquodonrsquot get caughtrsquorsquo Recently there have been signs that suggest that the intelligence community is busily if somewhat ponderously groping toward a limitsetting policy for its professionalsHuman intelligence collection is a major preoccupation of the clandestine service Simply put this is the process of extracting from others information or national assets theywould not willingly part with under normal circumstances In some cases the creation of appropriate circumstances is relatively easyThis is where the source is a willing volunteer acting out of his own sense of patriotism Anti-Soviet eacutemigreacute Hungarians providing detailed information on Russian military units occupying their country fall into this category The clandestine officer must provide the means whereby the eacutemigreacute can return to his country By and large the clandestine officer can content himself with the knowledge that the Hungarian is as anxious to reenter his homeland illegally as he is anxious to have him make the effort But the highest art in tradecraft is to develop a source that you lsquolsquoown lock stock and barrelrsquorsquo According to the clandestine ethos a lsquolsquocontrolledrsquorsquo source provides the most reliable intelligence lsquolsquoControlledrsquorsquo means of course bought or otherwise obligated Traditionally it has been the aim of the professional in the clandestine service to weave a psychological web around any potentially fruitful contact and to tighten that web whenever possible

6

Opportunities are limited but for those in the clandestine service who successfully develop controlled sources rewards in status and peer respect are high The modus operandi required however is the very antithesis of ethical interpersonal relationships

Sometimes the information obtained by these methods can be important It is however rarely of critical importance At best it may provide a measure of confirmation of some already suspected development or fill in a missing piece of a complex mosaic of facts There have been occasions when controlled sources have been successful in snatching internal documents off high-level desks in their own governments but even in these instances the lsquolsquotakersquorsquo has not been earthshaking Perhaps the faintly disappointing recordof achievement by clandestine operatives is explainable in bureaucratic terms Well-placed officials with immediate access to critical policy-making circlesmdashand for the most part this means they are part of the policy-making processmdashare generally well rewarded by and well satisfied with their own governments If they were not they would not hold powerful positions The main targets for clandestine collectors are usually second- and third-level officials who may not be fully privy to policy developments

Quality of information obtained aside a fundamental ethical issue concerning clandestine human collection remains That issue is the impact on the clandestine officer of his relationship with his source The formerrsquos bread and butter is the subversion of the latterrsquos integrity The officer is painstakingly trained in techniques that will convert an acquaintance into a submissive tool to shred away his resistance and deflate his sense of self-worth Of course the source may be thoroughly cynical even a venal merchant of his countryrsquos privacy and in that case the task of the clandestine officer is less burdensomemdashalthough he may come to find the relationship just as repellent as if the source had slowly and resistingly been bent to complianceWhatever the chemistry between the two individuals collector and source or perhaps more pointedly dominant and dominated the biggest loser is the one whose ethical scruples are most damaged in the process Depending on the techniques he may have to use to bring the source under control and maintain that relationship the biggest loser may be the clandestine officerAnother prime concern of the clandestine services is the development of methodologies and devices to thwart the defensive measures of other intelligence agencies and other national political systems While much of this activity is purely technical electronic engineering a significant investment has also been made in such exotica as lsquolsquotruth drugsrsquorsquo complex psychological warfare strategies bizarre bugging devices and the like Some of these devices and techniques have been used with profit and success by clandestine officers operating overseas others have proved impractical in the field or have stalled on the drawing board as development costs got out of hand But the search for new ways to penetrate other societies goes on Todayrsquos drug experimenters (if there are indeed any left) may become tomorrowrsquos experts in longrange behavior-modification processesWhatever the state of these arcane arts they have two things in common First their purpose is almost always to facilitate the manipulation of man by man In this sense they are not dissimilar in effect and impact to the process of controlled source development Secondly the practitioners of these arts and the lsquolsquopsych warfarersquorsquo experts are obliged by

7

the very nature of their trade to presume that they are operating in hostile environments The end point of their efforts after all is to bypass normal authority or at the least to usesemi-legal means to overcome obstacles placed in their path by the authorities of other nations The professional premise of the officers engaged in these practices then is the constructive use of illegality

Many of the arguments used to question the efficacy and suitability of political operations can be applied to the process of human clandestine intelligence collection the product is not all that impressive the moral damage to the collectors is high intelligence tends to be collected as an end in itself and there is always the risk of exposure Nevertheless intelligence must be collected in selected areas and against specific subject targets Technology is now the workhorse of the collection business and it should remain so Thepresent Director has in effect recognized this evolution in collection methods he has justified his reduction of covert officers on this ground Photographic and audio satellites and other interception devices are immensely expensive but they have the advantage of doing only minimal damage to the ethical standards of the operators and processors As noted above technological intelligence collection is in at least one highly significant areamdashthat of arms limitation controlmdashtacitly accepted as essential to security by bothsuperpowers6Of course even with the phasing down of clandestine human collection the need will remain for residual capability in certain esoteric collection techniques Atmospheric conditions in some geographic locations may be so unfavorable that short-range collection devices will be needed to supplement lsquolsquostand-offrsquorsquo equipment such as satellites There will always be the need for personnel skilled in the techniques of situating these devices Similarly there must be those who can exploit the defector or the lsquolsquowalk-inrsquorsquo sourceCounterintelligence is another field of clandestine intelligence activity which probably cannot be dispensed with for some years to come But if counterintelligence is to survive it should be organized on a purely defensive basis as a protection against foreign penetration of the US intelligence services and their technical capabilities It should be a small lean component with a sophisticated understanding not only of the technological capabilities of major foreign intelligence services but also of those countriesrsquo politicaldynamics Far from being walled off from other Agency components as in the past it should be a vital part of Agency life as much to gain from exposure to varying points of view as to influence those points of view

Obviously action is facilitated if both intelligence and operations can be controlled under one organization but an offsetting merit of separation is that an intelligence unit is more likely to be impartial in its assessment of the success of operations if it is independent of any attempt by the operational side to interpret the evidence regarding success or failure too favorably For all these reasons I continue to stand for the independence of intelligence from operations both covert and overt to the highest possible level in

8

government organization although of course recognizing the need for the greatest possible understanding between intelligence and operational staffs

Puncte esentiale privind etica intelligence-ului

ASSASSINATIONHelms himself observed that lsquolsquowar corrupts and secret war corrupts secretlyrsquorsquo14 So it is easy to slip toward the acceptance of assassination as one of its techniques In 1940 there was a suggestion that there would be a specialBritish clandestine operation to attack the aircrews of the German pathfinderswho were causing us so much trouble in the Blitz They were to beambushed while being ferried by bus between their billets and the airfield atVannes before taking off for an attack This was vetoed by Sir Charles Portalthe Chief of Air Staff but as the war progressed feelings became less delicateLater at the time of the Suez crisis in 1956 there was even talkmdashitappearsmdashof attempting to assassinate President Nasser15 In America AllenDulles aware of the danger of the CIA slipping toward an acceptance ofassassination specifically forbade it when he was Director and an embargowas included in presidential directives on three occasions Nevertheless itwas sometimes attempted with disastrous results for the CIA when it cameto lightTORTURE AND DURESSTorture too was officially barredmdashat least to the extent of a rule being formulatedby Helms in 1955 under Dullesrsquos directorship lsquolsquoYou may not useelectrical chemical or physical duressrsquorsquo it read although as Powers thenwent on to point out lsquolsquopsychological duress was okayrsquorsquo16 We in World WarII certainly tried to bluff prisoners of war into thinking we knew muchmore than we did in the hope that this would mislead them into giving awaythings about which we knew little or nothing And it seemed not too unfairto lsquolsquofencersquorsquo psychologically with a prisoner and thus to trap him into sayingmore than he had originally intended But there had to be a limit such as forexample not playing on a manrsquos emotions by encouraging him to worryabout the safety of his family I take it that no such restraint is likely to bewidely observed todaylsquolsquoCHARACTER ASSASSINATIONrsquorsquoShort of killing a key individual on the opposing side his value to them maybe destroyed if his colleagues or countrymen can be misled into suspectingthat he is a secret agent for your own side or has some other motive forworking against his sidersquos interests This mischievous technique is only likelyto succeed when the individual in question is working in an organizationprone to mutual suspicion but in so far as it exploits a moral weakness inthat organization so lsquolsquohoisting the engineer with his own petardrsquorsquo it may beless repugnant than other measures

9

INTERVENTIONIn parallel with the ethical problem of the humane limits of conduct towardindividuals there is the problem of the extent to which any one state canbe justified in attempting to interfere in the internal affairs of another ThelsquolsquoIrangatersquorsquo affair and the clandestine mining of Nicaraguan harbors underCIA auspices are cases in point In discussing such questions StansfieldTurner in Secrecy and Democracy17 quotes John Stuart Millrsquos A few words onnon-intervention (1859)The doctrine of non-intervention to be a legitimate principle of morality mustbe accepted by all governments The despot must consent to be bound by it aswell as the free state Unless they do the profession comes to this miserableissuemdashthat the wrong side may help the wrong but the right must not help theright

INTERNAL INTELLIGENCEBesides the ethical questions concerning how a nation and its officials andagents should restrain their activities in gaining information about anothernationrsquos secrets or in attempting to interfere in its internal affairs there areother questions that will arise when a nationrsquos officials have to seek out activitieswithin its own borders that could jeopardize its security

PRIVACYWhile any decent individual instinctively reacts against break-ins and lessviolent infringements of privacy a state legitimately requests some detailsabout each of its individual citizens for a wide range of social purposes suchas taxation educational planning transport facilities and potential for militaryand other forms of public service It might therefore be asked why we set so much store by a right to privacy Apart from the nightmare of a lsquolsquoBigBrotherrsquorsquo state there is an instinctive dislike of surveillance even parentalsurveillance and there may well be an apprehension based deeply back in theevolutionary process arising from a feeling of vulnerability while executingbodily functions or in sickness and of latent trouble from a stalking predatorwhose staring eyes betray his intentions More rationally I for one wouldhave little objection to any authority having any information it wished aboutmy actionsmdashor even my thoughtsmdashprovided that I could be sure that itwould not misinterpret the information to come to false conclusions aboutmeJust as technology is tending to modify concepts of sovereignty (from athree-mile limit for territorial waters based on the range of a gun to a limitof 200 miles today and the free movement of satellites over the territories ofother nations for example) so also it is tending to change the balancebetween the rights of individuals and the states of which they are membersThe complex organization of a modem state needs to know more about itsindividuals for optimum functioning and this is all the easier to achievebecause of the technical advances in handling and storing information and

10

unfortunately it will be only too easy for zeal to replace judgment in theprocess

MINIMUM TRESPASSTwo final points on ethics are worth making The first is that despite all theopportunitiesmdashand temptationsmdashthat it offers for malpractice intelligencecan be an honorable pursuit Indeed by improving the assessment by onenation of another it can on occasion contribute to international stabilityOn less happy occasions of course the children of light will be at a disadvantageunless they know enough of the ways of the world to forestall orcounter any unworthy exploitation of those ways by the children of thisworld There need be absolutely no dishonor in trying to ascertain what apotential or actual opponent is likely to attempt be it by external armedthreat or by internal subversion The risk of disrepute will depend on theextent to which the individual intelligence officer or his organization departsfrom the norms of morality in uncovering an opponentrsquos activitiesThe second point follows from the first One of the canons governing militaryor police action is the doctrine of minimum force and a parallel canonshould govern intelligence it should be conducted with the minimum trespassagainst national and individual human rights This canon applies to allforms of intelligence both external and internal that a civilized state mayfind it necessary to undertake

ETHICAL DIMENSIONS FOR INTELLIGENCEOPERATIONS IN GENERALSpying as a form of statecraft is as old as recorded history Babylonian tablets reportedly contain passages about spying3 and the Bible has several passages about the use of intelligence agents4Modern times also are replete with spy sagas of all kinds5 This legacy of intelligence operations by nations throughout history is evidence of a long-standing acceptance of such activity by many diverse cultural groupsHowever while many people may feel intuitively that at least some form of intelligence activity is morally justifiable it is somewhat difficult to articulate exactly what the ethical foundation is for such activity We will approach this task first by presenting a set of guidelines that should define the morality of both open and clandestine information-gathering operations

Information-Gathering ActivitiesWe submit that the following principles provide an ethical basis for the use of information-gathering services by a democratic government for foreign policy purposes First because a state has the responsibility to its citizens to protect their lives welfare and property it must take steps to understand the foreign threats if there are any to those citizens as well as to the nation as a whole In order to do this the state must gather informationmdash openly if possible but by using secret methods if necessary In a world in

11

which many societies are closed or in which information does not circulate completely freely the state must engage in clandestine informationgathering to protect against foreign threats to its security Our second principle is that the state should use the least intrusive means of collecting information That is one should not spy when information can be gathered in an open way Further the information to be gathered ought to be related to advancing the goals of the state as a whole rather than the private interests of individualsThird intelligence data must be presented to policymakers without bias or political taint Those who report the information must not manipulate it to drive policy or to justify further intrusive intelligence collection Finally one should recognize the need for the state to employ counterintelligence to protect its own national security information from being stolen All nations generally agree that the state has the right to punish those it catches in the act of spying Thus one countryrsquos hero is bound to be anotherrsquos traitor one countryrsquos intelligence success is ipso facto anotherrsquos counterintelligence failureIt is important to note here that what is morally acceptable behavior for the government in protecting the nation as a whole may not necessarily be acceptable for the individual in fact quite the opposite may be true While nations may sometimes use intrusive measures to collect information individuals may not Thus espionage as a form of acceptable statecraft would be considered mere theft if practiced by individuals

Covert ActivitiesWhile most people recognize the statersquos need to possess the capability of gathering information by clandestine means a significant number are troubled by the use of intelligence resources to interfere in the internal activities of another nation In wartime one might condone this interference as a preferred alternative to direct military action and defining the enemy is easier in wartime In peacetime however internal interference with other nations may seem less acceptable Under what circumstances then does a nation especially a free and open society that professes to follow the rule of law have the right to interfere with a foreign government or even to seek to change its nature when that nation would find such activity totally unacceptable even hostile if done to itGiven the adversarial relationship between East and West since the end of World War II some pragmatists might argue that a governmentrsquos foreign policy cannot function without some degree of covert activities with questionable ethical aspects7 This argument is similar to the one made by Niccolo Machiavelli that rulers must sometimes be immoral in establishing and maintaining the states8 While pragmatists may be content with the Machiavellian rationale it has extreme results when the preservation of the statersquos power conflicts with other highly esteemed values Can a nation espouse such moral positions on freedom democracy and human rights as does the United States and still support actions that contravene these ideals Only the most extreme political or religious leaders would reject the pragmatic line in these areas Yet these same leaders might argue that under certain circumstances a state may be justified in using convert activities to carry out foreign policy

Just War Theory

12

Some authors have used the existing literature on just war theory to establish a moral basis for clandestine intelligence operations10 Although just war theory is concerned with permissible acts of the state during wartime some aspects of the theory may indeed contribute to our understanding of the morality of peacetime covert intelligence activitiesJust war theory posits that there are times when conflict is morally justified It painfully seeks to discern the difference between a just and an unjust cause Simply defined a just war is a conflict that is fought either in selfdefense or in collective defense against an armed attack There is an assumption that the opposing party is in the wrong and that its attack is unjustifiedOf course there are numerous examples of conflicts in which both sides claimed to be the morally correct party and accused the other of aggression11 It is important to emphasize that the function of just war theory is not to justify warfare itself but rather to judge conflicts The standard method under the theory is to lay down common criteria by which to measure wars The criteria encompass intentions as well as the actual acts and consequences of wars One can successfully incorporate intelligence activitymdashboth espionage and covert interference with internal affairs of foreign nationsmdashunder the penumbra of just war theory if one understands that governments use such activities as a means for government survival

MORAL CONSIDERATIONS CONFRONTING THE INDIVIDUAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERHaving explored the moral constructs that support an intelligence system as a whole we now examine the ethical considerations that confront the individual intelligence officer Are these considerations different from what they would be for other civil servants military officers or members of the private sectorEthics are often defined as behavior relating to professional standards of conduct As in any other profession such standards exist in the field of intelligence even if these standards require behavior that is unacceptable for private citizens Dr David Hunter has argued that lsquolsquofor intelligence professionals to disregard the national values they are committed to defend is to ignore the fundamental reason for being in the gamersquorsquo33 Indeed American intelligence agencies are required by executive order to collect information in a manner that is lsquolsquorespectful of the principles on which the United Stateswas foundedrsquorsquo34There are several key differences between intelligence professionals and their counterparts in other areas of government service or private business Professional standards require intelligence professionals to lie hide information or use covert tactics to protect their lsquolsquocoverrsquorsquo access sources and responsibilities The Central Intelligence Agency expects teaches encourages and controls these tactics so that the lies are consistent and supported (lsquolsquobackstoppedrsquorsquo) The CIA expects intelligence officers to teach others to lie deceive steal launder money and perform a variety of other activities that would certainly be illegal if practiced in the United States They call these tactics lsquolsquotradecraftrsquorsquo and intelligence officers practice them in all the worldrsquos intelligence services35In other contexts intelligence officers must be as honest and forthright as those who work in the private sector or other parts of government Intelligence officers must always

13

tell the truth about their activities to their superiors Otherwise they may find themselves suspected of betraying the organization to which they owe their loyalty Honesty is especially important in intelligence because many officers operate in settings where theiractions cannot be observed36Intelligence analysts must never alter intelligence judgments to fit the desires of policymakers who might prefer different conclusions Forcing the facts to fit policy warps the purpose of intelligence operations37 Intelligence officers must be scrupulous in managing funds or equipment with which they are entrusted Care in this area is especially important because funds are often lsquolsquounvoucheredrsquorsquo (not subject to outside audit) and equipment is deliberately designed to prevent its identification with the officer or service concerned38Intelligence officers must give up certain rights of privacy so that they may be trusted with secrets They are subject to examinations of their private and professional activities during their careers and must accept some restrictions on their behavior even after leaving the service for example they must continue to protect secrets they learned while on duty39The United States military has long recognized that individual soldiers are obligated to follow the lawful orders of their superiors in fact soldiers must swear that they will do so40The military also recognizes that following illegal or unlawful orders is not acceptable The so-called Nuremberg defensemdashthat one is not accountable for onersquos actions if merely following ordersmdashis not acceptable The question for intelligence professionals is whether they have the same kinds of obligationsIn the authorsrsquo view government servants whether military or civilian have an obligation to tell their superiors about matters they consider illegal immoral or ill-conceived If in the judgment of the superior the questionable order must stand the junior official has the choice of carrying out the unacceptable order appealing to a higher authority or ultimately resigningWhat is not possible in the realm of intelligencemdashalthough it might be possible in other areas of United States government servicemdashis to lsquolsquogo publicrsquorsquo with the issue in question Intelligence officials have the obligation to keep secret issues properly classified and thus public discussion is not possible without a gross violation of classification rules and the professional ethics of the intelligence officer41In reality such ethical disputes rarely arise As in most enterprises superiors want to develop the loyalty and trust of their juniors and also want to be advised when things seem to be going awry Thus strong disagreement often leads to compromise rather than confrontation

CONCLUSIONEthics and morality in intelligence are integral parts of operating a secret intelligence service in a free democratic and moral society A free democratic government has the obligation to protect the interests and security of the people it serves If the world were perfect intelligence operations would be unnecessary Given the depravity of the world

14

around us however free societies have no choice but to engage in intelligence activities if they are to remain free

Bibliografie

Instrumente web

1 httpethicsiiteducodes

Carti

1 JAN Goldman Ethics of Spying A reader for the intelligence professional Editura Scarecrow Press Oxford 2006

2 IONEL Nitu Ghidul Analistului de Intelligence Editura Academiei Nationale de Informatii Mihai Viteazul Bucuresti 2011

15

pretenţia că acestea epuizează sfera unui posibil cadru deontologic icircn materie raţiunea pentru care au fost formulate este de a pune icircn valoare o perspectivă de abordare a fenomenului analitic specific serviciilor de informaţii situată dincolo de imperativele generate prin ansamblul normativ consacrat

Though several writers have discussed the morality of war and the ethics of the soldier2 few have specifically addressed the ethics of intelligence operations Perhaps this void in the literature exists because such operations do not fit neatly within the more traditional forms of foreign policy operationsmdashdiplomacy and military forcemdashbut instead lie somewhere in between we define lsquolsquointelligence servicesrsquorsquo to mean both (1) the collection and analysis of information about threats to the security and interests of the nation and (2) the use of clandestine resources to carry out the foreign policy of the nation The former category involves such activities as espionage and the use of intrusive technical sensors the latter includes such activities as propaganda psychological warfare the use of agents of influence deception disinformation and support for paramilitary or guerrilla forces Throughout our analysis we recognize the important distinction between mere information-gathering services which most people consider to be acceptable intelligence activities and covert activities that interfere with the internal affairs of other nations which are more difficult to justify on moral grounds Nevertheless we contend that some forms of intelligence operations that may be considered immoral are nevertheless justifiable in particular circumstances

intelligence can be viewed as an extension of diplomacy complete with rules that prevent certain forms of abuse although these are largely unacknowledged parameters and conventions23

Clandestine intelligence gathering covert action torture and targeted killingmdash all are dramatic yet familiar themes to seasoned observers of world history and international conflict Over the centuries rules governing such activities have evolved and restraints have been developed to regulate these darker aspects of human conflictWhere does one go for guidance on the tough moral choices that confront us today How do we calculate the trade-offs that are demanded by the imperfect world in which we live How do we evaluate the institutional arrangements of todayrsquos intelligence community and the actions of those professionals who must act within its systemSurprisingly there is no central address for reflection on the ethical dimensions of the intelligence profession Yet the direction is clear Institutional design is not merely aesthetic It is decisive in producing morally favorable results Proper oversight reporting and accountability procedures go a long way to tipping the balance toward creating intelligence agencies that yield morally desirable outcomes Similarly hiring and promoting people of integrity in the professionmdashmen and women with a strong moral compassmdashwill encourage morally favorable outcomes at the level of personal decision-makingPerhaps the most powerful force for ethics in the intelligence profession is open and honest reflection Free debate is the beginning of the education process Forthright discussion is what distinguishes the American approach from many others Self-criticism

3

makes us strong Analysis of tough cases becomes our ally as we think about the values and standards that will guide us in the future

The role of ethics in intelligence work has always been either misunderstood or poorly appreciated by both policymakers and the public leading to the stale joke that lsquolsquoethicsrsquorsquo and lsquolsquointelligencersquorsquo form an oxymoron In other words lsquolsquodoing whatrsquos rightrsquorsquo (ie doing your job which may require you to act immorally) should not interfere with doing lsquolsquothe right thingrsquorsquo (ie acting with moral principles) Of course most work done by intelligence professionals does not involve a moral dilemma such as providing accurate analysis or collecting information Sometimes however conflicting requirements and tasks impose significant ethical and moral dilemmas upon people doing their job Consequently public servants must make a decision or take an action that could be considered inappropriate or unethical for a similar circumstancein their private lives

The public is inundated with the perception that intelligence professionals will say or do anything to accomplish their jobs and that to be employed as an intelligence professional is to abandon any sense of moral judgment Bookstores and theaters are filled with stories of people who are sanctioned by the government and thus they have a lsquolsquolicensersquorsquo to lie cheat steal or kill This license is bestowed on the individual in the name of society to act as we dare not They are not responsible for their actions and morality be damned

Professionals in many fields have standards of ethical conduct with established codes of ethics to include psychologists (by the American Psychological Association) lawyers (by the American Bar Association) doctors (by the American Medical Association) organists (by the American Guild of Organists) music teachers (by the Music Teachers Association) real estate appraisers (by the Society of Real Estate Appraisers) funeral directors (by the Funeral Ethics Association) travel agents (by the American Society of Travel Agents) and speleologists (ie people who study caves by the National Speleological Society) The list goes on and on1 All these professions have a concern with the issues and ethical conflicts that those who work in that field may encounter These concerns may include problems of honesty confidentiality privacy impartiality accountability and conflicts of interest In the intelligence business these concerns are as real as in any other profession

Lacking legal directives or guidance intelligence professionals are left to decide for themselves how far they and the country they represent can go before losing the moral high ground And if it is legal is it ethical

Most ethics and intelligence education which is really training normally consists of management and leadership techniques learning the legal ramifications for conducting certain actions and decisions associating the intelligence profession with the military profession or learning from previous ethical mishaps through case studies Although all of these are excellent teaching tools they fail to take into consideration the moral underpinnings of this very volatile and possibly morally damaging profession

4

None of these pedagogical methods seeks to establish a theory upon which a code of ethics can be built a framework that can transcend the intelligence community

