3. Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank versus Felonia (GR no. 189477,Feb. 26, 2014)

FACTS:Felonia and De Guzman mortgaged a parcel of land to Delgado tosecure a loan. However, instead of a real estate mortgage, the partiesexecuted a deed of absolute sale with an option to repurchase thusFelonia and De Guzman filed an action for reformation of instrument.

Inspite of the pendency of the Reformation case in which she was thedefendant, Delgado filed a Petition for Consolidation of Ownership ofProperty Sold with an Option to Repurchase and Issuance of a NewCertificate of Title. The RTC declared Delgado the absolute owner andordered the Registry of Deeds to issue a new certificate of title in thename of Delgado.

Delgado mortgage the property to Homeowners Savings and LoanBank (HSLB) using her newly registered title. Felonia and De Guzmansubsequently caused the annotation of a notice of lispendens onDelgados title. On November 1997, HLRB foreclosed the property andlater consolidated ownership in its favor.

Felonia and De Guzman instituted a complaint before RTC of Las Pinasfor reconveyance of possession and ownership of the subject propertyin their favor. As defendant, HLRC contended that it was a mortgageein good faith. RTC ruled in favor of Felonia and De Guzman. CA affirmedthe RTC decision

ISSUE: Whether or not HSLB is a mortgagee and a purchaser in goodfaith

HELD: No. Decision of CA sustained.

Although the doctrine of mortgagee in good faith, upon whichpetitioner relies, was clarified as "based on the rule that all personsdealing with property covered by the Torrens Certificate of Title, asbuyers or mortgagees, are not required to go beyond what appears onthe face of the title. In turn, the rule is based on public interest inupholding the indefeasibility of a certificate of title, as evidence oflawful ownership of the land or of any encumbrance thereon."

Insofar as the HSLB is concerned, there is no longer any public interestin upholding the indefeasibility of the certificate of title of itsmortgagor, Delgado. Such title has been nullified in a decision that had

become final and executory. Its own title, derived from the foreclosureof Delgado's mortgage in its favor, has likewise been nullified in thevery same decision that restored the certificate of title in respondents'name. There is absolutely no reason that can support the prayer ofHSLB to have its mortgage lien carried over and into the restoredcertificate of title of respondents.

Moreover , HSLB utterly failed to take the necessary precautions. Atthe time the subject property was mortgaged, there was yet noannotated Notice ofLis Pendens. However, at the time HSLB purchasedthe subject property, the Notice ofLis Pendenswas already annotatedon the title. When a prospective buyer is faced with facts andcircumstances as to arouse his suspicion, he must take precautionarysteps to qualify as a purchaser in good faith.

Indeed, at the time HSLB bought the subject property, HSLB had actualknowledge of the annotated Notice of Lis Pendens. Instead of heedingthe same, HSLB continued with the purchase knowing the legalrepercussions a notice of lis pendens details.

4. PINAUSUKAN SEAFOOD HOUSE, ROXAS BOULEY ARD, INC., Petitioner, vs.

FAR EAST BANK & TRUST COMPANY, NOW BANK OF THE PHILIPPINEISLANDS AND HECTOR I. GALURA

Facts: Bonier, then the President of petitioner corporation (Pinausukan),executed four real estate mortgages in favor of Far East Bank and TrustCompany (now BPI) which was registered in name of Pinausukan. AfterPinausukan defaulted, bank commenced proceedings for theextrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgages. Pinausukan brought anaction for the annulment of real estate mortgages in the RTC, averringthat Bonier had obtained the loans only in his personal capacity andhad constituted the mortgages on the corporate asset withoutPinausukan’s consent through a board resolution.

The counsels of the parties did not appear in court on the hearingscheduled. RTC dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. The orderof dismissal attained finality. Pinausukan brought the petition forannulment in the CA seeking the nullification of the order dismissingthe Civil Case salleging that its counsel had been guilty of gross andpalpable negligence in failing to keep track of the case he was handlingamounting to extrinsic fraud. CA dismissed the petition for annulment.

Issues: (a) WON counsel’s failure to apprise Pinausukan of thedevelopments in the case constitutes extrinsic fraud.

(b) WON it is the CA that has jurisdiction over an action to annul thejudgment.

Held:

(a)The allegations do not speak of the extrinsic fraud contemplated byRule 47. The petition suggests that the negligence of counsel mayconstitute professional misconduct (but this is a matter for lawyer andclient to resolve). What is certain, for purposes of the application ofRule 47, is that mistake and gross negligence cannot be equated to theextrinsic fraud that Rule 47 requires to be the ground for an annulmentof judgment.

By its very nature, extrinsic fraud relates to a cause that is collateral incharacter. Even in the presence of fraud, annulment will not lie unlessthe fraud is committed by the adverse party, not by one’s own lawyer.In the latter case, the remedy of the client is to proceed against hisown lawyer and not to re-litigate the case where judgment had beenrendered.

(b) The Legislature has enacted Batas Pambansa Blg.129 (JudiciaryReorganization Act of 1980). Among several innovations of thislegislative enactment was the formal establishment of the annulmentof a judgment or final order as an action independent from the genericclassification of litigations in which the subject matter was not capableof pecuniary estimation, and expressly vested the exclusive originaljurisdiction over such action in the CA. The action in which the subjectof the litigation was incapable of pecuniary estimation continued to beunder the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC, which replaced theCFI as the court of general jurisdiction. Since then, the RTC no longerhad jurisdiction over an action to annul the judgment of the RTC,eliminating all concerns about judicial stability. To implement thischange, the Court introduced a new procedure to govern the action toannul the judgment of the RTC in the 1997 revision of the Rules ofCourt under Rule 47, directing in Section 2 thereof that the annulmentmay be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack ofjurisdiction.

5G.R. No. 199595 April 2, 2014PHILIPPINE WOMAN'S CHRISTIAN TEMPERANCE UNION,INC., Petitioner, vs.TEODORO R. YANGCO 2ND AND 3RD GENERATION HEIRSFOUNDATION, INC., Respondent.

