FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin - Jan99leb

8/9/2019 FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin - Jan99leb

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ISSN 0014-5688 USPS 383-310

Features

Departments

15 Book ReviewThe Language of Confession,Interrogation, and Deception

16 Focus on PersonnelAlcohol Abuse in Policing

Computers, the Year 2000,

and Law EnforcementBy Clyde B. Eisenberg

and Teresa F. Slattery

Negotiation Concepts

for CommandersBy Gary W. Noesner

Mass Transit:

Target of TerrorBy Kurt R. Nelson

Crime Scene SearchesBy Kimberly A. Crawford

1

6

The Year 2000 problem holds manychallenges for the law enforcementcommunity.

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26

Law enforcement administrators mustunderstand the crisis negotiatorsabilities and methods to resolve criticalincidents successfully and peacefully.

January 1999Volume 68Number 1

United StatesDepartment of Justice

Federal Bureau ofInvestigation

Washington, DC20535-0001

Louis J. FreehDirector

Contributors' opinions andstatements should not be

considered an endorsement bythe FBI for any policy, program,

or service.

The Attorney General hasdetermined that the publicationof this periodical is necessary in

the transaction of the publicbusiness required by law. Use of

funds for printing this periodicalhas been approved by theDirector of the Office of

Management and Budget.

The FBI Law EnforcementBulletin (ISSN-0014-5688) is

published monthly by theFederal Bureau of Investigation,

935 Pennsylvania Avenue,N.W., Washington, D.C.

20535-0001. Periodical postagepaid at Washington, D.C., and

additional mailing offices.Postmaster: Send addresschanges to Editor, FBI LawEnforcement Bulletin, FBI

Academy, Madison Building,Room 209, Quantico, VA 22135.

Editor

John E. OttManaging Editor

Kim Waggoner

Associate Editors

Glen Bartolomei

Cynthia L. Lewis

Bunny S. Morris

Art Director

Brian K. Parnell

Assistant Art Director

Denise K. Bennett

Staff Assistant

Linda W. Szumilo

Internet Address

[email protected]

Cover photos

Adobe Image Library

Send article submissions toEditor, FBI Law Enforcement

Bulletin, FBI Academy, MadisonBuilding, Room 209, Quantico,

VA 22135.

Law enforcement agencies shoulddevelop policies emphasizing the

need for warrants at crime scenes.

Few local law enforcement agencies areprepared to combat acts of terrorism,and mass transit systems remainparticularly vulnerable.

25 Bulletin ReportsSurvey on Police EducationStatistics on Fallen Officers


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January 1999 / 1

magine it is 8 a.m. on January3, 2000, in a busy police de-partment containing many of-

parameters: 12-24-99 to 01-02-00.Shortly after the officers press theenter key, an error message appearson their screens: INVALID DATERANGE. Several more attemptsproduce the same result. After mak-ing mental notes to check with thedepartments computer mainte-nance people, the officers begin

checking other systems.However, every time they try to

access a computer program, theyget the same error message. A fewofficers begin to filter through the

stacks of paperwork in their in-bas-kets and discover a memo from thecommunication section supervisorto the head of computer mainte-nance explaining that no entries canbe made into the statewide crimeinformation database for stolenproperty and missing or wantedpersons. The memo states that the

problem began on January 1, 2000.The computer difficulties the

officers encountered earlier and thecommunication sections problemsuddenly become crystal clear. The

Computers, the Year 2000,

and Law EnforcementBy CLYDE B. EISENBERG, M.S., and TERESA F. SLATTERY

Ificers returning to work after theholidays. They begin the day byturning on their personal computersthat are connected to the depart-ments local area network. To bringthemselves up-to-date, some offic-

ers decide to run a list of all of theburglaries entered into the depart-ments database during their vaca-tions. They bring up the searchscreen and type in the search

PhotoPeter Hendrie


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2 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

computer programs interpreted theending date (01-02-00) that the of-ficers attempted to enter for the bur-glary search and other activities asthe year 1900. The states crimecomputer database also failed to ac-cept the entries for the same reason.For the departments computer pro-grams, the year 1900 goes far be-yond the automatic expungementdate, which deletes all data over 50years old. Some of the officers re-

member reading about the Year2000 problem but thought that itwould affect only large businessesand corporations. How wrong theywere.

While the plight of these offic-ers represents a fictional scenario,experts indicate that such problemsmay become a reality in the verynear future. Already, Year 2000problems have begun to surface.For example, holders of credit cardswith expiration dates of 2000 or

later have encountered difficultiesbecause some businesses havefailed to update their verificationsystems.1

The Problem

The problem begins with thesix-digit date format (two digitseach for the month, the day, and theyear). A computer most likely willinterpret a year entry of 00 (forthe year 2000) as the year 1900.Thus, any programs that involvedate comparisons, arithmetic func-tions, scheduling, forecasting, orstatistical analysis stand a goodchance of rendering erroneous in-

formation. Moreover, most law en-forcement agencies have their com-puters linked to other computersystems, such as the local court net-works, the county jail, and state andfederal crime information systems.2

Consequently, faulty programssending invalid data may corruptother systems.

