FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin - Oct02leb

ISSN 0014-5688 USPS 383-310

Features

Departments

6 Focus on School ViolenceBomb Threat Assessments

13 Bulletin ReportsLaw Enforcement

Drugs and Crime

14 PerspectiveBulletproof Dogs

Physical Fitness inLaw Enforcement

By Patti Ebling

Safety Awareness forPublic-Contact Employees

By Jacqueline B. Wheelerand Christopher M. Lando

Use-of-Force Policiesand Training

By Thomas D. Petrowski

1

October 2002Volume 71Number 10

United StatesDepartment of Justice

Federal Bureau of InvestigationWashington, DC 20535-0001

Robert S. Mueller IIIDirector

Contributors' opinions and statementsshould not be considered an

endorsement by the FBI for any policy,program, or service.

The attorney general has determinedthat the publication of this periodical is

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The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin(ISSN-0014-5688) is published

monthly by the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation, 935 PennsylvaniaAvenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.

20535-0001. Periodicals postage paidat Washington, D.C., and additionalmailing offices. Postmaster: Sendaddress changes to Editor, FBI LawEnforcement Bulletin, FBI Academy,

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EditorJohn E. Ott

Associate EditorsCynthia L. LewisBunny S. Morris

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Assistant Art DirectorStephanie L. Lowe

Staff AssistantLinda W. Szumilo

This publication is produced bymembers of the Law Enforcement

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Internet Address [email protected]

Cover Photo© Tom Chancey

Send article submissions to Editor,FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, FBIAcademy, Madison Building, Room

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Public safety employees withoutenforcement powers can face dangerssimilar to those encountered by swornlaw enforcement officers.

Physical fitness can help lawenforcement officers in their daily dutiesand provide a sense of personalaccomplishment.

25The constitutional constraints on theuse of force by law enforcementrequire reasonableness.

8

17 Crime DataViolent Crimes Remained

Relatively Unchanged

18 Research ForumOfficer-Involved Shootings

October 2002 / 1

arly on a cold, rainy morn-ing, four veteran law en-forcement officers faced aE

serious challenge to their physicaland mental abilities as they waitedto hear the clang of a bell. One of-ficer thought, “If I had any brains, Iwouldn’t be here.” The second pon-dered, “I know I haven’t got theheart for this.” The third officerworried, “My courage will fail me,”and the fourth kept saying to her-self, “I wish I’d stayed home!”1

What terrible fate awaited thesehighly experienced, streetwise of-ficers? The Yellow Brick Road.

These officers illustrate whatmany attendees of the FBI National

Academy (NA)2 feel when theyparticipate in the obstacle courseand runs that comprise the FBI’sYellow Brick Road Fitness Chal-lenge. Why do they subject them-selves to such a task? Why do somany consider taking home theiryellow brick as important as theacademic skills, friendships, andprofessional contacts they garnerwhile attending the NA? The variedand complex answers hinge on aquote from America’s third presi-dent, Thomas Jefferson: “Exerciseand recreation are as necessary asreading; I will say, rather, more nec-essary because health is worth morethan learning.”

Thomas Jefferson’s peers de-scribed him as being well formed,indicating strength, activity, and ro-bust health. He appeared strong, ac-tive, and in full possession of asound mind. To this day, his firmbelief in the importance of exerciseinspires many officers through hiswords engraved on a bell left as alegacy from the 195th session of theNA. Law enforcement officers fromaround the world stop to reflect onthese words before beginning a runat the FBI Academy.

For several decades, the FBIhas trained law enforcement profes-sionals and, in the process, has cre-ated a testament to the importance

Physical Fitnessin Law EnforcementFollow the Yellow Brick RoadBy PATTI EBLING

2 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

of physical, as well as mental, pre-paredness. Fitness and the FBI havebecome nearly synonymous notonly because law enforcement of-ficers must remain physically ca-pable to perform their duties butalso because exercise can help themcombat the stress associated withthe emotional pressure of their pro-fession. However, “as an occupa-tion, law enforcement holds the dis-tinction of having the highest rate ofheart disease, diabetes, and suicideout of 149 professions.”3 This un-fortunate statistic belies the impor-tance of physical fitness in the lawenforcement profession.4

While most law enforcementagencies recognize the importanceof physical fitness for their officersand encourage them to exercise andmaintain an adequate level of fit-ness, many find it difficult to imple-ment a fitness program. To this end,the FBI’s program may provideagencies with an example that theycan adapt for their personnel.

EXAMINING THE FBI’SFITNESS CHALLENGE

The FBI’s Focus on Fitnessprogram emphasizes cardiovascularand strength training. The agencytests its agents on their physical fit-ness and encourages them to main-tain these fitness levels throughouttheir careers. Law enforcement of-ficers who remain physically fitprove more readily able to copewith the day-to-day stress of the joband are better prepared to handlecritical incidents. Realizing this, theFBI established the Focus on Fit-ness program to promote the healthand wellness of its special agentpopulation, which then led to theinclusion of the NA into the pro-gram and the development of theFBI Fitness Challenge.

HistoryIn 1981, the FBI Academy

implemented the Fitness Challenge.The Physical Training Unit5 startedthe Challenge as part of a class for

the NA. Only a handful of studentsshowed up for the first few Chal-lenges. They would meet at 5 p.m.in the gym and go for a run. Nor-mally, these runs were longer thanthe runs that they had in their physi-cal training classes. Eventually, theChallenge grew and became a com-bined effort of the National Acad-emy Unit and the Physical TrainingUnit. It subsequently evolved into astructured series of seven physi-cally challenging runs, culminatingin the ultimate Yellow Brick Roadendurance feat. The 154th sessionof the NA received the first yellowbricks, beginning a tradition thatsurvives today. In fact, physicaltraining (PT) instructors estimatethat they have awarded over 14,000yellow bricks to NA students whohave completed the Challenge.These bricks, painted yellow andbearing the number of the NA ses-sion, serve as a vivid reminder ofthe recipient’s success in overcom-ing physical, mental, and emotionalchallenges.

The Oz ConnectionWhy did the FBI go to Oz to

find a name for part of its FitnessChallenge? Several years before theFBI became involved, the U.S. Ma-rine Corps at Quantico, Virginia,designed a running course for itstrainees. As a safety feature, paintedyellow rocks showed runners theway through the wooded trail. In-structors told trainees to follow theyellow rocks along the way, and,soon, runners began calling the trailthe “Yellow Brick Road.” Over theyears, participants coined names forsome of the runs, such as the “HumpRun” and the “Belly of the Beast,”

”Ms. Ebling is a physical training instructor in theOperational Skills Unit at the FBI Academy.

“ No winners orlosers should existin a well-developed

physical fitnessprogram, just

participants doingtheir best.

October 2002 / 3

based on the terrain. However, tomaintain a cohesiveness, the FBIdecided to name the runs in theChallenge after characters andevents in The Wizard of Oz.6

The first run of the Challenge,Not in Kansas Anymore, consists of1.8 miles and occurs only 2 weeksafter the NA students arrive at theFBI Academy. It reminds them thatthey have started on a new adven-ture. The next run, the Tin ManTrot, winds through the woods for2.6 miles, while the third run, theGates of Oz, goes down a gravelroad and then through the woods for3.1 miles. The midpoint of the Chal-lenge, the Cyclone, consists of 30minutes of circuit training on thetrack. All of the NA students and PTinstructors run for 30 minutes, stop-ping along the way to do crunches,push ups, and dips. The fifth run,the Lion’s Leap, increases the milesto 3.4 and takes runners on the mainroad around the FBI Academy. Fi-nally, the Munchkin Trail consistsof a 4.2-mile run through thewoods, while the Return to Oz, thelast run before the Yellow BrickRoad, is 5.2 miles and includes ahill that proves demanding even forseasoned runners. Gradual inclineson this seemingly endless trail makeit very deceiving on the return run tothe academy.

During the Challenge, the NAstudents run in color groups accord-ing to their initial 1.5-mile run timethat the PT instructors record at thebeginning of training. The colorgroups—jet black, black, gold, red,green, blue, and silver—each runwith their own color-coded flag anddevelop a special group comradery.Running groups prove motivational

and helpful for many students.Some assume the role of leaders intheir groups and help others alongthe way. All of the students worktogether to accomplish a commongoal—a yellow brick, the symbol oftheir achievement.

NA students keep track of theirown runs by initialing their logbooks in the gym after each run.Basing their performance on thehonor system truly challenges those

students who have less than stellarphysical abilities. However, the PTinstructors have found that thecomradery that develops among theparticipants during such demandingactivities creates an atmosphere oftrust and integrity that no one daresto destroy.

The Yellow Brick RoadThe Yellow Brick Road is the

final test of the Fitness Challenge.Its wooded trails, 3 walls, 6 ropes,and 26 obstacles make it the ulti-mate challenge for everyone. Stu-dents either must run out to or backfrom the Yellow Brick Road for a

total of 6.1 miles. Some runners optto run both ways for a total of nearly9.5 miles.

Once at the site, students face abear trap, barbed wire, and numer-ous hills that wind through roughterrain. Running such a demandingcourse unites the students who helpeach other through the tough spots.They soon realize that it is not aone-person challenge but a team ef-fort. Sometimes, students take awrong turn and find themselves onan unsolicited tour of the Virginiacountryside. PT instructors roundthem up and get them back on thecorrect trail. Climbing over walls,running across creeks, jumpingthrough simulated windows, andscaling sheer rock faces with thehelp of ropes present physicallydemanding tasks for the runners,but belly crawling through a muddytrench reminds them that gettingdirty actually can be fun. As thestudents make their way up the his-torical Yellow Brick Road, the mainattraction on the course, they reflecton the markers left by prior NA ses-sion attendees. Everything fromconcrete lions to fire hydrants havefound a home on this site and serveas memorials to those who con-quered the Yellow Brick Road.

Next comes the most well-known obstacle—the cargo netmade famous in the motion pictureThe Silence of the Lambs. Flippingover the top of the net, approxi-mately 10 to 12 feet above theground, offers a tough but exhilarat-ing test for everyone. After accom-plishing this, most students stop totake photographs, get a drink of wa-ter, and catch their breath beforecontinuing the last three quarters of


a mile, which includes a combatcrawl under barbed wire in muddywater, to the finish line. As theyreach the end of the hard-foughtcourse, the students cheer, hug, andcongratulate each other. The par-ticipants have survived a physicalchallenge and, in the process,learned some interesting lessonsabout themselves.

The Wizard’s LessonsPT instructors have received a

great deal of feedback from NA stu-dents who have participated in theFBI Fitness Challenge. Most par-ticipants remarked on how theChallenge influenced their desire tomaintain the level of fitness thatthey achieved while attending theNA. For example, one student fromthe 206th NA session said, “Thefitness program has been one of themost challenging aspects of the NA.It has reawakened my realizationof the importance of physical fit-ness. I did not think I could run asfar as I have, nor did I think I couldever feel as well as I do.” Another

student from the same sessionstated, “I found that through regularexercise my stress level was re-duced substantially and my energylevel has been great.”

Besides the physical improve-ment of their bodies, many partici-pants stated that the teamwork andcomradery that developed becauseof sharing a challenging experienceproved more valuable. One studentin the 206th session said, “Thesingle most important thing that theChallenge did for me was to reem-phasize teamwork. It’s not that any-one was the fastest, slowest, fin-ished first, or last, but that each goalwas accomplished with teamworkand helping friends.” Another re-marked, “The program has allowedme the opportunity to develop rela-tionships, relieve stress, keep fo-cused academically, and buildcomradery with my classmates. Notenough can be said in regard to thebenefits I have received.” Finally,one student summed up his experi-ence by saying, “The Yellow BrickRoad is a mystery. We had all heard

of it prior to our arrival. Its nameepitomizes the completion of theFBI Fitness Challenge. Of course,there is more to the NA than theYellow Brick Road, but it is uniquein its mystique. It is surroundedwith an aura that is symbolic ofphysical achievement, not ego orspeed, just achievement.”

Such statements reveal the truemeaning and worth of physicalchallenges by showing participantsfar more about themselves thantheir mere physical endurance. Themental and emotional resolve theyneed to go beyond perceived limitsand prove that they can succeed at atask they thought impossible re-flects the true meaning of a chal-lenge. However, many participantsalso have discovered the necessityof balancing their desire to achievewith their physical limitations. Thismay represent the most importantlesson of all.

CREATING FITNESSPROGRAMS

In developing fitness programs,agencies should stress the idea ofaccomplishing each officer’s per-sonal best, not competing againstothers who are younger or havegreater athletic abilities. This foun-dation must exist in physical fitnessprograms; otherwise, they becomefraught with problems inherent incompetitions. If agencies empha-size competing over teamwork, theywill create atmospheres where of-ficers push themselves beyond theirlimits, resulting in physical injuriesand emotional traumas from com-petition-induced peer pressure.

