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1515151515 Research Forum Research Forum Research Forum Research Forum Research Forum In the Line of Fire

Deadly ForceDeadly ForceDeadly ForceDeadly ForceDeadly ForceDecision MakingDecision MakingDecision MakingDecision MakingDecision Making

By Dean T. Olson

CyberschoolCyberschoolCyberschoolCyberschoolCyberschoolBy Thomas Dempsey

Combating GangsCombating GangsCombating GangsCombating GangsCombating GangsBy Lisa A. Regini

1

10With Christopher NewportUniversitys two online programs, lawenforcement officers can go back toschool without leaving the station.

25

Deadly force decision making, one ofthe most liability-prone activities inlaw enforcement, is a training priorityfor many agencies.

February 1998Volume 67Number 2

Many complex constitutional issuesmust be considered when loiteringordinances and injunctions are usedto combat gang activity.

24 24 24 24 24 Forensic UpdateForensic UpdateForensic UpdateForensic UpdateForensic Update DNA Profiling

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s one of the most liability- negligent or inadequate training.Agencies can help officers makebetter decisions by employing threestrategies: improving deadly forcepolicies, training officers in sur-vival physiology, and using dy-namic training. These strategies canproduce marked improvements byproviding effective policy guidanceto officers, enhancing their tacticalskills, and increasing their confi-dence levels.

DEADLY FORCE POLICYBefore embarking on any effort

to improve decision making, an

agency needs an effective and prac-tical deadly force policy. Officersneed to know the parameters oftheir authority. Since the 1985 U.S.Supreme Court decision in Tennes-see v. Garner,1 most law enforce-ment agencies have adopted restric-tive policies that rely on defense oflife as the rationale for usingdeadly force. The Garner decisionmandated policy improvements byforbidding the use of deadly forceagainst fleeing felons not threaten-ing death or serious injury to anofficer or others. Defense of life iswidely interpreted as the use of

Improving DeadlyImproving DeadlyImproving DeadlyImproving DeadlyImproving DeadlyForce DecisionForce DecisionForce DecisionForce DecisionForce DecisionMakingMakingMakingMakingMakingBy DEAN T. OLSON

Adecision making tops the list oftraining priorities for many agen-cies. An improper shooting decisioncarries the potential for costly civildamage awards, criminal prosecu-tion, strained community relations,and ruined professional and per-sonal lives.

Improving the decisions offi-cers make in deadly force situationsbolsters an agencys employee de-velopment process and can en-hance its position against claims of

prone activities in law en-forcement, deadly force

Photo Tribute

2 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

force by law enforcement officersin the performance of their duties toprotect themselves or another inno-cent person from death or seriousinjury.

However, ambiguities often ex-ist when officers attempt to applypolicy in the dynamic, unforgivingenvironment of the street. A deci-sion-making model can help toclarify policy and provide guidancefor effective and legal deadly forcedecisions.

Decision Model:The Deadly Force Triangle

The deadly force triangle is adecision model designed to enhancean officers ability to respond to adeadly force encounter while re-maining within legal and policy pa-rameters.2 The three sides of anequilateral triangle represent threefactorsability, opportunity, andjeopardy. All three factors must bepresent to justify deadly force.

In this model, ability meansthe suspects physical capacity toharm an officer or another innocent

person. This is widely interpretedas a suspects being armed witha weapon capable of inflictingdeath or serious injury, such as afirearm, knife, or club. Ability alsoincludes personal physical capabil-ity, such as that possessed by amartial arts practitioner, a power-fully built man, or an agitated sus-pect on drugs.

Opportunity describes the sus-pects potential to use their abilityto kill or seriously injure. An un-armed, but very large and power-fully built suspect might have theability to injure seriously or kill asmaller, less well-conditioned of-ficer. However, opportunity doesnot exist if the suspect is 50 yardsaway. Similarly, a suspect armedwith a knife has the ability to kill orseriously injure an officer but mightlack opportunity if the officer hastaken cover.

Jeopardy exists when suspectstake advantage of their abilityand opportunity to place an of-ficer or another innocent personin imminent physical danger. For

example, a situation in which anarmed robbery suspect refuses todrop a weapon when cornered aftera foot pursuit would constitutejeopardy.

Trainers use decision models tohelp clarify deadly force policy. Intraining sessions, officers examinea variety of scenarios, which oftendraw from actual incidents, and ap-ply the principles of the model andthe agencys policy. The officersmust determine if and when jus-tification for deadly force exists.Trainers must be careful to in-clude scenarios that both do anddo not culminate in a justificationfor deadly force. In this way, offi-cers learn the limitations on theiruse of force and make appropriatedecisions.

The Necessity CriterionSome deadly force situations

are not defined clearly. Is it appro-priate to use deadly force against asuspect who, for example, has thepotential to inflict death or seriousinjury but does not pose an immedi-ate threat? How do officers inter-pret policy when confronted byarmed robbery suspects who re-spond to verbal commands to haltand remain turned away but refuseto drop weapons, to kneel or proneout, or to show their hands?

Some policies fail to addressthis issue. In fact, some policies as-sume that jeopardy does not existuntil a threat is immediate. Thisdangerous notion forces officers towait until a suspect overtly moves aweapon toward an officer or otherinnocent person before attemptingto neutralize the threat.

Practical and effective policytakes into account the time lapse

A decision-makingA decision-makingA decision-makingA decision-makingA decision-makingmodel can help tomodel can help tomodel can help tomodel can help tomodel can help toclarify policy andclarify policy andclarify policy andclarify policy andclarify policy andprovide guidanceprovide guidanceprovide guidanceprovide guidanceprovide guidancefor effective andfor effective andfor effective andfor effective andfor effective and

legal deadly forcelegal deadly forcelegal deadly forcelegal deadly forcelegal deadly forcedecisions.decisions.decisions.decisions.decisions.

Lieutenant Olson commands the employee development divisionof the Douglas County Sheriffs Department in Omaha, Nebraska.

February 1998 / 3

between recognizing a threat andresponding to it. Dynamic trainingexercises have demonstrated that asuspect in a deadly force confronta-tion can bring a weapon to bear andfire it before the officer can respondby squeezing the trigger of aweapon already drawn and aimed atthe suspect.3 Quite simply, action isfaster than reaction. Furthermore,police handgun rounds do not reli-ably incapacitate suspects immedi-ately,4 and officers encounter manysituations with inadequate or un-available cover. Therefore, policiesrequiring officers to wait for overtmovement of a weapon before tak-ing action can place both innocentbystanders and officers in needlessdanger.

The concept of jeopardy mustbe expanded to embrace necessityas a criterion determining whendeadly force can be used. In 1995,the U.S. Department of Justice(DOJ) revised its deadly forcepolicy, defining necessity as con-sisting of two componentsimmi-nent danger and the absence of safealternatives.5

Imminent is defined as a pend-ing action; it does not mean imme-diate or instant. Under DOJ policy,necessity means that a subject canpose an imminent danger, even if,at that precise moment, [the sub-ject] is not pointing a weapon at an[officer].6 Federal agents are notrequired to use or consider alterna-tives to deadly force in the absenceof safe alternatives.

Factors affecting the ability touse safe alternatives include asuspects response to commands,availability of cover, time con-straints imposed by the action/reac-tion gap, and the lack of a reliable

way to stop a threatening actioninstantly.7

Enhancing deadly force policyby including a necessity criterionprovides officers with an additionaldecision tool. It helps them makeeffective decisions while maintain-ing the necessary balance betweenofficer safety and the constitutionalrequirement of reasonableness.

Despite the best policies, how-ever, officers still might not handleincidents involving deadly force inthe best possible way. A significantcause of this problem can be tracedto the physiological effects of stressin survival situations.

narrowing, auditory exclusion, de-creased fine motor skills, and othersymptoms that affect officers inlife-threatening situations, trainersguessed at what methods and strate-gies would counter the effects ofthese symptoms.

Some of these guesses led toineffective approaches. For ex-ample, the majority of law enforce-ment training was, and in manycases still is, conducted in the static,nonthreatening, low-stress environ-ment of the gun range, gymnasium,or classroom, using what psycholo-gists call closed motor skill train-ing.8 Such training exercises arepredictable, planned, static, andlow-stress. A common example istraditional firearms qualification onthe gun range in which officers fireonly on command at identical papertargets that do not return fire. Tech-niques that look or feel effective inthis type of environment often havelittle or no application in a stressful,dynamic, real-world environment.

The most prominent exampleinvolves the transition from the in-stinctive shooting style of thesingle-handed point, or FBIcrouch, and modified isoscelesshooting stances to the Weaverstance decades ago. Generations oflaw enforcement officers learnedthe Weaver stanceessentially afield interrogation stance in whichthe officer assumes a three-quarterside stance, gun side and groinbladed away from the target withthe strong arm and gun hand fullyextended and almost locked, stabi-lized and supported by the weakarm. Firearms instructors extolledthe virtues of the Weaver stance asan improved shooting platform. Un-fortunately, research has shown that

SURVIVAL PHYSIOLOGYFor many years, law enforce-

ment trainers struggled to explainwhy, despite comprehensive train-ing, officers often performed inef-fectively in survival situations.They continuously revised their in-struction in attempts to bridge thegap between officers performanceon the gun range or in the classroomand their performance on the street.

