FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin - Jan00leb

8/9/2019 FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin - Jan00leb

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January 2000 / 1

his broadcast interruptedthe workday for hundreds oflocal, state, and federal law

city and town leaders, must con-sider how they would manage aWMD attack, especially how theywould make a successful transitionfrom crisis management at thescene to consequence management(i.e., managing the aftermath of acrisis, including tending to theneeds of the population) after theattack.

Recent legislation has ad-dressed these areas by 1) designat-ing the FBI as the lead federal

agency for the crisis management ofany domestic terrorism incident, in-cluding any incidents that occur onmilitary facilities;2 2) tasking the

Dateline: November 19, 1997,

New London, Connecticut. Atapproximately 11:30 this morning,

the U.S. Naval Submarine Base

at New London, Connecticut,became the target of a possible

terrorist attack. Initial reportsindicate that hostages may have

been taken, although the numberof hostages is unknown, and the

terrorists have not made public

demands at this time. A railroadtanker carrying hazardous

materials appears to havederailed inside the base; however,

it remains unclear if this derail-

ment is related to the hostage

taking....

Exercise BaselineTraining for TerrorismBy GARY J. ROHEN, M.S.

Tenforcement officers, military per-sonnel, and public safety employ-ees. Fortunately, the scenario wasfictitious; it was, in fact, a trainingexercise designed to test the abilityof jurisdictions to respond to theterrorist attacks that many expertsbelieve are inevitable. Without suchtraining scenarios, American townsremain vulnerable to a terrorist at-

tack employing weapons of massdestruction (WMD).1 All levels ofgovernment, from the executivebranch of the federal government to


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For training

to providesignificantvalue, realism

must play acentral role.

2 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

U.S. Department of Defense withproviding training and equipment tocivilian first responders, such asemergency medical technicians,firefighters, police officers, andemergency management person-nel;3 and 3) delegating to the Fed-eral Emergency ManagementAgency (FEMA)4 the developmentof a federal response plan that ad-dresses both crisis management and

the subsequent transition to conse-quence management.

Yet, for all the legislation,funding, and memorandums of un-derstanding, nothing provides amore effective preparation than anactual hands-on exercise. One suchexercise, Baseline, involved theFBIs New Haven, Connecticut,Field Office, and the U.S. NavalSubmarine Base at New London,Connecticut. It became the first testof the FBI WMD Joint OperationsCenter (JOC) model,5 which seeksto integrate interagency emergencymanagement functions; provide acommand, control, communica-tions, and intelligence architecture

for all participating agencies; andcoordinate all crisis resolution andsubsequent consequence manage-ment operations.

ESTABLISHINGTHE BASELINE

In June 1996, the FBIs NewHaven Field Office conducted anassessment survey that identifiedthe U.S. Navy Submarine Base at

New London as a high-val uefacility vulnerable to terrorist ac-tion. In addition, the New Londonarea serves as home to the companythat builds and fits many of thenations nuclear submarines. Be-cause of the FBIs lead role in ter-rorist incidents, a senior-level FBIagent served as the on-scene com-mander. He coordinated with thebase commander, who played an in-tegral role in the JOC commandgroup and participated in all critical

decisions during the exercise. AJOC should accommodate the in-frastructure for all three phasesof WMD operational management,including

the establishment of anIncident Command System(ICS) by local and state

agencies, set up soon afterthe incident occurs;

the FBIs crisis managementresponse; and

FEMAs consequence man-agement infrastructure.

Overlap occurs during all threephases across almost all agencies.Proper JOC site selection must in-volve all administration levels,from local agencies to the executivebranch of the federal government.

THE SCENARIO

For training to provide signifi-cant value, realism must play acentral role. The planning andpreparation phase took place overan 18-month period and includedmultiagency crisis managementtraining. This training involved les-sons the FBI learned from actualWMD incidents. To foster the inter-est of all participants, each partici-pating agency had potential emer-

gency management responsibilitiesfor the area and provided input todevelop the scenario, as well as itsgoals and objectives, to ensureapplicability for their respectiveagency functions. Agencies fromthe state of Connecticut, the federalgovernment, and the military, aswell as local police and fire ser-vices, provided participants. Theexercise intended to facilitate apositive interaction among all agen-cies and to familiarize other agen-

cies with the FBIs crisis manage-ment model.

To reinforce basic crisis man-agement principles and to foster im-proved liaison during an actual

Formerly the Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the FBIs New HavenField Office, Special Agent Rohen currently serves in the NationalSecurity Division, FBI Headquarters, Washington, DC.


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WMD incident, all agencies withpotential emergency managementresponsibilities for the area were in-

vited. Ultimately, 16 agencies, withover 100 representatives, partici-pated in the scenario.

A multiagency working groupdeveloped scenario requirements,which focused on a credible chemi-cal/biological threat from a domes-tic terrorist group. The scenarioincluded an explosion and a derail-ment of railroad cars carrying haz-ardous material (HazMat) on thesubmarine base. This served as adiversion and gave sufficient expe-

rience to state and local respondersfor consequence management of aHazMat/WMD incident. Addition-ally, the terrorist group took controlof a building on the base and heldhostages. This increased the threatand required negotiations, whicheventually resolved the threatenedrelease of a chemical/biologicalagent.

The working group based thedesign philosophy of the scenarioon reality. As part of the exercise

plan, the group selected the biologi-cal agent based on what an averageperson could reasonably exploitwith minimal training, public-source information, such as theInternet, and readily obtainable in-gredients. At the same time, the sce-nario did not employ often-usedbiological agents, which have well-documented characteristics andmay have generated predictable,textbook solutions. Instead, thegroup selected rabies as the biologi-cal threat agent. Potential terroristscould produce distributable vol-umes of the virus without sophisti-cated lab equipment by trapping

diseased livestock. From a psycho-logical perspective, the generalpublic almost universally recog-

nizes and fears rabies, adding to thescenarios reality.In addition, a technician work-

ing with bomb experts devised, pro-duced, and tested a realistic, practi-cal delivery system at the FBIAcademy. Each delivery devicecontained liquid rabies, placed in20-ounce soda bottles and separatedby a contoured freezer pack con-taining plastic explosives, all ofwhich was packed inside a soft, six-pack-size beverage cooler. The de-

vice used a blasting cap and a stan-dard antipersonnel mine to generatea charge. Upon command detona-tion, the device would release anaerosol mist of the deadly rabiesvirus.

exposed to Agent Orange andGulf War Syndrome (GWS).Additionally, they each had chil-

dren who suffered from GWSsymptoms. Because of their back-grounds and beliefs, the charactersdemanded immediate governmentacknowledgment of GWS and paidmedical treatment for veterans andtheir families.

Agency Coordination

To ensure involvement by allexercise participants, the scenariorequired action and coordinationamong all agencies. The exercise

involved two related events at thesubmarine base. The first event, thedeliberate derailment of a train, in-cluded a number of tank cars thatcontained very large quantities ofhazardous compounds.The derail-ment technique ensured that thetrain overturned and hazardous flu-ids leaked from the tank cars. Theexplosive charge that caused the de-railment also spread an incendiarymixture, which enhanced the air-borne dissemination of toxic mate-

rials, further complicating theHazMat response. This derailmentinitiated a first response by localpolice and fire units and their estab-lishment of a local ICS to deal withthe HazMat and train derailmentsituation. First, the local police andfire departments implemented thelocal ICS to determine the extent ofinjuries or fatalities and to assessthe effects of the explosion. TheFBIs exercise objective was to testthe integration of an ongoing ICSwith the FBI JOC. To ensure real-ism, the participants walked the ac-tual railhead in the planning phaseand used public access information

WMD threatsto theUnited Statesdo exist.

Drawing upon composite pro-files of likely domestic terrorists,the group developed characters offour disgruntled Vietnam War vet-erans. The characters possessed amilitary background in specialoperations or health service andsupposedly had met and formedfriendships at veterans events andshared their views on the failure ofthe government to acknowledge andprovide medical care for veterans


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to identify the contents of scheduledtrains. By knowing the trainsschedule and its contents, the terror-

ists determined the most conducivetime to execute their plan.The second event occurred at

noon, approximately 30 minutes af-ter the train derailment. The actorsseized a fast-food restaurant andheld the occupants hostage. Aftermoving the hostages to the roof ofthe building due to the need to dis-perse the biological agent in the air,they demanded that the president orthe secretary of defense admit toboth deliberately contaminating the

environment and endangering thehealth of the military forces and sur-rounding communities. The adver-saries prepared to disseminate ap-proximately 3.5 gallons of therabies if the president or secretaryfailed to make such an admission.The crisis response plan includedactivating the JOC (the FBI re-sponded to the crisis in less than 1hour). Extensive negotiation par-tially achieved crisis resolutionwhen the hostage takers released

some of the hostages. However, thedetonation of the biological agentappeared imminent when the sub-jects became irrational with the ne-gotiator. The hostage taker pickedup the detonator device, presentinga danger to the hostages. At thispoint, negotiations broke down withthe subjects, and the decision mak-ers exercised final tactical solutionby using both special weapons andtactics and hostage rescue teammembers to intervene.

