FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin - Sept99leb

ISSN 0014-5688 USPS 383-310

Features

Departments

7 Focus on Community Policing Police Liaison for Schools

17 Case Study Timber Theft

Law Enforcement and the Millennialist Vision

By Carl J. Jensen IIIand Yvonne Hsieh

School Violence By Stephen R. Band

and Joseph A. Harpold

Safeguarding Our SchoolsBy Dennis Bridges

Gang Congregation Ordinance By Daniel J. Schofield

1

9

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September 1999Volume 68Number 9

United StatesDepartment of Justice

Federal Bureau ofInvestigation

Washington, DC20535-0001

Louis J. FreehDirector

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considered an endorsement bythe FBI for any policy, program,

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20 Bulletin Reports Reducing Gang Crime Delinquency Prevention Drug and Disorder Problems Victims of Crime

27 Book Review When Good Kids Kill

Representatives from six schools thatexperienced shootings provide thelessons they learned from thesetragedies.

The U.S. Supreme Court recently heldChicago’s Gang CongregationOrdinance unconstitutional.

Law enforcement agencies can identifypotential dangers that may come withthe new millennium.

22Self-directed work teams help agenciestap the talents of their employees andimprove service to the community.

September 1999 / 1

aw enforcement profession-als face more challenges to-day than ever before.

will become an area of increasingconcern to law enforcement, espe-cially as the year 2000 approaches.By examining the behavioral dy-namics occurring in groups that ad-here to millenialist philosophies,law enforcement agencies can iden-tify potential dangers in order toappropriately respond to and inter-act with these groups.

MILLENNIALISMGenerally, millennialism refers

to any movement that anticipatesthe “total transformation and purifi-cation of society.”1 In Western soci-ety, the most well-known religious

version of millennialism occurs inthe biblical account of the apoca-lypse as recorded in the Book ofRevelation, where John, who hadbeen exiled to the island of Patmos,relates a vision in which the Mes-siah returns to engage in a battlewith Satan.2 While numerous inter-pretations of the events portrayed inthe Book of Revelation exist, one ofthe most popular Christian interpre-tations maintains that following nu-merous tribulations and battles,God vanquishes Satan, and the“chosen people” come to dwellwith the Messiah for 1,000 yearsof bliss (e.g., the millennium).

LNot since the advent of modernpolicing have agencies sought soarduously to examine and refinetheir missions, goals, and strategiesto deal with increasingly ill-definedpurposes. To make matters moredifficult, this examination comesduring a time of decreasingbudgets, increasing legal and mediascrutiny, and often-uncertain publicrelations.

The millennialist, apocalypticview of the world, which manygroups and individuals hold, likely

Law Enforcementand the Millennialist VisionA Behavioral ApproachBy CARL J. JENSEN III, M.A., and YVONNE HSIEH

2 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

Millennialism, however, does notbelong exclusively to Christianity.Many other religions, seculargroups, and societies have theirown versions of apocalyptic battlesin which the forces of good triumphover evil following a cataclysmicand often-supernatural period ofbattle.3

While the Bible does not pro-vide a date for the apocalypse, manygroups4 and individuals have con-cluded that they are currently livingin the “end times.” To some indi-viduals, the year 2000, with its nu-merical symmetry and obviousmillennial correlation, representsthe date of the great battle betweengood and evil. Many others do notadhere to a specific belief involvingsupernatural battles, but they fearthat a general state of chaos mayresult. These beliefs and percep-tions may cause greater involve-ment between law enforcementagencies and those groups that ad-here to a millennial or apocalypticphilosophy. Due to the dynamicsand beliefs of several groups, more

episodes involving suicides may oc-cur by those who believe they fol-low God’s will. Perhaps on a moresinister note, police officers mayfind themselves the targets ofapocalyptic groups that feel justi-fied in violently resisting legitimateacts by law enforcement agencies.

Millennialism andExtremist Groups

For law enforcement purposes,extremism relates to groups andindividuals engaged in criminal ac-tivity for the purpose of advan-cing or attempting to advance a po-litical, religious, or social agenda.Unfortunately, many individualsunfamiliar with the distinction usethe terms “extremist group” and“militia” interchangeably. For ex-ample, in the wake of the OklahomaCity tragedy, some members of themedia portrayed militia groupmembers as wild-eyed, violent, anduneducated. This caricature seri-ously misstates the reality thatmany militia group members repre-sent intelligent, law-abiding

citizens who care deeply about theircountry but may question politicaland constitutional issues. Indeed,many militias condemned the Okla-homa City bombing.5 However,some militia, paramilitary, and ex-tremist groups, as well as unaffili-ated individuals, will engage incriminal activity to support theirreligious, social, and politicalphilosophies.

For many individuals andgroups, apocalyptic themes play acentral role in their belief systems.According to some, the govern-ment6 has aligned itself with evilforces. After Saddam Husseininvaded Kuwait in 1990, then-President George Bush began mak-ing statements in which he used thephrase “New World Order.” For ex-ample, in a speech before the Coun-cil of Christian Broadcasters, hetalked about “a moral and just warto defeat the tyranny of Saddam—amadman who threatens the bur-geoning New World Order....”7

Most individuals who heard thesewords believed that President Bushwas talking about an internationalcommunity united by a sense of jus-tice and the rule of law. Others,however, have cited those state-ments as proof that the U.S. govern-ment is involved with internationalforces in a plot to replace democ-racy in America with a tyrannical,Communist-like dictatorship.8 Oth-ers suggest that foreign troops havearrived clandestinely in the UnitedStates to await orders to round upany Americans who oppose thispresumed New World Order. Someindividuals allege that gun controllegislation represents a ploy to as-semble lists of gun owners in order

Ms. Hsieh served as an honorsintern in the Behavioral ScienceUnit at the FBI Academy.

Special Agent Jensen serves inthe Behavioral Science Unit atthe FBI Academy.

September 1999 / 3

to arrest them and transport themto concentration camps, whichsupposely are secretly under con-struction by the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency. Still othershave gone so far as to assert that thetragedies at Ruby Ridge and Wacoserved as dry runs for future gov-ernment actions by New WorldOrder storm troopers.9

THE APOCALYPTIC MODELWhether based on a religious or

secular model, apocalyptic beliefsystems contain certain universalcharacteristics.10 At the core ofeach, a fundamental struggle existsbetween good and evil. In Chris-tianity, this struggle occurs betweenGod and Satan. For many extrem-ists, the evil forces of the NewWorld Order constantly strugglewith those patriotic Americans whobelieve that the democratic prin-ciples of this country have almostdisappeared. This perspective con-tains little gray area: those definedas evil remain unremittingly sinis-ter, while those defined as good stayunerringly righteous and pure.

To this end, even those apoca-lyptic belief systems that are prima-rily secular often contain religiousor supernatural rhetoric and ideas.For example, many who deplore theNew World Order make liberal useof religious imagery: those parts ofthe U.S. Constitution with whichthey agree are “sacred” and “holy,”while those that run counter to theirbeliefs (e.g., the 14th Amendment,which granted citizenship to formerslaves) are cast in demonic terms.

The battle between the forces ofgood and evil generally representsthe final chapter in an ongoing

struggle. For example, the conflictbetween God and Satan began in theBook of Genesis, while many whobelieve in the New World Ordertrace the roots of this grand con-spiracy to the Knights Templars andthe Crusades.11

Another common apocalyptictheme concerns the grand and hor-rific nature of the final battle be-tween good and evil. Some predictthat many individuals will perish onboth sides of the conflict. In certainChristian denominations, the cho-sen ones will proceed to heaven and

against evil will be rewarded witheither everlasting life in heaven orthe defeat of tyranny and the fulfill-ment of heaven on earth.

The Apocalyptic TimetableIn addition to articulating the

alleged plan for the takeover ofAmerica, religious and secularspokespersons routinely providetimetables for its implementation.In many cases, the year 2000 repre-sents the date when the apocalypsepurportedly will begin. This datehas significance for a variety of in-dividuals. Those who follow theNew World Order theory believethat 2000 represents the year for thetakeover of America. For others, theyear 2000 has great religious sig-nificance, and those with no par-ticular political or religious agendabelieve that the turn of the centurywill usher in a period of unprec-edented floods, earthquakes, andother natural disasters.

Certain existing conditions mayappear to validate these beliefs. Forexample, government and privatesector computer experts have ac-knowledged that in the year 2000,many computers will be unable todistinguish the year 2000 from theyear 1900. Dubbed the Y2K Prob-lem, it may cause widespread com-puter software failures. To some in-dividuals, this problem signalsimpending societal discord andchaos and appears to complementand reinforce the predicted apoca-lyptic nightmare scenario.

AN EXTREMIST VIEWOF LAW ENFORCEMENT

For some extremists, politicaland religious symbolism often meld

miss the battle, while those not cho-sen will suffer horrible plagues andconsequences on earth. Other reli-gious and secular groups believethey will participate in the struggleand play a pivotal role in allowinggood to triumph. For example, thesegroups purport that loyal patriotswho have managed to save theirweapons from confiscation will de-feat the forces of the New WorldOrder.12

The final component of theapocalyptic vision includes the con-tention that in the end, good tri-umphs over evil. In addition, thosewho have persevered in the fight

“...extremist groupsphysically and

psychologically isolatetheir members frommainstream society.

”


“...law enforcementcan fulfill its

mission no matterwhat the new

millennium holds.

”

together to create a dictatorial, anti-Christian future vision of America.To those who fear such a future, thesolution appears obvious—right-eous, courageous Americans whobelieve in a free America must ob-tain arms for its immediate defense.Subsequently, such individualsmust consider against whom theymust defend the country. They con-sider federal law enforcement offic-ers, especially those who have pri-mary jurisdiction over firearm andterrorism matters (e.g., the Bureauof Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearmsand the FBI) the enemies. Increas-ingly, however, state and local of-ficers who contact citizens on amore routine basis have becomevictims of violent acts. In a recent,well-publicized example, an indi-vidual with alleged links to a whitesupremacist organization firedupon Ohio officers during a trafficstop. A review of the incident indi-cated that the individual who firedthe shots possibly prepared himselffor the confrontation by donningbody armor and assembling avail-able weapons while troopers ques-tioned his brother.

Psychological IssuesThe examination of domestic

extremist groups reveals three so-cial-psychological components thatappear to interact to produce an ef-fect known as the Lethal Triad.13 Inparticular, extremist groups physi-cally and psychologically isolatetheir members from mainstream so-ciety. This isolation causes a reduc-tion of critical thinking on the partof group members, who becomemore entrenched in the belief pro-posed by the group leadership. As a

result, group members relinquish allresponsibility for group decisionmaking to their leader and blamethe cause of all group grievances onsome outside entity or force, a pro-cess known as projection. Finally,isolation and projection combine toproduce pathological anger, the fi-nal component of the triad.14

scenarios such as the Y2K glitchserve to enhance the believability ofan apocalyptic scenario in theminds of those already predisposedto this belief.