Incorrect AssumptionsUnfortunately, instructors often

recognized the symptoms of sur-vival stress but commonly failed tograsp the causes. Unaware of thephysiological reasons for visual

Officers need toOfficers need toOfficers need toOfficers need toOfficers need toknow theknow theknow theknow theknow theparameters ofparameters ofparameters ofparameters ofparameters oftheir authority.their authority.their authority.their authority.their authority.

4 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

it is extremely difficult to assumethe Weaver stance when confrontedby a sudden, close threat.9

Why? Humans are binocularanimals that process 90 percent ofsensory input visually when theyexperience survival stress.10 Duringa deadly force encounter, offic-ers instinctively and uncontrolla-bly crouch and square off facingthe threat to maximize visual in-put to the brain. This instinctivestance was first documented inthe 1920s based on observationsof soldiers in combat.11 Becausemost deadly force encounters aresudden and close, teaching offic-ers to use the Weaver stancemade them rely on a techniqueineffective for the deadly forcesituations they encountered.

Survival Stress ManagementTrainers must understand

survival physiology and survivalstress management techniques tohelp officers improve their deci-sion-making skills in deadly forcesituations. According to the re-search, when faced with a survivalsituation, the human body experi-ences involuntary physiological re-actions that affect performance ofmotor skills. Many of these reac-tions have a negative impact on of-ficers ability to defend themselvesin life-or-death struggles.

Motor skills combine cognitiveprocesses and physical actions toenable a person to perform physicaltasks, such as firing a weapon.There are three types of motorskillsgross, fine, and complex.

Gross motor skills involve theaction of large muscle groups, suchas those found in the thighs, chest,back, and arms. These skills depend

Fine motor skills use smallmuscle groups, such as the handsand fingers. These skills frequentlyinvolve hand-eye coordination,such as shooting a firearm. Theyrequire low or nonexistent levels ofstress for optimum performance.Fine motor skills rapidly deteriorateunder survival stress conditions.13

Complex motor skills incorpo-rate multiple components, ofteninvolving hand-eye coordination,timing, tracking a moving target,and balance. The Weaver shootingstance and such intricate defensivetactics as a takedown or batoncome-along exemplify complexmotor skills. To achieve optimalperformance of these skills, stresslevels must be low. Therefore,the high stress encountered in a

survival situation reduces anofficers ability to perform complexmotor skills.14

During a deadly force encoun-ter, unprepared or poorly trained of-ficers experience a chain reaction ofescalating stress that increases their

heart rates. As the heart raterises, fine and complex motorskills deteriorate rapidly, result-ing in an inability to handle aweapon or assume a Weavershooting stance, for example.The rising heart rate also triggersthe bodys sympathetic nervoussystem, which is part of theautonomic nervous system thatcontrols breathing and other in-voluntary life functions. Thesympathetic system secretespowerful hormones, such asadrenaline, epinephrine, andsimilar substances that increaseheart rate and blood pressure andregulate body metabolism underlife-threatening stress. The body

redirects blood away from the fin-gers, hands, and extremities to ma-jor muscles, such as the chest,thighs, and arms. Hand dexterityand coordination drastically declineas blood vessels constrict.15

Eyesight also is affected by in-creased stress. The contour of thelenses of the eyes changes, makingvisual tracking or focusing onnearby objects, such as the frontsight of a weapon, difficult or evenimpossible. Perceptual narrowingoccurs and affects depth percep-tion, often causing officers to fireshots low.16 Peripheral vision near-ly vanishes as the field of viewreduces to 12 to 18 inches. Becausemost threats are processed througha persons visual sense, the tre-mendous reduction in visual input

Abilit

y

Jeopardy

OpportunityDecision Model:Decision Model:Decision Model:Decision Model:Decision Model:

Deadly Force TriangleDeadly Force TriangleDeadly Force TriangleDeadly Force TriangleDeadly Force Triangle

on strength and improve underhigh-stress conditions due to thebodys release of adrenaline andother hormones. Survival stress haslittle or no negative effect on theseskills.12

February 1998 / 5

severely restricts the brains abilityto receive and process vital infor-mation. Research has shown thatwhen peripheral vision decreases70 percent, it takes a person up to440 percent more time to react.17

If an officers rising heart rateremains unchecked, a survivalstress response called hypervigi-lance occurs. With hypervigilance,the officer freezes in place or en-gages in inappropriate or irrationalactions in a panic or near-paniccondition.18 This condition is char-acterized by an indiscriminate at-tention to inappropriate threat cuesas an officer frantically searches fora way to escape the danger. Notuncommonly, officers experiencinghypervigilance might repeatedlypull the trigger of an empty weapon,misidentify innocuous items asweapons, or not see or hear inno-cent bystanders in the line of fire.

One of the keys to managingsurvival stress is controlling heartrate.19 Research has proven that aslight increase in heart rate in re-sponse to stress stimuli improvesperformance. However, additionalstress and increased heart ratecauses rapid deterioration of perfor-mance. Cognitive skills begin to de-teriorate at heart rates above 155beats per minute (BPM), and per-ceptual narrowing, hypervigilance,and irrational behavior begin at 175BPM. Officers experience full-blown hypervigilance at heart ratesbetween 200 and 225 BPM. Theoptimal heart rate for combat per-formance is between 115 and 145BPM.20 Teaching officers stressmanagement techniques that enablethem to keep their heart rates in ornear this range will help them con-trol survival stress.

DYNAMIC TRAININGPractice through realistic simu-

lation offers one of the best ways toprepare officers to handle deadlyforce decisions. This training strat-egy integrates classroom instruc-tion on policies and decision-mak-ing models with open motor skilltraining to enable officers to applytheir knowledge in dynamic, stress-ful situations that approximate reallife.

PurposesDynamic training serves two

purposes in improving the decisionsofficers make during deadly forcesituations. It allows them to imple-ment survival stress managementtechniques in conjunction with ef-fective tactics and procedures in arealistic environment, and it meetshigher training standards imposedby recent court decisions.

participants shooting. Second, theammunition strikes with enoughforce to cause pain and minor bruis-ing; participants soon learn thevalue of using cover in a way thatcannot be duplicated by other formsof training.

Dynamic training also ad-dresses some judicial concernsraised by a 1993 court decision thatimposed higher standards fordeadly force training. In Zuchel v.City of Denver, the U.S. Court ofAppeals for the 10th Circuit uphelda jury verdict that the City of Den-ver, Colorado, was deliberately in-different to the rights of its citizensbecause of the inadequate deadlyforce training provided to its policeofficers.21 The jury found that thedeath of a city resident during apolice shooting was due to an un-reasonable use of deadly forcestemming from inadequate training.The implication of the Zuchel deci-sion is that traditional instructionconsisting of periodic firearmsqualifications on the gun range, theuse of classroom shoot/dont shootscenarios, and other closed motorskills training strategiesdoes notadequately prepare law enforce-ment officers to make effectivedeadly force decisions.

To meet the higher standard im-posed by the Zuchel decision,deadly force training also must de-velop decision-making skills thatenable officers to avoid confronta-tions when possible and to mini-mize the escalation of force whenpractical. Dynamic training meetsthis standard. It allows officers toapply survival stress managementand safety and survival tactics in anopen motor skills environmentwithin the parameters of the law and

The dynamic training techniqueuses role-playing scenarios that pitofficers against live adversarieswho think, plan, interact, move, usecover, and return fire using modi-fied duty weapons firing simulatedammunition with marking dye.Such ammunition provides two keybenefits. First, hits can be scored torate the effectiveness of each

One of the keys toOne of the keys toOne of the keys toOne of the keys toOne of the keys tomanaging survivalmanaging survivalmanaging survivalmanaging survivalmanaging survivalstress isstress isstress isstress isstress iscontrolling heartcontrolling heartcontrolling heartcontrolling heartcontrolling heart

rate.rate.rate.rate.rate.

6 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

Practice throughPractice throughPractice throughPractice throughPractice throughrealistic simulationrealistic simulationrealistic simulationrealistic simulationrealistic simulationoffers one of theoffers one of theoffers one of theoffers one of theoffers one of thebest ways tobest ways tobest ways tobest ways tobest ways to

prepare officers toprepare officers toprepare officers toprepare officers toprepare officers tohandle deadly forcehandle deadly forcehandle deadly forcehandle deadly forcehandle deadly force

decisions.decisions.decisions.decisions.decisions.

the agencys deadly force policy.Open motor skills trainingcon-ducted in a fluid, reactive, sponta-neous, stressful environmentaddsrealistic decision making to the in-structional setting. For example,dynamic force-on-force training ora simulated deadly force encounterinvolves open motor skills.