Instead, agencies must ensurethat their officers understand the

October 2002 / 5

importance of a team approach. Afitness program is not about thefastest runners. It is about the fastestrunners completing the course andreturning to the end to encouragethe slowest ones to do their best—inessence, running twice to help theirfellow officers. It is about all par-ticipants waiting at the finish lineuntil the last one completes theevent and cheering that person asheartily as the first. It is about goingout in the rain, snow, or oppressiveheat and continuing to train and im-prove. It is about transforming agroup of individuals into a team,changing “I’ll try” to “We’ll try”and, ultimately, to “We did it.”

This sense of accomplishing adifficult task as a team representsthe fundamental aspect of the FBI’syellow brick—a token given in rec-ognition of each participant’s per-sonal success and a reminder ofthose who helped that person attainit. Any item would work as well. Byemphasizing cooperation, not com-petition, agencies can demonstrateto all of their officers, regardless ofskill or age, that improvingeveryone’s fitness level constitutesthe goal that all personnel shouldwork toward. No winners or losersshould exist in a well-developedphysical fitness program, just par-ticipants doing their best.

CONCLUSIONToday, everyone knows the im-

portance of a healthy, activelifestyle. However, physical fitnessfor law enforcement officers isimportant not only for their per-sonal well-being but also for theirsurvival in a profession fraught withdanger and high levels of stress.

within themselves that even a wiz-ard could not have provided. Inshort, they all found the brains,heart, and courage to achieve amuch-sought-after goal and to re-turn home with the knowledge thatthey did their best.

Endnotes1 Any resemblance to the four characters

(the Scarecrow, the Tin Man, the CowardlyLion, and Dorothy) in L. Frank Baum’s classicchildren’s tale The Wizard of Oz is intentionaland acknowledged by the author. The subtitle ofthis article came from the musical score of thefilm version, E.Y. Harburg and Harold Arlen,We’re Off to See the Wizard (New York, NY:Leo Feist, Inc., 1939).

2 The FBI hosts four 10-week sessions eachyear during which law enforcement executivesfrom around the world come together to attendclasses in various criminal justice subjects,including physical fitness.

3 Ronald J. Getz, “You Can’t Afford Not toHave a Fitness Program,” Law and Order, June1990, 44-50.

4 For a comprehensive overview of thephysical benefits of exercise, see WayneWestcott, Strength Fitness (Dubuque, IA:Brown & Benchmark, 1995); Jack Wilmore andDavid Costill, Physiology of Sport and Exercise(Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 1999);Everett Aaberg, Resistance Training(Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 1999); andKenneth Cooper, The Total Aerobics Programfor Well-Being (New York, NY: Bantam/M.Evans & Co., Inc., 1983).

5 Due to organizational restructuring, theFBI Academy recently combined physicaltraining with practical skill instruction to formthe Operational Skills Unit. For clarity in thearticle, however, the author maintains theoriginal title of the unit charged with providingphysical training at the academy. She alsogratefully acknowledges the assistance of all ofthe physical training staff members in thepreparation of this article.

6 L. Frank Baum, The Wizard of Oz (NewYork, NY: Grosset & Dunlap, 1956).

To help officers remain physicallystrong and mentally alert to performtheir duties and protect theircommunities, law enforcementagencies should encourage their of-ficers to exercise and maintain ahealthy diet.

The FBI has long held that thephysical fitness of law enforcementofficers ranks equal with their men-tal preparedness. To this end, theFBI Academy offers its FitnessChallenge, including one course

that has become nearly legendaryover the past 20 years. The YellowBrick Road may have begun in theimaginary land of Oz, but it hasshown many law enforcement offic-ers the way to a healthier lifestyleand, more important, a sense ofpride in achieving a difficult goalthrough personal effort and team-work. Just like the four officers atthe beginning of this article, manyfelt beaten before they started. But,with the help of their friends and thewisdom gained from facing theirfears, they discovered resources

”

These bricks...serve as a vividreminder of the

recipient’s successin overcoming

physical, mental,and emotional

challenges.

“


hen investigators analyze an anonymousthreat, they have a broad range of behav-

Focus on School Violence

Bomb Threat AssessmentsBy Ronald F. Tunkel, M.C.J.

substance to obtain, process, and store. His threatfailed the reality test, and neither the school nor thetown was evacuated.

Further, threats from purportedly well-organized,violent groups rarely are grounded in reality. In fact,anonymous threateners often invoke the presence of agroup, peppering their communications with thepronoun “we” or claiming to have an extensivenetwork conducting surveillance or preparing to carryout the threat. Some threateners believe that havingthe power of a group bolsters credibility with theirvictims. In reality, to investigators involved in threatassessment, such language usually suggests a loneoffender.

Studying the language of the threat plays a criticalrole in the second avenue of analysis, looking forevidence of commitment to the threat by the threat-ener. Statement analysis involves studying a subject’slanguage, verbal or written, to detect indicators ofdeception; uncover hidden, disguised meanings ormotivations; or discover areas of sensitivity to thesubject. The use of first person active tense andunequivocal language signals a good indicator ofcommitment. The statement, “At the next pep rally, Iwill throw a homemade pipe bomb filled with blackpowder after I light the fuse,” would carry moreweight than “An upcoming pep rally may be disruptedby our group carrying some high explosives, likegunpowder.” In the latter example, the subject usesthe passive tense “be disrupted” and equivocation inthe statement through the qualifiers “may” and“some.” This language suggests a lack of commitmenton the subject’s part.

Investigators also may see evidence of commit-ment, or the lack thereof, in the details provided bythe offender. Has the offender put time, energy,resources, or effort into his plan? For example, doeshe appropriately describe school security measuresand how they may be defeated? Likewise, somethingas simple as an incorrect address or misspelling of anaddressee’s name may signal a lack of commitment tothe threat. Certainly, if individuals seriously plan tocommit a potentially life-threatening crime andexpose themselves to criminal prosecution, theywould have done some research on their targets.

The details that the subject provides also mayassist in the third area of analysis, the offender’s

Wioral science techniques available to them, such asstatement analysis, psycholinguistics, and forensicstylistics. They also rely on the more traditionalforensic sciences, including document examination,finger- and voiceprinting, and DNA analysis.

When assessing school bomb threats, investiga-tors first should question whether the threat passes thereality test, which they should apply to both thethreatener and the threat. Though only a trainedprofessional is qualified to render a psychologicaldiagnosis, most people can recognize if an individualis grounded in reality. If the offender makes suchclaims as “The spacemen inside my head are tellingme to blow up the school” or his language is a saladof unrelated or nonsensical words, he may havemental health issues, which could lessen the credibil-ity of the threat.1 Further, the threat itself may not begrounded in reality. A recent case centered on a well-written note threatening to explode a device at a highschool. However, the writer claimed that he woulduse plutonium, an extremely difficult and dangerous

© Mark C. Ide

October 2002 / 7

ability to carry out his threat. An offender demon-strates ability when he provides appropriate andaccurate details about his plan or weapon. To indi-viduals assessing threats, providing these essentialdetails establishes the credibility of the threatener. Inthe previous example of the lesser threat, an errorexists in the details; gunpowder is not a high explo-sive. It sounds scary to say “high explosives,” but thisstatement would reflect the threatener’s lack ofknowledge, again suggesting low commitment andlack of ability to carry out the threat. In the moreserious example, the suspect provided accurate detailswhen describing a basic pipe bombrecipe: pipe, viable explosivefiller, and a fuse to initiate thedevice. He shows that he hasknowledge to make a device, and itsuggests that he put time, energy,and resources into his plan.

The fourth area of focus isevidence of a motive. Does thereappear to be a justifiable mission/goal behind the threat? “I’m tiredof the jocks picking on youngerkids and getting away with it.Because none of the teachers willdo anything about it, I’m going tobomb them!” Investigators should consider this typeof statement more seriously than, “Everyone in thistown must die, and we’ll start with bombs in the highschool.” The first threat gives an understandablereason for the threatened action. It is specific andtargets one group. The second statement is broad andlacks motive. Does this threatener not feel that hisfriends, family, and even himself fall into the categoryof “everyone in this town?” Sometimes, people venttheir anger and frustration through broad, bold talk. Itdissipates the energy that an offender otherwise mightuse for harmful intent. The first threat also raisesinterest because the threatener seems to have consid-ered, but run out of, the usual peaceful options whenhe says, “Because none of the teachers will doanything about it....” Research suggests that when asubject feels he has no peaceful alternative or meansto communicate his grievance, the likelihood that hewill act out violently dramatically increases.

Fortunately, in most cases, the motive for thesebomb threats involves some type of excitement orgain for the offender and simply making the threatwith no intention of ever carrying it out meets theoffender’s needs. Some people feel a sense of thrilland empowerment if the entire population of a schoolis evacuated, people feel afraid, and such authorityfigures as police and fire personnel arrive at thescene. And, if it is a beautiful spring day, or if schoolis canceled on a Friday or on a test day, an evacuationcan benefit the students as well. The research alsosuggests that the axiom “most threateners don’t bomb

and most bombers don’t threaten”appears true in most cases. In fact,only a very small percentage ofbomb threats to schools results inthe deployment of an actual, viabledevice. Most anonymous bombthreats at schools usually are falsealarms.

This information provides onlya brief, summary outline of howinvestigators should assess anony-mous bomb threats at schools. It isnot intended for those assessing apotential mass act of violence.Applying these principles may

help administrators and law enforcement personnelaccurately assess the viability and credibility of athreat and appropriately gauge their response. Anycredible evidence provided by teachers or peers thatone or more students are planning a mass homicide oftheir schoolmates and teachers needs to be assessedwith different measures and afforded a graver concernthan the more typical anonymous bomb threat.

Endnotes1 For illustrative purposes and to avoid confusion in the article, the

author sometimes refers to subjects as males.

““

”

An offenderdemonstrates ability

when he providesappropriate and

accurate details abouthis plan or weapon.

Special Agent Tunkel serves with the Arson and ExplosivesPrograms Division, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco andFirearms and currently is assigned to the FBI’s NationalCenter for the Analysis of Violent Crime at the FBIAcademy.


nlike sworn law enforce-ment officers, most publicsafety employees, such as

SafetyAwareness forPublic-Contact EmployeesBy JACQUELINE B. WHEELER and CHRISTOPHER M. LANDO

Uparole and probation officers, truantofficers, building inspectors, or so-cial workers, do not have enforce-ment powers. However, these em-ployees face similar threats to theirsafety because they, like law en-forcement officers, often deal withindividuals who have steppedacross the boundaries of society’slaws.

To help its county governmentemployees who have frequentpublic contact, the Prince William

County, Virginia, Police Depart-ment has developed a training classon safety awareness.1 Instructorsdesigned the class, offered as a 1-day training session at the PrinceWilliam County Criminal JusticeAcademy, to increase the awarenessof county employees of the poten-tially hazardous people and situa-tions that they can encounter whileon duty.

CLASS DESIGNThe training does not cover de-

fensive tactics. It does not advocatethe use of force, teach how to use

weapons, or provide self-defensetechniques. Rather, instructorsteach various strategies to help pre-pare county employees for theirencounters with the public. Thesestrategies include the use of thefield interview stance (i.e., how andwhere to position themselves); whatphysical cues or body language towatch for that could indicate a po-tential attack; contact and cover or“safety-in-numbers” strategy (i.e.,one employee talks with the subjectwhile another ensures safety); andhow employees can communicateany hazard they perceive to their

© Mark C. Ide

© PhotoDisc

© PhotoDisc

October 2002 / 9

coworkers so they can both reactand escape from potentially hazard-ous situations. The instructors in-corporate a combination of lectures,handouts, videos, and computerpresentations into the trainingto keep it interesting, as well aseducational.

Divided into several categorieswith various objectives, the trainingsession specifically teaches em-ployees to be wary of certain warn-ing signs that indicate an attack maybe imminent. Follow-up discus-sions provide methods of diffusionor escape should the employee feelthe situation is becoming danger-ous. The training then covers waysemployees can avoid placing them-selves in such potentially hazardoussituations. Finally, the sessionteaches certain practices that em-ployees can implement to increasetheir safety while interacting withcounty residents.

Early Warning Signs of aPotential Attack

Employees may detect someearly warning signs of an attack. Forexample, do the subjects have aknown violent background? Dothey ignore authority by turning andwalking away? Do they glance at aparticular object or in a certain di-rection, perhaps toward a kitchenknife, an avenue of exit, anotherperson, or toward another item thatthey may use against the employee?Are they standing with armscrossed or hands placed on hips?Perhaps, even more telling, do theyclench their fists or take a defiantstance? These examples all serve aspotential preassault indicators. Ifany occur, employees immediatelyshould attempt to get away.

Special Agent Lando serves withthe FBI’s Ashville, North CarolinaResident Agency.

First Sergeant Wheeler isassigned to the OperationsDivision/Patrol of the PrinceWilliam County, Virginia,Police Department.

Instructors of the class alsoteach the participants to recognizesigns that can indicate possible al-cohol or other drug use, such asbloodshot eyes, unfocused vision,impaired balance, slurred speech,odor of alcohol, hallucinations, orwild or incoherent statements. Be-cause the attitude and reaction of aperson using alcohol or other drugseasily can change without warning,employees never should attempt tointerview or reason with a personwho may be under the influence.