Group members’ anger growsas they project blame onto outsidesources. As a perceived threat be-comes imminent, anger will growaccordingly. As the year 2000 ap-proaches, the threat of the NewWorld Order becomes more realand imminent to those who believein its existence. According to thethird component of the LethalTriad, anger will grow, as will thepotential for future violent acts.Many law enforcement profession-als have reported a general increasein extremist group activities withintheir jurisdictions in the past fewyears.15 The question remains, how-ever, whether this purported in-crease in criminality will achievestatistical significance and continueto increase as the year 2000approaches.

Perhaps of equal importance tolaw enforcement, many potentiallydangerous groups have indicatedthat they will not take offensive ac-tion against the government but willact only in a “defensive posture.”Unfortunately, the activities thatwill justify this defensive, or, moreproperly, reactive posture remainunclear. While major actions in-volving groups (e.g., mass arrests)may provoke a response, no oneknows what may happen in otheractivities. Even the extremistgroups do not appear sure of theirresponses. In light of the lethal triadmethodology, the threshold for in-voking a reactive posture may de-crease as the year 2000 approaches.

Millennialism intersects witheach component in different ways.In terms of isolation, some groupscontinually send apocalyptic im-ages and messages to group mem-bers, who internalize their contentand compare the messages toknown reality or past learning. Formany schooled in Christianthought, the apocalypse is not new.When a message of governmentmalfeasance combines with a famil-iar belief, such as that of the apoca-lypse, the entire message may gaincredibility. For example, acceptingthe notion of foreign troops onAmerican soil might prove difficult,but if explained in the context ofa belief that already has gainedcredibility (e.g., the coming apoca-lypse with its authoritative, biblicalprecedent), the entire concept maybecome plausible. Additionally,

September 1999 / 5

That is, extremist group membersmay view standard police activity,such as stopping motorists for mi-nor traffic infractions or servingmisdemeanor warrants, as offensivemeasures and may respond with in-creasing violence. While definitivestatistics do not exist to confirm ordisprove this prediction, the Ohiotraffic stop incident should serve asa warning—well-rehearsed andwell-prepared adversaries may ap-pear with greater frequency as theyear 2000 approaches.

LAW ENFORCEMENTRESPONSE

Some individuals in the militiamovement view law enforcement asthe enemy. Perhaps the worstcourse of action for law enforce-ment to take when dealing withthese individuals is to engage inactivity that validates their apoca-lyptic fears. Many critics havenoted, for example, that the federalactions at both Waco and RubyRidge reinforced the belief of manyindividuals that their views con-cerning an impending tyrannicalNew World Order were correct.Subsequent to these incidents, theFBI developed and employed newtechniques that included low-keynegotiations coupled with a reduc-tion in visible signs of a paramili-tary and special weapons and tacticsteam presence. These techniquesshowed great success during theFreemen standoff in Montana in1996. In addition, the peacefulresolution of this standoff likelyhad great symbolic significance tothose who view the governmentas the enemy—in contrast to theirpresumption that the federal

government would use a heavy-handed approach to resolve the situ-ation, the low-key, patient strategyemployed deflated this perception.Indeed, many militia leaderspraised the actions of the federalgovernment in the Freemen affair.

Accordingly, state and locallaw enforcement should take stepsto reduce the level of fear and dis-trust that may exist between theirorganizations and extremist groupsoperating in their jurisdictions. Forexample, after determining safetyissues, police and sheriffs’ depart-ment officials should consider con-tacting known militia group mem-bers in their areas. Such contactsshould remain friendly and low-keyin order to diffuse tensions and re-duce misunderstandings betweenthe police and group members.16

These contacts have proven very ef-fective. In some cases, members ofmilitia groups have assisted law en-forcement agencies in preventingviolent acts. Prior law enforcementfamiliarity with some extremist

groups has allowed for the peacefulresolution of potentially volatile ar-rest situations.17 At the same time,agencies should not attempt to gainor confirm intelligence informationthrough these contacts or volun-teer sensitive information to militiarepresentatives.

Law enforcement agenciesshould remain aware of any poten-tial threats to their personnel andstay abreast of any trends involvingextremist group activities. For ex-ample, individuals driving in ve-hicles without license plates or withplates not issued by a legitimate li-censing authority may be membersof an organization that does not rec-ognize the authority of a state orlocal policing agency. Lack of avalid vehicle registration or driver’slicense may offer further confirma-tion that the individual belongs tosuch a group.18

In addition to federal, state,and local law enforcement sources,many civilian and academicorganizations track trends of

Photo © PhotoDisc


extremist groups. These sources ofinformation may prove extremelyvaluable to law enforcement offi-cials, and using them on a regularbasis as permitted under the lawmay, in fact, lead to better commu-nication with extremist group mem-bers, ultimately aiding in avoidingdeadly confrontations.

Finally, departments shouldcontinue to emphasize basic officerand street survival techniques on aregular basis. By combining threatanalysis with specific methods ofdealing with potentially lethal situa-tions, law enforcement managerscan help their officers reducecomplacency and carelessness inperforming everyday, repetitivetasks.19

CONCLUSIONAs the year 2000 approaches,

law enforcement agencies may faceadditional challenges from indi-viduals and groups for whom themillennium holds great spiritualand symbolic significance. The Le-thal Triad concept offers a conciseexplanatory model to understandthe behavioral dynamics that under-lie a belief involving millennial andapocalyptic themes. This approachcan help explain how and whyapocalyptic groups pose a challengeto law enforcement personnel.

As with most challenges facingpolice officers, knowledge of po-tential threats, good relationshipswith all members of the community,and an emphasis on basic street sur-vival and officer safety hold thegreatest potential for averting trag-edy while providing the highestlevel of citizen protection and po-lice services. While no one canpredict the future, with forethought

and planning, law enforcement canfulfill its mission no matter what thenew millennium holds.

Endnotes1 Michael Barkun, “End Time Jitters: An

Interview with an Expert in Millennialism,”Klanwatch Quarterly Intelligence Report(Montgomery, AL: Southern Poverty LawCenter, summer 1997), 16.

2 Philip Lamy, Millennium Rage (NewYork: Plenum Press, 1996), 81-84.

3 Ibid.

8 Jonathan Karl, The Right to Bear Arms:The Rise of America’s New Militias (New York:HarperPaperbacks, 1995), 76-78.

9 Supra note 2; John George and LairdWilcox, American Extremists (Amherst, NY:Prometheus Books, 1996) and Jonathan Karlsupra note 7.

10 For a comprehensive description of bothmillenialist beliefs and possible implications ofthose beliefs at the individual and societal level,see Lamy (supra note 2), 81-84.

11 The Knights Templars were one of theearliest founders of military orders. Someindividuals believe the Knights Templars leftEngland for the Middle East and found gold,which they brought to England and have usedto finance this ongoing conspiracy.

12 Supra note 2.13 Kevin M. Gilmartin, “The Lethal Triad:

Understanding the Nature of Isolated ExtremistGroups,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin,September 1996, 1-5.

14 Ibid.15 Mark Pitcavage’s Flashpoint America:

Surviving a Traffic Stop Confrontation with anAntigovernment Extremist (Militia WatchdogWebsite on the Internet: http://www.militia-watchdog.org/trafstop.htm) offers a generaldiscussion of the increasing incidents of trafficstop confrontations involving law enforcementpersonnel and antigovernment extremist groupmembers.

16 Supra note 5; See also James McNamara,“Community Policing and Militia Groups,”unpublished paper prepared for the 190thsession of the FBI National Academy (copiesavailable from the author), for a discussion ofthis; and James E. Duffy and Alan C. Brantley,“Militias: Initiating Contact,” FBI LawEnforcement Bulletin, July 1997, 22-26, whichcontains a typology to determine the dangerous-ness of militia groups. For a more generaltypology that examines the dangerousness of alltypes of groups, see Anthony J. Pinizzotto,“Deviant Social Groups,” Law and Order,October 1996, 75-80.

17 Supra note 5 and see McNamara (supranote 16).

18 For strategies to employ in recognizingand confronting an extremist during a trafficstop, see Pitcavage (supra note 15).

19 Anthony Pinizzotto, Edward F. Davis, andCharles E. Miller III, In the Line of Fire: AStudy of Selected Felonious Assaults on LawEnforcement Officers (Washington, DC:Department of Justice, FBI, and the NationalInstitute of Justice, 1997).

4 For purposes of this article, the authorsintentionally remain very general and will, forthe most part, refrain from citing examplesinvolving specific groups to promote a generalunderstanding of millennialist philosophieswhile protecting the privacy and religiousfreedom of the subjects.

5 James E. Duffy and Alan C. Brantley,“Militias: Initiating Contact,” FBI LawEnforcement Bulletin, July 1997, 22-26.

6 Historically, the government has meant thefederal government. Increasingly, however, thisterm includes state and local governments, aswell as institutions that many regard asextensions of local government, such as schoolsand clinics.

7 John Yemma, “Bush Addresses ChristianBroadcasters,” and John Yoder, “In Search ofthe ‘Just War’” Boston Globe, January 27,1991.

September 1999 / 7

Police Liaison for SchoolsBy Martin J. Dunn

Focus on Community Policing

n the mid-1980s, the citizens of the United Statesencountered a challenge never before experi-

Hoping to change this dim forecast and becausechildren spend a majority of their day in school,educators have joined the fight against drugs andviolence. Unfortunately, they may not have theexperience necessary to accomplish this task withoutthe help of others. Realizing this, school administra-tors in Lower Camden County, New Jersey, havetaken a proactive approach and joined forces withlocal law enforcement to combat their district’s drugand violence problems.

The Lower Camden County ExperienceThe Lower Camden County Regional High

School District (LCCD) employs approximately 700employees and has 5,100 students in the 7th through12th grades who live in 7 municipalities in CamdenCounty, New Jersey. This school district consists oftwo junior high schools, two senior high schools, anda special-needs school.

Like many areas throughout the United States,Camden County experienced an increase in violentactivity during the mid-1980s that has continued intothe 1990s. As violence has increased in the commu-nity, it also has increased in the schools, includingthose in the LCCD. Incidents of drug use, fights, andassaults have increased, forcing school officials tospend more time addressing public safety issues thaneducating.

In 1993, the school district hired a securityconsulting firm for an on-site study of its five schools.After the firm reported its findings and recommenda-tions, the district formed a committee—which in-cluded parents, law enforcement officials, and othermembers of the community—to further examine thefindings.

The consulting firm recommended creating asecurity department and assigning a police officer toeach of the high schools. In 1994, the committeeendorsed this idea and implemented a pilot program atone junior high school and one senior high school.The LCCD hired sworn police officers from localmunicipalities and reimbursed the police departmentfor the officers’ salaries and associated expenses.

The students and staff of both schools welcomedthe officers, and after 4 months, the district expandedthe pilot program by creating a Department of Secu-rity staffed with five commissioned police officers,

Ienced in such magnitude—drug abuse. Causingwidespread damage from one border to another, thismodern-day plague pushed America’s social andgovernment agencies to their limits. It also forced lawenforcement agencies to reestablish priorities toaddress the new threat placed on public safety.