To some the mere juxtaposition of ethics and intelligence may appear to be a contradiction in terms But at heart intelligence is rooted in the severest of ethical principles truth telling After all the end purpose of the elaborate apparatus that the intelligence community has become is to provide the policymaker with as close to a truthful depiction of a given situation as is humanly possible Anything less is not intelligence It may be useful opinionmdash in some cases it may even be more accurate than prevailing intelligencemdash but if it is the opinion maker is lucky or in the particular instance possessed of more facts and sharper judgmental skills than the professionalintelligence officer Even the CIA has long recognized the centrality of truth telling As a contributor to Foreign Affairs observed several years ago the motto of the CIA chosen by the doughty old Presbyterian Allen Dulles is lsquolsquoAnd the Truth Shall Make You Freersquorsquo1 To accept the approximation of truth as the purpose of intelligence is one thing To accept the methods by which truth can be obtained poses ethical dilemmas The truth after all is often a set of facts or concrete physical entities or intentions which the party with whom they are entrusted will guard jealously as a precious not to say sacred element of the national preserve Ferreting out the truth under these circumstances often requires means and techniques not ordinarily employed in human intercourseBut we are not all ethical absolutists Value trade-offs are probably the best that most people in an uncertain world will accept And it is because intelligence offers security that bizarre methods to obtain it are acceptable to most Foreign policy making without an intelligence input of some kind would be capricious in the uncharted waters of world crisis situations it would be scandalously foolhardy It follows that the more ambiguous the international situation the greater the value of intelligence in the decision-makingprocess Put another way of course this means that where intelligence does not add to international security but rather say to the obsessive comfort of knowing more about Ruritania than even the Ruritanians or where it merely facilitates the feeding of salacious tidbits about foreign leaders to inquisitive Presidents questionable methods to collect it are not acceptableThe security returns of intelligence are probably inestimable and they are welcomed by both world superpowers and tacitly condoned by almost all active participating nations on the world stage Satellites monitor the missiledevelopments of the superpowers microwave telephone messages between foreign embassies and capitals are intercepted for critical informationIn a world where the two great powers can no longer guarantee international stability and where weaponry is no longer the exclusive currency of power intelligence monitoring must sweep targets other than the principal antagonistmdasheg China or the Middle East It must also be as concerned with economic and energy considerations as missiles But the principle governing the choice of targets remains the same Intelligence must promoteinternational security or the ethical compromises necessary to accommodate the requisite collection methods cannot and should not be stomached Intelligence monitoring substitutes for full faith and credit between nations and technology provides a pitiful but

5

workable substitute for the joyful conditions of a distant One World The tensions of the nation-state system are in other words held in bounds not only by diplomacy and bymutual common sense but by carefully calibrated monitoring systemsAssuming then that intelligence can help toward security in a dangerous international order how can the intelligence function be carried out at the least risk to other values in our society To put this most succinctly how can a professional intelligence service operate so that officials within it perform their roles in an ethical manner Most public officials would prefer that this be the case certainly most private citizens expect nothing less

Foreign intelligence is not by and large conducted by people lacking the capacity to recognize ethical standards but standards are lowered to accommodate the perceived national purpose Once lowered they can be more easily lowered a second time or they can be lowered further and further as routine reduces ethical resistance to repugnant activities This is the area of human dynamics where yesterdayrsquos managers of the intelligence community have been the most irresolute Management rarely blew the whistle on subordinates When subordinates succeeded in operations of questionablemorality they were as often rewarded with promotions as reprimanded for using dubious methods

Most professions such as the law and medicine have for centuries provided themselves with fail-safe systems to ensure that ethical norms are not compromised out of existence or rusted from misuse Some of these systems work better than others some are susceptible to corruption themselves and a few are mere shams but the fact that they exist and generally are taken seriously by the members of the profession is critically significant At the very least it means that there are limits to a professionalrsquos freedom and thatthose limits are defined by ethical codes sanctioned by colleagues A profession whose end purpose it is to root out the truth cannot afford to resist asking where its limits should be set However the intelligence professional has in the past operated under the simple guideline lsquolsquodonrsquot get caughtrsquorsquo Recently there have been signs that suggest that the intelligence community is busily if somewhat ponderously groping toward a limitsetting policy for its professionalsHuman intelligence collection is a major preoccupation of the clandestine service Simply put this is the process of extracting from others information or national assets theywould not willingly part with under normal circumstances In some cases the creation of appropriate circumstances is relatively easyThis is where the source is a willing volunteer acting out of his own sense of patriotism Anti-Soviet eacutemigreacute Hungarians providing detailed information on Russian military units occupying their country fall into this category The clandestine officer must provide the means whereby the eacutemigreacute can return to his country By and large the clandestine officer can content himself with the knowledge that the Hungarian is as anxious to reenter his homeland illegally as he is anxious to have him make the effort But the highest art in tradecraft is to develop a source that you lsquolsquoown lock stock and barrelrsquorsquo According to the clandestine ethos a lsquolsquocontrolledrsquorsquo source provides the most reliable intelligence lsquolsquoControlledrsquorsquo means of course bought or otherwise obligated Traditionally it has been the aim of the professional in the clandestine service to weave a psychological web around any potentially fruitful contact and to tighten that web whenever possible

6

Opportunities are limited but for those in the clandestine service who successfully develop controlled sources rewards in status and peer respect are high The modus operandi required however is the very antithesis of ethical interpersonal relationships

Sometimes the information obtained by these methods can be important It is however rarely of critical importance At best it may provide a measure of confirmation of some already suspected development or fill in a missing piece of a complex mosaic of facts There have been occasions when controlled sources have been successful in snatching internal documents off high-level desks in their own governments but even in these instances the lsquolsquotakersquorsquo has not been earthshaking Perhaps the faintly disappointing recordof achievement by clandestine operatives is explainable in bureaucratic terms Well-placed officials with immediate access to critical policy-making circlesmdashand for the most part this means they are part of the policy-making processmdashare generally well rewarded by and well satisfied with their own governments If they were not they would not hold powerful positions The main targets for clandestine collectors are usually second- and third-level officials who may not be fully privy to policy developments

Quality of information obtained aside a fundamental ethical issue concerning clandestine human collection remains That issue is the impact on the clandestine officer of his relationship with his source The formerrsquos bread and butter is the subversion of the latterrsquos integrity The officer is painstakingly trained in techniques that will convert an acquaintance into a submissive tool to shred away his resistance and deflate his sense of self-worth Of course the source may be thoroughly cynical even a venal merchant of his countryrsquos privacy and in that case the task of the clandestine officer is less burdensomemdashalthough he may come to find the relationship just as repellent as if the source had slowly and resistingly been bent to complianceWhatever the chemistry between the two individuals collector and source or perhaps more pointedly dominant and dominated the biggest loser is the one whose ethical scruples are most damaged in the process Depending on the techniques he may have to use to bring the source under control and maintain that relationship the biggest loser may be the clandestine officerAnother prime concern of the clandestine services is the development of methodologies and devices to thwart the defensive measures of other intelligence agencies and other national political systems While much of this activity is purely technical electronic engineering a significant investment has also been made in such exotica as lsquolsquotruth drugsrsquorsquo complex psychological warfare strategies bizarre bugging devices and the like Some of these devices and techniques have been used with profit and success by clandestine officers operating overseas others have proved impractical in the field or have stalled on the drawing board as development costs got out of hand But the search for new ways to penetrate other societies goes on Todayrsquos drug experimenters (if there are indeed any left) may become tomorrowrsquos experts in longrange behavior-modification processesWhatever the state of these arcane arts they have two things in common First their purpose is almost always to facilitate the manipulation of man by man In this sense they are not dissimilar in effect and impact to the process of controlled source development Secondly the practitioners of these arts and the lsquolsquopsych warfarersquorsquo experts are obliged by

7

the very nature of their trade to presume that they are operating in hostile environments The end point of their efforts after all is to bypass normal authority or at the least to usesemi-legal means to overcome obstacles placed in their path by the authorities of other nations The professional premise of the officers engaged in these practices then is the constructive use of illegality

Many of the arguments used to question the efficacy and suitability of political operations can be applied to the process of human clandestine intelligence collection the product is not all that impressive the moral damage to the collectors is high intelligence tends to be collected as an end in itself and there is always the risk of exposure Nevertheless intelligence must be collected in selected areas and against specific subject targets Technology is now the workhorse of the collection business and it should remain so Thepresent Director has in effect recognized this evolution in collection methods he has justified his reduction of covert officers on this ground Photographic and audio satellites and other interception devices are immensely expensive but they have the advantage of doing only minimal damage to the ethical standards of the operators and processors As noted above technological intelligence collection is in at least one highly significant areamdashthat of arms limitation controlmdashtacitly accepted as essential to security by bothsuperpowers6Of course even with the phasing down of clandestine human collection the need will remain for residual capability in certain esoteric collection techniques Atmospheric conditions in some geographic locations may be so unfavorable that short-range collection devices will be needed to supplement lsquolsquostand-offrsquorsquo equipment such as satellites There will always be the need for personnel skilled in the techniques of situating these devices Similarly there must be those who can exploit the defector or the lsquolsquowalk-inrsquorsquo sourceCounterintelligence is another field of clandestine intelligence activity which probably cannot be dispensed with for some years to come But if counterintelligence is to survive it should be organized on a purely defensive basis as a protection against foreign penetration of the US intelligence services and their technical capabilities It should be a small lean component with a sophisticated understanding not only of the technological capabilities of major foreign intelligence services but also of those countriesrsquo politicaldynamics Far from being walled off from other Agency components as in the past it should be a vital part of Agency life as much to gain from exposure to varying points of view as to influence those points of view

Obviously action is facilitated if both intelligence and operations can be controlled under one organization but an offsetting merit of separation is that an intelligence unit is more likely to be impartial in its assessment of the success of operations if it is independent of any attempt by the operational side to interpret the evidence regarding success or failure too favorably For all these reasons I continue to stand for the independence of intelligence from operations both covert and overt to the highest possible level in

8

government organization although of course recognizing the need for the greatest possible understanding between intelligence and operational staffs

Puncte esentiale privind etica intelligence-ului

ASSASSINATIONHelms himself observed that lsquolsquowar corrupts and secret war corrupts secretlyrsquorsquo14 So it is easy to slip toward the acceptance of assassination as one of its techniques In 1940 there was a suggestion that there would be a specialBritish clandestine operation to attack the aircrews of the German pathfinderswho were causing us so much trouble in the Blitz They were to beambushed while being ferried by bus between their billets and the airfield atVannes before taking off for an attack This was vetoed by Sir Charles Portalthe Chief of Air Staff but as the war progressed feelings became less delicateLater at the time of the Suez crisis in 1956 there was even talkmdashitappearsmdashof attempting to assassinate President Nasser15 In America AllenDulles aware of the danger of the CIA slipping toward an acceptance ofassassination specifically forbade it when he was Director and an embargowas included in presidential directives on three occasions Nevertheless itwas sometimes attempted with disastrous results for the CIA when it cameto lightTORTURE AND DURESSTorture too was officially barredmdashat least to the extent of a rule being formulatedby Helms in 1955 under Dullesrsquos directorship lsquolsquoYou may not useelectrical chemical or physical duressrsquorsquo it read although as Powers thenwent on to point out lsquolsquopsychological duress was okayrsquorsquo16 We in World WarII certainly tried to bluff prisoners of war into thinking we knew muchmore than we did in the hope that this would mislead them into giving awaythings about which we knew little or nothing And it seemed not too unfairto lsquolsquofencersquorsquo psychologically with a prisoner and thus to trap him into sayingmore than he had originally intended But there had to be a limit such as forexample not playing on a manrsquos emotions by encouraging him to worryabout the safety of his family I take it that no such restraint is likely to bewidely observed todaylsquolsquoCHARACTER ASSASSINATIONrsquorsquoShort of killing a key individual on the opposing side his value to them maybe destroyed if his colleagues or countrymen can be misled into suspectingthat he is a secret agent for your own side or has some other motive forworking against his sidersquos interests This mischievous technique is only likelyto succeed when the individual in question is working in an organizationprone to mutual suspicion but in so far as it exploits a moral weakness inthat organization so lsquolsquohoisting the engineer with his own petardrsquorsquo it may beless repugnant than other measures

9

INTERVENTIONIn parallel with the ethical problem of the humane limits of conduct towardindividuals there is the problem of the extent to which any one state canbe justified in attempting to interfere in the internal affairs of another ThelsquolsquoIrangatersquorsquo affair and the clandestine mining of Nicaraguan harbors underCIA auspices are cases in point In discussing such questions StansfieldTurner in Secrecy and Democracy17 quotes John Stuart Millrsquos A few words onnon-intervention (1859)The doctrine of non-intervention to be a legitimate principle of morality mustbe accepted by all governments The despot must consent to be bound by it aswell as the free state Unless they do the profession comes to this miserableissuemdashthat the wrong side may help the wrong but the right must not help theright

INTERNAL INTELLIGENCEBesides the ethical questions concerning how a nation and its officials andagents should restrain their activities in gaining information about anothernationrsquos secrets or in attempting to interfere in its internal affairs there areother questions that will arise when a nationrsquos officials have to seek out activitieswithin its own borders that could jeopardize its security

PRIVACYWhile any decent individual instinctively reacts against break-ins and lessviolent infringements of privacy a state legitimately requests some detailsabout each of its individual citizens for a wide range of social purposes suchas taxation educational planning transport facilities and potential for militaryand other forms of public service It might therefore be asked why we set so much store by a right to privacy Apart from the nightmare of a lsquolsquoBigBrotherrsquorsquo state there is an instinctive dislike of surveillance even parentalsurveillance and there may well be an apprehension based deeply back in theevolutionary process arising from a feeling of vulnerability while executingbodily functions or in sickness and of latent trouble from a stalking predatorwhose staring eyes betray his intentions More rationally I for one wouldhave little objection to any authority having any information it wished aboutmy actionsmdashor even my thoughtsmdashprovided that I could be sure that itwould not misinterpret the information to come to false conclusions aboutmeJust as technology is tending to modify concepts of sovereignty (from athree-mile limit for territorial waters based on the range of a gun to a limitof 200 miles today and the free movement of satellites over the territories ofother nations for example) so also it is tending to change the balancebetween the rights of individuals and the states of which they are membersThe complex organization of a modem state needs to know more about itsindividuals for optimum functioning and this is all the easier to achievebecause of the technical advances in handling and storing information and

10

unfortunately it will be only too easy for zeal to replace judgment in theprocess

MINIMUM TRESPASSTwo final points on ethics are worth making The first is that despite all theopportunitiesmdashand temptationsmdashthat it offers for malpractice intelligencecan be an honorable pursuit Indeed by improving the assessment by onenation of another it can on occasion contribute to international stabilityOn less happy occasions of course the children of light will be at a disadvantageunless they know enough of the ways of the world to forestall orcounter any unworthy exploitation of those ways by the children of thisworld There need be absolutely no dishonor in trying to ascertain what apotential or actual opponent is likely to attempt be it by external armedthreat or by internal subversion The risk of disrepute will depend on theextent to which the individual intelligence officer or his organization departsfrom the norms of morality in uncovering an opponentrsquos activitiesThe second point follows from the first One of the canons governing militaryor police action is the doctrine of minimum force and a parallel canonshould govern intelligence it should be conducted with the minimum trespassagainst national and individual human rights This canon applies to allforms of intelligence both external and internal that a civilized state mayfind it necessary to undertake

ETHICAL DIMENSIONS FOR INTELLIGENCEOPERATIONS IN GENERALSpying as a form of statecraft is as old as recorded history Babylonian tablets reportedly contain passages about spying3 and the Bible has several passages about the use of intelligence agents4Modern times also are replete with spy sagas of all kinds5 This legacy of intelligence operations by nations throughout history is evidence of a long-standing acceptance of such activity by many diverse cultural groupsHowever while many people may feel intuitively that at least some form of intelligence activity is morally justifiable it is somewhat difficult to articulate exactly what the ethical foundation is for such activity We will approach this task first by presenting a set of guidelines that should define the morality of both open and clandestine information-gathering operations

Information-Gathering ActivitiesWe submit that the following principles provide an ethical basis for the use of information-gathering services by a democratic government for foreign policy purposes First because a state has the responsibility to its citizens to protect their lives welfare and property it must take steps to understand the foreign threats if there are any to those citizens as well as to the nation as a whole In order to do this the state must gather informationmdash openly if possible but by using secret methods if necessary In a world in

11

which many societies are closed or in which information does not circulate completely freely the state must engage in clandestine informationgathering to protect against foreign threats to its security Our second principle is that the state should use the least intrusive means of collecting information That is one should not spy when information can be gathered in an open way Further the information to be gathered ought to be related to advancing the goals of the state as a whole rather than the private interests of individualsThird intelligence data must be presented to policymakers without bias or political taint Those who report the information must not manipulate it to drive policy or to justify further intrusive intelligence collection Finally one should recognize the need for the state to employ counterintelligence to protect its own national security information from being stolen All nations generally agree that the state has the right to punish those it catches in the act of spying Thus one countryrsquos hero is bound to be anotherrsquos traitor one countryrsquos intelligence success is ipso facto anotherrsquos counterintelligence failureIt is important to note here that what is morally acceptable behavior for the government in protecting the nation as a whole may not necessarily be acceptable for the individual in fact quite the opposite may be true While nations may sometimes use intrusive measures to collect information individuals may not Thus espionage as a form of acceptable statecraft would be considered mere theft if practiced by individuals

Covert ActivitiesWhile most people recognize the statersquos need to possess the capability of gathering information by clandestine means a significant number are troubled by the use of intelligence resources to interfere in the internal activities of another nation In wartime one might condone this interference as a preferred alternative to direct military action and defining the enemy is easier in wartime In peacetime however internal interference with other nations may seem less acceptable Under what circumstances then does a nation especially a free and open society that professes to follow the rule of law have the right to interfere with a foreign government or even to seek to change its nature when that nation would find such activity totally unacceptable even hostile if done to itGiven the adversarial relationship between East and West since the end of World War II some pragmatists might argue that a governmentrsquos foreign policy cannot function without some degree of covert activities with questionable ethical aspects7 This argument is similar to the one made by Niccolo Machiavelli that rulers must sometimes be immoral in establishing and maintaining the states8 While pragmatists may be content with the Machiavellian rationale it has extreme results when the preservation of the statersquos power conflicts with other highly esteemed values Can a nation espouse such moral positions on freedom democracy and human rights as does the United States and still support actions that contravene these ideals Only the most extreme political or religious leaders would reject the pragmatic line in these areas Yet these same leaders might argue that under certain circumstances a state may be justified in using convert activities to carry out foreign policy

Just War Theory

12

Some authors have used the existing literature on just war theory to establish a moral basis for clandestine intelligence operations10 Although just war theory is concerned with permissible acts of the state during wartime some aspects of the theory may indeed contribute to our understanding of the morality of peacetime covert intelligence activitiesJust war theory posits that there are times when conflict is morally justified It painfully seeks to discern the difference between a just and an unjust cause Simply defined a just war is a conflict that is fought either in selfdefense or in collective defense against an armed attack There is an assumption that the opposing party is in the wrong and that its attack is unjustifiedOf course there are numerous examples of conflicts in which both sides claimed to be the morally correct party and accused the other of aggression11 It is important to emphasize that the function of just war theory is not to justify warfare itself but rather to judge conflicts The standard method under the theory is to lay down common criteria by which to measure wars The criteria encompass intentions as well as the actual acts and consequences of wars One can successfully incorporate intelligence activitymdashboth espionage and covert interference with internal affairs of foreign nationsmdashunder the penumbra of just war theory if one understands that governments use such activities as a means for government survival

MORAL CONSIDERATIONS CONFRONTING THE INDIVIDUAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERHaving explored the moral constructs that support an intelligence system as a whole we now examine the ethical considerations that confront the individual intelligence officer Are these considerations different from what they would be for other civil servants military officers or members of the private sectorEthics are often defined as behavior relating to professional standards of conduct As in any other profession such standards exist in the field of intelligence even if these standards require behavior that is unacceptable for private citizens Dr David Hunter has argued that lsquolsquofor intelligence professionals to disregard the national values they are committed to defend is to ignore the fundamental reason for being in the gamersquorsquo33 Indeed American intelligence agencies are required by executive order to collect information in a manner that is lsquolsquorespectful of the principles on which the United Stateswas foundedrsquorsquo34There are several key differences between intelligence professionals and their counterparts in other areas of government service or private business Professional standards require intelligence professionals to lie hide information or use covert tactics to protect their lsquolsquocoverrsquorsquo access sources and responsibilities The Central Intelligence Agency expects teaches encourages and controls these tactics so that the lies are consistent and supported (lsquolsquobackstoppedrsquorsquo) The CIA expects intelligence officers to teach others to lie deceive steal launder money and perform a variety of other activities that would certainly be illegal if practiced in the United States They call these tactics lsquolsquotradecraftrsquorsquo and intelligence officers practice them in all the worldrsquos intelligence services35In other contexts intelligence officers must be as honest and forthright as those who work in the private sector or other parts of government Intelligence officers must always

13

tell the truth about their activities to their superiors Otherwise they may find themselves suspected of betraying the organization to which they owe their loyalty Honesty is especially important in intelligence because many officers operate in settings where theiractions cannot be observed36Intelligence analysts must never alter intelligence judgments to fit the desires of policymakers who might prefer different conclusions Forcing the facts to fit policy warps the purpose of intelligence operations37 Intelligence officers must be scrupulous in managing funds or equipment with which they are entrusted Care in this area is especially important because funds are often lsquolsquounvoucheredrsquorsquo (not subject to outside audit) and equipment is deliberately designed to prevent its identification with the officer or service concerned38Intelligence officers must give up certain rights of privacy so that they may be trusted with secrets They are subject to examinations of their private and professional activities during their careers and must accept some restrictions on their behavior even after leaving the service for example they must continue to protect secrets they learned while on duty39The United States military has long recognized that individual soldiers are obligated to follow the lawful orders of their superiors in fact soldiers must swear that they will do so40The military also recognizes that following illegal or unlawful orders is not acceptable The so-called Nuremberg defensemdashthat one is not accountable for onersquos actions if merely following ordersmdashis not acceptable The question for intelligence professionals is whether they have the same kinds of obligationsIn the authorsrsquo view government servants whether military or civilian have an obligation to tell their superiors about matters they consider illegal immoral or ill-conceived If in the judgment of the superior the questionable order must stand the junior official has the choice of carrying out the unacceptable order appealing to a higher authority or ultimately resigningWhat is not possible in the realm of intelligencemdashalthough it might be possible in other areas of United States government servicemdashis to lsquolsquogo publicrsquorsquo with the issue in question Intelligence officials have the obligation to keep secret issues properly classified and thus public discussion is not possible without a gross violation of classification rules and the professional ethics of the intelligence officer41In reality such ethical disputes rarely arise As in most enterprises superiors want to develop the loyalty and trust of their juniors and also want to be advised when things seem to be going awry Thus strong disagreement often leads to compromise rather than confrontation

CONCLUSIONEthics and morality in intelligence are integral parts of operating a secret intelligence service in a free democratic and moral society A free democratic government has the obligation to protect the interests and security of the people it serves If the world were perfect intelligence operations would be unnecessary Given the depravity of the world

14

around us however free societies have no choice but to engage in intelligence activities if they are to remain free

Bibliografie

Instrumente web

1 httpethicsiiteducodes

Carti

1 JAN Goldman Ethics of Spying A reader for the intelligence professional Editura Scarecrow Press Oxford 2006

2 IONEL Nitu Ghidul Analistului de Intelligence Editura Academiei Nationale de Informatii Mihai Viteazul Bucuresti 2011

15

makes us strong Analysis of tough cases becomes our ally as we think about the values and standards that will guide us in the future

The role of ethics in intelligence work has always been either misunderstood or poorly appreciated by both policymakers and the public leading to the stale joke that lsquolsquoethicsrsquorsquo and lsquolsquointelligencersquorsquo form an oxymoron In other words lsquolsquodoing whatrsquos rightrsquorsquo (ie doing your job which may require you to act immorally) should not interfere with doing lsquolsquothe right thingrsquorsquo (ie acting with moral principles) Of course most work done by intelligence professionals does not involve a moral dilemma such as providing accurate analysis or collecting information Sometimes however conflicting requirements and tasks impose significant ethical and moral dilemmas upon people doing their job Consequently public servants must make a decision or take an action that could be considered inappropriate or unethical for a similar circumstancein their private lives

The public is inundated with the perception that intelligence professionals will say or do anything to accomplish their jobs and that to be employed as an intelligence professional is to abandon any sense of moral judgment Bookstores and theaters are filled with stories of people who are sanctioned by the government and thus they have a lsquolsquolicensersquorsquo to lie cheat steal or kill This license is bestowed on the individual in the name of society to act as we dare not They are not responsible for their actions and morality be damned

Professionals in many fields have standards of ethical conduct with established codes of ethics to include psychologists (by the American Psychological Association) lawyers (by the American Bar Association) doctors (by the American Medical Association) organists (by the American Guild of Organists) music teachers (by the Music Teachers Association) real estate appraisers (by the Society of Real Estate Appraisers) funeral directors (by the Funeral Ethics Association) travel agents (by the American Society of Travel Agents) and speleologists (ie people who study caves by the National Speleological Society) The list goes on and on1 All these professions have a concern with the issues and ethical conflicts that those who work in that field may encounter These concerns may include problems of honesty confidentiality privacy impartiality accountability and conflicts of interest In the intelligence business these concerns are as real as in any other profession

Lacking legal directives or guidance intelligence professionals are left to decide for themselves how far they and the country they represent can go before losing the moral high ground And if it is legal is it ethical

Most ethics and intelligence education which is really training normally consists of management and leadership techniques learning the legal ramifications for conducting certain actions and decisions associating the intelligence profession with the military profession or learning from previous ethical mishaps through case studies Although all of these are excellent teaching tools they fail to take into consideration the moral underpinnings of this very volatile and possibly morally damaging profession

4

None of these pedagogical methods seeks to establish a theory upon which a code of ethics can be built a framework that can transcend the intelligence community

