FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin - Feb01leb

35
ISSN 0014-5688 USPS 383-310 Features Departments 7 Police Practice The Work Itself as a Motivator 16 Book Review Drugs in Society The Crisis Intervention Team By Deborah L. Bower and W. Gene Pettit Offshore Financial Centers By Mark D. Ferbrache Documenting and Reporting a Confession By Timothy T. Burke The International Sharing Program By Douglas A. Kash and Jennifer A. Gorman 1 February 2001 Volume 70 Number 2 United States Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, DC 20535-0001 Louis J. Freeh Director Contributors' opinions and statements should not be considered an endorsement by the FBI for any policy, program, or service. The Attorney General has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business required by law. Use of funds for printing this periodical has been approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (ISSN-0014-5688) is published monthly by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20535-0001. Periodicals postage paid at Washington, D.C., and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to Editor, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, FBI Academy, Madison Building, Room 209, Quantico, VA 22135. Editor John E. Ott Associate Editors Glen Bartolomei Cynthia L. Lewis Bunny S. Morris Art Director Brian K. Parnell Assistant Art Director Denise Bennett Smith Staff Assistant Linda W. Szumilo This publication is produced by members of the Law Enforcement Communication Unit, William T. Guyton, Chief. Internet Address [email protected] Send article submissions to Editor, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, FBI Academy, Madison Building, Room 209, Quantico, VA 22135. International offshore financial centers illustrate the need for effective global law enforcement cooperation. The Albuquerque Police Department has found an effective and efficient way to deal with individuals in crisis. 17 Accurately documenting confessions constitutes an important law enforcement procedure. 23 Perspective Preventing Corruption within Our Ranks 10 27 Cooperative foreign countries are entitled to share in the proceeds garnered from successful forfeiture actions.

Transcript of FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin - Feb01leb

ISSN 0014-5688 USPS 383-310

Features

Departments

7 Police PracticeThe Work Itself asa Motivator

16 Book ReviewDrugs in Society

The Crisis Intervention Team By Deborah L. Bower

and W. Gene Pettit

Offshore Financial Centers By Mark D. Ferbrache

Documenting andReporting a Confession

By Timothy T. Burke

The InternationalSharing ProgramBy Douglas A. Kash

and Jennifer A. Gorman

1

7

February 2001Volume 70Number 2

United StatesDepartment of Justice

Federal Bureau of InvestigationWashington, DC 20535-0001

Louis J. FreehDirector

Contributors' opinions and statementsshould not be considered an

endorsement by the FBI for any policy,program, or service.

The Attorney General has determinedthat the publication of this periodical is

necessary in the transaction of thepublic business required by law. Useof funds for printing this periodical hasbeen approved by the Director of theOffice of Management and Budget.

The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin(ISSN-0014-5688) is published

monthly by the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation, 935 PennsylvaniaAvenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.

20535-0001. Periodicals postage paidat Washington, D.C., and additionalmailing offices. Postmaster: Sendaddress changes to Editor, FBI LawEnforcement Bulletin, FBI Academy,

Madison Building, Room 209,Quantico, VA 22135.

EditorJohn E. Ott

Associate EditorsGlen BartolomeiCynthia L. LewisBunny S. Morris

Art DirectorBrian K. Parnell

Assistant Art DirectorDenise Bennett Smith

Staff AssistantLinda W. Szumilo

This publication is produced bymembers of the Law Enforcement

Communication Unit,William T. Guyton, Chief.

Internet Address [email protected]

Send article submissions to Editor,FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, FBIAcademy, Madison Building, Room

209, Quantico, VA 22135.

International offshore financial centersillustrate the need for effective globallaw enforcement cooperation.

The Albuquerque Police Departmenthas found an effective and efficient wayto deal with individuals in crisis.

17Accurately documenting confessionsconstitutes an important lawenforcement procedure.

23 PerspectivePreventing Corruptionwithin Our Ranks

10

27Cooperative foreign countries areentitled to share in the proceedsgarnered from successful forfeitureactions.

February 2001 / 1

ike most large metropolitanpolice departments, the Al-buquerque, New Mexico,

“The intervention by CIT-trainedofficers in crisis situations isdirectly responsible for thedecrease in police shootings.This has saved the lives of bothcitizens and police officers.”

LPolice Department (APD) faces thechallenge of finding the most effec-tive way to deal with individuals incrisis. These individuals often dem-onstrate inadequate coping withstressful life events by endangeringthemselves or others and may be atserious risk of injury or death. Theymay compound their problems withalcohol or other drugs, have a men-tal illness, or intend to die at the

hands of police (victim-precipitatedhomicide or suicide by cop).Unwittingly, individuals in crisismay behave in ways that can resultin a police shooting. Research onthese incidents reveals five key fac-tors associated with fatal policeshootings: 1) commission of a seri-ous criminal offense; 2) use of alco-hol or other drugs; 3) presence of amental disorder or irrational behav-ior; 4) existence of actions thatofficers can misinterpret easily,such as pointing a toy gun; and

—Albuquerque Police ChiefGerry Galvin

The Albuquerque PoliceDepartment’s CrisisIntervention TeamA Report CardBy DEBORAH L. BOWER, M.S., M.A., and W. GENE PETTIT

2 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

5) occurrence of victim-precipi-tated homicide.1

In an effort to safely and effec-tively meet the needs of individualsin crisis, APD studied several crisisintervention approaches. In early1997, with the cooperation and as-sistance of local mental health con-sumer and treatment services, APDinstituted a Crisis InterventionTeam (CIT) based on the model cre-ated by the Memphis, Tennessee,Police Department in 1988. Sincethe inception of CIT, 230 Albuquer-que officers, as well as officersfrom Houston, Austin, and SouthRio Grande Valley, Texas, andRoanoke, Virginia, have graduatedfrom the in-house, 40-hour trainingcourse in crisis intervention.

The current designated strengthof CIT stands at 108 officers, orapproximately one-fourth of thefield patrol. These CIT specialistsrespond in a team effort to crisissituations. They bring psychologyto the streets—to individuals with

Sergeant Pettit serves with theAlbuquerque, New Mexico, PoliceDepartment and administers theCIT program.

Ms. Bower conducts dataanalysis on police shootings forthe Albuquerque, New Mexico,Police Department.

mental illness and to those who, in atime of crisis, pose a danger tothemselves or others. After 3 yearsof working together, the CIT hasgathered facts and tabulated data toexamine its effectiveness.

WHAT ARE THE RESULTS?

The CIT program has shownimpressive results. In 1999, CIT of-ficers responded to 3,257 calls, anaverage of 271 calls per month. Al-most half of the contacts (48 per-cent) resulted in transporting indi-viduals to a local mental healthfacility where they received profes-sional care. Officers arrested, trans-ported to jail, or otherwise took intoprotective custody fewer than 10percent of the individuals con-tacted. Injuries to citizens duringCIT contacts occurred in only alittle over 1 percent of calls. Whilemental illness was an apparent fac-tor in 58 percent of the calls, almosthalf of the calls (45 percent) in-volved suicide attempts or threats.

Alcohol, present in 27 percent ofthe cases, constituted the most fre-quently cited substance of abuse.

Police Shootings

Since the inception of CIT, spe-cial weapons and tactics (SWAT)call outs involving a crisis interven-tion component have decreased 58percent. Police shootings involvingindividuals in crisis also have de-clined incrementally since 1997, asthe CIT program has developed.From 1994 through 1996, six indi-viduals were killed in crisis-relatedpolice shootings. From 1997through 1999, four individuals werekilled. These data are important inlight of the fact that the populationof Albuquerque has grown 18 per-cent in the last 10 years and 7 per-cent (from 418,454 to 446,400residents) since 1996. Although thepopulation of Albuquerque has in-creased, the number of policeshootings has dropped. This sug-gests that CIT officers use skill anddiscretion in resolving potentiallylethal situations. It also demon-strates the department’s commit-ment to less-than-lethal force (e.g.,use of beanbag or taser weapons) inresolving life-threatening crises.

Additional Data

In May 1999, APD added otherdata-gathering categories to CIT re-porting, including age and race ofthe subject, specific drugs or sub-stances present, weapon method (tohurt self or others), and level ofthreat to officers or other individu-als. Of the 2,105 cases from May toDecember 1999, individuals 36 to60 years old required the most fre-quent intervention, followed by

February 2001 / 3

those 19 to 35 years of age. Non-Hispanic whites constituted 59percent of the cases, followed byHispanics at 28 percent; AfricanAmericans and Native Americans at5 percent, each; and other races at 3percent. The ethnic backgrounds ofthese individuals reflect the demo-graphic composition of Albuquer-que where 35 percent of the citizensdeclare themselves to be of Spanishorigin, 3 percent each as AfricanAmerican or Native American, and2 percent as Asian.2

Second to alcohol, a variety ofprescription and over the countermedications (often mixed with al-cohol) proved the most frequentlyidentified category of substanceabuse. Anecdotal information sug-gests that individuals, particularlyfemales, used prescribed drugs,such as antidepressants, as the mostcommon medications for overdose.

Individuals brandished edgedweapons and firearms (199 and 117cases, respectively) in 15 percent ofthe calls. Other weapons includedbats or, in the cases of suicide at-tempts, pills and carbon monoxide(196 cases). Jumping (37 cases) andhanging (20 cases) represent otherintended or threatened methods ofsuicide attempts. Thirty individualsmade suicide gestures by jumpingout of cars into traffic. Fourteenpercent of the cases involveda threat to harm others, and 4percent threatened to harm policepersonnel.

Notably, nine cases occurred inwhich individuals stated that theyintended to die at the hands of po-lice. Literature on suicide by cop(also referred to as victim-precipi-tated homicide and hetero-suicide)

suggests that probable or possiblesuicidal motivation exists in 16 to47 percent of police shootings.3

While some individuals make de-tailed plans for confronting policewith the intention of being killed,others may react impulsively to po-lice presence during a crisis.4 Stillothers, caught in the act of commit-ting a crime, would rather be killedthan captured.

process. After acceptance into theCIT program, officers must com-plete a 40-hour certification train-ing course. Once on the street, eachofficer receives $50 per month asincentive pay.

Training includes instruction inlegal issues specific to commitmentand the rights of the individual, casemanagement, special populations(e.g., individuals who are homeless,elderly, developmentally disabled,or brain injured), psychopharma-cology, substance abuse, and tac-tical considerations. The bulk ofthe training, however, involves rec-ognizing mental illnesses and per-sonality disorders and applyingappropriate crisis intervention tech-niques. Practical exercises includeprofessional actors who role-playindividuals in crisis. During thesesimulations, officers demonstratetheir crisis intervention skills,which trainers evaluate and providefeedback on.

The training also formally ad-dresses officer awareness, safety,and tactics. Statistical compilationsinform officers about the character-istics of those officers killed in theline of duty, as well as the offend-ers.5 The training emphasizes thatwhile good evaluation, empathy,and communication skills are nec-essary for CIT officers, officersafety remains paramount. Whilethe need for understanding andknowledge in dealing with peoplein crisis exists, the need for CITofficers to be well-balanced, tacti-cal specialists remains equally im-portant as well.6 Therefore, thetraining stresses tactical issues byaddressing the interface betweenCIT and SWAT units should

“While trainingrepresents an

important aspectof the program, CIT

exists primarily as anoperational concept.

”WHY DOES CIT WORK?

CIT has worked because theAPD studied other successful pro-grams and planned carefully. Also,the department emphasized fivemain areas: the selection and train-ing of CIT officers, the operationalconcept of CIT, the team-within-a-team approach of the program, thepartnering of community resources,and the cost-effective aspects ofCIT.