Exercise Methodology

Unlike the active military, mostfederal, state, and local agencies

lack the required on-scene infra-structure to rapidly establish an op-erating command post. Accord-

ingly, the planning group requestedthat the National Guard providecritical communications and logis-tical support. The group housed thecrisis and consequence manage-ment team under one roof. Theplanners established emergencyoperation centers for the statesOffice of Emergency Management(OEM), FEMA, the submarinebase, local cities and towns, andstate police, as well as major indus-tries in the area. The group placed

exercise, the chief exercise control-ler displayed the sequence of eventson an overhead projector as they

occurred. The FBI and the stateOEM developed possible actions,investigative leads, and responsesfor crisis and consequence manage-ment. An internal telephone systemestablished by the National Guardconnected exercise controllers inseparate rooms to crisis and conse-quence management components.These controllers injected descrip-tive items at the appropriate timesduring the incident while radio traf-fic and couriers provided written di-

rections to supplement internal tele-phone traffic. For example, thecontrollers could increase the mo-mentum of the exercise to stimulateinteraction or discussion by callingthe JOC and advising that a localmilitia group, out of sympathy forthe hostage takers, was comingto the base to help them in theirmission.

All exercise participants andobservers received identificationbadges and briefing books prior to

the exercise. The local police de-partment provided security for theexercise area. In order to optimizethe learning experience and to im-prove interoperability among agen-cies, a signpost clearly identifiedeach component. Extensive use of apublic address system and cinemascreen multimedia projection sys-tem ensured that all participants re-ceived regular updates on the statusof the scenario. Additionally, par-ticipants dealt with other issues ofconcern during the protractedoperation, including shift changes,rest room breaks, and nourishmentneeds. Finally, the large number of

...the controllerscould increasethe momentumof the exercise

to stimulateinteraction ordiscussion....

the crisis and consequence manage-ment operations together to facili-tate the exchange of informationduring the exercise and to provide alearning experience for all parties toobserve the full spectrum of exer-cise activities.

The scenario accommodated abriefing, a 4- to 5-hour exercise,and, finally, a postexercise hotwash (when agencies immediatelydiscussed the most salient points ofthe exercise), all within the timeconstraints of a single shift for stateand local agencies. During the


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agencies using computers and otherhigh-tech electronic devices illus-trated the need for an adequate,

stable power supply, which the siteprovided.

Postexercise Assessment

Immediately after the resolu-tion of the crisis and the hot wash,

the participants gathered to makeobservations and suggestions. A

single representative from eachparticipating agency provided ageneral and limited critique of the

exercise. The working groupprepared and furnished a transcript

Although every situation involves unique circumstances, agencies should consider the followingchecklist when selecting the site for a Joint Operations Center.

Checklist

Transportation/Accessibility

Near major roadways

Vertical clearance for helipad/airstrip

Adequate parking for all types ofvehicles

Sea and rail accessibility, if possible

Communications

Ability to accommodate large volumeof voice and data telephone lines (bestif preinstalled with prearranged trunkassignments and directories)

Availability of backup communication

lines (telephones, radios) Vertical clearance and flat, open surface

for satellite systems

Minimal spectrum interference frompower lines

Ability to accommodate more telephonelines for computers/modems to facilities

Facilities

Covered open areas (e.g., aircraft hangars),which offer greater flexibility

Adequate lighting

Securable perimeter (i.e., fenced withcontrolled access)

Life Support

Adequate plumbing or portable toilets

Adequate ventilation

Climate control

Distance from residential areas for noisepollution considerations

Kitchen/dining areas

Waste disposal with scheduled removal

Power/Electricity

Industrial electrical consumption forlighting, computers, etc.

Backup uninterrupted power supply(e.g., generators)

Special Functions Facilities

Secured, climate-controlled evidencestorage

Crime-scene reconstruction area Media/VIP briefing area

Victim/survivor recovery area


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of comments to all participants.Agency representatives commentedthat the exercise proved a positive

and worthwhile experience. At thesame time, they gained a new appre-ciation for the amount of resourcesinvolved in the planning, prepara-tion, execution, and after-action ac-tivity for the exercise. Training andbriefing initiatives over the 18-month period required substantialcommitment by all participants.Other federal, state, and local agen-cies learned how to work with avariety of agencies that have dif-ferent jurisdictions and authority.

Unlike the military, which has abui lt- in tra ining cycle , federal,state, and local agencies must con-tinue normal operations while con-ducting exercises.

The inadequacies of trainingand equipment and the lack of afull understanding of medical anddecontamination requirements in

response to a WMD incidentbecame apparent during the exer-cise. These inadequacies, although

anticipated, advocated the purposeof supporting legislation, such asthe Nunn-Lugar bill, which ap-proved WMD preparedness train-ing for state and local law enforce-ment agencies.6 Additionally, thisexercise served as a catalyst for theFBI and the state in which it washeld to conduct a seminar for healthcare professionals concerningmedical preparations to respond to aWMD incident. The Navy also leftthe exercise with a better apprecia-

tion for WMD incident preparation.The Baseline Exercise also

highlighted a collective problem ofinformation flow among the variousagencies of the JOC. Typically,each agency deployed an intelli-gence group responsible for collect-ing and analyzing information thatfocused on the essential elements

for that organization. This often re-sulted in incomplete and narrowlyinterpreted intelligence, leading to

distorted analysis and inaccurate as-sessments. As a result of this prob-lem, the FBI developed the JointInteragency Intelligence SupportElement (JIISE), a component ofthe JOC. The JIISE created a re-sponsive intelligence architectureconsisting of a collection manage-ment section, a dissemination sec-tion, and a current intelligence sec-tion. These sections integratedaccurate and up-to-date informa-tion, enhanced more efficient pro-

cessing of this information, and en-abled on-scene commanders tomake the best possible decisionsbased on this knowledge.

ADDRESSING THE MEDIA

On the day of the event, partici-pants announced the exercise with apress release, drawing immediateand considerable media attention.The press release aimed to preemptany public misperception of the ex-ercise and to ensure citizens that

confident, organized preparationsexisted to deal with a WMD inci-dent. Although exercise plannersdid anticipate the medias high levelof interest, they reacted as theywould to an actual event; they an-swered questions concerning terror-ism, in particular, a WMD incident.In this way, the exercise becameeven more realistic. To ensure thesafety of media representatives, thecommand group denied them an ac-tual view of the incident and se-lected a predetermined location forthe media to consult with spokes-persons from the FBI, Navy, andlocal town. Additionally, the com-

Baseline command center


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aw enforcement administrators know that theyshould plan for future events or assignments.

Planning for the FutureBy Robert B. Richards, M.S.

LDepending on their organizations assets and primaryjurisdiction, these situations could range from a civildisturbance to a terrorists threat to activate a weaponof mass destruction. However, administrators oftenperceive planning as tedious and formidable. Theyfeel that no matter how hard they plan or how muchthey plan, the plan never works the way they designedit. Fortunately, administrators can overcome thisnegative perception by following some basic planningprocedures.

The success or failure of the planning processhinges on administrators first answering severalcritical questions. How committed is the organizationto the planning process? Who should be involved?How long will it take? What information is needed forsuccessful planning? Who should develop the data?2

Once they have made these decisions, administratorscan begin the planning process.

Planning provides viable courses of action when

organizations encounter specific circumstances,known as contingencies, which may occur at anytime. Planning stands not as an attempt to predict thefuture but as the best chance for survival in a worldthat is constantly changing. Therefore, administratorsshould anticipate potential contingencies, continu-ously prepare for them, and regularly review anyexisting plans. Their reviews should consider anychanges in their organizations structure, assets,personnel, jurisdiction, and expertise. If they discoverany changes, administrators should develop newcourses of action or refine the existing ones for eachcontingency accordingly.

To this end, administrators should not allow timeconstraints imposed by outside influences or theirown lack of preparedness to short-circuit the planningprocess. Although the specified time limit for anoperation or assignment will dictate the amount of

time spent on the various planning phases, administra-tors still should address each phase. Additionally, thetime spent on each phase can depend on how often the

planning process takes place, whether it occurs in anactual event or during a training exercise, and howoften organizations update their standard operatingprocedures.

DEVELOPING THE PLAN

The deliberate, logical planning process beginswith having an objective, defining the problem, andgathering relevant facts associated with attaining theobjective. Then, the process moves to developingalternative approaches, evaluating the effects in termsof the desired objective, and finally, making thedecision to act in a specific manner.3 Whether senior

members of the organization or circumstances initiatethe objective, the receipt of the assignment begins theformal planning process.

Defining the Problem

First, administrators should analyze the objectiveto ensure that they fully understand the problem.Once this occurs, the definition becomes a targetafocal point toward which administrators can channeltheir problem-solving activities.4 Next, they mustdetermine whether the problem lies within the scopeof their organizations capabilities. If their organiza-tions available assets cannot support the objective,

Perspective

Special Agent Richardsserves in the Practical

Applications Unit of theFBI Academy.