To some the mere juxtaposition of ethics and intelligence may appear to be a contradiction in terms But at heart intelligence is rooted in the severest of ethical principles truth telling After all the end purpose of the elaborate apparatus that the intelligence community has become is to provide the policymaker with as close to a truthful depiction of a given situation as is humanly possible Anything less is not intelligence It may be useful opinionmdash in some cases it may even be more accurate than prevailing intelligencemdash but if it is the opinion maker is lucky or in the particular instance possessed of more facts and sharper judgmental skills than the professionalintelligence officer Even the CIA has long recognized the centrality of truth telling As a contributor to Foreign Affairs observed several years ago the motto of the CIA chosen by the doughty old Presbyterian Allen Dulles is lsquolsquoAnd the Truth Shall Make You Freersquorsquo1 To accept the approximation of truth as the purpose of intelligence is one thing To accept the methods by which truth can be obtained poses ethical dilemmas The truth after all is often a set of facts or concrete physical entities or intentions which the party with whom they are entrusted will guard jealously as a precious not to say sacred element of the national preserve Ferreting out the truth under these circumstances often requires means and techniques not ordinarily employed in human intercourseBut we are not all ethical absolutists Value trade-offs are probably the best that most people in an uncertain world will accept And it is because intelligence offers security that bizarre methods to obtain it are acceptable to most Foreign policy making without an intelligence input of some kind would be capricious in the uncharted waters of world crisis situations it would be scandalously foolhardy It follows that the more ambiguous the international situation the greater the value of intelligence in the decision-makingprocess Put another way of course this means that where intelligence does not add to international security but rather say to the obsessive comfort of knowing more about Ruritania than even the Ruritanians or where it merely facilitates the feeding of salacious tidbits about foreign leaders to inquisitive Presidents questionable methods to collect it are not acceptableThe security returns of intelligence are probably inestimable and they are welcomed by both world superpowers and tacitly condoned by almost all active participating nations on the world stage Satellites monitor the missiledevelopments of the superpowers microwave telephone messages between foreign embassies and capitals are intercepted for critical informationIn a world where the two great powers can no longer guarantee international stability and where weaponry is no longer the exclusive currency of power intelligence monitoring must sweep targets other than the principal antagonistmdasheg China or the Middle East It must also be as concerned with economic and energy considerations as missiles But the principle governing the choice of targets remains the same Intelligence must promoteinternational security or the ethical compromises necessary to accommodate the requisite collection methods cannot and should not be stomached Intelligence monitoring substitutes for full faith and credit between nations and technology provides a pitiful but

5

workable substitute for the joyful conditions of a distant One World The tensions of the nation-state system are in other words held in bounds not only by diplomacy and bymutual common sense but by carefully calibrated monitoring systemsAssuming then that intelligence can help toward security in a dangerous international order how can the intelligence function be carried out at the least risk to other values in our society To put this most succinctly how can a professional intelligence service operate so that officials within it perform their roles in an ethical manner Most public officials would prefer that this be the case certainly most private citizens expect nothing less

Foreign intelligence is not by and large conducted by people lacking the capacity to recognize ethical standards but standards are lowered to accommodate the perceived national purpose Once lowered they can be more easily lowered a second time or they can be lowered further and further as routine reduces ethical resistance to repugnant activities This is the area of human dynamics where yesterdayrsquos managers of the intelligence community have been the most irresolute Management rarely blew the whistle on subordinates When subordinates succeeded in operations of questionablemorality they were as often rewarded with promotions as reprimanded for using dubious methods

Most professions such as the law and medicine have for centuries provided themselves with fail-safe systems to ensure that ethical norms are not compromised out of existence or rusted from misuse Some of these systems work better than others some are susceptible to corruption themselves and a few are mere shams but the fact that they exist and generally are taken seriously by the members of the profession is critically significant At the very least it means that there are limits to a professionalrsquos freedom and thatthose limits are defined by ethical codes sanctioned by colleagues A profession whose end purpose it is to root out the truth cannot afford to resist asking where its limits should be set However the intelligence professional has in the past operated under the simple guideline lsquolsquodonrsquot get caughtrsquorsquo Recently there have been signs that suggest that the intelligence community is busily if somewhat ponderously groping toward a limitsetting policy for its professionalsHuman intelligence collection is a major preoccupation of the clandestine service Simply put this is the process of extracting from others information or national assets theywould not willingly part with under normal circumstances In some cases the creation of appropriate circumstances is relatively easyThis is where the source is a willing volunteer acting out of his own sense of patriotism Anti-Soviet eacutemigreacute Hungarians providing detailed information on Russian military units occupying their country fall into this category The clandestine officer must provide the means whereby the eacutemigreacute can return to his country By and large the clandestine officer can content himself with the knowledge that the Hungarian is as anxious to reenter his homeland illegally as he is anxious to have him make the effort But the highest art in tradecraft is to develop a source that you lsquolsquoown lock stock and barrelrsquorsquo According to the clandestine ethos a lsquolsquocontrolledrsquorsquo source provides the most reliable intelligence lsquolsquoControlledrsquorsquo means of course bought or otherwise obligated Traditionally it has been the aim of the professional in the clandestine service to weave a psychological web around any potentially fruitful contact and to tighten that web whenever possible

6

Opportunities are limited but for those in the clandestine service who successfully develop controlled sources rewards in status and peer respect are high The modus operandi required however is the very antithesis of ethical interpersonal relationships

Sometimes the information obtained by these methods can be important It is however rarely of critical importance At best it may provide a measure of confirmation of some already suspected development or fill in a missing piece of a complex mosaic of facts There have been occasions when controlled sources have been successful in snatching internal documents off high-level desks in their own governments but even in these instances the lsquolsquotakersquorsquo has not been earthshaking Perhaps the faintly disappointing recordof achievement by clandestine operatives is explainable in bureaucratic terms Well-placed officials with immediate access to critical policy-making circlesmdashand for the most part this means they are part of the policy-making processmdashare generally well rewarded by and well satisfied with their own governments If they were not they would not hold powerful positions The main targets for clandestine collectors are usually second- and third-level officials who may not be fully privy to policy developments

Quality of information obtained aside a fundamental ethical issue concerning clandestine human collection remains That issue is the impact on the clandestine officer of his relationship with his source The formerrsquos bread and butter is the subversion of the latterrsquos integrity The officer is painstakingly trained in techniques that will convert an acquaintance into a submissive tool to shred away his resistance and deflate his sense of self-worth Of course the source may be thoroughly cynical even a venal merchant of his countryrsquos privacy and in that case the task of the clandestine officer is less burdensomemdashalthough he may come to find the relationship just as repellent as if the source had slowly and resistingly been bent to complianceWhatever the chemistry between the two individuals collector and source or perhaps more pointedly dominant and dominated the biggest loser is the one whose ethical scruples are most damaged in the process Depending on the techniques he may have to use to bring the source under control and maintain that relationship the biggest loser may be the clandestine officerAnother prime concern of the clandestine services is the development of methodologies and devices to thwart the defensive measures of other intelligence agencies and other national political systems While much of this activity is purely technical electronic engineering a significant investment has also been made in such exotica as lsquolsquotruth drugsrsquorsquo complex psychological warfare strategies bizarre bugging devices and the like Some of these devices and techniques have been used with profit and success by clandestine officers operating overseas others have proved impractical in the field or have stalled on the drawing board as development costs got out of hand But the search for new ways to penetrate other societies goes on Todayrsquos drug experimenters (if there are indeed any left) may become tomorrowrsquos experts in longrange behavior-modification processesWhatever the state of these arcane arts they have two things in common First their purpose is almost always to facilitate the manipulation of man by man In this sense they are not dissimilar in effect and impact to the process of controlled source development Secondly the practitioners of these arts and the lsquolsquopsych warfarersquorsquo experts are obliged by

7

the very nature of their trade to presume that they are operating in hostile environments The end point of their efforts after all is to bypass normal authority or at the least to usesemi-legal means to overcome obstacles placed in their path by the authorities of other nations The professional premise of the officers engaged in these practices then is the constructive use of illegality

Many of the arguments used to question the efficacy and suitability of political operations can be applied to the process of human clandestine intelligence collection the product is not all that impressive the moral damage to the collectors is high intelligence tends to be collected as an end in itself and there is always the risk of exposure Nevertheless intelligence must be collected in selected areas and against specific subject targets Technology is now the workhorse of the collection business and it should remain so Thepresent Director has in effect recognized this evolution in collection methods he has justified his reduction of covert officers on this ground Photographic and audio satellites and other interception devices are immensely expensive but they have the advantage of doing only minimal damage to the ethical standards of the operators and processors As noted above technological intelligence collection is in at least one highly significant areamdashthat of arms limitation controlmdashtacitly accepted as essential to security by bothsuperpowers6Of course even with the phasing down of clandestine human collection the need will remain for residual capability in certain esoteric collection techniques Atmospheric conditions in some geographic locations may be so unfavorable that short-range collection devices will be needed to supplement lsquolsquostand-offrsquorsquo equipment such as satellites There will always be the need for personnel skilled in the techniques of situating these devices Similarly there must be those who can exploit the defector or the lsquolsquowalk-inrsquorsquo sourceCounterintelligence is another field of clandestine intelligence activity which probably cannot be dispensed with for some years to come But if counterintelligence is to survive it should be organized on a purely defensive basis as a protection against foreign penetration of the US intelligence services and their technical capabilities It should be a small lean component with a sophisticated understanding not only of the technological capabilities of major foreign intelligence services but also of those countriesrsquo politicaldynamics Far from being walled off from other Agency components as in the past it should be a vital part of Agency life as much to gain from exposure to varying points of view as to influence those points of view

Obviously action is facilitated if both intelligence and operations can be controlled under one organization but an offsetting merit of separation is that an intelligence unit is more likely to be impartial in its assessment of the success of operations if it is independent of any attempt by the operational side to interpret the evidence regarding success or failure too favorably For all these reasons I continue to stand for the independence of intelligence from operations both covert and overt to the highest possible level in

8

government organization although of course recognizing the need for the greatest possible understanding between intelligence and operational staffs

Puncte esentiale privind etica intelligence-ului

ASSASSINATIONHelms himself observed that lsquolsquowar corrupts and secret war corrupts secretlyrsquorsquo14 So it is easy to slip toward the acceptance of assassination as one of its techniques In 1940 there was a suggestion that there would be a specialBritish clandestine operation to attack the aircrews of the German pathfinderswho were causing us so much trouble in the Blitz They were to beambushed while being ferried by bus between their billets and the airfield atVannes before taking off for an attack This was vetoed by Sir Charles Portalthe Chief of Air Staff but as the war progressed feelings became less delicateLater at the time of the Suez crisis in 1956 there was even talkmdashitappearsmdashof attempting to assassinate President Nasser15 In America AllenDulles aware of the danger of the CIA slipping toward an acceptance ofassassination specifically forbade it when he was Director and an embargowas included in presidential directives on three occasions Nevertheless itwas sometimes attempted with disastrous results for the CIA when it cameto lightTORTURE AND DURESSTorture too was officially barredmdashat least to the extent of a rule being formulatedby Helms in 1955 under Dullesrsquos directorship lsquolsquoYou may not useelectrical chemical or physical duressrsquorsquo it read although as Powers thenwent on to point out lsquolsquopsychological duress was okayrsquorsquo16 We in World WarII certainly tried to bluff prisoners of war into thinking we knew muchmore than we did in the hope that this would mislead them into giving awaythings about which we knew little or nothing And it seemed not too unfairto lsquolsquofencersquorsquo psychologically with a prisoner and thus to trap him into sayingmore than he had originally intended But there had to be a limit such as forexample not playing on a manrsquos emotions by encouraging him to worryabout the safety of his family I take it that no such restraint is likely to bewidely observed todaylsquolsquoCHARACTER ASSASSINATIONrsquorsquoShort of killing a key individual on the opposing side his value to them maybe destroyed if his colleagues or countrymen can be misled into suspectingthat he is a secret agent for your own side or has some other motive forworking against his sidersquos interests This mischievous technique is only likelyto succeed when the individual in question is working in an organizationprone to mutual suspicion but in so far as it exploits a moral weakness inthat organization so lsquolsquohoisting the engineer with his own petardrsquorsquo it may beless repugnant than other measures

9

INTERVENTIONIn parallel with the ethical problem of the humane limits of conduct towardindividuals there is the problem of the extent to which any one state canbe justified in attempting to interfere in the internal affairs of another ThelsquolsquoIrangatersquorsquo affair and the clandestine mining of Nicaraguan harbors underCIA auspices are cases in point In discussing such questions StansfieldTurner in Secrecy and Democracy17 quotes John Stuart Millrsquos A few words onnon-intervention (1859)The doctrine of non-intervention to be a legitimate principle of morality mustbe accepted by all governments The despot must consent to be bound by it aswell as the free state Unless they do the profession comes to this miserableissuemdashthat the wrong side may help the wrong but the right must not help theright

INTERNAL INTELLIGENCEBesides the ethical questions concerning how a nation and its officials andagents should restrain their activities in gaining information about anothernationrsquos secrets or in attempting to interfere in its internal affairs there areother questions that will arise when a nationrsquos officials have to seek out activitieswithin its own borders that could jeopardize its security

PRIVACYWhile any decent individual instinctively reacts against break-ins and lessviolent infringements of privacy a state legitimately requests some detailsabout each of its individual citizens for a wide range of social purposes suchas taxation educational planning transport facilities and potential for militaryand other forms of public service It might therefore be asked why we set so much store by a right to privacy Apart from the nightmare of a lsquolsquoBigBrotherrsquorsquo state there is an instinctive dislike of surveillance even parentalsurveillance and there may well be an apprehension based deeply back in theevolutionary process arising from a feeling of vulnerability while executingbodily functions or in sickness and of latent trouble from a stalking predatorwhose staring eyes betray his intentions More rationally I for one wouldhave little objection to any authority having any information it wished aboutmy actionsmdashor even my thoughtsmdashprovided that I could be sure that itwould not misinterpret the information to come to false conclusions aboutmeJust as technology is tending to modify concepts of sovereignty (from athree-mile limit for territorial waters based on the range of a gun to a limitof 200 miles today and the free movement of satellites over the territories ofother nations for example) so also it is tending to change the balancebetween the rights of individuals and the states of which they are membersThe complex organization of a modem state needs to know more about itsindividuals for optimum functioning and this is all the easier to achievebecause of the technical advances in handling and storing information and

10

unfortunately it will be only too easy for zeal to replace judgment in theprocess

MINIMUM TRESPASSTwo final points on ethics are worth making The first is that despite all theopportunitiesmdashand temptationsmdashthat it offers for malpractice intelligencecan be an honorable pursuit Indeed by improving the assessment by onenation of another it can on occasion contribute to international stabilityOn less happy occasions of course the children of light will be at a disadvantageunless they know enough of the ways of the world to forestall orcounter any unworthy exploitation of those ways by the children of thisworld There need be absolutely no dishonor in trying to ascertain what apotential or actual opponent is likely to attempt be it by external armedthreat or by internal subversion The risk of disrepute will depend on theextent to which the individual intelligence officer or his organization departsfrom the norms of morality in uncovering an opponentrsquos activitiesThe second point follows from the first One of the canons governing militaryor police action is the doctrine of minimum force and a parallel canonshould govern intelligence it should be conducted with the minimum trespassagainst national and individual human rights This canon applies to allforms of intelligence both external and internal that a civilized state mayfind it necessary to undertake

ETHICAL DIMENSIONS FOR INTELLIGENCEOPERATIONS IN GENERALSpying as a form of statecraft is as old as recorded history Babylonian tablets reportedly contain passages about spying3 and the Bible has several passages about the use of intelligence agents4Modern times also are replete with spy sagas of all kinds5 This legacy of intelligence operations by nations throughout history is evidence of a long-standing acceptance of such activity by many diverse cultural groupsHowever while many people may feel intuitively that at least some form of intelligence activity is morally justifiable it is somewhat difficult to articulate exactly what the ethical foundation is for such activity We will approach this task first by presenting a set of guidelines that should define the morality of both open and clandestine information-gathering operations

Information-Gathering ActivitiesWe submit that the following principles provide an ethical basis for the use of information-gathering services by a democratic government for foreign policy purposes First because a state has the responsibility to its citizens to protect their lives welfare and property it must take steps to understand the foreign threats if there are any to those citizens as well as to the nation as a whole In order to do this the state must gather informationmdash openly if possible but by using secret methods if necessary In a world in

11

which many societies are closed or in which information does not circulate completely freely the state must engage in clandestine informationgathering to protect against foreign threats to its security Our second principle is that the state should use the least intrusive means of collecting information That is one should not spy when information can be gathered in an open way Further the information to be gathered ought to be related to advancing the goals of the state as a whole rather than the private interests of individualsThird intelligence data must be presented to policymakers without bias or political taint Those who report the information must not manipulate it to drive policy or to justify further intrusive intelligence collection Finally one should recognize the need for the state to employ counterintelligence to protect its own national security information from being stolen All nations generally agree that the state has the right to punish those it catches in the act of spying Thus one countryrsquos hero is bound to be anotherrsquos traitor one countryrsquos intelligence success is ipso facto anotherrsquos counterintelligence failureIt is important to note here that what is morally acceptable behavior for the government in protecting the nation as a whole may not necessarily be acceptable for the individual in fact quite the opposite may be true While nations may sometimes use intrusive measures to collect information individuals may not Thus espionage as a form of acceptable statecraft would be considered mere theft if practiced by individuals

Covert ActivitiesWhile most people recognize the statersquos need to possess the capability of gathering information by clandestine means a significant number are troubled by the use of intelligence resources to interfere in the internal activities of another nation In wartime one might condone this interference as a preferred alternative to direct military action and defining the enemy is easier in wartime In peacetime however internal interference with other nations may seem less acceptable Under what circumstances then does a nation especially a free and open society that professes to follow the rule of law have the right to interfere with a foreign government or even to seek to change its nature when that nation would find such activity totally unacceptable even hostile if done to itGiven the adversarial relationship between East and West since the end of World War II some pragmatists might argue that a governmentrsquos foreign policy cannot function without some degree of covert activities with questionable ethical aspects7 This argument is similar to the one made by Niccolo Machiavelli that rulers must sometimes be immoral in establishing and maintaining the states8 While pragmatists may be content with the Machiavellian rationale it has extreme results when the preservation of the statersquos power conflicts with other highly esteemed values Can a nation espouse such moral positions on freedom democracy and human rights as does the United States and still support actions that contravene these ideals Only the most extreme political or religious leaders would reject the pragmatic line in these areas Yet these same leaders might argue that under certain circumstances a state may be justified in using convert activities to carry out foreign policy

Just War Theory

12

Some authors have used the existing literature on just war theory to establish a moral basis for clandestine intelligence operations10 Although just war theory is concerned with permissible acts of the state during wartime some aspects of the theory may indeed contribute to our understanding of the morality of peacetime covert intelligence activitiesJust war theory posits that there are times when conflict is morally justified It painfully seeks to discern the difference between a just and an unjust cause Simply defined a just war is a conflict that is fought either in selfdefense or in collective defense against an armed attack There is an assumption that the opposing party is in the wrong and that its attack is unjustifiedOf course there are numerous examples of conflicts in which both sides claimed to be the morally correct party and accused the other of aggression11 It is important to emphasize that the function of just war theory is not to justify warfare itself but rather to judge conflicts The standard method under the theory is to lay down common criteria by which to measure wars The criteria encompass intentions as well as the actual acts and consequences of wars One can successfully incorporate intelligence activitymdashboth espionage and covert interference with internal affairs of foreign nationsmdashunder the penumbra of just war theory if one understands that governments use such activities as a means for government survival

MORAL CONSIDERATIONS CONFRONTING THE INDIVIDUAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERHaving explored the moral constructs that support an intelligence system as a whole we now examine the ethical considerations that confront the individual intelligence officer Are these considerations different from what they would be for other civil servants military officers or members of the private sectorEthics are often defined as behavior relating to professional standards of conduct As in any other profession such standards exist in the field of intelligence even if these standards require behavior that is unacceptable for private citizens Dr David Hunter has argued that lsquolsquofor intelligence professionals to disregard the national values they are committed to defend is to ignore the fundamental reason for being in the gamersquorsquo33 Indeed American intelligence agencies are required by executive order to collect information in a manner that is lsquolsquorespectful of the principles on which the United Stateswas foundedrsquorsquo34There are several key differences between intelligence professionals and their counterparts in other areas of government service or private business Professional standards require intelligence professionals to lie hide information or use covert tactics to protect their lsquolsquocoverrsquorsquo access sources and responsibilities The Central Intelligence Agency expects teaches encourages and controls these tactics so that the lies are consistent and supported (lsquolsquobackstoppedrsquorsquo) The CIA expects intelligence officers to teach others to lie deceive steal launder money and perform a variety of other activities that would certainly be illegal if practiced in the United States They call these tactics lsquolsquotradecraftrsquorsquo and intelligence officers practice them in all the worldrsquos intelligence services35In other contexts intelligence officers must be as honest and forthright as those who work in the private sector or other parts of government Intelligence officers must always

13

tell the truth about their activities to their superiors Otherwise they may find themselves suspected of betraying the organization to which they owe their loyalty Honesty is especially important in intelligence because many officers operate in settings where theiractions cannot be observed36Intelligence analysts must never alter intelligence judgments to fit the desires of policymakers who might prefer different conclusions Forcing the facts to fit policy warps the purpose of intelligence operations37 Intelligence officers must be scrupulous in managing funds or equipment with which they are entrusted Care in this area is especially important because funds are often lsquolsquounvoucheredrsquorsquo (not subject to outside audit) and equipment is deliberately designed to prevent its identification with the officer or service concerned38Intelligence officers must give up certain rights of privacy so that they may be trusted with secrets They are subject to examinations of their private and professional activities during their careers and must accept some restrictions on their behavior even after leaving the service for example they must continue to protect secrets they learned while on duty39The United States military has long recognized that individual soldiers are obligated to follow the lawful orders of their superiors in fact soldiers must swear that they will do so40The military also recognizes that following illegal or unlawful orders is not acceptable The so-called Nuremberg defensemdashthat one is not accountable for onersquos actions if merely following ordersmdashis not acceptable The question for intelligence professionals is whether they have the same kinds of obligationsIn the authorsrsquo view government servants whether military or civilian have an obligation to tell their superiors about matters they consider illegal immoral or ill-conceived If in the judgment of the superior the questionable order must stand the junior official has the choice of carrying out the unacceptable order appealing to a higher authority or ultimately resigningWhat is not possible in the realm of intelligencemdashalthough it might be possible in other areas of United States government servicemdashis to lsquolsquogo publicrsquorsquo with the issue in question Intelligence officials have the obligation to keep secret issues properly classified and thus public discussion is not possible without a gross violation of classification rules and the professional ethics of the intelligence officer41In reality such ethical disputes rarely arise As in most enterprises superiors want to develop the loyalty and trust of their juniors and also want to be advised when things seem to be going awry Thus strong disagreement often leads to compromise rather than confrontation

CONCLUSIONEthics and morality in intelligence are integral parts of operating a secret intelligence service in a free democratic and moral society A free democratic government has the obligation to protect the interests and security of the people it serves If the world were perfect intelligence operations would be unnecessary Given the depravity of the world

14

around us however free societies have no choice but to engage in intelligence activities if they are to remain free

Bibliografie

Instrumente web

1 httpethicsiiteducodes

Carti

1 JAN Goldman Ethics of Spying A reader for the intelligence professional Editura Scarecrow Press Oxford 2006

2 IONEL Nitu Ghidul Analistului de Intelligence Editura Academiei Nationale de Informatii Mihai Viteazul Bucuresti 2011

15

None of these pedagogical methods seeks to establish a theory upon which a code of ethics can be built a framework that can transcend the intelligence community

To some the mere juxtaposition of ethics and intelligence may appear to be a contradiction in terms But at heart intelligence is rooted in the severest of ethical principles truth telling After all the end purpose of the elaborate apparatus that the intelligence community has become is to provide the policymaker with as close to a truthful depiction of a given situation as is humanly possible Anything less is not intelligence It may be useful opinionmdash in some cases it may even be more accurate than prevailing intelligencemdash but if it is the opinion maker is lucky or in the particular instance possessed of more facts and sharper judgmental skills than the professionalintelligence officer Even the CIA has long recognized the centrality of truth telling As a contributor to Foreign Affairs observed several years ago the motto of the CIA chosen by the doughty old Presbyterian Allen Dulles is lsquolsquoAnd the Truth Shall Make You Freersquorsquo1 To accept the approximation of truth as the purpose of intelligence is one thing To accept the methods by which truth can be obtained poses ethical dilemmas The truth after all is often a set of facts or concrete physical entities or intentions which the party with whom they are entrusted will guard jealously as a precious not to say sacred element of the national preserve Ferreting out the truth under these circumstances often requires means and techniques not ordinarily employed in human intercourseBut we are not all ethical absolutists Value trade-offs are probably the best that most people in an uncertain world will accept And it is because intelligence offers security that bizarre methods to obtain it are acceptable to most Foreign policy making without an intelligence input of some kind would be capricious in the uncharted waters of world crisis situations it would be scandalously foolhardy It follows that the more ambiguous the international situation the greater the value of intelligence in the decision-makingprocess Put another way of course this means that where intelligence does not add to international security but rather say to the obsessive comfort of knowing more about Ruritania than even the Ruritanians or where it merely facilitates the feeding of salacious tidbits about foreign leaders to inquisitive Presidents questionable methods to collect it are not acceptableThe security returns of intelligence are probably inestimable and they are welcomed by both world superpowers and tacitly condoned by almost all active participating nations on the world stage Satellites monitor the missiledevelopments of the superpowers microwave telephone messages between foreign embassies and capitals are intercepted for critical informationIn a world where the two great powers can no longer guarantee international stability and where weaponry is no longer the exclusive currency of power intelligence monitoring must sweep targets other than the principal antagonistmdasheg China or the Middle East It must also be as concerned with economic and energy considerations as missiles But the principle governing the choice of targets remains the same Intelligence must promoteinternational security or the ethical compromises necessary to accommodate the requisite collection methods cannot and should not be stomached Intelligence monitoring substitutes for full faith and credit between nations and technology provides a pitiful but