Selection and Training

Officers selected for CIT train-ing possess superior skills in com-munication, tactics, and problemsolving. Each applicant for a CITposition submits a resume andundergoes an intensive screening

4 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

a CIT call escalate to a SWATdeployment.

Operational Concept

While training represents animportant aspect of the program,CIT exists primarily as an opera-tional concept. A cross section offield patrol officers throughout thecity comprises the team. These of-ficers function as generalists andspecialists. When not responding tocalls in which individuals withmental illness constitute a potentialfactor or where people are other-wise in crisis and at risk, CIT offi-cers handle regular patrol functions.Strategic placement of CIT officerson all shifts provides for a rapidspecialist response to potentiallydangerous scenes. These officersoperate within squads and reportdirectly to the sector sergeant.

Typically, 911 operators, whohave both entry-level and roll-calltraining in crisis recognition, iden-tify CIT calls. The operators flagthe calls for a specialist responseand direct them to the police dis-patcher who communicates the callto the nearest available CIT fieldofficer. Should the need for a re-sponse arise in an area of the citywithout a CIT officer nearby, a teammember from another area com-mand would respond.

Team within a Team

APD’s 854 sworn personnelprovide community-oriented polic-ing services to approximately446,000 Albuquerque residents.7 Ofthe 403 officers dedicated to fieldpatrol functions, 108 are CIT offi-cers. A full-time sergeant, fourdetectives, and an administrative

assistant provide support for theseofficers. Housed administratively inthe Special Investigations Division(SID), this support staff representsone team within the larger team ofCIT officers. Each detective is as-signed to a specific area commandand functions as a liaison betweenthe field and the SID office. Thissupport network, or team-within-a-team concept, has contributed to thedramatic, positive results of the CITprogram.

Follow-up of CIT calls by thedetectives also has facilitated thesuccess of this team. They carefullyreview all reports generated by fieldCIT officers for content. In manycases, detectives initiate intensivefollow-up investigations and proac-tive interventions. The support staffmembers conduct “knock and talks”where they visit individuals whopotentially may pose a threatto themselves or others. The mem-bers identify resource-intensiveindividuals and implement mea-sures to reduce the frequency of po-lice contacts. Officers in the fieldreceive bulletins about these poten-tially dangerous individuals to en-hance safety for police personnel,as well as the involved individuals.

Community Resources

Support from the mental healthcommunity has proved critical tothe success of CIT. Despite a his-tory of adversarial relationships andmisunderstandings, once policepersonnel and mental health admin-istrators sat down together to solveproblems collectively, they ex-pressed mutual goals and objec-tives. Roundtable discussions withthe administrators of the differentlocal facilities eliminated barriers

• Minimized police use of force, resulting in reductions ininjuries to police personnel and consumers

• Established proactive intervention to deter crisis-relatedevents from possible undesirable outcomes

• Reduced liability risks through improved crisis management

• Created partnerships between mental health agenciesand the police, resulting in problem solving and programdevelopment

• Identified deficiencies within the mental health network

• Used police officers as case finders for the mental healthsystem

• Developed an administrative vehicle for supporting a jaildiversion program

• Increased public confidence and support

CIT Results

February 2001 / 5

and promoted positive change.Without the cooperation of thisnetwork of mental health care pro-viders, proactive measures bypolice would have proved fruitless.

Since the inception of CIT, adramatic shift in attitude has takenplace between the police and mentalhealth care providers.8 For example,

improved cooperation led to theUniversity of New Mexico MentalHealth Center changing the triagesystem of its psychiatric emergencyroom to better accommodate lawenforcement officers who bring inindividuals for evaluation. Now, thesystem places officers at the top ofthe waiting list, with the goal of

reducing their wait time andreturning them to service as soon aspossible.

Other mental health care advo-cates have noted the impact of im-proved cooperation. One mentalhealth care professional contendsthat CIT “is the best thing that hashappened for the mentally ill

CIT Data for 1999

Total calls for CIT service 3,257

PercentageCount

Mental illness believed to be a factorMental illness not believed to be a factorMental illness not evaluatedSex Female

MaleUnspecified

Suicide calls AttemptedThreatened

Threatened suicide by cop*Weapons involved

Injury to subject Prior to police contactResult of police contact

Subjects transportedArrests/protective custodyMental health facilities

*Data from May-December 1999, (total equals 2,105)**Underestimate, officers leave facility prior to admission

Substance abuse AlcoholOther drugs

Admission to mental health facilities** 398 12.2

1,878 407 9721,3661,871 20

57.712.529.841.957.4 .7

505948

9457

15.529.1

0.42714.0

890554

27.317.0

426 38

13.1 1.2

2981,391

9.142.7

6 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

residents of Albuquerque. They aregoing to jail less and are treatedwith more respect.”9 This kind ofresponse has led individuals withmental illness and their families tohave more confidence in the policehandling of crisis situations. In fact,at the annual meeting of the NewMexico chapter of the National Al-liance for the Mentally Ill, familymembers were encouraged to call911 and ask for a CIT officer shoulda crisis situation occur.

In the final analysis, for CIT tofunction, it had to develop partner-ships with a variety of mental healthresources because these communityprograms provide the referrals thatCIT officers use for individuals inneed of mental health services.These resources also enable the CITdetectives to promote favorablelong-range alternatives to police in-tervention in these situations.

Cost-effectiveness

Limited training costs for CITinclude materials and the cost ofprofessional role-players for inter-active training scenarios. Fortu-nately, grant funding from the NewMexico Department of Health ab-sorbs these expenses. Another cost-saving aspect involves volunteerCIT instructors cultivated fromwithin the police, legal, and mentalhealth communities.

In contrast, CIT justifies the in-centive pay of $50 per month by theanticipated reduction in risk of in-jury or death to officers and indi-viduals in crisis and by the reduc-tion of large liability claims, whichcould result from police use offorce. Further, savings incurred bythe significant reduction in SWAT

activations and resulting overtimepay also offset the incentive pay.

WHAT ABOUTTHE FUTURE?

Given these results, the CITprogram administrators have nur-tured future plans. These includeproviding CIT training to APD’s 30school resource officers, improvingdata collection to aid in planningand program development, perfect-ing and implementing an earlywarning system to identify chroni-cally dangerous individuals, andsupporting initiatives to create morecommunity resources critical to thesuccess of proactive intervention.

CONCLUSION

Effectively handling individu-als in crisis poses a difficulty for alllaw enforcement agencies. The Al-buquerque, New Mexico, PoliceDepartment implemented a pro-gram that stands as an effective andefficient method of crisis interven-tion. The department has had itsCrisis Intervention Team in placefor the past 3 years and hascollected valuable data on its

“Since the inceptionof CIT, a dramatic

shift in attitudehas taken place

between the policeand mental health

care providers.

effectiveness. The data support theobjectives of the AlbuquerquePolice Department’s community-oriented policing efforts, as well asits goal of resolving crisis situationswithout the use of force.

Albuquerque’s CIT programexemplifies what law enforcement,the mental health community, andindividuals in need of crisis inter-vention and their families can ac-complish when they work togetherto solve problems. The CIT modelcan help agencies striving for excel-lence in community-oriented polic-ing and, more important, help themreduce the often-tragic conse-quences of dealing with individualsin crisis.

Endnotes

1 R. Parent, “Police Shootings: Reducing theRisks,” Law and Order, January 2000, 82-84.

2 City of Albuquerque Planning Department,Census Information for the City of Albuquer-

que (Albuquerque, NM, 2000) available fromhttp://www.cabq.gov/planning/statistics/

census.html; accessed December 11, 2000.3 D. Kennedy, R. Homant, and R. Thomas

Hupp, “Suicide by Cop,” FBI Law Enforcement

Bulletin, August 1998, 21-27.4 V. Lord, “One Form of Victim Precipitated

Homicide: The Use of Law EnforcementOfficers to Commit Suicide,” presentation atthe 1998 annual meeting of the Academy ofCriminal Justices Sciences.

5 Department of Justice, Federal Bureau ofInvestigation, Law Enforcement Officers Killed

and Assaulted, 1998 (Washington, DC, 1999).6 Dr. Donn Hubler, former director of

APD’s Behavioral Science Unit.7 City of Albuquerque Planning Department,

Population Estimates (Albuquerque, NM,2000); available from http://www.cabq.gov/

planning/statistics; accessed December 11,2000.

8 Nancy Purtell, executive director of theUniversity of New Mexico Mental HealthCenter.

9 Dr. Shirley Washburn, past president ofthe New Mexico chapter of the NationalAlliance for the Mentally Ill.

February 2001 / 7

Police Practice

or decades, management and leadershiptheorists have proposed the concept that

promote a deeper commitment to their organizationand possibly enhance their career. DouglasMcGregor’s X and Y theories view employees aseither self-motivated and hard working (Theory Y)or mindless, lazy employees who must be coercedinto doing their jobs (Theory X).1 These theoriespersuaded managers at the Pulaski, Tennessee, PoliceDepartment that something that glorified employeesat their daily work, while performing routine activi-ties, would serve as a powerful internal motivationalforce that the department could capitalize uponfor wide-spread, long-term organizational benefit.However, the methodology used to accomplish thisfeat proved the most difficult part of the concept tocreate.

In educational sessions, leadership theorists citethe intrinsic value of work as one of the significantmotivational features of an employment environment,but they provide very little, if anything, to guidemanagers to successfully accomplish this. How canmanagers take the work itself and use it as a motiva-tional tool? Traditionally, most theorists suggest usingrewards or some type of accolade. This approach has

Femployee motivation is based upon several factors,including interpersonal relationships, organizationaleffects, and the work itself. Such theories have de-emphasized the importance of other, longer-heldtheories about employee motivation, such as salary,benefits, and working conditions. From a motivationalstandpoint, viewing the work itself as a motivationaldevice usually has depended on internal motives(intrinsic rewards) concerning the type of workemployees engage in and their personal beliefs aboutthe work they perform. Amid all material publishedconcerning the phenomenon of motivating employeesin the workplace, very little addresses how managerscan use employees’ work to enhance their profes-sional confidence or how managers can use that workexperience to help motivate employees toward betterquality work or productivity.

Some individuals believe that police work re-quires personal motivation, self-pride, professionalsatisfaction, and individual expectations. By capturingthese effects of personal motivations, officers could

The WorkItself as aMotivator

By John L. White, Ph.D.

8 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

given rise to the dramatic increase in performance andexcellence awards. However, managers often encoun-ter problems when implementing these types ofapproaches. Albeit powerful motivational tools, theycontain many drawbacks inherent in their application.For example, equity issues occur in a variety of formscomplicating the process, such as commonly heldvalues prove difficult to define, organizationalconcerns may arise, and personality-based issuessometimes make recognition awards impractical.Some employee merit systems even praise undeserv-ing employees for substandard efforts—at least in theeyes of the recipient’s peers. Reward/recognitionprograms of these types usuallysuffer reversals of intended effectvia employee cynicism and a hostof creative work reversals.

Police managers should avoidthese pitfalls to positively influ-ence employees within theirorganization. How can a manageruse the work employees perform tolaud its inherent values, use it tohelp reinforce the organizationalvalues, and provide first-rateservice to the community? Theanswer to this complex questionlies within a single concept—thatmanagers could harness the initial motivations thatbrought their employees into the service of lawenforcement and, thus, provide a continual motiva-tional drive.

THE PULASKI EXPERIENCE

The Pulaski Police Department tried a uniqueattempt to take “work itself” at face value, capture iton video, and produce it in a valorous presentation tohelp increase employee motivation. In the past, themedia has used sporting events to glamorize certainevents and people with great impact. Departmentmanagers believed that if portraying sporting-eventfigures and participants in such dramatic postures,relating to their employment, has such an effect on theparticipants and those viewing the presentations, thenusing the same premise in relation to law enforcementpersonnel should have an equally beneficial result.