Facts:Philanthropist Teodoro R. Yangco (Yangco) donated on May 19, 1934 a14,073-square meter parcel of land (subject property) located at 21Boni Serrano Avenue, Quezon City in the following manner,8 viz:

a) the property shall be used as a site for an institution to beknown as the Abierrtas House of Friendship the purpose of whichshall be to provide a Home for needy and unfortunate womenand girls, including children of both sexes and promote, foster allefforts, work and activities looking toward their protection fromthe ravages of all forms of immoralities;b) Should the property herein be used for any other purpose orpurposes not herein specified, the present gift shall become ipsofacto null and void and property given shall automatically revertto the donor, his heirs and assigns, but any improvement orimprovements placed, constructed and/or maintained on saidpremises by the Donee, shall remain the property of said Doneeto be by it removed there[f]rom (sic) at its expense afterreasonable notice from the donor, his heirs and assigns.9

The property was registered in the name of PWCTUI by virtue of TCT No. 20970 at the back of which the above-quoted conditions of the donation were annotated. PWCTUI is a non-stock, non-profit corporation originally registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1929.PWCTUI’s corporate term expired in September 1979.11 Five yearsthereafter, using the same corporate name, PWCTUI obtained SECRegistration No. 12208812 and forthwith applied for the issuance of anew owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 20970 over the subject propertythru LRC Case No. 22702. The application was granted and PWCTUIwas issued a new TCT No. 20970 T-2270213 which, however, bore onlythe first condition imposed on the donation.Recounting the foregoing episodes, TRY Foundation claimed that the expiration of PWCTUI’s corporate term in 1979 effectively rescinded the donation pursuant to the "unwritten resolutory condition" deemed written by Article 1315 of the Civil Code14 prescribing that the Corporation Code, specifically Section 12215 thereof, be read into the donation.Being comprised of the heirs of the donor, TRY Foundation claimed thatit is entitled to petition for the issuance of a new title in their name

pursuant to Section 108 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529.16 TRY Foundation prayed for the issuance of a new title in its name after the cancellation of PWCTUI’s TCT No. 20970 T-22702.PWCTUI opposed the petition.RTC denied the Opposition18 of PWCTUI. According to the trial court, when the corporate life of PWCTUI expired in 1979, the property ceased to be used for the purpose for which it was intended, hence, it automatically reverted to Yangco. As such, TRY Foundation, being composed of his heirs, is considered "other person in interest" under Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 with a right to file a petition for the issuance of title over the property.The RTC granted TRY Foundation’s petition by ordering the cancellationof PWCTUI’s TCT No. 20970 T-22702 and the issuance of a new title inthe name of TRY Foundation. PWCTUI appealed the decision but CAdenied the appeal and the assailed decision was affirmed in toto.

Issue:WON the judgment was proper.

Ruling:the RTC, acting as a land registration court, had no jurisdiction over theactual subject matter contained in TRY Foundation’s petition forissuance of a new title. TRY Foundation cannot use the summaryproceedings in Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 to rescind a contract ofdonation as such action should be threshed out in ordinary civilproceedings. In the same vein, the RTC had no jurisdiction to declarethe donation annulled and as a result thereof, order the register ofdeeds to cancel PWCTUI’s TCT No. 20970 T-22702 and issue a new onein favor of TRY Foundation.The RTC, acting as a land registration court, should have dismissed theland registration case or re-docketed the same as an ordinary civilaction and thereafter ordered compliance with stricter jurisdictionalrequirements. Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action forrevocation of donation disguised as a land registration case, thejudgment in LRC Case No. Q-18126(04) is null and void. Being void, itcannot be the source of any right or the creator of any obligation. Itcan never become final and any writ of execution based on it islikewise void.48 Resultantly, the appellate proceedings relative thereto and allissuances made in connection with such review are likewise of no forceand effect. A void judgment cannot perpetuate even if affirmed onappeal by the highest court of the land. All acts pursuant to it and allclaims emanating from it have no legal effect.50

the petition is GRANTED and All proceedings taken, decisions,resolutions, orders and other issuances made in LRC Case No. Q-

18126(04), CA-G.R. CV No. 90763 and G.R. No. 190193 are herebyANNULLED and SET ASIDE.The Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ORDERED to CANCELany Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of Teodoro R. Yangco2nd and 3rd Generation Heirs Foundation, Inc. as a consequence of theexecution of the disposition in LRC Case No. Q-18126(04), and toREINSTATE Transfer Certificate of Title No. 20970 T-22702 in the nameof Philippine Woman’s Christian Temperance Union, Inc.

6G.R. No. 182908 August 6, 2014HEIRS OF FRANCISCO I. NARVASA, SR., and HEIRS OF PETRAIMBORNAL and PEDRO FERRER, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact, MRS. REMEDIOS B. NARVASA-REGACHO, Petitioners, vs.EMILIANA, VICTORIANO, FELIPE, MA TEO, RAYMUNDO, MARIA,and EDUARDO, all surnamed IMBORNAL,Respondents.

Facts:Basilia owned a parcel of land situated at Sabangan, Pangasinan which she conveyed to her three (3) daughters Balbina, Alejandra, and Catalina (Imbornal sisters) sometime in 1920.

Meanwhile, Catalina’s husband, Ciriaco Abrio (Ciriaco), applied for andwas granted a homestead patent over a 31,367-sq. m. riparian land(Motherland) adjacent to the Cayanga River in San Fabian,Pangasinan.14 He was eventually awarded Homestead Patent No.2499115 therefor, and, on December 5, 1933, OCT No. 1462 was issuedin his name. Later, or on May 10, 1973, OCT No. 1462 was cancelled,and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 10149516 was issued in thename of Ciriaco’s heirs, namely: Margarita Mejia; Rodrigo Abrio,marriedto Rosita Corpuz; Antonio Abrio, married to Crisenta Corpuz;Remedios Abrio, married to Leopoldo Corpuz; Pepito Abrio; DominadorAbrio; Francisca Abrio; Violeta Abrio; and Perla Abrio (Heirs of Ciriaco).

Ciriaco and his heirs had since occupied the northern portion of theMotherland, while respondents occupied the southern portion.17

Sometime in 1949, the First Accretion, approximately 59,772 sq. m. in area, adjoined the southern portion of the Motherland. On August 15, 1952, OCT No. P-318 was issued in the name of respondent Victoriano, married to Esperanza Narvarte, covering the First Accretion.18 Decades later, or in 1971, the Second Accretion, which had an area of 32,307 sq. m., more or less, abutted the First Accretion on its southern

portion.19 On November 10, 1978, OCT No. 21481 was issued in the names of all the respondents covering the Second Accretion.Claiming rights over the entire Motherland, Francisco, et al., as the children of Alejandra and Balbina, filed on February 27,1984 an Amended Complaint20 for reconveyance, partition, and/or damages against respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. D-6978. They anchored their claim on the allegation that Ciriaco, with the help of his wife Catalina, urged Balbina and Alejandra to sell the Sabangan property.