The Year 2000 problem is notlimited merely to midsize or largemainframe computers. Many agen-cies have local area networks and

stand-alone computers that provejust as susceptible to the problem aslarger computers. Any device thatrelies on software may be affected,

including private branch phone sys-tems, or PBXs, used by many lawenforcement agencies.

The Fix

Unfortunately, fixing the Year2000 problem will not be easy.Large system programs containmillions of lines of programmingcode. Because each line must beindividually examined and possiblyaltered, computer specialists mustspend long periods of time recodingprograms, resulting in costly, labor-intensive changes.

Currently, fixing a single line of

computer code costs approximately$1.30. This amount should rise toabout $3.65 by 1999 and to around$4 by the year 2000.3 Cost estimatesfor fixing the problem in the UnitedStates business sector range from$120 to $300 billion. For example,one banking corporation alone mustfix 2,500 computer systems and es-timates that it will cost about $380million.4 A recent government re-port calculates that Year 2000 re-pairs at federal agencies will reach

$4.7 billion.5In addition to the cost of fixing

the problem, experts anticipate aninflux of Year 2000-related law-suits. At a recent Year 2000 TaskForce meeting sponsored byLloyds of London, underwriterspredicted $1 trillion in litigation inthe United States alone.6

The Local Approach

The Hillsborough CountySheriffs Office (HCSO) in Tampa,

Florida, has spent the last 4 yearswriting and modifying programsto make them Year 2000 compli-ant. The departments mainframe

Deputy Slattery serves with theEnforcement Operations Bureau ofthe Hillsborough County SheriffsOffice in Tampa, Florida.

Sergeant Eisenberg serves withthe Enforcement OperationsBureau of the Hillsborough CountySheriffs Office in Tampa, Florida.


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January 1999 / 3

computer connects approximately1,000 computers and 500 video ter-minals. It also connects about 1,000

mobile data terminals in HCSO ve-hicles via radio transmissions. Ad-ditionally, the mainframe computercontains large databases, includingthe Computer Aided Dispatch Sys-tem (CADS) and the Jail Adminis-tration and Management System(JAMS). Officers access CADS formost dispatch and law enforcementfunctions, while they use JAMS forthe operation of the HillsboroughCounty Jail System. If these data-bases remain unchanged, programs

dealing with such issues as the jailssecurity system, prisoner releasedates, juvenile detention center re-lease dates, or active warrant datesor any program that calculatessomeones age could be affected inthe year 2000.

In addition to these in-housefunctions, HCSOs mainframecomputer shares databases with thelocal clerks office for traffic tick-ets, the Department of HighwaySafety and Motor Vehicles for ve-hicle registration information, andthe Florida Crime Information Cen-ter and the National Crime Infor-mation Center databases for crimi-nal information. If these otheragencies delay in working on theYear 2000 problem, they will affectHCSOs programs. Part of the rea-son for meeting internal deadlinesinvolves HCSOs allotting suffi-cient time to test and retest its pro-grams with outside databases prior

to implementation.HCSO does have an advantageover other departments that havefailed to actively address theproblem. First, the Data Operations

Bureau began work on Year2000-oriented goals several yearsago. Also, along with assigning

each HCSO programmer differentprograms to correct before 2000,the bureau dedicated an entiremonth in 1997 solely to working onYear 2000-related problems. Fur-ther, in order to seek out potentialYear 2000 problems, HCSO beganusing a test system that tricks thecomputers clock into thinking thatthe programs are being run in theyear 2000. When programmers findproblems, they modify the pro-grams and record the changes for

future reference. Finally, HCSO hasbeen actively exchanging problem-solving information with other gov-ernment agencies that have similarprograms.

While the departments DataOperations Bureau spent approxi-mately $200,000 for Year 2000programming adjustments in 1997,the 1998 fiscal budget for Year

2000-related requests doubled toabout $400,000 for hardware, soft-ware, and reprogramming concerns.

However, in the future, the budgetmay need to include funds for con-tracting additional help, if needed,to solve some of the more diffi-cult or time-consuming Year 2000problems.

Along with budgetary con-cerns, HCSOs Data OperationsBureau realizes that time consti-tutes a major issue. Solving theYear 2000 problem proves ted-ious, as every program must betested, checked, and rechecked,

and no magic bullet exists to fixeverything.

The Data Operations Bureau re-mains concerned about meetingdeadlines because approximately3,200 mainframe programs need tobe checked. With fewer deadlinedays remaining, programmers mayhave to work overtime to meet thedemanding schedule.

The Year 2000 Web Page: http://www.year2000.comOffers links to hundreds of articles and resources on theYear 2000 problem

Federal Government Information: http://www.itpolicy.gsa.gov/mks/yr2000/y2khome.htm

Provides an information directory of the federalgovernments Year 2000 effort

Year 2000 Managers Toolbox: http://www.govexec.com/ tech/year2000

Discusses Year 2000 concerns that managers need to know

Year 2000 Resources: http://www.computerworld.com/res/year-2000.htmlOffers a variety of resources concerning the Year 2000problem

Year 2000 Internet Resources


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Recommendations

For those government agen-cies that start too late, HCSO pro-

grammers predict that it will costthem dearly in terms of money,time, and aggravation. However,these agencies may want to trysome of the strategies HCSO hasemployed. Specifically, agenciesshould:

1) inventory all of theirsystems;

2) prioritize the items thatneed to be fixed;

3) develop contingency plans

for all critical items in casethey are not fixed on time orthe fix fails;

4) establish test environmentsto verify the integrity of thechanges, allowing sufficienttime for testing;

5) involve the users in thetesting process;

6) obtain written certificationof successful test results; and

7) provide monthly statusreports to senior managers.