Production

Over a 9-month period, a reserve officer madecandid videotapes of department personnel duringtheir routine workdays. These videos ranged fromfield events to office work, from actual operations toorganized events of fellowship. Additionally, theofficer captured video of a regularly scheduleddepartment meeting, which focused on differentindividuals as they participated in the meeting.

The photographer also took video of the city andused it for the introductory portion of the tape,accompanied by inspirational background music. Thevideo presentation was divided into segments of each

shift depicting a freeze-frame ofofficers with a caption of theirrank and date of service. Follow-ing the still-shot segment, theproducer included several vi-gnettes of each officer involvedin normal work activities. Thevideotape ended with a list of allemployees, their assignments, andan inspiring message on life.

Presentation

The video made its debut atthe end of the year at an annualholiday party for all of the employ-

ees and their families. Managers noticed the effectfrom the outset; department personnel displayedmarkedly visible emotional reactions as the tapeplayed. Managers presented all officers with a per-sonal copy of the “video yearbook” and told them thatit served as tangible proof of their significance andimportance to the agency.

Evaluation

The film achieved more than being merely avideo yearbook. Taken at its face value, the videoserves as a historical document and has accomplishedits mission of increasing employee motivation as well.Initially, the tape reaffirmed the employees’ impor-tance to the agency. The fact that the department usedresources to make the video not only served as a silenttestimony of the officers’ importance to the agency,but it also dramatized their individual role in helping

Police managersshould...positively

influence employeeswithin their

organization.

February 2001 / 9

the agency attain its overall mission and sustainingthe overall prestige of the law enforcement profes-sion. Both of these factors serve as strong inspirationsto employees about who they are and their value tothe agency. Such a strong visual presentation becomesa public recognition of the intrinsic value theseemployees hold in their work. The video allowsofficers to see themselves through the eyes of others;realize how important their work appears to others;understand how integral their contribution is toaccomplishing the goals of the agency; and recognizehow vital they are to the everyday operations of thedepartment.

On a far deeper level, the tape may serve as apersonal motivator over an extended period of time.As the employees view the tapein the future, they may reenforcetheir own importance to theorganization. Similarly, viewingthe tape with friends and familymembers can serve to enhancethe motivational effects to amuch greater extent thanviewing it with colleagues.Those involved in producing thevideo believed it would serve asa long-term motivator byreminding employees why theyoriginally began service with theorganization, or in law enforce-ment in general. This reminder may instill a renewedvigor to employees and to the work they perform andhelp maintain the highest level of professional exper-tise in daily operations.

Although the idea may appear very simple inconcept, numerous employees have proven its impactby asking for a second copy of the tape. This wasexactly the reaction that department managers hadhoped to accomplish. Each time employees view thevideo they reinforce their initial reason for becomingpolice officers, as well as build loyalty to the depart-ment they serve.

For other agencies, the cost of producing a similarvideo cannot be valued in terms of its relationship tothe potential benefits it may provide because thosebenefits are impossible to quantify. An agency merely

needs the services of an individual with the technicalskills to create such a motivational tool and to havemanagers who care enough about their employees toarrange the production. Even if the film does notachieve anticipated motivational goals, it can stillserve as an expression of gratitude to employees fromtheir managers. That factor itself should prove aworthy reason to create the video.

CONCLUSION

Because each employee is motivated by differentstimuli, a motivational video may not benefit allemployees. However, for many people working inmodern organizations, such recognition of the workthey perform, presented in a positive light, can serve

as a beneficial, long-termmotivational stimulus.

As with any profession, lawenforcement officers needmotivational support from theirmanagers as well. To this end,the Pulaski, Tennessee, PoliceDepartment created a motiva-tional video for its employees asa way to recognize their contri-butions to the success of thedepartment and their value tothe community they serve. Theoverwhelmingly positivereaction to the video justified

the depart-ment’s efforts. Other police managers maydiscover that they have little to lose from producingsuch a video for their departments and much to gain.In the interest of their employees, police mangersshould examine new ways to motivate their officersand, more important, highlight the value of the often-seemingly unappreciated profession these men andwomen have chosen.

Endnote

1 For further information, see Douglas McGregor, The Professional

Manager (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 1967).

Dr. White recently retired as the assistant chief of thePulaski, Tennessee, Police Department.

10 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

dvances in communica-tions technology are mak-ing the world a smaller

Offshore Financial CentersThe Channel Islands and the Isle of ManBy MARK D. FERBRACHE

Aplace to do business. A simplemouse click can transfer millions ofdollars to the next hemisphere in aninstant. As a result, no longer dointernational borders stand as barri-ers to criminals who engage in in-ternational fraud and money laun-dering. In fact, they use them totheir advantage. To keep tenaciousinvestigators at bay, fraudsters ex-ecute their scams in multiple for-eign jurisdictions simply to exploit

the difficulties that local law en-forcement officers often encounterwhen dealing with other countries.

Because fraud investigationsprogress by tracking the money in-volved, the trail frequently leads to,or passes through, a foreign coun-try. Therefore, the global law en-forcement community must re-spond to the technological advancesused by criminals engaged in theseactivities by actively developinggreater cooperation among foreignauthorities. This requires the estab-lishment of effective gateways for

the timely exchange of informationand delivery of assistance.

THE CHANNEL ISLANDSAND THE ISLE OF MANCONNECTION

Most experienced fraud investi-gators view the Channel Islands andthe Isle of Man1 as loosely regulatedtax havens immune to inquiriesfrom foreign authorities, whichmake the Islands the choice ofcriminals to launder their illegalgains. However, two recent reviewsof the Islands’ financial and legal

February 2001 / 11

sectors provide evidence to the con-trary. The consensus of these re-views found that the Islands have awell-regulated financial industry,money laundering legislation inplace, and a demonstrated willing-ness to cooperate with and provideassistance to foreign authorities.2

In the last 15 to 20 years, theIslands have blossomed as offshorefinancial centers due, in part, totheir proximity to the United King-dom, low taxes, and overall eco-nomic and political stability. Whatis an “offshore” financial center?Simply, it is any financial centerthat provides financial services for asubstantial number of nonresidents.

Geographic andHistorical Aspects

Where are the relatively ob-scure Channel Islands and theireven lesser-known cousin to thenorth, the Isle of Man? The ChannelIslands comprise the islands of Jer-sey and Guernsey, well known fortheir two unique breeds of cattle,which bear the islands’ names, theirfine agriculture and horticultureproduce, and beautiful scenery. Lo-cated in the English Channel, theIslands lie approximately 13 milesfrom the northern coast of Franceand about 85 miles from the south-ern coast of Great Britain.

The Bailiwick of Jersey com-prises the island of Jersey and a fewuninhabited islands and covers ap-proximately 45 square miles in sur-face area, with a resident populationof approximately 85,000. The Baili-wick of Guernsey includes the twosmaller islands of Alderney andSark. Guernsey has a surface area ofjust over 25 square miles, Alderneyapproximately 3 square miles, and

Sark slightly more than 2 squaremiles. The entire Bailiwick ofGuernsey has a resident populationof approximately 62,000.

The Isle of Man is centrally lo-cated in the Irish Sea betweenNorthern Ireland and Great Britain.The topography ranges from vaststretches of open moorland tothickly wooded glens. A centralrange of mountains traverses the is-land from the northeast to the south-west, together with valleys leadingto rocky cliffs and secluded bays.The island measures 33 miles run-ning north to south and 13 milesfrom east to west for a total surfacearea of 227 square miles, making it5 times larger than Jersey and 9times the size of Guernsey. Theisland’s resident population standsat approximately 73,000.

Local history of the Channel Is-lands is steeped in the memory ofinvasions and attempted conquests.Along the coast, gray concreteWorld War II bunkers and

fortifications contrast with oldcastle turrets and towers remainingfrom the Napoleonic wars and me-dieval times. The Normans addedthe Channel Islands to their duchyin 933. In 1066, Duke William ofNormandy successfully invadedEngland and became King WilliamI of England. When King John ofEngland lost control of his posses-sions on mainland France in 1204,the Islands remained loyal to theEnglish Crown and have been En-glish dependencies since that time.The Islands have enjoyed sevencenturies of self-government, butstill retain some relics of theFrench-Norman language and law.

The Isle of Man can trace itshistory from the introduction offarming in the fourth millenniumB.C. through the Manx Iron Age(from 500 B.C. to 500 A.D.) and theCeltic traditions to Christianity andthe Viking rule of the ninth century.Rule of the territory alternated be-tween England and Scotland, and

...law enforcementagencies in the

Islands haveestablished informalgateways to share

criminal intelligenceon a regular basis

with the FBI.

Special Agent Ferbrache servesas an FBI assistant legalattache in London, England.

less frequently Ireland, during thethirteenth to fifteenth centuries.Throughout the years, the Isle ofMan developed its own unique cul-ture. Although spared the Romanand Norman invasions, the Vikingsleft lasting impressions, such as theisland’s parliament, known as theTynwald, the oldest governing bodystretching back over 1,000 years.3

Administrative Authority

Since the emergence of the Eu-ropean Union (EU), whose mem-bers (with the exception of theUnited Kingdom) recently adoptedthe “Euro” as a common currency,the Islands have faced increasingpressure to adopt effective moneylaundering legislation, broadentheir efforts to cooperate and assistwith foreign inquiries, and imple-ment financial regulations similarto the United Kingdom and otherEU countries. Most of the EU coun-tries are members of the FinancialAction Task Force (FATF), estab-lished at the 1989 economic summitin Paris, France. The FATF is amultinational group that developsand promotes policies and proce-dures to combat internationalmoney laundering. By 1997, all 26FATF members enacted moneylaundering legislation in accor-dance with FATF recommenda-tions, which set forth internationalstandards for money laundering leg-islation and financial industryregulation.4

However, because the Islandsare dependencies of the BritishCrown, they cannot participatefully as members of the EU and,therefore, do not consider EU direc-tives on such issues as tax harmoni-zation as binding upon them. Their

constitutions allow them the inde-pendence to govern their own af-fairs. While the United Kingdomremains responsible for the Islands’international affairs and for theirdefense, the Islands have autonomyover their domestic affairs, includ-ing taxation. Furthermore, becausethe Islands are not part of the UnitedKingdom, the Mutual Legal Assis-tance Treaty (MLAT) between theUnited States and the United King-dom and Northern Ireland does notapply to them.

EU pressure to create a more“level playing field” remained onthe United Kingdom and, by exten-sion, on the Crown Dependencies.In January 1998, due, in part, to EUpressure, the United KingdomHome Secretary, a Justice Ministerequivalent, commissioned a reviewof the laws, financial regulatorysystems, and methods for combat-ing financial crime and cooperatingwith foreign jurisdictions in theIslands. This review culminated ina four-volume report issued inNovember 1998.5

Because the Home Secretarycommissioned the report withoutany prior consultation with the

Islands, the report’s anticipated re-lease caused some anxiety for Is-land officials. But, despite the con-troversy generated by the UnitedKingdom’s imposed review, theconclusions drawn by the reportproved positive. The report con-cluded that the Islands, “...have in-frastructures of legislation, judi-ciary, prosecution, regulation, andlaw enforcement, mostly based onUnited Kingdom models, which forthe most part are extremely good forsuch relatively small jurisdictions.In many areas they have cooperatedwell, sometimes remarkably so,with the authorities of other coun-tries in the pursuit of crime andregulatory breaches.”6

Financial Profile

The Islands’ financial industryincludes banking investment, aswell as insurance and trust compa-nies. Total bank deposits on the Is-lands (resident and nonresident)currently consist of around 170 bil-lion pounds (Jersey, 100 billion;Guernsey, 50 billion; and Isle ofMan, 20 billion pounds).7 By com-parison, nonresident deposits heldin the United Kingdom total ap-proximately 1 trillion pounds.8 Theindependence of the Islands alsohas enabled them to provide consid-erable tax advantages to their cus-tomers. For example, corporate andpersonal tax rates generally are 20percent on all of the Islands as op-posed to tax rates in the UnitedKingdom and Europe, which canvary from approximately 30 to 50percent.9 This proves unsurprisingbecause the Islands have no interna-tional debt, a simple tier of govern-ment, low unemployment, and alow-cost infrastructure.