Likewise, Francisco, et al. alleged that through deceit, fraud, falsehood,and misrepresentation, respondent Victoriano, with respect to the FirstAccretion, and the respondents collectively, with regard to the SecondAccretion, had illegally registered the said accretions in their names,notwithstanding the fact that they were not the riparian owners (asthey did not own the Motherland to which the accretions merelyformed adjacent to). In this relation, Francisco, et al. explained thatthey did not assert their inheritance claims over the Motherland andthe two (2) accretions because they respected respondents’ rights,until they discovered in 1983 that respondents have repudiated their(Francisco, et al.’s) shares thereon.22 Thus, bewailing that respondentshave refused them their rights not only with respect to the Motherland,but also to the subsequent accretions, Francisco, et al. prayed for thereconveyance of said properties, or, in the alternative, the payment oftheir value, as well as the award of moral damages in the amountof P100,000.00, actual damages in the amount of P150,000.00,including attorney’s fees and other costs.23

On August 20, 1996, the RTC rendered a Decision26 in favor ofFrancisco, et al. and thereby directed respondents to: (a) reconvey toFrancisco, et al. their respective portions in the Motherland and in theaccretions thereon, or their pecuniary equivalent; and (b) pay actualdamages in the amount of P100,000.00, moral damages in the amountofP100,000.00, and attorney’s fees in the sum of P10,000.00, as wellas costs of suit.On November 28, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision29 reversing andsetting aside the RTC Decision and entering a new one declaring: (a)the descendants of Ciriaco as the exclusive owners of the Motherland;(b) the descendants of respondent Victoriano asthe exclusive owners ofthe First Accretion; and (c) the descendants of Pablo (i.e., respondentscollectively) as the exclusive owners of the Second Accretion.At odds with the CA’s disposition, Francisco et al. filed a motion forreconsideration which was, however denied by the CA in aResolution35 dated May 7, 2008, hence, this petition taken by thelatter’s heirs as their successors-in-interest.

Issues:

(a) WON the descendants of Ciriaco are the exclusive owners of the Motherland; (b) WON the descendants of respondent Victoriano are theexclusive owners of the First Accretion; and (c) WON the descendants of Pablo (respondents collectively) are the exclusive owners of the Second Accretion on the basis of the following grounds: (1) prescription of the reconveyance action, which was duly raised as an affirmative defense in the Amended Answer, and (2) the existence of an implied trust between the Imbornal sisters and Ciriaco.

Ruling:The petition is bereft of merit.A. Procedural Matter: Issue of Prescription.At the outset, the Court finds that the causes of action pertaining tothe Motherland and the First Accretion are barred by prescription.To recount, Francisco, et al. asserted co-ownership over the Motherland, alleging that Ciriaco agreed to hold the same in trust for their predecessors-in-interest Alejandra and Balbina upon issuance of the title in his name. Likewise, they alleged that respondents acquired the First and Second Accretions by means of fraud and deceit.

When property is registered in another’s name, an implied or constructive trust is created by law in favor of the true owner.

An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in 10 years. The reference point of the 10-yearprescriptive period is the date of registration of the deed or the issuance of the title. The prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. However, if the plaintiff, as the real owner of the property also remains in possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the property does not run against him.

Based on the foregoing, Francisco, et al. had then a period of ten (10) years from the registration of the respective titles covering the disputed properties within which to file their action for reconveyance, taking into account the fact that they were never in possession of the said properties. Hence, with respect tot he Motherland covered by OCT No. 1462 issued on December 5, 1933 in the name of Ciriaco, an actionfor reconveyance therefor should have been filed until December 5, 1943; with respect to the First Accretion covered by OCT No. P-318 issued on August 15, 1952 in the name of respondent Victoriano, an action of the same nature should have been filed until August 15, 1962; and, finally, with respect to the Second Accretion covered by OCT No. 21481 issued on November 10, 1978in the name of the

respondents, a suit for reconveyance therefor should have been filed until November 10, 1988.

A judicious perusal of the records, however, will show that the Amended Complaint42 covering all three (3) disputed properties was filed only on February 27, 1984. As such, it was filed way beyond the 10-year reglementary period within which to seek the reconveyance of two (2) of these properties, namely, the Motherland and the First Accretion, with only the reconveyance action with respect to the Second Accretion having been seasonably filed.

B. Substantive Matter: Existence of an Implied Trust.

The main thrust of Francisco, et al.’s Amended Complaint is that an implied trust had arisen between the Imbornal sisters, on the one hand, and Ciriaco, on the other, with respect to the Motherland.

a homestead patent award requires proof that the applicant meets the stringent conditions48 set forth under Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, which includes actual possession, cultivation, and improvement of the homestead. It must be presumed, therefore, that Ciriaco underwent the rigid process and duly satisfied the strict conditions necessary for the grant of his homestead patent application.As such, it is highly implausible that the Motherland had been acquiredand registered by mistake or through fraud as would create an implied trust between the Imbornal sisters and Ciriaco.

Hence, when OCT No. 1462 covering the Motherland was issued in his name pursuant to Homestead Patent No. 24991 on December 15, 1933, Ciriaco’s title to the Motherland had become indefeasible. It bears to stress that the proceedings for land registration that led to theissuance of Homestead Patent No. 24991 and eventually, OCT No. 1462 in Ciriaco’s name are presumptively regular and proper,49 which presumption has not been overcome by the evidence presented by Francisco, et al.

Consequently, as Francisco, et al. failed to prove their ownership rightsover the Motherland, their cause of action with respect to the FirstAccretion and, necessarily, the Second Accretion, must likewise fail. Afurther exposition is apropos.

As regards the third issue, being the owner of the land adjoining the foreshore area, respondent is the riparian or littoral owner who has preferential right to lease the foreshore area.Accordingly, therefore, alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek or ariver do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property

automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may havebeen added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the ownerof the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrenssystem; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisitionthrough prescription by third persons.53

In this case, Francisco, et al. and, now, their heirs, i.e., herein petitioners are not the riparian owners of the Motherland to which the First Accretion had attached, hence, they cannot assert ownership overthe First Accretion. Consequently, as the Second Accretion had merely attached to the First Accretion, they also have no right over the SecondAccretion. Neither were they able to show that they acquired these properties through prescription as it was ·not established that they were in possession of any of them. Therefore, whether through accretion or, independently, through prescription, the discernible conclusion is that Francisco et al. and/or petitioners' claim of title over the First and Second Accretions had not been substantiated, and, as a result, said properties cannot be reconveyed in their favor. This is especially so since on the other end of the fray lie respondents armed with a certificate of title in their names covering the First and Second Accretions coupled with their possession thereof, both of which give rise to the superior credibility of their own claim. Hence, petitioners' action for reconveyance with respect to both accretions must altogether fail.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

11.