Dynamic training provides an-other benefit: It often identifies per-formance deficiencies not spottedin other forms of training. Oneagency found that, in spite of con-tinuous emphasis on the importanceof decocking semiautomatic side-arms equipped with decock mecha-nisms, the overwhelming number ofparticipants under survival stressfailed to do so before reholsteringtheir weapons following a shootingscenario. With this knowledge,trainers could take steps to addressthis dangerous performance issue.

Administrators and trainersseeking to use simulation-basedtraining should be forewarned thatit cannot be developed overnight.Creating a dynamic training pro-gram requires that administratorsdetermine the agencys specifictraining needs, design and developthe content, and then evaluate anddocument the instruction.

Needs AssessmentOne of the most difficult as-

pects of developing dynamic train-ing can be the preparatory work thatmust be completed before actualtraining begins. Trainers shouldconduct a needs assessment to iden-tify the gap between officers actualperformance and their desired per-formance. This evaluation mightidentify such deficiencies as poorteamwork or ineffective stress man-agement in survival situations.

The needs assessment alsoshould focus on identifying thetypes of threats officers likely willface so that training can be devel-oped to address these needs. By ex-amining an agencys use-of-forcereports for the previous years, train-ers can identify common force inci-dents and identify performance de-ficiencies. Other local sources ofinformation include state crimecommissions, training academies,peace officer standards and trainingorganizations, and other area lawenforcement agencies. Trainersalso should consider nationalsources of information on threattrends, such as the Bureau of JusticeStatistics and the FBIs annual sum-maries of law enforcement officerskilled and assaulted.

depth of the subject matter probablywill require that some classroom in-struction precede the practical exer-cises. For example, before conduct-ing a simulation that requiresparticipants to use cover, instruc-tors might lead a classroom discus-sion on the reasons to seek cover,the types of cover available in avariety of common situations, howto discriminate between good andbad cover, and how best to usecover.

After identifying the instruc-tional objectives, trainers shouldscript realistic scenarios so that par-ticipants can master practical andeffective tactics that maximize con-trol and minimize danger in survivalsituations. Instructors must avoidthe tendency to create unwinnablescenarios. Few things destroy train-ing efforts more than scenarios thatnever allow participants to succeed.This is not to say that scenariosshould be designed so students can-not ever fail. Rather, if students fol-low proper procedures and take ap-propriate actions in the scenario,they can win. Research indicatesthat the most effective training pro-vides participants with positivelearning experiences. To optimizethe learning process, trainingshould proceed in phases designedto introduce the participants to in-creasingly complex and demandingtasks gradually, as their skill levelsincrease.22

Training TechniquesThe needs assessment will re-

veal specific threats and problemareas that should be addressed inthe scenarios. In addition, instruc-tors should teach officers tech-niques to help them respond tothese threats safely and confidently.

Based on the specific needsidentified, instructional objectivesmust clearly specify the learningand performance outcomes ex-pected of participants. Each objec-tive must state precisely what tasksparticipants must perform, as wellas how well and under what condi-tions they must perform them. Theparticipants should be informed ofthe objectives at the beginning ofthe session. The complexity or

February 1998 / 7

Officers acquire confidence bypracticing visualization, gross mo-tor skills, conditioned responses tocertain stimuli, and tactical breath-ing. As the officers acquire confi-dence in their ability to handle situ-ations safely, they will be betterable to control their heart ratesand thus avoid negative survivalresponses.

VisualizationAthletes frequently use visu-

alization to improve their perfor-mance. Likewise, officers can re-hearse specific survivalsituations, mentally identifyingthreats or threat cues and usingappropriate tactical responses.Visualization allows officers toprepare for and plan their indi-vidual performance throughmental rehearsal. They canclarify tasks, identify potentialperformance problems, andchoose effective tactics.

Visualization contains threecomponentspredicting potentialthreat cues, programming theproper survival response, and pro-gramming back-up plans.23 First, of-ficers imagine what factors mightindicate a threat in a specific situa-tion. For example, a potentiallyarmed suspect detained on foot at3 a.m. in an apartment complexmight have a bulge in his waist-band, refuse to remove his handsfrom his pockets, or make furtivehand movements.

After identifying the potentialthreat cues, officers picture them-selves responding to the threat byusing the correct survival re-sponses. Finally, officers plan alter-native actions in case the primaryresponse is ineffective or cannot beused.

Through visualization, officersplan simple, yet effective, strat-egies to respond to deadly forcesituations. Studies of reaction timeindicate that when the number ofpossible responses increases fromone to two, reaction time increases

Modified isosceles two-handedstance

Weaver stance.The choice of shooting stance de-pends on the circumstances of theevent.

At ranges less than 3 yardswhen time is minimal, officersshould use the single-handedpoint stance. The brain recog-nizes that there is not enoughtime to acquire the target with atwo-handed grip; therefore, theofficer extends the weapon, orpunches it out, toward the targetat stomach or chest height in aone-handed grip.

Officers should use themodified isosceles two-handedstance at ranges greater than 3yards when time allows andgreater accuracy is needed.With this stance, they grip theweapon in a two-handed holdand raise it to eye level. Whenstartled, the body instinctivelyactivates the sympathetic ner-

vous system, forcing the head andshoulders to square on the target toobtain the maximum visual input.The arms automatically begin tobend at the elbow and assume anisosceles position, fitting the natu-ral strength curve of the body. Thedominant foot should be to the rear.

With adequate time, distance,and cover, such as in a barricadedshooting situation, officers can usethe Weaver stance. Because it is acomplex motor skill, this stance canonly be used when survival stresshas not fully activated the sympa-thetic nervous system.

Stimulus-Conditioned ResponseFor officers to survive deadly

force encounters, their responsesmust demand a minimal outlay of

58 percent.24 By mentally discard-ing ineffective responses in ad-vance, officers limit their responseoptions, which reduces reactiontime.25 Unfortunately, during adeadly force encounter, the gap be-tween the suspects action and theofficers response often is measuredin milliseconds. Visualization re-duces reaction time and increasesthe officers chances of survival.

Gross Motor SkillsDue to the deterioration of fine

and complex motor skills under sur-vival stress, training must focus ongross motor skills whenever pos-sible. These skills include the use ofthe following shooting stances:26

Single-handed point stance

Photo K.L. Morrison

8 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

physical or mental energy.27 Thisquick response can be learned whentraining combines a stimulusinthe form of recognizing specificthreats or threat cueswith a con-ditioned response.28 Officers learnto respond automatically when thestimulus occurs. For example, uponrecognizing the threat cues associ-ated with a concealed weapon, of-ficers might draw their weapons toengage the threat while moving topositions of cover and issuing ver-bal commands.

Tactical BreathingFinally, officers can use tac-

tical breathing to govern theirsurvival responses. This tech-nique helps them control theirheart rates and avoid full activa-tion of the sympathetic nervoussystem. By bringing more oxy-gen into their systems, theylower their heart rates, which im-proves perceptual abilities andreduces anxiety.29

During training, partici-pants heart rates should bemonitored to provide feedbackabout their individual stress lev-els as they work through thedynamic simulations. This willhelp them recognize the onsetof survival stress symptoms andemploy stress managementtechniques.

Evaluation and DocumentationParticipants performances dur-

ing dynamic training sessionsshould be evaluated and docu-mented. A simple, impartial evalua-tion instrument that rates partici-pants on the performance objectivesserves three functions: It gauges theparticipants learning, identifies

remediation needs, and documentsthe instruction.

A practical rating instrument al-lows trainers to evaluate partici-pants in critical skill areas quickly,uniformly, and impartially. A re-view of the ratings for the wholeclass might reveal topics that needto be addressed more thoroughly orin a different way. Trainers shouldgive a copy of the completed ratinginstruments to the participants andplace the originals in each parti-cipants training file.

Videotaping all exercises pro-vides additional feedback for par-ticipants. Showing an officers per-formance on videotape eliminatescomplaints about the instructorsbias or misperception in rating andavoids the problem of denial ifremediation becomes necessary.When officers see the mistakes theymade, they can better correct theerrors.

Agencies should keep detailedrecords of the instruction provided,including written rating instrumentsand videotapes of exercises. Theserecords serve as documentation incase of a legal challenge to the ef-fectiveness of the instruction. Well-maintained records also provide awealth of information useful for re-vising and updating the training.

CONCLUSIONThe primary goal of any law

enforcement training is to increaseofficers safety and effective-ness, for when they handle en-forcement activities effec-tively, danger levels decrease.Proper training also reduces anagencys exposure to liabilityclaims and expensive litigation.Clear policies that address therealities of deadly force en-counters, instruction in survivalphysiology and survival stressmanagement, and realistic, dy-namic training exercises canimprove officers confidencelevels and enhance their deci-sion-making skills.