The best laid schemes o mice and men oft go astray.1Robert Burns


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...each course ofaction shouldinclude basic

what, when,where, and howinformation....

administrators should consider reviewing the assign-ment and possibly scaling back their involvementor seeking assistance from other agencies. Finally,

administrators must ascertain the specific andimplied tasks required to successfully complete theassignment.

Gathering Relevant Facts

Administrators should deter-mine the information requirementsnecessary to successfully completethe objective. They should gatherinformation from various sourceswithin their organization and fromother cooperating agencies.Initially, holes or gaps may exist in

the amount and type of informa-tion available. However, adminis-trators should fill these holes bymaking educated assumptionsbased on subjective information(e.g., judgment, leadership,experience, knowledge, training,and perceptions) and then validatethese assumptions through the receipt and processingof additional information as the planning processdevelops.

Because gathering and updating information arecontinuous and concurrent actions throughout the

planning process, administrators should not plan in avacuum. Rather, they should provide supervisors andcommodity managers (those in charge of such areas ascommunication, transportation, or other supportservices) with periodic estimates of the situation.These estimates should include a logical and orderlyexamination of all of the known factors affecting theaccomplishment of the objective, any restraints orrestrictions, and a general plan of action.5 Althoughthe estimates will change during the planning process,they should remain as complete as time, availableinformation, and logical assumptions allow.

Developing Alternative ApproachesWhile administrators should consider a variety of

courses of action, they need to develop these alterna-tive approaches only to the extent that they can

analyze and compare them. For example, each courseof action should include basic what, when, where,and how information that can readily distinguish it

from the others.To this end, administrators should seek guidancefrom supervisors and commodity managers who canprovide them with unbiased and objective opinionsregarding their agencies ability to support a course of

action. This avoids wasting timecreating courses of action thattheir agencies available assetscannot support. Based on theserecommendations, administratorscan select for further developmentand comparison those approachesthat offer the greatest possibility

of success.

Evaluating the Effects

Once administrators haveformulated some courses ofaction, they should evaluate theeffects that these approaches willhave on their organizations. While

the internal structures of agencies vary, the areasmost concerned with the planning process includeadministrative, intelligence, investigative, surveil-lance, tactical, liaison, negotiation, logistical, techni-cal, media, and legal support, as well as the command

structure.6

Administrative Support

Administrative supervisors should address theavailability of personnel for the duration of the event.As the duration increases, they may face the prospectof staffing an operation 24 hours a day, 7 days aweek. If so, they need to consider such matters asbudget constraints, overtime expenses, court appear-ances, holidays, and illness.

Intelligence Support

Intelligence managers should consider the amount

and type of information currently available about theevent. They also should determine how to collect,process, and disseminate additional information asthe event unfolds.


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Investigative and Surveillance Support

Investigative supervisors should address theirability to aggressively assign, complete, process, and

retrieve investigative leads that pertain to achievingthe objective. To this end, surveillance managersshould consider their ability to collect and dissemi-nate information and conduct and maintain electronic,visual, aerial, photographic, and physical surveillancein a timely and efficient manner.

Tactical and Liaison Support

Tactical commanders should assess their capabili-ties and determine if they will need additional staff,equipment, training, or assets to achieve the objective.Supervisors should consider augmenting their existingtactical support capabilities with those from other

agencies. In conjunction with this,liaison managers should identifythose organizations that can offerassistance and determine the bestmethod of interacting with theseagencies (e.g., provide personnel tothe assisting organizations or havetheir representatives participate inthe command structure).

Negotiation Support

Negotiators should considertheir ability to function 24 hours a

day until the objective is achieved.Also, they should accumulate asmuch reference material or datathat pertains to the objective andmaintain it as part of their support.

Logistical and Technical Support

The success of any plan usually depends oneffective logistical and technical support and theproper employment of their assets. Logistical supervi-sors should consider the availability of a mobile oralternate command post. They also should addresshousing and feeding participants, providing transpor-tation, and supporting the day-to-day operation of theplan. Technical managers should consider their abilityto communicate internally and externally via radio,closed-circuit television, telephone, teletype, satellite

data links, and cryptographic means. They also shouldensure that radio frequencies are available, compat-ible, and assigned for use in a particular area of

operation, along with having repeaters (i.e., devicesthat receive and amplify electronic signals) availableand operational for primary and alternate communica-tion networks.

Media Support

Administrators often overlook media support. Amedia representative can advise the administrator, actas the spokesperson during the event, recommendpolicies and procedures regarding the disseminationof information to the general public and the media asrequired by the Freedom of Information Act,7 act asrumor control, and advise how best to use the media

for organizational purposes.Legal Support

Legal administrators can affectall of the other areas concernedwith the planning process. Typi-cally, they should provide guid-ance concerning jurisdiction andother legal ramifications of theplan, such as the use of chemicalagents or electronic eavesdroppingdevices.

Command StructureThe command structure

provides the organizationalframework necessary to success-

fully execute a course of action. Its design andfunction depends on the availability, training, experi-ence, and operational readiness of the supervisors,relief supervisors, and staff of the support areas.Administrators should develop, formalize, anddisseminate a specific command structure that clearlydelineates the responsibilities of and the authoritygiven to these supervisors and commodity managerscommensurate with their positions.

Deciding to Act

By considering all of the factors affecting thesituation, determining and analyzing feasible

...administratorsshould not allowtime constraints

imposed by outsideinfluences...to

short-circuit theplanning process.


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well, not to cast blame on any particular individualor commodity area. Administrators should ensurethat critiques remain constructive and that participantsfeel confident that they can solve the problems and

view the corrective measures as opportunities forgrowth.

CONCLUSION

Law enforcement administrators can free them-selves from their long-held belief that planning forthe future stands as a tedious and formidable taskby following some basic procedures. Theseinclude developing the plan through defining theproblem, gathering relevant facts, developing alterna-tive approaches, and evaluating the effects. Oncethey have completed these planning phases, adminis-trators can decide on their course of action, developa written plan, and then test it for potentialproblems.

Administrators should include supervisors andmanagers of support services in the planning process.

These individuals can contribute their expertiseto the process and avoid duplicative efforts. Adminis-trators also should encourage and challenge theirsubordinates to plan for the future. All law enforce-

ment professionals should remember that those whofail to plan, fail to achieve.

Endnotes

1 Robert Burns, To a Mouse, 1785; quoted in Leonard D.Goodstein, Timothy M. Nolan, and J. William Pfeiffer,Applied Strategic

Planning: A Comprehensive Guide (San Diego: Pfeiffer & Company,1992), 309.

2 Leonard D. Goodstein, Timothy M. Nolan, and J. William Pfeiffer,Applied Strategic Planning: A Comprehensive Guide (San Diego: Pfeiffer& Company, 1992), 9.

3 U.S. Marine Corps, Command and Staff Action FMFM 3-1 (March1985): 48.

4 Richard I. Lyles,Practical Management Problem Solving and

Decision Making(New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, Inc.,1982), 71.5 Supra note 3, 50-51.6 Supra note 3, 3.7 Title 5, U.S. Code, Section 552 A.

Louis A. Allen,Making Managerial Plan-ning More Effective (New York: R.R.Donnelley and Sons Company, 1982).

John Friedman,Planning in the PublicDomain: From Knowledge to Action(Princeton, NJ: Princeton UniversityPress, 1987).

Leonard D. Goodstein, Timothy M. Nolan,and J. William Pfeiffer,Applied StrategicPlanning: A Comprehensive Guide (SanDiego: Pfeiffer & Company, 1992).

Suggested Reading

Richard L. Lyles,Practical Manage-ment Problem Solving and DecisionMaking(New York: Van NostrandReinhold Company, Inc., 1982).

Spyros G. Makridakis,Forecasting,Planning and Strategy for the 21stCentury (New York: The Free Press,1990).

J. William Pfeiffer, Strategic Planning:Selected Readings (San Diego:Pfeiffer & Company, 1991).


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January 2000 / 13

uring the 1960s, an averageof 400 bank robberies oc-curred each year in the

nation in total bank robberies peryear and earning it the title BankRobbery Capital of the World. Thearea retained this title with an aver-age of 1,400 bank robberies per yearin the 1980s, which accountedfor 20 to 30 percent of all bankrobberies in the United States. Afterpeaking at 2,641 in 1992, by 1998,the number of robberies had plum-meted to 656, the lowest in 30 years.A number of factors contributed to

both the meteoric rise and precipi-tous fall of these violent crimes.

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

In general, two factors causedthe extensive number of bank rob-beries in the FBILA territory. First,

the area of Southern California sur-rounding Los Angeles has experi-enced unprecedented populationgrowth since the 1960s. Approxi-mately 17 million people now

Reducing Violent Bank

Robberies in Los AngelesBy WILLIAM J. REHDER, J.D.

DFBIs Los Angeles Field Office(FBILA) jurisdiction, which ex-ceeds 40,000 square miles and con-sists of seven counties. In the 1970s,the number of bank robberiesdoubled to almost 800 each year. In1978, the number of robberies ex-ceeded 1,000, placing the Los An-geles area ahead of the rest of the


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reside there. Second, California lawhistorically has permitted unlimitedbranch banking. Today, more than

3,500 federally insured commercialbanks, savings banks, and creditunions conduct operations in sevencounties. This vast number of rob-bery targets, coupled with the popu-lation growth, and attendant socialand criminal problems, particularlyincreased narcotics addictions andthe invasion of youthful street gang-sters onto the bank robbery scene,produced an increase in bankrobberies.