G.R. No. 202805, March 23, 2015ROSARIO BANGUIS­TAMBUYAT, Petitioner, v. WENIFREDA BALCOM­TAMBUYAT, Respondent. D EC I S I O NDEL CASTILLO, J.: 

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the February 14, 2012 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 84954 affirming with modification the May 26, 2003 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10 in LRC Case No. P-443-99, as well as its July 26, 2012 Resolution4 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration5 of the herein assailed judgment.

Factual Antecedents 

Adriano M. Tambuyat (Adriano) and respondent Wenifreda Balcom-Tambuyat (Wenifreda) were married

on September 16, 1965.6 During their marriage, Adriano acquired several real properties, including a 700-

square meter parcel of land located at Barangay Muzon, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan (the subject

property),7 which was bought on November 17, 1991.8 The deed of sale over the said property was signed by Adriano alone as vendee; one of the signing witnesses to the deed of sale was petitioner

Rosario Banguis-Tambuyat (Banguis), who signed therein as “Rosario Banguis.”9 When Transfer

Certificate of Title No. T-145321(M) (TCT T-145321) covering the subject property was issued, however,

it was made under the name of “ADRIANO M. TAMBUYAT married to ROSARIO E. BANGUIS.”10

All this time, petitioner Banguis remained married to Eduardo Nolasco (Nolasco). They were married on

October 15, 1975, and at all times material to this case, Nolasco was alive, and his marriage to petitioner

subsisted and was never annulled.11

On June 7, 1998, Adriano died intestate.12

On October 18, 1999, Wenifreda filed a Petition for Cancellation13 of TCT T-145321, which was docketed as LRC Case No. P-443-99 and assigned to Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan (Malolos RTC).

She alleged therein that she was the surviving spouse of Adriano; that TCTT-145321

was erroneously registered and made in the name of “ADRIANO M. TAMBUYAT married to ROSARIO E.

BANGUIS

;” that

per annexed Marriage Contract, Banguis was still married to Nolasco; that Banguis could

not have been married to Adriano;

that the issuance of the title in Banguis’s name as Adriano’s spouse was due to “an insidious machination by her and the person who brokered the sale of the subject

property, allegedly a cousin or relative of hers;”14 and that consequently, she suffered damages. Thus,

Wenifreda prayed that TCT T-145321 be cancelled; that a new certificate oftitle be made out in Adriano’s

name, with her as the spouse indicated;

that Banguis be ordered to surrender her copy of TCT T-145321; and that moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of litigation be adjudged in her favor.

In her Opposition15 to the petition for cancellation,

Banguis denied specifically that the subject property

was acquired by Adriano and Wenifreda

during their marriage. alone bought the subject property using her personalfunds; that

that on the other hand, she

that their union produced a son, who was born on April 1, 1990; that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the petition for cancellation,

which is merely a summary proceeding – considering that a thorough determination will have to be made as to whether the property is conjugal or exclusive property, and since she and Adriano have a child whose rights will be adversely affected by any judgment in the case; and that Wenifreda is guilty of forum- shopping in filing LRC Case No. P-443-99, considering that a prior similar case was already filed by her and dismissed on April 22,1999 by Branch 76 of the Malolos RTC. Banguis prayed for the dismissal ofLRC Case No. P-443-99 and to be paid moral damages and attorney’s feesby way of counterclaim.

During the course of the proceedings, the parties presented the following evidence, among others:

She claimed

September 2, 1988 and thereafter lived together as a married couple;

she and Adriano were married on

1.Marriage Contract of Adriano and Wenifreda;16

2.Publication of Adriano’s death;17

3.Social Security System (SSS) data record of Adriano indicating that Wenifreda is his spouse;

4.Barangay Council Certificate indicating that Adriano and Wenifreda were legally married and residents of No. 13 Hyacinth Road, Phase V, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City since 1981;19

5.Marriage Contract of Banguis and Nolasco dated October 15, 1975;20

6.Banguis’s SSS Member’s Data Change or Addition Report indicating that Banguis: a) sought to change her name from “Rosario E. Banguis” to “Rosario B. Nolasco”; b) listed Nolasco as her husband; and c) changed her civil status to “married;”

7.Banguis’s correspondence at work – Ocean East Agency Corporation (Ocean East), which was owned and operated by Adriano – in

which she signed as “Rosario B. Nolasco;”22

8.Banguis’s résumé on file with Ocean East, reflecting that she was married;23

9.Negative Certification of Marriage issued by the Civil Registrar of Bulacan to the effect that the Civil Register does not have any recordof Adriano and Banguis’s marriage which was supposedly solemnized on September 2, 1988;

10. Certification dated April 17, 2002 issued by Rev. Fr. Narciso Sampana, Parish Priest of St. Joseph Parish, to the effect that the parish never had a parish priest by the name of Fr. Roberto de Guzman – who is claimed to have solemnized the alleged marriage between Adriano and Banguis;25

11. Banguis’s testimony on direct examination that she and Adriano were married on September 2, 1988; that they had a son named Adrian; that Adriano purchased the subject property on November 17, 1991 per Deed of Sale – executed in Manila and with Adriano as the purchaser – entered as “Document No. 173; Page No. 3550; series of 1990” in the notarial registry of Mr. Julian B.Tubig; that she paid for the same with her own money; and that she stayed at the subject property each Friday night up to Sundaynight;26

12. Banguis’s testimony on cross-examination that she is married to Nolasco, who is still alive; that her marriage to the latter is still subsisting and has not been annulled; and that she knew that Adriano was married to someone else;

13. Photographs depicting Adriano and Banguis as a couple and with a child, supposedly taken at the subject property.

On May 26, 2003, the Malolos RTC rendered its Decision, decreeing thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby RENDERED in favor of the petitioner herein, as follows:

1.Directing the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan to cancel TCT No. T-145321 (M) and in lieu thereof to issue a new certificate of titlein the name of Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Wenifreda “Winnie” Balcom Tambuyat;

2.Directing the defendant Rosario Banguis Nolasco of 1714 Ibarra St., Sampaloc, Manila to surrender to the Register of Deeds for Meycauayan, Bulacan, the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT

No. T-145321 (M) within five (5) days from receipt of the order, failing which

the Register of Deeds should proceed with the cancellation of said TCT.

3.Directing defendant Rosario Banguis Nolasco to pay petitioner the sum of P100,000.00 as and by way of moral damages.