Most experiencedfraud investigatorsview the Channel

Islands and the Isleof Man as loosely

regulated tax havens....

12 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

Jersey has the largest bankingsector of all of the three islands,while Guernsey constitutes a majorcenter for captive insurance compa-nies. The Isle of Man has a rela-tively large life insurance and com-mercial insurance sector, withsmaller investment and bankingsectors.

The financial industry in Jerseyrepresents approximately 55 per-cent of this island’s economy,whereas in Guernsey, it representsapproximately 60 percent.10 In theIsle of Man, the financial industryaccounts for approximately 37 per-cent of this island’s economy.11 Fi-nally, Jersey and Guernsey each hasa Financial Services Commissiondesignated as regulators of the fi-nancial industry, while the Isle ofMan has the Financial SupervisionCommission.

Global Cooperation

Over the years, the FBI legalattache12 in London has enjoyed ex-cellent cooperation with the law en-forcement agencies from the Is-lands. In recent years, a growingnumber of U.S.-initiated fraud andmoney laundering investigations,with a nexus to the Islands, haveensued. Furthermore, the Islandshave adopted new legislation,which requires financial institu-tions to report any suspicious activi-ties to the police and creates crimi-nal statutes for money launderingoffenses. Former legislation re-quired disclosure only when suspi-cious activities related to drug traf-ficking or terrorism.

More frequently, the Islandsplay a role in large-scale interna-tional fraud investigations. Whilethese localities offer a variety of

legal, legitimate, and prudent busi-ness and tax advantages, these sameattributes often attract the more un-scrupulous or criminal element. Forexample, in the Islands, nomineedirectorships represent an area un-der considerable scrutiny. Essen-tially, nominee directors often serveas the directors of so many compa-nies that it proves impossible forthem to have detailed knowledge ofany individual company’s businessactivities or monetary transactions.

Nominee directors generally re-ceive a fixed annual fee as a directorfor each company. Usually, nomi-nee directors have no knowledge ofthe company’s true beneficial own-ers. This problem exists primarilyon the island of Sark in the Baili-wick of Guernsey. This island has atotal resident population of approxi-mately 575; however, directorshipsheld by Sark residents total approxi-mately 15,000.

Sark residents enjoy a uniquetax position together with perceivedsecrecy. These attributes have cre-ated a situation where companies

incorporated in other jurisdictionsseek Sark’s residents as directors.In recent years, the practice has ex-panded, with many residents par-ticipating in what has become a lu-crative business. Some individualshold in excess of 1,000 director-ships. In addition, some residentsalso supply accommodation ad-dresses, fax and telephone services,and company administration. MostSark directors have no knowledgeof what their companies do nor dothey know the identities of the com-panies’ true beneficial owners. Theactual running of the company isperformed by a company adminis-trator.13 To address this problem,the legislative assemblies in theBailiwick of Guernsey have ap-proved, in principle, legislation thatwill impose regulation of fiducia-ries, company administrators, andcompany directors. The proposedlegislation will require the registra-tion of all company directors,implement regulatory oversight,and impose a specific “know-your-customer” regimen. In November2000, by authority of the Tynwald,the Corporate Services ProvidersAct 2000 came into force in the Isleof Man. Similar to Guernsey’s re-sponse, this act brings company ser-vices providers under the supervi-sion of the Financial SupervisionCommission, the island’s financialregulator. Company services pro-viders now must be licensed andadhere to a set of guidelines govern-ing “good practice” and “know yourcustomer.”

Formal Assistance Requests

If U.S. law enforcement agen-cies, whether local, state, or federal,should require investigative

February 2001 / 13

14 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

assistance from the Islands, theyshould contact the Office of Inter-national Affairs (OIA), CriminalDivision, U.S. Department of Jus-tice (DOJ) in Washington, D.C.14

The OIA-DOJ represents the Cen-tral or Competent Authority for theUnited States, and all requests seek-ing foreign assistance are transmit-ted through this office. Likewise, aforeign Central Authority respond-ing to a formal request will submitits response to OIA. Upon receipt,OIA will forward the information orevidence to the U.S. prosecutor ini-tiating the request.

Typically, requests to the Is-lands are made in the context of“letters rogatory.” Letters rogatory,or diplomatic requests, constitutethe method by which one countryrequests assistance from anotherwhere compliance by the requestedcountry may require use of the for-eign court’s compulsory process.Requests for bank or businessrecords or the testimony of a wit-ness may require the foreign courtto issue a compulsion order to sat-isfy the request. The United Statesuses letters rogatory to request as-sistance from any country that itdoes not have an MLAT with or ininstances where the MLAT does notcover the offenses involved.

An MLAT represents a type ofbilateral agreement. The UnitedStates has entered into MLATs witha number of countries. While thesetreaties provide the formal mecha-nisms for the execution of requestssubmitted to obtain information,documents, and assistance in locat-ing and repatriating assets, they re-late only to crimes addressed by aspecific MLAT. For example, the

MLAT between the United Statesand the United Kingdom and North-ern Ireland creates procedures toprovide mutual assistance in—

• taking the testimony ofpersons;

• providing documents, records,and evidence;

• serving documents;

• locating or identifying persons;

• transferring persons in custodyfor testimony;

• executing requests for searchesand seizures;

• identifying, tracing, freezing,seizing, and forfeiting theproceeds and instrumentalitiesof crime and assistance inrelated proceedings; and

• providing any other assistancethat Central Authorities mayagree upon.

The requested country is not obli-gated to respond, but usually doesso as a matter of comity.

Police-to-police Network

Following the first review ofthe Islands’ financial industry in1998, another outside evaluationoccurred in the spring of 1999. The

FBI legal attache in London and theFinancial Crimes Section at FBIHeadquarters coordinated this re-view from a law enforcement per-spective. Welcomed by law en-forcement and government officialsfrom each island, the States of Jer-sey Police, Commercial Branch; theGuernsey Police Fraud and Finan-cial Investigation Unit; and the Isleof Man Fraud Squad all made sig-nificant contributions in this effortto improve law enforcement coop-eration in the global fight againstfraud and money laundering.

The review centered on devel-oping an in-depth understanding ofthe Islands’ offshore financial in-dustry and the local government’slegal and judicial system, as well aslearning how local law enforcementauthorities combat financial fraudand money laundering. After gain-ing some insight and a context forthese offshore localities, the reviewidentified gateways and methodsfor the effective exchange of infor-mation relating to criminal mattersof mutual interest. These gatewaysconsist of formal (e.g., official ordiplomatic) and informal (e.g., po-lice-to-police) communications.Today, law enforcement agencies inthe Islands have established infor-mal gateways to share criminal in-telligence on a regular basis withthe FBI.

A report of the findings of thereview serves as a resource andguide to all U.S. law enforcementagencies who have, or will have,investigative contact with the Is-lands. It provides a detailed, butsuccinct, review of these offshorefinancial centers from a U.S. lawenforcement perspective. The

”The Islands’ financial

industry includesbanking investment,as well as insuranceand trust companies.

February 2001 / 15

report discusses the political andeconomic climate, as well as thelaw enforcement and criminal en-vironment, and cites the specificlegislation local authorities operateunder in conducting fraud investi-gations and providing assistance.Because each of the Islands standsas a uniquely individual interna-tional offshore financial center, thereport includes copies of publishedguides from each island jurisdic-tion, which provide instructions onhow to draft requests for evidenceand assistance. Law enforcementagencies can access the report15

on the FBI’s Law EnforcementOnline.16

CONCLUSION

With the technological ad-vances in communications, law en-forcement agencies have begun toface the effects of the global crimi-nal. Fraud and money launderinghave become commonplace for theinternational thief due to these mod-ern developments.

Offshore financial centers, suchas the Channel Islands and the Isleof Man, demonstrate the need forglobal law enforcement coopera-tion. For years, authorities haveagreed with the widely held notionthat these areas are maverick cen-ters of thinly regulated financial ac-tivity attracting money launderersand impenetrable by law enforce-ment. Fortunately, two reports byoutside evaluators have dispelledthis long-standing myth. The as-sessment by the director of the Jer-sey Financial Services Commissionsums up the results of these reviewsthe best: “...the Commission isvery conscious of the completelylegitimate demands by international

customers for privacy in their finan-cial affairs.... At the same time, theCommission believes that it is vitalthat we, like other Jersey authori-ties, cooperate fully with others in-ternationally in the fight againstcrime. When there is an interna-tional investigation into financialfraud, we are not prepared to allowJersey to be the place where the trailgoes cold.”17 Experience has shownthat the authorities in Guernsey andthe Isle of Man have adopted thesame robust attitude.

Endnotes

1 For this article, the author refers to bothareas collectively as the Islands.

2 In 1999, the Offshore Group of BankingSupervisors (OGBS) organized a Financial TaskForce (FATF) evaluation of the Islands. Boththe OGBS and the FATF reviews provedfavorable to the Islands and found all threejurisdictions cooperative.

3 For additional information, see http://

www.isle-of-man.com; accessed November 2,2000.

4 For additional information, access theFATF Web site at http://www.oecd.org/fatf.

5 Andrew Edwards, Review of the Financial

Regulations in the Crown Dependencies

(London, England, 1998). This report becamebetter known as “The Edward’s Report.”

6 Ibid., Part I, Chapter 18, page 161.7 Ibid., Part II, Chapter 2, page 4. In U.S.

currency, about $245 billion total, with Jerseyat $144 billion, Guernsey at $72 billion, and theIsle of Man at $29 billion.

8 Ibid., Part II, Chapter 2, page 4. In U.S.currency, about $1.4 trillion.

9 Ibid., Part II, Chapter 2, page 5; and“Taxing Wages in OECD Countries, 1998-1999,” Organization for Economic Cooperationand Development; available from http://

www.oecd.org/daf/fa/stats/wages.htm; accessedNovember 2, 2000.

10 Ibid., Part II, Chapter 2, page 3.11 Ibid., Part II, Chapter 2, page 3.12 FBI legal attaches represent the primary

means through which FBI investigations areprogressed overseas.

13 “Obtaining Evidence in the Bailiwick ofGuernsey,” Sark Directors, Guernsey Policeand Commercial Fraud Department and theJoint Customs Financial Investigation Unit, 17.

14 U.S. Department of Justice, CriminalDivision, Office of International Affairs, 1301New York Avenue, NW, Washington, DC20530; http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/oia.html.

15 Because Special Agent Brian F. Warrenof the FBI’s Charlotte, North Carolina, officeconducted the review, the report, The Warren

Review, bears his name.16 Access is free to qualified law enforce-

ment, criminal justice, or public safetyprofessionals. To obtain access, call 202-324-8833 or send an e-mail to [email protected].

17 Richard Pratt, “The Jersey FinancialServices Commission,” Jersey International

Finance, 5, no. 1 (January 1999): 14.