Methods of Diffusion or EscapeThe ability to reduce stress

during an encounter remains an im-portant trait for employees havingcontact with the public. To de-esca-late a situation, employees quicklymust identify when someone be-comes upset, begins to show signsof agitation, or reveals any warningsigns and help decrease theindividual’s level of agitation.

However, if employees believetheir safety is in jeopardy, theyshould return later with coworkers,conduct the interview in a safer en-vironment, or obtain police protec-tion so that they can quickly, andsafely, resume the questioning.

Another tactic, screening, in-volves consciously placing barriersor objects between the employeeand the interviewee. If employeesconduct the interview outside, theymay want to meet in a drivewaywhere they can place the front oftheir cars between themselves andthe subjects. When conducting in-terviews inside, employees can tryto keep a table or desk betweenthemselves and the subjects whenconducting the interview. By creat-ing this barrier, employees canhinder an attack and give them sometime and distance to react or escapeshould an attack occur. If twoemployees attend a meeting, eachemployee should use available


barriers. With good positioning, anattack becomes less likely becausethe subject cannot reach two peopleseparated or shielded by obstacles.

When employees determinethat they need to escape, versusattempting to diffuse a situation,they must act immediately. When athreat or perceived threat has madethem concerned for their immediatesafety, employees should escapequickly and without explanation.They should not take time to closethe interview, collect any unfin-ished paperwork, or pack theirbriefcases. They simply must exitthe scene as quickly as possible.

Ways to Avoid PotentialHazards

The instructors recommend astrategy of prevention and avoid-ance, including identifying poten-tially hazardous persons or situa-tions before becoming involved inthe situation. Employees can ac-complish this by researching anyprevious history of the location thatthey are going to, as well as thebackground of the persons they willmeet. In doing so, employees canavoid any situation that may appeardangerous. The employees are in-structed to watch for telltale signsof potential danger (e.g., loud mu-sic, an ongoing party, yelling, or adomestic dispute) as they approachtheir destination. Employees alsoshould listen at the door for anysignals not readily apparent fromthe outside. After completing theseassessments and with no indicatorsexisting, the employees can knockand announce their presence.

Identifying the type of indi-viduals that employees face ranksas a top priority. The instructors

describe individuals as either“yes,” “no,” or “maybe” type ofpeople. How can employees tell thedifference? Employees easily canidentify “yes” individuals as coop-erative subjects. Clearly, in theinitial contact, such individuals ac-cept employees as authority figuresand comply with their directions.

Employees also easily can iden-tify “no” people. “No” individualsmake it clear from the start, whetherby phone or in person, that they donot want to have any interaction

with employees. They do not wantto listen to employees and have nointention of cooperating with them.When encountering such individu-als, employees can take numeroussteps to help avoid confrontations.For example, employees simply canchange the meeting place. They cantell the person that they will have tomeet at a business office or buildinglobby, rather than in a home or se-cluded area. Employees can includecoworkers or supervisors in the in-terview, based on the “safety-in-numbers” concept. Employees cancall the local police if a subjectbecomes disorderly as it remainsbetter to have law enforcement

responding before an incident be-comes an emergency. As anotheralternative, employees can request apolice escort for the necessary con-tact. This proactive approach em-phasizes avoiding negative contactthrough preparation. In the event ofa physical confrontation, employ-ees should focus their efforts on get-ting away and avoiding any physi-cal contact with the individualunless in self-defense.

“Maybe” individuals can provedifficult to recognize. This type canbecome a “yes” or “no” person de-pending on the employee’s abilityto communicate and deal with thesituation. If in doubt, employeesshould treat a “maybe” person as a“no” for safety reasons, remember-ing that if a “maybe” person be-comes a “no” person, they shouldleave the area. When communicat-ing, employees should remember totalk quietly, which often forces theindividual to calm down and listento what the employee has to say.Employees can point out how oth-ers (e.g., family members) are af-fected by the individual’s conduct.Also, showing the individual a writ-ten policy can reassure the personthat the employee is followingagency procedures.

Practices to Improve SafetyThe instructors tell the employ-

ees to give proper identification andintroduction and to maintain a pro-fessional demeanor at all times. Theclass participants learn to keep asafe distance (4 to 6 feet) duringcontact and the importance of ap-pearing confident and maintainingeye contact. Also, the instructorsemphasize that employees shouldavoid becoming too involved in

...instructors teachvarious strategies tohelp prepare countyemployees for theirencounters with the

public.

”“

October 2002 / 11

completing paperwork and possiblymissing any type of warning signs.

The training also emphasizesthat all public-contact employeesshould plan what they will do whena dangerous situation occurs. Ifthey remain prepared, it will takethem less time to react to such anoccurrence. As employees ap-proach each location, they shouldremain alert and observe the sur-roundings for the closest escaperoutes, available barriers or ob-stacles, any presence of weapons,and the location of the nearest tele-phone. Should the need arise, hav-ing a predetermined plan will helpthem move quickly and easily ex-ecute their plan. Employees can use

simple, effective techniques to helpget themselves out of danger. Forexample, employees can sayphrases, such as “I just got a page,”“I have to check in with my boss,”or “My coworkers should be arriv-ing soon and I need to let themknow...” to allow them to use thetelephone. If employees can reach atelephone, rather than calling theiroffice in an emergency, the instruc-tors tell them to call the policeemergency number. If needed, em-ployees can conduct a fake conver-sation with the dispatcher to signalthat a problem exists. Employeesshould remember that if they use acellular telephone to place the call,the emergency service cannot

identify their location. Keeping anopen phone line may help the dis-patcher locate employees if theycannot provide their exact where-abouts. Employees should informother coworkers of their scheduleand location each day. The instruc-tors stress that employees must re-main vigilant of their safety, andthey must be ready to use any tool,plan, or scheme to get them out of adangerous environment and notifypolice, if necessary.

Such tactics also can applywhen employees are working attheir offices. Personal safety in theworkplace involves several risk fac-tors, including exchanging moneywith the public and working alone

Early Warning Signs of a Potential Attack

• Conspicuous ignoring: As employees talk,subjects give no sign of understanding theconversation or dialogue. They avoid eyecontact and will not answer questions. Theymay ignore facts specifically pointed out tothem. They may be formulating their plan ofattack or withdrawal.

• Repetitive inquiries: Individuals will keeprepeating the question posed by employees,even after having been provided a satisfac-tory response, to help buy time to formulate alie or develop a plan of attack.

• Looking around: Subjects may be attemptingto find a way out of the situation. In theirminds, the employees are the ones whoplaced them there and made them feel thislevel of discomfort. This is different thantarget glancing in that their heads swivel tofind “any way out,” including through theemployees.

• Exaggerated pacing: This speaks to theirlevel of agitation and could indicate that they

are warming up for a withdrawal or anattack.

• Ceasing all movement: This is the reverseof exaggerated pacing and is better knownas “the calm before the storm,” but possiblycould indicate some type of action by thesubject.

• Actual threats: Employees should takethese seriously. They should not minimizeactual statements or threats made bysubjects. They should take such subjects attheir words or actions and respond appro-priately. They also should document thethreat.

• Flight versus fight: Because it remainsdifficult to tell whether any of these actionsare made in an attempt to withdraw or as aprecursor of an attack, it is only prudent toassume that they may be indicating apossible attack and to react accordingly. Itis not worth the employee’s safety to risknot responding.


or in small numbers, before or afternormal business hours, and in high-crime areas. When money ispresent, the risk of potential vio-lence increases. Employees mustremain aware of the risk and takesteps to minimize the “obvious-ness” of cash by limiting theamount of personal property theybring into the workplace; securingvaluables in a locked drawer or inthe trunk of their vehicles; andkeeping purses, wallets, and valu-ables out of sight. Because employ-ees face greater danger before andafter normal working hours and inhigh-crime areas, they should em-ploy recognized safety practices,such as parking near the door inwell-lighted areas, scanning thearea prior to entering or leavingbuildings, calling home prior toleaving, not advertising that theyare working alone, locking their of-fice doors, leaving in teams when-ever possible, and walking withpurpose and exuding confidence.Visitors to the workplace alsopresent dangers. Employees shouldensure that their office has a policyfor identifying authorized visitors,such as displaying an approved visi-tor badge, and that a policy exists toreport and handle unauthorizedpersons.

Finally, because a person’slevel of confidence may decreasethe chance of being victimized orincrease the chance of survivalshould an attack occur, the instruc-tors also emphasize the importanceof physical fitness. Employeesshould strive to maintain a level offitness to increase their health,which could help project a higherlevel of confidence to a person who

may be thinking about possibly at-tempting an assault. They shouldattain fitness gradually and shouldinitiate any fitness program only af-ter consulting with a doctor if anyhealth concerns exist. In addition,should an escape or defense becomenecessary, being physically fit willincrease the level of their perfor-mance in what may be a dynamicsituation.

CONCLUSIONWhile many public-contact em-

ployees do not have enforcementpowers, they do meet individualswho often take umbrage with themwhile they are carrying out their as-signed duties. To avoid possibleconfrontations and increase theirlevel of safety, these employeesshould receive training in how torecognize and deal effectively withthese types of individuals.

The Prince William County,Virginia, Police Department has de-veloped a 1-day training session toprovide its county government em-ployees who have frequent publiccontact with strategies that can helpthem deal with potentially danger-ous incidents. Although no em-ployee can predict when, or if, asituation will “go bad” for them,by thinking ahead, having a well-thought-out plan, and rehearsingit, they can improve their chancesof surviving a dangerous situationor, ideally, even preventing such anattack.

Endnote1 For additional information on the program,

contact Chief C.T. Deane, Prince WilliamCounty, Virginia, Police Department at703-792-6650.

Wanted:Photographs

he Bulletin staff isalways on the lookoutT

for dynamic, law enforce-ment-related photos forpossible publication in themagazine. We are interestedin photos that visually depictthe many aspects of the lawenforcement profession andillustrate the various taskslaw enforcement personnelperform.

We can use either black-and-white glossy or colorprints or slides, although weprefer prints (5x7 or 8x10).Appropriate credit will begiven to contributing photog-raphers when their workappears in the magazine. Wesuggest that you send dupli-cate, not original, prints aswe do not accept responsibil-ity for prints that may bedamaged or lost. Send yourphotographs to:

Art Director, FBI LawEnforcement Bulletin,FBI Academy, MadisonBuilding, Room 209,Quantico, VA 22135.

October 2002 / 13

Bulletin Reports

Reducing Gun Violence: The BostonGun Project’s Operation Ceasefireprovides a 78-page overview of OperationCeasefire, a unique problem-orientedpolicing initiative that tasked both academ-ics and practitioners with reducing homi-cide victimization among youths inBoston. This National Institute of Justiceresearch report details the issues andprocesses of the project’s implementationand design and discusses findings from anevaluation study. The study concluded thatOperation Ceasefire likely was responsiblefor the significant decline in the city’srates of youth homicide and gun violencein the 1990s. Moreover, although theproject was highly customized to Boston,certain process elements generally shouldbe applicable to similar problem-solvingefforts in other jurisdictions. This report(NCJ 188741) is available electronically athttp://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/188741.htm or call the NationalCriminal Justice Reference Service at800-851-3420.

Law Enforcement

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ)presents ADAM Preliminary 2000 Findingson Drug Use and Drug Markets: Adult MaleArrestees (NCJ 189101). This research reportfeatures original data from NIJ’s ArresteeDrug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) programusing a new probability-based samplingmethod, a poststratification weightingstrategy, and a redesigned survey instrument.The redesigned methodology gives research-ers and policymakers greater confidence inADAM data. Information in this NIJ researchreport was culled from sites in the ADAMnetwork as a result of new questions aboutheavy alcohol use, mental health and drugtreatment, the need for treatment of drugdependency, and characteristics of drugmarkets. The questions are based on itemsfrom other national surveys and allowresearchers to “crosswalk” between ADAMand other ongoing, large-scale researchstudies. To obtain a copy of this researchreport, visit http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/189101.htm or call the NationalCriminal Justice Reference Service at800-851-3420.

Drugs and Crime

Bulletin Reports is an edited collectionof criminal justice studies, reports, andproject findings. Send your material forconsideration to: FBI Law EnforcementBulletin, Room 209, Madison Building,FBI Academy, Quantico, VA 22135.(NOTE: The material in this section isintended to be strictly an informationsource and should not be considered anendorsement by the FBI for any productor service.)


Perspective

Ms. James-Mesloh, aformer public relationspractitioner who hasexperience with theFlorida legislature,currently is pursuing aPh.D. in public affairsat the University ofCentral Florida inOrlando.

he impact of news stories and the concentrationof media attention in an area can create a public

Bulletproof DogsThe Canine BallisticVest PhenomenonBy Charlie Mesloh, M.P.A., andJennifer James-Mesloh, M.P.A.

Mr. Mesloh, a formerlaw enforcement officerand canine handler andtrainer, currentlyinstructs at the Univer-sity of Central Florida inOrlando and is pursu-ing a Ph.D. in publicaffairs.