4.Directing defendant Rosario Banguis Nolasco to pay petitioner the sum of P100,000.00 as and by way of exemplary damages; and

5.Directing defendant Rosario Banguis Nolasco to pay petitioner attorney’s fees in the amount of P100,000.00, and the cost of suit.

Accordingly, the counterclaim of the oppositor is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

In arriving at the above pronouncement, the trial court held among others that under Section 112 of Act No. 496 or the Land Registration Act – now Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529) or the Property Registration Decreeauthorization is required for any alteration or amendment of a certificate of title when any error, omission or mistake was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate certificate, or when there is reasonable ground for the amendment or alteration of the title; that it has been established that Wenifreda is the surviving spouse of Adriano, and the subject property was acquired during their marriage, but it was erroneously registered in the name of another; that Banguis had a subsisting marriage with Nolasco when TCT T-145321 was issued with her being erroneously included and referred to therein as Adriano’s spouse; that Adrian’s filiation may not be proved collaterally through LRC Case No. P-443-99; that Wenifreda is entitled to an award of moral and exemplary damages without proof of pecuniary loss, for the damage caused upon her reputation and social standing caused by the wanton, fraudulent, malicious and unwarranted inclusion of Banguis’s name in the title; and that Wenifreda is likewise entitled to attorney’s fees as she was compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect her interests by reason of Banguis’s unjustified act.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals 

Petitioner appealed the trial court’s Decision with the CA. Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 84954, the appeal basically revolved around thethesis that the trial court erred in applying Section 108 of PD 1529; that with the serious objections raised by Banguis and considering that she is the actual owner and possessor of the subject property, a proper action in a different court exercising general jurisdiction should be filed, rather than in the current trial court which sits merely as a land registration court; that the trial court disregarded Article 148 of the Family Code31 which provides for the division of properties acquired by individuals united in a defective marriage; that the trialcourt erred in awarding damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit; that the trial court erred in granting execution pending appeal despite the absence of any good or special reasons; and that the denial of her counterclaim was improper.

Meanwhile, on October 30, 2003, Wenifreda moved for execution pending appeal. It appears that

Banguis failed to oppose the motion; she did not appear during the scheduled hearings on the motion as well. As a result, the trial court issued a March 30, 2004 Order directing the issuance of a Writ of Execution. Such writ was thus issued on April 14, 2004. TCT T-145321 was cancelled, and a new title – TCT T-433713(M) – was issued in its place.

On February 14, 2012, the CA issued the assailed Decision containing the following decretal portion:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 26, 2003 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 of Malolos, Bulacan is AFFIRMED with the modification that the award of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees andcost of the suit in favor of Wenifreda Tambuyat is hereby deleted.

SO ORDERED.33

The CA sustained the trial court’s application of Section 108 of PD 1529, noting that Banguis’s name was included in TCT T-145321 by error or mistake. It held that the evidence adduced proved that Wenifreda – and not Banguis – is the lawful wife of Adriano; that there is a valid and subsisting marriage between Nolasco and Banguis, and the latter admitted to such fact during the course of the proceedingsin the trial court; and that Banguis’s opposition to Wenifreda’s petition for cancellation of TCT T-145321 is not real and genuine as to place the latter’s title to the subject property in doubt.34

The CA added that contrary to Banguis’s position, a separate and different proceeding is not necessary to resolve her opposition to the petition in LRC Case No. P-443-99, as: 1) she in effect acquiesced and freely submitted her issues and concerns to the trial court for complete determination, submitting all her relevant documentary and other evidence to the court in order to prove her allegations – particularly that she is the lawful spouse of Adriano and that she is the actual owner and possessor of the subject

property; and 2) pursuant to law35 and jurisprudence,36 the distinction between the trial court sitting as a land registration court and as a court of general jurisdiction has been eliminated with the passage of PD 1529. It held further that, based on the evidence adduced, Adriano and Banguis are not co-owners of the subject property as it has been shown that: a) both of them had valid and subsisting marriages when they conducted their adulterous relations; b) Banguis failed to present even a modicum of evidence that she contributed to the purchase of the subject property; and c) the deed of sale itself indicated that Adriano alone was the vendee. Finally, indenying Wenifreda’s pecuniary awards and Banguis’s counterclaim, the CA held that the parties are not entitled thereto as there is no legal and factual basis to grant them.

Banguis moved for reconsideration, but in a July 26, 2012 Resolution, the CA was unconvinced. Hence, the present Petition.

Issues 

Banguis cites the following issues for resolution:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE RTC WHICH CANCELLED AND CORRECTED THE QUESTIONED ENTRY IN TCT NO. T-145321 (M) FROM “ROSARIO E. BANGUIS” TO “WENIFREDA ‘WINNIE’ BALCOM TAMBUYAT” UNDER SECTION 108 OFTHE PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE DESPITE THE LACK OF JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE SAME IN VIEW OF THE SERIOUS AND WEIGHTY OBJECTIONS OF THE PETITIONER AND THAT THE INSTITUTION OF ESTATE PROCEEDINGS OF THE LATE ADRIANO M. TAMBUYAT AND THE CONSEQUENT APPOINTMENT OF AN EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR WHICH IS THE PROPER REMEDY WHO CAN GO AFTER HIS PROPERTIES HELD BY OTHER PERSONS.

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE RTC WHICH CORRECTED AND CANCELLED THE QUESTIONED ENTRY IN TCT NO. T-145321 (M) IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 148 OF THE FAMILY CODE PROVIDING FOR THE SHARING OF PROPERTIES ACQUIRED BY PERSONS UNITED IN A DEFECTIVE MARRIAGE.

IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE RTC WHICH GRANTED THE IMMEDIATE EXECUTION OF ITS DECISION NOTWITHSTANDING THE SEASONABLE

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE RTC WHICH

CORRECTED AND CANCELLED THE QUESTIONED ENTRY IN TCT NO.T-145321 (M)

THROUGH AN ABSOLUTE AND COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE PROOF OF OWNERSHIP

AND POSSESSION BY THE PETITIONER OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.

APPEAL OF THE PETITIONER AND THE UTTER LACK OF ANY GOOD OR SPECIAL REASONS JUSTIFYING THE SAME.37

Petitioner’s Arguments 

In her Petition and Reply38 seeking to reverse and set aside the assailed CA dispositions and thus dismiss Wenifreda’s petition for cancellation in LRC Case No. P-443-99, Banguis insists on her original position adopted below that Section 108 of PD 1529 cannot apply in view of the contentious and controversial nature of her opposition to the petition for cancellation, which can be threshed out only in a separate proper proceeding where the court sits not merely as a land registration court, but as a court of general jurisdiction. She cites Tagaytay­Taal Tourist Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,39Liwag v. Court of Appeals,40 and Vda. de Arceo v. Court of Appeals,41 which made pronouncements to such effect.