5

workable substitute for the joyful conditions of a distant One World The tensions of the nation-state system are in other words held in bounds not only by diplomacy and bymutual common sense but by carefully calibrated monitoring systemsAssuming then that intelligence can help toward security in a dangerous international order how can the intelligence function be carried out at the least risk to other values in our society To put this most succinctly how can a professional intelligence service operate so that officials within it perform their roles in an ethical manner Most public officials would prefer that this be the case certainly most private citizens expect nothing less

Foreign intelligence is not by and large conducted by people lacking the capacity to recognize ethical standards but standards are lowered to accommodate the perceived national purpose Once lowered they can be more easily lowered a second time or they can be lowered further and further as routine reduces ethical resistance to repugnant activities This is the area of human dynamics where yesterdayrsquos managers of the intelligence community have been the most irresolute Management rarely blew the whistle on subordinates When subordinates succeeded in operations of questionablemorality they were as often rewarded with promotions as reprimanded for using dubious methods

Most professions such as the law and medicine have for centuries provided themselves with fail-safe systems to ensure that ethical norms are not compromised out of existence or rusted from misuse Some of these systems work better than others some are susceptible to corruption themselves and a few are mere shams but the fact that they exist and generally are taken seriously by the members of the profession is critically significant At the very least it means that there are limits to a professionalrsquos freedom and thatthose limits are defined by ethical codes sanctioned by colleagues A profession whose end purpose it is to root out the truth cannot afford to resist asking where its limits should be set However the intelligence professional has in the past operated under the simple guideline lsquolsquodonrsquot get caughtrsquorsquo Recently there have been signs that suggest that the intelligence community is busily if somewhat ponderously groping toward a limitsetting policy for its professionalsHuman intelligence collection is a major preoccupation of the clandestine service Simply put this is the process of extracting from others information or national assets theywould not willingly part with under normal circumstances In some cases the creation of appropriate circumstances is relatively easyThis is where the source is a willing volunteer acting out of his own sense of patriotism Anti-Soviet eacutemigreacute Hungarians providing detailed information on Russian military units occupying their country fall into this category The clandestine officer must provide the means whereby the eacutemigreacute can return to his country By and large the clandestine officer can content himself with the knowledge that the Hungarian is as anxious to reenter his homeland illegally as he is anxious to have him make the effort But the highest art in tradecraft is to develop a source that you lsquolsquoown lock stock and barrelrsquorsquo According to the clandestine ethos a lsquolsquocontrolledrsquorsquo source provides the most reliable intelligence lsquolsquoControlledrsquorsquo means of course bought or otherwise obligated Traditionally it has been the aim of the professional in the clandestine service to weave a psychological web around any potentially fruitful contact and to tighten that web whenever possible

6

Opportunities are limited but for those in the clandestine service who successfully develop controlled sources rewards in status and peer respect are high The modus operandi required however is the very antithesis of ethical interpersonal relationships

Sometimes the information obtained by these methods can be important It is however rarely of critical importance At best it may provide a measure of confirmation of some already suspected development or fill in a missing piece of a complex mosaic of facts There have been occasions when controlled sources have been successful in snatching internal documents off high-level desks in their own governments but even in these instances the lsquolsquotakersquorsquo has not been earthshaking Perhaps the faintly disappointing recordof achievement by clandestine operatives is explainable in bureaucratic terms Well-placed officials with immediate access to critical policy-making circlesmdashand for the most part this means they are part of the policy-making processmdashare generally well rewarded by and well satisfied with their own governments If they were not they would not hold powerful positions The main targets for clandestine collectors are usually second- and third-level officials who may not be fully privy to policy developments

Quality of information obtained aside a fundamental ethical issue concerning clandestine human collection remains That issue is the impact on the clandestine officer of his relationship with his source The formerrsquos bread and butter is the subversion of the latterrsquos integrity The officer is painstakingly trained in techniques that will convert an acquaintance into a submissive tool to shred away his resistance and deflate his sense of self-worth Of course the source may be thoroughly cynical even a venal merchant of his countryrsquos privacy and in that case the task of the clandestine officer is less burdensomemdashalthough he may come to find the relationship just as repellent as if the source had slowly and resistingly been bent to complianceWhatever the chemistry between the two individuals collector and source or perhaps more pointedly dominant and dominated the biggest loser is the one whose ethical scruples are most damaged in the process Depending on the techniques he may have to use to bring the source under control and maintain that relationship the biggest loser may be the clandestine officerAnother prime concern of the clandestine services is the development of methodologies and devices to thwart the defensive measures of other intelligence agencies and other national political systems While much of this activity is purely technical electronic engineering a significant investment has also been made in such exotica as lsquolsquotruth drugsrsquorsquo complex psychological warfare strategies bizarre bugging devices and the like Some of these devices and techniques have been used with profit and success by clandestine officers operating overseas others have proved impractical in the field or have stalled on the drawing board as development costs got out of hand But the search for new ways to penetrate other societies goes on Todayrsquos drug experimenters (if there are indeed any left) may become tomorrowrsquos experts in longrange behavior-modification processesWhatever the state of these arcane arts they have two things in common First their purpose is almost always to facilitate the manipulation of man by man In this sense they are not dissimilar in effect and impact to the process of controlled source development Secondly the practitioners of these arts and the lsquolsquopsych warfarersquorsquo experts are obliged by

7

the very nature of their trade to presume that they are operating in hostile environments The end point of their efforts after all is to bypass normal authority or at the least to usesemi-legal means to overcome obstacles placed in their path by the authorities of other nations The professional premise of the officers engaged in these practices then is the constructive use of illegality

Many of the arguments used to question the efficacy and suitability of political operations can be applied to the process of human clandestine intelligence collection the product is not all that impressive the moral damage to the collectors is high intelligence tends to be collected as an end in itself and there is always the risk of exposure Nevertheless intelligence must be collected in selected areas and against specific subject targets Technology is now the workhorse of the collection business and it should remain so Thepresent Director has in effect recognized this evolution in collection methods he has justified his reduction of covert officers on this ground Photographic and audio satellites and other interception devices are immensely expensive but they have the advantage of doing only minimal damage to the ethical standards of the operators and processors As noted above technological intelligence collection is in at least one highly significant areamdashthat of arms limitation controlmdashtacitly accepted as essential to security by bothsuperpowers6Of course even with the phasing down of clandestine human collection the need will remain for residual capability in certain esoteric collection techniques Atmospheric conditions in some geographic locations may be so unfavorable that short-range collection devices will be needed to supplement lsquolsquostand-offrsquorsquo equipment such as satellites There will always be the need for personnel skilled in the techniques of situating these devices Similarly there must be those who can exploit the defector or the lsquolsquowalk-inrsquorsquo sourceCounterintelligence is another field of clandestine intelligence activity which probably cannot be dispensed with for some years to come But if counterintelligence is to survive it should be organized on a purely defensive basis as a protection against foreign penetration of the US intelligence services and their technical capabilities It should be a small lean component with a sophisticated understanding not only of the technological capabilities of major foreign intelligence services but also of those countriesrsquo politicaldynamics Far from being walled off from other Agency components as in the past it should be a vital part of Agency life as much to gain from exposure to varying points of view as to influence those points of view

Obviously action is facilitated if both intelligence and operations can be controlled under one organization but an offsetting merit of separation is that an intelligence unit is more likely to be impartial in its assessment of the success of operations if it is independent of any attempt by the operational side to interpret the evidence regarding success or failure too favorably For all these reasons I continue to stand for the independence of intelligence from operations both covert and overt to the highest possible level in

8

government organization although of course recognizing the need for the greatest possible understanding between intelligence and operational staffs

Puncte esentiale privind etica intelligence-ului

ASSASSINATIONHelms himself observed that lsquolsquowar corrupts and secret war corrupts secretlyrsquorsquo14 So it is easy to slip toward the acceptance of assassination as one of its techniques In 1940 there was a suggestion that there would be a specialBritish clandestine operation to attack the aircrews of the German pathfinderswho were causing us so much trouble in the Blitz They were to beambushed while being ferried by bus between their billets and the airfield atVannes before taking off for an attack This was vetoed by Sir Charles Portalthe Chief of Air Staff but as the war progressed feelings became less delicateLater at the time of the Suez crisis in 1956 there was even talkmdashitappearsmdashof attempting to assassinate President Nasser15 In America AllenDulles aware of the danger of the CIA slipping toward an acceptance ofassassination specifically forbade it when he was Director and an embargowas included in presidential directives on three occasions Nevertheless itwas sometimes attempted with disastrous results for the CIA when it cameto lightTORTURE AND DURESSTorture too was officially barredmdashat least to the extent of a rule being formulatedby Helms in 1955 under Dullesrsquos directorship lsquolsquoYou may not useelectrical chemical or physical duressrsquorsquo it read although as Powers thenwent on to point out lsquolsquopsychological duress was okayrsquorsquo16 We in World WarII certainly tried to bluff prisoners of war into thinking we knew muchmore than we did in the hope that this would mislead them into giving awaythings about which we knew little or nothing And it seemed not too unfairto lsquolsquofencersquorsquo psychologically with a prisoner and thus to trap him into sayingmore than he had originally intended But there had to be a limit such as forexample not playing on a manrsquos emotions by encouraging him to worryabout the safety of his family I take it that no such restraint is likely to bewidely observed todaylsquolsquoCHARACTER ASSASSINATIONrsquorsquoShort of killing a key individual on the opposing side his value to them maybe destroyed if his colleagues or countrymen can be misled into suspectingthat he is a secret agent for your own side or has some other motive forworking against his sidersquos interests This mischievous technique is only likelyto succeed when the individual in question is working in an organizationprone to mutual suspicion but in so far as it exploits a moral weakness inthat organization so lsquolsquohoisting the engineer with his own petardrsquorsquo it may beless repugnant than other measures

9

INTERVENTIONIn parallel with the ethical problem of the humane limits of conduct towardindividuals there is the problem of the extent to which any one state canbe justified in attempting to interfere in the internal affairs of another ThelsquolsquoIrangatersquorsquo affair and the clandestine mining of Nicaraguan harbors underCIA auspices are cases in point In discussing such questions StansfieldTurner in Secrecy and Democracy17 quotes John Stuart Millrsquos A few words onnon-intervention (1859)The doctrine of non-intervention to be a legitimate principle of morality mustbe accepted by all governments The despot must consent to be bound by it aswell as the free state Unless they do the profession comes to this miserableissuemdashthat the wrong side may help the wrong but the right must not help theright

INTERNAL INTELLIGENCEBesides the ethical questions concerning how a nation and its officials andagents should restrain their activities in gaining information about anothernationrsquos secrets or in attempting to interfere in its internal affairs there areother questions that will arise when a nationrsquos officials have to seek out activitieswithin its own borders that could jeopardize its security

PRIVACYWhile any decent individual instinctively reacts against break-ins and lessviolent infringements of privacy a state legitimately requests some detailsabout each of its individual citizens for a wide range of social purposes suchas taxation educational planning transport facilities and potential for militaryand other forms of public service It might therefore be asked why we set so much store by a right to privacy Apart from the nightmare of a lsquolsquoBigBrotherrsquorsquo state there is an instinctive dislike of surveillance even parentalsurveillance and there may well be an apprehension based deeply back in theevolutionary process arising from a feeling of vulnerability while executingbodily functions or in sickness and of latent trouble from a stalking predatorwhose staring eyes betray his intentions More rationally I for one wouldhave little objection to any authority having any information it wished aboutmy actionsmdashor even my thoughtsmdashprovided that I could be sure that itwould not misinterpret the information to come to false conclusions aboutmeJust as technology is tending to modify concepts of sovereignty (from athree-mile limit for territorial waters based on the range of a gun to a limitof 200 miles today and the free movement of satellites over the territories ofother nations for example) so also it is tending to change the balancebetween the rights of individuals and the states of which they are membersThe complex organization of a modem state needs to know more about itsindividuals for optimum functioning and this is all the easier to achievebecause of the technical advances in handling and storing information and

10

unfortunately it will be only too easy for zeal to replace judgment in theprocess

MINIMUM TRESPASSTwo final points on ethics are worth making The first is that despite all theopportunitiesmdashand temptationsmdashthat it offers for malpractice intelligencecan be an honorable pursuit Indeed by improving the assessment by onenation of another it can on occasion contribute to international stabilityOn less happy occasions of course the children of light will be at a disadvantageunless they know enough of the ways of the world to forestall orcounter any unworthy exploitation of those ways by the children of thisworld There need be absolutely no dishonor in trying to ascertain what apotential or actual opponent is likely to attempt be it by external armedthreat or by internal subversion The risk of disrepute will depend on theextent to which the individual intelligence officer or his organization departsfrom the norms of morality in uncovering an opponentrsquos activitiesThe second point follows from the first One of the canons governing militaryor police action is the doctrine of minimum force and a parallel canonshould govern intelligence it should be conducted with the minimum trespassagainst national and individual human rights This canon applies to allforms of intelligence both external and internal that a civilized state mayfind it necessary to undertake

ETHICAL DIMENSIONS FOR INTELLIGENCEOPERATIONS IN GENERALSpying as a form of statecraft is as old as recorded history Babylonian tablets reportedly contain passages about spying3 and the Bible has several passages about the use of intelligence agents4Modern times also are replete with spy sagas of all kinds5 This legacy of intelligence operations by nations throughout history is evidence of a long-standing acceptance of such activity by many diverse cultural groupsHowever while many people may feel intuitively that at least some form of intelligence activity is morally justifiable it is somewhat difficult to articulate exactly what the ethical foundation is for such activity We will approach this task first by presenting a set of guidelines that should define the morality of both open and clandestine information-gathering operations

Information-Gathering ActivitiesWe submit that the following principles provide an ethical basis for the use of information-gathering services by a democratic government for foreign policy purposes First because a state has the responsibility to its citizens to protect their lives welfare and property it must take steps to understand the foreign threats if there are any to those citizens as well as to the nation as a whole In order to do this the state must gather informationmdash openly if possible but by using secret methods if necessary In a world in

11

which many societies are closed or in which information does not circulate completely freely the state must engage in clandestine informationgathering to protect against foreign threats to its security Our second principle is that the state should use the least intrusive means of collecting information That is one should not spy when information can be gathered in an open way Further the information to be gathered ought to be related to advancing the goals of the state as a whole rather than the private interests of individualsThird intelligence data must be presented to policymakers without bias or political taint Those who report the information must not manipulate it to drive policy or to justify further intrusive intelligence collection Finally one should recognize the need for the state to employ counterintelligence to protect its own national security information from being stolen All nations generally agree that the state has the right to punish those it catches in the act of spying Thus one countryrsquos hero is bound to be anotherrsquos traitor one countryrsquos intelligence success is ipso facto anotherrsquos counterintelligence failureIt is important to note here that what is morally acceptable behavior for the government in protecting the nation as a whole may not necessarily be acceptable for the individual in fact quite the opposite may be true While nations may sometimes use intrusive measures to collect information individuals may not Thus espionage as a form of acceptable statecraft would be considered mere theft if practiced by individuals

Covert ActivitiesWhile most people recognize the statersquos need to possess the capability of gathering information by clandestine means a significant number are troubled by the use of intelligence resources to interfere in the internal activities of another nation In wartime one might condone this interference as a preferred alternative to direct military action and defining the enemy is easier in wartime In peacetime however internal interference with other nations may seem less acceptable Under what circumstances then does a nation especially a free and open society that professes to follow the rule of law have the right to interfere with a foreign government or even to seek to change its nature when that nation would find such activity totally unacceptable even hostile if done to itGiven the adversarial relationship between East and West since the end of World War II some pragmatists might argue that a governmentrsquos foreign policy cannot function without some degree of covert activities with questionable ethical aspects7 This argument is similar to the one made by Niccolo Machiavelli that rulers must sometimes be immoral in establishing and maintaining the states8 While pragmatists may be content with the Machiavellian rationale it has extreme results when the preservation of the statersquos power conflicts with other highly esteemed values Can a nation espouse such moral positions on freedom democracy and human rights as does the United States and still support actions that contravene these ideals Only the most extreme political or religious leaders would reject the pragmatic line in these areas Yet these same leaders might argue that under certain circumstances a state may be justified in using convert activities to carry out foreign policy

Just War Theory

12

Some authors have used the existing literature on just war theory to establish a moral basis for clandestine intelligence operations10 Although just war theory is concerned with permissible acts of the state during wartime some aspects of the theory may indeed contribute to our understanding of the morality of peacetime covert intelligence activitiesJust war theory posits that there are times when conflict is morally justified It painfully seeks to discern the difference between a just and an unjust cause Simply defined a just war is a conflict that is fought either in selfdefense or in collective defense against an armed attack There is an assumption that the opposing party is in the wrong and that its attack is unjustifiedOf course there are numerous examples of conflicts in which both sides claimed to be the morally correct party and accused the other of aggression11 It is important to emphasize that the function of just war theory is not to justify warfare itself but rather to judge conflicts The standard method under the theory is to lay down common criteria by which to measure wars The criteria encompass intentions as well as the actual acts and consequences of wars One can successfully incorporate intelligence activitymdashboth espionage and covert interference with internal affairs of foreign nationsmdashunder the penumbra of just war theory if one understands that governments use such activities as a means for government survival

MORAL CONSIDERATIONS CONFRONTING THE INDIVIDUAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERHaving explored the moral constructs that support an intelligence system as a whole we now examine the ethical considerations that confront the individual intelligence officer Are these considerations different from what they would be for other civil servants military officers or members of the private sectorEthics are often defined as behavior relating to professional standards of conduct As in any other profession such standards exist in the field of intelligence even if these standards require behavior that is unacceptable for private citizens Dr David Hunter has argued that lsquolsquofor intelligence professionals to disregard the national values they are committed to defend is to ignore the fundamental reason for being in the gamersquorsquo33 Indeed American intelligence agencies are required by executive order to collect information in a manner that is lsquolsquorespectful of the principles on which the United Stateswas foundedrsquorsquo34There are several key differences between intelligence professionals and their counterparts in other areas of government service or private business Professional standards require intelligence professionals to lie hide information or use covert tactics to protect their lsquolsquocoverrsquorsquo access sources and responsibilities The Central Intelligence Agency expects teaches encourages and controls these tactics so that the lies are consistent and supported (lsquolsquobackstoppedrsquorsquo) The CIA expects intelligence officers to teach others to lie deceive steal launder money and perform a variety of other activities that would certainly be illegal if practiced in the United States They call these tactics lsquolsquotradecraftrsquorsquo and intelligence officers practice them in all the worldrsquos intelligence services35In other contexts intelligence officers must be as honest and forthright as those who work in the private sector or other parts of government Intelligence officers must always

13

tell the truth about their activities to their superiors Otherwise they may find themselves suspected of betraying the organization to which they owe their loyalty Honesty is especially important in intelligence because many officers operate in settings where theiractions cannot be observed36Intelligence analysts must never alter intelligence judgments to fit the desires of policymakers who might prefer different conclusions Forcing the facts to fit policy warps the purpose of intelligence operations37 Intelligence officers must be scrupulous in managing funds or equipment with which they are entrusted Care in this area is especially important because funds are often lsquolsquounvoucheredrsquorsquo (not subject to outside audit) and equipment is deliberately designed to prevent its identification with the officer or service concerned38Intelligence officers must give up certain rights of privacy so that they may be trusted with secrets They are subject to examinations of their private and professional activities during their careers and must accept some restrictions on their behavior even after leaving the service for example they must continue to protect secrets they learned while on duty39The United States military has long recognized that individual soldiers are obligated to follow the lawful orders of their superiors in fact soldiers must swear that they will do so40The military also recognizes that following illegal or unlawful orders is not acceptable The so-called Nuremberg defensemdashthat one is not accountable for onersquos actions if merely following ordersmdashis not acceptable The question for intelligence professionals is whether they have the same kinds of obligationsIn the authorsrsquo view government servants whether military or civilian have an obligation to tell their superiors about matters they consider illegal immoral or ill-conceived If in the judgment of the superior the questionable order must stand the junior official has the choice of carrying out the unacceptable order appealing to a higher authority or ultimately resigningWhat is not possible in the realm of intelligencemdashalthough it might be possible in other areas of United States government servicemdashis to lsquolsquogo publicrsquorsquo with the issue in question Intelligence officials have the obligation to keep secret issues properly classified and thus public discussion is not possible without a gross violation of classification rules and the professional ethics of the intelligence officer41In reality such ethical disputes rarely arise As in most enterprises superiors want to develop the loyalty and trust of their juniors and also want to be advised when things seem to be going awry Thus strong disagreement often leads to compromise rather than confrontation

CONCLUSIONEthics and morality in intelligence are integral parts of operating a secret intelligence service in a free democratic and moral society A free democratic government has the obligation to protect the interests and security of the people it serves If the world were perfect intelligence operations would be unnecessary Given the depravity of the world

14

around us however free societies have no choice but to engage in intelligence activities if they are to remain free

Bibliografie

Instrumente web

1 httpethicsiiteducodes

Carti

1 JAN Goldman Ethics of Spying A reader for the intelligence professional Editura Scarecrow Press Oxford 2006

2 IONEL Nitu Ghidul Analistului de Intelligence Editura Academiei Nationale de Informatii Mihai Viteazul Bucuresti 2011

15

workable substitute for the joyful conditions of a distant One World The tensions of the nation-state system are in other words held in bounds not only by diplomacy and bymutual common sense but by carefully calibrated monitoring systemsAssuming then that intelligence can help toward security in a dangerous international order how can the intelligence function be carried out at the least risk to other values in our society To put this most succinctly how can a professional intelligence service operate so that officials within it perform their roles in an ethical manner Most public officials would prefer that this be the case certainly most private citizens expect nothing less

Foreign intelligence is not by and large conducted by people lacking the capacity to recognize ethical standards but standards are lowered to accommodate the perceived national purpose Once lowered they can be more easily lowered a second time or they can be lowered further and further as routine reduces ethical resistance to repugnant activities This is the area of human dynamics where yesterdayrsquos managers of the intelligence community have been the most irresolute Management rarely blew the whistle on subordinates When subordinates succeeded in operations of questionablemorality they were as often rewarded with promotions as reprimanded for using dubious methods

Most professions such as the law and medicine have for centuries provided themselves with fail-safe systems to ensure that ethical norms are not compromised out of existence or rusted from misuse Some of these systems work better than others some are susceptible to corruption themselves and a few are mere shams but the fact that they exist and generally are taken seriously by the members of the profession is critically significant At the very least it means that there are limits to a professionalrsquos freedom and thatthose limits are defined by ethical codes sanctioned by colleagues A profession whose end purpose it is to root out the truth cannot afford to resist asking where its limits should be set However the intelligence professional has in the past operated under the simple guideline lsquolsquodonrsquot get caughtrsquorsquo Recently there have been signs that suggest that the intelligence community is busily if somewhat ponderously groping toward a limitsetting policy for its professionalsHuman intelligence collection is a major preoccupation of the clandestine service Simply put this is the process of extracting from others information or national assets theywould not willingly part with under normal circumstances In some cases the creation of appropriate circumstances is relatively easyThis is where the source is a willing volunteer acting out of his own sense of patriotism Anti-Soviet eacutemigreacute Hungarians providing detailed information on Russian military units occupying their country fall into this category The clandestine officer must provide the means whereby the eacutemigreacute can return to his country By and large the clandestine officer can content himself with the knowledge that the Hungarian is as anxious to reenter his homeland illegally as he is anxious to have him make the effort But the highest art in tradecraft is to develop a source that you lsquolsquoown lock stock and barrelrsquorsquo According to the clandestine ethos a lsquolsquocontrolledrsquorsquo source provides the most reliable intelligence lsquolsquoControlledrsquorsquo means of course bought or otherwise obligated Traditionally it has been the aim of the professional in the clandestine service to weave a psychological web around any potentially fruitful contact and to tighten that web whenever possible

6

Opportunities are limited but for those in the clandestine service who successfully develop controlled sources rewards in status and peer respect are high The modus operandi required however is the very antithesis of ethical interpersonal relationships

Sometimes the information obtained by these methods can be important It is however rarely of critical importance At best it may provide a measure of confirmation of some already suspected development or fill in a missing piece of a complex mosaic of facts There have been occasions when controlled sources have been successful in snatching internal documents off high-level desks in their own governments but even in these instances the lsquolsquotakersquorsquo has not been earthshaking Perhaps the faintly disappointing recordof achievement by clandestine operatives is explainable in bureaucratic terms Well-placed officials with immediate access to critical policy-making circlesmdashand for the most part this means they are part of the policy-making processmdashare generally well rewarded by and well satisfied with their own governments If they were not they would not hold powerful positions The main targets for clandestine collectors are usually second- and third-level officials who may not be fully privy to policy developments