16 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

Book Review

Drugs in Society: Causes, Concepts andControl, 3rd edition by Michael D. Lyman andGary W. Potter, Anderson Publishing Co.,Cincinnati, Ohio, 1998

Drugs have often been cited as one of themajor reasons for the recent explosion in ournation’s inmate population. Various points ofview, often dependant upon political rhetoric,provide contradictory conclusions on the tiesbetween drugs and crime. Some argue that drugusers commit proportionately more crimes thanthose who do not use drugs. Therefore, theirprosecution and imprisonment are justified.Others argue that decriminalization of drugs willalleviate the prison crisis by removing the druguser and drug trafficker from the inmate popu-lation. Such a decriminalization would permitcriminal justice resources to be devoted tonondrug crimes (e.g., murders, rapes, robberies,burglaries). As a result of these divergent views,many texts are written from either a law enforce-ment perspective or a treatment or social workperspective.

The authors have avoided the politicaliza-tion of the drug issue by writing a balanced,thorough, well-reasoned book on the drugphenomenon in our society. Both authors haveimpressive credentials for writing such a text.

Together they have over 30 years of experiencein the criminal justice field.

The authors divided their text into threemajor parts: Understanding the Problem, Gangsand Drugs, and Fighting Back. Within thesemajor divisions, they have 14 chapters that coverthe whole spectrum of the issue. They devotespecific chapters to the history of drug use, thedomestic and international drug trade, the roleof organized crime and gangs, drug control/prevention, and even the issue of legalizingdrugs. Their chapters on the illicit drug tradeand the domestic drug production are particu-larly interesting. For instance, the chapter on theillicit drug trade covers not only the trade routesof various drugs, but also the roles individualsplay in this criminal enterprise and reasons forprice fluctuations. The book also includeschapters devoted to the political solutionsattempted and to various treatment efforts.Information presented in the text regarding thehistorical roles of various governments concern-ing drugs is also noteworthy. For instance, theauthors discuss the role of Great Britain, France,Russia, and even the United States, in thelegalization of opium in China via the TientsinTreaty (1858).

The entire text is easy to read, and thematerial proves very interesting. Each chapterincludes a list of terms and discussion questionsto facilitate the learning of the material.

The authors have provided a historical,theoretical, and fact-driven work on one of thegreatest social ills of modern society. Lawenforcement personnel, attorneys, judges,correctional officials, and treatment specialistswill all benefit from reading this text.

Reviewed byArt Bowker

Probation OfficerNothern District of Ohio Probation Office

Cleveland, Ohio

February 2001 / 17

wo seasoned detectives in-terrogate a suspect who ini-tially denies all involve-T

ment in the heinous crime under in-vestigation. Employing a ruse, con-ducting a role-play, revealing evi-dence collected, exaggeratingpotential outcomes, and using othercleverly played exchanges enablethe detectives to reverse thesuspect’s position and eventuallyobtain a confession. The incidentends with one of the detectivespushing a pad of paper and pencilacross the table and instructing thesuspect to “write it down.”

This scene is played out almostweekly in a popular television se-ries, depicting the events impactinga homicide unit within a large po-lice department. Hollywood drama-tizations provide the viewer with anentertaining glimpse of police ac-tivities, such as the taking of a con-fession and its importance to thesolution of criminal investigations,but usually fall short in describingthe details surrounding theseevents. Real-life investigators knowthat their job is not complete untilthey have recorded the events prop-erly in accurate reports and signed

statements, which contain the rel-evant facts and admissions neces-sary for expedient prosecution orfurther cooperative efforts.1

IMPORTANCE OFDOCUMENTATION

Most subjects feel an inherentneed to lie or cover up their involve-ment in crimes. The ability to de-velop rapport with these subjectsand induce cooperation representskills that some investigators havemastered to increase their successrates for case resolution.2 These in-vestigators also recognize the

© Adobe Image Library

Documenting andReporting a Confessionwith a Signed Statement A Guide for Law EnforcementBy TIMOTHY T. BURKE

18 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

importance of taking accurate andextensive notes during interviews.Moreover, departmental policy maynecessitate preparation of an inter-view log (a document containingpertinent information about the in-dividuals involved and actionstaken during the interview) for cer-tain situations. For example, inter-view logs often accompany inter-views in which the advice of rightswarning and waiver are requiredand when a suspect is interviewedon the premise of the investigatingagency, even though not underarrest.

While seasoned investigatorswill attest to the excitement, exhila-ration, and relief that often accom-pany the admission of wrongdoingby a criminal, they realize that theymust follow this process with athorough and accurate recording ofthe confession in the form of aninvestigator’s report. Investigatorsalso know that they can furtherenhance these reports by includ-ing signed statements. As withall investigative techniques, it is

important to anticipate the legal re-quirements faced by prosecutorswho inherit the results of evidencecollection and are responsible forsecuring criminal conviction. Theywill rely on these reports and signedstatements as proof of the admis-sions to violations of criminal code.Therefore, investigators must prop-erly document these events in a suit-able format.

CONTENTS OF ASIGNED STATEMENT

Once subjects have confessedand provided a detailed explanationof their role in a particular crime,their signed statements will furthersupport the official report to follow.Written in the first person, the state-ment follows a logical format andcontains the subject’s own words asmuch as possible.3

The Opening

The opening paragraph identi-fies the subject, the investigators,and the nature of the crime. Thesecond paragraph further describes

the subject’s education and abilityto comprehend the statement heprepares and signs.

The Body

The body of the statement em-ploys language that the subject usedpreviously in the confession or canunderstand. Because most subjectsare not professional writers, investi-gators may assist in the formulationof these sentences. However, inves-tigators should avoid composingstatements that do not fit thesubject’s level of intelligence andlanguage abilities or that contradictprevious admissions. The statementshould describe fully importantgeneral facts, including the eventsleading up to the crime, thesubject’s intent and motivation,how the subject committed thecrime, and crime-specific items,such as the amount of money stolenor number of people victimized.The statement should reflect thesame relevant facts recorded in theinvestigator’s official report of theconfession, but may summarizesome details succinctly as long asthe omission of this informationdoes not change the context of thestatement. For example, the follow-ing type of information may appearin a signed statement: In 1999, Icame up with the idea to obtainmoney from my then employer, XYZInsurance Company, by submittingfalse claims using the fictitiousnames of John Doe and Mary Janeand my knowledge of internal pro-cedures for approval of claims pay-ments. From March to June, Iacquired over $250,000 in pay-ments pursuant to my scheme to de-fraud XYZ Insurance Company.

A properlydocumented

confession...increasesthe likelihood of

swift and successfulprosecution of

criminals.

”Special Agent Burke is an instructor in theInvestigative Training Unit at the FBI Academy.

February 2001 / 19

I, (subject’s name and address) hereby make the following free and voluntary statementto (officer’s official name and title) who has identified himself/herself as a (title of officer andname of department or agency). I have been advised that I have been interviewed concerning myinvolvement in (phrase describing scheme or nature of crime and victim, such as “the misappro-priation and theft of $100,000 from the First National Bank while I was employed there during1999”).

I was born on (subject’s date of birth) at (subject’s place of birth). I attended (last schoolattended) and completed (last grade or graduation date). I read and write the English language.

I knew that what I was doing was wrong, and I regret my actions. I wish to cooperate withthe (name of agency) investigation and get this matter resolved. (Optional paragraph, dependingon circumstances and subject’s remorse)

I have read this (number of pages) page statement, have initialed all corrections, and I amsigning it because it is true and correct. (The subject writes this after reading the statement aloudand accepting its contents.)

_____________________________________________________ (subject’s signature and date)

First witness: ___________________________________________________________________(officer taking statement, title, agency, location, and date)

Second witness: _________________________________________________________________(third-party individual, title, agency, location, and date)

(NOTE: Officers always should have the subject read the statement aloud to them and initial any corrections.Also, they should avoid blank lines between sentences and paragraphs in the statement.)

Signed Statement FormatWhite Collar Crime Sample

Officers should use the next few paragraphs to summarize what the subject did and howthe subject did it, in his own words. Because this statement occurs after the subject’s confes-sion, officers can assist the subject in formulating the statement, using information previ-ously provided. Officers should include any information the subject provides regarding whathappened to the stolen money, how it was spent, items purchased, and other related details.

20 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

I deposited the claims checks intothe fictitious-name accounts that Ihad established at First NationalBank and subsequently withdrewthis money for my personal use.However, the investigator’s officialreport undoubtedly would containgreater detail of each fraudulentevent, painstakingly obtained froma review of specific items of evi-dence with the cooperating subject.4

If appropriate, a paragraph re-flecting the subject’s acknowledg-ment of wrongdoing, regret, and in-tention to continue cooperating canfurther demonstrate the subject’sability to understand the conse-quences of his actions. Also, inves-tigators possibly could use such astatement to discredit later attemptsby defense attorneys arguing “stateof mind” and “insanity” pleas.

The Approval

Whether typed by law enforce-ment personnel or handwritten bythe subject, the statement should besingle-spaced and ultimately re-viewed (read aloud) by the subjectwho will initial corrections andwrite a final sentence acknowledg-ing his understanding of the state-ment. I have read this (number ofpages) page statement, have ini-tialed all corrections, and I amsigning it because it is true andcorrect.

Once the subject has completedthe statement and has read it back tothe investigators, the subject andthe witnesses (who are typically theinvestigators) should sign and datethe document. Occasionally, a sec-ond witness may include athird-party individual (nonlaw en-forcement), such as a relative of the

subject, a lawyer, or a representa-tive from the victim business/insti-tution where the interrogation oc-curred. The second witness signs asa witness to the subject’s signature,and not necessarily the subject’s ad-mission. Investigators may havesigned statements transcribed, withquotations, into the body of theirofficial report, which details the en-tire interview. The original signedstatement is then preserved as docu-mentary evidence. Like other formsof evidence, investigators shouldrefer to departmental policy or seekprosecutor advice before furnishingcopies of signed statements to sub-jects, their attorneys, or other thirdparties.

extent to which investigators shouldrecord this information in a finalreport generally relates to the com-pleteness of the confession andthe investigators’ abilities to cor-roborate the admissions with otherevidence. After providing an initialdenial, and other misleading infor-mation, (subject’s name) acknowl-edged he/she wanted to cooperatewith the (name of law enforcementagency) and thereafter admittedhis/her involvement in this matteras follows illustrates how investiga-tors can summarize these falsestatements and other extraneousitems, such as rapport-buildingdiscussions, in their final officialreports.

However, in the case of a sub-ject who confesses and thereafterbecomes a cooperating witness forthe government, investigators mustremember that prosecutors have anethical and constitutional obligationto provide defense attorneys withany exculpatory evidence and withany information that reflects negatively on the credibility of thiswitness. Although the previouslysuggested sentence is legally ac-ceptable to this point, a codefend-ant’s defense attorney subsequentlymay seek greater detail of these de-nials or false statements in an at-tempt to discredit this witness andthe government’s version of theseevents. Investigators can anticipatethis possibility and document themisleading statements more thor-oughly in the official report, fol-lowed by a transitional sentencewhich identifies the subject’s ac-knowledgment of wrongdoing,willingness to cooperate, and subse-quent confession.

APPLICATIONS OFDOCUMENTATION

False Statements

Newly assigned investigatorsand law enforcement trainees oftenwonder how to document state-ments that subjects make prior to aconfession, such as false statementsor denials that commonly dominatethe first part of the interview. The

Investigators mayhave signedstatements

transcribed, withquotations, intothe body of theirofficial report....

February 2001 / 21

Multiple Subjects

Some cooperative subjects willprovide false information duringand after a confession, which inves-tigators always should include intheir official reports. Cases in-volving multiple subjects typicallyinclude cooperating subjects whoredirect blame or exaggerate cocon-spirators’ roles in an attempt tominimize their own exposure. Theinvestigator’s report should includethis information (the totality of thecircumstances will determine latereach subject’s role and resultantprosecution), along with the factualdetails set forth in the confession.