Nothing, however, prepared the

region for the explosion of bankrobberies in the early 1990s. In1992, the 2,641 robberies that oc-curred in the FBILA area compelledFBI agents to investigate approxi-mately 1 bank robbery every 42minutes of each business day. Thisdramatic increase in the number ofrobberies occurred as Californiabanking, always a fiercely competi-tive industry, faced the dual

challenges of an influx of newbranches of out-of-state bankingcorporations and a renewed inci-

dence of bank mergers. To addressthese competitive challenges, theexecutives of various banks decidedto solidify their customer base byexpanding daily business hours.Banks opened earlier, closed later,and expanded their business hoursto Saturdays, and, in some in-stances, Sundays. In order to keeppace, other bankers throughout thestate quickly followed suit. Theseadditional hours of operation dra-matically increased the exposure to

robbery of California bankbranches by approximately 40 per-cent. Using various methods, ban-dits took full advantage of thisnewly widened opportunity.

Bank Robbery Methods

Even more alarming than theincreasing number of bank robber-ies was the type of robbery expand-ing fastest. Generally, criminals use

two basic methods to rob banksthe one-on-one robbery, fre-quently featuring a demand note,

and the takeover, a rapidly grow-ing violent tactic.In one-on-one situations, rob-

bers deliver a spoken or written rob-bery message to a single victimteller. Robbers avoid attention byspeaking softly to one victim, ifthey speak at all, and by keepingcommotion to a minimum. Other in-dividuals in the bank may remaincompletely unaware of the robbery.

In contrast, criminals who usethe takeover robbery method usu-

ally demand attention and involvemultiple subjects. They intimidatevictims with various combinationsof aggressive action, includingstorming into the bank, shoutingobscenities, jumping on or overcounters, physically attacking em-ployees or customers, and wavingor firing guns. These forms of ag-gression help give the bandits com-plete control of the premises. Con-trol is central to takeover robberies,which sharply escalate the level of

threats and violence. More trau-matic and potentially explosivethan one-on-one robberies, take-overs accounted for just 3 to 5 per-cent of all bank robberies in the LosAngeles area until late 1991. Be-tween 1992 and 1996, this percent-age increased dramatically to ap-prox imat ely 20 pe rcen t. Thetakeover percentage of total robber-ies in Los Angeles from 1997 to1998 rose to 28 percenta histori-cal high.

Gang Activity

The increase in the percentageof takeover robberies in relationto total bank robberies during this

...Los Angelesarea bankrobberies

have declinedsteadily.

Special Agent Rehder serves as the bank robbery coordinatorin the FBIs Los Angeles, California, Field Office.


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January 2000 / 15

decade resulted directly fromstreet-gang activity. In late 1988and early 1989, a small group of

young South Central Los Angelesgang members affiliated with theRollin 60s Crips gang began to fre-quent crack cocaine houses oper-ated by other Rollin 60s members.These gangsters initially recruitedor strong-armed crack cocaine ad-dicts, who patronized these houses,to function as bandits at a pre-selected bank.

The gangsters prepared a de-mand note for the addicts, drovethem to the bank, and told them how

to present the note to an individualteller. After obtaining the money,the addicts returned to the car andgave it to their sponsors, who inturn gave the addicts $50$100 orcrack cocaine. The sponsors keptthe remainder of the stolen money.If police arrested the addicts duringthe robbery, the sponsors merelyleft the scene to recruit another ad-dict. These robberies flourishedfrom 1989 to 1991, accounting foralmost 250 bank heists as other

street gangsters replaced addicts asrecruited bandits.

Then, things changed in Sep-tember 1991, when a small group oftakeover robbers known as the WestHills Bandits, stole $436,000, mak-ing it the largest single takeoverrobbery in the FBILA regions his-tory at that time. When the amountof the robbers loot leaked to thepress and was published, the Rollin60s, who already sponsored mul-tiple note jobs, promptly changeddirection and went full time into thetakeover robbery business.

The fourth quarter of 1991 ex-ploded with takeover robberies asother South Central gangs sought to

emulate the success of the Rollin60s organized robberies. From late1991 to 1993, several individuals

and groups who at one time hadbelonged to or associated withstreet gangs usually affiliated withthe Crips became takeover robberyorganizer-sponsors. They neverentered the bank where they mightleave fingerprints, witnesses mightidentify them, or surveillance cam-eras might photograph them. Theseoriginal gangsters (OGs), who werein their mid- to late-20s, recruitedmuch younger neighborhood streetyouths, some as young as 15 or 16

years old, to act as the actual bandits

and hasty instructions for the rolesthey would play once inside. Fre-quently, organizers told these

youths to fire shots and act aggres-sively to intimidate as many peopleas much as possible. Thus, once therealm of only the most experiencedbandits who were more interested inmaximizing profits than terrorizingvictims, takeover robberies becamethe province of amateurs, whoknew only the fundamentals ofstreet crime. Takeover robberies be-came, in essence, indoor muggings.

Despite the unique attributes ofthe Los Angeles area, many corrup-

tive social and criminal trends origi-nate there and spread rapidly to therest of the nation. By mid-1998,FBILA already had received nu-merous communications from vari-ous jurisdictions throughout theUnited States, as well as the remain-der of California, indicating that or-ganized bank robbery crews ofstreet gangsters had traveled farfrom their home base in Los Ange-les. They had spread the contagionof the L.A.-style takeover.

LAW ENFORCEMENTRESPONSE

After painstaking work by morethan 50 FBILA special agents, twoassistant U.S. attorneys, and locallaw enforcement agencies, FBILAbuilt a strong criminal enterprisecase against several of the most pro-lific bank robbers in history. In May1993, FBILA and local police ar-rested the two originators of theseinnovative takeover robberies, andin November 1993, after pleadingguilty to bank robbery charges, thesubjects received prison sentencesof 25 and 30 years, respectively.FBILA believes these subjects

Bandit barriers...completelyenclose the tellerand adjacent cashstorage areas....

inside the bank. OGs easily re-cruited these youngsters, enticingthem with easy money, increasednotoriety among their peers, or theprospect of living out an actionfantasy.

On several occasions, FBILAinvestigators determined that tal-ent scouts sent by these organizersactually went to several South Cen-tral Los Angeles area high schoolsand forced students out of the caf-eteria line to participate in bank rob-beries. Once recruited, organizersprovided them weapons if they didnot have their own, transportationin a stolen car to a preselected bank,


17/35


planned, organized, and promotedmore than 175 bank robberies, in-cluding 85 demand note jobs and 90

takeovers. Additionally, FBILAand local law enforcement agenciesbelieve that several street gangstersdirectly imitated their role as orga-nizers and caused the continuationof takeover-bank robberies in theLos Angeles area during the past 5years. This theory concerningcriminal enterprise bank robberiesis supported by interviews of re-cently arrested takeover-robberybandits and the known lack ofgroups of bandits who rob together

as cohesive units.Cooperating withFinancial Institutions

Fortunately, the dire statisticsregarding total bank robberies andtakeovers have reduced dramati-cally since 1992. By the end of1998, the number of robberies hadfallen to 656a 75 percent reduc-tion and the lowest number in 30yearswith violent takeovers re-duced by two-thirds.

The most important factor inreducing bank robberies involvedestablishing an effective workingrelationship between law enforce-ment agencies and financial institu-tions. The evolution of this relation-ship dates back to the early 1990s.As the number of bank robberies,particularly violent takeovers, sky-rocketed, the FBILA initiated a se-ries of regularly scheduled confer-ences with bank security directorsand local law enforcement adminis-

trators. At these conferences andat formal meetings of various banksecurity associations, both FBI spe-cial agents and local law enforce-ment officers with bank robbery

expertise served as speakers andadvisors. As a result, members ofthe banking community and law en-

forcement agencies forged a new,close-knit working relationship.Subsequently, the banking commu-nity implemented one of the firstand most positive effects of thisnew working relationshipits lawenforcement-endorsed plan to con-struct bullet-resistant bandit barri-ers or access control units (ACUs)at numerous local branch officesdeemed robbery prone. Althoughexpensive, these devices provedcost-effective by dramatically re-

ducing overall bank robberieswhile virtually eliminating violenttakeovers.

proves negative, the inner door au-tomatically unlocks, allowing entryinto the facility. If the search is

posi tive, indicating a possibleweapon, the bullet-resistant seconddoor remains locked, and the personmust retreat from the portal. Theseunits originally featured a captureoption that locked a person with aweapon inside either portal. Admin-istrators strongly recommend ex-cluding this feature for customer/employee safety reasons.

Smaller facilities with limitedwalk-in traffic use a more limitedand less costly model of the ACU.