HCSO regularly reviews and up-dates its monthly Year 2000 com-

pliance report and has developed acomprehensive written contingencyplan for all mission-critical systems

and equipment. Further, HCSO pro-grammers have found a wealth ofconstantly expanding informationand assistance on the Internet andhave contacted their computer andsoftware providers for up-to-datetechnical support. Also, since 1994,HCSO has developed more than1,000 programs and made themYear 2000 compliant. These strate-gies have helped HCSO face thechallenges of the Year 2000 prob-lem and may serve as a blueprint for

other law enforcement agencies.

Conclusion

Law enforcement administra-tors throughout the country mustnot underestimate the potentialproblems that may lie hidden withintheir computer systems until Janu-ary 1, 2000. Time is most certainlyof the essence, and the further theydelay in addressing the situation,the greater the probability of not

meeting the rapidly approachingdeadline for compliance. Adminis-trators at agencies without full-timecomputer personnel should seek a

professional diagnosis of their sys-tems and ensure that the costs offixing any problems receive appro-

priate budgetary priority. Adminis-trators can find a great deal of infor-mation to help them decide whataction to take.

With todays modern approachto law enforcement, it arguably canbe said that computers often playjust as important a role as the officeron the street. By waiting untilcomputer problems surface afterthe year 2000, law enforcementagencies will be doing a serious dis-service to the public they serve.

Therefore, administrators must at-tack this problem with the same ef-fort and determination that law en-forcement professionals employwhen faced with other challengingsituations.

Endnotes

1 D. Poppe, A $600 Billion Headache;

Reprogramming Countless Computers, The

Miami Herald, July 28, 1997, 22B, 1.2NCIC Technical and Operations Update:

Information Interstate Identification Index

Data Change and National Crime Center Date

Field Changes, Criminal Justice InformationServices Division, Federal Bureau of Investiga-

tion, Washington, DC, September 25, 1997,

explained all of the changes the FBI is making

to existing NCIC date field formats, edits, and

document conversion. Users should contact the

FBIs Criminal Justice Information Services

Division at 304-625-2730 regarding any

concerns or inquiries relating to Year 2000

compliance with FBI information systems.3 Supra note 1.4 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, A $50 Billion

Bug, Fed Official: Year 2000 Computer Fix

Could Slow Economy, The Washington Post,

April 29, 1998, A18.5 Ibid.6 Peter Leyden and Peter Schwartz, The

Long Boom: An Interview with Peter Leyden

and Peter Schwartz,Barrons, September 1,

1997, 17-20.

Department of JusticeKathy Larson, e-mail: [email protected]

Department of the TreasuryEldon Colby, e-mail: [email protected]

U.S. Courts

David Schenken, e-mail: [email protected] Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

Judy Walters, e-mail: [email protected]

Year 2000 Federal Points of Contact


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January 1999 / 5

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rom humble beginnings inthe New York City PoliceDepartment (NYPD) in

the industrialized world, and in-creasingly in developing nations,recognize negotiation as one of themost important tools available tolaw enforcement to peacefully re-solve crisis events. In fact, over thepast 25 years, the application of ne-gotiation skills has proven consis-tently to be one of the most success-ful and cost-effective innovations inall of law enforcement.

Today, negotiators respond notonly to hostage incidents but alsoto barricades, suicides, domesticdisputes, kidnappings, and othertypes of critical events where the

application of their communicationskills and specialized training canpositively influence outcomes. TheFBI, and many other police agen-cies, reflects this expanded applica-tion of negotiation skills by charac-terizing their trained practitionersas crisis negotiators.

While police agencies recog-nize the importance of crisis nego-tiators, law enforcement adminis-trators, the on-scene decisionmakers during a crisis, may notunderstand their negotiators abili-ties and methods and may interfereor make decisions that impede the

Negotiation Concepts

for CommandersBy GARY W. NOESNER, M.Ed.

F1972, the field of hostage negotia-tion has grown to impact signifi-cantly upon law enforcements abil-ity to peacefully resolve criticalincidents. In 1973, building uponthe NYPDs foundation, the FBIfurther developed the practical ap-plication of negotiation principlesand embarked upon an unprec-edented effort, which continues to-day, to instruct police officersworldwide on negotiation skills andpractices. Today, police throughout


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crisis teams efforts. For example,during the Waco standoff, on-scenemanagers received sound advice

from the negotiation team but of-ten did not follow that advice orappreciate the recommendedapproaches.1

To address these concerns, theFBI developed a block of instruc-tion for prospective crisis decisionmakers. The training, NegotiationConcepts for Commanders, servedas the template for the successfulresolution of the 81-day Freemensiege in Jordan, Montana, in 1996,as well as the peaceful resolution by

the Texas Rangers of the 7-day Re-public of Texas siege at Fort Davis,Texas, in 1997. It provides com-manders with an essential under-standing of the important principlesand concepts needed to effectivelymanage the negotiation process dur-ing a crisis event.