By 1987, a major influx of crack cocaine hadforced the nation into a war against drugs. In fact, by1990, drugs had successfully infiltrated many previ-ously drug-free areas. The nation’s schools, forexample, have been plagued with drugs for the pastseveral years. Local news agencies regularly report ondrug-related acts of violence committed by youths inthe community. Headlines such as “5th GraderArrested on Cocaine Charges,” “8th Grader Held inKnife Attack,” and “Three␣ Students Accused inSchool Gun Incident” have become common in nearlyall communities—so common, in fact, that they rarelydraw much attention. Some residents simply acceptthe stories as additional examples of a generation onthe decline, and government reports that corroboratethe connection echo their sentiments and predict adiscouraging future for today’s youth.1


including a director. The officers have full policepowers, including authorization to carry firearms. TheLCCD leases three of the officers from municipalpolice departments for the 10 months that school is insession and employs the other two officers.

The officers serve as the primary enforcementagents. When criminal activity takes place on schoolgrounds, the police officers coordinate the responseand follow-up investigation. Usually, officers arrivewhile the incident is in progress, which allows themto identify the perpetrator and takeimmediate action. Because officersare considered members of theschool community, staff membersand students cooperate with themwhen they conduct investigations.

The police officers perform awide range of duties as communitypolicing representatives. Theyremain proactive in crime preven-tion and drug education programs,and they serve as police liaisonofficers for the schools. In thisway, they bridge the gap that oftenexists between schools and locallaw enforcement.

In addition, all four high schools in the LCCDhave implemented a peer mediation program toaddress disputes among students. Individuals arereferred to this program by either faculty, staff, policeofficers, or other students. The police officers andother school staff members coordinate this program,but student volunteers carry out the actual administra-tion. These programs have successfully redirectedmany students’ violent tendencies.

The district recently took advantage of federalfunds by sending the two officers assigned to thejunior high schools for training to earn certification asGang Resistance Education and Training instructors.This crime prevention curriculum places a policeofficer in the classroom 1␣ day a week for 9 weeks toteach and interact with students about issues ofviolence and conflict resolution.

ResultsAlthough it is too soon to report statistical

findings in most areas, LCCD has experienced manypositive developments. The police department in the

municipality that sends the greatest number of stu-dents to LCCD schools has reported a 10 percentreduction in juvenile crime since the program’sinception. LCCD school principals have reportedfewer incidents of fighting among students, and drug-related problems occurring in these schools also havedropped significantly.

Parents ultimately supported the program becauseit reduced or eliminated their former perceptions ofdangerous problems common throughout the schools.

The police favor the programbecause they no longer dispatchofficers to the schools to handleincidents, which allows them torefocus their attention to the reston the community.

ConclusionThe active role the LCCD has

taken in combating its drug andviolence problems has paid offwith impressive results. LCCDadministrators have made acommitment to keep their schoolssafe in order for all students to

reach their learning potential in an environment thatleaves teachers free to help accomplish this goal.

Police administrators must realize that theirdepartments must play a significant part in the schoolcommunity, providing drug education and crimeprevention training on a regular basis. This allowsofficers to reach out to school children in an effort toteach them crucial information on the prevention ofcrime and the dangers of drugs that they may not getat home. By practicing this form of communitypolicing, departments not only will help the educa-tional process for students but also will make thecommunity safer for all residents.

Endnote1 See, for example, U.S. Department of Justice, Combating Violence

and Delinquency: The National Juvenile Justice Action Plan Report(Washington, DC, March 1996); available from http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles/jjplanfr.txt, accessed January 7, 1999.

Chief Dunn serves as director of security for the LowerCamden County Regional High School District in Atco,New Jersey.

“

”

...departments must playa significant part in the

school community,providing drug education

and crime preventiontraining on a regular

basis.

September 1999 / 9

n Pearl, Mississippi, a 16-year-old boy allegedly killed hismother, then went to his high

atmosphere of fear and disbelief inmany U.S. communities. How canyoungsters commit such vicious at-tacks? Why are they occurring?What can be done to stop them? Asthe first responders to these tragicincidents, the law enforcementagencies directly involved facemany difficult challenges and previ-ously unthinkable situations. Whatlessons can the law enforcement

community learn from these wantonacts of violence?2

First and foremost, all aspectsof a community need to work to-gether. School violence is not thesole responsibility of the schoolsystem. Law enforcement, localgovernment, civic groups, corpo-rate entities, schools, and parentsmust form a partnership to combatthese violent acts. Schools must

SchoolViolenceLessonsLearnedBy STEPHEN R. BAND, Ph.D.,and JOSEPH A. HARPOLD, M.S.

Ischool and shot 9 students, 2 fatally.Three students were killed and 5others were wounded in a highschool in West Paducah, Kentucky;a 14-year-old student pleadedguilty. During a false fire alarm at amiddle school in Jonesboro, Arkan-sas, 4 girls and a teacher were shotto death and 10 individuals werewounded when 2 boys, 11 and 13years old, allegedly opened firefrom the woods. A science teacherwas shot to death in front ofstudents at an 8th-grade dancein Edinboro, Pennsylvania; a14-year-old awaits trial. Two teen-agers were killed and more than 20individuals were hurt when a 15-year-old boy allegedly opened fireat a high school in Springfield, Or-egon. The deadliest incident ofschool violence recently occurred ata high school in Littleton, Colorado,when 2 young male students wenton a killing spree and then commit-ted suicide.1

These and other incidentsof school violence have shockedAmericans and created an

Photo © K.L. Morrison


prepare for these attacks. Law en-forcement must develop responseplans for handling such incidents.And, communities must work withboth to prevent such tragedies fromoccurring.

PREINCIDENTPREPARATION

Memorandumsof Understanding

Representatives from law en-forcement, the schools, and thecommunity should come togetherto sign memorandums of under-standing (MOUs) that clearly de-fine what each organization oragency will do from the beginningof the crisis to the end. MOUsshould state what resources eachparticipant will provide and identifythe command structure (i.e., whowill take charge and who will actas support). Also, MOUs shouldrequire ongoing liaison among allof the participants to enhance

communication and maintainreadiness.

Most important, MOUs shouldassign specific tasks—such as pro-cessing the crime scene, conductinginterviews, coordinating mediacoverage, administering victim/wit-ness services, and handling othersupport systems—and encourageagencies to appoint the best em-ployees to those tasks. Then, theparticipants should train together sothat each individual involved willknow exactly what to do and who isin charge. During a crisis, no timeexists to address these issues.

MOUs and Law EnforcementBecause some of these tragic

events have required officers tosecure large areas for crime sceneprocessing, MOUs should ensurethat law enforcement agencies con-sider the need for adequate humanresources and technical support.For example, in some of the schoolshootings, officers had to interview

up to 300 eyewitnesses immedi-ately. Additionally, a considerableamount of computer support be-came necessary. Such major inves-tigations often result in large data-bases that require the on-scenecapability of data entry and man-agement. Finally, MOUs shouldspecify that all investigators receiveannual training in how to handlejuvenile criminals, especiallyyoung mass or spree murderers.

MOUs and SchoolsBefore any planning or training

can occur, a good working relation-ship must exist between schools andpolice. To this end, school districtsshould establish a crisis responseteam made up of decision makerswho can develop preincident plansand sign MOUs. The team shouldinclude the leadership of the school,such as the chief of the school’ssecurity force, as well as facilitiesengineers and architects, medicalpersonnel, and legal representa-tives, if such exist. The school’smedia spokesperson also shouldparticipate.

Once they have developedpreincident plans, schools musttrain with the other participants tolearn their roles in crisis situations,including evacuation, and to under-stand the importance of their contri-butions, especially to the law en-forcement agencies involved.Moreover, the police should edu-cate teachers and school officialsabout problems in their communi-ties that could influence students,such as gangs, drugs, and violence.

MOUs and the MediaMOUs must state clearly who

will handle the media. This proves

Special Agent Harpold isan instructor in the BehavioralScience Unit at the FBI Academy.

Special Agent Band is the chiefof the Behavioral Science Unitat the FBI Academy.

September 1999 / 11

paramount because, in some in-stances, the media may arrive at thescene before the police. MOUsshould state who will issue pressreleases and how often that will oc-cur. Personnel assigned to handlethe media must provide written, ac-curate updates to the press. Theseindividuals also must know who isresponsible for investigating ru-mors. Because rumors constitute amajor problem in a crisis, quicklydispelling as many as possibleshould become a priority for inves-tigators. MOUs also should encour-age law enforcement and schools toinclude media representatives in thepreincident planning and trainingprocess.

Critical Incident ResponseOnce law enforcement agencies

have created partnerships with theirschools and communities and haveMOUs in place, they must develop acritical incident response plan. Toeffectively manage an incident ofschool violence, agencies shouldinitiate a formal plan that clearlydefines logistical considerations,communication needs, and victim/witness processing requirements.

Logistical ConsiderationsAgencies should create an

emergency response crime sceneteam comprised of experienced in-vestigators. They should designatea remote command post, away fromthe media and the crime scene. Forpress conferences, they should se-lect a facility, such as a NationalGuard armory, away from the com-mand post and the crime scene tokeep both of these locations securefrom the media and onlookers.

Communication NeedsAgencies should prearrange

mobile radio communications fortheir officers and dedicate a tele-phone line that they can publicize tohelp gather information. Agenciesalso should train and assign to anyincident of school violence full-time media or public informationofficers.

Initially, agencies should holdperiodic briefings at prearrangedtimes for the major participants ofthe investigation. As the investiga-tion progresses, they should holdbriefings as necessary. To combatrumors, agencies should establish acontrol center and assign officers toinvestigate rumors and dispel themas quickly as possible.

help. The facility should have con-tact information for various victim/witness resources, such as the Na-tional Organization for Victim As-sistance3 and other local or outsidesources, that agency personnel mayaccess quickly.

POSTINCIDENTDEBRIEFING

Law enforcement agenciesmust remember that their officershave the same concerns as otherparents when it comes to theirchildren’s safety. Before assigningthem duties, commanders should al-low officers to talk to their spousesand ensure that their children aresafe.

Agencies must plan beyond theincident, ensuring the availabilityof follow-up counseling for person-nel and their families, as well asothers in the community. Agenciesshould make employee assistanceand mental health professionalsavailable for critical incident defus-ing and debriefing of law enforce-ment and other emergency responsepersonnel as quickly as possible.Moreover, service providers them-selves may need help in order toassist others. For example, in eachof the six school shootings the FBIstudied, the National Organizationfor Victim Assistance’s Crisis Re-sponse Team arrived within 24hours of the incident. All of thejurisdictions praised the teamfor helping the local emergencyresponders help others in theircommunities.

PREVENTIVE MEASURESLaw enforcement agencies,

schools, and communities can

“Before any planningor training can occur,

a good workingrelationship must

exist betweenschools and police.

Victim/WitnessProcessing RequirementsAgencies should designate a

large facility to accommodate vic-tim/witness services. During a cri-sis, agencies should ensure that thefacility remains secure from themedia and onlookers. However, atthe same time, they must publicizeits existence so victims and wit-nesses will know where to go for

”


“Law enforcementagencies, schools,and communities

can employpreventive measures

that may helpidentify...at-risk

students....