This version consists of a single,reinforced, electronically lockedentry door that customers open byinserting an encoded plastic cardinto a slot and then entering a per-sonal identification number on anattached keypad. Bank employeescan override both versions of theACU by activating an electronicswitch inside the bank when theyrecognize a customer denied accessby the system.

Imposing Strict SentencesAnother contributor to this

positive turnaround evolved fromthe Federal Uniform SentencingGuidelines of 1987, which abol-ished the preexisting federal parolesystem. An inmate now must serveat least 85 percent of a federal sen-tence, with just 15 percent reduc-tion for good behavior. Therefore,bank robbers sentenced in the LosAngeles area since 1987 do not re-turn as quickly to the street to possi-bly repeat their offenses. Thischange, in combination with theincreased use of Title 18, U.S.Code, Section 924(c), which man-dates minimum, mandatory, and

Generally,criminals use twobasic methods torob banks....

Bandit barriersclear, bullet-

resistant, Plexiglas partitionscompletely enclose the teller andadjacent cash storage areas, extend-ing from the top of the counter tothe ceiling or from the floor to theceiling at the entryway. ACUsconsist of an electronically con-trolled, double-door entry portaland adjacent exit portal. Customersaccess the inside of the bank, one ata time, by entering through the outerdoor of the entry portal. When theouter door closes, a device conductsan automatic magnetometer-typesearch for weapons. If the search


18/35


19/35


Book Review

Gang Intelligence Manual: Identifyingand Understanding Modern-Day ViolentGangs in the United States by Bill Valentine,published by Paladin Press, Boulder, Colorado,1995.

With the proliferation of gangs across thenation, ironically amid a declining crime rate,the Gang Intelligence Manualis a welcome anduseful tool for law enforcement officers. Writtenin clear, concise, and plain language, the booktakes readers through the basics for understand-ing the makeup of a gang into an in-depth view

of a variety of gangs now plaguing the UnitedStates. These gangs are both on the streets andbehind prison walls. The author analyzes theiractivities, migration, and motivations.

The author, an 18-year veteran of theNevada Department of Corrections, has com-piled a realistic, fact-filled book. It representsa valuable piece of literature for every memberof the law enforcement community involved ingang-related work and makes a great referencemanual of gang signs, symbols, and terms forparents and citizens to use to identify thepresence of gangs in their communities.

The Gang Intelligence Manualprovides anin-depth look at the nations fastest-spreading

gang problemBloods and Cripswhileshowing their significance to the crack-cocaine

trade and the effect they had on the communitiesin which they settled. This book also provides acomprehensive list and analysis of a variety ofgangsincluding the Gangster Disciples, LatinKings, Asian gangs, Jamaican Posses, HellsAngelsas well as other ethnic and racistgangs. The author even explores the historicalemergence of the Colombian cartels within andaffecting the United States and offers an over-view of their basic operations.

The book continually reinforces factorsleading to gang violence and denotes howincidents of disrespect lead to repercussions of

violence even when gang members are wrong.Just one single incident of disrespect can leadto violence and death.

The Gang Intelligence Manualdemonstrateshow gangs gain strongholds, spread theirbusiness, and increase membership whileincarcerated and interacting with fellow inmates.For example, the author discusses Carlos Rivas-Lederers contact with a small-time marijuanadealer, George Jung, in a federal prison inConnecticut. This shows how gangs, in jail, gainconfidants, future business partners, and re-cruits. It also points out how gangs can spreadacross the country through prison incarcerationin other areas.

The information in this book provides animportant framework of gang interdictionprograms. The author has compiled a compre-hensive guide that everyone can use, and manylaw enforcement officers will wholeheartedlyagree with his statement ...gangs are a nationalepidemic and can only be solved by a combinedeffort of all citizens....

Reviewed by

Sgt. Louis SavelliCitywide Anti-Gang Enforcement UnitNew York City Police Department


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January 2000 / 19

ll emergency services op-erating on a 24-hour basishave to deal with the issues

changing the number of officers onduty accordingly. This approach toreducing crime constitutes one rea-son for using alternative flexiblework practicessuch as overlap-ping shifts, alternative shift pat-terns, more part-time police offi-cers, and more civilians to carry outadministrative and clerical work.

Two other factors affecting po-lice resources involve new legisla-tion that limits the working hours of

British and European workers and amove to develop a European flavorin British towns and cities by ex-tending retail outlet operating hoursand creating a 24-hour society.These competing pressures have led

to changes in the demand for policeservices and posed problems forsome agencies. To combat thesedifficulties, the British police forcesneed efficient and effective policingtechniques,2 including the use ofshift systems in general and the Ca-nadian shift system, Ottawa, inparticular.

POLICING THE24-HOUR SOCIETY

With the recent development ofthe 24-hour society in the UnitedKingdom, some cities have encour-aged shops, cinemas, clubs, andbars to substantially lengthen theirhours of operation.3 This has led to

Aof shift work and the availability ofpersonnel. The British police forcesare no exception. However, recentinternational comparisons haveshown that England and Wales havea worse crime rate than nearly everyother major industrialized nation,1

which has placed additional pres-sure on police resources. Crime

analysts have suggested many waysof reducing crime, including tryingto match the demand for police ser-vices with police resources by look-ing at the variations in daily,weekly, or annual crime rates and

British Policing andthe Ottawa Shift SystemEasing the Stress of Rotating ShiftsBy MIKE SIMPSON, Ph.D., and SUZANNE RICHBELL, M.Sc.


21/35


a demand for staff to work unusualand, some people consider, unso-ciable hours.4 Service and retail es-tablishments have begun to tacklethis issue in a variety of ways. How-ever, concerns about changingcrime patterns and the subsequentincreasing demand for officers haveproven challenging to local police

forces.New legislation also has af-

fected how British police musthandle the burdens of the 24-hoursociety. The European Union isimplementing a Working Time Di-rective that will limit the workweekto 48 hours (averaged over 17weeks).5 At present, police officers,medical students, and public safetypersonnel are exempt. However,within the next 2 years, the Work-ing Time Directive will include po-

lice officers in the limited work-week, and British police forces willneed shift systems that comply withthis directive. Therefore, in theircurrent quest to find shift systems

that improve officer health and wel-fare while matching supply for po-lice services with demand, Britishpolice forces also must considersystems that will comply with thisnew legislation or face having tochange systems again in the verynear future.

EFFECTS OF SHIFT WORKResearch on shift work in other

sectors, such as manufacturing andservice industries, provides a usefulcontext for the examination of theimplementation of the Ottawa sys-tem. The issues raised include theeffects of shift work on organiza-tions, their employees and families,as well as possible interventions tolimit those consequences.

On Attendance

Research evidence on the ef-fects of shift work on absenteeismconflicts. For example, one studyrevealed that shift workers lostfewer workdays through sickness

than personnel who did not work ona rotating schedule.6 However, an-other survey found that shift work-

ers suffered greater sickness and ab-senteeism than normal workers,especially when the hours werelong.7 A third report estimated thatin U.S. companies alone, shift-work-related costs (e.g., absentee-ism, lost production, medical bills,and accidents) totaled approxi-mately $70 billion a year.8

Some workers, however, likeshift work, and studies have foundthat less absenteeism occurs withthese workers than with employees

who work normal business hours.9

However, one report found that ab-sences increased on shift-changedays,10 which may impact policeservices because of quick change-overs (e.g., completing one shift at10 p.m. and starting the next thefollowing day at 6 a.m.) that someshift patterns use. All in all, the evi-dence for a correlation betweenshift work per se and higher ab-sences from work remains meagerand vague.11

On Stress

Over the past several years,work, particularly shift work, hasbecome more stressful.12 This fact,combined with the mixture of bore-dom and danger inherent in policework, has led to stress and negativeeffects on marriages and family lifefor British police officers.13 At thesame time, however, young policeofficers have highly rated and oftenpreferred the variety that shift work

offers.14

On Family

Rotating work schedules lead toless time in the family role and

Ms. Richbell lectures on humanresource management atSheffield University ManagementSchool in Sheffield, England.

Dr. Simpson teaches operationsmanagement at SheffieldUniversity Management Schoolin Sheffield, England.


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January 2000 / 21

result in conflicts between work andfamily life.15 Shift workers can be-come marginalized and isolated

from normal community life. Socialand domestic difficulties may arisefrom working shifts due to the dis-ruption of normal family life, par-ticularly in young families. Further,shift workers spouses dislike beingleft alone at night. Thus, the overlapbetween work and family issues canlead to domestic problems for Brit-ish police officers.16

On Health

When compared with employ-

ees not working shifts, shift work-ers have more health concerns, in-creased errors of judgment, anddisplay symptoms similar to thoseof insomnia.17 Shift workers com-plain of difficulties sleeping andloss of appetite and have increasedincidences of digestive disordersand ulcers.18

Sleep loss, however, stands asthe major health problem for shiftworkers, leading to higher levels offatigue than in other workers. Some

studies have linked continual partialsleep deprivation with increaseddeath and disease.19 One reportfound that fatigue proved commonamong shift workers but appearedto have no effect on mortality, acci-dents, or long-term health, althoughgastrointestinal disorders might be-come exacerbated.20 Another sur-vey did not agree and suggested thatsleep deprivation remains one of themost pervasive and serious healthproblems in the United States to-

day.21 This study also referred toprevious work that associated acci-dents, illness, and domestic prob-lems with lack of sleep.22

On Circadian Rhythms

Most bodily systems operate ona cyclic rhythm, which is governed

by the day/night sequence of activ-ity and rest.23 Temperature, heartrate, blood pressure, lung capacity,and other bodily processes followthe day/night cycle, with activitygenerally higher during the day,reaching a peak in the afternoon orearly evening and a trough during

clock resists rapid resetting, work-ers find it easier to go to bed late andget up late than to go to bed early

and rise early.