THE ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS

Types of Incidents

The FBI characterizes all crit-

ical eventsregardless of themotive, mental health, or criminalhistory of the subjectas eitherhostage or nonhostage situations.2

Understanding the difference be-tween the two remains paramountto peacefully resolving such inci-dents and thus represents the bulk ofthe FBIs training for commanders.

Hostage Situations

During hostage situations, sub-jects hold another person or persons

for the purpose of forcing the fulfill-ment of substantive demands upona third party, usually law enforce-ment. Typically, subjects make di-rect or implied threats to harm hos-tages if their demands are not met.

Substantive demands include thingsthat subjects cannot obtain forthemselves, such as money, escape,and political or social change.

Hostage takers demonstrategoal-oriented and purposefulbehavior. Thus, they use hostagesas leverage to force law enforce-ment to fulfill their demands. Whilethe hostages remain at risk, the pri-mary goal of hostage takers is not toharm the hostages. In fact, hostage

takers realize that only throughkeeping the hostages alive can theyhope to achieve their goals. Theyunderstand that if they harm thehostages, they will change the inci-dent dynamics and increase thelikelihood that the authorities willuse force to resolve the incident.Therefore, it remains in the best in-terests of hostage takers to keep thehostages alive and avoid actionsthat might trigger a violent responsefrom police.

Law enforcement negotiatorshave learned to handle hostageevents by stalling for time, loweringsubjects expectations, and revers-ing their sense of empowermentand control. Negotiators buy time

by using delay tactics and initiatinggive-and-take bargaining (makingsubjects work for everything theyget). At the same time, the tacticalteam uses highly visible contain-ment strategies to demonstrate tothe subject that the police are will-ing and able to use force if neces-sary. Still, the police should neverdirectly threaten to use force be-cause doing so may cause subjectsto resist further.

Hostage takers may initiallyfeel in control and empowered, butas time passes, the negotiation teambuilds trust and rapport and con-vinces them that they will not ac-complish their objectives and thatthey should surrender peacefully.Ultimately, hostage takers must de-cide whether to come out peacefullyand live or to get injured or killedwhen the police inevitably takeaction against them. Fortunately, al-most all hostage incidents are re-solved peacefully as hostage takersdesire to live outweighs their needto have their demands met.

This process may take time, andthe negotiation team must employpatience and understanding and use

...on-scenecommanders must

understand the typeof critical incidentthey face in order

to identify theappropriate law

enforcement strategy.

Special Agent Noesner serves as the chief of the Crisis Negotiation Unitof the FBIs Critical Incident Response Group at the FBI Academy.


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active listening skills3 in an effort tothoughtfully communicate with thehostage taker, defuse the conflict,

and work toward establishing alevel of rapport that allows them toexplore problem-solving optionsand progress to a nonviolent resolu-tion. This approach enables policepractitioners to de-escalate and de-fuse in a peaceful manner mostvolatile conflicts they encounter.This process enjoys an extremelyhigh success rate in achieving sur-renders without bloodshed.

Nonhostage Situations

In contrast to hostage situa-tions, in nonhostage incidents, indi-viduals act in an emotional, sense-less, and often-self-destructive way.Unable to control their emotions inresponse to lifes many stressors,they are motivated by anger, rage,frustration, hurt, confusion, or de-pression. They have no clear goalsand often exhibit purposeless, self-defeating behavior. Such individu-als have either no substantive or es-cape demands or totally unrealistic

demands for which they would haveno reasonable expectation of fulfill-ment. Disgruntled employees, jiltedlovers, rejected spouses, aggrievedindividuals, idealistic fanatics, indi-viduals with mental illness, and oth-ers with unfulfilled aspirations whofeel that they have been wronged byothers or events fall into this broadcategory. Their displeasure at theircircumstances places them in acutestress and disrupts their ability tofunction normally. Angry, con-fused, and frustrated, they mayexpress their anger and vent theirfrustrations by undertaking actionsthat bring them into conflict withlaw enforcement.

During nonhostage situations,individuals barricade themselves orhold others against their will, not to

gain leverage over police to achievea specific goal but to express theiranger over events or at the indi-vidual they hold. In such cases, theperson being held technically is nota hostage, used to secure fulfillmentof a demand, but a victim whom thesubject contemplates harming. Sub-jects holding victims, with whomthey typically have a prior relation-ship, usually have no substantive

in nonhostage incidents, they firstand foremost must demonstrate pa-tience and understanding. Negotia-

tors buy time while being non-threatening and nonjudgmental andavoiding all actions that may esca-late the confrontation. Subjects fre-quently distrust police motives andmanifest high levels of paranoia.They often exhibit hypervigilanceand hypersensitivity to policemovements and may overreact withviolence to the slightest provoca-tion. Thus, in contrast to hostageevents, the police should handlenonhostage incidents using a low-

profile containment scheme that isless confrontative and demonstratespeaceful intentions. This serves toavoid provoking undesirable re-sponses from the subject.