Quality of information obtained aside a fundamental ethical issue concerning clandestine human collection remains That issue is the impact on the clandestine officer of his relationship with his source The formerrsquos bread and butter is the subversion of the latterrsquos integrity The officer is painstakingly trained in techniques that will convert an acquaintance into a submissive tool to shred away his resistance and deflate his sense of self-worth Of course the source may be thoroughly cynical even a venal merchant of his countryrsquos privacy and in that case the task of the clandestine officer is less burdensomemdashalthough he may come to find the relationship just as repellent as if the source had slowly and resistingly been bent to complianceWhatever the chemistry between the two individuals collector and source or perhaps more pointedly dominant and dominated the biggest loser is the one whose ethical scruples are most damaged in the process Depending on the techniques he may have to use to bring the source under control and maintain that relationship the biggest loser may be the clandestine officerAnother prime concern of the clandestine services is the development of methodologies and devices to thwart the defensive measures of other intelligence agencies and other national political systems While much of this activity is purely technical electronic engineering a significant investment has also been made in such exotica as lsquolsquotruth drugsrsquorsquo complex psychological warfare strategies bizarre bugging devices and the like Some of these devices and techniques have been used with profit and success by clandestine officers operating overseas others have proved impractical in the field or have stalled on the drawing board as development costs got out of hand But the search for new ways to penetrate other societies goes on Todayrsquos drug experimenters (if there are indeed any left) may become tomorrowrsquos experts in longrange behavior-modification processesWhatever the state of these arcane arts they have two things in common First their purpose is almost always to facilitate the manipulation of man by man In this sense they are not dissimilar in effect and impact to the process of controlled source development Secondly the practitioners of these arts and the lsquolsquopsych warfarersquorsquo experts are obliged by

7

the very nature of their trade to presume that they are operating in hostile environments The end point of their efforts after all is to bypass normal authority or at the least to usesemi-legal means to overcome obstacles placed in their path by the authorities of other nations The professional premise of the officers engaged in these practices then is the constructive use of illegality

Many of the arguments used to question the efficacy and suitability of political operations can be applied to the process of human clandestine intelligence collection the product is not all that impressive the moral damage to the collectors is high intelligence tends to be collected as an end in itself and there is always the risk of exposure Nevertheless intelligence must be collected in selected areas and against specific subject targets Technology is now the workhorse of the collection business and it should remain so Thepresent Director has in effect recognized this evolution in collection methods he has justified his reduction of covert officers on this ground Photographic and audio satellites and other interception devices are immensely expensive but they have the advantage of doing only minimal damage to the ethical standards of the operators and processors As noted above technological intelligence collection is in at least one highly significant areamdashthat of arms limitation controlmdashtacitly accepted as essential to security by bothsuperpowers6Of course even with the phasing down of clandestine human collection the need will remain for residual capability in certain esoteric collection techniques Atmospheric conditions in some geographic locations may be so unfavorable that short-range collection devices will be needed to supplement lsquolsquostand-offrsquorsquo equipment such as satellites There will always be the need for personnel skilled in the techniques of situating these devices Similarly there must be those who can exploit the defector or the lsquolsquowalk-inrsquorsquo sourceCounterintelligence is another field of clandestine intelligence activity which probably cannot be dispensed with for some years to come But if counterintelligence is to survive it should be organized on a purely defensive basis as a protection against foreign penetration of the US intelligence services and their technical capabilities It should be a small lean component with a sophisticated understanding not only of the technological capabilities of major foreign intelligence services but also of those countriesrsquo politicaldynamics Far from being walled off from other Agency components as in the past it should be a vital part of Agency life as much to gain from exposure to varying points of view as to influence those points of view

Obviously action is facilitated if both intelligence and operations can be controlled under one organization but an offsetting merit of separation is that an intelligence unit is more likely to be impartial in its assessment of the success of operations if it is independent of any attempt by the operational side to interpret the evidence regarding success or failure too favorably For all these reasons I continue to stand for the independence of intelligence from operations both covert and overt to the highest possible level in

8

government organization although of course recognizing the need for the greatest possible understanding between intelligence and operational staffs

Puncte esentiale privind etica intelligence-ului

ASSASSINATIONHelms himself observed that lsquolsquowar corrupts and secret war corrupts secretlyrsquorsquo14 So it is easy to slip toward the acceptance of assassination as one of its techniques In 1940 there was a suggestion that there would be a specialBritish clandestine operation to attack the aircrews of the German pathfinderswho were causing us so much trouble in the Blitz They were to beambushed while being ferried by bus between their billets and the airfield atVannes before taking off for an attack This was vetoed by Sir Charles Portalthe Chief of Air Staff but as the war progressed feelings became less delicateLater at the time of the Suez crisis in 1956 there was even talkmdashitappearsmdashof attempting to assassinate President Nasser15 In America AllenDulles aware of the danger of the CIA slipping toward an acceptance ofassassination specifically forbade it when he was Director and an embargowas included in presidential directives on three occasions Nevertheless itwas sometimes attempted with disastrous results for the CIA when it cameto lightTORTURE AND DURESSTorture too was officially barredmdashat least to the extent of a rule being formulatedby Helms in 1955 under Dullesrsquos directorship lsquolsquoYou may not useelectrical chemical or physical duressrsquorsquo it read although as Powers thenwent on to point out lsquolsquopsychological duress was okayrsquorsquo16 We in World WarII certainly tried to bluff prisoners of war into thinking we knew muchmore than we did in the hope that this would mislead them into giving awaythings about which we knew little or nothing And it seemed not too unfairto lsquolsquofencersquorsquo psychologically with a prisoner and thus to trap him into sayingmore than he had originally intended But there had to be a limit such as forexample not playing on a manrsquos emotions by encouraging him to worryabout the safety of his family I take it that no such restraint is likely to bewidely observed todaylsquolsquoCHARACTER ASSASSINATIONrsquorsquoShort of killing a key individual on the opposing side his value to them maybe destroyed if his colleagues or countrymen can be misled into suspectingthat he is a secret agent for your own side or has some other motive forworking against his sidersquos interests This mischievous technique is only likelyto succeed when the individual in question is working in an organizationprone to mutual suspicion but in so far as it exploits a moral weakness inthat organization so lsquolsquohoisting the engineer with his own petardrsquorsquo it may beless repugnant than other measures

9

INTERVENTIONIn parallel with the ethical problem of the humane limits of conduct towardindividuals there is the problem of the extent to which any one state canbe justified in attempting to interfere in the internal affairs of another ThelsquolsquoIrangatersquorsquo affair and the clandestine mining of Nicaraguan harbors underCIA auspices are cases in point In discussing such questions StansfieldTurner in Secrecy and Democracy17 quotes John Stuart Millrsquos A few words onnon-intervention (1859)The doctrine of non-intervention to be a legitimate principle of morality mustbe accepted by all governments The despot must consent to be bound by it aswell as the free state Unless they do the profession comes to this miserableissuemdashthat the wrong side may help the wrong but the right must not help theright

INTERNAL INTELLIGENCEBesides the ethical questions concerning how a nation and its officials andagents should restrain their activities in gaining information about anothernationrsquos secrets or in attempting to interfere in its internal affairs there areother questions that will arise when a nationrsquos officials have to seek out activitieswithin its own borders that could jeopardize its security

PRIVACYWhile any decent individual instinctively reacts against break-ins and lessviolent infringements of privacy a state legitimately requests some detailsabout each of its individual citizens for a wide range of social purposes suchas taxation educational planning transport facilities and potential for militaryand other forms of public service It might therefore be asked why we set so much store by a right to privacy Apart from the nightmare of a lsquolsquoBigBrotherrsquorsquo state there is an instinctive dislike of surveillance even parentalsurveillance and there may well be an apprehension based deeply back in theevolutionary process arising from a feeling of vulnerability while executingbodily functions or in sickness and of latent trouble from a stalking predatorwhose staring eyes betray his intentions More rationally I for one wouldhave little objection to any authority having any information it wished aboutmy actionsmdashor even my thoughtsmdashprovided that I could be sure that itwould not misinterpret the information to come to false conclusions aboutmeJust as technology is tending to modify concepts of sovereignty (from athree-mile limit for territorial waters based on the range of a gun to a limitof 200 miles today and the free movement of satellites over the territories ofother nations for example) so also it is tending to change the balancebetween the rights of individuals and the states of which they are membersThe complex organization of a modem state needs to know more about itsindividuals for optimum functioning and this is all the easier to achievebecause of the technical advances in handling and storing information and

10

unfortunately it will be only too easy for zeal to replace judgment in theprocess

MINIMUM TRESPASSTwo final points on ethics are worth making The first is that despite all theopportunitiesmdashand temptationsmdashthat it offers for malpractice intelligencecan be an honorable pursuit Indeed by improving the assessment by onenation of another it can on occasion contribute to international stabilityOn less happy occasions of course the children of light will be at a disadvantageunless they know enough of the ways of the world to forestall orcounter any unworthy exploitation of those ways by the children of thisworld There need be absolutely no dishonor in trying to ascertain what apotential or actual opponent is likely to attempt be it by external armedthreat or by internal subversion The risk of disrepute will depend on theextent to which the individual intelligence officer or his organization departsfrom the norms of morality in uncovering an opponentrsquos activitiesThe second point follows from the first One of the canons governing militaryor police action is the doctrine of minimum force and a parallel canonshould govern intelligence it should be conducted with the minimum trespassagainst national and individual human rights This canon applies to allforms of intelligence both external and internal that a civilized state mayfind it necessary to undertake

ETHICAL DIMENSIONS FOR INTELLIGENCEOPERATIONS IN GENERALSpying as a form of statecraft is as old as recorded history Babylonian tablets reportedly contain passages about spying3 and the Bible has several passages about the use of intelligence agents4Modern times also are replete with spy sagas of all kinds5 This legacy of intelligence operations by nations throughout history is evidence of a long-standing acceptance of such activity by many diverse cultural groupsHowever while many people may feel intuitively that at least some form of intelligence activity is morally justifiable it is somewhat difficult to articulate exactly what the ethical foundation is for such activity We will approach this task first by presenting a set of guidelines that should define the morality of both open and clandestine information-gathering operations

Information-Gathering ActivitiesWe submit that the following principles provide an ethical basis for the use of information-gathering services by a democratic government for foreign policy purposes First because a state has the responsibility to its citizens to protect their lives welfare and property it must take steps to understand the foreign threats if there are any to those citizens as well as to the nation as a whole In order to do this the state must gather informationmdash openly if possible but by using secret methods if necessary In a world in

11

which many societies are closed or in which information does not circulate completely freely the state must engage in clandestine informationgathering to protect against foreign threats to its security Our second principle is that the state should use the least intrusive means of collecting information That is one should not spy when information can be gathered in an open way Further the information to be gathered ought to be related to advancing the goals of the state as a whole rather than the private interests of individualsThird intelligence data must be presented to policymakers without bias or political taint Those who report the information must not manipulate it to drive policy or to justify further intrusive intelligence collection Finally one should recognize the need for the state to employ counterintelligence to protect its own national security information from being stolen All nations generally agree that the state has the right to punish those it catches in the act of spying Thus one countryrsquos hero is bound to be anotherrsquos traitor one countryrsquos intelligence success is ipso facto anotherrsquos counterintelligence failureIt is important to note here that what is morally acceptable behavior for the government in protecting the nation as a whole may not necessarily be acceptable for the individual in fact quite the opposite may be true While nations may sometimes use intrusive measures to collect information individuals may not Thus espionage as a form of acceptable statecraft would be considered mere theft if practiced by individuals

Covert ActivitiesWhile most people recognize the statersquos need to possess the capability of gathering information by clandestine means a significant number are troubled by the use of intelligence resources to interfere in the internal activities of another nation In wartime one might condone this interference as a preferred alternative to direct military action and defining the enemy is easier in wartime In peacetime however internal interference with other nations may seem less acceptable Under what circumstances then does a nation especially a free and open society that professes to follow the rule of law have the right to interfere with a foreign government or even to seek to change its nature when that nation would find such activity totally unacceptable even hostile if done to itGiven the adversarial relationship between East and West since the end of World War II some pragmatists might argue that a governmentrsquos foreign policy cannot function without some degree of covert activities with questionable ethical aspects7 This argument is similar to the one made by Niccolo Machiavelli that rulers must sometimes be immoral in establishing and maintaining the states8 While pragmatists may be content with the Machiavellian rationale it has extreme results when the preservation of the statersquos power conflicts with other highly esteemed values Can a nation espouse such moral positions on freedom democracy and human rights as does the United States and still support actions that contravene these ideals Only the most extreme political or religious leaders would reject the pragmatic line in these areas Yet these same leaders might argue that under certain circumstances a state may be justified in using convert activities to carry out foreign policy

Just War Theory

12

Some authors have used the existing literature on just war theory to establish a moral basis for clandestine intelligence operations10 Although just war theory is concerned with permissible acts of the state during wartime some aspects of the theory may indeed contribute to our understanding of the morality of peacetime covert intelligence activitiesJust war theory posits that there are times when conflict is morally justified It painfully seeks to discern the difference between a just and an unjust cause Simply defined a just war is a conflict that is fought either in selfdefense or in collective defense against an armed attack There is an assumption that the opposing party is in the wrong and that its attack is unjustifiedOf course there are numerous examples of conflicts in which both sides claimed to be the morally correct party and accused the other of aggression11 It is important to emphasize that the function of just war theory is not to justify warfare itself but rather to judge conflicts The standard method under the theory is to lay down common criteria by which to measure wars The criteria encompass intentions as well as the actual acts and consequences of wars One can successfully incorporate intelligence activitymdashboth espionage and covert interference with internal affairs of foreign nationsmdashunder the penumbra of just war theory if one understands that governments use such activities as a means for government survival

MORAL CONSIDERATIONS CONFRONTING THE INDIVIDUAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERHaving explored the moral constructs that support an intelligence system as a whole we now examine the ethical considerations that confront the individual intelligence officer Are these considerations different from what they would be for other civil servants military officers or members of the private sectorEthics are often defined as behavior relating to professional standards of conduct As in any other profession such standards exist in the field of intelligence even if these standards require behavior that is unacceptable for private citizens Dr David Hunter has argued that lsquolsquofor intelligence professionals to disregard the national values they are committed to defend is to ignore the fundamental reason for being in the gamersquorsquo33 Indeed American intelligence agencies are required by executive order to collect information in a manner that is lsquolsquorespectful of the principles on which the United Stateswas foundedrsquorsquo34There are several key differences between intelligence professionals and their counterparts in other areas of government service or private business Professional standards require intelligence professionals to lie hide information or use covert tactics to protect their lsquolsquocoverrsquorsquo access sources and responsibilities The Central Intelligence Agency expects teaches encourages and controls these tactics so that the lies are consistent and supported (lsquolsquobackstoppedrsquorsquo) The CIA expects intelligence officers to teach others to lie deceive steal launder money and perform a variety of other activities that would certainly be illegal if practiced in the United States They call these tactics lsquolsquotradecraftrsquorsquo and intelligence officers practice them in all the worldrsquos intelligence services35In other contexts intelligence officers must be as honest and forthright as those who work in the private sector or other parts of government Intelligence officers must always

13

tell the truth about their activities to their superiors Otherwise they may find themselves suspected of betraying the organization to which they owe their loyalty Honesty is especially important in intelligence because many officers operate in settings where theiractions cannot be observed36Intelligence analysts must never alter intelligence judgments to fit the desires of policymakers who might prefer different conclusions Forcing the facts to fit policy warps the purpose of intelligence operations37 Intelligence officers must be scrupulous in managing funds or equipment with which they are entrusted Care in this area is especially important because funds are often lsquolsquounvoucheredrsquorsquo (not subject to outside audit) and equipment is deliberately designed to prevent its identification with the officer or service concerned38Intelligence officers must give up certain rights of privacy so that they may be trusted with secrets They are subject to examinations of their private and professional activities during their careers and must accept some restrictions on their behavior even after leaving the service for example they must continue to protect secrets they learned while on duty39The United States military has long recognized that individual soldiers are obligated to follow the lawful orders of their superiors in fact soldiers must swear that they will do so40The military also recognizes that following illegal or unlawful orders is not acceptable The so-called Nuremberg defensemdashthat one is not accountable for onersquos actions if merely following ordersmdashis not acceptable The question for intelligence professionals is whether they have the same kinds of obligationsIn the authorsrsquo view government servants whether military or civilian have an obligation to tell their superiors about matters they consider illegal immoral or ill-conceived If in the judgment of the superior the questionable order must stand the junior official has the choice of carrying out the unacceptable order appealing to a higher authority or ultimately resigningWhat is not possible in the realm of intelligencemdashalthough it might be possible in other areas of United States government servicemdashis to lsquolsquogo publicrsquorsquo with the issue in question Intelligence officials have the obligation to keep secret issues properly classified and thus public discussion is not possible without a gross violation of classification rules and the professional ethics of the intelligence officer41In reality such ethical disputes rarely arise As in most enterprises superiors want to develop the loyalty and trust of their juniors and also want to be advised when things seem to be going awry Thus strong disagreement often leads to compromise rather than confrontation

CONCLUSIONEthics and morality in intelligence are integral parts of operating a secret intelligence service in a free democratic and moral society A free democratic government has the obligation to protect the interests and security of the people it serves If the world were perfect intelligence operations would be unnecessary Given the depravity of the world

14

around us however free societies have no choice but to engage in intelligence activities if they are to remain free

Bibliografie

Instrumente web

1 httpethicsiiteducodes

Carti

1 JAN Goldman Ethics of Spying A reader for the intelligence professional Editura Scarecrow Press Oxford 2006

2 IONEL Nitu Ghidul Analistului de Intelligence Editura Academiei Nationale de Informatii Mihai Viteazul Bucuresti 2011

15

Opportunities are limited but for those in the clandestine service who successfully develop controlled sources rewards in status and peer respect are high The modus operandi required however is the very antithesis of ethical interpersonal relationships

Sometimes the information obtained by these methods can be important It is however rarely of critical importance At best it may provide a measure of confirmation of some already suspected development or fill in a missing piece of a complex mosaic of facts There have been occasions when controlled sources have been successful in snatching internal documents off high-level desks in their own governments but even in these instances the lsquolsquotakersquorsquo has not been earthshaking Perhaps the faintly disappointing recordof achievement by clandestine operatives is explainable in bureaucratic terms Well-placed officials with immediate access to critical policy-making circlesmdashand for the most part this means they are part of the policy-making processmdashare generally well rewarded by and well satisfied with their own governments If they were not they would not hold powerful positions The main targets for clandestine collectors are usually second- and third-level officials who may not be fully privy to policy developments

Quality of information obtained aside a fundamental ethical issue concerning clandestine human collection remains That issue is the impact on the clandestine officer of his relationship with his source The formerrsquos bread and butter is the subversion of the latterrsquos integrity The officer is painstakingly trained in techniques that will convert an acquaintance into a submissive tool to shred away his resistance and deflate his sense of self-worth Of course the source may be thoroughly cynical even a venal merchant of his countryrsquos privacy and in that case the task of the clandestine officer is less burdensomemdashalthough he may come to find the relationship just as repellent as if the source had slowly and resistingly been bent to complianceWhatever the chemistry between the two individuals collector and source or perhaps more pointedly dominant and dominated the biggest loser is the one whose ethical scruples are most damaged in the process Depending on the techniques he may have to use to bring the source under control and maintain that relationship the biggest loser may be the clandestine officerAnother prime concern of the clandestine services is the development of methodologies and devices to thwart the defensive measures of other intelligence agencies and other national political systems While much of this activity is purely technical electronic engineering a significant investment has also been made in such exotica as lsquolsquotruth drugsrsquorsquo complex psychological warfare strategies bizarre bugging devices and the like Some of these devices and techniques have been used with profit and success by clandestine officers operating overseas others have proved impractical in the field or have stalled on the drawing board as development costs got out of hand But the search for new ways to penetrate other societies goes on Todayrsquos drug experimenters (if there are indeed any left) may become tomorrowrsquos experts in longrange behavior-modification processesWhatever the state of these arcane arts they have two things in common First their purpose is almost always to facilitate the manipulation of man by man In this sense they are not dissimilar in effect and impact to the process of controlled source development Secondly the practitioners of these arts and the lsquolsquopsych warfarersquorsquo experts are obliged by

7

the very nature of their trade to presume that they are operating in hostile environments The end point of their efforts after all is to bypass normal authority or at the least to usesemi-legal means to overcome obstacles placed in their path by the authorities of other nations The professional premise of the officers engaged in these practices then is the constructive use of illegality

Many of the arguments used to question the efficacy and suitability of political operations can be applied to the process of human clandestine intelligence collection the product is not all that impressive the moral damage to the collectors is high intelligence tends to be collected as an end in itself and there is always the risk of exposure Nevertheless intelligence must be collected in selected areas and against specific subject targets Technology is now the workhorse of the collection business and it should remain so Thepresent Director has in effect recognized this evolution in collection methods he has justified his reduction of covert officers on this ground Photographic and audio satellites and other interception devices are immensely expensive but they have the advantage of doing only minimal damage to the ethical standards of the operators and processors As noted above technological intelligence collection is in at least one highly significant areamdashthat of arms limitation controlmdashtacitly accepted as essential to security by bothsuperpowers6Of course even with the phasing down of clandestine human collection the need will remain for residual capability in certain esoteric collection techniques Atmospheric conditions in some geographic locations may be so unfavorable that short-range collection devices will be needed to supplement lsquolsquostand-offrsquorsquo equipment such as satellites There will always be the need for personnel skilled in the techniques of situating these devices Similarly there must be those who can exploit the defector or the lsquolsquowalk-inrsquorsquo sourceCounterintelligence is another field of clandestine intelligence activity which probably cannot be dispensed with for some years to come But if counterintelligence is to survive it should be organized on a purely defensive basis as a protection against foreign penetration of the US intelligence services and their technical capabilities It should be a small lean component with a sophisticated understanding not only of the technological capabilities of major foreign intelligence services but also of those countriesrsquo politicaldynamics Far from being walled off from other Agency components as in the past it should be a vital part of Agency life as much to gain from exposure to varying points of view as to influence those points of view

Obviously action is facilitated if both intelligence and operations can be controlled under one organization but an offsetting merit of separation is that an intelligence unit is more likely to be impartial in its assessment of the success of operations if it is independent of any attempt by the operational side to interpret the evidence regarding success or failure too favorably For all these reasons I continue to stand for the independence of intelligence from operations both covert and overt to the highest possible level in

8

government organization although of course recognizing the need for the greatest possible understanding between intelligence and operational staffs

Puncte esentiale privind etica intelligence-ului

ASSASSINATIONHelms himself observed that lsquolsquowar corrupts and secret war corrupts secretlyrsquorsquo14 So it is easy to slip toward the acceptance of assassination as one of its techniques In 1940 there was a suggestion that there would be a specialBritish clandestine operation to attack the aircrews of the German pathfinderswho were causing us so much trouble in the Blitz They were to beambushed while being ferried by bus between their billets and the airfield atVannes before taking off for an attack This was vetoed by Sir Charles Portalthe Chief of Air Staff but as the war progressed feelings became less delicateLater at the time of the Suez crisis in 1956 there was even talkmdashitappearsmdashof attempting to assassinate President Nasser15 In America AllenDulles aware of the danger of the CIA slipping toward an acceptance ofassassination specifically forbade it when he was Director and an embargowas included in presidential directives on three occasions Nevertheless itwas sometimes attempted with disastrous results for the CIA when it cameto lightTORTURE AND DURESSTorture too was officially barredmdashat least to the extent of a rule being formulatedby Helms in 1955 under Dullesrsquos directorship lsquolsquoYou may not useelectrical chemical or physical duressrsquorsquo it read although as Powers thenwent on to point out lsquolsquopsychological duress was okayrsquorsquo16 We in World WarII certainly tried to bluff prisoners of war into thinking we knew muchmore than we did in the hope that this would mislead them into giving awaythings about which we knew little or nothing And it seemed not too unfairto lsquolsquofencersquorsquo psychologically with a prisoner and thus to trap him into sayingmore than he had originally intended But there had to be a limit such as forexample not playing on a manrsquos emotions by encouraging him to worryabout the safety of his family I take it that no such restraint is likely to bewidely observed todaylsquolsquoCHARACTER ASSASSINATIONrsquorsquoShort of killing a key individual on the opposing side his value to them maybe destroyed if his colleagues or countrymen can be misled into suspectingthat he is a secret agent for your own side or has some other motive forworking against his sidersquos interests This mischievous technique is only likelyto succeed when the individual in question is working in an organizationprone to mutual suspicion but in so far as it exploits a moral weakness inthat organization so lsquolsquohoisting the engineer with his own petardrsquorsquo it may beless repugnant than other measures

9

INTERVENTIONIn parallel with the ethical problem of the humane limits of conduct towardindividuals there is the problem of the extent to which any one state canbe justified in attempting to interfere in the internal affairs of another ThelsquolsquoIrangatersquorsquo affair and the clandestine mining of Nicaraguan harbors underCIA auspices are cases in point In discussing such questions StansfieldTurner in Secrecy and Democracy17 quotes John Stuart Millrsquos A few words onnon-intervention (1859)The doctrine of non-intervention to be a legitimate principle of morality mustbe accepted by all governments The despot must consent to be bound by it aswell as the free state Unless they do the profession comes to this miserableissuemdashthat the wrong side may help the wrong but the right must not help theright

INTERNAL INTELLIGENCEBesides the ethical questions concerning how a nation and its officials andagents should restrain their activities in gaining information about anothernationrsquos secrets or in attempting to interfere in its internal affairs there areother questions that will arise when a nationrsquos officials have to seek out activitieswithin its own borders that could jeopardize its security