”

employ preventive measures thatmay help identify potential at-riskstudents and defuse violent con-frontations. Anonymous reportingprograms, school resource officers,zero-tolerance policies, educationalprograms, effective liaison, and leg-islative and social reforms consti-tute some of the ways communitiescan safeguard their children.

Implement AnonymousReporting Programs

In all but one of the six schoolshootings, the suspects “leaked”their intentions to other students,but the police did not receive thisinformation. At the time of theshootings, none of these schoolshad a Scholastic Crime StoppersProgram or an anonymous tip lineor comment box in place. A tip lineor similar program would facilitatethe flow of anonymous informationfrom the students to the police andwould constitute a definitive pre-ventive effort. To ensure effective-ness, school officials should moni-tor this tip line or comment box 24hours a day or at least access it be-fore the school day begins. A goodworking relationship must exist be-tween school authorities and the po-lice to ensure that the police receivethe information in a timely way. Ifthe targeted schools had had ananonymous tip program, the policeprobably could have caught severalof the shooters as they entered theirschools.

Employ SchoolResource Officers

In conjunction with a tipprogram, schools should con-sider school resource officers (i.e.,

Develop a Zero-Tolerance PolicySchools should establish a zero-

tolerance policy for students whomake threats. Such a policy mightinclude expulsion or suspension ofstudents who threaten to kill or as-sault others and, if appropriate,quickly provide psychologicalevaluation or intervention for thesestudents. When adults take threatsseriously, students will realize thatviolence is not a condoned resolu-tion to conflict.

Educate Teachers and ParentsThe police should train teach-

ers, school counselors, and parentsto recognize students at risk of com-mitting violence. While society canprevent or minimize violence, itrarely, if ever, can predict it becauseof the numerous human variablesinvolved. Therefore, teachers andparents must look for “leakage” instudent behavior that may signal thepotential for violence. One behav-ior leakage that was present in allbut one of the shootings involvedthe stated or implied desire to com-mit a violent act or suicide.

Other general warning signs orpersonal background indicatorsinclude:

• a history of violence;

• a close family member whohas committed a violent act;

• a history of alcohol or drugabuse;

• a precipitating event, such asa failed romance or the percep-tion of a failed romance,which was the case inseveral of the schoolshootings;

• the availability of a weapon orthe means to commit violence;

• a recent attempt to commitsuicide or an act of violence,as was the case in several ofthe school shootings;

• a lack of coping skills orstrategies to handle personallife crises with no controls toprevent anger or positive waysto release it; and

• no apparent emotional supportsystem.

officers permanently assigned tothe school by the police depart-ment). These officers can providepositive information quickly, weedout rumors, and develop intelli-gence regarding potential orplanned acts of violence. Besidesschool resource officers and otherofficers with school duties, patrolofficers should adopt schools intheir assigned areas and, wheneverpossible, have lunch at the school.This gives students an opportunityto develop trust and to talk to policeofficers in a neutral, nonthreateningatmosphere.

September 1999 / 13

When teachers, school counse-lors, or parents see a problem, theyshould notify school security per-sonnel and the police. Police shouldmeet with parents and teachers toencourage them to seek counselingfor youths who exhibit symptomsindicating a need for intervention.However, because many incidentsand changes in life can causechanges in student behavior, it be-comes difficult to know what is nor-mal student behavior and what con-stitutes grounds for concern andpossible intervention.

One method for discovering po-tentially violent students involveshaving students write about theirlives as a window into theirthoughts. This would have helpedin some of the school shootings ifthe teachers had had the essays andthen been able to interpret their con-tent and style. For example, one ofthe shooters’ work was influencedheavily by the 19th-century Germanphilosopher Friedrich Nietzsche,who is best known for having pro-claimed the death of God and forcalling himself an “immoralist,”one who opposes all morality.4 An-other suspect’s writing was inspiredby the musician Marilyn Mansonwho reportedly based his song “An-tichrist Superstar” on Nietzsche’sbook The Antichrist, a critique ofPauline Christianity.5 While theseinfluences and writing styles maynot uncover a potential schoolshooter, they do represent signs thateducators and parents should takeseriously and explore further.

Maintain CommunicationNo easy solutions exist for

curbing violent behavior. No onegroup can accept the blame for the

establish rapport with students,teachers, and staff. Liaison, trust,training, and intelligence must existfor prevention programs to succeed.

Moreover, communities mustsend positive messages to all oftheir children that they are valuableand important to the community.Parents and other concerned adultsmust find ways to sincerely praisechildren, positively recognize their

increasingly violent actions of stu-dents. For example, research hasshown that violence depicted in themedia has a small impact on a largenumber of children and a large im-pact on a small number of children.6

Therefore, as a way of identifyingthe small number of childrengreatly impacted by violence in themedia, uniformed officers shouldvisit schools as often as possible to

Violence Indicators

Several factors exist that may indicate that individualshave the potential to commit violence. While these indicatorsare by no means certain or present in every case of violence,children who exhibit these symptoms should receive counsel-ing services in an effort to prevent the potential of futureviolent acts.

• The individuals demonstrate low self-esteem.

• The individuals have committed previous acts of crueltyto animals. This is a symptom of child abuse, along withsetting fires, bed-wetting (beyond a normal age), andbeing abusive to adults. FBI research has found that theseindicators frequently appear in the childhoods of serialviolent sexual offenders and may exist in cases of juve-nile violence.

• The individuals are fascinated with firearms. In the sixcases of school violence, the offenders used firearms,which they allegedly obtained without parental or guard-ian consent or stole outright.

• The individuals’ mothers or other family membersdisrespect them. This creates a feeling of powerlessnesswhen coupled with chronic abuse and can initiate theneed to exert power over and control another. It also canresult in extreme anger.

• The individuals see violence as the only alternative leftfor them. In the six school shootings, the suspectscarefully planned their crimes and thoroughly premedi-tated the actual events.


contributions to the community,and actively show children that theyare loved and respected. At thesame time, communities shouldencourage zero tolerance forviolence whether committed bychildren or adults.

Explore Legislativeand Social Reforms

Law enforcement, schools,and parents can do only so muchto prevent school violence. Societymust begin to explore ways to com-bat these vicious attacks. Such

initiatives could include legislationthat

• provides for mandatorycustody to evaluate anyjuvenile found in the posses-sion of a firearm or otherdeadly weapon;

Offender ProfileThe suspects involved in the six school shootings that the FBI reviewed displayed similar traits.

While any one of these characteristics alone may not describe a potential school shooter, takentogether, they provide a profile that may assist law enforcement, schools, and communities toidentify at-risk students.

• The suspects were white males under 18years old with mass or spree murderer traits.

• They sought to defend narcissistic views orfavorable beliefs about themselves, while,at the same time, they had very lowself-esteem.

• They experienced a precipitating event (e.g.,a failed romance) that resulted in depressionand suicidal thoughts that turned homicidal.

• They lacked, or perceived a lack of, familysupport. Two of the suspects killed one orboth of their parents.

• They felt rejected by others and soughtrevenge or retaliation for real or perceivedwrongs done to them.

• They acquired firearms generally owned bya family member or someone they knew.

• They perceived that they were differentfrom others and disliked those who weredifferent (i.e., self-loathing). They neededrecognition, and when they did not receivepositive recognition, they sought negativerecognition.

• They had a history of expressing anger ordisplaying minor acts of aggressive physicalcontact at school.

• They had a history of mental healthtreatment.

• They seemed to have trouble with theirparents, though no apparent evidence ofparental abuse existed.

• They were influenced by satanic or cult-type belief systems or philosophical works.

• They listened to songs that promoteviolence.

• They appeared to be loners, averagestudents, and sloppy or unkempt in dress.

• They seemed to be influenced or used byother manipulative students to commitextreme acts of violence.

• They appeared isolated from others,seeking notoriety by attempting to “copy-cat” other previous school shootings butwanting to do it better than the last shooter.

• They had a propensity to dislike popularstudents or students who bully others.

• They expressed interest in previouskillings.

• They felt powerless and, to this end, mayhave committed acts of violence to assertpower over others.

• They openly expressed a desire to killothers.

• They exhibited no remorse after thekillings.

September 1999 / 15

• requires school officials toreport to the police anycriminal offenses committed attheir schools and to furnishblueprints of their facilities tolocal law enforcement authori-ties;

• enables law enforcement,schools, juvenile authorities,and other criminal justiceagencies to share informationfor the purpose of criminalinvestigations or identifyingchildren who may pose adanger to themselves andothers; and

• allows courts to try as adultsjuveniles who commithomicide.7

Besides supporting legislativeaction, communities should de-velop programs that denounce

violence and encourage respect forlife and education, along with ini-tiatives that increase individual andparental responsibility and account-ability. Communities also shouldadvocate mental health services forindividuals who need it, meaningfulsanctions for those who demon-strate an unwillingness to conformtheir behavior to the law, and av-enues for obtaining information thatmay enable behavioral scientists tobetter identify predictive behaviorand thresholds of behavior that re-quire intervention (treatment orsanctions, as appropriate).

CONCLUSIONMany Americans may find the

old adage an ounce of prevention isworth a pound of cure difficult tobelieve. But who would havethought that such horrible acts of

school violence could occur inrural areas of the United States?Unfortunately, Americans need toaccept that grisly, violent acts canoccur anywhere and be committedby almost anyone, even a child.

If a youngster can take a gun toschool and pull the trigger, thencommunities must come togetherto deal with this problem ina multidisciplinary approach. Thephenomenon of school violence iscomplicated and will take a greatdeal of wisdom to address pro-perly. Meanwhile, law enforcementagencies must develop compre-hensive plans for responding tosuch attacks, and they must joinwith their schools and commun-ities to implement preventionprograms. Doing so will makeAmerican children feel good aboutthemselves, their families, their

Scholastic Crime Stoppers

he Scholastic Crime Stoppers Programpromotes school spirit, pride, and responsi-T

bility. It allows students to take action againstvictimization and crime by anonymously report-ing such activities to the school administration.The students receive a monetary reward rangingfrom $5 to $100 if the tip proves instrumentalin solving a crime. This program is found mostlyin high schools, but elementary and junior highschools, along with universities and colleges,have begun to implement such initiatives.

The program is operated by students whoappoint a board of directors composed ofstudents who market and advertise the program,

raise funds, review information about crimes,and determine rewards. However, the successof the program often depends directly upon theamount of support and encouragement that theschool administration provides.

Schools should tailor the program to fit theirspecific needs. Some schools have implementedCrime Stopper hot lines, billboards, contests,designated Crime Stopper days, and parades todeliver their message of zero tolerance againstcrime.

For additional information, visit the Scho-lastic Crime Stoppers Web site at: http://www.c-s-i.org/scs.htm.


neighborhoods, and their country.To paraphrase a familiar saying, allit takes for the triumph of evil is fora few good people to do nothing.8

Endnotes1 “America Under the Gun: Assaults in U.S.