Tperception that previously did not exist. For example,numerous cases of the media’s involvement incriminal justice issues have created new publicperceptions, which can be referred to as “socialconstruction” or “framing an issue.”1

This scenario is evident in the news stories thattranspired after the 1998 death of the New JerseyState Police dog Solo, mortally wounded in the line ofduty. The brutal killing of Solo grabbed the media’sattention, and the story spread nationwide. As areaction to the shooting, a 14-year-old girl in Califor-nia responded by organizing a program to fund thepurchase of protective vests for police dogs. Manybelieved that if Solo had been wearing ballistic armor,he would have survived the shooting.

The New Jersey legislature also responded to themedia’s attention generated by Solo’s death andenacted new state legislation enhancing the penaltiesfor injuring or killing a police animal. The legislation,referred to as Solo’s Law, represented an effort tohonor the fallen canine. The media was charmed bythe emotional outpouring toward a police canine andcontinued to cover the story, further promoting thereputation of Solo who had become a national figure.

PerceptionsOnce media organizations realized the appeal of

police canines produced by the Solo incident, theylooked for similar stories in their local news markets.By constructing news stories that focused on canineprotective vests, the media generated a public percep-tion that such gear was a necessity and that thoseresponsible for the protection of others should beequally protected. These stories tapped into theemotional reservoir of a nation. They sparked theinherent goodness that exists in children and fueledthe creation of organizations dedicated to protecting

those in law enforcement with ballistic vests. Thereporting of such events only perpetuated the growingperception that protective vests for police officers andpolice canines would prove the difference betweenlife and death.

A review of media stories indicated that policecanines are viewed in a positive manner by mostpeople and often portrayed as the “four-footedcommunity police officer of the 21st century.”2

However, the formation of public perceptions createdby the media’s framing of police canine issues hascontributed greatly to establishing protective vests inthe public’s mind as the solution to all death andinjury scenarios for police service animals. While thebasis for providing vests is generated from humankindness and the goodness of children, it also raisessome concerns that the law enforcement communityshould address.

October 2002 / 15

ConcernsThe phenomenon of socially constructing an issue

and then spinning the public’s perception of it seemsto have occurred over the use of protective vests forpolice canines. For example, although no researchcurrently exists documenting the extent of protectionthat a vest would provide a police canine, the public’sperception and the continued reporting by the mediachampion the use of such equipment. Research,however, does exist that evaluates social constructionand its linkage to criminal justice issues. It was fromthis point that two researchersanalyzed the progression of newsarticles reporting on police caninesand the use of protective armoredvests.3 These researchers identifieda total of 2,022 newspaper articlesfrom a Boolean search that in-cluded the words police dog for theyears 1994 through 2000.4 Theyintended to identify major trendsand changes in the socially con-structed image of police dogs andtheir activities over this 7-yearspan. During the course of acontent analysis of newspaperarticles regarding police dogs, theresearchers noted a substantialtrend in the number of stories focusing on the pur-chases of ballistic vests to protect police animals.5

Ninety-six articles over the 7-year period focusedspecifically on body armor for police dogs. Articlesregarding canine vests were rare prior to the high-profile canine deaths, especially that of Solo’s in1998. However, a sharp increase began in early 1999and continued through the end of the study.

During that time, the media framed police dogs ina positive context and, when linked with specificarticles, constructed a perception that implied a needfor public involvement. This need for public involve-ment has taken the form of purchasing ballistic vests.Although the use of such equipment has obviouseffects for police officers, the same may not hold truefor canines. While canines can benefit from wearingvests, they also can encounter some unstated hazards.

A likely scenario involves a police canine deployed toapprehend a fleeing suspect who then fires a gun atthe dog. However, when imagining this scenario, thesuspect would be standing and firing the gun at adownward angle to hit the target (the dog), whichwould be running toward the suspect. A problemarises because protective vests are designed to coverthe chest and back region of the dog, leaving the headarea completely exposed and vulnerable to a gunshotwound. Obviously, the head presents the most likelytarget, as it is closest to the suspect. It also remainsunclear whether ballistic vests offer sufficient protec-

tion against blunt trauma injury asthe researchers could find nostudies demonstrating the effec-tiveness of the material to dis-perse projectile energy on a dog’sphysiology. Further, the addi-tional weight and bulkiness of thevest may reduce the speed andmaneuverability of the canine,while offering the suspect theability to use the vest as a grip-ping point during a physicalconfrontation.

In addition, no reports of acanine ballistic vest saving thelife of a police animal have

occurred in the United States. As a result of thepositive social construction revolving around protec-tive vests for canines, harm actually may come topolice dogs because of placing so much faith in theballistic vest. To this end, agencies may begin toplace dogs in a wider range of functions that inher-ently prove more dangerous. Finally, the public, atsome point, may expect agencies to deploy vest-protected animals in tactical operations as an addi-tional nonlethal option. Although special weaponsand tactics (SWAT) and canine unit interaction iscommonplace in many containment scenarios, theperception of the dog as “bulletproof” by the publicpossibly raises future issues, particularly in incidentswhere officers must employ deadly force. Inevitably,someone will ask why the “armored dog” was not sentto subdue a barricaded and heavily armed individual.

““

”

A vest will notprotect a dog under

all circumstances norwill it eliminate the

need for deadly forceagainst criminal

suspects.


This represents an example of “framing an issue” thatwas meant to be positive, but, instead, suffers fromnegative externalities.

RecommendationsWith these concerns in mind, agencies should use

caution when they accept donations of canine bodyarmor. Although these gifts symbolize communitysupport toward the canine unit and the police depart-ment as a whole, they may carry unreasonable expec-tations that a dog and vest cannot fulfill. A vest willnot protect a dog under all circumstances nor will iteliminate the need for deadly force against criminalsuspects. Realistically, a vestprovides a police dog with anadded level of protection but alsohas some negative features thatonly a canine handler can trulyjudge in the final analysis.Clearly, documented policy andprocedures for deployment and anunderstanding of the canine’sabilities and limitations mayreduce future problems betweencommunities and their lawenforcement agencies.

Moreover, regardless of howagencies may consider caninevests, they should support anational study to gather statisticsabout the number of dogs saved by these vests. Byexamining the benefits and risks associated withcanine protective vests, the law enforcement commu-nity can gain a clearer, less emotionally charged viewof the issue, rather than relying on the media’sinterpretation of the tactical use of police dogs. Thisis similar to the use of protective vests for law en-forcement officers. Over the years, the number ofofficers saved by wearing body armor has grown asmore officers and agencies have seen the benefitsderived from them and have implemented their use.However, equally well known is the tragic number ofofficers who have lost their lives even though theywere wearing a protective vest at the time.6 Byexamining these incidents, manufacturers have madegreat improvements in the design, material, and

comfort level of body armor for officers. The sameshould be done for police service animals, especiallysupplementing the vest with some type of headcovering or helmet device to protect the dog’s mostvulnerable target zone. Additionally, researchersshould obtain input from canine officers. Becausepolice dogs cannot speak for themselves, their han-dlers must provide as much information as possible asto whether canine protective vests can save the livesof these highly trained and devoted animals. Finally,with accurate data on the benefits and risks associatedwith the use of protective vests for police serviceanimals, the media can present a true picture of the

issue to the public. News organi-zations still can cover stories ofheroic actions of police dogs, butthey also can demonstrate to thepublic that these brave animalshave the best and most up-to-dateequipment, training, and humanguidance.

ConclusionIn today’s world of advanced

technology and instant communi-cation, the media can focus thepublic’s attention on many issuesand often change how peopleperceive them. The issue ofprotective vests for police

canines illustrates this concept very well. Braveanimals sacrificing their lives for the public’s safetycan seize the media’s attention unlike little else. Intheir zeal to cover such stories, however, newsorganizations may create incorrect perceptions of thesolution to these tragedies. To avoid this, the lawenforcement community must determine if thebenefits of this solution outweigh the risks.

Primarily, law enforcement agencies can supporta national study of the effectiveness of canine protec-tive vests, research into improving the design of suchequipment, and a continuing dialogue between caninehandlers, vest manufacturers, and the media. Suchactions would create an environment that promotesthe safety of the animals, their handlers, and thepublic they serve and stand as a fitting memorial to all

October 2002 / 17

of those, like Solo, who have given their lives in theline of duty.

Endnotes1 R. Surette, Media, Crime and Criminal Justice, 2d ed. (New York,

NY: Wadsworth, 1992); G. Barak, Media, Process and the SocialConstruction of Crime (New York, NY: Garland Publishing, 1994);and R. Fox and R. Van Sickel, Tabloid Justice: Criminal Justice inan Age of Media Frenzy (Boulder, CO: Lynee Rienner Publisher,2001).

2 C. Mesloh and R. Surette, “Analysis of News Media CoverageRegarding the Law Enforcement Canine,” 2001, pending publication.

3 Ibid.4 A Boolean search, named for the British mathematician George

Boole, uses “operators,” such as and or or, to define a relationshipbetween terms. A search for police and dogs locates every article in whichboth words appear. A search for police or dogs finds every article inwhich either of the words appears. The researchers conducted theirBoolean search by accessing http://www.newslibrary.com.

5 Supra note 2.6 From 1991 through 2000, 293 law enforcement officers were shot

and killed in the line of duty while wearing body armor, with gunshotwounds to the head accounting for 168 of those deaths; U.S. Departmentof Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Law Enforcement OfficersKilled and Assaulted 2000 (Washington, DC, 2001), 15.

Crime Data

reliminary 2001 data from the FBI’s Uni-form Crime Reporting Program indicates a 2

Violent Crime Offenses Remained Relatively Unchanged

Ppercent increase in the nation’s Crime Index fromthe 2000 figure. The Crime Index is composed ofmurder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault,burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft.The Modified Crime Index includes the propertycrime of arson.

Including the offenses surrounding the eventsof September 11, 2001, preliminary data showthat the 2001 Crime Index remains at the 2percent increase from the 2000 figure; the volumeof violent crime increased .6 percent; and themurder volume increased 26.4 percent. However,the FBI advised that the figures reflecting theoffenses from the events of September 11 are notincluded in the trend data because they arestatistical outliers that will affect current andfuture crime trends.

Preliminary figures for 2001, excludingthe data mentioned above, suggest that the volumeof violent crime offenses remained relativelyunchanged—a .3 percent increase—when com-pared with data for 2000; however, the volume ofproperty crime offenses rose by 2.2 percent.

Among violent crimes, robbery showed thegreatest increase, 3.9 percent. Murder rose 3.1percent, and forcible rape showed a minimalincrease of .2 percent. Aggravated assault, whichis the most frequently occurring violent crime inthe Index, was the only violent offense to show adecrease from the 2000 volume—1.4 percent. Inthe property crime category, motor vehicle theftincreased 5.9 percent, and burglary rose 2.6percent. Arson and larceny-theft increased 2percent and 1.4 percent, respectively.

Collectively, law enforcement agencies inthree of the nation’s four geographical regionsreported increases in their Crime Index totals.Agencies in the West recorded a 4.5 percentincrease; agencies in the South, a 1.9 percentincrease; and agencies in the Midwest, a .9percent increase. Northeastern agencies collec-tively noted an overall Crime Index decrease of1.2 percent.

For the complete preliminary annual UniformCrime Report press release, access the FBI’sInternet site at http://www.fbi.gov.


Research Forum

f it hadn’t been for the recoil, I wouldn’thave known my gun was working. Not only“I

didn’t I hear the shots but afterward my ears weren’teven ringing.”

“I saw the suspect suddenly point his gun at mypartner. As I shot him, I saw my partner go down in aspray of blood. I ran over to help my partner, and hewas standing there unharmed. The suspect never evengot off a shot.”

“When I got home after the shooting, my wifetold me that I had called her on my cell phone duringthe pursuit of the violent suspect just prior to theshooting. I have no memory of making that phonecall.”

“I told the SWAT team that the suspect was firingat me from down a long dark hallway about 40 feetlong. When I went back to the scene the next day, Iwas shocked to discover that he had actually beenonly about 5 feet in front of me in an open room.There was no dark hallway.”

“During a violent shoot-out I looked over, drawnto the sudden mayhem, and was puzzled to see beercans slowly floating through the air past my face.What was even more puzzling was that they had theword Federal printed on the bottom. They turned outto be the shell casings ejected by the officer who wasfiring next to me.”

These representative samples, taken from actualofficer-involved shootings, exemplify the quirkynature of perception and memory. Law enforcementofficers fully realize that their superiors, legal authori-ties, and the public they serve will hold them com-pletely accountable for their every action during anofficer-involved shooting. These same individualsalso will scrutinize the accuracy and truthfulness ofstatements made by officers taking part in suchincidents. Therefore, it becomes important to under-stand that expecting officers to have perfect recall of

any event is not realistic. Indeed, the body of researchon perception and memory supports the fact thatpeople rarely are capable of total and perfect recall ofevents.