Banguis adds that the instant case involved the partition of Adriano’s estatewhich in effect transfers the subject property to Wenifreda and thus divests

her and her son Adrian of their rights and interests therein; that based on the evidence she introduced, it should be concluded that the property belongs to her as it was acquired using solely her own funds and money borrowed from her sister, and because she has been in constant possession thereof, introducing improvements thereon through the years; that the subject property is owned in common by her and Adriano since it was acquired during their cohabitation; and that the CA erred in refusing to rule on the propriety of the trial court’s grant of execution pending appeal.

Respondent’s Arguments 

In Wenifreda’s Comment,42 it is stressed that the distinction between the trial court acting as a land registration court, on one hand, and its acting asa court of general jurisdiction, on the other, has been removed with the effectivity of PD 1529; thus, trial courts are no longer fettered by their former limited jurisdiction which enabled them to grant relief in land registration cases only when there is unanimity among the parties, or whennone of them raises any adverse claims or serious objections. It is further argued that Banguis’s claim of ownership cannot stand, for the evidence fails to indicate that she contributed to the purchase of the subject property,even as the deed of sale to the property itself shows that Adriano alone is the vendee thereof, and Banguis signed merely as a witness thereto. Finally, respondent explains that during the proceedings covering the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, Banguis wasaccorded the opportunity to participate, but she did not; as a result, the old title was cancelled and a new one was accordingly issued in its stead.

Our Ruling 

The Court denies the Petition.

The trial court in LRC Case No. P-443-99 was not precluded from resolvingthe objections raised by Banguis in her opposition to the petition for cancellation; a separate action need not be filed in a different

Under Section 108 of PD 1529, the proceeding for the erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate

of title may be resorted to

(3) when any error, omission or mistake

court exercising general jurisdiction. Banguis should be considered to haveacquiesced and freely submitted the case to the trial court for complete determination on her opposition, when she went to trial and adduced and submitted all her relevant evidence to the court. “The active participation ofthe party against whom the action was brought, coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the actionis pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or body’s jurisdiction.”43

in seven instances: (1) when registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased; (2) when new interests have

arisen or been created which do not appear upon the certificate;

was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon or on any duplicate certificate

; (4) when the name of any person on the certificate has been changed; (5)when the registered owner has been

married, or, registered as married, the marriage has been terminated and no right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; (6) when a corporation, which owned registered land and has been dissolved, has not conveyed the same within three years after its dissolution; and (7)

4

Proceedings under Section 108 are “summary in nature, contemplating corrections or insertions of mistakes which are only clerical but certainly not controversial issues.”45 Banguis’s opposition to the petition for cancellation ostensibly raised controversial issues involving her claimed ownership and the hereditary rights of Adrian, which she claims to be her

son by Adriano. However,

“Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis” when, in truth and infact, respondent Wenifreda –

and not Banguis – is Adriano’s lawful spouse.

evidence of Banguis’s ownership is irrelevant in Wenifreda’s petition, the evidence apparently indicates

is irrelevant and unnecessary to the complete determination of Wenifreda’s petition. The Court is thus led

when there is

reasonable ground for the amendment or alteration of title.4

where the Registrar of Deeds of Bulacan committed an error in issuing TCT T-145321 in the name of

The present case falls under (3) and (7),

apart from the fact that

that Banguis could not be the owner of the subject property, while a resolution of the issue of succession

to the conclusion that the Registrar of Deeds of Bulacan simply erred in including Banguis in TCT T-

145321 as Adriano’s spouse.

As correctly ruled by the appellate court, the preponderance of evidence points to the fact that Wenifreda is the legitimate spouse of Adriano. Documentary evidence – among others, the parties’ respective marriage contracts, which, together with marriage certificates, are considered the primary evidence of a marital union46 – indicates that Adriano was married

to Wenifreda, while Banguis was married to Nolasco – and both marriages were subsisting at the time of the acquisition of the subject property and issuance of the certificate of title thereto. Thus, it cannot be said that Adriano and Banguis were husband and wife to each other; it cannot even be said that they have a common-law relationship at all. Consequently, Banguis cannot be included or named in TCT T-145321 as Adriano’s spouse; the right and privilege belonged to Wenifreda alone.

x x x Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband andwife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally married in common law jurisdictions butnot in the Philippines.

While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in our society, and that they produce a communityof properties and interests which is governed by law, authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the manand woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contractmarriage. In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving Spouse and Children During Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated: “Be it noted however that with respect to ‘spouse’, the same must be the legitimate ‘spouse’ (not common-law spouses).”

There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term “spouse” embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto. But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at

bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a “spouse” contemplate a lawfullywedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.47 (Emphasis supplied)

The only issue that needed to be resolved in LRC Case No. P-443-99 is – who should be included in the

title to the subject property as Adriano’s spouse, Banguis or Wenifreda? Was there error in placing Banguis’s name in the title as Adriano’s spouse? If Banguis is Adriano’s spouse, then there would be no need to amend or even cancel the title. On the other hand, if Wenifreda is Adriano’s spouse, the inclusion of Banguis would then be erroneous, and TCT T-145321 would have to be cancelled. All that is required in resolving this issue is to determine who between them is Adriano’s spouse; it was unnecessary for Banguis to prove that she is the actual owner of the property. Title to the property is different from the certificate of title to it.

x x x. In Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals, the Court made a clear distinction between title and the certificate of title:The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). By title, the law refers to ownership which is represented by that document. Petitioner apparently confuses certificate with title. Placing a parcel of land under themantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land. Besides, the

certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. Mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. To repeat, registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used. x x x.Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title. Land registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what he actually has.48