The report concludes with a tran-scription of the signed statement,prepared after the confession. In-vestigators should maintain inter-view notes and logs as supportingrecords for the official report untilthe matter is adjudicated.

Anticipating the confessor’slater refusal to take the witnessstand in a subsequent joint trialconstitutes another considerationfor signed statements in casesinvolving two or more subjects.In this situation, legal representa-tives may consider any referencesto codefendants in the confessor’ssigned statement as prejudicial to

their clients' rights and possibly re-strict using the statement as evi-dence. Several options exist for in-vestigators to appropriately addressthis issue. One involves simply pre-paring the statement and then al-lowing prosecutors the discretion toredact portions that they cannot use.Alternatively, investigators may in-corporate a paragraph into the state-ment (just after the introductoryparagraphs) in which the confessorstates his involvement in the crimeswithout naming the coconspirators.Another option involves preparingtwo separate statements, onerelating all details of the offense as

1. Identity of person interviewed

2. Identity of officers conducting interview

3. Location of interview

4. Date of interview

5. Time of arrest, if applicable

6. Location of arrest

7. Identity of officers making arrest

8. Time interview began

9. Time officers informed subject or suspectof his rights, and if more than one officer,name of officer advising subject or suspect

10. Time subject or suspect waived his rights

11. Time interview concluded

12. Time preparation of statement commenced

Interview Log Contents

13. Identity of person preparing statement

14. Time statement completed

15. Time subject or suspect reviewedstatement

16. Time subject or suspect signed written statement

17. A record of requests and complaints ofsubject and the action taken thereon, suchas the time a subject requests permissionto call an attorney, the time he made a callto his attorney, the time subject com-plained of illness, the time and actiontaken on this complaint, the time subjectrequested food, the time and action takenon this request, and the details as to howthis request was handled.

Source: FBI Special Agent’s Legal Handbook

furnished by the confessor, and theother containing only admissions ofthe confessor that relate solely tohis guilt.5 Whichever method theyemploy, investigators should re-main consistent throughout theentire investigation.

CONCLUSION

Law enforcement officials un-derstand the importance of suffi-ciently reporting investigative re-sults to withstand the scrutiny of thelegal system. A properly docu-mented confession accompanied bya well-prepared signed statement

increases the likelihood of swiftand successful prosecution ofcriminals. Although many televi-sion and movie depictions of policeobtaining confessions inaccuratelyportray or fail to emphasize this as-pect of the confession, it remains anecessary part of effective policework.

Endnotes

1 The author based this article on theknowledge he gained during 12 years in theFBI’s Detroit, Michigan, office, participatingin numerous subject interviews and over 100confessions involving bank robbery, violentcrime, and white collar crime investigations.

2 For additional information on interroga-tions, see David Vessel, “ConductingSuccessful Interrogations,” FBI Law Enforce-

ment Bulletin, October 1998, 1-6; and MichaelR. Napier and Susan H. Adams, “Magic Wordsto Obtain Confessions,” FBI Law Enforcement

Bulletin, October 1998, 11-15.3 For illustrative purposes and to avoid

confusion in the article, the author refers tosubjects as males.

4 When investigators use evidentiary itemsduring a witness interview or subject confes-sion, they should avoid exposing originalevidence to the interviewee and potentiallytainting its forensic value for future use at legalproceedings. Investigators should prepareworking copies or photographs of thesematerials beforehand in anticipation of thenecessity for witness identification.

5 FBI Special Agent’s Legal Handbook.

22 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

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Internet address is [email protected] would like to know your thoughts on

contemporary law enforcement issues. Wewelcome your comments, questions, and

suggestions about the magazine. Pleaseinclude your name, title, and agency

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The Bulletin’sE-mail Address

Perspective

Special Agent Perry,former chief of the Ethics

Unit, Office of ProfessionalResponsibility, at the FBIAcademy, now heads the

FBI’s Raleigh, NorthCarolina, resident agency.

n the last two decades, research and commentaryregarding the causes and effects of law enforce-

ment corruption have intensified and diversified.Efforts in Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and theUnited States have effectively identified symptomsand remedies in those countries, as emerging demo-cracies in Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Pacific Rimface the more immediate and stark realities of self-governance and the police role. Comparative reviewsof problems and best practices, as well as academicresearch, suggest that corruption follows certainpredictable routes and that precursory signs occurprior to any actual quid pro quo corrupt activity.

Three organizational failures can foster a resent-ful, cynical, and demoralized work force leading toindividual and collective acts of corruption. Thesefailures are: little or ineffective discipline anddeselection of trainees (a commitment to fairly butfirmly graduate only those individuals who trulydemonstrate performance and integrity standards);ignorance of the nature and effects of the goal-gradient phenomenon (the farther away individualsremain from their goal, the less the tendency toremain passionately interested in its attainment); andthe allowance of a double standard within the organi-zation, thereby decreasing moral accountability asprofessional responsibility increases. All of thesefactors represent instances of what sociologists havereferred to for many years as the “broken windowtheory”—if enough broken windows in a neighbor-hood go unattended, the neighborhood falls into amoral and material malaise. Law enforcement appli-cations of this theory are addressed rarely.1

Understanding Corruption

Corruption can include an abuse of position,although not all abuses of position constitute corruptacts.2 Committing a criminal act under color of law3

represents one example of corruption, while usingone’s law enforcement position for a de minimus, or

I

insignificant, private gain may not necessarily rise towhat reasonable persons will call a corrupt act,though it may be corrupting.4 All self-interested orpotentially corrupt acts are not completely corrupt.5 Infact, these acts can constitute police deviance,6 whichbest captures the nature of the precursory signs ofcorruption, as opposed to actual corruption.

Precursory signs, or instances of police deviance,may be agency-specific, or generic and found in lawenforcement as a profession. Unprofessional on- andoff-duty misconduct, isolated instances of misuse ofposition, improper relationships with informants orcriminals, sexual harassment, disparaging racial orsexual comments, embellished/falsified reporting,time and attendance abuse, insubordination, nepotism,cronyism, and noncriminal unauthorized disclosure ofinformation all represent precursory signs of policedeviance that inspection and internal affairs compo-nents must monitor. When agencies determine a trendof increasing frequency and egregiousness of suchdeviance, they must take steps before classic or quidpro quo corruption occurs. An organization with anincrease in such deviance becomes a “rotten barrel,”even without completely “rotten apples.”

Repairing Broken WindowsPreventing Corruptionwithin Our RanksBy Frank L. Perry, Ph.D.

February 2001 / 23

24 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

Literature on the rotten-barrel concept has be-come more sophisticated. One study surmises thatmost of the major inquiries into police corruptionreject the “bad-apple” theory: “The rotten-appletheory won’t work any longer. Corrupt police officersare not natural-born criminals, nor morally wickedmen, constitutionally different from their honestcolleagues. The task of corruption control is toexamine the barrel, not just the apples, the organiza-tion, not just the individual in it, because corruptpolice are made, not born.”7

Examining Corruption

How, then, can agencies examine the barrel?They must analyze the increasing frequency andegregiousness of precursory signs, then assess theirdepartment’s training. Agencies must not treatdeselection expressly or implicitly as a negative ordetrimental policy. No trainee has a right to becomea law enforcement officer, althoughall qualified persons have an equalright to compete for such anassignment. Personnel, applicant, orrecruitment officers within policeagencies cannot predict who willmeet all suitability and trustworthi-ness standards prior to the trainingsetting. Therefore, the trainingcomponents must make this deter-mination with an overriding focuson the agency’s mission, image,and efficacy, while maintaining arespect-of-persons principle. Thismeans deselection—a commitmentto fairly but firmly graduate only those who trulydemonstrate performance and integrity standards.Organizational laziness in this regard is detrimental tothe agency and to the community it protects. Onceimmersed in the weighty discretion and low visibilityof law enforcement culture, those who do not meetminimal suitability and trustworthiness standards willcontribute invariably to the frequency of the precur-sory signs. The practical conclusion drawn fromrecent research is that, “in order to distance oneselfmorally from serious corruption, it is important not toengage in any corruption, albeit corruption of anapparently trivial kind.... Once a certain practice is

accepted, people are likely to go on to accept otherpractices that are increasingly unacceptable.”8

Failure to impartially deselect trainees based uponsuitability and trustworthiness standards eventuallydetermines the organizational grade of the infamousslippery slope. The higher the performance andintegrity standards for successful completion of thetraining program, the greater the angle from actualperformance and moral peak to potential failure.Metaphorically, the organizational culture will helpprevent individual slide because the ethical andperformance slope is so steep and the incrementalslide more obvious and preventive. Conversely, themore gradual the slope, the less the perception ofmoral and administrative slide.9

Additionally, law enforcement agencies mustunderstand and confront the goal-gradient phenom-enon, a facet of human behavior most relevant to lawenforcement work and culture. In general, the closer

individuals get to their goal, thefaster they run (a race), the harderthey try (a career), or the moreinterest they show (working latethe night before a vacation).Applied to law enforcement, thegoal-gradient phenomenon sug-gests that the midpoint in anofficer’s career can present adanger zone for malaise, resent-ment, cynicism, or just plainboredom. Such attitudes fuelprecursory corruption or policedeviance, if not actual corruption.Most professionals in any field of

endeavor can deal with and overcome the “too late toquit and too early to retire” syndrome successfully,but when burdened with the rigors of the very natureof law enforcement, such as high discretion, lowvisibility, and criminal element interaction, andweighed down further by an agency culture of poorrecruitment, ineffective training, and inept internalcontrols, then the goal-gradient phenomenon canbecome fatal—to a career and to an organization.

Preventing Corruption

How can law enforcement agencies counter thistendency of human nature? First, agencies should

““

Corruption caninclude an abuse ofposition, althoughnot all abuses of

position constitutecorrupt acts.

February 2001 / 25

consider frequent assignment moves, especially fromand to the areas of policing more prone to corrup-tion.10 Geographical and intradivisional reassignmentsprevent stagnation, broaden experience, and preemptlasting effects of deleterious associations—albeitperhaps at the expense of deepening expertise in asingle area.

Second, agencies should “feed the eagles.” Onepolice corruption investigation “perhaps best knownfor its distinction between ‘grass eaters’ and ‘meateaters,’ also included a third category: the ‘birds.’ Thebirds were the officers who flewabove the corruption, seekingsafety in the safe and rarified air ofadministrative positions.”11 Thebirds fly above corruption ordeviance, but sometimes they alsoconfront it. Certainly, these birdswho aspire for management rankscan, to further the analogy, become“eagles.” The eagle confrontscorruption, soars to perform dutiesin the most noble fashion possible,and, thereby, raises theorganization’s dignity and effec-tiveness. Thus, agencies shouldselect, nurture, and promote individuals who demon-strate these attributes early.

Efforts to counter the goal gradient shouldinclude positive reinforcement. Individuals relish fairand honest praise, commendation, and recognition.Agencies should do the same for all of their employ-ees as long as flattery, political gain, or gratuitousself-promotion are not intended. True professionalsrespect each other, and the goal gradient simply willnot take hold where a culture of support, commonal-ity, respect of persons, and appreciation of perfor-mance exists.