Law enforcement officersmust make split-second life-or-death decisions. Agencies candemonstrate their concern forthe rights of their citizens andthe safety of their employees by

preparing officers to make the bestchoices possible.

Endnotes1 471 U.S. 1 (1985).2 Exact source unknown. Author learned of

model during emergency services trainingprovided by the 3902nd Security PoliceSquadron, Strategic Air Command, OffuttAir Force Base, Bellevue, NE, August 20,1984.

Photo Don Ennis

February 1998 / 9

3 Observed by author on three differentoccasions with different participants duringsemiannual Simmunitions training conductedfor the Douglas County, NE, SheriffsDepartment, March-April, 1996.

4 Urey W. Patrick, Handgun WoundingFactors and Effectiveness, FBI AcademyFirearms Training Unit, Quantico, VA, 1989,16.

5 U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureauof Investigation, Deadly Force Policy:Instructional Outline, December 1, 1995.

6 Ibid.7 Ibid.8 E. C. Poulton, On Prediction in Skilled

Movements, Psychological Bulletin, vol. 54,no. 6 (1957): 467-478.

9 B. K. Siddle, Sharpening the WarriorsEdge: The Psychology & Science of Training(Millstadt, IL: PPCT Research Publications,1995), 121.

10 H. Breedlove and B. K. Siddle, HowStress Affects Vision and Shooting, PoliceMarksman, vol. 20, no. 3, 57.

11 W. E. Fairbairn and E. A. Sykes, Shootingto Live (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1987), 39.

12 B. J. Cratty, Movement Behavior andMotor Learning, 3d Ed. (Philadelphia, PA: Lea& Febiger, 1973), 207-213.

13 Supra note 8, 472.14 Supra note 9, 61.15 B. K. Siddle, Sharpening the Warriors

Edge, Specialized Training Course, NebraskaLaw Enforcement Training Center, GrandIsland, NE, March 1996.

16 Observed by author during semi-annualSimmunitions training conducted for theDouglas County, Nebraska, Sheriffs Depart-ment, March-April, 1996.

17 Ibid.18 Supra note 9, 85.19 Supra note 9, 49.

20 Supra note 15.21 Zuchel v. City of Denver, 997 F.2d 730

(10th Cir. 1993).22 Supra note 9, 82.23 Supra note 9, 102-104.24 R. A. Schmidt, Motor Control and

Learning (Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics,1991), 90-105.

25 Supra note 9, 82.26 W. White and B. K. Siddle, PPCT

Defensive Tactics Instructor Manual: Series A(Millstadt, IL: PPCT Management Systems,1989), 19.

27 Supra note 9, 119-121.28 E. R. Guthrie, The Psychology of

Learning (New York: Harper and Row, 1952),23.

29 Supra note 9, 104-106.

T he FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin staff invites youto communicate with us via e-mail. Our Internetaddress is:

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We would like to know your thoughts oncontemporary law enforcement issues. We

welcome your comments, questions, andsuggestions. Please include your name, title,and agency on all e-mail messages.

Also, the Bulletin is available forviewing or downloading on a number ofcomputer services, as well as the FBIshome page. The home page address is:

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10 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

oth administrators and lineofficers agree that law en-forcement training does not

states regulatory agency. Off-siteclasses mean paying for travel,lodging, and meals, in addition totuition. Even local or onsite coursesmean the loss of the employee forthe training period. To compensate,agencies either must pay other

employees overtime or reduce theagencys level of service to thecommunity, a choice many admin-istrators find hard to make.

The new watchword for educa-tors and trainers alike is distancelearning. Using means as simple as

Bend at the police academy. Peaceofficer standards and trainingboards require that officers receiveadditional training every year; thecourts hold departments respon-sible if they fail to train their offi-cers; and citizens want well-trainedofficers protecting them. As a re-sult, with the support of their com-manders, officers attend in-servicetraining to improve their skills orlearn new ones.

At the same time, a growingnumber of police agencies haverealized that educationbroad-based instruction that generallyteaches why rather than howben-efits their employees by providingthe theoretical foundation they needto understand issues and applylearned skills to new situations.Many agencies require that their en-try-level officers possess some col-lege education; many also requireundergraduate degrees for com-mand-level positions. Generally,educational requirements increasewith rank.

While they recognize the im-portance of education and trainingfor their employees, police adminis-trators faced with limited resourcesremain reluctant to send employeesfor training beyond the minimumnumber of hours mandated by their

CyberschoolCyberschoolCyberschoolCyberschoolCyberschoolOnline Law Enforcement ClassesBy THOMAS DEMPSEY, M.A.

February 1998 / 11

videocassettes or as sophisticated astwo-way audio and video telecon-ferencing systems, distance learn-ing has become the correspondencecourse of the 21st century. Studentscan receive the training or educa-tion they need without placing toogreat a burden on their personal andprofessional lives. Distance learn-ing may, in fact, be the only chancebusy law enforcement professionalshave to obtain the training theyneed.

Christopher Newport Univer-sity in Newport News, Virginia, ishome to two online educational pro-gramsCNU ONLINE and TheMid-Atlantic Police SupervisoryInstitute (MAPSI)available tolaw enforcement officers. CNUONLINE is a computer-basedInternet communication system thatallows students to take accreditedcollege courses and, in fact, entiredegree programs without physicallyattending any classes.

The MAPSI gives first-line su-pervisors an efficient, cost-effec-tive way to develop the administra-tive, leadership, and ethical skillsthey need to succeed in their posi-tions. As important, they can takeclasses without losing valuable timefrom work. This article describesboth of these innovative programs.

CNU COMES ONLINESince the fall of 1993, Christo-

pher Newport University has of-fered online courses across the cur-riculum. One particular degreeprogramthe bachelor of sciencein governmental administrationallows students to complete theirstudies entirely online. With con-centrations in public management,

criminal justice administration, in-ternational administration, and le-gal studies, the governmental ad-ministration program can providevaluable education for law en-forcement officers, who only needto come to campus if they chooseto participate in the graduationceremony.

The MAPSI program grewnaturally from CNU ONLINE. Rec-ognizing the benefits that newlypromoted officers receive from ad-ditional education and training,chiefs from several southeasternVirginia police departments metwith CNU faculty and other law en-forcement executives to design aneducational program for first-linesupervisors. Everyone agreed thatthe ability to deliver the course ma-terial online was fundamental toMAPSIs success.

Six of the courses from CNUONLINEs governmental adminis-tration major, tailored for law

enforcement officers, provide thefoundation for MAPSI. The coursesaddress leadership strategies, hu-man resource management, plan-ning and evaluation, budget, ethicsin government, and police organiza-tion and management.

After completing four courses,MAPSI students receive a certifi-cate. They also can apply the 12credits they earn toward the re-quirements for the bachelor ofscience degree in governmentaladministration.

COURSE STRUCTURECNU ONLINE and MAPSI

courses allow students to completethe required work at a pace thatcomplements their work and per-sonal schedules. Depending ontheir course loads, students cancomplete the MAPSI program in 9to 21 months without being absentfrom normal duties. Students alsomay complete the entire program

A retired police officer, Professor Dempsey serves as director for criminal justiceadministration at Christopher Newport University in Newport News, Virginia.

Students can receiveStudents can receiveStudents can receiveStudents can receiveStudents can receivethe training orthe training orthe training orthe training orthe training or

education they neededucation they neededucation they neededucation they neededucation they needwithout placing toowithout placing toowithout placing toowithout placing toowithout placing toogreat a burden ongreat a burden ongreat a burden ongreat a burden ongreat a burden ontheir personal andtheir personal andtheir personal andtheir personal andtheir personal andprofessional lives.professional lives.professional lives.professional lives.professional lives.

12 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

same online classes, and in the tra-ditional classroom, they would sitside by side.

Yet, conventional approachesto education do not work in the vir-tual classroom. Even more so thanin traditional college courses,online classes must emphasize criti-cal thinking, independent study,and interaction among all of the stu-dents and the instructor. To do this,CNU instructors keep students in-terested and involved through a va-riety of challenging assignments,both formal and informal.

AssignmentsFormal assignments generally

include several group projects, aswell as weekly essays, which usu-ally are based on a reading from thetextbook. Other tasks include quoteanalysis, in which students identifya short quotation from an assignedreading and, in two paragraphs,paraphrase it and defend or refute itusing at least one outside reference.This type of exercise helps studentsdevelop analytical ability, whileforcing them to express their ideasconcisely. Group projects teach

through a single semester of full-time attendance.

Four half-day Saturday work-shops give MAPSI students practi-cal information designed specifi-cally for working police officers.Thus, although governmental ad-ministration students share classeswith MAPSI students, only MAPSIstudents attend the workshops.

Workshop speakers cover po-lice personnel issues, communitypolicing concepts, and leadershipstrategies, to name a few. Studentswho cannot attend these on-campusseminars receive a videotape of theprogram along with the presenterse-mail address. In the near future,the university plans to installvideoconferencing equipment,which will enable experts from allover the world to engage in real-time discussions with students indifferent locations.