Schools,” The New York Times, April 26, 1999,available from http://www.nytimes.com/library/national/guns-schools.html; accessed April 26,1999.

2 These lessons resulted from a 2-day schoolviolence summit hosted by the FBI’s LittleRock Field Office and the Arkansas State Policeand moderated by the FBI’s Behavioral ScienceUnit in August 1998. Representatives fromPearl, Mississippi; Stamps and Jonesboro,Arkansas; Edinboro, Pennsylvania; Springfield,Oregon; and Paducah, Kentucky, shared theirexperiences. The suggestions they offered fordealing with school violence form the basis ofthis article.

3 The National Organization for VictimAssistance is located at 1757 Park Road, NW,Washington, DC 20010-2101 and can becontacted at 202-232-6682 or 800-TRY-NOVAor at its Web site http://www.try-nova.org.

4 Maude Marie Clark, “Nietzsche,Friedrich,” in Routledge Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy, 1998.

5 Ibid. The musician wrote an article aboutthe shooting at Littleton, Colorado. See MarilynManson, “Columbine: Whose Fault Is It?”Rolling Stone, May 1999, available from http://www.marilyn-manson.net/press/rolling-stone-may-1999.ntm; accessed June 4, 1999.

6 Deborah Prothrow-Stith, DeadlyConsequences (New York: Harper Collins,1991), 29-47.

7 Supra note 2. These suggestions werecontributed by a chief of police attending theseminar.

8 The original quote, “The only thingnecessary for the triumph of evil is for goodmen to do nothing,” is attributed to Sir EdmundBurke in John Bartlett, Bartlett’s FamiliarQuotations, 16th ed., ed. Justin Kaplan, (NewYork: Little, Brown and Company, 1992), 332.

Wanted:Photographs

he Bulletin staff isalways on the lookoutT

for dynamic, law enforce-ment-related photos forpossible publication in themagazine. We are interestedin photos that visually depictthe many aspects of the lawenforcement profession andillustrate the various taskslaw enforcement personnelperform.

We can use either black-and-white glossy or colorprints or slides, although weprefer prints (5x7 or 8x10).Appropriate credit will begiven to contributing photog-raphers when their workappears in the magazine. Wesuggest that you send dupli-cate, not original, prints aswe do not accept responsibil-ity for prints that may bedamaged or lost. Send yourphotographs to:

Brian Parnell, ArtDirector, FBI LawEnforcement Bulletin,FBI Academy, MadisonBuilding 209, Quantico,VA 22135.

September 1999 / 17

hen picking up a pencil, opening a door, orusing the hundreds of other everyday items

What Is Timber Theft?In most states, the unauthorized control of some-

one else’s property, including timber, constitutestheft. Occasionally, states may include a specificdollar value as part of the prerequisites for theft, andcontrary to common belief, timber does have a value.

An officer may ask, “Why would someone wantto steal a tree?” The motivation to steal timber is thesame as it is to steal any item—profit. Superiorquality logs can sell for a high price. The value oftimber depends on the species, the quality, the length,and the diameter of the log and will vary dependingon current market prices. For example, the currentworth for a medium-grade black-walnut veneer logdelivered to a veneer mill is $5 per board foot.1

According to one of several methods used in theindustry to price timber, a log with a diameter of 18inches and a length of 14 feet has 171 board feet anda value of $855.

One Officer’s ExperienceAn officer with the Indiana Department of

Natural Resources received information that someonehad taken several trees from a farm near an interstate.The officer met with the landowner, who advised thathe had found several stumps on his property but thatonly certain parts of the trees were missing. Headvised the officer that the thieves apparently haddriven through a neighbor’s field, cut his fence, andentered his property. The landowner also believed thetheft had occurred within the month.

The officer and the landowner went to the woodsand found six black-walnut trees cut with a portion ofeach missing. Apparently the thieves were in a hurrybecause each stump had splinter pulls—the uncutfibers of the tree that remain after the tree falls. Thethieves had cut the stumps 14 inches or more abovethe ground, similar to firewood cuts, as opposed to thevery low cuts of veneer harvesters. The officerconducted a preliminary crime scene survey andfound over 20 empty beer cans scattered throughoutthe woods, a shoe print on one of the paths, and tiretracks in several locations. The landowner mentionedto the officer that he had seen similar tracks leadinginto another wooded area approximately 2 miles northof his woods.

Timber TheftA Solvable CrimeBy David L. Windsor

Wmade from wood, people seldom consider that thoseitems originated as trees in a forest. Someone har-vested, processed, and formed the wood needed tocreate those items. Although most timber is harvestedlegally, several thousand trees are harvested illegallyeach year throughout the United States.

Unfortunately, many of these illegal harvests orthefts go unreported, and those reported often remainunsolved. Many times, when a law enforcementagency receives a report of a timber theft, the depart-ment considers it an unsolvable crime. Because mostofficers have little or no knowledge of the timberindustry or timber thefts, they frequently make themistake of thinking that someone has trespassed tocut firewood and assume that no evidence exists thatthey can trace to a suspect. Investigations also arehampered because the thefts often occur severalweeks or even months prior to their discovery.

Photo © PhotoDisc

Case Study


After taking photographs and collecting evidence,the officer checked the second woods mentioned bythe landowner. The officer observed similar tiretracks and found nine black-walnut stumps cut likethose in the first case. The officer also found beercans scattered, along with otherdebris, throughout the scene.While surveying the scene of thistheft, the officer noticed that thevehicle driven into the woods hadscraped various trees leaving paint.The officer photographed andcollected paint samples and beercans from this scene, as well.

Next, the officer needed todetermine the value of the stolenproperty. He contacted a stateforestery expert to “re-create” thestolen log. The forester used atechnique, accepted in the forestryprofession, that uses the stump diameter, the diameterof the second cut at the tree top, and the distancebetween the indentation where the tree fell and thesecond cut at the tree top to determine the diameterand length of the stolen log. Determining the qualityof the log is a more difficult task; however, byexamining the remaining portions of the tree fordefects in the wood and the quality of the surroundingtrees, the forester can estimate accurately the qualityof the stolen log.

The forester estimated the value of the logs takenfrom the first scene as $2,946 and the total value ofthe downed trees to be $3,266. The logs taken fromthe second woods were worth $6,100; the total valueof those trees was $6,300. It remains important todetermine the value of both the stolen logs and thedowned trees because the property owner was de-prived of the ability to harvest the trees and sell themlegally.

The police laboratory processed the evidencecollected from both scenes and found a single finger-print on one of the beer cans. Although the print wasidentifiable, the police had no suspects or witnesses toeither crime. They suspended this investigation fornearly 2 years. They reopened the case when alandowner in a nearby county caught a suspectstealing black-walnut trees from his property.

The officer from the first case learned that thelandowner from the second case was holding thesuspect’s truck until he received payment for the logs.The officer obtained a search warrant and took paintsamples and other evidence from the truck, including

a receipt from a nearby veneermill.

Then the officer met with theowner of the veneer mill, whoproduced documents showing thatthe mill bought several black-walnut logs from the suspect. Theofficer surmised that the suspecthad stolen each of the logs becausehe was not a licensed timber buyerin Indiana. The mill owner in-formed the officer that he hadstopped doing business with thesuspect when the suspect hadattempted to steal a log from the

mill several months earlier. The mill owner thoughtthe suspect also had sold logs to another local veneermill.

Contact with the employees of the second millrevealed that the suspect had sold logs to them andcontinued to bring in logs weekly. The mill employ-ees cooperated in the investigation and notified theofficer each time the suspect sold logs to them. Uponnotification that the suspect had visited the mill, theofficer would photograph the logs and obtain copiesof the payment receipts given to the suspect. Becausethe pattern of annual rings and the shape of the treetrunk provide unique information similar to finger-prints, the officer took a cutting from the end of eachlog for possible comparisons in any future thefts.

After a fourth theft was reported, the officer againfound evidence similar to the previous cases. After athorough crime scene search, the officer recognizedan unusual characteristic in one of the stumps. Hecompared the sample cuttings from the veneer milland matched three cuttings to the stumps at the newcrime scene. He then filed charges against the suspect.

The suspect was charged with theft in state courtand later charged with theft in two other counties andonce in federal court for theft on a federal wildliferefuge. The courts found the suspect guilty in eachcase. Additionally, state revenue investigators

“

”

In most states, theunauthorized control

of someone else’sproperty, includingtimber, constitutes

theft .

September 1999 / 19

charged the suspect with tax evasion for failure toreport the income he had received from the sale ofover 400 logs. The suspect paid restitution to thelandowners and spent a total of 6 years in prison.

How to InvestigateTimber Theft

The first officers on thescene of a timber theft mustdetermine who owns theproperty and if the owner hasmade any arrangements thatwould allow a renter to selltimber from the property.Some reported cases oftimber theft become civilcases due to misunderstand-ings and landowner-tenantdisputes. Once officersdetermine that a timber thefthas occurred, they canprocess the crime scene asthey would any other.

Officers must rememberthat every crime scenecontains evidence, regardlessof the location, and a timbertheft crime scene is noexception. Each scene always will contain traceableevidence of the timber’s being taken, such as tiretracks, occasional paint transfers, stumps, and variousother items that the thief may have purposely dis-carded or accidently left behind. Keeping this inmind, officers should secure the scene and protect anypotential evidence for later use or identification.

Before investigators begin the search for stolentimber, they should have an idea of how it may beused. For example, in the Midwestern states, wheresuch trees as black-walnut, white and red oak, maple,and black cherry remain abundant, high-quality logsare harvested and processed into veneer to use aspaneling or processed into furniture and other woodproducts. In such states as Oregon and Washington,Douglas fir and hemlock are harvested for commer-cial firewood, and cedar is harvested for shakeshingles and fence posts. Many other species are

commonly are used for other products ranging frombuilding materials to baseball bats.

Once officers determine the suspected use, theycan begin to look at various mills in their area.

Investigators should not limittheir focus to their ownjurisdictions but shouldexpand to a large area,including surroundingcommunities and, in somecases, other states. Forestryexperts can help investigatorsdistinguish tree species fromtheir unique identifiers,determine timber quality andvalue, explain commonharvest practices, locatepotential timber buyers, andeven identify potentialsuspects.

ConclusionAlthough timber theft

investigations may soundunique, they are conductedmuch the same as any othercriminal investigation. Often,the lapse of time between

when the logs are stolen and when the landownerreports the theft can hinder an investigation. Bymaking contact with area mills; state, national, andprivate foresters; timber buyers; and other timberindustry personnel, officers can gain valuable knowl-edge that will save them crucial time when a timbertheft occurs and will help them in apprehending thethief more quickly.

Endnote1 A board foot is an industry standard unit of measure equal to a board

1 inch thick by 12 inches long by 12 inches wide.

Lieutenant Windsor serves as the training officer forthe Indiana Department of Natural Resources, LawEnforcement Division, Indianapolis.


Bulletin Reports

The Los Angeles Police Department employed a deceptivelysimple tactic, traffic barriers, to block automobile access to streets as away of reducing gang violence. The National Institute of Justice (NIJ)-sponsored evaluation of Operation Cul-de-Sac (OCDS), as the programwas called, examined whether the tactic could reduce gang crime.