Although the underlying physical processes ofperception and memory continue as a matter ofresearch and debate, empirical observation of humanbehavior can shed some light on the behavioralconsequences of these processes. To this end, theauthor focused her research on the self-reportedperceptual and memory distortions experienced byofficers involved in shootings.1

BACKGROUNDGermane to this topic is how trauma and other

highly emotional experiences can impact perceptionand memory. A noted researcher in the area of stressand fear conducted a comprehensive review of thistopic.2 He came to the conclusion that people havetwo distinctly different modes of processing informa-tion. One, the rational-thinking mode, happens duringlow emotional arousal states, whereas the second, theexperiential-thinking mode, occurs during states ofhigh stress and emotional arousal, such as wouldoccur during an officer-involved shooting.

He pointed out that when people are not underhigh levels of stress, they have the ability to calmlyengage in the conscious, deliberative, and analyticalcognitive processing that characterizes rationalthinking. However, when a perceived emergencyrequires quick action, they cannot afford this luxury.Instead, their cognitive processing system automati-cally switches over to experiential thinking. He statedthat “people are angry, sad, or frightened not as adirect result of what objectively occurs but because ofhow they interpret what happens. The automatic,preconscious construals that are the effective instiga-tors of such emotions are made so automatically andrapidly as to preclude the deliberative, sequential,analytical thinking that is characteristic of the rationalsystem.”3

He delineated the differences in rational andexperiential thinking, including the concept thatexperiential thinking represents a system that “auto-matically, rapidly, effortlessly, and efficiently pro-cesses information,”4 an obvious advantage in a

Perceptual and MemoryDistortion During Officer-Involved ShootingsBy Alexis Artwohl, Ph.D.

October 2002 / 19

life-threatening situation demanding an immediateresponse. Along with facilitating automatic, rapidresponses, he pointed out that experiential thinking ismore likely than rational to have such characteristicsas—

• fragmented memory instead of an integratednarrative;

• based on past experiences instead of a consciousappraisal of events;

• intuitive and holistic instead of analytic andlogical;

• oriented toward immediate action instead ofreflection and delayed action;

• highly efficient and rapidcognitive processing instead ofslow, deliberative thinking;

• “seized by emotions” insteadof “in control of our thoughts”;or

• “experiencing is believing”instead of requiring justifica-tion via logic and evidence.He continued with, “In most

situations, the automatic process-ing of the experiential system isdominant over the rational systembecause it is less effortful andmore efficient and, accordingly, is the default op-tion.”5 He noted that people frequently engage inexperiential thinking during everyday events simplybecause it is more efficient, but “emotional arousaland relevant experience are considered to shift thebalance of influence in the direction of the experien-tial system.”6 This clearly applies to officers involvedin shootings and other high-stress situations.

PREVIOUS RESEARCHTo understand this connection more thoroughly,

the author reviewed previous research relative toofficer-involved shootings. In the process, she con-centrated on three main studies.

In 1986, two researchers were among the first topublish data specific to officer-involved shootings.7 Intheir study of 86 officers involved in shootings, they

found that 67 percent of the officers saw the incidentin slow motion, while 15 percent observed it as fasterthan normal. Fifty-one percent heard sounds duringthe event in a diminished manner, whereas 18 percentof the officers said that the sounds were intensified.Thirty-seven percent had tunnel vision, while 18percent experienced greater visual detail.

In 1998, two other researchers studied a variety ofreactions in 348 officers involved in shootings.8 Theyadministered their surveys within 3 to 5 days after theincident, just prior to each officer’s participation in amandatory debriefing. They found that 41 percent ofthe officers thought that time slowed down, while 20percent perceived that it sped up. Fifty-one percent

said that sounds seemed quieter,whereas 23 percent reportedsounds as being louder. Forty-fivepercent of the officers had tunnelvision, while 41 percent experi-enced an increased attention todetail. In addition, 22 percent ofthe officers reported memory lossfor part of the incident.

A recent researcher did acomprehensive survey of officer-involved shootings that consistedof detailed interviews with 80municipal and county law enforce-ment officers who reported on 113

separate cases where they shot citizens during theircareers in law enforcement.9 While his report con-tained a wealth of information, it also set out specificdata relative to perceptual and memory distortions. Hefound that 56 percent of the officers saw the incidentin slow motion, while 23 percent thought that ithappened quicker than normal. Eighty-two percentreported that sounds diminished, whereas 20 percentthought sounds intensified. Fifty-six percent experi-enced heightened visual detail, while 51 percent hadtunnel vision. In addition, 13 percent of the officersreported other types of distortion during the event.

PRESENT RESEARCH

From 1994 to 1999, the author supplied a writtensurvey to 157 officers involved in shootings frommultiple agencies. Although approximately two-thirds

““

”

...independentstudies...found that

memory and perceptualdistortions, in fact, did

occur to some degree inofficer-involved

shootings.


of the officers received the survey during theirindividual mandatory debriefing within 1 week afterthe shooting, the author told them not to fill out thesurvey until they had attended a group debriefing(which typically occurs 2 to 4 weeks after the inci-dent, allowing time for agencies to complete theirinvestigations). The author did this because shediscovered, in the course of conducting numerousgroup debriefings, that many officers do not fullyrealize the extent of their own memory and perceptualgaps and distortions until confronted with evidence tothe contrary. During a group debriefing, as officerstell their versions of what happened, the completepicture begins to emerge. Partici-pating officers enjoy the benefit offinding out what really happenedoverall and how their own versionmight differ. Even for officers whowere the only officer present, theirlater perusal of investigationreports, including physical evi-dence and eyewitness statements,can educate them as to the lack ofcompleteness and total accuracy oftheir memories of the event.

By contrast, the author col-lected the remaining one-third ofthe surveys from mental health orlaw enforcement professionals who gave the surveysto officers who they knew had been involved inshootings. With these surveys, the length of time thathad passed since the shooting occurred varied morethan those collected after group debriefings.

In addition, the sample did not represent a “clini-cal” population; these officers were not seekingtreatment for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD),although some may have been experiencing a certaindegree of PTSD. The majority of the officers whocompleted the surveys collected by the author weredoing well emotionally by the time their groupdebriefing occurred. The officers voluntarily filled outthe surveys, and the great majority of the officersreturned them to the author.

Overall, the author’s research revealed that 62percent of the officers viewed the incident in slowmotion, while 17 percent said that time appeared to

speed up. Eighty-four percent of the officers notedthat sounds seemed diminished, whereas 16 percentthought that sounds were intensified. Seventy-ninepercent had tunnel vision, while 71 percent experi-enced heightened visual clarity. In addition, 74percent of the officers stated that they responded on“automatic pilot,” with little or no conscious thought.Fifty-two percent reported memory loss for part of theevent, and 46 percent noted memory loss for some oftheir own behavior. Thirty-nine percent recalledexperiencing dissociation (i.e., the sense of detach-ment or unreality); 26 percent had intrusive distract-ing thoughts; 21 percent noted memory distortion

(i.e., saw, heard, or experiencedsomething that did not reallyhappen or it happened very differ-ently than they remembered); and7 percent reported having tempo-rary paralysis.

DISCUSSION

Past and Present Survey Results

Diminished sound refers to theinability to hear very loud soundsthat a person ordinarily obviouslywould hear, such as gunshots. Itranges from not hearing thesesounds at all to hearing them in an

odd muffled, distant manner. This may contribute tothe findings of previous researchers, as well as theauthor, indicating that officers often do not knowexactly how many rounds they fired, especially as thenumber of shots increases.

Tunnel vision denotes the loss of peripheralvision. This, combined with heightened visual clarity,can result in the odd combination of officers seeingwith unusual detail some stimuli within their nar-rowed field of vision, but remaining visually oblivi-ous to the surroundings that they ordinarily would seewith their peripheral vision.

Although 7 percent of the officers reportedtemporary paralysis, such a reaction is unlikely torepresent “freezing” to the point of dysfunctionduring the event. In cases where the author debriefedofficers who were angry at themselves for “freezing,”

““

”

...memory is not aflawless “videotape”

that can play backexactly the same way

each time a persontries to remember a

past event.

October 2002 / 21

she found that, in fact, this was simply the normal“action-reaction” gap that occurs because the officerscan shoot only after the suspect has engaged inbehavior that represents a threat.10 Although this gapoccurs in a very brief span of time, because of thecommon perceptual distortion of slow-motion time, itcan seem to the officers as if they stood there foreverafter perceiving the threat and before responding.While it remains possible that some of the respon-dents did, in fact, totally “freeze,” it is unlikely that asmany as 7 percent did. Perhaps, none did.

Intrusive distracting thoughts are those notimmediately relevant to the tactical situation, oftenincluding thoughts about loved ones or other personalmatters. In addition, memory gaps and perceptualdistortions can result in “flash-bulb” memories, where the indi-vidual has a series of vivid imagesburned into memory, with the restof the event somewhat fuzzy, a bitout or order, or even missing.

The author found one notableaspect about all of the studies.None quantified other perceptualdistortions that can occur, such asdistance distortion, color distor-tion, face recognition distortion, orlighting distortions.

Overall, although some of thestudies found similar results onvarious items, inconsistencies alsooccurred in several items from study to study. Regard-less of the methodological differences that might havecontributed to these deviations, the most importantfinding remained the same for all. That is, indepen-dent studies using different methodologies found thatmemory and perceptual distortions, in fact, did occurto some degree in officer-involved shootings. There-fore, those who analyze the actions and statements ofofficers involved in shootings must take these find-ings into account. Two researchers stated this clearlyafter finding that 22 percent of officers in their surveyexperienced memory loss.

While other studies have reported even highernumbers, 22 percent remains a highly significantamount given that the officers will be expected to

testify regarding their actions sometime in the future.What appears to be a relatively common perceptualdisturbance following involvement in a criticalincident has the potential of opening up the officers toaccusations of either outright lying or withholding thetruth. This is particularly relevant should subsequentinterviews result in additional observations or clarifi-cations, as is often the case.11

Implications for InvestigatorsThese researchers accurately pointed out that

memory is not a flawless “videotape” that can playback exactly the same way each time a person tries toremember a past event. Rather, memory is a creativeand not entirely understood process. If an officer’s

recollection of an event is not atotally accurate representation ofreality, it does not necessarily meanthat the officer is lying or trying toengage in a cover-up. Likewise, itis normal for memories to changesomewhat over time, and thechanged or new memories may ormay not represent reality moreaccurately. The same conceptapplies to other eyewitnesses andthe suspects as well. No one shouldaccuse an individual of lyingsimply due to inaccurate, inconsis-tent, or missing memories. Whilesome individuals will choose to be

untruthful, investigators should reserve this accusa-tion for those cases where additional evidence existsto indicate that the person deliberately lied.

The author found that 21 percent of the officers“saw, heard, or experienced something during theevent that I later found out had not really happened orhappened very differently than how I remembered it.”All participants in an event, including the suspect,eyewitnesses, and officers, have the potential to see,hear, feel, or experience things that did not actuallyhappen. A wide variety of factors, including percep-tual distortions, biases, beliefs, expectations, and priorexperiences, influence people’s perceptions. Aninteresting aspect to these memory distortions that theauthor repeatedly has observed is that they can “feel”


more real to the witness than what actually happened.This remains consistent with the observation thatexperiential thinking is “self-evidently valid: ‘seeingis believing,’” as opposed to rational thinking, which“requires justification via logic and evidence.”12

When confronted with a videotape that conclusivelyproved that he saw things that did not happen, aveteran SWAT officer told the author, “Doc, I nowintellectually know that what I thought I saw didn’treally happen, but it still feels more real to me thanwhat I saw on the tape.” Some witnesses sincerelyand vehemently will insist that their perceptions andmemories are accurate when, in fact, they may not beaccurate at all.

The differences between rational and experientialmodes of thinking also have implications in thepostshooting aftermath. Clearly,officers need to be held account-able for all of their on-duty behav-ior, especially if they must usedeadly force. However, those whoconduct postshooting analysesshould keep two things in mind.First, while officers usually haveonly seconds (or less) to decideabout using force, all of thosedoing postshooting analyses willhave hours, weeks, months, or evenyears to contemplate all of theevidence and decide what theofficers really should have done.Although postincident analysis canprove very helpful as a learning exercise, it was notan option available to the involved officers at the timeof the shooting. Second, research indicates thatofficers will be in the experiential-thinking modebecause it is the default option, especially in emotion-ally laden situations. On the other hand, all of thoseengaged in postshooting analyses have the ability toanalyze the officers’ behaviors in rational-modethinking, a different cognitive process altogether anda luxury that the officers did not have during theshootings. This does not suggest that officers be givencarte blanche to behave in any way they want during ahigh-stress situation. It does imply, however, that thelaw enforcement profession must remain rigorous in

its training, realistic in its expectations, and cognizantof the demands of emergency situations.

Another research review found that “traumaticsituations will inevitably result in memory impair-ment.”13 These researchers pointed out, and the authoragrees, that officers may make more thorough andaccurate statements if they wait at least 24 hours,during which time they should get some sleep, beforeparticipating in their formal interview with investiga-tors. Research evidence suggests that REM (rapid eyemovement) sleep, in particular, helps integratememories and facilitate learning and memory re-trieval. Some officers might appear unusually calmshortly after an incident and may prefer to give animmediate full statement. Often, however, it is bestfor officers to sleep first and give their statements

later. This does not preclude theirproviding enough brief informa-tion during an immediate on-scene“walk-through” to get the investi-gation started. But, investigatorsmust conduct these initial sessionsin a sensitive manner that does notcompromise the officers’ legalrights.