The Saturday workshops markthe only difference in course struc-ture for MAPSI students. In allother respects, MAPSI studentscover the same academic ground asgovernmental administration ma-jors. In fact, they are enrolled in the

students to overcome the obstaclesand recognize the benefits of team-work, a skill that serves them welloutside of school.

In addition to formal assign-ments, students participate in onlinediscussions using an electronicmailing list. Unlike chat roomconversations, these discussions donot take place in real time. A chatroom does exist, however, andmany professors use it as a virtualoffice, allowing students to visitduring specified hours. Studentsalso may e-mail their professors orpeers directly at any time.

Messages posted to the listgo to the entire class, includingthe professor. A significant portionof the students grades dependsupon the quality and frequency oftheir participation in these onlinediscussions.

To invite additional commen-tary, students post most of theircompleted assignments to the list.The class also monitors group workin progress, although the professorevaluates finished projects beforeposting them. Professors tailor theirassignments to each student. They

February 1998 / 13

might ask working police officers todefend a policy in place in theirorganizations, whereas other stu-dents would discuss an issue basedon their perceptions or beliefs, noton actual experience. The differ-ences in students backgrounds andthe online format, where studentsremain relatively anonymous, leadto lively discussions.

Part of the ethics curriculum,for example, involves reviewingcase studies, about half of whichrelate directly to law enforcement.What experienced police officersthink constitutes ethical behaviorversus what the other students be-lieve has led to some no-holds-barred debates.

EQUIPMENTREQUIREMENTS

The CNU ONLINE and MAPSIprograms use a point-and-click,Windows-based system. Studentsneed a personal computer1 with atleast 4 megabytes of random accessmemory (RAM), a modem with aminimum speed of 14,400 bytes persecond, communications software,and Internet navigation software.

Higher RAM allows students to runmultiple applications, for instance,a word-processing program and theonline communications software,simultaneously. Likewise, a higherspeed modem will move the infor-mation across the Internet at a fasterrate.

Students access the system bydialing either a local or toll-freenumber or through a commercialInternet service provider (ISP). Stu-dents within the local dialing areahave almost unlimited access with-out an ISP, while the 800 numberrestricts students to 10 minutes ac-tual online time each day. This hasproven adequate for students takinga single class because they needonly a short period of time to accessthe system and download their mes-sages. They then can prepare re-sponses off line, reenter the system,and upload their responses. The 10-minute limit is marginally sufficientfor those students taking more thanone class or for those who needInternet access for course-relatedresearch.

Accordingly, students outsidethe local dialing area are strongly

encouraged to obtain an ISP ac-count with a commercial service.Many commercial Internet provid-ers offer unlimited access for about$25 per month. A grant from theVirginia Department of CriminalJustice allows the university to off-set this expense with a tuition ad-justment for MAPSI students.

ONLINE ALUMNISome agencies have allowed

their officers to attend MAPSI fulltime; others, one or two classes asemester. Each semester since theprograms inception in the spring of1996, several students have takenall four courses at once. Employedby the Hampton and NewportNews, Virginia, police depart-ments, they found their time com-mitment to be at least comparable toa normal work schedule.

The remainder of the students,officers from the Virginia Beach,Franklin, James City County, andseveral additional Virginia policedepartments, took one MAPSIcourse while remaining in theirfull-time duty assignments. Thesestudents found the courses, coupled

Photo Lance Jackson, New Moon Image Library

14 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

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with the Saturday workshops, atleast as challenging as any othercollege courses they had taken. Allof the part-time students worked ontheir own time, although at least oneagency is considering allowing stu-dents to earn compensatory timewhile attending MAPSI.

Though all of the students so farhave completed the course work athome, some departments may in-stall the necessary software in workstations at their agencies to allowstudents to complete their coursework there. Whether this will prove

a suitable work environment re-mains to be seen, but minimal hard-ware and software requirementsmake this option financially viablefor many agencies.

CONCLUSIONCompleting either training or

educational courses online is a chal-lenging way to earn college credits.To succeed, online students must behighly motivated and disciplined.

Officers who put their lives onthe line every day need not beintimidated by classes that require

them to express their thoughtsonline. Through the use of CNUONLINE and the Mid-Atlantic Po-lice Supervisory Institute, Christo-pher Newport University is provid-ing officers with the tools they needto survive in the classroom, at theoffice, and on the street.

Endnote

Either an Intel-based computer with a 386microprocessor or a Mac II system will meet theminimum requirements.

February 1998 / 15

n a spring Tuesday at noon, two officers incivilian dress, both assigned to investigative

In the Line of FireIn the Line of FireIn the Line of FireIn the Line of FireIn the Line of FireLearning from Assaults on Law Enforcement OfficersBy Anthony J. Pinizzotto, Ph.D., Edward F. Davis, M.S., and Charles E. Miller III

A previous study, Killed in the Line of Duty,2

scrutinized felonious killings of law enforcementofficers, but by nature, it omitted a crucial perspec-tivethat of the victim officers. In the continuingsearch for the best ways to prepare officers to facedanger in the line of duty, In the Line of Fire: Vio-lence Against Law Enforcement focuses on thesurvivors and presents extensive information on thevictim officers, the offenders, and the incidents thatbrought them together in a potentially deadly mix.3

THE STUDYOver a 3-year period, the authors examined 40

incidents selected from 625 closed cases submitted bylocal, state, and federal law enforcement agencies.Selection criteria included the size and type of thevictims agency, the type of assignment the officerwas working at the time of the assault, and the regionof the country in which the officer worked. Theselected cases occurred between 1987 and 1994and included 52 law enforcement officers and 42offenders.

Research ForumResearch ForumResearch ForumResearch ForumResearch Forum

work, responded to an address to search for a robberyand burglary suspect. When one officer opened acloset door during the search, he was shot in the chestby a 41-year-old female hiding inside. A struggleensued, and the officer returned fire, striking theoffender. Both the officer and the assailant weretransported to the hospital. The victim officer, a 28-year-old 4-year veteran, was released after 13 daysand returned to duty. The assailant, who had a priorrecord for robbery, burglary, and assault, is confinedto a wheelchair as a result of her wounds.

This scenario depicts 1 of 40 cases examined bythe authors in an attempt to answer two importantquestions: Why and how are officers assaulted in theline of duty? Every year, more than 50,000 lawenforcement officers are assaulted, one-third of thoseassaulted are injured, and about 70 are killed.1 Whydo some officers die and other officers survive insubstantively similar situations? No simple answersexist.

OPhoto Mark Ide

16 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

First Aid:A Matter of Life and Death

In a case not used in the study, the victim officerreported that while working in uniform during themidnight to 8 a.m. tour of duty, he responded to asuspicious person call. While questioning an individualat the scene, a confrontation developed and the officersthroat was cut from ear to ear. He protected himselffrom further injury by shooting his assailant.

In response to his call for help, numerous officersresponded to the crime scene, but none of these officersattempted to provide any sort of first aid to the victim.The injuries were so severe that he was placed in apatrol vehicle and transported to a hospital. A physicianwas the first person to render first aid through the singleact of placing his hand over the wound to stop thebleeding.

The victim officer reported that first aid trainingwas conducted at the academy but not supported bysubsequent in-service instruction. He stated that if hehad responded to a similar situation, he would not haveadministered first aid and did not think to self-adminis-ter a compress to stop the flow of his own blood. Thelack of training placed this officers life in seriousjeopardy.

After choosing cases for the study, the authorsgathered as much information as possible about eachincident in order to elicit specific, useful responsesduring interviews. They reviewed the departmentscase files, which included offense reports, statementsmade by assisting officers, witnesses, and offenders,and later, other documentation provided by the victimofficers, such as reports, performance ratings, news-paper articles, and police radio transmissions. Inter-views of the surviving victim officers focused on theirbackground, family structure, law enforcementtraining, preassault behavior and experience, condi-tions at the time of the assault, and description of theincident.

The authors also reviewed and evaluated pertinentinformation obtained from law enforcement andcorrectional records on each offender. Interviews of

the offenders focused on seven areas: background,family structure, attitudes toward authority, criminalhistory, weapons training and use, description of theincident setting, and perspective on the incident.

To protect the victim officers and their depart-ments from unwanted attention and to encourage themto be as candid as possible, the authors grantedanonymity to the study participants. Similarly, theoffenders and the penal institutions that housed themwere granted anonymity.

THE FINDINGSThe sample for this study was small and not

scientifically random; therefore, results should not begeneralized. Nevertheless, the wealth of data thestudy presents on the officers, the offenders, and theincidents that brought them together can provide

insight for administrators evaluating theirdepartments policies, training, and proce-dures, as well as for individual officersevaluating their own daily practices.

The OfficersThe 52 officers who agreed to partici-

pate in the study realized that their actionswould come under intense scrutiny. Theyset aside their personal concerns andshared their information and insight,hoping to help their colleagues preventserious injury or death during a line-of-duty assault.