In its 2 years of operation, 1990-1991, OCDS appeared to reduceviolent crime. Homicides and street assaults fell significantly in bothyears and rose after the program ended. Property crime decreasedsubstantially during the first year, but it also declined in the compari-son area that had no OCDS operating, indicating that other factorsbesides the traffic barriers caused the reduction. Moreover, in thesecond year of the program, property crime rose, suggesting that thestreet closures affected only violent crime. Lastly, crime was notdisplaced to other areas. This may have occurred because the areas ofpotential displacement are the turf of rival gangs.

Agencies can use traffic barriers as part of an approach to maxi-mize neighborhood residents’ defensible space by increasing their spanof control. Zones configured with the barriers heighten the visibility ofsuspect activities and can prove effective when combined with “naturalguardians,” people who serve as informal sources of surveillance andsocial control. Toorder a copy of thisreport, “DesigningOut” Gang Homi-cides and StreetAssaults, NCJ173398, contact NIJ’sNational CriminalJustice ReferenceService at 800-851-3420, or access thehome page at http://www.ncjrs.org.

Reducing Gang Crime

1998 Annual Report on School Safety (NCJ 173934) provides parents,schools, and communities with an overview of the scope of school crimeand describes actions schools and communities can take to address thiscritical issue. The report shows what measures some schools have takento prevent or address school violence and provides parents, students, andeducators with information and resources to evaluate and enhance theirown school’s level of safety.

Promising Strategies to Reduce Gun Violence (NCJ 173950) profiles60 demonstrated or promising programs and strategies that address theproblem of gun violence; examines the nature of the problem from anational perspective, including current trends; and discusses the processof developing a solution. The report also includes a section on resourcesfor research, technical assistance, and education; geographical andalphabetical program indexes; and a matrix of participating agencies.

Individuals interested in obtaining free copies of these reports orobtaining a list of additional publications produced by OJJDP shouldcontact the Juvenile Justice Clearinghouse at 800-638-8736.

The Office of Juvenile Justice and DelinquencyPrevention Releases New Publications

September 1999 / 21

Law enforcement agencies across the United States have implemented many strategies to reducedrug and disorder problems. One strategy gaining prominence applies civil remedies (e.g., fines forcode violations and threats of legal action) to persuade or coerce nonoffending third parties, typicallythe property owner or manager, to take action against criminal or nuisance behavior. The Oakland,California, Police Department developed the Beat Health program, which uses civil statute sanctions asleverage to encourage managers to address drug and disorder problems on their properties. Researchersgathered basic data at 50 control sites (where police engaged in standard patrol responses to drug anddisorder problems) and at 50 Beat Health program sites throughout the city over a 39-month period.Researchers used calls for service, social observations, and interviews with managers to explore theimpact of the program.

The combined efforts of the police and municipal authorities led to noticeably cleaner properties,more legitimate use of the street, less illicit and uncivil behavior, and fewer drug-related calls forservice, especially in residential sites. Specifically, during the 12-month postintervention period, thedensity of drug calls for service per square mile in the Beat Health residential sites decreased by 16.2percent and increased by 5.4 percent in the control residential sites. The density of drug calls related tocommercial Beat Health sites increased by 45.8 percent during this period and by 282.2 percent at thecommercial control sites.These findings suggest thatthe Beat Health program isparticularly effective inresidential locations, andthat the patrol response isparticularly ineffective atcommercial locations. For acopy of this National Insti-tute of Justice report,Controlling Drug andDisorder Problems:Oakland’s Beat HealthProgram, NCJ 175051,access NIJ’s Web site athttp://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij.

Controlling Drug and Disorder Problems

The Office for Victims of Crime (OVC) provides federalfunds to support victim assistance and compensation programsaround the country and advocates the fair treatment of crimevictims. The OVC Training and Technical Assistance Centerserves as a centralized access point for information aboutOVC’s training and technical assistance resources to federal,state, and local agencies and special emphasis organizationsinvolved in providing services to crime victims. The centerprovides expert, focused support and mentoring in such areasas program management, program evaluation, and policy/procedure development to facilitate long-term, systemicchange to improve services to crime victims. It establishes anannual training calendar and ensures that training materialsdeveloped by OVC, in partnership with its discretionarygrantees, are available to the victim services field. The centersupplies speakers for conferences, focus groups, and othermeetings and maintains a consultant pool of experts capableof providing effective on-site technical assistance to addressoperational problems and needs. For more information,contact OVC at 800-627-6872 or at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/.

Office for Victims of CrimeTraining and Technical Assistance Center


everal students havebeen shot at the highschool. Gunmen are

these tragedies. Schools shouldhave safety procedures in place thatcover all possible catastrophes anddisasters. Although shooting inci-dents can occur even with extensiveprevention programs and campussecurity measures, with appropriatesafeguards, law enforcement agen-cies can help students be prepared ifviolence erupts in their school.

IMPLEMENTINGPHYSICAL SAFEGUARDS

U.S. public schools are notdesigned as fortresses. However, byusing basic crime prevention

techniques and precautionary mea-sures, communities can help createsafer schools. For example, schoolsshould limit access to their propertyby locking all unmonitored en-trances and requiring all visitors tocheck in at the office. They shouldissue distinct identification for visi-tors to wear while on campus andrequire, where legally permissible,student dress codes or uniforms toidentify intruders more easily.Schools should assign specific indi-viduals to monitor campus perim-eters and hallways and provide two-way radios for staff members

“Sholding hostages.” No law enforce-ment agency ever wants to receivethis kind of call. However, inthe emergence of recent schoolshootings, law enforcementagencies should have a tested emer-gency response plan to handle suchsituations.

The schoolyard shootings thatoccurred in several states during the1997/98 school year promptedschool officials and police to exam-ine their procedures for reacting to

Safeguarding Our SchoolsBy DENNIS BRIDGES

responsible for monitoring campusactivities. School personnel shouldconduct routine security inspec-tions of the exterior and interior ofthe campus and report any suspi-cious activity to school officials or,if warranted, to the police.

Schools also can safeguardtheir campuses by requiring thatstudents wear visible student identi-fication at all times. In certain in-stances, schools can help eliminateweapon possession by requiringthat students use backpacks andother book carriers made of clearmaterial to allow visibility of theircontents.

PLANNING RESPONSESWhile schools can take certain

preventive measures to safeguardstudents, communities still mustplan for the possibility of schoolviolence. Following the Jonesboro,Arkansas, school shooting, oneschool official said, “Those twokids had a plan, so they were al-ready one step ahead of everyoneelse. There was such thought anddetail in their actions. They knewspecifically where the teacher andthose girls would come out andwhen to pull the fire alarm. We needto get as smart as they are.”1

Developing an effective emer-gency response plan requires thatall facets of the community worktogether. Law enforcement agen-cies must form a partnership withschool administrators and parents todiscuss and design strategies to en-sure student safety. Before a crisisoccurs, students, teachers, and ad-ministrators should know how torespond, as well as how to help alle-viate fears. Plans should includestraightforward directions that

students and school personnel canlearn easily. Because students gen-erally range in age from 5 to 18years old, planners should ensurethat emergency responses remainappropriate for particular ages.

As part of the planning process,local law enforcement agenciesshould obtain school maps or siteplans, which will assist officerswho respond to shooting and hos-tage incidents. Additionally, localpolice departments should havemaster keys to all school class-rooms and offices to ensure thatspecial weapons and tactic (SWAT)teams have the quick access theyneed when confronting shooters orrescuing students and staff mem-bers. Finally, plans should stress theimportance of law enforcement andschool personnel remaining in con-stant contact during a crisis.

Audible Warning SystemA warning system using an au-

dible mechanism—such as a bell,

horn, or intercom system—cansignal when a school receives athreat and enters into an unusualmode (e.g., “lockdown” or “class-room evacuation”). The audiblewarning system will alert studentsand teachers to remain inside orto respond to classrooms andoffices. In a lockdown, all doorsremain locked to prevent unautho-rized individuals from enteringrooms. Officers should directschool officials to ensure that stu-dents remain in or respond to aparticular classroom or officeuntil the “all clear” signal sounds,which should originate only fromthe principal or the appropriatedesignee.

In the past, schools have usedclassroom evacuation for firealarms, bomb scares, and hazardousmaterial spills. However, law en-forcement officials may directschools to use this technique duringa school shooting if circumstancespermit.

“

”

Developing aneffective emergency

response planrequires that all

facets of thecommunity work

together.

Lieutenant Bridges serves in the Youth and CommunityServices Section for the Fresno, California, Police Department.

September 1999 / 23


Response to GunfireReactions to gunfire vary. The

ability to learn reaction skills de-pends on the age of the student (e.g.,young children will not remembercomplicated reaction instructions).Officers should provide the easiesttraining, thereby increasing stu-dents’ abilities to recall instructionsand react appropriately. Trainingshould remain as consistent as pos-sible with human instinct, whichpeople usually rely on when underpressure. Most individuals react in-stinctively to surprise gunfire.Therefore, law enforcement agen-cies should train students andschool staff members how to re-spond when they hear gunfire with-out receiving a previous warningsignal. Officers also should encour-age school personnel and studentsto try and remain calm during suchoccurrences.

Police officers should adviseschool students and staff membersto stay away from windows and toshield themselves behind or withobjects that will stop or signifi-cantly impede a bullet (e.g., a desk).In cafeterias, tables and benchesmay offer the quickest form ofcover. In some instances, when safeto do so, students should close andlock all windows and close curtainsor blinds.

Students outside of classroomsshould take evasive action whenpossible to minimize their chancesof getting struck by a bullet. Theyshould use the closest cover forprotection or seek concealment ifcover is not available. Concealmentcan provide an alternative totaking cover by hiding a personfrom the shooter, although it mightnot protect an individual from abullet (e.g., a bush). In open areas

with no immediate access to coveror concealment, police officersshould instruct students to “dropand hold”—get as close to theground as possible, cover theirheads, and remain still. However, incases where the threat does notpass (i.e., an intruder walks througha playground shooting at students),dropping and holding providesvulnerable, nonmoving targets forthe shooter. Therefore, studentsshould seek to eliminate or reducethe target they present by seekingcover or concealment as soon aspossible.

PRACTICING RESPONSES

Practice drills will confirm thatstudents and staff members under-stand what steps to take when re-sponding to a threat of or an actualshooting on campus. School admin-istrators never should surprise

Resources

Office for Victims of Crime National Organization for Victim Assistance

U.S. Department of Justice 1757 Park Rd., NW

810 7th St., NW, Seventh Floor Washington, DC 20010-2101

Washington, DC 20531 202-232-6682

202-305-4548 800-TRY-NOVA

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc http://www.try-nova.org

National Crime Prevention Council National Criminal Justice Reference Service

1700 K St. NW, Second Floor Box 6000

Washington, DC 20006-3817 Rockville, MD 20849-6000

202-466-6272 800-851-3420

http://www.ncpc.org http://www.ncjrs.org

students and staff members with asimulation of gunfire or create othertactics that might cause them tomistake a real incident of violencefor “just another drill.” Local lawenforcement officers and paramed-ics should participate in designingand practicing drills. They shoulddesignate a predetermined locationfor an emergency operations centerwhere police officers and schoolpersonnel can exchange critical in-formation and direct the operation.Individuals with knowledge of suchdetails as classroom designs, powerand water shut-off locations, crawl

spaces, and basements also shouldparticipate and provide assistance.