Nonetheless, if Banguis felt that she had to go so far as to demonstrate that she is the true owner of the subject property in order to convince the trial court that there is no need to cancel TCT T-145321, then she was not precluded from presenting evidence to such effect. Understandably, with the quality of Wenifreda’s documentary and other evidence, Banguis may have felt obliged to prove that beyond the certificate of title, she actually owned the property. Unfortunately for her, this Court is not convinced of her claimed ownership; the view taken by the CA must be adopted that she and Adriano could not have been co-owners of the subject property as she failed to present sufficient proof that she contributed to the purchase of the subject property, while the deed of sale covering the subject property showed that Adriano alone was the vendee. This Court is not a trier of facts, so it must rely on the findings of facts of

the Court of Appeals, which are thus considered conclusive and binding.49 Moreover, the Court notes that while Banguis claims that she alone paid for the property using her own funds and money borrowed from her sister, she nonetheless acknowledges that Adriano is a co-owner thereof, thus implying that he contributed to its acquisition. Such contradictory statements cast serious doubts on her claim; basically, if she were the sole purchaser of the property, it would only be logical and natural for her to require that her name be placed on the deed of sale as the vendee, and not as mere witness – which is what actually occurred in this case. On the other hand, if Adrianocontributed to its purchase, Banguis would have required that her name be placed on the deed as a co-vendee just the same. Her failure to explain why – despite her claims that she is the purchaser of the property – she allowed Adriano to be denominated as the sole vendee, renders her claim of ownership doubtful. “Where a party has the means in his power of

rebutting and explaining the evidence adduced against him, if it does not tend to the truth, the omission to do so furnishes a strong inference against him.”50 One cannot also ignore the principle that “the rules of evidence in the main are based on experience, logic, andcommon sense.”51

Neither can the Court believe Banguis’s assertion that Wenifreda’s petition for cancellation of TCT T- 145321 is in reality a partition of Adriano’s estate which in effect transfers the subject property to Wenifreda and thus divests Banguis and her son Adrian of their rights and interests therein. LRC Case No. P-443-99 is simply a case for the correction of the wrongful entry in TCT T-145321; it simply aims to reflect the truth in the certificate of title – that Adriano is married to Wenifreda – and nothing else. It would have been a summary proceeding, but Banguis complicated matters by injecting her claims of ownership, which are irrelevant in the first place for, as earlier stated, registration is not the equivalent of title.

Finally, with the foregoing disquisition, it becomes unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised by the petitioner, particularly those relating to the trial court’s March 30, 2004 Order directing the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, as well as the April 14, 2004 Writ of Execution issued, as they have become moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The February 14, 2012 Decision and July 26, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84954 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 

G.R. No. 163928, January 21, 2015MANUEL JUSAYAN,ALFREDO JUSAYAN,AND MICHAEL JUSAYAN, Petitioners, v. JORGE 

SOMBILLA, Respondent. D EC I S I O N BERSAMIN, J.: 

The Court resolves whether a lease of agricultural land between the respondent and the predecessor of the petitioners was a civil law lease or an agricultural lease. The resolution is determinative of whether or not the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had original exclusive jurisdiction over the action commenced by the predecessor of the petitioners against the respondent.cralawred

The Case 

Under review on certiorari is the decision promulgated on October 20, 2003,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the judgment in favor of the petitioners rendered on April 13, 1999 in CAR Case No. 17117 entitled Timoteo Jusayan, Manuel Jusayan, Alfredo Jusayan and Michael Jusayan v. Jorge Sombilla by the RTC, Branch 30, in Iloilo City.2chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Antecedents 

and would deliver 110 cavans of palay annually to Timoteo without need foraccounting of the cultivation expenses provided that Jorge would pay the irrigation fees. From 1971 to 1983, Timoteo and Jorge followed the arrangement. In 1975, the parcels of land were transferred in the names of Timoteo’s sons, namely; Manuel, Alfredo and Michael (petitioners).

Wilson Jesena (Wilson) owned four parcels of land situated in New Lucena, Iloilo. On June 20, 1970,

Wilson entered into an agreement with respondent Jorge Sombilla (Jorge),3

wherein Wilson designated

Jorge as his agent to supervise the tilling and farming of his riceland in crop year 1970-1971. On August

20, 1971,

before the expiration of the agreement,

Wilson sold the four parcels of land to Timoteo Jusayan

(Timoteo).4 Jorge and Timoteo verbally agreed that Jorge would retain possession of the parcels of land

terminating his administration and demanding the return of the possession of the parcels of

In 1984, Timoteo sent several letters to Jorge

land

against Jorge in the RTC

Timoteo filed on June 30, 1986 a complaint for recovery of possession and accounting

In his answer,6 Jorge asserted that he enjoyed security of tenure as the agricultural lessee of Timoteo;

and that he could not be dispossessed of his landholding without valid cause

.5chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Due to the failure of Jorge to render accounting and to return the possession of the parcels of land despite demands,

(CAR Case No. 17117). Following Timoteo’s death on October 4, 1991, thepetitioners substituted him as the plaintiffs.

Ruling of the RTC 

.cralawred

In its decision rendered on April 13, 1999,7 the between Timoteo and Jorge;and petitioners.cralawred

Judgment of the CA 

Jorge appealed to the CA.In the judgment promulgated on October 20, 2003,8 the

; and that the demand of Timoteo for the delivery of his share in the harvestand the payment of irrigation fees

constituted an agrarian dispute that was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC,and well within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DAR) pursuant to Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657

RTC upheld the contractual relationship of agency

ordered Jorge to deliver the possession of the parcels of land to the

declaring that the contractual relationship between the parties was one of agricultural tenancy

CA reversed the RTC and dismissed the case,

(Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988).cralawredIssuesThe petitionersnow appeal upon the following issues, namely:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Whether or not the relationship between the petitioners and respondent is that of agency or

agricultural leasehold;

a.)

and

b.) Whether or not RTC, Branch 30, Iloilo City as Regional Trial Court and Court of Agrarian Relations, had jurisdiction over the herein case.9

Ruling of the Court 

The petition for review lacks merit.

To properly resolve whether or not the relationship between Timoteo and Jorge was that of an agency or a tenancy, an analysis of the concepts of agency and tenancy is in order.

r.1011 the elements of which are, namely: (a) the relationship is established by the

parties’ consent, express or implied; (b) the object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person; (c) the agent acts as representative and not for himself; and (d) the agent acts within the scope of his authority.12 Whether or not an agency has been created is determined by the fact that one is representing and acting for another.13

.14chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The claim of Timoteo that Jorge was his agent contradicted the verbal agreement he had fashioned with Jorge. By assenting to Jorge’s possession of the land sans accounting of the cultivation expenses and actual produce of the land provided that Jorge annually delivered to him 110 cavans of palay and paid the irrigation fees belied the very nature of agency, which was representation. The verbal agreement between Timoteoand Jorge left all matters of agricultural production to the sole discretion of Jorge and practically divested Timoteo of the right to exercise his authority over the acts to be performed by Jorge. While in possession of the land, therefore, Jorge was acting for himself instead of for Timoteo. Unlike Jorge,Timoteo did not benefit whenever the production increased, and did not suffer whenever the production decreased. Timoteo’s interest was limited to the delivery of the 110 cavans of palay annually without any concern about how the cultivation could be improved in order to yield more produce.