Third, the double standard must die. “Those whoserve the public must be held to a higher standard ofhonesty and care for the public good than the generalcitizenry.... A higher standard is not a double stan-dard. Persons accepting positions of public trust takeon new obligations and are free not to accept themif they do not want to live up to the higher standard”(emphasis added).12 Beginning a career in law

enforcement—perhaps the most entrusting andpowerful service for the public good—entails a higherstandard of conduct and calling for the trainee.Certainly, this reasoning should continue up throughand to the command or executive management level.Who could argue that with increasing rank within alaw enforcement agency comes either diminished oreven the same obligation to the public good as that ofa support employee, patrol officer, or street investiga-tor? If the premise that individuals accepting positionsof public trust take on new obligations, then it follows

that the higher the position, thehigher the standard. Birds must flybut they also must land. Nobleeagles do not hide in the under-brush of hidden agendas or at-tempts at cover-up and cronyism.Administrators must hold lawenforcement eagles more account-able for their actions because theysee more, know more, have morevisibility, receive more pay, andmust make responsible decisionsfor the sake of the agency’smission and, correspondingly, forthe public good. Law enforcement

agencies most resistant to corruption remove tempta-tion, increase the fear of detection, and emphasizemanagerial responsibility.13 Moreover, leadership onthe part of these agencies’ senior officers consists oftheir willingness to “state explicitly and openlythat...they will personally serve as role models forintegrity.”14

Conclusion

The benefits of preventing corruption lie in starkcontrast to the contempt, cynicism, and resentmentgenerated within an organization—and for an organi-zation as viewed by the taxpayer—when it winks atmisconduct, whether precursory, deviant, corrupt, orcriminal, on the part of management. As some re-searchers emphasize, increasing managerial moralresponsibility and accountability builds institutionalpride. It dies when a policy creates a double standardor when favoritism, cronyism, or career aggrandize-ment develop it.

26 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

Therefore, internal controls must remain firm,fair, and fast, as well as forthright. Even an appear-ance of management protecting its own in substanti-ated cases of misconduct will not only cause forfei-ture of an agency’s internal police powers, but willruin the agency itself.

Avoiding deselection, ignoring the goal gradient,and promoting or permitting a double standard ofinternal controls can result in corruption in lawenforcement agencies. Internal affairs and ethicscomponents within law enforcement agencies, there-fore, must remain, “vigilant and skeptical.”15 Neitherattribute is akin to cynicism or arrogance, and neithervigilance nor skepticism need be born of zealots.Monitoring human conduct within law enforcementagencies—themselves designed to monitor humanconduct writ large—must be done with uncompromis-ing care for human dignity, while carefully maintain-ing and enhancing the mission of the agency.

Endnotes

1 For more information on this topic, see Edwin J. Delattre, Character

and Cops—Ethics in Policing, Third Edition (Washington, DC: The AEIPress, 1996); M. Punch, Conduct Unbecoming: The Social Construction

of Police Deviance and Control (London: Tavistock, 1985); and J.Q.Wilson and G. Kelling, “The Police and Neighborhood Safety: BrokenWindows,” The Atlantic Monthly, March 1982, 29-38.

2 Tim Newburn, Understanding and Preventing Police Corruption:

Lessons from the Literature (London: Her Majesty’s Press, 1999).3 For a complete definition of color of law, see 18 U.S.C. § 242.4 Supra note 1 (Punch).5 John Kleinig, The Ethics of Policing (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge

University Press, 1996).6 Supra note 1 (Punch).7 Supra note 2; quote by former New York Police Commissioner

Patrick Murphy, regarding findings by the Knapp Commission, whichwas appointed in 1970 to investigate police corruption.

8 Supra note 5, 175-176. See also L.W. Sherman, A Sociological

Perspective (New York, NY: Doubleday, 1974). See Sherman’s accountof “constant” and “variable factors” in police corruption.

9 Supra note 5, 175. The logical and psychological versions of theslippery slope appear in excellent summary in The Ethics of Policing.

10 Supra note 2, 46. Generally known within the FBI culture for manyyears, one of J. Edgar Hoover’s basic tenets depended upon this intuitivenotion.

11 Supra note 2, 3612 Supra note 1 (Delattre, 68).13 Supra note 2, 30.14 Supra note 1 (Punch).15 Supra note 2.

Wanted:Photographs

he Bulletin staff isalways on the lookoutT

for dynamic, law enforce-ment-related photos forpossible publication in themagazine. We are interestedin photos that visually depictthe many aspects of the lawenforcement profession andillustrate the various taskslaw enforcement personnelperform.

We can use either black-and-white glossy or colorprints or slides, although weprefer prints (5x7 or 8x10).Appropriate credit will begiven to contributing photog-raphers when their workappears in the magazine. Wesuggest that you send dupli-cate, not original, prints aswe do not accept responsibil-ity for prints that may bedamaged or lost. Send yourphotographs to:

Art Director, FBI LawEnforcement Bulletin,FBI Academy, MadisonBuilding, Room 209,Quantico, VA 22135.

February 2001 / 27

Legal Digest

uring the past few years,the DEA has received nu-merous requests from for-

international forfeiture and sharingprogram.

Legislative History

In 1992, Congress enacted Title28, U.S. Code, Section 1355(b)(2),which vests U.S. district courts withextraterritorial jurisdiction over as-sets located abroad.1 The assertionof U.S. jurisdiction under this

statute, by the filing of a civil forfei-ture action, depends completelyupon the cooperation of the foreigncountry in which the property is lo-cated. If the assets are not repatri-ated to the United States prior to orduring a judicial forfeiture, then therepatriation request should be sus-pended until a final order of forfei-ture is entered. Once the forfeiture

The InternationalSharing ProgramFostering International CooperationBy DOUGLAS A. KASH, J.D., and JENNIFER A. GORMAN, J.D.

Deign countries through their respec-tive investigative and prosecutorialagencies to participate in the U.S.Department of Justice’s sharingprogram. This article presents anintroduction to the substantiveand procedural aspects of the

© Digital Stock

judgment is entered and final, itshould be transmitted via the U.S.Central Authority, the Office ofInternational Affairs, U.S. Depart-ment of Justice, to the foreign sov-ereign for enforcement or repatria-tion of the asset.

Criminal forfeiture cases aresomewhat different than civilforfeitures because they are actionsbrought against defendants, nottheir property. Upon conviction, allof the assets named in the indict-ment may be included in the forfei-ture order. Unless the defendantsagree to the repatriation of the as-sets (i.e., through a plea agreement),or, unless the foreign sovereign iswilling to enforce the (criminal orcivil) final order of forfeiture, theUnited States has little chance ofsuccessfully securing physical cus-tody of the asset and may never re-alize the value of the asset throughthe forfeiture process.

In 1986, Congress enactedTitle 18, U.S. Code, Section981(a)(1)(B), which enabled theUnited States to provide forfeitureassistance to foreign governmentsas required by its obligations underthe United Nations ConventionAgainst Illicit Narcotics Traffick-ing of Narcotic Drugs and Psycho-tropic Substances (“Vienna Con-vention”). The Vienna Conventionwas drafted in response to the in-creasing frequency and complexityof international drug-related moneylaundering. Section 981(a)(1)(B)authorizes the United States to seizeand forfeit assets within its bordersthat represent the proceeds of drug-related felonies committed abroadeven where there has not been aviolation of domestic law. U.S. lawcurrently does not authorize the sei-zure and forfeiture of instrumentali-ties used or intended to be usedin violation of a foreign drug law.

In addition, proceeds from drugtrafficking can be forfeited underthe recently enacted Civil AssetForfeiture Reform Act of 2000(“CAFRA”). Pursuant to an amend-ment to Title 18, U.S. Code, Sec-tion 981(a)(1)(C), the proceedsof all specified unlawful activitieswill be directly forfeitable, in-cluding Title 18, U.S. Code, Section1956(c)(7)(B)(i) offenses in whichindividuals commit crimes against aforeign nation involving the manu-facturing, importation, or sale ofcontrolled substances.

Asset Sharing

It is the policy and practice ofthe United States, pursuant to gov-erning statutory authority, to sharethe proceeds of successful forfei-ture actions with countries thatmake possible or substantially fa-cilitate the forfeiture of assets underU.S. law. Pursuant to Title 18, U.S.Code, Section 981(i) (money laun-dering offenses) and Title 21, U.S.Code, Section 881(e)(1)(E) (drugtrafficking offenses), asset sharingis a discretionary authority vested inthe Attorney General, the Secretaryof Treasury, or their designees totransfer a percentage of the net for-feited assets or the proceeds of thesale of any forfeited property to anyforeign country that participated di-rectly or indirectly in the seizure orforfeiture of property. Such a trans-fer must be—

• agreed to by the Secretary ofState;

• authorized in an internationalagreement between the UnitedStates and the foreign country;and

Ms. Gorman, Esquire, is a Dyncorplaw clerk who is working with the U.S.Department of Justice, AssetForfeiture Section, in Washington,D.C.

Mr. Kash serves as a seniorattorney for the DEA inArlington, Virginia.

28 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

February 2001 / 29

• made to a country which, ifapplicable, has been certifiedunder Title 22, U.S. Code,Section 2291(j).2

A Mutual Legal AssistanceTreaty (MLAT) is the typical agree-ment between the United States andother countries that will provide thebasis for legal assistance in drugand other criminal matters, includ-ing international asset sharing. Inaddition, executive agreements,which are not treaties and, there-fore, do not require Senate ap-proval, are narrower in scope thanMLATs and also can provide forinternational asset sharing. Finally,if neither an MLAT nor an execu-tive agreement exists, the State De-partment can draft a case-specificagreement with a foreign country tosatisfy the statutory requirementsgoverning the international transferof forfeited funds. Thus, an existinginternational agreement is not nec-essary in order to effectuate sharingwith a foreign country.

International SharingProcedures

A portion of the net forfeitedproperty, or the proceeds from suchproperty, may be transferred to aforeign government (not a foreignpolice agency3), as reflected by itsparticipation in the investigationand forfeiture of the asset. U.S. for-eign counterparts must understandthat the investigative agency andU.S. agents with whom they aredealing cannot bind the UnitedStates to transfer any particularamount of sharing because the ulti-mate decision rests with the Attor-ney General and the Secretary ofState, or their designees.

While a foreign governmentmay submit a sharing request underan applicable MLAT, sharingagreement, or through diplomaticchannels, the foreign investigativeagency is not required to submitany memoranda requesting a shareof the forfeited assets. Instead,the responsibility to prepare the“justification memorandum” ex-plaining the assistance rendered bythe foreign law enforcement entityand recommending a sharing per-centage rests with the case agentand must be signed by the specialagent in charge or country attaché.

(AFMLS), Criminal Division, U.S.Department of Justice stronglyurges submitting one sharing rec-ommendation covering all assetsthat were forfeited in the case. But,if there are multiple assets and theforeign government contributes adifferent amount of assistance foreach asset seizure, the request forsharing will still be processed.4

The justification memorandummust detail all of the pertinent caseinformation such as—

• specific explanation of theassistance provided by theforeign country, type ofconditions surroundingthe case, and length ofparticipation;

• whether any assistance wasreceived from domestic lawenforcement agencies; and

• whether confidential infor-mants were used and awardsare anticipated.5

If the DEA is the seizing agen-cy, the justification memorandum isthen forwarded to the chief of theAsset Forfeiture Section (AFS). Ifthe assets were forfeited adminis-tratively, the AFS sends its recom-mendation directly to the AFMLS.If the assets were forfeited judi-cially, the AFS sends its recommen-dation to the responsible U.S.Attorney’s Office (USAO) so thatthe DEA’s recommendation can beincorporated with the USAO’s rec-ommendation and be forwarded tothe AFMLS.

The AFMLS reviews the re-quest and forwards its recommen-dation to the Deputy Attorney Gen-eral (DAG).6 In an effort tomaintain parity and consistency in

“The internationalsharing program is

a critical tool todevelop and fosterrelationships with

foreign governmentsand their respective

law enforcementagencies.