CONCLUSIONAny gun injury or death on

a school campus presents anenormous tragedy. The number ofcases during an average schoolyear in which a student is shotwhile attending school remainsvery low. Because of the rarity ofthese incidents, they receive broadmedia coverage that continues forseveral days following the event.

Most schools will notexperience gun violence, but law

enforcement agencies, schoolofficials, and parents shouldremain prepared. By planningemergency responses and teachingreaction skills without instillingunwarranted fear, school personnel,students, and parents will gainconfidence in the safety of theirschools.

Endnotes1 Cathy Danyluk, Safe Schools coordinator,

regarding the Jonesboro, Arkansas, schoolshooting that left four girls and a teacher dead.

Subscribe Now

September 1999 / 25

FBI Law Enforcement BulletinAuthor Guidelines


GENERAL INFORMATIONThe FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin is an

official publication of the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation and the U.S. Department of Justice.

Frequency of Publication: Monthly.Purpose: To provide a forum for the ex-

change of information on law enforcement-relatedtopics.

Audience: Criminal justice professionals,primarily law enforcement managers.

MANUSCRIPT SPECIFICATIONSLength: Feature articles should contain 2,000

to 3,500 words (8 to 14 pages, double-spaced).Submissions for specialized departments, such asPolice Practice and Case Study, should contain1,200 to 2,000 words (5 to 8 pages, double-spaced).

Format: Authors should submit three copiesof their articles typed and double-spaced on 81/2-by 11-inch white paper with all pages numbered.When possible, an electronic version of the articlesaved on computer disk should accompany thetyped manuscript.

Authors should supply references whenquoting a source exactly, citing or paraphrasinganother person’s work or ideas, or referring toinformation that generally is not well known. Forproper footnote format, authors should refer to AManual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, andDissertations, 6th ed., by Kate L. Turabian.

Writing Style and Grammar: The Bulletinprefers to publish articles in the third person(Point of View and Perspective submissionsare exceptions) using active voice. Authorsshould follow The New York Public LibraryWriter’s Guide to Style and Usage and shouldstudy several issues of the magazine to ensurethat their writing style meets the Bulletin’srequirements.

Authors also should contact the Bulletin stafffor the expanded author guidelines, which contain

additional specifications, detailed examples, andeffective writing techniques.

PHOTOGRAPHS AND GRAPHICSA photograph of the author(s) should

accompany the manuscript. Authors can submitphotos and illustrations that visually enhanceand support the text. Black-and-white glossyprints (3- by 5-inch to 5- by 7-inch) reproducebest. The Bulletin does not accept responsibilityfor lost or damaged photos or illustrations.

PUBLICATIONJudging Manuscripts: The Bulletin judges

articles on relevance to the audience, factualaccuracy, analysis of the information, structureand logical flow, style and ease of reading, andlength. The Bulletin generally does not publisharticles on similar topics within a 12-monthperiod or accept articles previously published orcurrently under consideration by other maga-zines. Because it is a government publication,the Bulletin cannot accept articles that advertisea product or service.

Query Letters: Authors may submit aquery letter along with a 1- to 2-page outlinebefore writing an article. Although designed tohelp authors, this process does not guaranteeacceptance of any article.

Author Notification: The Bulletin staff willreview queries and articles and advise theauthors of acceptance or rejection. The maga-zine cannot guarantee a publication date foraccepted articles.

Editing: The Bulletin staff edits all manu-scripts for length, clarity, format, and style.

SUBMISSIONAuthors should mail their submissions to:Editor, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, FBI

Academy, Madison Bldg., Room 209, Quantico,VA 22135; telephone: 703-632-1952; fax: 703-632-1968; e-mail: [email protected].

September 1999 / 27

Book Review

When Good Kids Kill by Michael D.Kelleher, published by Praeger Publisher,Westport, CT, 1998.

Most juvenile violence research focuseson youths with a history of troubled back-grounds (e.g., school dropouts, runawaysliving on the streets, abuse victims, and thosefrom broken homes). In contrast,When GoodKids Kill addresses the violent crimes commit-ted by juveniles who 1) have supportivefamilies and stable homes; 2) do not havepolice records; 3) maintain average grades inschool; and 4) participate in athletics. Juve-niles’ killing peers or family members remainsone of the most frustrating and complexcategories of violence.

The author of When Good Kids Killspecializes in threat assessment and strategicand human resource management, bringing amultitude of research, analysis, and writingexperience to the juvenile violence topic. Thebook provides valuable insight to the lawenforcement and investigative communities byinterviewing youths and providing much-needed information on an important topic.

The author addresses crimes that rangefrom juveniles’ murdering their babies fromsocial fear and killing from feelings of rage orretribution to senseless thrill killing andmurdering family members and friends. In thefirst three chapters, the author discusses thesex of youths who murder and their relation-ship to their victims and then narrows theresearch to focus on crimes hard to detect dueto low-level predictors and limited knownpatterns to law enforcement. For example, ifjuveniles have not come into contact previ-ously with law enforcement, it may be moredifficult to prove them capable of violent acts.Additionally, the book includes charts sup-porting this research. Most of the cases the

author presents have received national cover-age but provided limited information.

When Good Kids Kill is a well-designedand progressive book that analyzes the devel-opment of real scenarios involving juvenileviolence. Each chapter begins with an anec-dote correlating that specific chapter’s title andtheme. The author presents seven violentincidents committed by girls, over 12 incidentsinvolving boys and girls who kill, and 15 case-by-case snap shot profiles of these youngcriminals. The research reinforces the need forlaw enforcement agencies to perfect crimescene skills and develop knowledge of kids insociety who seldom, if ever, come into contactwith law enforcement until an incident occursrequiring a response.

The fact that mitigating circumstancesassociated with the killings usually do notexist creates a common thread in each of thescenarios for law enforcement officers andprosecutors. Even though some low-levelindicators suggest that violence might occur,most officers do not take juveniles’ commentsseriously. The book concludes with a sectionadvising parents to communicate and becomegood friends with their teens, as well as todemonstrate and prove their love to them—good advice for all members of society.Additionally, When Good Kids Kill couldprovide instructional reference to supportjuvenile instruction programs.

Reviewed byLarry R. Moore

U.S. Army Military Police Corps (ret.)Certified Emergency Manager,

National Coordinating Council onEmergency Management


Legal Digest

Gang Congregation OrdinanceSupreme Court InvalidationBy DANIEL L. SCHOFIELD, S.J.D.

n June 10, 1999, in thecase of City of Chicago v.Morales,1 the U.S. Su-

the differing views of the justices.Finally, the article assesses thelikely impact of Morales on usingordinances and injunctions to com-bat gang activity.

CONSEQUENCES OFLOITERING GANGMEMBERS

The Chicago City Council’sCommittee on Police and Fire con-ducted hearings to explore theproblems created by the city’s street

gangs. Based on evidence from resi-dents and other sources, the councildetermined that public loitering bygang members had 1) increased themurder rate; 2) escalated violentand drug-related crimes; and 3) en-abled gang members to establishcontrol of areas that intimidatedresidents and created a justifiablefear for the safety of people andproperty in those areas. Of particu-lar significance, the city councilfound that criminal street gangs

Opreme Court held by a 6-3 vote thatChicago’s Gang Congregation Or-dinance is unconstitutional. Under-standing the law enforcement impli-cations of Morales is complicatedbecause the decision includes sixseparate opinions. This article be-gins with a description of the ordi-nance and the reasons for its enact-ment. Next, the article summarizes

Photo © Tribute

September 1999 / 29

“

”

avoided arrest by committing no of-fense punishable under existinglaws when they knew the policewere present.

CHICAGO GANGCONGREGATIONORDINANCE

The ordinance created a crimi-nal offense based on the followingfour predicates: 1) an officer mustreasonably believe that at least oneof the two or more individualspresent in a “public place” is acriminal street gang member; 2) theindividuals must be “loitering,” de-fined as “remaining in any oneplace with no apparent purpose”;3) the officer then must order “all”of the individuals to disperse andremove themselves from the area;and 4) a person must disobey theofficer’s order. If any person,whether a gang member or not, dis-obeys the officer’s order, thatperson is guilty of violating theordinance.2

After the Chicago Police De-partment issued a general order pro-viding guidelines to govern en-forcement of the ordinance,officers, issued over 89,000 dis-persal orders and arrested more than42,000 people over a 3-year period.An Illinois court invalidated the or-dinance, ending its enforcement andbeginning years of litigation thatculminated in the Supreme Court’sdeciding that the ordinance is un-constitutionally vague.

THE MORALES DECISIONSix justices concluded that the

Chicago ordinance is unconstitu-tionally vague because it fails toprovide adequate standards to guide

police discretion. Three of thosejustices (the plurality) also con-cluded that the ordinance infringesa constitutional right to innocentloitering and fails to give residentsadequate notice of how to conformtheir conduct to the confines of thelaw. Three justices dissented, find-ing the ordinance constitutional.

Majority—InadequateLimits on Police Discretion

Six justices (the majority)agreed that the ordinance reaches asubstantial amount of innocent con-duct and is unconstitutional becausethe city council failed to “establishminimal guidelines to govern lawenforcement.”3 The absence of suchguidelines “necessarily entrustslawmaking to the moment-to-mo-ment judgment of the policeman onhis beat.”4

The majority focused on thevast discretion conferred on policeto determine whether a person is“loitering,” which the ordinancedefined as “to remaining in any one

place with no apparent purpose.”5

That definition provides officersabsolute discretion in decidingwhether to issue a dispersal order.“The ‘no apparent purpose’ stan-dard for making that decision is in-herently subjective because its ap-plication depends on whether somepurpose is ‘apparent’ to the officeron the scene.”6

The majority noted somewhatdisdainfully that the ordinance di-rects the police to issue an order forindividuals to disperse without firstmaking any inquiry about their pos-sible purposes7 and then observed:

It matters not whether thereason that a gang memberand his father, for example,might loiter near Wrigley Fieldis to rob an unsuspecting fanor just to get a glimpse ofSammy Sosa leaving theballpark; in either event, iftheir purpose is not apparent toa nearby police officers, theymay—indeed, they “shall”—order them to disperse.8

Special Agent Schofield is the chief of the LegalInstruction Unit at the FBI Academy.

Six justices concludedthat the Chicago

ordinance isunconstitutionally vaguebecause it fails to provide

adequate standards toguide police discretion.


“...Chicago Policeofficers issued

over 89,000dispersal orders

and arrestedmore than 42,000

people over a3-year period.