On the other hand, to prove the tenancy relationship, Jorge presented handwritten receipts15 indicating that the sacks of palay delivered to and received by one Corazon Jusayan represented payment of rental. In this regard, rental was the legal term for the consideration of the lease.16

Consequently, the receipts substantially proved that the contractual relationship between Jorge and Timoteo was a lease.

In agency, the agent binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on

behalf of the principal, with the consent or authority of the latte

agency is representation,

The basis of the civil law relationship of

 The law does not presume agency; hence, proving its existence,

nature and extent is incumbent upon the person alleging it

Yet, the lease of an agricultural land can be either a civil law or an agricultural lease.

the members of his immediate farm household,

and of

17

In the civil law lease,

one of the parties binds himself to give to another the enjoyment or use of a thing for a price certain, and

for a period that may be definite or indefinite.

In the agricultural lease, also termed as a leasehold

tenancy, the physical possession of the land devoted to agriculture is given by its owner or legal

possessor (landholder) to another (tenant) for the purpose of production through labor of the latter

in consideration of which the latter agrees to share the

harvest with the landholder, or to pay a price certain or ascertainable

, either in produce or in money, or in both.18 Specifically, in Gabriel v. Pangilinan,19 this Court differentiated between a leasehold tenancy and a

civil law lease in the following manner, namely: (1) the subject matter of a leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural land, but that of a civil law lease may be rural or urban property; (2) as to attention and cultivation, the law requires the leasehold tenant to personally attend to and cultivate the agricultural land; the civil law lessee need not personally cultivate or work the thing leased; (3) as to purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy is devoted to agriculture; in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any other lawful pursuits; and(4) as to the law that governs, the civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code, but the leasehold tenancy is governed by special laws.

The sharing of the harvest in proportion to the respective contributions of the landholder and tenant, otherwise called share tenancy,20 was abolishedon August 8, 1963 under Republic Act No. 3844. To date, the only permissible system of agricultural tenancy is leasehold tenancy,21 a relationship wherein a fixed consideration is paid instead of proportionately sharing the harvest as in share tenancy.

In Teodoro v. Macaraeg,22 this Court has synthesized the elements of agricultural tenancy to wit: (1) the object of the contract or the relationship is an agricultural land that is leased or rented for the purpose of agriculturalproduction; (2) the size of the landholding is such that it is susceptible of personal cultivation by a single person with the assistance of the members of his immediate farm household; (3) the tenant- lessee must actually and personally till, cultivate or operate the land, solely or with the aid of labor from his immediate farm household; and (4) the landlord-lessor, who is either the lawful owner or the legal possessor of the land, leases the same to the tenant-lessee for a price certain or ascertainable either in an amountof money or produce.

It can be gleaned that in both civil law lease of an agricultural land and agricultural lease, the lessor gives to the lessee the use and possession of the land for a price certain. Although the purpose of the civil law lease and the agricultural lease may be agricultural cultivation and production, the distinctive attribute that sets a civil law lease apart from an agricultural lease is the personal cultivation by the lessee. An agricultural lessee cultivates by himself and with the aid of those of his immediate farm household. Conversely, even when the lessee is in possession of the leased agricultural land and paying a consideration for it but is not personally cultivating the land, he or she is a civil law lessee.

The only issue remaining to be resolved is whether or not Jorge personally cultivated the leased agricultural land.

Cultivation is not limited to the plowing and harrowing of the land, but includes the various phases of farm labor such as the maintenance, repair and weeding of dikes, paddies and irrigation canals in the landholding. Moreover, it covers attending to the care of the growing plants,23 and grownplants like fruit trees that require watering, fertilizing, uprooting weeds, turning the soil, fumigating to eliminate plant pests24 and all other activities designed to promote the growth and care of the plants or trees and husbanding the earth, by general industry, so that it may bring forth more products or fruits.25 In Tarona v. Court of Appeals,26 this Court ruled that a tenant is not required to be physically present in the land at all hours of the day and night provided that he lives close enough to the land to be cultivated to make it physically possible for him to cultivate it with some degree of constancy.

Nor was there any question that the parcels of agricultural land with a total area of 7.9 hectares involved herein were susceptible of cultivation by a single person with the help of the members of his immediate farm household. As the Court has already observed, an agricultural land of an area of four hectares,27 or even of an area as large as 17 hectares,28 could be personally cultivated by a tenant by himself or with

help of the members of his farm household.It is elementary that he who

alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof.29 Hence,

His ability to farm the seven hectares of land despite his regular employment as an Agricultural Technician at the Municipal Agriculture Office32 was not physically

impossible for him to accomplish considering that his daughter, a member of his immediate farm household, was cultivating one of the parcels of the land.33 Indeed, the law did not prohibit him as the agricultural lessee who generally worked the land himself or with the aid of member of his immediate household from availing himself occasionally or temporarily of the help of others in specific jobs.34 In short, the claim of the petitioners thatthe employment of Jorge as an Agricultural Technician at the Municipal Agriculture Office disqualified him as a tenant lacked factual or legal basis.

Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3844 provides that once there is an agricultural tenancy, the agricultural tenant’s right to security of tenure is recognized and protected. The landowner cannot eject the agricultural tenant from the land unless authorized by the proper court for causes provided by law. Section 36 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, enumerates the several grounds for the valid dispossession of the tenant.35It is underscored, however, that none of such grounds for valid dispossession of landholding was attendant in Jorge’s case.

Although the CA has correctly categorized Jorge’s case as an agrarian dispute, it ruled that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case based on Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6657, which vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) the “primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters” and the “exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform” except disputes falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.

We hold that the CA gravely erred. The rule is settled that the jurisdiction ofa court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the

commencement of an action.36 In 1980, upon the passage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act), the Courts of Agrarian Relations were integrated into the Regional Trial Courts and the jurisdictionof the Courts of Agrarian Relations was vested in the Regional Trial Courts.37 It was only on August 29, 1987, when Executive Order No. 229 took effect, that the general jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts to try agrarian reform matters was transferred to the DAR. Therefore, the RTC still had jurisdiction over the dispute at the time the complaint was filed in the RTC on June 30, 1986.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari byandORDERS the petitioners to

pay the costs of suit.The parties are ordered to comply with their undertakings as agricultural lessor and agricultural lessee. SO ORDERED.