By applying active listeningskills, the negotiation team properlypursues a strategy that attempts tolower subjects emotions, defuseanger, and return the subjects tomore rational thinking. The nego-tiator works toward building trustand rapport by demonstrating un-

derstanding of and concern for sub-jects. Negotiators should specifi-cally demonstrate through word andexpression that they understand theissues that are important to orbother subjects (their stories) andhow subjects respond to thoseissues (their feelings).4 After estab-lishing a trusting relationship, nego-tiators then can attempt to introducenonviolent problem-solving alter-natives that steer subjects toward apeaceful outcome. This approachhas enabled the police to defuseeven the most volatile incidents.

Frequently, subjects do notwant to talk to police and resist re-peated efforts to communicate. As

Risk-effective

tacticalintervention

options requiredetailed planning

and flawlessexecution.

demands because they neither neednor want anything from the police.What they want is what they alreadyhave, the victim. In these cases, thesubject typically will tell police,Go away, We dont need you orwant you here, or This is none ofyour business. The potential forhomicide followed by suicide inmany of these cases is very high.Indeed, when loss of life occurs dur-ing a crisis incident, it most oftenhappens during a nonhostage event.Subjects are clearly in crisis, andthe police must respond to them in acareful and thoughtful manner.

Crisis negotiation teams havelearned that to effectively intervene


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frustrating as this can be, negotia-tion teams should continue to reachout to subjects and converse withthem as though an actual dialoguewere occurring. During this one-way contact, negotiators shouldreassure subjects and begin to con-vey positive themes, as thoughresponding to their stated concerns.For example, acknowledging thesubjects fear and providing re-assurance that the police want tohelp can convince the subject to

begin talking.Moreover, early efforts to con-

tact the subject remain vital andshould not be unduly delayed.Many departments choose to avoidinitiating contact until they have

the tactical team in place. Whileunderstandable, this proceduremay overlook the value of verbalcontainment. Subjects are lesslikely to commit violence againsttheir victims while they are con-versing with negotiators. Therefore,even if the tactical team has not setup completely, negotiation dialoguecan begin to lower tension duringthe initial, generally most danger-ous, period of any event.

Police should exercise restraint

and avoid manipulation of anxietytechniques throughout the incident.Breaking windows, tossing rockson the roof, or playing loud musiconly serves to reinforce the sub-jects suspicions about law enforce-

ments intentions. While such ef-forts may prove acceptable with alone barricaded individual, theynevershould be employed when thesubject holds a hostage or victim.Law enforcement cannot predictwith certainty whether the subjectwill respond violently to such ac-tions or not. Law enforcement deci-sion makers should beware of theaction imperative, the pressurethat compels police departments totake any action to get things going.

Frequently doing nothing differentor staying the course is proper andappropriate; restraint does notequate to weakness.

In a nonhostage situation,thoughtful demonstrations of

Apply active listening skills to buildrapport

Exercise patience and restraint

Types of Crisis Incidents

Hostage NonhostageSubjects:

Demonstrate goal-oriented and purposefulbehavior

Hold hostages to fulfill substantive demands(money, escape, change)

Subjects:

Act in emotional, senseless, and oftenself-destructive ways

Hold victims with intent to harm

Have no substantive demands or totallyunrealistic onesLaw Enforcement Strategies:

Employ highly visible containment

Use delay tactics

Make subjects work for everything

Lower subjects expectations

Contrast benefits of surrender with risk ofresistance

Offer safe surrender with dignity

Law Enforcement Strategies:

Employ low-profile containment scheme

Demonstrate patience and understanding

Give a little without getting in return

Apply active listening skills to lower emotion,defuse anger, and establish rapport

Provide nonviolent resolution options

Law Enforcement Strategies for All Incidents

Use force only when necessary and risk-effective

Coordinate all actions in a team approach


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peaceful intentions by the authori-ties actually may help build rapportand enhance dialogue. In other

words, giving a man threatening hisgirlfriend a cigarette, without ex-pecting anything in return, can dem-onstrate good intentions and may beappropriate. Because nonhostageevents are crisis interventions, notbargaining interactions, limited actsof unilateral giving by authoritieswill not empower subjects. Thesesubjects do not want their demandsmet; rather they want to vent theiranger and are considering harmingtheir victims. Therefore, anything

law enforcement can do to calmsubjects down and establish trustmay benefit efforts to build rapportand thereby influence behavior.This contrasts with hostage takers,who should not be given anythingwithout the police getting some-thing in return.

Everyone wants respect,even the most troubled orseemingly undeserving individual.Law enforcement should properlyview negotiations as a process

through which they can influencesubjects, steering them away fromviolence and toward a peaceful sur-render. The most common mistakenegotiators make is trying to hurrythe process by rushing into problemsolving before establishing a mea-sure of trust. This is typified by ne-gotiators who ceaselessly press sub-jects to surrender before they areready. Negotiators should not dronethe mantra, When are you comingout? Only after they have estab-lished rapport and earned the rightto do so can negotiators begin toinfluence the subject by suggestingresolution options.