”

The majority was troubled thatan officer could treat an innocentpurpose such as engaging in idleconversation as too frivolous to be“apparent” or order dispersal “eventhough an illicit purpose is actually‘apparent.’”9 And literally inter-preted, the “no apparent purpose”definition of loitering would haveno applications to loitering that hasan obviously threatening or illicitpurpose that excludes “from itsconverge much of the intim-idating conduct that motivated itsenactment.”10

The majority rejected the argu-ment that requiring officers to rea-sonably believe that a group of loi-terers contains a gang member is asufficient limitation but then addedthat police discretion could be suffi-ciently limited “if the ordinanceonly applied to loitering that had anapparently harmful purpose or ef-fect, or possibly if it only applied toloitering by persons reasonably be-lieved to be criminal gang mem-bers.”11 Finally, the majority con-cluded that the general order issuedby the police department limitingenforcement to certain designatedareas in the city did not cure theotherwise-unconstitutional ordi-nance because those internal ruleswould not provide a defense to aloiterer arrested in violation ofthose rules as long as the arrest wasconsistent with the broader provi-sions of the ordinance.12

Plurality—Ordinance InfringesConstitutional Right to Loiter

Three justices (the plurality)premised their decision to invali-date the ordinance on the notionthat “liberty,” protected by the Due

Process Clause of the FourteenthAmendment, affords citizens a rightto engage in loitering that is entirelyharmless in both purpose and ef-fect.13 They also concluded that theordinance failed to meet the re-quirements of the Due ProcessClause because “it is so vague andstandardless that it leaves the publicuncertain as to the conduct itprohibits.”14

The plurality focused on theuncertainty of what loitering is cov-ered by the ordinance and what isnot. Even though loiterers are notsubject to arrest unless they disobeya dispersal order, the loitering is theconduct that the ordinance is de-signed to prohibit. Therefore, theplurality reasoned that “if the loiter-ing is in fact harmless and innocent,the dispersal order itself is an unjus-tified impairment of liberty.”15

Moreover, the terms of the dispersalorder compound the inadequacy ofthe notice because it is unclear howlong the loiterers must remain apartand how far they must move.

Dissenters—OrdinanceAffords Police Traditionaland Constitutional PeacekeepingAuthority

Justice Thomas’ dissentingopinion, which the Chief Justiceand Justice Scalia joined, beginswith this ominous prediction: “Byinvalidating Chicago’s ordinancewhich was enacted to prevent gangsfrom establishing dominion overthe public streets, the Court has un-necessarily sentenced law-abidingcitizens to lives of terror and mis-ery.”16 In support of his conclusionthat “[t]he ordinance does nothingmore than confirm the well-estab-lished principle that the police havethe duty and the power to maintainthe public peace, and when neces-sary, to disperse groups of in-dividuals who threaten it,”17 JusticeThomas offered several arguments.

First, neither history nor Courtprecedent support the plurality viewthat “the freedom to loiter for inno-cent purposes is part of the ‘liberty’protected by the Due ProcessClause of the Fourteenth Amend-ment.” Furthermore, the ordinancedoes not criminalize loitering per sebut instead penalizes the failure toobey an officer’s order to disperse.Justice Thomas offered historicaland legal support for the proposi-tion that “as peace officers, the po-lice long have had the authority andthe duty to order groups of individu-als who threaten the public peace todisperse.... The authority to issuedispersal orders continues to play acommonplace and crucial role inpolice operations.”18 Second, policemust inevitably exercise discretionin performing their peacekeepingresponsibilities. Based on the

September 1999 / 31

requirement that officers issuedispersal orders only if they “ob-serve a person whom they rea-sonably believe to be a criminalstreet gang member loitering in anypublic place,” the ordinance is aconstitutionally acceptable alloca-tion of police discretion. Concedingthe possibility that some officersmay abuse that discretion, JusticeThomas wrote:

Instances of arbitrary ordiscriminatory enforcement ofthe ordinance, like any otherlaw, are best addressed when(and if) they arise, rather thanprophylactically through thedisfavored mechanism of afacial challenge on vaguenessgrounds.19

Third, the ordinance is notvague in terms of what is forbiddenand what is permitted because“there is nothing vague about anorder to disperse.”20 Because thereis no “fundamental right to loiter,”it is erroneous to assume, as theplurality did, that the ordinance pro-scribes constitutionally protectedconduct. Moreover, persons of ordi-nary intelligence sufficiently under-stand what it means “to remain inany one place with no apparentpurpose.”21

Justice Thomas concluded hisopinion by criticizing the majorityfor focusing on the rights of gangmembers and their companions atthe expense of the residents of Chi-cago, who suffer the consequencesof gang loitering. “By focusing ex-clusively on the imagined rights ofthe two percent, the Court has de-nied our most vulnerable citizensthe...freedom of movement.”22

Concurring Opinions IllustrateNarrow Scope of Decision

Justices O’Connor, Kennedy,and Breyer wrote opinions in whichthey concurred with one another inpart and also concurred in the judg-ment. The concurrence of JusticeO’Connor that Justice Breyerjoined is noteworthy for the follow-ing suggestions it offers on how theChicago ordinance and other gang

loitering ordinances might be struc-tured to pass constitutional muster:

1) if the ordinance appliedonly to individuals reasonablybelieved to be gang mem-bers;23 2) if the ordinance onlyapplied to loitering that had anapparent harmful purpose oreffect;24 3) if the ordinanceincorporated limits on the areaand manner in which the lawsmay be enforced;25 4) if theordinance directly prohibitedthe presence of a large collec-tion of obviously brazen,insistent, and lawless gangmembers and hangers-on onthe public ways that intimi-dates residents;26 5) if the term

“loiter” had been narrowed tomean “to remain in any oneplace with no apparent purposeother than to establish controlover identifiable areas, tointimidate others from enteringthose areas, or to concealillegal activities”;27 and 6) ifthere were limitations thatrestricted the ordinance’scriminal penalties to gangmembers or that more care-fully delineated the circum-stances in which those penal-ties would apply to nongangmembers.28

CONCLUSIONAll Supreme Court justices in

Morales recognized that lawmakersand law enforcement officers facemany difficult challenges in tryingto combat the serious problemscaused by gang-related activities.Justice Scalia noted that those diffi-culties are compounded by the factreliance on existing laws that pro-hibit intimidating and unlawfulconduct (that are presumably con-stitutional) are rendered largely in-effective when, as the ChicagoCity Council found, “gang mem-bers cease their intimidating andunlawful behavior under the watch-ful eye of the police officers butreturn to it as soon as the policedrive away.”29

Chicago’s solution to that real-ity was to enact an ordinance thatgave police discretion to clear thestreets of loitering gang membersand their associates. In JusticeScalia’s view, Chicagoans “decidedthat depriving themselves of thefreedom to ‘hang out’ with a gangmember is necessary to eliminate


Law enforcement officers of other thanfederal jurisdiction who are interested inthis article should consult their legaladvisors. Some police procedures ruledpermissible under federal constitutional laware of questionable legality under state lawor are not permitted at all.

pervasive gang crime and intimi-dation—and that the elimination ofthe one is worth the deprivation ofthe other.”30

While the Court in Morales in-validated Chicago’s ordinance,lawmakers should carefully con-sider structuring gang loitering or-dinances in accordance with thesuggestions in Justice O’Connor’sconcurring opinion. An ordinancethat is deemed constitutional byJustices O’Connor and Breyer pre-sumably also would be upheld bythe three dissenting Justices inMorales.

Finally, the article “CombatingGangs: The Need for Innovation”that appeared in the February 1998issue of the FBI Law EnforcementBulletin addressed the use of civilinjunctions to abate gang activity

under the theory that ongoing gangactivity is a public nuisance.31 Im-portantly, the holding in Moraleshas no apparent effect on the contin-ued use of injunctions to prohibitnamed gang members with a docu-mented history of intimidating resi-dents and unlawful conduct in des-ignated areas from loiteringtogether in those areas.

Endnotes1 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999)2 Id at 1854.3 Id at 1861.4 Id.5 Id.6 Id at 1862.7 Id at 1861.8 Id.9 Id at 1862.10 Id.11 Id.12 Id.13 Id at 1857.

14 Id at 1859.15 Id at 1860.16 Id at 1879.17 Id at 1881.18 Id at 1884.19 Id at 1886.20 Id.21 Id at 1887.22 Id.23 Id 1964.24 Id.25 Id.26 Id.27 Id at 1964-65.28 Id at 1865.29 Id at 1878.30 Id at 1879.31 Regini, J.D.,“Combating Gangs: The

Need for Innovation,” FBI Law EnforcementBulletin, February 1998, 25-32.

T he FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin staff invitesyou to communicate with us via e-mail. Our

Internet address is [email protected] would like to know your thoughts on

contemporary law enforcement issues. Wewelcome your comments, questions, and

suggestions. Please include your name,title, and agency on all e-mail

messages.Also, the Bulletin is available

for viewing or downloading on anumber of computer services,as well as the FBI’s home page.The home page address ishttp://www.fbi.gov.

The Bulletin’sE-mail Address

The Bulletin Notes

Law enforcement officers are challenged daily in the performance of their duties; they face eachchallenge freely and unselfishly while answering the call to duty. In certain instances, their actionswarrant special attention from their respective departments. The Bulletin also wants to recognizetheir exemplary service to the law enforcement profession.

After receiv-ing a call of ahouse fire earlyone morning,Sergeant Gre-gory Snider andPatrolman ButchPressley of theClinton, SouthCarolina, PoliceDepartment

arrived at the location within minutes. An elderly citizen wastrapped inside the burning house, and the officers heard faintcries for help. Unable to gain entry through the front of theresidence, both officers, without protective clothing or breathingapparatus, entered the back of the house. Due to heavy smokeand heat, they crawled on their hands and knees, located thevictim, and pulled him to safety. Without Sergeant Snider’s andPatrolman Pressley’s bravery and respect for human life, thevictim would have died before fire personnel arrived.

While off duty at a shopping mall,Officer Miguel Albarran of the Marta,Georgia, Police Department observed aman, who had a bandana covering his face,leave the women’s rest room carryingwomen’s clothing. At the same time,Officer Albarran heard a cry for help fromthe rest room. He immediately chased,captured, and then subdued the man after astruggle. Further investigation revealedthat the subject had attempted to rape thewoman at knifepoint in the rest room.

Officer Albarran’s quick and decisive action led to the promptapprehension of a dangerous sexual offender.

Sergeant Snider Patrolman Pressley

Officer Albarran

While patrollingbehind a building lateone night, Patrol OfficerStacy Snyder of theMcPherson, Kansas,Police Departmentobserved an elderlyfemale who had fallen ina large snowbank in anearby field. The womanwas on her knees andunable to get up. Thewindchill had brought thetemperature down to -9degrees and it wasunknown how long shehad been in the snow.Because the woman wasunable to move on herown, Patrol OfficerSnyder picked her up,carried her to safety, andnotified emergencymedical services. PatrolOfficer Snyder’s alertobservation and quickreaction saved thewoman’s life.

Officer Snyder

FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin - Sept99leb

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