Given that perceptual andmemory distortions are an integralpart of traumatic events, investi-gators may find research on thecognitive interview techniquehelpful.14 The developers of thismethod found that how investiga-

tors interview individuals can significantly impact theability of the witnesses to remember and report thedetails of an event. Their research indicated thecognitive interview as the most effective techniquefor facilitating memory retrieval with cooperativewitnesses. Using proper interview techniques isparticularly important for high-stress situationsbecause during experiential thinking, the individualis more likely to be dissociative and “encodes realityin concrete images, metaphors, and narratives,”whereas, in rational thinking, the individual is morelogical and “encodes reality in abstract symbols,words, and numbers.”15 This means that the survivorsof traumatic experiences will find it challenging to

““

”

...it is normal formemories to changesomewhat over time,

and the changed or newmemories may or maynot represent reality

more accurately.

October 2002 / 23

translate the dissociated concrete images and meta-phors they experienced during the high-stress eventinto the sequential, verbal, abstract, and logicalnarrative required by an investigative interview andcourtroom testimony. Skilled investigators can helpwitnesses with this difficult task.

Implications for TrainingSeventy-four percent of the officers that the

author surveyed reported, “I responded automaticallyto the perceived threat giving little or no consciousthought to my actions.” Thisfinding coincides with the experi-ential-thinking mode, described asan “automatic, intuitive mode ofinformation processing that oper-ates by different rules from that ofthe rational mode” that “occursautomatically and effortlesslyoutside of awareness because thatis its natural mode of operation, amode that is far more efficient thanconscious, deliberative thinking.”16

This has profound implications fortraining because experientialthinking is based on past experi-ences. Therefore, under sudden,life-threatening stress, individuals likely will exhibitbehavior based on past experiences that they auto-matically will produce without conscious thought.This means not only training officers in appropriatetactics but also providing sufficient repetition understress so that the new behaviors automatically willtake precedent over any previously learned, poten-tially inappropriate, behaviors that they possessedbefore becoming an officer.17

Another implication of the author’s study, as wellas other research, is that it supports the concept ofreality-based training that all tactically mindedofficers and trainers know represents the foundationfor reliable performance in high-stress situations.“Information obtained from textbooks and lectures isof a different quality from information acquired fromexperience. Experientially derived knowledge often ismore compelling and more likely to influence behav-ior than is abstract knowledge.”18

This is especially critical in sudden, high-stresssituations requiring instant physical performance.Abstract knowledge obtained in lectures and bookscan be very useful in rational-thinking mode situa-tions, such as formulating policies and analyzingsituations. However, when officers face sudden, life-threatening incidents, their reality-based trainingexperiences most likely surface.

Reality-based instruction that subjects the partici-pants to high levels of stress during training also willhelp officers develop coping mechanisms to compen-

sate for perceptual and memorydistortions. For instance, tocompensate for tunnel vision,many officers have learned topractice visually scanning thetactical environment during high-stress situations, such as pursuitsand high-risk entries. Trainingunder stress also will help officerslearn to control their arousal level.As their physiological agitationescalates, so might their suscepti-bility to perceptual and memorydistortions. Thus, learning tocontrol arousal level can helpreduce distortions. Therefore,

officers should receive training in and regularlypractice ways to control arousal levels in high-stresssituations. One process, the combat breathing tech-nique, has proven highly effective in this area.19

Officers and their family members also shouldreceive training on what reactions they can expectduring and after high-stress situations, such asshootings. Providing officers and their family mem-bers with information on what to expect can helpthem cope better with highly stressful events.20

Finally, those who analyze or participate in theaftermath of officer-involved shootings should receivetraining as well. Such individuals could includeattorneys, association representatives, peers, juries,journalists, command staff and supervisors, mentalhealth professionals, employee assistance personnel,worker compensation employees, and any otherswho have a vested interest in these events. This willbetter enable them to make informed, reasonable

© Peter Hendrie, Tribute


judgements about the officers’ behaviors and advo-cate for the type of training and postincident care thatthe officers will need to best serve and protect theircommunities.

CONCLUSIONThe observations of the officers at the beginning

of this article effectively portray how perception andmemory can influence an individual’s understandingof a particular incident. One officer did not hear thesound of his gun discharging.Another did not remember callinghis wife just prior to beinginvolved in a shooting. Threeothers observed things happeningin ways that did not actuallyoccur. All of the officers wereinvolved in the highly stressfuland emotionally laden process ofusing deadly force and, therefore,subject to later scrutiny by theiragencies and the citizens theyserve for their actions.

Although highly trained inaccurately describing events anduncovering facts pertinent tocriminal investigations, lawenforcement officers face the same difficulties that allpeople do when trying to recall what happened inhigh-stress situations. Research has revealed thatpeople rarely can remember such events with totalaccuracy. The author’s study, along with otherresearch she examined, demonstrated that this findingholds true for officers involved in shootings. With thisin mind, the law enforcement profession must realizethe implications this has for officers and those whoanalyze their actions. Because critical incidentsdemand split-second decisions, officers must receivethe best training that will help them react appropri-ately in high-stress situations. Likewise, those whoanalyze these events must understand the demandsplaced on officers during such incidents and maintainrealistic expectations concerning what officersperceived during the events and what they can recallaccurately afterwards. In the end, recognizing theperceptual and memory distortions that officers can

Dr. Artwohl, a retired police psychologist, currently provideslaw enforcement training and consultation throughout theUnited States and Canada through a private firm based inLas Vegas, Nevada.

have during a shooting can go a long way towardhelping officers deal with such difficult situationsand, perhaps, reduce their occurrence.

Endnotes1 Officers can contact Dr. Artwohl, coauthor of Deadly Force

Encounters: What Cops Need to Know to Mentally and PhysicallyPrepare for and Win a Gunfight (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1997), [email protected] or access her Web site at http://www.alexisartwohl.com.

2 Seymour Epstein, “The Integration of the Cognitive and Psychody-namic Unconscious,” American Psychologist49 (1994): 709-723.

3 Ibid.4 Ibid.5 Ibid.6 Ibid.7 R.M. Solomon and J.M. Horn, “Post-

Shooting Traumatic Reactions: A PilotStudy,” in Psychological Services for LawEnforcement, eds. J.T. Reese and H.A.Goldstein (Washington, DC: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1986).

8 A.L. Hoenig and J.E. Roland, “ShotsFired: Officer Involved,” Police Chief,October 1998.

9 David Klinger, U.S. Department ofJustice, National Institute of Justice, PoliceResponses to Officer-Involved Shootings, NCJ192285 (Washington, DC, October 2001).

10 Bill Lewinski, “Why Is the Suspect Shotin the Back?” The Police Marksman,

November/December 2000.11 Supra note 8.12 Supra note 2.13 D. Grossman and B.K. Siddle, Critical Incident Amnesia: The

Physiological Basis and Implications of Memory Loss During ExtremeSurvival Stress Situations (Millstadt, IL: PPCT Management Systems,Inc., 1998).

14 R.P. Fisher and R.E. Geiselman, Memory Enhancing Techniquesfor Investigative Interviewing (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1992).

15 Supra note 2.16 Supra note 2.17 Charles Humes, “The Flashlight Dilemma,” Tactical Edge, 1992.18 Supra note 2.19 Charles Humes, “Lowering Pursuit Stress,” Police, June 2001.20 D. Meichenbaum, Stress Inoculation Training (Boston, MA: Allyn

& Bacon, 1985).

““

”

...the law enforcementprofession must remainrigorous in its training,

realistic in itsexpectations, andcognizant of the

demands of emergencysituations.

October 2002 / 25

his is the first of a two-partarticle examining law en-forcement policies and

training in the use of force by lawenforcement. While there has beena decrease in the number of lawenforcement officers feloniouslykilled each year,2 injury to any lawenforcement officer who is a victimof attack is unacceptable. In re-viewing felonious assaults on lawenforcement officers resulting indeath or injury, one common de-nominator often is conspicuouslypresent—the victim officer hesi-tated in responding with force. Dur-ing postincident review of assaultson police, victim officers often indi-cated that they were uncertainabout what force options werepermissible under law or depart-ment policy and that they did notperceive their attacker to be a

serious threat until it was too late.This hesitation is tragic and oftenavoidable.

Constitutional LimitsThe seminal case defining the

modern constitutional constraintson law enforcement use of force isthe 1989 U.S. Supreme Court deci-sion in Graham v. Connor.3 Thecase involved an investigative de-tention of an individual and theuse of nondeadly force by the de-taining officers that resulted in in-jury to the detainee. While the U.S.Supreme Court did not decidewhether the use of force by the de-taining officers was constitutionallypermissible,4 the Court defined howuse of force by law enforcement

Ttraining related to the use of force.It will provide an overview of theconstitutional constraints on theuse of force by law enforcement,address the inherent hesitation ofpolice officers to use significantlevels of force, and make recom-mendations regarding the ubiqui-tous force continuum and othertraining considerations.

The United States is currentlyexperiencing an unprecedentedlevel of violence. For example, theper capita rate of aggravated as-saults has increased nearly 500%since 1959.1 This growth in vio-lent crime forever has altered

Legal Digest

© Corbis

Use-of-ForcePolicies and TrainingA Reasoned ApproachBy THOMAS D. PETROWSKI, J.D.


should be constitutionally evalu-ated. The decision demonstratesthat the Court understands the dy-namics of violent encounters andthe practical safety issues law en-forcement officers face. The Courtmakes clear that the law profoundlydistinguishes between the danger-ous and the endangered and paysgreat deference to officers whouse force to defend themselves oranother.

The Court held in Graham thatthe use of force by law enforcementwhile making a seizure—to includeforce used in self-defense or de-fense of another—is evaluated un-der the Fourth Amendment. Suchconduct, therefore, is analyzed forreasonableness since the FourthAmendment prohibits “unreason-able searches and seizures.”5 Thetest of what is reasonable is a com-mon sense evaluation of what anobjectively reasonable officermight have done in the samecircumstance. The Court heldreasonableness is an objectivestandard viewed from the officer’sperspective:

The “reasonableness” of aparticular use of force must bejudged from the perspective ofa reasonable officer on thescene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. TheFourth Amendment is notviolated by an arrest based onprobable cause, even thoughthe wrong person is arrested,nor by the mistaken executionof a valid search warrant onthe wrong premises. Withrespect to a claim of excessiveforce, the same standard ofreasonableness at the momentapplies: Not every push orshove, even if it may laterseem unnecessary in thepeace of a judge’s chambers,violates the Fourth Amend-ment. The calculus of reason-ableness must embody allow-ance for the fact that policeofficers often are forced tomake split-second judg-ments—in circumstances thatare tense, uncertain, andrapidly evolving—about theamount of force that is neces-

sary in a particular situation.As in other Fourth Amendmentcontexts, however, the “rea-sonableness” inquiry in anexcessive force case is anobjective one: the question iswhether the officers’ actionsare “objectively reasonable”in light of the facts andcircumstances confrontingthem....6

The legal question is whetheran objectively reasonable officercould have taken the action in issue.Put another way, an unreasonableuse of force is one that no objec-tively reasonable law enforcementagent would have used. It does notinvolve any subjective informationregarding the officer who used theforce, such as training, age, or expe-rience. For example, in McLenaganv. Karnes,7 the Fourth Circuit Courtof Appeals applied the Graham ob-jective reasonableness standard. InMcLenagan, a police officer shot anindividual he perceived to bearmed and posing a deadly threat(the individual turned out to be nei-ther armed nor posing a threat).Within moments after shootingthe plaintiff, the defendant policeofficer realized he had shot thewrong person and then—for no rea-son offered in the opinion—firedtwo rounds through a closed doorwhere the subject may have been.Those two rounds, while notinjuring anyone, were clearly un-reasonable.

In finding the use of force bythe officer against the plaintiff to bereasonable, the court noted: “To as-certain whether probable cause ex-isted for [the police officer] to firehis weapon, we consider the par-ticular circumstances confronting

...an unreasonableuse of force is onethat no objectively

reasonable lawenforcement agentwould have used.

Special Agent Petrowski is a legal instructor at the FBI Academy.

“

October 2002 / 27

”

In use-of-forcetraining, legal and

practicalconsiderations arenot two separate

subject matters; theyare complementary.