DemographicsThe victim officers in the study were

predominantly male (88 percent), married(62 percent), white (90 percent), andcollege educated (58 percent). Theyaveraged 5 feet 9 inches tall, 186 pounds,33 years of age, and 8 years of law en-forcement service. This description closelyresembles that of the officers killed in theline of duty from 1986 through 1995.

Behavioral CharacteristicsThe demographic descriptions of the

assault survivors were not the only factors

February 1998 / 17

that mirrored the characteristics of officers killed inthe line of duty; the officers also shared many behav-ioral traits. To develop a behavioral profile of thevictim officers, the authors reviewed the availablewritten documentation and observed and evaluatedthe behavior and comments of victims during theinterview process. Following the agreement ofanonymity with the officers, the authors could notcontact the officers peers or supervisors, so theseobservations could not be validated independently.Nevertheless, the recorded behavioral characteristicsoffer some telling clues about the victimofficers.

One frequently mentionedadjective was hard-working.These officers sought to be the bestcops possible, and they often tookrisks to achieve this objective. Formany, being the best meant produc-ing the most arrests, traffic cita-tions, and reports. One officer,named officer of the month priorto his assault, described takingshortcuts to increase his productiv-ity. For example, he often servedwarrants alone. He never requestedbackup, never advised the dis-patcher of his plan or location, andnever expected to be shot by the individual he at-tempted to arrest.

Nineteen officers studied were assaulted whenthey unilaterally took action in response to a situation.Would the outcomes have been different if help hadbeen available? No one can say for sure. Neverthe-less, such high-risk behaviors demonstrate that somehard-working officers might be ignoring rules estab-lished for their safety. The real question is whetherboosting productivity statistics merits the risksinvolved.

If risk taking got them into trouble, the will tosurvive kept these officers alive. The authors ob-served a tremendous determination to live in virtuallyall of the officers interviewed. One officer said shewas determined to survive so that her parents, wholived 700 miles away, would not be notified of herdeath by a telephone call. An officer shot in a dirty,

trash-filled building refused to die in such a place. Heused his shoestrings as tourniquets to stop the bleed-ing from serious arm and leg wounds, made his wayout of the building, and found a citizen to call forhelp.

Another officer suffered a severe bullet wounddirectly below his eye. After being unconscious for anunknown period of time, he concentrated on observ-ing his breath in the cold night air, believing that aslong as he focused on breathing he would continue tolive. Nearly blinded, he stuck the thumb of his weakhand into his wound and held it there to control thebleeding while he held his weapon in his strong hand.

Without a portable radio to call forhelp, the officer struggled approxi-mately 300 yards to his patrol unitto summon aid.

These officers walked,crawled, and limped away from thescenes of their assaults. Theyrefused to give up. They weresurvivors.

The OffendersThe victim officers in the study

possessed a preconceived image ofthe kind of person they consideredlikely to assault them. The data

suggest, however, that no singular profile exists of anindividual who would assault, attempt to kill, oractually kill a police officer. Officers preconceivedideas of the assaulter profile were of little value insecuring their personal safety.

To paint the clearest possible picture of theassaults and the people involved, the authors inter-viewed the offenders. Of the 42 offenders inter-viewed, 38 were still in prison at the time of theinterview. The authors met with the remaining fouroffenders, who had been released from prison, in theirlocal communities.

DemographicsThe offenders were generally male (93 percent),

young (average age 27 years), nonwhite, single, andhigh school educated. Compared to the victim offi-cers, the offenders were younger, less likely to have

OfficersOfficersOfficersOfficersOfficerspreconceived ideaspreconceived ideaspreconceived ideaspreconceived ideaspreconceived ideas

of the assaulterof the assaulterof the assaulterof the assaulterof the assaulterprofile were of littleprofile were of littleprofile were of littleprofile were of littleprofile were of littlevalue in securingvalue in securingvalue in securingvalue in securingvalue in securing

their personaltheir personaltheir personaltheir personaltheir personalsafety.safety.safety.safety.safety.

18 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

families, and less educated. Physically, the averageoffender was 5 feet 9 inches tall and weighed 170pounds, a stature similar to that of the victim officers.

Authors asked the offenders to describe theirfamily status and history. None of this informationwas corroborated with other family members. Accord-ing to the offenders, their mothers were the mostsignificant figures in their families;yet, 43 percent reported that theirnatural fathers had been presentmost of the time. They frequentlyreported hostile and aggressiverelationships with both the domi-nant male and female members ofthe household. Over one-half of theassaulters said that their familiessolved problems by arguing,shouting, and initiating physicalviolence.

While the earlier study ofpolice killers demonstrated parallelfindings on family composition, theassaulters tended to report less instability in familycaretaking and less physical and psychological abusewithin the family than did the killers. Also, althoughmost assaulters considered their preadult economicstatus to be marginal or lower, most of the killers inthe earlier study considered their economic status tohave been at least average or comfortable.

Criminal HistoryThe self-reported average age at which offenders

committed their first crime was 11. For more thantwo-thirds of the offenders, this crime was larceny-theft. Across the board, they reported weaponsviolations with greater frequency than any othercrime. The criminal histories of these offenderscoincide with the predominant incarcerating offensesof all convicted felons.4 Twenty-four of the 42offenders reported having been involved in shootingincidents (either firing or being fired upon) prior tothe assault under study. Notably, 21 percent of theoffenders reported having attempted to assault apolice officer in the past.

Some of the offenders can best be described asstreet combat veterans, based on the frequency of

their involvement in exchanges of gunfire with othercriminals and police. In 8 of the 40 incidents exam-ined, offenders used more than one weapon, includingknives and blunt objects, as well as hands, fists, andfeet, but firearms were by far the weapons of choicein the incidents studied. Fifty of the 52 officers wereassaulted with firearms, and availability was the

overriding factor in weapon choice.When questioned about their

preferred method for carrying ahandgun on their persons, 36percent of the offenders reportedcarrying the weapons in the groinarea. One-half of these felt thisarea was most overlooked by lawenforcement personnel whoconduct searches. When in avehicle, 50 percent of the offenderscarried their handguns directly ontheir persons. Over one-fourth ofthe offenders reported carrying asecond weapon, usually a handgun,

at least part of the time, with the expressed intent ofusing it against a law enforcement officer or anyoneelse who removed their primary weapon. Clearly, theoffenders familiarity, proficient use, and methods ofcarrying and concealing handguns should be consid-ered when agencies develop procedures for approach-ing and searching suspects.

Alcohol or Drug UseAmong the offenders studied, 62 percent were

using drugs, alcohol, or both at the time of the inci-dent. Simultaneous use of drugs, usually cocaine, andalcohol was most common. One offender describedthe effect of drugs on his behavior:

Heroin makes you feel invincible; cocaine makesyou feel defensive and somewhat paranoid. Drugsdo not hinder your ability to use a firearm.5 Theymake you quicker to shoot. When youre ondrugs, youre irritable and cranky and may bequicker to use a gun.This offender, involved in an armed robbery

interrupted by a police officer, indicated that he didnot necessarily intend to hurt the officer, just to avoidcapture. If captured, he knew he would be unable to

Fifty of the 52Fifty of the 52Fifty of the 52Fifty of the 52Fifty of the 52officers wereofficers wereofficers wereofficers wereofficers were

assaulted withassaulted withassaulted withassaulted withassaulted withfirearms, andfirearms, andfirearms, andfirearms, andfirearms, and

availability was theavailability was theavailability was theavailability was theavailability was theoverriding factor inoverriding factor inoverriding factor inoverriding factor inoverriding factor in

weapon choice.weapon choice.weapon choice.weapon choice.weapon choice.

February 1998 / 19

satisfy his need for more drugs, which motivated therobbery in the first place.

Offenders Perspectives on the IncidentsWhile the opinions of the offenders are highly

subjective and suspect, the manner in which anoffender perceives a particular event emerged as animportant issue. Although their perceptions might notbe completely accurate, they based their actions onthose perceptions.

The authors asked the offenders to describe theassault circumstances and to assess the victim officersinvolved in the study. Sixty-five percent of the

offenders said the attack on the victim officer wasimpulsive, unplanned, or opportunistic. One-third (13)of the offenders stated that nothing the officers couldhave done would have prevented the attacks.

The offenders reported a variety of intentions atthe time of the assault, including to

Escape or avoid arrest, 38 percent

Kill the victim officer, 19 percent

Frighten the officer, 14 percent

Wound the officer, 7 percent

Immobilize the officer, 2 percent.6

While patrolling in her cruiser at about4 a.m. on a fall Thursday morning in a large city,a 29-year-old officer was stopped by a citizenwho reported the theft of his fathers car. Shewas advised that the car would contain severaloccupants, including anHispanic male reportedlycarrying a firearm. Shortlyafter broadcasting the theft,the officer spotted the vehicle,which was occupied by onefemale and two male suspects.Stopping the vehicle, theofficer observed a white malepassenger exit the car andattempt to leave the scene. Shedetained him, frisked him forweapons, and, finding himclean, let him go. The officerthen ordered the Hispanic male from the car,requested identification, and conducted a bodysearch, which revealed possession of a huntingknife.