PRIVACYWhile any decent individual instinctively reacts against break-ins and lessviolent infringements of privacy a state legitimately requests some detailsabout each of its individual citizens for a wide range of social purposes suchas taxation educational planning transport facilities and potential for militaryand other forms of public service It might therefore be asked why we set so much store by a right to privacy Apart from the nightmare of a lsquolsquoBigBrotherrsquorsquo state there is an instinctive dislike of surveillance even parentalsurveillance and there may well be an apprehension based deeply back in theevolutionary process arising from a feeling of vulnerability while executingbodily functions or in sickness and of latent trouble from a stalking predatorwhose staring eyes betray his intentions More rationally I for one wouldhave little objection to any authority having any information it wished aboutmy actionsmdashor even my thoughtsmdashprovided that I could be sure that itwould not misinterpret the information to come to false conclusions aboutmeJust as technology is tending to modify concepts of sovereignty (from athree-mile limit for territorial waters based on the range of a gun to a limitof 200 miles today and the free movement of satellites over the territories ofother nations for example) so also it is tending to change the balancebetween the rights of individuals and the states of which they are membersThe complex organization of a modem state needs to know more about itsindividuals for optimum functioning and this is all the easier to achievebecause of the technical advances in handling and storing information and

10

unfortunately it will be only too easy for zeal to replace judgment in theprocess

MINIMUM TRESPASSTwo final points on ethics are worth making The first is that despite all theopportunitiesmdashand temptationsmdashthat it offers for malpractice intelligencecan be an honorable pursuit Indeed by improving the assessment by onenation of another it can on occasion contribute to international stabilityOn less happy occasions of course the children of light will be at a disadvantageunless they know enough of the ways of the world to forestall orcounter any unworthy exploitation of those ways by the children of thisworld There need be absolutely no dishonor in trying to ascertain what apotential or actual opponent is likely to attempt be it by external armedthreat or by internal subversion The risk of disrepute will depend on theextent to which the individual intelligence officer or his organization departsfrom the norms of morality in uncovering an opponentrsquos activitiesThe second point follows from the first One of the canons governing militaryor police action is the doctrine of minimum force and a parallel canonshould govern intelligence it should be conducted with the minimum trespassagainst national and individual human rights This canon applies to allforms of intelligence both external and internal that a civilized state mayfind it necessary to undertake

ETHICAL DIMENSIONS FOR INTELLIGENCEOPERATIONS IN GENERALSpying as a form of statecraft is as old as recorded history Babylonian tablets reportedly contain passages about spying3 and the Bible has several passages about the use of intelligence agents4Modern times also are replete with spy sagas of all kinds5 This legacy of intelligence operations by nations throughout history is evidence of a long-standing acceptance of such activity by many diverse cultural groupsHowever while many people may feel intuitively that at least some form of intelligence activity is morally justifiable it is somewhat difficult to articulate exactly what the ethical foundation is for such activity We will approach this task first by presenting a set of guidelines that should define the morality of both open and clandestine information-gathering operations

Information-Gathering ActivitiesWe submit that the following principles provide an ethical basis for the use of information-gathering services by a democratic government for foreign policy purposes First because a state has the responsibility to its citizens to protect their lives welfare and property it must take steps to understand the foreign threats if there are any to those citizens as well as to the nation as a whole In order to do this the state must gather informationmdash openly if possible but by using secret methods if necessary In a world in

11

which many societies are closed or in which information does not circulate completely freely the state must engage in clandestine informationgathering to protect against foreign threats to its security Our second principle is that the state should use the least intrusive means of collecting information That is one should not spy when information can be gathered in an open way Further the information to be gathered ought to be related to advancing the goals of the state as a whole rather than the private interests of individualsThird intelligence data must be presented to policymakers without bias or political taint Those who report the information must not manipulate it to drive policy or to justify further intrusive intelligence collection Finally one should recognize the need for the state to employ counterintelligence to protect its own national security information from being stolen All nations generally agree that the state has the right to punish those it catches in the act of spying Thus one countryrsquos hero is bound to be anotherrsquos traitor one countryrsquos intelligence success is ipso facto anotherrsquos counterintelligence failureIt is important to note here that what is morally acceptable behavior for the government in protecting the nation as a whole may not necessarily be acceptable for the individual in fact quite the opposite may be true While nations may sometimes use intrusive measures to collect information individuals may not Thus espionage as a form of acceptable statecraft would be considered mere theft if practiced by individuals

Covert ActivitiesWhile most people recognize the statersquos need to possess the capability of gathering information by clandestine means a significant number are troubled by the use of intelligence resources to interfere in the internal activities of another nation In wartime one might condone this interference as a preferred alternative to direct military action and defining the enemy is easier in wartime In peacetime however internal interference with other nations may seem less acceptable Under what circumstances then does a nation especially a free and open society that professes to follow the rule of law have the right to interfere with a foreign government or even to seek to change its nature when that nation would find such activity totally unacceptable even hostile if done to itGiven the adversarial relationship between East and West since the end of World War II some pragmatists might argue that a governmentrsquos foreign policy cannot function without some degree of covert activities with questionable ethical aspects7 This argument is similar to the one made by Niccolo Machiavelli that rulers must sometimes be immoral in establishing and maintaining the states8 While pragmatists may be content with the Machiavellian rationale it has extreme results when the preservation of the statersquos power conflicts with other highly esteemed values Can a nation espouse such moral positions on freedom democracy and human rights as does the United States and still support actions that contravene these ideals Only the most extreme political or religious leaders would reject the pragmatic line in these areas Yet these same leaders might argue that under certain circumstances a state may be justified in using convert activities to carry out foreign policy

Just War Theory

12

Some authors have used the existing literature on just war theory to establish a moral basis for clandestine intelligence operations10 Although just war theory is concerned with permissible acts of the state during wartime some aspects of the theory may indeed contribute to our understanding of the morality of peacetime covert intelligence activitiesJust war theory posits that there are times when conflict is morally justified It painfully seeks to discern the difference between a just and an unjust cause Simply defined a just war is a conflict that is fought either in selfdefense or in collective defense against an armed attack There is an assumption that the opposing party is in the wrong and that its attack is unjustifiedOf course there are numerous examples of conflicts in which both sides claimed to be the morally correct party and accused the other of aggression11 It is important to emphasize that the function of just war theory is not to justify warfare itself but rather to judge conflicts The standard method under the theory is to lay down common criteria by which to measure wars The criteria encompass intentions as well as the actual acts and consequences of wars One can successfully incorporate intelligence activitymdashboth espionage and covert interference with internal affairs of foreign nationsmdashunder the penumbra of just war theory if one understands that governments use such activities as a means for government survival

MORAL CONSIDERATIONS CONFRONTING THE INDIVIDUAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERHaving explored the moral constructs that support an intelligence system as a whole we now examine the ethical considerations that confront the individual intelligence officer Are these considerations different from what they would be for other civil servants military officers or members of the private sectorEthics are often defined as behavior relating to professional standards of conduct As in any other profession such standards exist in the field of intelligence even if these standards require behavior that is unacceptable for private citizens Dr David Hunter has argued that lsquolsquofor intelligence professionals to disregard the national values they are committed to defend is to ignore the fundamental reason for being in the gamersquorsquo33 Indeed American intelligence agencies are required by executive order to collect information in a manner that is lsquolsquorespectful of the principles on which the United Stateswas foundedrsquorsquo34There are several key differences between intelligence professionals and their counterparts in other areas of government service or private business Professional standards require intelligence professionals to lie hide information or use covert tactics to protect their lsquolsquocoverrsquorsquo access sources and responsibilities The Central Intelligence Agency expects teaches encourages and controls these tactics so that the lies are consistent and supported (lsquolsquobackstoppedrsquorsquo) The CIA expects intelligence officers to teach others to lie deceive steal launder money and perform a variety of other activities that would certainly be illegal if practiced in the United States They call these tactics lsquolsquotradecraftrsquorsquo and intelligence officers practice them in all the worldrsquos intelligence services35In other contexts intelligence officers must be as honest and forthright as those who work in the private sector or other parts of government Intelligence officers must always

13

tell the truth about their activities to their superiors Otherwise they may find themselves suspected of betraying the organization to which they owe their loyalty Honesty is especially important in intelligence because many officers operate in settings where theiractions cannot be observed36Intelligence analysts must never alter intelligence judgments to fit the desires of policymakers who might prefer different conclusions Forcing the facts to fit policy warps the purpose of intelligence operations37 Intelligence officers must be scrupulous in managing funds or equipment with which they are entrusted Care in this area is especially important because funds are often lsquolsquounvoucheredrsquorsquo (not subject to outside audit) and equipment is deliberately designed to prevent its identification with the officer or service concerned38Intelligence officers must give up certain rights of privacy so that they may be trusted with secrets They are subject to examinations of their private and professional activities during their careers and must accept some restrictions on their behavior even after leaving the service for example they must continue to protect secrets they learned while on duty39The United States military has long recognized that individual soldiers are obligated to follow the lawful orders of their superiors in fact soldiers must swear that they will do so40The military also recognizes that following illegal or unlawful orders is not acceptable The so-called Nuremberg defensemdashthat one is not accountable for onersquos actions if merely following ordersmdashis not acceptable The question for intelligence professionals is whether they have the same kinds of obligationsIn the authorsrsquo view government servants whether military or civilian have an obligation to tell their superiors about matters they consider illegal immoral or ill-conceived If in the judgment of the superior the questionable order must stand the junior official has the choice of carrying out the unacceptable order appealing to a higher authority or ultimately resigningWhat is not possible in the realm of intelligencemdashalthough it might be possible in other areas of United States government servicemdashis to lsquolsquogo publicrsquorsquo with the issue in question Intelligence officials have the obligation to keep secret issues properly classified and thus public discussion is not possible without a gross violation of classification rules and the professional ethics of the intelligence officer41In reality such ethical disputes rarely arise As in most enterprises superiors want to develop the loyalty and trust of their juniors and also want to be advised when things seem to be going awry Thus strong disagreement often leads to compromise rather than confrontation

CONCLUSIONEthics and morality in intelligence are integral parts of operating a secret intelligence service in a free democratic and moral society A free democratic government has the obligation to protect the interests and security of the people it serves If the world were perfect intelligence operations would be unnecessary Given the depravity of the world

14

around us however free societies have no choice but to engage in intelligence activities if they are to remain free

Bibliografie

Instrumente web

1 httpethicsiiteducodes

Carti

1 JAN Goldman Ethics of Spying A reader for the intelligence professional Editura Scarecrow Press Oxford 2006

2 IONEL Nitu Ghidul Analistului de Intelligence Editura Academiei Nationale de Informatii Mihai Viteazul Bucuresti 2011

15

the very nature of their trade to presume that they are operating in hostile environments The end point of their efforts after all is to bypass normal authority or at the least to usesemi-legal means to overcome obstacles placed in their path by the authorities of other nations The professional premise of the officers engaged in these practices then is the constructive use of illegality

Many of the arguments used to question the efficacy and suitability of political operations can be applied to the process of human clandestine intelligence collection the product is not all that impressive the moral damage to the collectors is high intelligence tends to be collected as an end in itself and there is always the risk of exposure Nevertheless intelligence must be collected in selected areas and against specific subject targets Technology is now the workhorse of the collection business and it should remain so Thepresent Director has in effect recognized this evolution in collection methods he has justified his reduction of covert officers on this ground Photographic and audio satellites and other interception devices are immensely expensive but they have the advantage of doing only minimal damage to the ethical standards of the operators and processors As noted above technological intelligence collection is in at least one highly significant areamdashthat of arms limitation controlmdashtacitly accepted as essential to security by bothsuperpowers6Of course even with the phasing down of clandestine human collection the need will remain for residual capability in certain esoteric collection techniques Atmospheric conditions in some geographic locations may be so unfavorable that short-range collection devices will be needed to supplement lsquolsquostand-offrsquorsquo equipment such as satellites There will always be the need for personnel skilled in the techniques of situating these devices Similarly there must be those who can exploit the defector or the lsquolsquowalk-inrsquorsquo sourceCounterintelligence is another field of clandestine intelligence activity which probably cannot be dispensed with for some years to come But if counterintelligence is to survive it should be organized on a purely defensive basis as a protection against foreign penetration of the US intelligence services and their technical capabilities It should be a small lean component with a sophisticated understanding not only of the technological capabilities of major foreign intelligence services but also of those countriesrsquo politicaldynamics Far from being walled off from other Agency components as in the past it should be a vital part of Agency life as much to gain from exposure to varying points of view as to influence those points of view

Obviously action is facilitated if both intelligence and operations can be controlled under one organization but an offsetting merit of separation is that an intelligence unit is more likely to be impartial in its assessment of the success of operations if it is independent of any attempt by the operational side to interpret the evidence regarding success or failure too favorably For all these reasons I continue to stand for the independence of intelligence from operations both covert and overt to the highest possible level in

8

government organization although of course recognizing the need for the greatest possible understanding between intelligence and operational staffs

Puncte esentiale privind etica intelligence-ului

ASSASSINATIONHelms himself observed that lsquolsquowar corrupts and secret war corrupts secretlyrsquorsquo14 So it is easy to slip toward the acceptance of assassination as one of its techniques In 1940 there was a suggestion that there would be a specialBritish clandestine operation to attack the aircrews of the German pathfinderswho were causing us so much trouble in the Blitz They were to beambushed while being ferried by bus between their billets and the airfield atVannes before taking off for an attack This was vetoed by Sir Charles Portalthe Chief of Air Staff but as the war progressed feelings became less delicateLater at the time of the Suez crisis in 1956 there was even talkmdashitappearsmdashof attempting to assassinate President Nasser15 In America AllenDulles aware of the danger of the CIA slipping toward an acceptance ofassassination specifically forbade it when he was Director and an embargowas included in presidential directives on three occasions Nevertheless itwas sometimes attempted with disastrous results for the CIA when it cameto lightTORTURE AND DURESSTorture too was officially barredmdashat least to the extent of a rule being formulatedby Helms in 1955 under Dullesrsquos directorship lsquolsquoYou may not useelectrical chemical or physical duressrsquorsquo it read although as Powers thenwent on to point out lsquolsquopsychological duress was okayrsquorsquo16 We in World WarII certainly tried to bluff prisoners of war into thinking we knew muchmore than we did in the hope that this would mislead them into giving awaythings about which we knew little or nothing And it seemed not too unfairto lsquolsquofencersquorsquo psychologically with a prisoner and thus to trap him into sayingmore than he had originally intended But there had to be a limit such as forexample not playing on a manrsquos emotions by encouraging him to worryabout the safety of his family I take it that no such restraint is likely to bewidely observed todaylsquolsquoCHARACTER ASSASSINATIONrsquorsquoShort of killing a key individual on the opposing side his value to them maybe destroyed if his colleagues or countrymen can be misled into suspectingthat he is a secret agent for your own side or has some other motive forworking against his sidersquos interests This mischievous technique is only likelyto succeed when the individual in question is working in an organizationprone to mutual suspicion but in so far as it exploits a moral weakness inthat organization so lsquolsquohoisting the engineer with his own petardrsquorsquo it may beless repugnant than other measures

9

INTERVENTIONIn parallel with the ethical problem of the humane limits of conduct towardindividuals there is the problem of the extent to which any one state canbe justified in attempting to interfere in the internal affairs of another ThelsquolsquoIrangatersquorsquo affair and the clandestine mining of Nicaraguan harbors underCIA auspices are cases in point In discussing such questions StansfieldTurner in Secrecy and Democracy17 quotes John Stuart Millrsquos A few words onnon-intervention (1859)The doctrine of non-intervention to be a legitimate principle of morality mustbe accepted by all governments The despot must consent to be bound by it aswell as the free state Unless they do the profession comes to this miserableissuemdashthat the wrong side may help the wrong but the right must not help theright

INTERNAL INTELLIGENCEBesides the ethical questions concerning how a nation and its officials andagents should restrain their activities in gaining information about anothernationrsquos secrets or in attempting to interfere in its internal affairs there areother questions that will arise when a nationrsquos officials have to seek out activitieswithin its own borders that could jeopardize its security

PRIVACYWhile any decent individual instinctively reacts against break-ins and lessviolent infringements of privacy a state legitimately requests some detailsabout each of its individual citizens for a wide range of social purposes suchas taxation educational planning transport facilities and potential for militaryand other forms of public service It might therefore be asked why we set so much store by a right to privacy Apart from the nightmare of a lsquolsquoBigBrotherrsquorsquo state there is an instinctive dislike of surveillance even parentalsurveillance and there may well be an apprehension based deeply back in theevolutionary process arising from a feeling of vulnerability while executingbodily functions or in sickness and of latent trouble from a stalking predatorwhose staring eyes betray his intentions More rationally I for one wouldhave little objection to any authority having any information it wished aboutmy actionsmdashor even my thoughtsmdashprovided that I could be sure that itwould not misinterpret the information to come to false conclusions aboutmeJust as technology is tending to modify concepts of sovereignty (from athree-mile limit for territorial waters based on the range of a gun to a limitof 200 miles today and the free movement of satellites over the territories ofother nations for example) so also it is tending to change the balancebetween the rights of individuals and the states of which they are membersThe complex organization of a modem state needs to know more about itsindividuals for optimum functioning and this is all the easier to achievebecause of the technical advances in handling and storing information and

10

unfortunately it will be only too easy for zeal to replace judgment in theprocess

MINIMUM TRESPASSTwo final points on ethics are worth making The first is that despite all theopportunitiesmdashand temptationsmdashthat it offers for malpractice intelligencecan be an honorable pursuit Indeed by improving the assessment by onenation of another it can on occasion contribute to international stabilityOn less happy occasions of course the children of light will be at a disadvantageunless they know enough of the ways of the world to forestall orcounter any unworthy exploitation of those ways by the children of thisworld There need be absolutely no dishonor in trying to ascertain what apotential or actual opponent is likely to attempt be it by external armedthreat or by internal subversion The risk of disrepute will depend on theextent to which the individual intelligence officer or his organization departsfrom the norms of morality in uncovering an opponentrsquos activitiesThe second point follows from the first One of the canons governing militaryor police action is the doctrine of minimum force and a parallel canonshould govern intelligence it should be conducted with the minimum trespassagainst national and individual human rights This canon applies to allforms of intelligence both external and internal that a civilized state mayfind it necessary to undertake

ETHICAL DIMENSIONS FOR INTELLIGENCEOPERATIONS IN GENERALSpying as a form of statecraft is as old as recorded history Babylonian tablets reportedly contain passages about spying3 and the Bible has several passages about the use of intelligence agents4Modern times also are replete with spy sagas of all kinds5 This legacy of intelligence operations by nations throughout history is evidence of a long-standing acceptance of such activity by many diverse cultural groupsHowever while many people may feel intuitively that at least some form of intelligence activity is morally justifiable it is somewhat difficult to articulate exactly what the ethical foundation is for such activity We will approach this task first by presenting a set of guidelines that should define the morality of both open and clandestine information-gathering operations

Information-Gathering ActivitiesWe submit that the following principles provide an ethical basis for the use of information-gathering services by a democratic government for foreign policy purposes First because a state has the responsibility to its citizens to protect their lives welfare and property it must take steps to understand the foreign threats if there are any to those citizens as well as to the nation as a whole In order to do this the state must gather informationmdash openly if possible but by using secret methods if necessary In a world in

11

which many societies are closed or in which information does not circulate completely freely the state must engage in clandestine informationgathering to protect against foreign threats to its security Our second principle is that the state should use the least intrusive means of collecting information That is one should not spy when information can be gathered in an open way Further the information to be gathered ought to be related to advancing the goals of the state as a whole rather than the private interests of individualsThird intelligence data must be presented to policymakers without bias or political taint Those who report the information must not manipulate it to drive policy or to justify further intrusive intelligence collection Finally one should recognize the need for the state to employ counterintelligence to protect its own national security information from being stolen All nations generally agree that the state has the right to punish those it catches in the act of spying Thus one countryrsquos hero is bound to be anotherrsquos traitor one countryrsquos intelligence success is ipso facto anotherrsquos counterintelligence failureIt is important to note here that what is morally acceptable behavior for the government in protecting the nation as a whole may not necessarily be acceptable for the individual in fact quite the opposite may be true While nations may sometimes use intrusive measures to collect information individuals may not Thus espionage as a form of acceptable statecraft would be considered mere theft if practiced by individuals

Covert ActivitiesWhile most people recognize the statersquos need to possess the capability of gathering information by clandestine means a significant number are troubled by the use of intelligence resources to interfere in the internal activities of another nation In wartime one might condone this interference as a preferred alternative to direct military action and defining the enemy is easier in wartime In peacetime however internal interference with other nations may seem less acceptable Under what circumstances then does a nation especially a free and open society that professes to follow the rule of law have the right to interfere with a foreign government or even to seek to change its nature when that nation would find such activity totally unacceptable even hostile if done to itGiven the adversarial relationship between East and West since the end of World War II some pragmatists might argue that a governmentrsquos foreign policy cannot function without some degree of covert activities with questionable ethical aspects7 This argument is similar to the one made by Niccolo Machiavelli that rulers must sometimes be immoral in establishing and maintaining the states8 While pragmatists may be content with the Machiavellian rationale it has extreme results when the preservation of the statersquos power conflicts with other highly esteemed values Can a nation espouse such moral positions on freedom democracy and human rights as does the United States and still support actions that contravene these ideals Only the most extreme political or religious leaders would reject the pragmatic line in these areas Yet these same leaders might argue that under certain circumstances a state may be justified in using convert activities to carry out foreign policy

Just War Theory

12

Some authors have used the existing literature on just war theory to establish a moral basis for clandestine intelligence operations10 Although just war theory is concerned with permissible acts of the state during wartime some aspects of the theory may indeed contribute to our understanding of the morality of peacetime covert intelligence activitiesJust war theory posits that there are times when conflict is morally justified It painfully seeks to discern the difference between a just and an unjust cause Simply defined a just war is a conflict that is fought either in selfdefense or in collective defense against an armed attack There is an assumption that the opposing party is in the wrong and that its attack is unjustifiedOf course there are numerous examples of conflicts in which both sides claimed to be the morally correct party and accused the other of aggression11 It is important to emphasize that the function of just war theory is not to justify warfare itself but rather to judge conflicts The standard method under the theory is to lay down common criteria by which to measure wars The criteria encompass intentions as well as the actual acts and consequences of wars One can successfully incorporate intelligence activitymdashboth espionage and covert interference with internal affairs of foreign nationsmdashunder the penumbra of just war theory if one understands that governments use such activities as a means for government survival

MORAL CONSIDERATIONS CONFRONTING THE INDIVIDUAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERHaving explored the moral constructs that support an intelligence system as a whole we now examine the ethical considerations that confront the individual intelligence officer Are these considerations different from what they would be for other civil servants military officers or members of the private sectorEthics are often defined as behavior relating to professional standards of conduct As in any other profession such standards exist in the field of intelligence even if these standards require behavior that is unacceptable for private citizens Dr David Hunter has argued that lsquolsquofor intelligence professionals to disregard the national values they are committed to defend is to ignore the fundamental reason for being in the gamersquorsquo33 Indeed American intelligence agencies are required by executive order to collect information in a manner that is lsquolsquorespectful of the principles on which the United Stateswas foundedrsquorsquo34There are several key differences between intelligence professionals and their counterparts in other areas of government service or private business Professional standards require intelligence professionals to lie hide information or use covert tactics to protect their lsquolsquocoverrsquorsquo access sources and responsibilities The Central Intelligence Agency expects teaches encourages and controls these tactics so that the lies are consistent and supported (lsquolsquobackstoppedrsquorsquo) The CIA expects intelligence officers to teach others to lie deceive steal launder money and perform a variety of other activities that would certainly be illegal if practiced in the United States They call these tactics lsquolsquotradecraftrsquorsquo and intelligence officers practice them in all the worldrsquos intelligence services35In other contexts intelligence officers must be as honest and forthright as those who work in the private sector or other parts of government Intelligence officers must always

13

tell the truth about their activities to their superiors Otherwise they may find themselves suspected of betraying the organization to which they owe their loyalty Honesty is especially important in intelligence because many officers operate in settings where theiractions cannot be observed36Intelligence analysts must never alter intelligence judgments to fit the desires of policymakers who might prefer different conclusions Forcing the facts to fit policy warps the purpose of intelligence operations37 Intelligence officers must be scrupulous in managing funds or equipment with which they are entrusted Care in this area is especially important because funds are often lsquolsquounvoucheredrsquorsquo (not subject to outside audit) and equipment is deliberately designed to prevent its identification with the officer or service concerned38Intelligence officers must give up certain rights of privacy so that they may be trusted with secrets They are subject to examinations of their private and professional activities during their careers and must accept some restrictions on their behavior even after leaving the service for example they must continue to protect secrets they learned while on duty39The United States military has long recognized that individual soldiers are obligated to follow the lawful orders of their superiors in fact soldiers must swear that they will do so40The military also recognizes that following illegal or unlawful orders is not acceptable The so-called Nuremberg defensemdashthat one is not accountable for onersquos actions if merely following ordersmdashis not acceptable The question for intelligence professionals is whether they have the same kinds of obligationsIn the authorsrsquo view government servants whether military or civilian have an obligation to tell their superiors about matters they consider illegal immoral or ill-conceived If in the judgment of the superior the questionable order must stand the junior official has the choice of carrying out the unacceptable order appealing to a higher authority or ultimately resigningWhat is not possible in the realm of intelligencemdashalthough it might be possible in other areas of United States government servicemdashis to lsquolsquogo publicrsquorsquo with the issue in question Intelligence officials have the obligation to keep secret issues properly classified and thus public discussion is not possible without a gross violation of classification rules and the professional ethics of the intelligence officer41In reality such ethical disputes rarely arise As in most enterprises superiors want to develop the loyalty and trust of their juniors and also want to be advised when things seem to be going awry Thus strong disagreement often leads to compromise rather than confrontation