27

Hence, managersshould make any shift changes in aclockwise direction to reduce theirpersonnels risk of fatigue and di-gestive problems. For example,workers would find it easier tochange from day shift to afternoonshift, rather than vice versa. Otherinterventions include such mea-sures as employing bright-lighttherapy, selecting personnel basedon their suitability for night andshift work, and providing coping

strategies.28

Managers also should experi-ment with different shift systems tofind the one that works best for theirdepartments. Some systems provemore adaptable to individualagency needs than others. For ex-ample, the Ottawa shift systemremoves the need for quickchangeovers and provides longerperiods between shift changes. Thisresults in an increase in sleep overthe shift cycle together with a sig-

nificant improvement in employeewell-being.29

Shift Systems

The British police forces, likeindustry and commerce in general,use many different continuous shiftsystems. Other police forces, in-cluding those in the United States,have implemented various systems,such as 12-hour fixed shifts (basedon working 2 days, having 2 off,then working 3 days) with staggered

reporting times.30 This has advan-tages for police patrol personnel be-cause they never work more than 3consecutive days, have 14 days off

Managers...shouldexperiment withdifferent shift systemsto find the one thatworks best for their

departments.

the night.24 Shift work alters sleep-

ing habits, meal times, and elimina-tion processes25 and may affect pro-ductivity and safety, especially on

the night shift. Evidence shows thatthe ability to perform most tasks islowest during the early hours of themorning. Similarly, performanceappears to decline on shifts in ex-cess of 8 hours and where workersperform physically or mentally de-manding or repetitive tasks.26

POSSIBLE INTERVENTIONS

While some problems related toshift work remain largely a fact ofthe human condition that no shift

system can solve, managers still cantake steps to help their employeesadjust to a rotating work schedule.For example, because the body


23/35


The British policeforces...use many

different continuousshift systems.

per month, and only work everyother weekend. However, theregulation system, including the

regulation system with quickchangeovers, and the Ottawa sys-tem represent the systems that theBritish police have examined.

Regulation System

British police designed theiroriginal regulation shift system toprovide 24-hour police coverageby equitably dividing the workdayinto three 8-hour shifts (e.g.,6 a.m.2 p.m., 2 p.m.10 p.m., and10 p.m.6 a.m.). In this system, 4

duty groups31

cover a 28-day cycle.These groups work 7 each of day,evening, and night shifts with 7 restdays interspersed to provide breaksbetween the 3 shifts. When con-fronted with the lack of personneldue to sickness or holiday absencesor an abnormally heavy demand forpolice services, police forces em-ploy quick changeovers within theregulation system.

However, as early as 1983, po-lice administrators began to ques-

tion the effectiveness of this sys-tem, particularly its ability to matchresources with the demand for po-lice services while considering of-ficer welfare. The inability of theregulation system to cope withchanges in the police force and in-creased demands for police serviceshas concerned British police man-agers for several years.32 Therefore,they began to examine other shiftsystems that might address theseconcerns.

Ottawa Shift System

Originally developed in Ot-tawa, Ontario, Canada, in 1981,the Ottawa shift system uses 5

duty groups working 3 shifts (a 10-hour day, a 10-hour evening, and an8 1/2-hour night shift) on a 35-day

work pattern.33

Local agencies canincorporate variations around thisbasic pattern.

Initial British police trials of theOttawa shift system began in 1989.Since then, a number of forces have

switched to the system and discov-ered numerous advantages.34 Theseagencies found the system mostuseful for urban areas, where po-lice can predict and define crimepatterns. Also, the overlappingshifts allowed better matching ofsupply to demand; created flexibil-ity for operations, training, and un-interrupted extended briefings; andencouraged a continuous policepresence during shift changes. Ad-ditionally, longer shifts allowed

more thorough and rapid investiga-tions. Because of a greater numberof rest days from working on anannualized hours basis, officer mo-rale, welfare, and social life im-proved, and fatigue decreased withthe removal of rapid shift change-overs and longer rests after workingthe night shift.

Conversely, agencies also dis-covered some disadvantages. Pri-marily, departments experienceddifficulty in maintaining minimum

staffing levels on any shift becauseof the five instead of four dutygroups and in arranging overlapsbetween shifts to coincide with thepeaks in local established crime pat-terns. Police forces also found thesystem unsuitable for rural areas,where crime proves less predictableand less frequent and geographicalsize creates a barrier to maintaininga police presence. The possibleneed for increased resources, suchas extra police vehicles, during theoverlap periods and problems withcontinuity of investigations causedby the 6 days off after working thenight shift constituted additionaldisadvantages.

The Ottawa shift system offersa more flexible alternative to theBritish police regulation shift sys-tem because it is based on annual-ized hours (the number of annual,not weekly or monthly, hoursworked) and facilitates variations inthe length of shifts. In this way, itallows for overlap periods wheretwo shift groups work simulta-neously. The length of these over-

laps may vary, and with careful de-sign, the system can increase officerstaffing levels to meet peaks in de-mand on both a daily and weeklybasis. Such flexibility has led ad-ministrators to regard the Ottawashift system as well suited for urbanBritish police needs because of suchproblems as afternoon shopliftingand late-night or weekend publicdisturbances that place increaseddemands on police services. More-over, those working the Ottawashift system enjoy increased restdays resulting from longer shiftsand experience a 6-day breakafter completing their night-shiftrotation.


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January 2000 / 23

A CASE STUDY OF THESOUTH YORKSHIRE POLICE

England and Wales have 43 in-

dependent police forces that vary insize. The smallest, the City of Lon-don, has 717 officers, while thelargest, the Metropolitan PoliceForce, covers the rest of the GreaterLondon area and has over 28,000officers.

South Yorkshire consists offour main urban communities:Sheffield, Rotherham, Doncaster,and Barnsley. The South YorkshirePolice (SYP) has 3,071 officers andis divided into 11 districts (A to K)

of various geographical sizes withdifferent policing requirements. Forexample, H District comprises astrictly urban district, whereas JDistrict contains a larger, more ru-ral area covering both residentialand small farming communities.Five of these districts have imple-mented the Ottawa shift system,while the others continue workingthe regulation or regulation withquick changeovers systems.

In July 1997, the SYP con-ducted a complete review of the Ot-tawa shift system.35 This involvedsite visits to each district, distribu-tion of a previously piloted ques-tionnaire to 811 uniformed staffworking the Ottawa shift system,and visits to three other forces(Avon and Somerset Police, GreaterManchester Police, and West Mid-lands Police) working the Ottawashift system or other similar alterna-tive shift patterns. Of the 811 offi-

cers surveyed, 549 returned theirforms, giving a response rate of 68percent. The review of the Ottawashift system revealed both positiveand negative results.

reduced fatigue experienced by of-ficers assigned to this shift system.

Supervision and Overtime

Some districts working theregulation system felt that theywould need more supervisory staffin order to implement the Ottawashift system. At the same time,those districts using the Ottawashift system found that matchingstaff resources to demand ac-counted for considerable savings inovertime expenditures. For ex-ample, the reviewers estimated thatthe overlap time for staffing public

disturbance patrols in one SYP dis-trict alone could result in annualovertime savings of 38,880, orover $62,000.

Annualized Hours

Under the British system, an-nual leave and accounting for train-ing hours normally are calculatedon a day-for-day basis, not on thenumber of actual hours used. There-fore, when officers working the Ot-tawa system use a day of leave,

those working 10-hour shifts gain 2hours over their colleagues workingthe regulation 8-hour duty. Whilefriction or unrest among officershas not occurred, many thought thatthis practice was unfair. Addition-ally, those working the Ottawa shiftsystem have an extra 42 days ofannual leave and can create longholidays by combining annual leavewith the 6 days off after working thenight shift. Many officers saw thisas more than adequate entitlement

for working a longer shift. Whilesome commanders felt that thesebenefits were needed, they alsothought that calculating annualleave in hours would improve

Overlap Time

Sixty-nine percent of respon-dents felt that administrators effec-

tively managed the overlap andchangeover periods, while 74 per-cent thought that managers effi-ciently used the overlap time. Also,89 percent of respondents thought

that for public disturbance cases,

the Ottawa shift system matchedpolice resources with demand forpolice services better than the Brit-ish police regulation system.