While the suspect was being placed underarrest for carrying a concealed weapon, astruggle ensued. As the officer and her assailantwrestled on the ground, he attempted to grab herweapon. Unable to obtain it, the man called to

Potential Threats from Passengers

his female companion to go to the vehicle andretrieve his gun. The 29-year-old accomplicebrought the gun to the assailant, and as both theofficer and perpetrator got to their feet, the manthreatened to kill the officer if she did not relin-

quish her weapon. Instead, shedrew her revolver, and whileshe exchanged gunfire with theoffender, he shot her once inthe left arm with a .25-calibersemiautomatic weapon. Theofficer, who was wearing aprotective vest, returned firewith her .357-magnum re-volver, striking the assailant inthe abdomen, leg, and pelvis.The offender continued to fireat the officer but withoutfurther effect. The two perpe-

trators then fled the scene, and the officer radioedthat she had been shot.

The officer later reported that she had notviewed the female passenger as a threat. Thefemale offender reported that she had intended todisarm the officer prior to the start of the shooting.Even though she was just 2 feet away from theofficer when firing began, the officer had paid noattention to her and issued no commands.

Photo Photodisc

20 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

In all but one case examined, the offender at-tacked first. Thirty-one percent of the offendersbelieved the officer was surprised by the attack.Nineteen percent of the offenders described theofficer as capable or professional, while an equalnumber said the officer seemed unprepared or indeci-sive in the face of the attack.

Four of the offenders admitted membership instreet gangs and exhibited a street gang mentality.Two of them were paid $50 to kill the next drugenforcement officer who entered a particular area.Regardless of whether the gang members werearrested, they still would receive status and respect-ability within the gang. In describing the contractshooting of the officer, one offender recounted theofficer begging for his life and offering money ascompensation. The offender reportedly responded,

We dont want your money, we want your life. Heand a fellow gang member then shot the officer seventimes and left him for dead. All four of the gangmembers interviewed exhibited this type of cold-blooded, remorseless mentality.

The SituationsTo understand the incidents fully, the authors

thoroughly assessed the circumstances surroundingthe assaults. This assessment included the type of callbeing handled, the location, the modes of transporta-tion used by officers and offenders, the environment,and the weapons used.

Of the 40 cases examined, 50 percent involvedresponses to disturbance calls, 20 percent occurredwhile officers investigated suspicious persons orcircumstances, and 18 percent happened during traffic

stops or pursuits. Sixty percent of theassaults took place on a road or in an alley.Eighty percent of the officers and nearlyhalf of the offenders arrived at the scene inmotor vehicles. In more than 75 percent ofthe incidents, the assault occurred at thesame location as the initial encounterbetween the offenders and the officers.

Most assaults occurred at nighttime,with 62 percent between the hours of 6p.m. and 6 a.m. One-fourth of the assaultsoccurred between noon and 6 p.m. Thetiming of the assaults raises visibility as apossible issue warranting safety trainingattention. In some instances, officers alsohad to contend with fog, rain, total dark-ness or only partial lighting during theassaults. While these environmentalfactors did not precipitate the attacks, theydid affect the officers ability to respondeffectively.

The authors also examined the princi-pal weapons used by both parties in theassaults. As noted, offenders used fire-arms, mainly handguns, to assault 50 of the52 officers in this study. Some also struckofficers with blunt objects or cut them withknives. All of the victim officers werearmed with handguns; three also had

Surprise Assault from Bystander

On a spring Friday evening at approximately 9oclock, a 26-year-old uniformed officer and hispartner were patrolling in their marked police carwhen they observed a vehicle run a stop sign andpulled it over. During the stop, a man approached thescene on foot from an alley. Observing the traffic stopin progress, the man opened fire with a 9-millimetersemiautomatic handgun. The victim officer, who waswearing a protective vest, was hit several times in thelower leg. Neither officer was aware of the offenderspresence until the shots were fired.

Fleeing the scene, the 18-year-old assailantdisposed of the weapon. Several witnesses identifiedthe gunman, and officers later arrested him at hisresidence. Apparently angry over a recent controver-sial court verdict, the assailant was using drugs at thetime of the assault and reportedly had set out to attacka police officer. He had a prior criminal history. Thewounded officer, who had 2 years of service, returnedto duty after 7 days of hospitalization and 4 months ofrehabilitation.

February 1998 / 21

personally owned shotguns and one wasarmed with a submachine gun. Fortypercent of the officers fired their weapons.None of the victim officers had rifles,chemical agents, or tasers. Seven officerswere disarmed and had their firearms usedagainst them. Offenders firing handgunshit their intended targets 91 percent of thetime; officers, 41 percent. It should benoted, however, that the offenders firedfirst in most cases. With shotguns, theoffenders fired with 43 percent accuracyand the officers with 100 percentaccuracy.7

In most situations, the victim officersinitially perceived that they were dealingwith minor offenders who were reluctantto go to jail. The offenders, on the otherhand, were fighting for their lives andtheir freedom. Approximately two-thirdsof the officers reported having no indica-tion of the impending attack. Only afterbeing injured seriously did some of themrealize they were engaged in life-and-death struggles, not just minor physicalaltercations.

RECOMMENDATIONSSeveral significant issues related to officer safety

emerged from the authors analysis of these incidents.The full report recommends policy and trainingreviews in such areas as use of force, traffic stops,and searches.8

Use of ForceDuring the assaults, the officers in the study

generally recalled what not to do and when not to useforce, but some had difficulty recalling when the useof force was an appropriate, timely, necessary, andpositive decision. Some had problems recalling theiragencies deadly force policies and determining whento progress to the next level of force, and manyofficers experienced great difficulty recognizing thepoint at which they actually were fighting for theirlives.

Clearly, agencies should review their use-of-force policies to ensure that all elements of thepolicy are clearly articulated and easily understood.Further, officers should be tested regularly to ensuretheir proper recall of the policy, and trainers shouldstress positive aspects of the policy, especially theproper time to use deadly force, while not overem-phasizing the negative aspects, such as when not toshoot.

The victim officers in this study also reportedthat repetitive safety training reflecting real-lifecircumstances enabled them to survive potentiallylethal situations. In contrast, they believed trainingthat reinforced improper procedures or was deficientin some element could endanger officers.

Traffic StopsThis study and the 1992 study of officers killed

both serve as reminders that traffic stopstasksfrequently viewed as routine and repetitivepose apotentially grave threat to officers. Few officers

Prepare to Be Attacked

When a 40-year-old sergeant left the police station atnoon to have lunch one fall Tuesday, he monitored a callconcerning a holdup alarm at a bank approximately fourblocks away. He notified dispatch that he would re-spond, even though the dispatcher called back to informhim that the alarm was accidental.

Entering the vestibule area near the front door of thebank, he observed an individual dressed in a suspiciousmanner. Upon turning and seeing the uniformed ser-geant, the suspect began firing a .25-caliber semiauto-matic handgun. The 14-year veteran officer then re-treated from the bank and sought protection behind hisvehicle. The assailant pursued the sergeant, continuingto fire as he did so. The officers return fire struck theoffender twice. The officer was not injured in theincident.

In later interviews, the officer expressed shock atwhat transpired. He expected the offender to flee, notpursue him. None of his prior training had prepared himfor the possibility of being pursued and attacked aftertaking cover.

22 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

considered that someone they stopped for a minorinfraction of the law would consider taking their livesin an effort to escape. The officers desire to producestatistics, whether internally or externally motivated,sometimes caused them to take safety-related short-cuts, such as failing to inform dispatchers of theiractions. In addition, officers rarely considered thephysical surroundings when they chose to maketraffic stops. Finally, on very hot days, officers weremore reluctant to wear their soft body armor.

In light of the high risk oftraffic stops, departmental enforce-ment policies should includesections dealing with officersafety. These sections shouldaddress proper selection of a stoplocation, required notification ofthe police dispatcher, and requiredwearing of soft body armor. Wheretwo-officer units are employed,departments should ensure that theresponsibilities of each officer areclearly established and understood.Departments also should reviewpolicies that allow officers to bringthe driver of a stopped vehicleback to the police car.

SearchesSearches proved to be problematic for several

reasons with severe consequences. Officers experi-enced problems remaining focused while conductingsearches, often because of their perceived need togain physical control of the offender. In addition,when they recovered items of contraband during asearch, the officers attention often shifted to makingan arrest. This caused them to overlook weapons thatcould then be used against them.

Concerns over contracting communicable dis-eases, such as AIDS, often superseded officersconcerns for immediate physical safety. They alsoexpressed displeasure at searching the groin area ofmale subjects, and while they would pat down thisarea on the outside of the clothing, they were reluc-tant to go into the subjects clothing there. Severaloffenders, aware of the officers reluctance, reportedthat the groin area was normally where they secretedweapons and contraband. Male officers expressed

similar hesitation at thoroughly searching femalesubjects for fear of complaints. In the absence ofwritten directives regarding this practice, theofficers were unsure when thorough searcheswould be justified.