CONCLUSIONEthics and morality in intelligence are integral parts of operating a secret intelligence service in a free democratic and moral society A free democratic government has the obligation to protect the interests and security of the people it serves If the world were perfect intelligence operations would be unnecessary Given the depravity of the world

14

around us however free societies have no choice but to engage in intelligence activities if they are to remain free

Bibliografie

Instrumente web

1 httpethicsiiteducodes

Carti

1 JAN Goldman Ethics of Spying A reader for the intelligence professional Editura Scarecrow Press Oxford 2006

2 IONEL Nitu Ghidul Analistului de Intelligence Editura Academiei Nationale de Informatii Mihai Viteazul Bucuresti 2011

15

government organization although of course recognizing the need for the greatest possible understanding between intelligence and operational staffs

Puncte esentiale privind etica intelligence-ului

ASSASSINATIONHelms himself observed that lsquolsquowar corrupts and secret war corrupts secretlyrsquorsquo14 So it is easy to slip toward the acceptance of assassination as one of its techniques In 1940 there was a suggestion that there would be a specialBritish clandestine operation to attack the aircrews of the German pathfinderswho were causing us so much trouble in the Blitz They were to beambushed while being ferried by bus between their billets and the airfield atVannes before taking off for an attack This was vetoed by Sir Charles Portalthe Chief of Air Staff but as the war progressed feelings became less delicateLater at the time of the Suez crisis in 1956 there was even talkmdashitappearsmdashof attempting to assassinate President Nasser15 In America AllenDulles aware of the danger of the CIA slipping toward an acceptance ofassassination specifically forbade it when he was Director and an embargowas included in presidential directives on three occasions Nevertheless itwas sometimes attempted with disastrous results for the CIA when it cameto lightTORTURE AND DURESSTorture too was officially barredmdashat least to the extent of a rule being formulatedby Helms in 1955 under Dullesrsquos directorship lsquolsquoYou may not useelectrical chemical or physical duressrsquorsquo it read although as Powers thenwent on to point out lsquolsquopsychological duress was okayrsquorsquo16 We in World WarII certainly tried to bluff prisoners of war into thinking we knew muchmore than we did in the hope that this would mislead them into giving awaythings about which we knew little or nothing And it seemed not too unfairto lsquolsquofencersquorsquo psychologically with a prisoner and thus to trap him into sayingmore than he had originally intended But there had to be a limit such as forexample not playing on a manrsquos emotions by encouraging him to worryabout the safety of his family I take it that no such restraint is likely to bewidely observed todaylsquolsquoCHARACTER ASSASSINATIONrsquorsquoShort of killing a key individual on the opposing side his value to them maybe destroyed if his colleagues or countrymen can be misled into suspectingthat he is a secret agent for your own side or has some other motive forworking against his sidersquos interests This mischievous technique is only likelyto succeed when the individual in question is working in an organizationprone to mutual suspicion but in so far as it exploits a moral weakness inthat organization so lsquolsquohoisting the engineer with his own petardrsquorsquo it may beless repugnant than other measures

9

INTERVENTIONIn parallel with the ethical problem of the humane limits of conduct towardindividuals there is the problem of the extent to which any one state canbe justified in attempting to interfere in the internal affairs of another ThelsquolsquoIrangatersquorsquo affair and the clandestine mining of Nicaraguan harbors underCIA auspices are cases in point In discussing such questions StansfieldTurner in Secrecy and Democracy17 quotes John Stuart Millrsquos A few words onnon-intervention (1859)The doctrine of non-intervention to be a legitimate principle of morality mustbe accepted by all governments The despot must consent to be bound by it aswell as the free state Unless they do the profession comes to this miserableissuemdashthat the wrong side may help the wrong but the right must not help theright

INTERNAL INTELLIGENCEBesides the ethical questions concerning how a nation and its officials andagents should restrain their activities in gaining information about anothernationrsquos secrets or in attempting to interfere in its internal affairs there areother questions that will arise when a nationrsquos officials have to seek out activitieswithin its own borders that could jeopardize its security

PRIVACYWhile any decent individual instinctively reacts against break-ins and lessviolent infringements of privacy a state legitimately requests some detailsabout each of its individual citizens for a wide range of social purposes suchas taxation educational planning transport facilities and potential for militaryand other forms of public service It might therefore be asked why we set so much store by a right to privacy Apart from the nightmare of a lsquolsquoBigBrotherrsquorsquo state there is an instinctive dislike of surveillance even parentalsurveillance and there may well be an apprehension based deeply back in theevolutionary process arising from a feeling of vulnerability while executingbodily functions or in sickness and of latent trouble from a stalking predatorwhose staring eyes betray his intentions More rationally I for one wouldhave little objection to any authority having any information it wished aboutmy actionsmdashor even my thoughtsmdashprovided that I could be sure that itwould not misinterpret the information to come to false conclusions aboutmeJust as technology is tending to modify concepts of sovereignty (from athree-mile limit for territorial waters based on the range of a gun to a limitof 200 miles today and the free movement of satellites over the territories ofother nations for example) so also it is tending to change the balancebetween the rights of individuals and the states of which they are membersThe complex organization of a modem state needs to know more about itsindividuals for optimum functioning and this is all the easier to achievebecause of the technical advances in handling and storing information and

10

unfortunately it will be only too easy for zeal to replace judgment in theprocess

MINIMUM TRESPASSTwo final points on ethics are worth making The first is that despite all theopportunitiesmdashand temptationsmdashthat it offers for malpractice intelligencecan be an honorable pursuit Indeed by improving the assessment by onenation of another it can on occasion contribute to international stabilityOn less happy occasions of course the children of light will be at a disadvantageunless they know enough of the ways of the world to forestall orcounter any unworthy exploitation of those ways by the children of thisworld There need be absolutely no dishonor in trying to ascertain what apotential or actual opponent is likely to attempt be it by external armedthreat or by internal subversion The risk of disrepute will depend on theextent to which the individual intelligence officer or his organization departsfrom the norms of morality in uncovering an opponentrsquos activitiesThe second point follows from the first One of the canons governing militaryor police action is the doctrine of minimum force and a parallel canonshould govern intelligence it should be conducted with the minimum trespassagainst national and individual human rights This canon applies to allforms of intelligence both external and internal that a civilized state mayfind it necessary to undertake

ETHICAL DIMENSIONS FOR INTELLIGENCEOPERATIONS IN GENERALSpying as a form of statecraft is as old as recorded history Babylonian tablets reportedly contain passages about spying3 and the Bible has several passages about the use of intelligence agents4Modern times also are replete with spy sagas of all kinds5 This legacy of intelligence operations by nations throughout history is evidence of a long-standing acceptance of such activity by many diverse cultural groupsHowever while many people may feel intuitively that at least some form of intelligence activity is morally justifiable it is somewhat difficult to articulate exactly what the ethical foundation is for such activity We will approach this task first by presenting a set of guidelines that should define the morality of both open and clandestine information-gathering operations

Information-Gathering ActivitiesWe submit that the following principles provide an ethical basis for the use of information-gathering services by a democratic government for foreign policy purposes First because a state has the responsibility to its citizens to protect their lives welfare and property it must take steps to understand the foreign threats if there are any to those citizens as well as to the nation as a whole In order to do this the state must gather informationmdash openly if possible but by using secret methods if necessary In a world in

11

which many societies are closed or in which information does not circulate completely freely the state must engage in clandestine informationgathering to protect against foreign threats to its security Our second principle is that the state should use the least intrusive means of collecting information That is one should not spy when information can be gathered in an open way Further the information to be gathered ought to be related to advancing the goals of the state as a whole rather than the private interests of individualsThird intelligence data must be presented to policymakers without bias or political taint Those who report the information must not manipulate it to drive policy or to justify further intrusive intelligence collection Finally one should recognize the need for the state to employ counterintelligence to protect its own national security information from being stolen All nations generally agree that the state has the right to punish those it catches in the act of spying Thus one countryrsquos hero is bound to be anotherrsquos traitor one countryrsquos intelligence success is ipso facto anotherrsquos counterintelligence failureIt is important to note here that what is morally acceptable behavior for the government in protecting the nation as a whole may not necessarily be acceptable for the individual in fact quite the opposite may be true While nations may sometimes use intrusive measures to collect information individuals may not Thus espionage as a form of acceptable statecraft would be considered mere theft if practiced by individuals

Covert ActivitiesWhile most people recognize the statersquos need to possess the capability of gathering information by clandestine means a significant number are troubled by the use of intelligence resources to interfere in the internal activities of another nation In wartime one might condone this interference as a preferred alternative to direct military action and defining the enemy is easier in wartime In peacetime however internal interference with other nations may seem less acceptable Under what circumstances then does a nation especially a free and open society that professes to follow the rule of law have the right to interfere with a foreign government or even to seek to change its nature when that nation would find such activity totally unacceptable even hostile if done to itGiven the adversarial relationship between East and West since the end of World War II some pragmatists might argue that a governmentrsquos foreign policy cannot function without some degree of covert activities with questionable ethical aspects7 This argument is similar to the one made by Niccolo Machiavelli that rulers must sometimes be immoral in establishing and maintaining the states8 While pragmatists may be content with the Machiavellian rationale it has extreme results when the preservation of the statersquos power conflicts with other highly esteemed values Can a nation espouse such moral positions on freedom democracy and human rights as does the United States and still support actions that contravene these ideals Only the most extreme political or religious leaders would reject the pragmatic line in these areas Yet these same leaders might argue that under certain circumstances a state may be justified in using convert activities to carry out foreign policy

Just War Theory

12

Some authors have used the existing literature on just war theory to establish a moral basis for clandestine intelligence operations10 Although just war theory is concerned with permissible acts of the state during wartime some aspects of the theory may indeed contribute to our understanding of the morality of peacetime covert intelligence activitiesJust war theory posits that there are times when conflict is morally justified It painfully seeks to discern the difference between a just and an unjust cause Simply defined a just war is a conflict that is fought either in selfdefense or in collective defense against an armed attack There is an assumption that the opposing party is in the wrong and that its attack is unjustifiedOf course there are numerous examples of conflicts in which both sides claimed to be the morally correct party and accused the other of aggression11 It is important to emphasize that the function of just war theory is not to justify warfare itself but rather to judge conflicts The standard method under the theory is to lay down common criteria by which to measure wars The criteria encompass intentions as well as the actual acts and consequences of wars One can successfully incorporate intelligence activitymdashboth espionage and covert interference with internal affairs of foreign nationsmdashunder the penumbra of just war theory if one understands that governments use such activities as a means for government survival

MORAL CONSIDERATIONS CONFRONTING THE INDIVIDUAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERHaving explored the moral constructs that support an intelligence system as a whole we now examine the ethical considerations that confront the individual intelligence officer Are these considerations different from what they would be for other civil servants military officers or members of the private sectorEthics are often defined as behavior relating to professional standards of conduct As in any other profession such standards exist in the field of intelligence even if these standards require behavior that is unacceptable for private citizens Dr David Hunter has argued that lsquolsquofor intelligence professionals to disregard the national values they are committed to defend is to ignore the fundamental reason for being in the gamersquorsquo33 Indeed American intelligence agencies are required by executive order to collect information in a manner that is lsquolsquorespectful of the principles on which the United Stateswas foundedrsquorsquo34There are several key differences between intelligence professionals and their counterparts in other areas of government service or private business Professional standards require intelligence professionals to lie hide information or use covert tactics to protect their lsquolsquocoverrsquorsquo access sources and responsibilities The Central Intelligence Agency expects teaches encourages and controls these tactics so that the lies are consistent and supported (lsquolsquobackstoppedrsquorsquo) The CIA expects intelligence officers to teach others to lie deceive steal launder money and perform a variety of other activities that would certainly be illegal if practiced in the United States They call these tactics lsquolsquotradecraftrsquorsquo and intelligence officers practice them in all the worldrsquos intelligence services35In other contexts intelligence officers must be as honest and forthright as those who work in the private sector or other parts of government Intelligence officers must always

13

tell the truth about their activities to their superiors Otherwise they may find themselves suspected of betraying the organization to which they owe their loyalty Honesty is especially important in intelligence because many officers operate in settings where theiractions cannot be observed36Intelligence analysts must never alter intelligence judgments to fit the desires of policymakers who might prefer different conclusions Forcing the facts to fit policy warps the purpose of intelligence operations37 Intelligence officers must be scrupulous in managing funds or equipment with which they are entrusted Care in this area is especially important because funds are often lsquolsquounvoucheredrsquorsquo (not subject to outside audit) and equipment is deliberately designed to prevent its identification with the officer or service concerned38Intelligence officers must give up certain rights of privacy so that they may be trusted with secrets They are subject to examinations of their private and professional activities during their careers and must accept some restrictions on their behavior even after leaving the service for example they must continue to protect secrets they learned while on duty39The United States military has long recognized that individual soldiers are obligated to follow the lawful orders of their superiors in fact soldiers must swear that they will do so40The military also recognizes that following illegal or unlawful orders is not acceptable The so-called Nuremberg defensemdashthat one is not accountable for onersquos actions if merely following ordersmdashis not acceptable The question for intelligence professionals is whether they have the same kinds of obligationsIn the authorsrsquo view government servants whether military or civilian have an obligation to tell their superiors about matters they consider illegal immoral or ill-conceived If in the judgment of the superior the questionable order must stand the junior official has the choice of carrying out the unacceptable order appealing to a higher authority or ultimately resigningWhat is not possible in the realm of intelligencemdashalthough it might be possible in other areas of United States government servicemdashis to lsquolsquogo publicrsquorsquo with the issue in question Intelligence officials have the obligation to keep secret issues properly classified and thus public discussion is not possible without a gross violation of classification rules and the professional ethics of the intelligence officer41In reality such ethical disputes rarely arise As in most enterprises superiors want to develop the loyalty and trust of their juniors and also want to be advised when things seem to be going awry Thus strong disagreement often leads to compromise rather than confrontation

CONCLUSIONEthics and morality in intelligence are integral parts of operating a secret intelligence service in a free democratic and moral society A free democratic government has the obligation to protect the interests and security of the people it serves If the world were perfect intelligence operations would be unnecessary Given the depravity of the world

14

around us however free societies have no choice but to engage in intelligence activities if they are to remain free

Bibliografie

Instrumente web

1 httpethicsiiteducodes

Carti

1 JAN Goldman Ethics of Spying A reader for the intelligence professional Editura Scarecrow Press Oxford 2006

2 IONEL Nitu Ghidul Analistului de Intelligence Editura Academiei Nationale de Informatii Mihai Viteazul Bucuresti 2011

15

INTERVENTIONIn parallel with the ethical problem of the humane limits of conduct towardindividuals there is the problem of the extent to which any one state canbe justified in attempting to interfere in the internal affairs of another ThelsquolsquoIrangatersquorsquo affair and the clandestine mining of Nicaraguan harbors underCIA auspices are cases in point In discussing such questions StansfieldTurner in Secrecy and Democracy17 quotes John Stuart Millrsquos A few words onnon-intervention (1859)The doctrine of non-intervention to be a legitimate principle of morality mustbe accepted by all governments The despot must consent to be bound by it aswell as the free state Unless they do the profession comes to this miserableissuemdashthat the wrong side may help the wrong but the right must not help theright

INTERNAL INTELLIGENCEBesides the ethical questions concerning how a nation and its officials andagents should restrain their activities in gaining information about anothernationrsquos secrets or in attempting to interfere in its internal affairs there areother questions that will arise when a nationrsquos officials have to seek out activitieswithin its own borders that could jeopardize its security

PRIVACYWhile any decent individual instinctively reacts against break-ins and lessviolent infringements of privacy a state legitimately requests some detailsabout each of its individual citizens for a wide range of social purposes suchas taxation educational planning transport facilities and potential for militaryand other forms of public service It might therefore be asked why we set so much store by a right to privacy Apart from the nightmare of a lsquolsquoBigBrotherrsquorsquo state there is an instinctive dislike of surveillance even parentalsurveillance and there may well be an apprehension based deeply back in theevolutionary process arising from a feeling of vulnerability while executingbodily functions or in sickness and of latent trouble from a stalking predatorwhose staring eyes betray his intentions More rationally I for one wouldhave little objection to any authority having any information it wished aboutmy actionsmdashor even my thoughtsmdashprovided that I could be sure that itwould not misinterpret the information to come to false conclusions aboutmeJust as technology is tending to modify concepts of sovereignty (from athree-mile limit for territorial waters based on the range of a gun to a limitof 200 miles today and the free movement of satellites over the territories ofother nations for example) so also it is tending to change the balancebetween the rights of individuals and the states of which they are membersThe complex organization of a modem state needs to know more about itsindividuals for optimum functioning and this is all the easier to achievebecause of the technical advances in handling and storing information and

10

unfortunately it will be only too easy for zeal to replace judgment in theprocess

MINIMUM TRESPASSTwo final points on ethics are worth making The first is that despite all theopportunitiesmdashand temptationsmdashthat it offers for malpractice intelligencecan be an honorable pursuit Indeed by improving the assessment by onenation of another it can on occasion contribute to international stabilityOn less happy occasions of course the children of light will be at a disadvantageunless they know enough of the ways of the world to forestall orcounter any unworthy exploitation of those ways by the children of thisworld There need be absolutely no dishonor in trying to ascertain what apotential or actual opponent is likely to attempt be it by external armedthreat or by internal subversion The risk of disrepute will depend on theextent to which the individual intelligence officer or his organization departsfrom the norms of morality in uncovering an opponentrsquos activitiesThe second point follows from the first One of the canons governing militaryor police action is the doctrine of minimum force and a parallel canonshould govern intelligence it should be conducted with the minimum trespassagainst national and individual human rights This canon applies to allforms of intelligence both external and internal that a civilized state mayfind it necessary to undertake

ETHICAL DIMENSIONS FOR INTELLIGENCEOPERATIONS IN GENERALSpying as a form of statecraft is as old as recorded history Babylonian tablets reportedly contain passages about spying3 and the Bible has several passages about the use of intelligence agents4Modern times also are replete with spy sagas of all kinds5 This legacy of intelligence operations by nations throughout history is evidence of a long-standing acceptance of such activity by many diverse cultural groupsHowever while many people may feel intuitively that at least some form of intelligence activity is morally justifiable it is somewhat difficult to articulate exactly what the ethical foundation is for such activity We will approach this task first by presenting a set of guidelines that should define the morality of both open and clandestine information-gathering operations

Information-Gathering ActivitiesWe submit that the following principles provide an ethical basis for the use of information-gathering services by a democratic government for foreign policy purposes First because a state has the responsibility to its citizens to protect their lives welfare and property it must take steps to understand the foreign threats if there are any to those citizens as well as to the nation as a whole In order to do this the state must gather informationmdash openly if possible but by using secret methods if necessary In a world in

11

which many societies are closed or in which information does not circulate completely freely the state must engage in clandestine informationgathering to protect against foreign threats to its security Our second principle is that the state should use the least intrusive means of collecting information That is one should not spy when information can be gathered in an open way Further the information to be gathered ought to be related to advancing the goals of the state as a whole rather than the private interests of individualsThird intelligence data must be presented to policymakers without bias or political taint Those who report the information must not manipulate it to drive policy or to justify further intrusive intelligence collection Finally one should recognize the need for the state to employ counterintelligence to protect its own national security information from being stolen All nations generally agree that the state has the right to punish those it catches in the act of spying Thus one countryrsquos hero is bound to be anotherrsquos traitor one countryrsquos intelligence success is ipso facto anotherrsquos counterintelligence failureIt is important to note here that what is morally acceptable behavior for the government in protecting the nation as a whole may not necessarily be acceptable for the individual in fact quite the opposite may be true While nations may sometimes use intrusive measures to collect information individuals may not Thus espionage as a form of acceptable statecraft would be considered mere theft if practiced by individuals

Covert ActivitiesWhile most people recognize the statersquos need to possess the capability of gathering information by clandestine means a significant number are troubled by the use of intelligence resources to interfere in the internal activities of another nation In wartime one might condone this interference as a preferred alternative to direct military action and defining the enemy is easier in wartime In peacetime however internal interference with other nations may seem less acceptable Under what circumstances then does a nation especially a free and open society that professes to follow the rule of law have the right to interfere with a foreign government or even to seek to change its nature when that nation would find such activity totally unacceptable even hostile if done to itGiven the adversarial relationship between East and West since the end of World War II some pragmatists might argue that a governmentrsquos foreign policy cannot function without some degree of covert activities with questionable ethical aspects7 This argument is similar to the one made by Niccolo Machiavelli that rulers must sometimes be immoral in establishing and maintaining the states8 While pragmatists may be content with the Machiavellian rationale it has extreme results when the preservation of the statersquos power conflicts with other highly esteemed values Can a nation espouse such moral positions on freedom democracy and human rights as does the United States and still support actions that contravene these ideals Only the most extreme political or religious leaders would reject the pragmatic line in these areas Yet these same leaders might argue that under certain circumstances a state may be justified in using convert activities to carry out foreign policy

Just War Theory

12

Some authors have used the existing literature on just war theory to establish a moral basis for clandestine intelligence operations10 Although just war theory is concerned with permissible acts of the state during wartime some aspects of the theory may indeed contribute to our understanding of the morality of peacetime covert intelligence activitiesJust war theory posits that there are times when conflict is morally justified It painfully seeks to discern the difference between a just and an unjust cause Simply defined a just war is a conflict that is fought either in selfdefense or in collective defense against an armed attack There is an assumption that the opposing party is in the wrong and that its attack is unjustifiedOf course there are numerous examples of conflicts in which both sides claimed to be the morally correct party and accused the other of aggression11 It is important to emphasize that the function of just war theory is not to justify warfare itself but rather to judge conflicts The standard method under the theory is to lay down common criteria by which to measure wars The criteria encompass intentions as well as the actual acts and consequences of wars One can successfully incorporate intelligence activitymdashboth espionage and covert interference with internal affairs of foreign nationsmdashunder the penumbra of just war theory if one understands that governments use such activities as a means for government survival

MORAL CONSIDERATIONS CONFRONTING THE INDIVIDUAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERHaving explored the moral constructs that support an intelligence system as a whole we now examine the ethical considerations that confront the individual intelligence officer Are these considerations different from what they would be for other civil servants military officers or members of the private sectorEthics are often defined as behavior relating to professional standards of conduct As in any other profession such standards exist in the field of intelligence even if these standards require behavior that is unacceptable for private citizens Dr David Hunter has argued that lsquolsquofor intelligence professionals to disregard the national values they are committed to defend is to ignore the fundamental reason for being in the gamersquorsquo33 Indeed American intelligence agencies are required by executive order to collect information in a manner that is lsquolsquorespectful of the principles on which the United Stateswas foundedrsquorsquo34There are several key differences between intelligence professionals and their counterparts in other areas of government service or private business Professional standards require intelligence professionals to lie hide information or use covert tactics to protect their lsquolsquocoverrsquorsquo access sources and responsibilities The Central Intelligence Agency expects teaches encourages and controls these tactics so that the lies are consistent and supported (lsquolsquobackstoppedrsquorsquo) The CIA expects intelligence officers to teach others to lie deceive steal launder money and perform a variety of other activities that would certainly be illegal if practiced in the United States They call these tactics lsquolsquotradecraftrsquorsquo and intelligence officers practice them in all the worldrsquos intelligence services35In other contexts intelligence officers must be as honest and forthright as those who work in the private sector or other parts of government Intelligence officers must always

13

tell the truth about their activities to their superiors Otherwise they may find themselves suspected of betraying the organization to which they owe their loyalty Honesty is especially important in intelligence because many officers operate in settings where theiractions cannot be observed36Intelligence analysts must never alter intelligence judgments to fit the desires of policymakers who might prefer different conclusions Forcing the facts to fit policy warps the purpose of intelligence operations37 Intelligence officers must be scrupulous in managing funds or equipment with which they are entrusted Care in this area is especially important because funds are often lsquolsquounvoucheredrsquorsquo (not subject to outside audit) and equipment is deliberately designed to prevent its identification with the officer or service concerned38Intelligence officers must give up certain rights of privacy so that they may be trusted with secrets They are subject to examinations of their private and professional activities during their careers and must accept some restrictions on their behavior even after leaving the service for example they must continue to protect secrets they learned while on duty39The United States military has long recognized that individual soldiers are obligated to follow the lawful orders of their superiors in fact soldiers must swear that they will do so40The military also recognizes that following illegal or unlawful orders is not acceptable The so-called Nuremberg defensemdashthat one is not accountable for onersquos actions if merely following ordersmdashis not acceptable The question for intelligence professionals is whether they have the same kinds of obligationsIn the authorsrsquo view government servants whether military or civilian have an obligation to tell their superiors about matters they consider illegal immoral or ill-conceived If in the judgment of the superior the questionable order must stand the junior official has the choice of carrying out the unacceptable order appealing to a higher authority or ultimately resigningWhat is not possible in the realm of intelligencemdashalthough it might be possible in other areas of United States government servicemdashis to lsquolsquogo publicrsquorsquo with the issue in question Intelligence officials have the obligation to keep secret issues properly classified and thus public discussion is not possible without a gross violation of classification rules and the professional ethics of the intelligence officer41In reality such ethical disputes rarely arise As in most enterprises superiors want to develop the loyalty and trust of their juniors and also want to be advised when things seem to be going awry Thus strong disagreement often leads to compromise rather than confrontation

CONCLUSIONEthics and morality in intelligence are integral parts of operating a secret intelligence service in a free democratic and moral society A free democratic government has the obligation to protect the interests and security of the people it serves If the world were perfect intelligence operations would be unnecessary Given the depravity of the world