Absenteeism,Morale, and Health

Statistics showed that whencompared with districts working theregulation system, most districts us-ing the Ottawa shift system hadlower absenteeism from sicknessand showed improving trends. Ac-

cording to 80 percent of respon-dents, their morale and healthhad improved while working theOttawa shift system. The reviewersgenerally attributed this to the


25/35


...the Ottawa shiftsystem uses 5 dutygroups working 3shifts (a 10-hour day, a

10-hour evening, andan 8 1/2-hour night

shift)....

morale, ease staff shortages, andreduce overtime.

Choice of Shift System

Eighty-one percent of respon-dents had worked all three shift sys-tems in operation at SYP. Whenasked to state a preference, 91 per-cent of the respondents chose theOttawa shift system as their firstchoice, and 52 percent chose theregulation system without quickchangeovers as their second choice.These findings support existing re-search on the unpopularity of quick-changeover shift systems.36

Recommendations

The SYP review recommendedthat agencies maintain duty groupstrength (i.e., minimum staffinglevels), even at the expense of othersections of police work; calculateannual leave and training in hours;establish a process for reviewingand evaluating shift patternsin comparison with demand; andincorporate time for structuredtraining. The review also recom-

mended that the SYP and theAvon and Somerset Police establishperformance measures to monitorthe effectiveness of shift patternsrather than rely on aggregated cor-porate statistics.37

The review concluded thatwhile the Ottawa shift systemworks better in some districts thanothers, it does have advantages overthe regulation shift system. The re-view suggested that districts al-ready working the Ottawa shift sys-

tem incorporate the recommendedimprovements, while those districtswishing to introduce the system in-clude in their pilot programs the re-view recommendations.

experimenting with different shiftsystems to find one that works fora specific police force. Moreover,the experiences of both forcesdemonstrate the need to establishperformance measures to effec-

tively evaluate shift systems.

Merseyside Police

Merseyside Police found thatthe Ottawa shift system largelyfailed to deliver the staffing flex-ibility and the decline in absentee-ism that they expected.38 The Avonand Somerset Police experiencedsimilar failures.39

After a 2-year study of the Ot-tawa shift system, the Merseysidereview team concluded that moreofficers were on duty when theywere not needed than when theywere. The team also found that justas the SYP and Avon and SomersetPolice had, the Merseyside Police

lacked established performancemeasures to monitor the effective-ness of shift patterns. Therefore, the

inappropriate match between sup-ply and demand and lack ofadequate management informationcaused the review team to lookat other shift systems. They identi-fied five alternative shift systems,including one that met the require-ments of the European WorkingTime Directive (a maximum 48-hour workweek with a maximum8-hour night shift and minimumrest breaks applied between work-days). However, after assessing the

systems, the force rejected all ofthem. The team then devised a newsystem based on the Ottawa shiftsystem but with the night shift lim-ited to a maximum of 4 nights fol-lowed by 3 rest days. The newsystem also provided adequate cov-erage at times of high demand forpolice services.

Officers, however, have notsupported the new Merseysideshift system. Also, the local PoliceFederation has indicated that

the Ottawa shift system couldhave worked with increased man-agement support.40 Merseysidepersonnel have criticized the newsystem on the grounds that the3-day break, which begins aftera night shift, is effectively a 2-daybreak.41 Additionally, the loss ofthe 6-day break, which officersapproved of in the Ottawasystem, could have a bad effecton morale and increase healthproblems.

Cheshire Police

Cheshire Police (a neighboringforce to Merseyside) has takena different view. The force has

OTTAWA INOTHER UK FORCES

Two other British police forces,

Merseyside and Cheshire, havestudied the effects of implementingthe Ottawa shift system. Both havefound advantages and disadvan-tages and point out the necessity of


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January 1999 / 25

implemented the Ottawa shift sys-tem (locally known as the vari-able shift system) despite the rural

nature of the majority of Cheshireand the presumed unsuitability ofthe Ottawa system for rural polic-ing. The chief constable felt that allofficers in the force should shareimprovements in morale, health,and social welfare wherever pos-sible. Also, the officers requestedthe Ottawa shift system after learn-ing about it from their colleagues inthe nearby town of Chester.

For 3 years, the Chester Policehave used the Ottawa system, alter-

ing it to cover peaks and troughs inthe demand for officers. The mostimportant variation covered late-night alcohol-related violent crime.In Chester, nightclubs close at 2a.m. The police, therefore, neededan overlap period that provided ad-ditional police resources until 3a.m. They achieved this by startingand finishing the afternoon shiftlater on Thursdays, Fridays, andSaturdays.

The Cheshire Police are using

the Chester system as a blueprint forimplementing their own Ottawashift system. In addition, supportingoffice staff work a complementaryshift system to assist in improvingservice to the public. This approachcontrasts markedly with SouthYorkshire Police, where such areasas communications use the regula-tion system, while patrol officerswork under the Ottawa system.

CONCLUSION

The effective and efficient useof limited resources stands as oneof the most difficult tasks that lawenforcement administrators face.Balancing the demand for adequate

day-, afternoon-, and night-shiftrotation. To this end, the law en-forcement community should en-

courage the examination of alterna-tive shift systems not only toimprove police services and the ef-fective use of police resources butalso to enhance officer health andwell-being.

Endnotes1 A. Travis, England and Wales Top Crime

League, The Guardian, May 26, 1997, 6 and16.

2 D. B. Walker and M. Richards, A ServiceUnder Change: Current Issues in Policing inEngland and Wales,Police Studies: The

International Review of Police Development19, no. 1 (1996): 53-73.

3The 24-Hour Society (London: FutureFoundation, 1997).

4 D. A. Kirby, Employment in Retailing:Unsociable Hours and Sunday Trading,

International Journal of Retail and Distribu-

tion Management, 20, no. 7 (1992): 19-28.5 Working Time Regulations, Statutory

Instrument No. 1833, 1998; and CouncilDirective 93/104/EC Concerning CertainAspects of the Organization of Working Time,Official Journal L 307(December 13, 1993):18-24.

6 M. Frese and K. Okonek, Reasons toLeave Shift Work and Psychological and

Psychosomatic Complaints of Former ShiftWorkers,Journal of Applied Psychology 69(1984): 509-514.

7 M.I. Holbrook, M.H. White, and M.J.Hutt, Increasing Awareness of Sleep Hygienein Rotating Shift Workers: Arming LawEnforcement Officers Against ImpairedPerformance,Perceptual and Motor Skills 79(1994): 520-522.

8 R. A. Snyder, One Mans Time Warp IsAnother (Wo)mans Treasure: The Importanceof Individual and Situational Differences inShift Work Tolerance and Satisfaction,Human

Resource Development Quarterly 6, no. 4(Winter 1995): 397-407.

9 J. Walker, The Human Aspects of Shift

Work(London: Institute of Personnel Manage-ment, 1978).

10 J. M. Harrington, Shift Work and Health(London: Her Majestys Stationery Office,1978).

11 Ibid.

police presence with the humanneeds of their officers requires thatmanagers find shift systems that can

address both of these issues.While British police adminis-trators have expended considerableeffort to examine the efficiency andeffectiveness of the Ottawa shiftsystem and others, they have foundlittle conclusive evidence that oneshift system is better than another.Without established performanceindicators based on the objectivesthat managers wish to achieve, itremains difficult to assess the ad-vantages and disadvantages of vari-

ous shift systems. However, for

the present, the fact that officerslike the Ottawa shift system, whichhas improved their morale anddecreased their fatigue, and oppor-tunities exist for matching supplyto demand indicate that theOttawa system appears to have ad-vantages over other less flexible

shift systems. Perhaps as moreagencies use the Ottawa shiftsystem and establish better evalua-tion methods, the system may provea viable alternative to the rigid


27/35


12 Supra note 8.13 R. Graef, Talking BluesThe Police in

Their Own Words (Glasgow: Collins Harvill,1990); and N. Fielding,Joining Forces

(London: Routledge Publishing, 1988).14 Supra note 13, Fielding.15 G. L. Staines and J. H. Pleck, Nonstand-

ard Work Schedules and Family Life,Journalof Applied Psychology 69 (1984): 515-523.

16 S. Richbell, The Police WelfareRequirement(London: Central AdvisoryFacility (PRSU), Home Office, 1991).

17 Supra note 7.18 E. Thiis-Evensen, Shift Work and

Health,Industrial Medicine and SurgeryXXVII (1958): 493-497; quoted in J.M.Harrington, Shift Work and Health(London: Her Majestys Stationery Office,1978), 5; and M. Everley, Shift Work andHealth,Health and Safety at Work, September

1992, 40-41.19 Supra note 18, Everley.20 Supra note 10.21 Supra note 8.22 Supra note 8.

23 L. Smith, Beat the Clock,PoliceReview, November 27, 1998, 16-18.

24 Supra notes 9 and 10.25 Supra note 9.26

Supra note 18, Everley.27 Supra notes 7 and 9; and J. Adams,Shift Patterns and the Body Clock,(Nottinghamshire, UK: NottinghamshirePolice, 1992, unpublished report).

28 Supra note 23.29 P. Totterdell and L. Smith, Ten-Hour

Days and Eight-Hour Nights: Can theOttawa Shift System Reduce the Problems ofShift Work? Work and Stress 6 (1992):139-152.