In short, the negotiation team,the on-scene commander, and the

tactical team must understand andappreciate whether they face a hos-tage incident, in which subjects use

hostages as leverage to achievetheir demands, or a nonhostage inci-dent, in which subjects direct theiraggression against themselves or avictim. After determining which ofthese two basic types of situationsthey face, on-scene decision makersmust carefully consider all contem-plated actions.

Decision-makingConsiderations

Today, all police actions in any

crisis come under strict scrutiny.Decision makers understand thatthe choices they make during anyincident become subject to a court

alternatives first. Loss of life ismost likely to occur during policetactical intervention. Therefore, be-

fore initiating any tactical action,decision makers must considercarefully the current threat to thehostages/victims, as well as therisks faced by their tactical officers.

If the threat to the victims isbelieved low, then high-risk tacticalactions are inadvisable and difficultto defend. If the threat to the victimsis higher, then risk-effective tacticalaction is easier to defend and shouldat least be considered. Finally, if thethreat to the victims is very high,

then high-risk tactical action maybe necessary; commanders mayhave no choice.

Any loss of life, even to thesubject, will result in the close ex-amination of the actions of the po-lice agency. Critics will want proofthat the threat to hostages increasedand that the police exhausted lessrisky alternatives prior to taking ac-tion. At the same time, members ofthe public will accept the conse-quences of high-risk action only if

they believe with certainty thattaking no action at all surelywould have resulted in harm to thehostages/victims.

Unified Strategy

Anecdotal information pro-vided by crisis personnel nation-wide reflects that crisis managersfrequently fail to sufficiently coor-dinate the efforts of their negotia-tors and tactical personnel. Indeed,the on-scene decision maker mustbring all of the key component lead-ers together to ensure that all par-ties understand the type of situationand its accompanying dynamicsand understand and support theproposed resolution strategy. All

Synchronizingnegotiations andtactics in a parallelfashion can achieve

maximum effect.

of law and to the court of publicopinion and must be consideredcarefully. The FBI recommends us-ing the three-part Action Criteria:1) is the contemplated action neces-sary? 2) is the contemplated actionrisk-effective? and 3) is the contem-plated action acceptable?5

Decision makers also shouldprepare to answer why they tookaction when they did, what condi-tions changed from earlier thatcaused them to take action, andwhether they fully explored andattempted to implement less risky


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January 1999 / 11

police elements must convey a con-sistent theme.

Moreover, negotiations repre-

sent not only what occurs overthe telephone but also every actionthe police take and the subjectinterprets.6 Thus, the negotiatorswords and tactical actions mustconvey the same message. Demon-strations of force by the tacticalteam can undermine nonthreaten-ing, purposeful negotiations. If ne-gotiators are attempting to de-esca-late tensions while the tacticalperimeter teams actions appearthreatening, then efforts to gain rap-

port and build trust with the subjectwill be thwarted.

Component coordination alsoshould involve public informationofficers. Crisis managers alwaysshould assume that the subject hasaccess to radio or television and canview what the police say to the me-dia, as well as what the media re-port. Thus, police press officersmust clear all prepared statementsnot only with the on-scene com-mander but with the negotiation

team, as well. Doing so will helpprevent harmful or regret tablestatements that may agitate the sub-ject or in some way inhibit the trustand rapport the negotiation team isattempting to establish.

Negotiations and Tactics:A Balanced Approach

Experience has shown that toomany police departments continueto employ a linear approach to crisisresolution. First they try to talk sub-jects out (ask them), then they useforce to take them out (make them).This approach remains typicalamong action-oriented police ormilitary establishments not used to

having others dictate their actions.Police officers learn to identify aproblem, solve it, and move on tothe next one. As a result, they be-come frustrated when the actions ofa criminal or disturbed individualbecome the controlling force in de-termining the outcome of an inci-

dent. While the police have learnedto use negotiations to buy time,muster resources, gain intelligence,and prepare for action, they do notalways understand that tactics donot simply follow failed negotia-tions. Rather, commanders must ap-preciate that the proper use of tac-tics encourages negotiation.

Synchronizing negotiations andtactics in a parallel fashion canachieve maximum effect. The nego-tiator should contrast for the subjectthe benefits of reaching agreementthrough negotiation with the risksof disagreement leading to tacticalintervention,7 preferably by an in-cremental display of power during

the negotiation process withoutactually using it. Still, an appropri-ate limited display of tacticalpower is not the same as an overtlythreatening use of that power. Thegoal remains to bring subjects to thetable, not to their knees.

Negotiation Team StructureA single individual cannot con-

duct the negotiation process.Rather, a team structure representsthe best approach to proper negotia-tions. An effective negotiation teamrequires a minimum of three indi-viduals: a primary negotiator, acoach, and a team leader. Many in-cidents require additional teammembers to maintain situationboards,8 collect and disseminate in-telligence information, interviewreleased victims or friends/familyof the subject, serve as mentalhealth consultants, and act as tacti-cal liaisons. Major incidents can de-mand an even larger negotiation

Minimal Encouragements: Use verbal responses or replies,e.g., O.K.; I see.

Paraphrasing: Repeat the subjects message back in the

negotiators own words to convey listening and understanding.Emotion Labeling: Label the subjects feeling to gain insight

into the subjects attitude and behavior as the subject agrees ordisagrees.