14

around us however free societies have no choice but to engage in intelligence activities if they are to remain free

Bibliografie

Instrumente web

1 httpethicsiiteducodes

Carti

1 JAN Goldman Ethics of Spying A reader for the intelligence professional Editura Scarecrow Press Oxford 2006

2 IONEL Nitu Ghidul Analistului de Intelligence Editura Academiei Nationale de Informatii Mihai Viteazul Bucuresti 2011

15

unfortunately it will be only too easy for zeal to replace judgment in theprocess

MINIMUM TRESPASSTwo final points on ethics are worth making The first is that despite all theopportunitiesmdashand temptationsmdashthat it offers for malpractice intelligencecan be an honorable pursuit Indeed by improving the assessment by onenation of another it can on occasion contribute to international stabilityOn less happy occasions of course the children of light will be at a disadvantageunless they know enough of the ways of the world to forestall orcounter any unworthy exploitation of those ways by the children of thisworld There need be absolutely no dishonor in trying to ascertain what apotential or actual opponent is likely to attempt be it by external armedthreat or by internal subversion The risk of disrepute will depend on theextent to which the individual intelligence officer or his organization departsfrom the norms of morality in uncovering an opponentrsquos activitiesThe second point follows from the first One of the canons governing militaryor police action is the doctrine of minimum force and a parallel canonshould govern intelligence it should be conducted with the minimum trespassagainst national and individual human rights This canon applies to allforms of intelligence both external and internal that a civilized state mayfind it necessary to undertake

ETHICAL DIMENSIONS FOR INTELLIGENCEOPERATIONS IN GENERALSpying as a form of statecraft is as old as recorded history Babylonian tablets reportedly contain passages about spying3 and the Bible has several passages about the use of intelligence agents4Modern times also are replete with spy sagas of all kinds5 This legacy of intelligence operations by nations throughout history is evidence of a long-standing acceptance of such activity by many diverse cultural groupsHowever while many people may feel intuitively that at least some form of intelligence activity is morally justifiable it is somewhat difficult to articulate exactly what the ethical foundation is for such activity We will approach this task first by presenting a set of guidelines that should define the morality of both open and clandestine information-gathering operations

Information-Gathering ActivitiesWe submit that the following principles provide an ethical basis for the use of information-gathering services by a democratic government for foreign policy purposes First because a state has the responsibility to its citizens to protect their lives welfare and property it must take steps to understand the foreign threats if there are any to those citizens as well as to the nation as a whole In order to do this the state must gather informationmdash openly if possible but by using secret methods if necessary In a world in

11

which many societies are closed or in which information does not circulate completely freely the state must engage in clandestine informationgathering to protect against foreign threats to its security Our second principle is that the state should use the least intrusive means of collecting information That is one should not spy when information can be gathered in an open way Further the information to be gathered ought to be related to advancing the goals of the state as a whole rather than the private interests of individualsThird intelligence data must be presented to policymakers without bias or political taint Those who report the information must not manipulate it to drive policy or to justify further intrusive intelligence collection Finally one should recognize the need for the state to employ counterintelligence to protect its own national security information from being stolen All nations generally agree that the state has the right to punish those it catches in the act of spying Thus one countryrsquos hero is bound to be anotherrsquos traitor one countryrsquos intelligence success is ipso facto anotherrsquos counterintelligence failureIt is important to note here that what is morally acceptable behavior for the government in protecting the nation as a whole may not necessarily be acceptable for the individual in fact quite the opposite may be true While nations may sometimes use intrusive measures to collect information individuals may not Thus espionage as a form of acceptable statecraft would be considered mere theft if practiced by individuals

Covert ActivitiesWhile most people recognize the statersquos need to possess the capability of gathering information by clandestine means a significant number are troubled by the use of intelligence resources to interfere in the internal activities of another nation In wartime one might condone this interference as a preferred alternative to direct military action and defining the enemy is easier in wartime In peacetime however internal interference with other nations may seem less acceptable Under what circumstances then does a nation especially a free and open society that professes to follow the rule of law have the right to interfere with a foreign government or even to seek to change its nature when that nation would find such activity totally unacceptable even hostile if done to itGiven the adversarial relationship between East and West since the end of World War II some pragmatists might argue that a governmentrsquos foreign policy cannot function without some degree of covert activities with questionable ethical aspects7 This argument is similar to the one made by Niccolo Machiavelli that rulers must sometimes be immoral in establishing and maintaining the states8 While pragmatists may be content with the Machiavellian rationale it has extreme results when the preservation of the statersquos power conflicts with other highly esteemed values Can a nation espouse such moral positions on freedom democracy and human rights as does the United States and still support actions that contravene these ideals Only the most extreme political or religious leaders would reject the pragmatic line in these areas Yet these same leaders might argue that under certain circumstances a state may be justified in using convert activities to carry out foreign policy

Just War Theory

12

Some authors have used the existing literature on just war theory to establish a moral basis for clandestine intelligence operations10 Although just war theory is concerned with permissible acts of the state during wartime some aspects of the theory may indeed contribute to our understanding of the morality of peacetime covert intelligence activitiesJust war theory posits that there are times when conflict is morally justified It painfully seeks to discern the difference between a just and an unjust cause Simply defined a just war is a conflict that is fought either in selfdefense or in collective defense against an armed attack There is an assumption that the opposing party is in the wrong and that its attack is unjustifiedOf course there are numerous examples of conflicts in which both sides claimed to be the morally correct party and accused the other of aggression11 It is important to emphasize that the function of just war theory is not to justify warfare itself but rather to judge conflicts The standard method under the theory is to lay down common criteria by which to measure wars The criteria encompass intentions as well as the actual acts and consequences of wars One can successfully incorporate intelligence activitymdashboth espionage and covert interference with internal affairs of foreign nationsmdashunder the penumbra of just war theory if one understands that governments use such activities as a means for government survival

MORAL CONSIDERATIONS CONFRONTING THE INDIVIDUAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERHaving explored the moral constructs that support an intelligence system as a whole we now examine the ethical considerations that confront the individual intelligence officer Are these considerations different from what they would be for other civil servants military officers or members of the private sectorEthics are often defined as behavior relating to professional standards of conduct As in any other profession such standards exist in the field of intelligence even if these standards require behavior that is unacceptable for private citizens Dr David Hunter has argued that lsquolsquofor intelligence professionals to disregard the national values they are committed to defend is to ignore the fundamental reason for being in the gamersquorsquo33 Indeed American intelligence agencies are required by executive order to collect information in a manner that is lsquolsquorespectful of the principles on which the United Stateswas foundedrsquorsquo34There are several key differences between intelligence professionals and their counterparts in other areas of government service or private business Professional standards require intelligence professionals to lie hide information or use covert tactics to protect their lsquolsquocoverrsquorsquo access sources and responsibilities The Central Intelligence Agency expects teaches encourages and controls these tactics so that the lies are consistent and supported (lsquolsquobackstoppedrsquorsquo) The CIA expects intelligence officers to teach others to lie deceive steal launder money and perform a variety of other activities that would certainly be illegal if practiced in the United States They call these tactics lsquolsquotradecraftrsquorsquo and intelligence officers practice them in all the worldrsquos intelligence services35In other contexts intelligence officers must be as honest and forthright as those who work in the private sector or other parts of government Intelligence officers must always

13

tell the truth about their activities to their superiors Otherwise they may find themselves suspected of betraying the organization to which they owe their loyalty Honesty is especially important in intelligence because many officers operate in settings where theiractions cannot be observed36Intelligence analysts must never alter intelligence judgments to fit the desires of policymakers who might prefer different conclusions Forcing the facts to fit policy warps the purpose of intelligence operations37 Intelligence officers must be scrupulous in managing funds or equipment with which they are entrusted Care in this area is especially important because funds are often lsquolsquounvoucheredrsquorsquo (not subject to outside audit) and equipment is deliberately designed to prevent its identification with the officer or service concerned38Intelligence officers must give up certain rights of privacy so that they may be trusted with secrets They are subject to examinations of their private and professional activities during their careers and must accept some restrictions on their behavior even after leaving the service for example they must continue to protect secrets they learned while on duty39The United States military has long recognized that individual soldiers are obligated to follow the lawful orders of their superiors in fact soldiers must swear that they will do so40The military also recognizes that following illegal or unlawful orders is not acceptable The so-called Nuremberg defensemdashthat one is not accountable for onersquos actions if merely following ordersmdashis not acceptable The question for intelligence professionals is whether they have the same kinds of obligationsIn the authorsrsquo view government servants whether military or civilian have an obligation to tell their superiors about matters they consider illegal immoral or ill-conceived If in the judgment of the superior the questionable order must stand the junior official has the choice of carrying out the unacceptable order appealing to a higher authority or ultimately resigningWhat is not possible in the realm of intelligencemdashalthough it might be possible in other areas of United States government servicemdashis to lsquolsquogo publicrsquorsquo with the issue in question Intelligence officials have the obligation to keep secret issues properly classified and thus public discussion is not possible without a gross violation of classification rules and the professional ethics of the intelligence officer41In reality such ethical disputes rarely arise As in most enterprises superiors want to develop the loyalty and trust of their juniors and also want to be advised when things seem to be going awry Thus strong disagreement often leads to compromise rather than confrontation

CONCLUSIONEthics and morality in intelligence are integral parts of operating a secret intelligence service in a free democratic and moral society A free democratic government has the obligation to protect the interests and security of the people it serves If the world were perfect intelligence operations would be unnecessary Given the depravity of the world

14

around us however free societies have no choice but to engage in intelligence activities if they are to remain free

Bibliografie

Instrumente web

1 httpethicsiiteducodes

Carti

1 JAN Goldman Ethics of Spying A reader for the intelligence professional Editura Scarecrow Press Oxford 2006

2 IONEL Nitu Ghidul Analistului de Intelligence Editura Academiei Nationale de Informatii Mihai Viteazul Bucuresti 2011

15

which many societies are closed or in which information does not circulate completely freely the state must engage in clandestine informationgathering to protect against foreign threats to its security Our second principle is that the state should use the least intrusive means of collecting information That is one should not spy when information can be gathered in an open way Further the information to be gathered ought to be related to advancing the goals of the state as a whole rather than the private interests of individualsThird intelligence data must be presented to policymakers without bias or political taint Those who report the information must not manipulate it to drive policy or to justify further intrusive intelligence collection Finally one should recognize the need for the state to employ counterintelligence to protect its own national security information from being stolen All nations generally agree that the state has the right to punish those it catches in the act of spying Thus one countryrsquos hero is bound to be anotherrsquos traitor one countryrsquos intelligence success is ipso facto anotherrsquos counterintelligence failureIt is important to note here that what is morally acceptable behavior for the government in protecting the nation as a whole may not necessarily be acceptable for the individual in fact quite the opposite may be true While nations may sometimes use intrusive measures to collect information individuals may not Thus espionage as a form of acceptable statecraft would be considered mere theft if practiced by individuals

Covert ActivitiesWhile most people recognize the statersquos need to possess the capability of gathering information by clandestine means a significant number are troubled by the use of intelligence resources to interfere in the internal activities of another nation In wartime one might condone this interference as a preferred alternative to direct military action and defining the enemy is easier in wartime In peacetime however internal interference with other nations may seem less acceptable Under what circumstances then does a nation especially a free and open society that professes to follow the rule of law have the right to interfere with a foreign government or even to seek to change its nature when that nation would find such activity totally unacceptable even hostile if done to itGiven the adversarial relationship between East and West since the end of World War II some pragmatists might argue that a governmentrsquos foreign policy cannot function without some degree of covert activities with questionable ethical aspects7 This argument is similar to the one made by Niccolo Machiavelli that rulers must sometimes be immoral in establishing and maintaining the states8 While pragmatists may be content with the Machiavellian rationale it has extreme results when the preservation of the statersquos power conflicts with other highly esteemed values Can a nation espouse such moral positions on freedom democracy and human rights as does the United States and still support actions that contravene these ideals Only the most extreme political or religious leaders would reject the pragmatic line in these areas Yet these same leaders might argue that under certain circumstances a state may be justified in using convert activities to carry out foreign policy

Just War Theory

12

Some authors have used the existing literature on just war theory to establish a moral basis for clandestine intelligence operations10 Although just war theory is concerned with permissible acts of the state during wartime some aspects of the theory may indeed contribute to our understanding of the morality of peacetime covert intelligence activitiesJust war theory posits that there are times when conflict is morally justified It painfully seeks to discern the difference between a just and an unjust cause Simply defined a just war is a conflict that is fought either in selfdefense or in collective defense against an armed attack There is an assumption that the opposing party is in the wrong and that its attack is unjustifiedOf course there are numerous examples of conflicts in which both sides claimed to be the morally correct party and accused the other of aggression11 It is important to emphasize that the function of just war theory is not to justify warfare itself but rather to judge conflicts The standard method under the theory is to lay down common criteria by which to measure wars The criteria encompass intentions as well as the actual acts and consequences of wars One can successfully incorporate intelligence activitymdashboth espionage and covert interference with internal affairs of foreign nationsmdashunder the penumbra of just war theory if one understands that governments use such activities as a means for government survival

MORAL CONSIDERATIONS CONFRONTING THE INDIVIDUAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERHaving explored the moral constructs that support an intelligence system as a whole we now examine the ethical considerations that confront the individual intelligence officer Are these considerations different from what they would be for other civil servants military officers or members of the private sectorEthics are often defined as behavior relating to professional standards of conduct As in any other profession such standards exist in the field of intelligence even if these standards require behavior that is unacceptable for private citizens Dr David Hunter has argued that lsquolsquofor intelligence professionals to disregard the national values they are committed to defend is to ignore the fundamental reason for being in the gamersquorsquo33 Indeed American intelligence agencies are required by executive order to collect information in a manner that is lsquolsquorespectful of the principles on which the United Stateswas foundedrsquorsquo34There are several key differences between intelligence professionals and their counterparts in other areas of government service or private business Professional standards require intelligence professionals to lie hide information or use covert tactics to protect their lsquolsquocoverrsquorsquo access sources and responsibilities The Central Intelligence Agency expects teaches encourages and controls these tactics so that the lies are consistent and supported (lsquolsquobackstoppedrsquorsquo) The CIA expects intelligence officers to teach others to lie deceive steal launder money and perform a variety of other activities that would certainly be illegal if practiced in the United States They call these tactics lsquolsquotradecraftrsquorsquo and intelligence officers practice them in all the worldrsquos intelligence services35In other contexts intelligence officers must be as honest and forthright as those who work in the private sector or other parts of government Intelligence officers must always

13

tell the truth about their activities to their superiors Otherwise they may find themselves suspected of betraying the organization to which they owe their loyalty Honesty is especially important in intelligence because many officers operate in settings where theiractions cannot be observed36Intelligence analysts must never alter intelligence judgments to fit the desires of policymakers who might prefer different conclusions Forcing the facts to fit policy warps the purpose of intelligence operations37 Intelligence officers must be scrupulous in managing funds or equipment with which they are entrusted Care in this area is especially important because funds are often lsquolsquounvoucheredrsquorsquo (not subject to outside audit) and equipment is deliberately designed to prevent its identification with the officer or service concerned38Intelligence officers must give up certain rights of privacy so that they may be trusted with secrets They are subject to examinations of their private and professional activities during their careers and must accept some restrictions on their behavior even after leaving the service for example they must continue to protect secrets they learned while on duty39The United States military has long recognized that individual soldiers are obligated to follow the lawful orders of their superiors in fact soldiers must swear that they will do so40The military also recognizes that following illegal or unlawful orders is not acceptable The so-called Nuremberg defensemdashthat one is not accountable for onersquos actions if merely following ordersmdashis not acceptable The question for intelligence professionals is whether they have the same kinds of obligationsIn the authorsrsquo view government servants whether military or civilian have an obligation to tell their superiors about matters they consider illegal immoral or ill-conceived If in the judgment of the superior the questionable order must stand the junior official has the choice of carrying out the unacceptable order appealing to a higher authority or ultimately resigningWhat is not possible in the realm of intelligencemdashalthough it might be possible in other areas of United States government servicemdashis to lsquolsquogo publicrsquorsquo with the issue in question Intelligence officials have the obligation to keep secret issues properly classified and thus public discussion is not possible without a gross violation of classification rules and the professional ethics of the intelligence officer41In reality such ethical disputes rarely arise As in most enterprises superiors want to develop the loyalty and trust of their juniors and also want to be advised when things seem to be going awry Thus strong disagreement often leads to compromise rather than confrontation

CONCLUSIONEthics and morality in intelligence are integral parts of operating a secret intelligence service in a free democratic and moral society A free democratic government has the obligation to protect the interests and security of the people it serves If the world were perfect intelligence operations would be unnecessary Given the depravity of the world

14

around us however free societies have no choice but to engage in intelligence activities if they are to remain free

Bibliografie

Instrumente web

1 httpethicsiiteducodes

Carti

1 JAN Goldman Ethics of Spying A reader for the intelligence professional Editura Scarecrow Press Oxford 2006

2 IONEL Nitu Ghidul Analistului de Intelligence Editura Academiei Nationale de Informatii Mihai Viteazul Bucuresti 2011

15

Some authors have used the existing literature on just war theory to establish a moral basis for clandestine intelligence operations10 Although just war theory is concerned with permissible acts of the state during wartime some aspects of the theory may indeed contribute to our understanding of the morality of peacetime covert intelligence activitiesJust war theory posits that there are times when conflict is morally justified It painfully seeks to discern the difference between a just and an unjust cause Simply defined a just war is a conflict that is fought either in selfdefense or in collective defense against an armed attack There is an assumption that the opposing party is in the wrong and that its attack is unjustifiedOf course there are numerous examples of conflicts in which both sides claimed to be the morally correct party and accused the other of aggression11 It is important to emphasize that the function of just war theory is not to justify warfare itself but rather to judge conflicts The standard method under the theory is to lay down common criteria by which to measure wars The criteria encompass intentions as well as the actual acts and consequences of wars One can successfully incorporate intelligence activitymdashboth espionage and covert interference with internal affairs of foreign nationsmdashunder the penumbra of just war theory if one understands that governments use such activities as a means for government survival

MORAL CONSIDERATIONS CONFRONTING THE INDIVIDUAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERHaving explored the moral constructs that support an intelligence system as a whole we now examine the ethical considerations that confront the individual intelligence officer Are these considerations different from what they would be for other civil servants military officers or members of the private sectorEthics are often defined as behavior relating to professional standards of conduct As in any other profession such standards exist in the field of intelligence even if these standards require behavior that is unacceptable for private citizens Dr David Hunter has argued that lsquolsquofor intelligence professionals to disregard the national values they are committed to defend is to ignore the fundamental reason for being in the gamersquorsquo33 Indeed American intelligence agencies are required by executive order to collect information in a manner that is lsquolsquorespectful of the principles on which the United Stateswas foundedrsquorsquo34There are several key differences between intelligence professionals and their counterparts in other areas of government service or private business Professional standards require intelligence professionals to lie hide information or use covert tactics to protect their lsquolsquocoverrsquorsquo access sources and responsibilities The Central Intelligence Agency expects teaches encourages and controls these tactics so that the lies are consistent and supported (lsquolsquobackstoppedrsquorsquo) The CIA expects intelligence officers to teach others to lie deceive steal launder money and perform a variety of other activities that would certainly be illegal if practiced in the United States They call these tactics lsquolsquotradecraftrsquorsquo and intelligence officers practice them in all the worldrsquos intelligence services35In other contexts intelligence officers must be as honest and forthright as those who work in the private sector or other parts of government Intelligence officers must always

13

tell the truth about their activities to their superiors Otherwise they may find themselves suspected of betraying the organization to which they owe their loyalty Honesty is especially important in intelligence because many officers operate in settings where theiractions cannot be observed36Intelligence analysts must never alter intelligence judgments to fit the desires of policymakers who might prefer different conclusions Forcing the facts to fit policy warps the purpose of intelligence operations37 Intelligence officers must be scrupulous in managing funds or equipment with which they are entrusted Care in this area is especially important because funds are often lsquolsquounvoucheredrsquorsquo (not subject to outside audit) and equipment is deliberately designed to prevent its identification with the officer or service concerned38Intelligence officers must give up certain rights of privacy so that they may be trusted with secrets They are subject to examinations of their private and professional activities during their careers and must accept some restrictions on their behavior even after leaving the service for example they must continue to protect secrets they learned while on duty39The United States military has long recognized that individual soldiers are obligated to follow the lawful orders of their superiors in fact soldiers must swear that they will do so40The military also recognizes that following illegal or unlawful orders is not acceptable The so-called Nuremberg defensemdashthat one is not accountable for onersquos actions if merely following ordersmdashis not acceptable The question for intelligence professionals is whether they have the same kinds of obligationsIn the authorsrsquo view government servants whether military or civilian have an obligation to tell their superiors about matters they consider illegal immoral or ill-conceived If in the judgment of the superior the questionable order must stand the junior official has the choice of carrying out the unacceptable order appealing to a higher authority or ultimately resigningWhat is not possible in the realm of intelligencemdashalthough it might be possible in other areas of United States government servicemdashis to lsquolsquogo publicrsquorsquo with the issue in question Intelligence officials have the obligation to keep secret issues properly classified and thus public discussion is not possible without a gross violation of classification rules and the professional ethics of the intelligence officer41In reality such ethical disputes rarely arise As in most enterprises superiors want to develop the loyalty and trust of their juniors and also want to be advised when things seem to be going awry Thus strong disagreement often leads to compromise rather than confrontation

CONCLUSIONEthics and morality in intelligence are integral parts of operating a secret intelligence service in a free democratic and moral society A free democratic government has the obligation to protect the interests and security of the people it serves If the world were perfect intelligence operations would be unnecessary Given the depravity of the world

14

around us however free societies have no choice but to engage in intelligence activities if they are to remain free

Bibliografie

Instrumente web

1 httpethicsiiteducodes

Carti

1 JAN Goldman Ethics of Spying A reader for the intelligence professional Editura Scarecrow Press Oxford 2006

2 IONEL Nitu Ghidul Analistului de Intelligence Editura Academiei Nationale de Informatii Mihai Viteazul Bucuresti 2011

15

tell the truth about their activities to their superiors Otherwise they may find themselves suspected of betraying the organization to which they owe their loyalty Honesty is especially important in intelligence because many officers operate in settings where theiractions cannot be observed36Intelligence analysts must never alter intelligence judgments to fit the desires of policymakers who might prefer different conclusions Forcing the facts to fit policy warps the purpose of intelligence operations37 Intelligence officers must be scrupulous in managing funds or equipment with which they are entrusted Care in this area is especially important because funds are often lsquolsquounvoucheredrsquorsquo (not subject to outside audit) and equipment is deliberately designed to prevent its identification with the officer or service concerned38Intelligence officers must give up certain rights of privacy so that they may be trusted with secrets They are subject to examinations of their private and professional activities during their careers and must accept some restrictions on their behavior even after leaving the service for example they must continue to protect secrets they learned while on duty39The United States military has long recognized that individual soldiers are obligated to follow the lawful orders of their superiors in fact soldiers must swear that they will do so40The military also recognizes that following illegal or unlawful orders is not acceptable The so-called Nuremberg defensemdashthat one is not accountable for onersquos actions if merely following ordersmdashis not acceptable The question for intelligence professionals is whether they have the same kinds of obligationsIn the authorsrsquo view government servants whether military or civilian have an obligation to tell their superiors about matters they consider illegal immoral or ill-conceived If in the judgment of the superior the questionable order must stand the junior official has the choice of carrying out the unacceptable order appealing to a higher authority or ultimately resigningWhat is not possible in the realm of intelligencemdashalthough it might be possible in other areas of United States government servicemdashis to lsquolsquogo publicrsquorsquo with the issue in question Intelligence officials have the obligation to keep secret issues properly classified and thus public discussion is not possible without a gross violation of classification rules and the professional ethics of the intelligence officer41In reality such ethical disputes rarely arise As in most enterprises superiors want to develop the loyalty and trust of their juniors and also want to be advised when things seem to be going awry Thus strong disagreement often leads to compromise rather than confrontation

CONCLUSIONEthics and morality in intelligence are integral parts of operating a secret intelligence service in a free democratic and moral society A free democratic government has the obligation to protect the interests and security of the people it serves If the world were perfect intelligence operations would be unnecessary Given the depravity of the world

14

around us however free societies have no choice but to engage in intelligence activities if they are to remain free

Bibliografie

Instrumente web

1 httpethicsiiteducodes

Carti

1 JAN Goldman Ethics of Spying A reader for the intelligence professional Editura Scarecrow Press Oxford 2006

2 IONEL Nitu Ghidul Analistului de Intelligence Editura Academiei Nationale de Informatii Mihai Viteazul Bucuresti 2011

15

around us however free societies have no choice but to engage in intelligence activities if they are to remain free

Bibliografie

Instrumente web

1 httpethicsiiteducodes

Carti

1 JAN Goldman Ethics of Spying A reader for the intelligence professional Editura Scarecrow Press Oxford 2006

2 IONEL Nitu Ghidul Analistului de Intelligence Editura Academiei Nationale de Informatii Mihai Viteazul Bucuresti 2011

15

3 STEVEN M Stigal A strategy framework for the Intelligence Analyst Studies in Intelligence Vol 56 nr 3 September 2012 disponibil online pe httpswwwciagovlibrarycenter-for-the-study-of-intelligencecsi-publicationscsi-studiesstudiesvol-56-no-3a-strategy-framework-for-the-intelligence-analysthtml accesat in 22122012

16