30 R. B. Walker and C. Eisenberg, The 12-Hour Fixed Shift: Measuring Satisfaction,FBI

Law Enforcement Bulletin, August 1995,18-20.

31 Duty group means a group of officers

working as a unit on a specific shift rotation.Some departments may call this group a shift.However, to avoid confusion when discussingshift systems, the authors refer to these officersas duty groups.

32Manpower Effectiveness and Efficiency inthe Police Service, Home Office Circular 114,London (1983).

33 Supra note 29.34

Touche Ross and Co., Home OfficeStudy into Effective Shift Systems for thePolice ServiceFinal Report, (London: HomeOffice, 1992, unpublished report); and S.Richbell, M. Simpson, G.M.H. Sykes, and S.Meegan, Policing with the Ottawa ShiftSystem: A British Experience,Policing: An

International Journal of Police Strategies and

Management21, no. 3 (1998): 384-396.35 D. Featherstone, S. Wilkinson, and P.

Catley, Thematic Inspection: OTTAWA,(Sheffield, UK: South Yorkshire Police, July1997, unpublished report).

36 Supra note 9.37 Supra note 35.38 D. Adams, Clockwise,Police Review,

June 26, 1998, 22-24.39 Supra note 35.40 Supra note 38.41 J. Spence, Take a Break,Police Review,

July 17, 1998, 14.

Snap Shots

ne officer in the High Point, NorthCarolina, Police Department is a real

Police Officer Mannequin

Howard Tillery

Odummy. The department began using amannequin, dressed as a police officer, to slowdown drivers at intersections with high acci-dent rates or on streets where many citizensspeed. The dummy police officer has drawncomplaints. Motorists have called the policedepartment to report that the unfriendly officerwill not wave back. Calls from motorists alsohave included reports that the officer might beeither sleeping on duty or dead. According toCaptain Debra Duncan, the dummy seems towork. Traffic officers even have seen motor-ists warn oncoming drivers by flashing theirheadlights at them.


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January 2000 / 27

Legal Digest

uring the past 20 years, theUnited States has beenfighting one of the most dif-

Drug Detection Dogs

Legal ConsiderationsBy MICHAEL J. BULZOMI, J.D.

controlled substances, includingtheir use in determining probablecause for searches of vehicles, indi-viduals, and premises.

THE COURTS VIEW

In United States v. Place,1 theSupreme Court ruled that the expo-sure of luggage located in a publicplace to a trained canine did notconstitute a search within the mean-ing of the Fourth Amendment.Place aroused the suspicions ofDEA agents in the Miami Interna-tional Airport. He was asked for and

gave his consent to have his luggagesearched. However, fearing thatPlace would miss his plane and thatthe DEA would be liable for the costof the ticket, the agents allowedPlace to proceed on his flight with-out searching his luggage. Theagents then telephoned other DEAagents at New Yorks LaGuardia

Airport to pass on their suspicionsconcerning Place.Upon his arrival in New York,

Place was met by DEA agentswho again asked for consent tosearch his luggage. This time, Place

Dficult wars in its history: the war ondrugs. One of law enforcementsmost effective tools in this war hasbeen the drug detection dog. Drugdetection dogs have proven highlyeffective and reliable in detecting

illegal narcotics. The SupremeCourt and most lower courts havegranted particular deference to theolfactory abilities of police drug de-tection dogs. This article addressesthe legal aspects of canine sniffs for


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The use of drug

detection dogshas met withfew real legalchallenges in

the courts.

Special Agent Bulzomi is a legalinstructor at the FBI Academy.refused to give consent. The agentsdetained Places luggage and took itto Kennedy Airport, where a traineddrug detection dog sniffed the lug-gage and alerted (indicated thedetection of the odor of drugs).Based on the dogs alert, the agentscontinued to detain the luggagewhile they sought a search warrantauthorizing the search of the lug-gage. A search warrant for Places

luggage was issued and executed,and a large quantity of drugs wasdiscovered. Place was arrested andlater convicted.

The Supreme Court reversedPlaces conviction but not on thebasis of the dog sniff. The Courtruled that the 90-minute presniffseizure of the luggage was too longto be reasonable. Nonetheless, theCourt took great care to clarify thatthe dogs alert created sufficientreason for further detention of theluggage, as well as the requisiteprobable cause necessary for the is-suance of a search warrant fordrugs.

The Court explained that thedogs sniff is nonintrusive and re-veals only the presence of contra-band, an item for which a persondoes not have a reasonable expecta-tion of privacy. Moreover, Placewas not required to open his lug-gage and expose his personal itemsto public view, thereby avoiding theembarrassment and inconvenienceentailed in a typical search.

PROBABLE CAUSE

In United States v. Gonzalez-Acosta,2 the U.S. Court of Appealsfor the Tenth Circuit refused to au-thorize extensive defense requestsfor a drug detection dogs trainingrecords, veterinary records, alert re-ports, and other miscellaneousdocuments. The court allowed thedefense to review only limitedtraining records, stating: We donot believe the documents were rel-evant because the dog was certifiedon the day in question and becausethe dog properly alerted to the pres-ence of contraband.... Indeed, had

the dogs records indicated ithad false-alerted in the past, thedefendants ability to cross-exam-

ine would not have been enhancedbecause there is no doubt it cor-rectly alerted in this instance.3

A dogs positive alert alonegenerally constitutes probablecause to search a vehicle under themotor vehicle exception to thesearch warrant requirement.4 How-ever, courts still confront chal-lenges to dog sniffs based on theirreliability. Courts that have consid-ered the question of canine reliabil-ity have relied heavily on the dogs

certification.5

As the case aboveshows, the fact that the dog cor-rectly alerted adds significantly tothe dogs credibility in establishingprobable cause.

TRAFFIC STOPS

In United States v. Navarro,6 adeputy stopped a sports utility ve-hicle for speeding. As the officerspoke with the driver, he becamesuspicious of drug activity. A back-up officer teamed with a drug detec-

tion dog arrived. As the first officertalked to the driver, the canine han-dler positioned the dog to sniff thevehicle. The dog alerted on thedrivers door. The deputies foundfive kilos of cocaine in a duffle bagon the front seat of the vehicle. Thedefendant later challenged the stopas pretextual because the detentionthat allowed for the arrival anduse of a drug detection dog was un-constitutional.

The U.S. Court of Appeals forthe Sixth Circuit did not agree withthe defendants claim that his con-stitutional rights had been violated.The officers in this case had


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January 2000 / 29

A dogs positivealert alonegenerallyconstitutes

probable causeto search avehicle....

received a tip earlier in the day con-cerning Navarros possible posses-sion of contraband, and the likeli-

hood that a sports utility vehiclemight be used to transport the con-traband.

Pretext Stops

The Supreme Courts ruling inWhren v. United States7 thatpretextual traffic stops do not vio-late the Fourth Amendment createsan extremely productive opportu-nity for traffic stops to become sniffstops, as well. Drug detection dogscan be used on routine traffic patrol

in high drug areas to sniff carsstopped for traffic violations.In Romo v. Champion,8 the

United States Court of Appeals forthe Tenth Circuit ruled that whenthe odor of narcotics escapes fromthe interior of a vehicle, societydoes not recognize a reasonableprivacy interest in the public air-space containing the incriminatingodor.... Where government officialshave lawfully detained a vehicle, adogs sniff is not a search within the

meaning of the Fourth Amend-ment.9 As long as the vehicle is notdetained beyond the time necessaryto accomplish the purpose of thetraffic stop, whether it be to issue acitation, wait for a computer check,or simply to give a warning, theexterior of the vehicle is availablefor a sniff. TheRomo court held thatif a vehicle is otherwise lawfullydetained, consent is not required fora canine sniff, even absent any rea-sonable suspicion.

Scope of the Sniff

The scope of the sniff is limitedto the outside of the vehicle. Anofficer may not unlawfully enter

an area in order to conduct a dogsearch.... The warrantless search ofa car interior is unlawful unless

there is probable cause to believethat it contains contraband.10 InNavarro, the interior sniff of thevehicle was supported by probablecause, because the dog had alertedimmediately outside the driversside door, indicating narcotics in-side the car.

Detention of the vehicle beyondthe brief time needed to issue a cita-tion or warning requires reasonable

suspicion of illegal activity.11 Oncedrivers produce a valid license andproof that they are entitled to oper-ate the car, they must be allowed toproceed on their way, without beingsubject to delay by police for fur-ther questioning.12 Any further de-tention for questioning, not for issu-ing a citation, is beyond the scope ofthe stop and, therefore, is illegal un-less the officer has a reasonable sus-picion of unlawful activity.13

If an officers suspicions are

aroused during the course of a traf-fic stop where a drug detection dogis not present and the officer canarticulate reasonable suspicion ofdrug activity, the officer may detain

the vehicle for a reasonable lengthof time to allow for the arrival of adrug detection dog.14 It is recom-

mended that if there is no reason-able suspicion to detain occupantsin the vehicle, they should be per-mitted to leave and told how theycan arrange to claim the vehiclelater, if appropriate.

Consent Sniffs

When officers lack reasonablesuspicion of drug activity to justifya detention, they may ask d

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