Mirroring: Repeat the last words or main idea of the subjectsmessage to build rapport.

Open-ended Questions: Ask questions that require more than ayes-or-no or one-word response to get the subject to talk; avoidwhy questions, which may imply interrogation.

I Messages: Express feelings when the subject behaves in acertain way or says certain things, e.g., I feel frustrated that wehavent come to an agreement, to humanize the negotiator.

Effective Pauses: Use silence to encourage the subject to talkand calm overly emotional subjects.

Active Listening Skills

Source: Gary W. Noesner, M.Ed., and Mike Webster, Ed.D., Crisis Intervention:

Using Active Listening Skills in Negotiations,FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, August1997, 16-18.


13/35


team performing other functionsand working in shifts. The negotia-tion team needs to operate in a quiet

areawhich the FBI refers to as theNegotiation Operations Center, orNOCthat remains free from in-trusion and interference, sits sepa-rate yet adjacent to the commandpost, and contains sufficient spaceto accommodate the personnelrequired.

Along with the tactical teamleader, the negotiation coordinatorshould serve as one of the on-scenecommanders principal advisorsand have almost continual interac-

tion with the on-scene commander.These three key individuals mustinteract in a positive and effectivemanner to ensure a uniform under-standing of the subjects behaviorand motives and to promote a uni-fied strategy aimed at risk-effec-tively resolving the incident.

Many negotiation teams nation-wide have learned the value of hav-ing a tactical team representativestationed within the NOC. Negotia-tors represent the ears of the opera-

tions; the tactical team, the eyes.Together, they work to exchangeintelligence; compare subjectswords with their actions; coordinatedeliveries, releases, and surrenders;and prepare for and implementtactical intervention. Making deliv-eries, receiving released victims,and handling surrenders requireparticularly close coordination be-tween the negotiation team and thetactical team. These critical activi-ties, more than any other actions,tend to become problematic due to alack of coordination and uniformunderstanding of the specifics of theagreement and the timing requiredto carry them out. For example, if

the subject expects a box of food tobe placed in a certain area, and forwhatever reason, the tactical team

puts it in another area, it can resultin the subjects feeling misled or setup. Such a simple misunderstandingcan result in an erosion of trust anddisrupt efforts to establish andmaintain rapport.

Indicators ofNegotiation Progress

Commanders most frequentlyask negotiation coordinators twoquestions: 1) how long will the inci-dent last? and 2) is the team making

progress? The answers to thesequestions are neither simple nor

the subject has reduced threatsand is using less violentlanguage,

the subjects emotions havelowered,

the subject has exhibitedincreased rationality in speechand action,

deadlines have passed,

the subject has becomeincreasingly willing tobargain,

the subject has lowereddemands,

the subject has released ahostage,

the negotiator has built arapport with the subject,

the subject has made posi-tive statements about thewelfare of the hostage/victim,and/or

the subject has asked about theconsequences of surrendering.

Conversely, the negotiation coordi-nator may cite an increased risk to

the victims due to the absence ofsome of the indicators of progressor continued clear threats or actualinjury to the victim(s); no substan-tive demands; no escape demands;or verbal clues of suicidal inten-tions. These and other risk factorsindicate that the potential for fur-ther loss of life remains high.9

When all signs point to the inabilityof negotiation to prevent the subjectfrom harming hostages/victims, theteam can consider tactical interven-tion options aimed at rescuing hos-tages/victims before the subject cantake action to harm them.

This is easier said than done.Risk-effective tactical intervention

Negotiatorsshould not dronethe mantra,When are youcoming out?

straightforward. First, the situationwill last as long as it lasts and not amoment less. It is nearly impossibleto predict with certainty the dura-tion of an incident. The answer tothe second question lies in a numberof indicators of either progress orhigh risk.

The following indicators sig-nify progress and generally mean

that current negotiation initiativesshould continue. Specifically, sincenegotiations have begun,

no additional deaths or injurieshave resulted,


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January 1999 / 13

options require detailed planningand flawless execution. Experiencehas demonstrated repeatedly that

when the police feel compelled toinitiate tactical action, the prognosisfor loss of life greatly increases.During high-risk scenarios, tacticalaction might best be described ashigh risk, high gain, meaning thatthe risk to all parties (subject, vic-tim, and police) is usually veryhigh, albeit necessary, but the po-tential gain in the safe release ofvictims is compelling. To take noaction probably seals the fate of thevictims. On-scene commanders

must weigh carefully the risks ver-sus the gains, ensuring that they au-thorized the action, with negotia-tion team concurrence, out ofnecessity, not because the policehad the ability to do it, grew fa-tigued, or became impatient.

Tactical Roleof the Negotiator

Once the on-scene commanderauthorizes tactical intervention, thenegotiation team can and should as-

sume a proactive tactical supportrole, softening up subjects and mak-ing them more vulnerable to tac-tical action. The negotiation teamaccomplishes this by setting updeliveries in a predictable patternfor subsequent tactical exploita-tion, making concessions that causesubjects to lower their guard, occu-pying subjects on the phone duringthe assault (thus specifically locat-ing them), identifying the leader ormost violent subject for tactical fo-cus, getting subjects to vacate thestronghold and thereby becomemore accessible to tactical action,and explaining away any tacticalmovements seen or heard by thesubject.