“

the official at the time of the ques-tioned action...if a reasonable of-ficer possessing the same particu-larized information as [the policeofficer] could have...believed thathis conduct was lawful, then [theactions of the police officer werereasonable].”8 With respect to thetwo additional rounds fired after theplaintiff was shot, the court notedthat “...such conduct might be in-dicative of an officer’s propensityfor ill-considered actions...[h]ow-ever, in this case, [the officer] hadno time to consider anything atall—except his and the public’s im-mediate safety. At the moment oftruth, [the officer] acted well withinthe range of behavior expected of apolice officer. What happened afterthe critical time had passed is sim-ply irrelevant.”9

The court in McLenagan alsoaddressed the fundamental FourthAmendment principle that law en-forcement officers need not be cor-rect—only reasonable—in their de-cisions to use force. The court held:“We will not second-guess the split-second judgment of a trained policeofficer merely because that judg-ment turns out to be mistaken, par-ticularly where inaction could haveresulted in death or serious injury tothe officer and others. Although it isextremely unfortunate that [theplaintiff] was seriously injured, [thelaw] does not purport to redress in-juries resulting from reasonablemistakes.”10

The Court in Graham madeclear that the determination of rea-sonableness requires a common-sense pragmatic approach11 fromthe perspective of an objectivelyreasonable law enforcement officer

to determine whether an officer’sconduct was constitutional. The le-gal constraints on the use of forceby law enforcement are based onpractical considerations unique toeach circumstance. Unlike otherFourth Amendment contexts,officer’s actions are not based on aspecific rule set out by the Court.The Court prefers to give bright-line rules when possible, particu-larly in Fourth Amendment mat-ters.12 When such specific guidanceis given by the Court, it is importantthat department policy and trainingreflect that guidance. However, the

“circumstances which are tense, un-certain and rapidly evolving,” theCourt underscored that law enforce-ment agents are reacting to asubject’s refusal to voluntarilycomply with the law. It is the sub-ject that dictates what use of force,if any, is necessary and reasonable.Federal case law recognizes theshort critical time period in whichlaw enforcement officers mustmake use-of-force decisions.13 Thisalso takes into account the effects ofadrenal stress,14 which is an invol-untary reaction with substantialpsychological and physiological re-sults that significantly affect aperson's capacity to react, perceiveinformation, and recall details.

The Court in Graham alsonoted that use of force by police hastwo distinct justifications. The firstis in response to a suspect posingan immediate threat to the safety ofthe officers or others, and the sec-ond is to prevent the escape of asubject.15 While the use of force un-der both justifications is evaluatedfor Fourth Amendment reason-ableness, the practical consider-ations—and, thus, the approach totraining—can be quite different. Inresponding to a subject who is at-tempting to escape while notposing an immediate danger to theseizing officers, there may be time,albeit seconds, to contemplateforce options. However, in re-sponse to immediate threats tosafety there is virtually never thatluxury of time. Training in the useof force must address this dis-tinction. Unfortunately, many use-of-force curricula address bothforce justifications with the sameapproach.

constitutional restrictions on lawenforcement use of force are not—because they cannot be—bright-line rules. It is critical that use-of-force policy and training not bebased on strict rules or, as the Courtsaid in Graham, “mechanical appli-cations.” The law is defined by therealistic functional aspects of eachcase. In use-of-force training, legaland practical considerations are nottwo separate subject matters; theyare complementary.

In recognizing that an officer’sdecision to use force occurs in


Hesitation: The Ever-PresentAdversary

More than 25 centuries ago,Sun Tzu, in his classic military trea-tise The Art of War, noted that “theworst calamities that befall an armyarise from hesitation....”16 The no-tion that one must not hesitate in theface of a dangerous threat seemselementary in use-of-force training,but in some training contexts, hesi-tation is exactly what is encouragedor expressly prescribed.

Empirical data indicate that lawenforcement officers responding toa threat hesitate to use force, par-ticularly deadly force, even in theface of an imminent threat. Studiesof military conflict confirm that thevast majority of individual soldiersin combat refused to kill an identi-fied enemy even when they knewthat doing so would endanger theirown lives.17 Review of FBI officervictimology studies and informa-tion provided by victim officers’departments18 indicated that ap-proximately 85 percent of law en-forcement officers feloniouslykilled in the line of duty never dis-charged their service weapons. Re-view of individual case studies re-vealed that victim officers oftenhesitated—even in the face of animmediate threat.

FBI Uniform Crime Reports(UCR) data indicated that only asmall portion of law enforcementofficers who are violently assaultedrespond with deadly force.19 UCRdata for the years 1991 through2000 indicated that 644 law en-forcement officers were feloniouslykilled in the line of duty. The dataalso indicated an annual average of60,307 documented assaults on law

enforcement officers. An annual av-erage of 10, 994 of these assaultsinvolved a dangerous weapon; anaverage of 49,313 involved the at-tacker using personal weapons. Itshould be noted that these numbersrepresent assaults documented by adepartment and then reported to theU.S. Department of Justice. Fur-ther, while there are more than17,000 law enforcement agencies inthe United States, the average num-ber of agencies reporting docu-mented assaults was only 8,985. Itis safe to assume that these assaultstatistics are very conservative, if

not introduce a service weapon intoa conflict; officers may have beenmurdered with their own weapon,22

been ambushed,23 or selflesslychose not to shoot because of adanger to a third party. However,the annual rate of fatal use ofdeadly force by law enforcementofficers (364) compared with theannual reported assaults on law en-forcement officers (60,307—10,994 of which involved a deadlyweapon) is telling. These data, sup-ported by the historical militarystudies and officer victimology re-ports, clearly indicated a reluctanceon the part of officers to use signifi-cant force even when confrontedwith an imminent threat of death orserious physical injury.

Compounding the inherenthesitation officers have in using sig-nificant levels of force is the in-stinctive tendency to quickly closewith subjects and place themselvesbetween the offender and those theyprotect.24 Officers are quick to putthemselves in harm’s way but arethen reluctant to use significantforce. Use-of-force training shouldtake this into account and strive toreduce officer hesitation to useforce when it is clearly necessary.Unfortunately, some use-of-forcetraining takes the opposite focus ofencouraging officers not to useforce, particularly deadly force, un-less it is preceded by unrealisticallylengthy deliberation.

The Use-of-Force Continuum:A Strategy for Hesitation

In Graham, the Court's in-sight-ful statement, “...the test of reason-ableness under the Fourth Amend-ment is not capable of precise

not grossly underreported. UCRdata also indicated that during theperiod 1994 through 2000, law en-forcement officers in the UnitedStates intentionally killed an an-nual average of 364 felons whilein the line of duty.20 This numberdoes not address those individualsnonfatally shot by law enforcementofficers.21

There are certainly legitimatereasons that could have preventedofficers from using deadly forcewhen it clearly was justified. Therecould have been tactical reasons to

© Corbis

October 2002 / 29

definition or mechanical applica-tion...”25 was meant to illustrate thenotion that every situation involv-ing the use of force by police isunique and that it is impossible todefine specific applications of forceoptions. Unfortunately, many lawenforcement agencies have adoptedtraining in the guise of a “forcecontinuum,” which is precisely themechanical application that theCourt proscribed for use by lowercourts because it is inconsistentwith the concept of reasonableness.

Most use-of-force continua in-dicate a reflective approach to amenu of force options with the goalof selecting the least intrusive op-tion. The typical force continuumbegins with the presence of the of-ficer or with verbal commands andthen lists use-of-force options in or-der of increasing intrusiveness, end-ing with deadly force. Usually,accompanying language suggeststhat officers should consider whichforce option is appropriate and in-cludes the suggestion of “escalat-ing“ their response to a subject witha view toward “de-escalating” thethreat posed by the subject. Thecontinuum also usually containslanguage that suggests officers con-sider progressing up or down theforce continuum. While virtuallyevery force continuum providesthat such progressing through forceoptions may not be appropriate inall use-of-force situations, the seedof hesitation is inescapably planted.The word continuum implies a se-quential approach.

The force continuum canbe superficially very attractive,particularly when provided in theform of a euphonic acronym. This

purports to make it easy to remem-ber the steps of the continuum—which is exactly what it does—re-sulting in guaranteed hesitation inthe face of a threat. The force con-tinuum is most problematic when itis necessary for an officer to applydeadly force or a higher nondeadlyforce option. An officer trained toprogress through a force optionmenu inevitably will hesitate too

use unnecessary force when the em-pirical data show that the commonresponse is to hesitate. The forcecontinuum purports to provide amechanical application when offi-cers should be making a subjectivethreat assessment. It encourages of-ficers to “wait and see,” in the hopethat either the aggressors willabruptly change their minds or theassessment of threat by the officerwill become very simple. While it isoften a prudent practice for depart-ments to have policies that are morerestrictive than the law requires toensure compliance with the law,mandating force continua risksmore than the loss of evidence—itrisks the lives of officers. While thisapproach may reduce use of forceby police, the risk to officers issignificant and not constitutionallyrequired.

Some departments and vendorstake the force continuum even fur-ther, employing what they call a“less-lethal” option. That is, whilethe force option constitutes deadlyforce, it is less intrusive than otherdeadly force options. This practicerequires that once it is determined(consistent with a review of forceoptions on the continuum) thatdeadly force is necessary, then areview of options within that levelbe undertaken. This creates a con-tinuum within a continuum, makingan unacceptably long decision pro-cess even longer.

The Least Intrusive AlternativeThe goal of force continua—

using the least intrusive means torespond to a threat—simply is notconstitutionally required. The lawdoes not require officers to select

long to eliminate all less intrusiveforce options.

There may be situations wherethe progressive escalating force op-tion approach is logical, such aswhen a subject poses no immediatethreat of serious physical harm toanyone while attempting to escape.When there is no immediate threat,officers may have the luxury of timeto escalate through force options touse the least intrusive force option.But, to require such an escalatingapproach when faced with an imme-diate serious threat is contrary tocommon sense and the specificdirection of the Supreme Court.26 Itassumes a propensity by police to

”

Empirical data indicatethat law enforcement

officers responding toa threat hesitate to use

force, particularlydeadly force, even in

the face of animminent threat.

“


the minimum force necessary, onlya reasonable option. The SeventhCircuit Court of Appeals said inPlakas v. Drinski,27 “[t]here is noprecedent in this circuit (or anyother) which says that the Constitu-tion requires law enforcement offic-ers to use all feasible alternatives toavoid a situation where deadly forcecan justifiably be used. There are,however, cases which support theassertion that, where deadly force isotherwise justified under the Con-stitution, there is no constitutionalduty to use nondeadly alternativesfirst.”28 Choosing the least intrusivealternative is not legally requiredbecause it is an impossible standardto apply to hold law enforcement.The U.S. Supreme Court and everyfederal circuit in this country recog-nize this. It is an obvious point thatuse-of-force trainers and policymakers should heed.

Conclusion

The constitutional constraintson the use of force by law enforce-ment require reasonableness. TheSupreme Court has identified anumber of considerations lowercourts should look at in determiningreasonableness that emphasizelooking at the practical circum-stances facing the officer who usedforce. Each case should be evalu-ated in light of the particularunique facts from the perspectiveof the officer at the time the deci-sion to use force was made. Thelaw provides that there cannot bebright-line rules (“mechanical ap-plications”) regarding what forcean officer may use. It is the practi-cal considerations that inform thelaw.

1999. Obviously, aggravated assault is a betterindicator of the increase in violent crimebecause it shows how often people in thiscountry actually are committing serious acts ofviolence. The murder rate as an indicator ofsociety’s capacity to be violent is skewed by thesignificant advances in health care over the past40 years. This increase in violent crime isparticularly cogent in light of recent positiveinfluences on violent crime, such as thelegalization of abortion. See John J. Donohue IIIand Steven D. Levitt, “The Impact of LegalizedAbortion on Crime,” The Quarterly Journal ofEconomics, MIT Press, Harvard University’sDepartment of Economics, Cambridge, MA.See also David A. Grossman, The Bullet-ProofMind (Carrollton, TX: Calibre Press, 1999).

2 During the period 1971 through 1975, theaverage annual number of law enforcementofficers feloniously killed was 128. The annualaverage for the period 1996 through 2000 was57. See U.S. Department of Justice, FederalBureau of Investigation, Law EnforcementOfficers Killed and Assaulted for the indicatedyears. The reduction in law enforcementofficers killed has been caused primarily by theincreased use of bullet-proof vests andimprovements in kevlar technology. Otherfactors that may have contributed to thereduction are better training and policepractices.

3 490 U.S. 386 (1989). The Grahamdecision is relevant only to Fourth Amendmentcases. Use-of-force matters involvingincarcerated convicts are brought under theEighth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amend-ment claims can be brought for use of force bylaw enforcement that do not apply to either theFourth or Eighth Amendments.

While there have been numerous applica-tions of the Graham decision by the SupremeCourt and in every federal circuit, in 2001 theSupreme Court generally readdressed the issuein Katz v. Saucier, 121 S. Ct. 2151 (2001). TheCourt in Katz was extremely prolaw enforce-ment and made clear that in evaluating the useof force by law enforcement great deferencemust be paid to the risks assumed by lawenforcement and strongly reinforced itsprevious decisions in police use of force cases.The Katz decision is replete with references ofdeference to law enforcement in both qualifiedimmunity and constitutional contexts. Forexample, at 2158: “ We set out a test thatcautioned against the “20/20 vision ofhindsight” in favor of deference to thejudgment of reasonable officers on the scene.Citing Graham, at 396. Emphasis added.