To overcome these problems, proper train-ing should simulate realistic situations, includ-ing procedures for searches conducted duringthe day, at night, under low levels of lighting, inresidences and other locations, and with resist-

ing subjects. Departmentsshould establish a core policygoverning the proper searchof all persons arrested forviolations of the law. Prison-ers should be searchedthoroughly by each officeraccepting responsibility forcustody of the prisoner. Sucha policy should also addressthorough searches of policevehicles at the beginning ofduty tours, especially if carsare used on a rotating basis.Administrators should ensureadequate supplies of proper

safety equipmentespecially for officers whoregularly arrest and transport drug law viola-torsto reduce officer concerns about searchingoffenders who present an offensive or question-able appearance.

CONCLUSIONThis study clearly shows that an arrest for an

apparently minor infraction of the law mightwell result in a felonious assault against a policeofficer. All members of a law enforcementagency, from administrator through patrolofficer, must be aware of the risks and activelyprepare for them. Administrators must devisepolicies and provide the types of training andequipment that address the safety needs of theirofficers. They must also ensure that seeminglyunrelated policies or procedures, such as thesystem of rewards for performance, do notunwittingly undermine officer safety. Similarly,officers must use all of the resources available tothem to ensure their own safety, as well as that

SeveralSeveralSeveralSeveralSeveraloffenders...reportedoffenders...reportedoffenders...reportedoffenders...reportedoffenders...reportedthat the groin areathat the groin areathat the groin areathat the groin areathat the groin area

was normally wherewas normally wherewas normally wherewas normally wherewas normally wherethey secretedthey secretedthey secretedthey secretedthey secretedweapons andweapons andweapons andweapons andweapons andcontraband.contraband.contraband.contraband.contraband.

February 1998 / 23

Friendly

Hard-working

Service-oriented

Willing to use force when justified

Do not follow established rules andprocedures, especially in regard to arrests,traffic stops, and calling for or waiting foravailable backup

Feel able to read situations or persons andwill drop guard as a result

Survivors

Behavioral CharacteristicsBehavioral CharacteristicsBehavioral CharacteristicsBehavioral CharacteristicsBehavioral Characteristicsof Officers Killedof Officers Killedof Officers Killedof Officers Killedof Officers Killed

Behavioral Descriptors

Behavioral CharacteristicsBehavioral CharacteristicsBehavioral CharacteristicsBehavioral CharacteristicsBehavioral Characteristicsof Officers Assaultedof Officers Assaultedof Officers Assaultedof Officers Assaultedof Officers Assaulted

Friendly to everyone

Well-liked by community and department

Tend to use less force than other officers feltthey would use in similar circumstances

Hard-working

Tend to perceive duties as more publicrelations than law enforcement

Service-oriented

Use force only as last resort

Do not follow all of the rules, especially inregard to arrests, confrontations withprisoners, traffic stops, and waiting foravailable backup

Feel able to read people and situations andwill drop guard as a result

Tend to look for good in others

Laid-back and easygoing Source: In the Line of Fire

Dr. Pinizzotto and Mr. Davis serve as instructors in theBehavioral Science Unit of the Training Division at the FBIAcademy in Quantico, Virginia. Mr. Miller serves as aninstructor in the Education/Training Services Unit of theFBIs Criminal Justice Information Services Division inClarksburg, West Virginia.

of their partners, innocent bystanders, and the sub-jects they encounter. In order to serve and protect thecommunity, law enforcement officers must first beprepared to protect themselves.

Endnotes1 U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Crime

in the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice,Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1994).

2 U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Killedin the Line of Duty: A Study of Selected Felonious Killings of LawEnforcement Officers (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice,Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1992).

3 For the complete report, see Anthony J. Pinizzotto, Edward F.Davis, and Charles E. Miller, In the Line of Fire: Violence Against LawEnforcement (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, FederalBureau of Investigation, and the National Institute of Justice, 1997). Thisresearch was funded in part by a National Institute of Justice grant and

earned the University of Virginias Jefferson Award for significantresearch in 1997.

4 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Felony Sentencing in the United States,1992 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 1996).

5 This statement reflects the personal opinion of the offender and is notsupported by clinical data.

6 The remaining offenders gave no specific answer to the question.7 One officer fired a shotgun once from a distance of 30 feet.8 Other areas addressed in the report include waiting for backup, use

of handcuffs, off-duty performance, postassault trauma, and post-incidentrecovery.

24 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

In October 1997, correctional officer IranShuttlesworth was convicted of the kidnap-ping and first-degree sexual assault of aMilwaukee woman. As they do in manycrimes, examiners from the FBI Laboratoryhad compared the suspects DNA to that of asemen stain found on the victims clothing.At the trial, an exam-iner testified that theFBI had identifiedShuttlesworth as thesource of the semenstain.

This case repre-sents a major break-through for DNAevidence. Althoughrecognized as thegenetic blueprint for anindividual, in the past,DNA tests could do nomore than show that anindividual could not beexcluded as a possiblesource of an evidencestain. Sometimes theodds of another person in a given populationhaving the same DNA were astronomical;nevertheless, scientists could not positivelylink a specific person with a particularevidence stain.

Improved profiling techniques, as well asan unparalleled statistical base, provide theframework for this scientific breakthrough.In a process known as Restriction FragmentLength Polymorphism (RFLP) typing, FBIscientists generate DNA profiles from sixsites, or loci, on the DNA molecule. Theseloci provide enough information to comparewith the DNA profiles from evidence stains

Forensic UpdateForensic UpdateForensic UpdateForensic UpdateForensic Update

and declare a match. Experts then comparethe matching profile to various populationgroups and calculate the likelihood of select-ing an individual from the population with asimilar profile. If that number proves exceed-ingly rare, the suspect can be named as thesource of the evidentiary stain. The ability to

do so testifies to theFBIs statisticalmethods. In addition,improvements in RFLPtyping have allowedthe FBI to examine sixloci in less than 2weeks, a process thatonce took more thanthree times that longand involved only foursites. Moreover, onceDNA testing requiredrelatively large stainswith high-qualityDNA, and it tookweeks to reach a

conclusion. Today, however, FBI scientistscan type DNA from the back of a postagestamp, the shaft of a hair, and the end of acigarette in a matter of days. Over a decadeof research paved the way for the FBIsability to match suspects to evidence stains.

Now the equivalent of molecule finger-prints, DNA profiles have indeed proven tobe valuable investigative tools. As the FBILaboratory continues to develop innovativetechnologies and share its expertise withcriminal justice professionals worldwide, ittakes great strides in bringing offenders toswift and sure justice, while clearinginnocent individuals and protecting crimevictims.

DNA Profiling Advancement

February 1998 / 25

he skyrocketing crime rate

CombatingCombatingCombatingCombatingCombatingGangsGangsGangsGangsGangs

The Need forInnovation

By LISA A. REGINI

Communities throughout thecountry have implemented policingstrategies aimed at addressing theircriminal street gang problems, hop-ing to improve the quality of life ina local neighborhood and the com-munity as a whole. These strategiesoften include the use of long-existing provisions such as loitering

ordinances and injunctions. Manycomplex constitutional issues arisewhen these measures are used tocombat gang activity. This articleexamines recent decisions by theIllinois Supreme Court, whichfound a gang loitering ordinanceuncon-stitutional and the CaliforniaSupreme Court, which upheld the

innovative anticrime strategies tocombat this increase. Law enforce-ment officials realized that greatercommunity involvement was neces-sary if anticrime initiatives were tobe successful. A factor contributingto this involvement is how a givenneighborhood perceives the effec-tiveness of law enforcement andthe viability of anticrime efforts. Tolessen the gap between law enforce-ment and the community it serves, arenewed emphasis was placed onthe investigation and prosecution ofquality-of-life crimes.1

There may be no greater factorcontributing to a neighborhoodsblight than the presence of anorganized criminal street gang. Asgraphically described by theCalifornia Supreme Court in a re-cent case, one community hadbecome an urban war zone, and a4-block neighborhood within thiscommunity was described as anoccupied territory where ...mur-der, attempted murder...vandalism,arson, and theft are common-place...[and where] area residentshave had their garages used asurinals...and even their vehiclesturned into a sullen canvas of ganggraffiti. 2

Tof the past few decades hasforced policy makers to adopt

Photo Mark Ide

26 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

Special Agent Regini is a legalinstructor at the FBI Academy.

use of an injunction to target gangconduct that creates a publicnuisance.

CRIMINAL STREET GANGLOITERING ORDINANCES

The Chicago ExperimentIn 1992, the Chicago City

Council held hearings to address theproblems gang members were caus-ing in local communities. Commu-nity residents testified that gangmemb