”Similarly, the foreign governmentneed not submit a Request for Equi-table Sharing (form DAG-71), al-though there should be a notation onthe Decision Form for Transfer ofFederally Forfeited Property(DAG-72) indicating that an inter-national sharing request has been orwill be submitted.

When a case involves mul-tiple assets, the Asset Forfeitureand Money Laundering Section

30 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

the Departments of Justice andTreasury international sharing pro-grams, the AFMLS also notifies theTreasury Department about thepending request. Once the DAG ap-proves the recommendation, theAFMLS forwards it to the State De-partment for its concurrence.

The Departments of Justice andTreasury entered into a Memoran-dum of Understanding (MOU) onMay 4, 1995, to provide guidanceon what percentage is appropriate torecommend for a foreign govern-ment. The MOU outlines three per-centage-based ranges. The MOUrecommends a sharing of 50 percentor more to foreign governmentsthat—

• repatriate forfeitable assets tothe United States without thecooperation of a signatoryauthority or property owner;

• relinquish or waive the optionof proceeding against thedefendants or their property toallow the United States toforfeit the assets;

• defend against, in litigationbrought by owners, claimants,and third parties, attempts toimpede the foreigngovernment’s efforts to assistthe United States; or

• provide the United States withall, or substantially all, of theevidence needed to prevail in adomestic forfeiture actionagainst property deposited inthe United States.7

The MOU recommends a shar-ing of 40-50 percent for foreigngovernments that provide importantassistance, although not necessarilyessential to the successful forfeitureaction. These foreign governmentsshould—

• enforce a United Statesforfeiture order and repatriatethe assets;

• freeze assets at the request ofthe United States and lift thefreeze to enable the witnessdefendant to repatriate theassets to the United States;

• return the property for forfei-ture pursuant to an extraditionrequest;

• expend substantial law en-forcement resources to assistthe United States; or

• engage in law enforcementactivity that places foreign lawenforcement personnel inphysical danger.

The MOU recommends a shar-ing of up to 40 percent to foreigngovernments that—

• disclose information that leadsto a U.S. investigation result-ing in a successful forfeitureaction;

• provide bank or other financialrecords that allow the UnitedStates to determine the loca-tion and extent of forfeitablewealth;

• support efforts of the UnitedStates to persuade foreignbanks to take steps thatfacilitate the forfeiture ofaccount proceeds in theUnited States;

• assist in the service of processor conduct discovery;

• permit foreign law enforce-ment officials to testify at U.S.forfeiture proceedings; or

• allow foreign territory to beused in an undercover opera-tion involving U.S. lawenforcement officials thatultimately leads to theforfeiture of assets.

As more countries enact shar-ing legislation, the United States in-creasingly is submitting requests toother countries for a share of assets

© Digital Stock

February 2001 / 31

forfeited with U.S. investigative orjudicial assistance. Similar to theprocedures set forth above, thecountry attaché or special agent incharge must prepare a memoran-dum to the AFS. The AFS will thendraft a memorandum to the AFMLSwhich, if there is an applicabletreaty or agreement, will forward itsrequest to the Office of Interna-tional Affairs for transmission tothe foreign country.

Uses of Shared Property

Unlike the policy underlyingdomestic equitable sharing, there isno statutory or regulatory authorityby which the United States can in-sist that a foreign country useshared property or proceeds in anyparticular manner or allocate themto any particular government com-ponent. Accordingly, as a generalrule, the United States does notplace conditions or stipulations onhow the recipient country must usethe proceeds.8

Conclusion

The international sharing pro-gram is a critical tool to develop andfoster relationships with foreigngovernments and their respectivelaw enforcement agencies. If a U.S.law enforcement agency requestsand receives assistance from a for-eign counterpart that results in theseizure and ultimate forfeiture ofassets, case agents should not letthat assistance go unrecognized.They should draft a memorandumjustifying the transfer of a percent-age of the net forfeited proceeds tothe assisting government. The justi-fication memorandum should besubmitted before the forfeiture iscomplete and should accompany

the domestic sharing package(DAG 71 and 72) so that the review-ing officials will be aware of alldomestic sharing requests and inter-national sharing recommendationsto the forfeited property.

The nature of large-scale druginvestigations routinely requiresforeign assistance because illicitnarcotics are typically manufac-tured or produced in one countryand distributed in another. More-over, shipment routes may trans-gress the territorial boundaries ofseveral other foreign countries.

important, recognition of a U.S. forfeiturejudgment.

2 This section requires annual certificationthat a specific country has cooperated fully withthe United States, has taken adequate steps toachieve full compliance with the goals andobjectives established by the Vienna Conven-tion, or that such certification is warranted as avital interest of the United States.

3 The statute provides for government-to-government sharing. Consequently, the UnitedStates does not share with foreign policeagencies unless the sharing agreement or MLATauthorizes such a sharing.

4 Neither the Department of Justice nor theDepartment of State wants to seek approvalfrom high level officials for multiple assets forthe same foreign government in the same casein a piecemeal fashion. Moreover, there is agreater likelihood that if recommendations areprocessed individually for assets in the samecase, the sharing allocation may fall below the$10,000 threshold that the State Departmenthas imposed for processing internationalrequests.

5 Pursuant to A Guide to Equitable Sharing

of Federally Forfeited Property for State and

Local Law Enforcement Agencies (March1994), the net proceeds available for interna-tional and domestic sharing are calculated afterthe expenses, such as awards to informants, arededucted from the “gross receipts,” Chapter IX,Section A. The available federal share fromwhich domestic sharing is calculated isdetermined after the international sharing hasbeen allocated.

6 Id, the ultimate determination of the actualpercentage shared by the Department of Justiceis at the sole discretion of the Attorney Generalor a designee.

7 It is highly unusual for the United Statesto share more than 50 percent with any onecountry in a case. Restitution to foreign victimsis an acceptable basis for recommending themaximum percentage.

8 There is the possibility of requesting thetransferred amount to be used specifically foranti-narcotics law enforcement efforts.Approval of the recommendation, however, isnot routine and requires Congressionalnotification.

Therefore, successful criminalprosecutions and civil forfeiture ac-tions will depend invariably on in-ternational cooperation. Wherecountries have worked together, itis fair that they share in the fruits oftheir efforts. U.S. law enforcementofficials have an obligation to en-sure that those cooperating nationsreceive their fair share.

Endnotes1 In such actions, the United States will

require assistance from the foreign authoritiesto perfect the court’s in rem jurisdiction overthe property by: restraining the property,providing notice to all interested parties,arranging for foreign publication, and most

“...the United Statesdoes not placeconditions or

stipulations on howthe recipient country

must use the proceeds.

”Law enforcement officers of other thanfederal jurisdiction who are interested inthis article should consult their legaladvisors. Some police procedures ruledpermissible under federal constitutional laware of questionable legality under state lawor are not permitted at all.

FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

Call for Authors

Why Should You Publish an Article?

• Allows you to share your experiences

• Provides you with a wider audience

• Increases your credibility

• Enhances your professional image

• Improves your chances for promotion

What Should You Write About?

Write about topics that interest you. Writeabout problems that you, your department, orcommunity have solved.Possible Bulletin topics include—

• administrative/personnel issues;

• crime problems and solutions;

• domestic violence;

• drugs;

• equipment;

• ethics;

• environmental crimes;

• firearms;

• future of policing;

• information resources;

• investigative techniques;

• juveniles;

• leadership/management concerns;

• negotiation/interviewing skills;

• police-community relations;

• technology; and

• training.

How Do You Write an Article?

Authors should write in third person anduse active voice. They should supply referenceswhen quoting a source exactly, citing orparaphrasing another person’s work or ideas,

or referring to information that generally is notwell known. Authors should study severalissues of the magazine to ensure that theirwriting style meets the Bulletin’s require-ments. Most important, authors shouldcontact the Bulletin staff for the expandedauthor guidelines, which contain additionalspecifications, detailed examples, and effec-tive writing techniques.

The Bulletin judges articles on relevanceto the audience, factual accuracy, analysis ofthe information, structure and logical flow,style and ease of reading, and length. The staffedits all manuscripts for length, clarity, format,and style.

The Bulletin generally does not publisharticles on similar topics within a 12-monthperiod or accept articles previously publishedor currently under consideration by othermagazines. Because it is a government publi-cation, the Bulletin cannot accept articles thatadvertise a product or service.

How Do You Submit an Article?

• Send a query letter and short outline or

• Submit a completed manuscript to—

Editor, FBI Law Enforcement BulletinFBI Academy, Quantico, VA 22135Telephone: 703-632-1952E-mail: [email protected].

The Bulletin staff will review queries andarticles and advise the authors of acceptanceor rejection. The magazine cannot guaranteea publication date for accepted articles.

Authors should submit three copies oftheir articles typed and double-spaced on81/2 - by 11-inch white paper with all pagesnumbered. When possible, authors shouldinclude an electronic version of the articlesaved on computer disk. A photograph of theauthor(s) should accompany the article.

32 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

The Bulletin Notes

Law enforcement officers are challenged daily in the performance of their duties; they face eachchallenge freely and unselfishly while answering the call to duty. In certain instances, their actionswarrant special attention from their respective departments. The Bulletin also wants to recognizetheir exemplary service to the law enforcement profession.

Officer Miller

Officer William P. Miller of the St. Joseph, Missouri, Police Departmentresponded to a situation where a man, armed with an assault rifle, a 12-gaugepump shotgun, a black powder pistol, numerous rounds of ammunition, and a largehunting knife, was randomly shooting motorists with the assault rifle. The subjectinjured four citizens and the first officer on the scene was killed instantly whenstruck in the back of the head as the subject hit his patrol unit with numerous shots.As officers arrived, they came under immediate fire from the gunman. OfficerMiller circled around the suspect, who was still firing at other officers and citizens,and fired two shots, striking the gunman and killing him. Investigation revealedthat the subject had fired approximately 225 shots before the rampage ended.Tragically, one officer lost his life, but Officer Miller’s courageous efforts savedthe lives of many other individuals during this terrifying ordeal.

Sergeant Grove

While on patrol, Sergeant Wilbern Grove of the St. Louis, Missouri, PoliceDepartment noticed several students standing away from their school bus, whichwas parked in a convenience store parking lot. When the students saw SergeantGrove, they motioned towards the bus. Approaching the area, Sergeant Groveheard the bus motor racing out of control—the transmission was stuck in drive—and saw the driver yelling frantically into her emergency radio. Sergeant Groveinstructed the driver to turn off the key and put the bus in park or neutral. Afterthis attempt proved unsuccess-ful, Sergeant Grove radioedfor the fire department andinstructed the store managerto shut down the gas pumps.

Upon the arrival of the fire department, the bussuddenly became engulfed in flames. A fireman putchocks in front of the bus wheels to prevent the busfrom running into the pumps and the store, and thedriver exited quickly through the rear door of thebus. Sergeant Grove’s quick response thwarted apotentially dangerous incident.

Nominations for the Bulletin Notes should be basedon either the rescue of one or more citizens orarrest(s) made at unusual risk to an officer’s safety.Submissions should include a short write-up(maximum of 250 words), a separate photograph ofeach nominee, and a letter from the department’sranking officer endorsing the nomination. Submis-sions should be sent to the Editor, FBI Law Enforce-ment Bulletin, FBI Academy, Madison Building,Room 209, Quantico, VA 22135.

PeriodicalsPostage and Fees PaidFederal Bureau of InvestigationISSN 0014-5688

U.S. Department of JusticeFederal Bureau of InvestigationFBI Law Enforcement Bulletin935 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20535-0001

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