Hesitation commonly plaguespolice who are victims of attack.Use-of-force training regarding im-mediate self-defense differs fromuse of force to effect a seizure whenan officer does not face an immi-nent threat. When training officersto use force in self-defense or de-fense of another, the focus must beon removing hesitation. The use of

a force continuum perpetuates hesi-tation and exacerbates a naturalreluctance to apply significant forceeven when faced with a seriousthreat. The progressive escalatingapproach—with the goal of usingthe least intrusive force—shouldnever be applied to defense-of-lifetraining. Next month, the FBI LawEnforcement Bulletin will featurethe second part of this articlewhich will address specific use-of-force training strategies and policyconsiderations.

Endnotes1 According to U.S. Department of Justice,

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in theUnited States, aggravated assaults in 1959occurred at the rate of 67.3 per 100,000inhabitants. In 1999, the rate was 334.3 per100,000 inhabitants. The murder rate in 1959was 4.8 per 100,000 inhabitants and 5.7 in

”

The law does notrequire officers to

select the leastintrusive forceoption, only a

reasonable one.

“

October 2002 / 31

And, at 2158-2159:The deference owed officers facing suits

for alleged excessive force is not different insome qualitative respect from the probablecause inquiry in [search cases]. Officers canhave reasonable, but mistaken, beliefs as to thefacts establishing the existence of probablecause or exigent circumstances, for example,and, in those situations, courts will not holdthat they have violated the Constitution. Yet,...even if a court were to hold that the officerviolated the Fourth Amendment by conductingan unreasonable, warrantless search, Andersonstill operates to grant officers immunity forreasonable mistakes as to the legality of theiractions. The same analysis is applicable inexcessive force cases, where in addition to thedeference officers receive on the underlyingconstitutional claim, qualified immunity canapply in the event the mistaken belief wasreasonable.

Emphasis added.4 The Court remanded the case back to the

trial court to apply the Court’s new guidance indetermining the reasonableness of police use offorce. A jury found the actions of the officersto be reasonable and, thus, constitutionallypermissible.

5 The Fourth Amendment to the Constitu-tion of the United States.

6 Graham at 396.7 27 F.3d 1002 (4th Cir. 1994).8 McLenagan at 1007.9 Id. at 1008.10 Id. at 1007.11 The Supreme Court has always reduced

the determination of probable cause andreasonableness to a laymen’s view:“[a]rticulating precisely what ... “probablecause” means is not possible. [It is a]...commonsense, nontechnical conception thatdeals with the factual and practical consider-ations of everyday life on which reasonableand prudent men, not legal technicians, act.”U.S. v. Ornelas, (U.S. Supreme Court) 517U.S. 690, 695 (1996) (emphasis added), citingtwo previous decisions.

12 For examples, see Chimel v. California,395 U.S. 752 (1969) (officers always maysearch an arrestee, to include the wingspanarea, incident to arrest); Pennsylvania v.Mimms, 434 U.S.106 (1977) (driver of avehicle always may be ordered to exit vehicleincident to traffic stops); Maryland v. Buie,494 U.S. 325 (1990) (incident to an arrest in astructure, officers always may conduct aprotective sweep of the room in which thearrest occurs and all rooms adjacent thereto);

Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981)(officers always may detain occupants of aresidence where a search warrant is executed).These cases illustrate the substantial deferencethe Court gives to those who put themselves inharm’s way by making arrests and conduictingsearches. The Court tries, where it can, to givelaw enforcement clear guidance to prevent thedifficult decision making that occurs in the“tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving”circumstances of most searches and seizures.However, with respect to review of use-of-force matters they have mandated that eachcase be individually evaluated, giving greatdeference to those making such difficultdecisions.

13 “The time-frame [an officer has torespond to a subject] is a crucial aspect ofexcessive force cases. Other than randomattacks, all such cases begin with the decisionof a police officer to do something, to help, toarrest, to inquire. If the officer had decided todo nothing, then no force would have beenused. In this sense, the police officer alwayscauses the trouble. But it is trouble which thepolice officer is sworn to cause, which societypays him to cause and which, if kept withinconstitutional limits, society praises the officerfor causing.” Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143,at 1150 (emphasis added) (7th Cir. 1994).

The notion that an individual attacked willnot have time to evaluate responses is not newto the courts. In 1921, the Supreme Court inBrown v. U.S., 41 S. Ct. 501, related at 502:“Detached reflection cannot be demanded inthe presence of an uplifted knife. Therefore, inthis Court, at least, it is not a condition ofimmunity that one in that situation shouldpause to consider whether a reasonable manmight not think it possible to fly with safety orto disable his assailant rather than killhim.”

14 See generally Alexis Artwohl, Ph.D. andLoren W. Christensen, Deadly Force Encoun-ters: What Cops Need to Know to Mentally andPhysically Prepare for and Survive a Gunfight(Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1997).

15 Graham, at 396. For a discussion of thelegal aspects of use of force to effect an arrest orto prevent escape, see John C. Hall, “Use ofDeadly Force to Prevent Escape,” and “PoliceUse of Nondeadly Force to Arrest,” FBI LawEnforcement Bulletin, March 1994, 27-32 andOctober 1997, 27-32, respectively.

16 Numerous translations of The Art of Warare available. See translation and commentaryby Lionel Giles, published by Indypublish.com,2001, or translation by Samuel B. Griffith,

Oxford University Press, London, England,1963.

17 See generally David A. Grossman, OnKilling (Boston, MA: Little, Brown andCompany, 1996), nominated for a PullitzerPrize. See also George T. Williams, “Reluctanceto Use Deadly Force,” FBI Law EnforcementBulletin, October 1999, 1-5.

18 A 1992 FBI Uniform Crime Report(UCR) study of law enforcement officersfeloniously killed in the line of duty indicatedthat 85 percent of the officers killed neverdischarged their service weapons. A review of148 incidents of law enforcement officers killedfrom 1998 through 2000 indicated that 125(84.5 percent) of the victim officers never fireda round at their killer. See U.S. Department ofJustice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Killedin the Line of Duty (Washington, DC, 1992);and U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureauof Investigation, Law Enforcement OfficersKilled and Assaulted (Washington, DC, 1998,1999, and 2000).

19 See U.S. Department of Justice, FederalBureau of Investigation, Law EnforcementOfficers Killed and Assaulted (Washington,DC, 2000).

20 See U.S. Department of Justice, FederalBureau of Investigation, Crime in the UnitedStates (Washington, DC, 1998 through 2000).

21 For a discussion of extrapolating thenumber of individuals shot (fatally andnonfatally), see generally William A. Geller andMichael S. Scott, “The Prevalence ofShootings,” in Deadly Force: What We Know(Washington, DC: Police Executive ResearchForum, 1992).

22 During the period 1991 through 2000, 51of the 601 law enforcement officers killed withfirearms were killed with their own weapon (8.5percent). See U.S. Department of Justice,Federal Bureau of Investigation, Law Enforce-ment Officers Killed and Assaulted (Washing-ton, DC, 2000).

23 During the period 1991 through 2000, 89of the 644 slain law enforcement officers wereambushed (13.8 percent). See U.S. Departmentof Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, LawEnforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted(Washington, D.C., 2000).

24 See Anthony J. Pinizzotto, Edward F.Davis, and Charles E. Miller III, “Escape fromthe Killing Zone,” FBI Law EnforcementBulletin, March 2002, 1-7.

25 Graham at 396 (quoting a prior SupremeCourt decision).

26 By adopting unnecessarily restrictivepolices, departments also may be holding

Law enforcement officers of other thanfederal jurisdiction who are interested inthis article should consult their legaladvisors. Some police procedures ruledpermissible under federal constitutional laware of questionable legality under state lawor are not permitted at all.

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themselves to a higher legal standard. Whilemere policy violations normally do not give riseto civil rights lawsuits, some courts have heldsuch actions may be viable when the policieshave been adopted for the benefit of thoseultimately injured. The Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals said in Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912(9th Cir. 1992), “Assuming internal policeguidelines are relevant to determining whetheruse of force is objectively reasonable,...they arerelevant only when one of their purposes is toprotect the individual against whom force isused. Thus, if a police department limits the useof chokeholds to protect suspects from beingfatally injured,...or restricts the use of deadlyforce to protect suspects from being shotunnecessarily,...such regulations are germane tothe reasonableness inquiry in an excessive forceclaim.” Id. at 915. Even if the above policy-

based suit fails, a department that adopts overlyrestrictive use-of-force continua probably willexpose itself to “expert” witnesses who willopine that lack of compliance with adepartment’s policies indicates an unreasonableuse of force.

27 19 F.3d 1143, at 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).28 The first time the U.S. Supreme Court

expressly asserted that Fourth Amendmentreasonableness did not require the leastintrusive alternative was in Illinois v. Lafayette,462 U.S. 640 (1983). For other examples ofcourts finding that a law enforcement officerneed not select the least intrusive option, seeU.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989); Roy v.Lewiston, 42 F.3d 691 (1st Cir. 1994); Salim v.Proulx, 93 F.3d 86 (2nd Cir. 1996); Elliott v.Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640 (4th Cir. 1996); Collins v.Nagle, 892 F.2d 489 (6th Cir. 1989); Tauke v.

Stine, 120 F.3d 1363 (8th Cir. 1997); Schulz v.Long, 44 F.3d 643 (8th Cir. 1995); Scott v.Henrich, 39 F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 1994); Warrenv. Las Vegas, 111 F.3d 139 (9th Cir. 1997);Wilson v. Meeks, 52 F.3d 1547 (10th Cir.1995); Menual v. Atlanta, 25 F.3d 990 (11thCir. 1994); and Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d1124 (10th Cir. 2001). See also the reference toBrown, supra note 13.


Law enforcement officers are challenged daily in the performance of their duties; they face eachchallenge freely and unselfishly while answering the call to duty. In certain instances, their actionswarrant special attention from their respective departments. The Bulletin also wants to recognizethose situations that transcend the normal rigors of the law enforcement profession.

The Bulletin Notes

Officer Foito

While working an evening shift, Officer Daniel E. Foito of theClinton, Connecticut, Police Department responded to a call of adisturbance at a motel. As Officer Foito pulled into the parking lot,he was confronted by a young woman, who was 8 months pregnantand had been stabbed repeatedly in her abdomen, chest, and neck.When Officer Foito questioned her about what happened, the womanpointed to a man exiting one of the motel rooms. The suspect, thewoman’s boyfriend, was covered in blood that was a mixture of thewoman’s and some that came from a self-inflicted knife woundacross his throat. He held a knife wrapped in bloody hair pulled fromthe woman’s head. As the suspect approached and advanced towardthem, Officer Foito pushed the woman behind him, shielded her with

his body, and retreated across theparking lot. Drawing his weapon,Officer Foito repeatedly told thesuspect to drop the knife. He activatedthe laser sighting system attached tohis weapon, and the red dot appearedas a warning on the suspect’s chest.The suspect ignored the warnings andcontinued to approach Officer Foitoand the woman. Backed against alarge trash bin, Officer Foito and thewoman were unable to retreat further,while the suspect continued to ad-vance toward them. When the suspectwas within a few feet, Officer Foitofired his weapon and fatally woundedthe suspect. The woman was airliftedto a trauma center where she receivedmedical treatment to her throatinjuries, which affected her ability tobreathe and speak. Subsequently, shedelivered a healthy, unharmed babyboy by emergency cesarean section.Officer Foito’s courage in a dangerousconfrontation saved the lives of twoinnocent victims.

Officer Thompson

Officer Tom Thompson ofthe Fife, Washington, PoliceDepartment was on patrol whenhe heard the faint buzz of the firealarm at an apartment complex.After he got out of his car, hefollowed the sound to an upstairsunit in the building. He forcedopen the door and immediatelybecame engulfed in smoke.Officer Thompson found thetenant, who was suffering from

smoke inhalation and trying to extinguish a large greasefire with clothing. Officer Thompson brought thesubject outside to safety, but when he turned around toget the fire extinguisher from his patrol car, the tenanthad returned to his apartment. Officer Thompson wentback upstairs and found the subject, who was in shock,carrying the hot pot of scalding grease in his arms.Officer Thompson ordered the subject to put down thepot. The tenant complied, but he already had receivedthird-degree burns on his arms and chest. OfficerThompson escorted the subject outside again andofficials took him to the hospital for medical treatment.Officer Thompson’s selfish actions saved the life of thetenant and helped prevent the fire from spreading toadditional units in the building.

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Patch Call

The steam locomotive on the Watertown, SouthDakota, Police Department patch depicts the firstrailroad built in the state. Also featured are theMellette House, the home of the last governor of theDakota territory and the state’s first, and the BigSioux River, which flows through the town. TheBlack Hills spruce trees, the state tree, helped desig-nate the town as “The Tree City.” The motto denotesthe department’s purpose, while 1880 is the year ofthe town’s founding.

The patch of the Pickerington, Ohio, PoliceDepartment features a covered bridge representing thelast of the operational covered bridges in the area. Thelarge sycamore tree and purple violets illustratenamesakes, such as the main waterway and thedesignation of Pickerington as the Violet Capital ofOhio. The date, 1815, signifies the year Pickeringtonwas incorporated.

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