On-scene com-manders frequentlyoverlook the negotia-

tors role during tacti-cal interventions. Theyoften fear that nego-tiators, armed with theknowledge of impend-ing tactical action, willsomehow betray thisinformation to the sub-ject over the phone.Yet, the FBIs reviewof thousands of caseshas not identified asingle incident in

which this has hap-pened. By co nt ra st ,many examples exist ofnegotiators, who, afterbeing made aware oftactical plans, have masked orcovered tactical movement thatmight have otherwise compro-mised the operation.

In a recent case, the tacticalteam, believing the subject wasasleep, made an early morning entryinto a hostage stronghold without

telling the negotiation team. Whatmight have happened if negotiationteam members had decided to callinto the crisis site to talk to the sub-ject? Had they done so, they unwit-tingly would have awakened thesubject, who then might have be-come aware of the ongoing policeentry and decided to resist violent-ly. Alternately, the subject mighthave awakened, heard the tacticalteam approaching, and phoned thenegotiation team seeking an expla-nation. Without any knowledge ofthe plan, the negotiation teamwould have been unprepared to of-fer a believable cover story explain-ing the noise or might have hungup to find out what was going on

instead of purposefully keeping thesubject occupied on the phone.

The Team View of Success

Negotiation team members arelaw enforcement officers, trained towork toward resolving crisis situa-tions in the most risk-effective way

possible. Tactical intervention may,indeed, represent the best solution;it does not equate to negotiationfailure. Statistically, negotiationssuccessfully resolve most incidents.Moreover, even if the subject doesnot surrender peacefully, negotia-tions nonetheless succeed by stabi-lizing the incident through verbalcontainment; buying time to gatherintelligence, staff, equipment, andother resources; and allowing the

tactical team to identify the sub-jects vulnerabilities and practiceits planned entry.

CONCLUSION

The art of hostage negotiationhas come a long way, and crisis


15/35


negotiators have developed theskills and knowledge they need topeacefully resolve even the mostvolatile incidents. The successfulresolution of such incidents usuallyrests in understanding the dynamicsof different situations, and on-scenecommanders must understand thetype of critical incident they face inorder to identify the appropriate lawenforcement strategy. Whether ahostage situation in which the sub-ject aims to force authorities to ful-fill certain demands or a nonhostagesituation in which the subject has noclear goals or substantive demands

and expresses anger, rage, or frus-tration in a senseless or self-de-structive way, negotiation remains avital tool to successfully resolve thecrisis.

Whether a hostage or nonhos-tage event, commanders should un-derstand that negotiation representsa process designed to demonstrateempathy, establish rapport, and, fi-nally, influence the subject to avoidfurther violence and surrenderpeacefully. Negotiations buy the

time necessary to gather importantintelligence; assemble personnel,resources, and equipment at thescene; and allow the tactical team toprepare for risk-effective interven-tion, if necessary.

Negotiations cannot work with-out proper tactical containment, andtactical intervention rarely succeedswithout the help of the negotiationteam to buy time or set up the sub-ject, lowering the potential risk totactical officers. The incremental,

coordinated use of tactics and nego-tiation effectively brings subjects tothe bargaining table. Still, the needfor tactical intervention does notmean that the negotiation teamfailed. It means that the subject was

not reasonable and did not make theproper decision to surrender. If tac-tical intervention proves necessary,both the tactical and negotiationcomponents need to work hand inglove to plan and then implementthe agreed-upon strategy.

Along with the tactical teamleader, the negotiation coordinatorshould stay in almost continual con-tact with the on-scene commanderto ensure that all actions are coordi-nated and further the agreed-uponstrategy. The negotiation coordina-tor should advise the commander ofthe indicators of progress as well as

restraint, that they carefully as-sessed and understood the subjectsbehavior and motivation, and thatthey felt compelled to use forceonly to save lives and not simplybecause they had the ability. Sucha policy will result in continuedsupport from an increasinglydemanding citizenry that will con-tinue to scrutinize any controversialpolice action.

Commanders always should re-member that to maintain the supportfrom the public they serve, theymust demonstrate professionalismin handling high-profile hostage,

barricade, and suicide incidents.Understanding the dynamics under-lying such incidents will assist com-manders in making the critical deci-sions needed to resolve them.

Endnotes

1 Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr., Evaluation of

the Handling of the Branch Davidian Standoff

in Waco, Texas, by the United States Depart-

ment of Justice and the Federal Bureau of

Investigation, report to the deputy attorney

general, October 8, 1993.2 Based on records from the FBIs Hostage

Barricade System (HOBAS) database, 86

percent of all incidents can be classified asnonhostage, while only 14 percent are hostage

incidents; HOBAS Statistical Report of

Incidents, March 23, 1998.3 See Gary W. Noesner, M.Ed., and Mike

Webster, Ed.D, Crisis Intervention: Using Ac-

tive Listening Skills in Negotiations,FBI Law

Enforcement Bulletin, August 1997, 13-19.4 Mike Webster, M. Ed., Centurion

Consulting Services, British Columbia, Canada,

lecture at the FBI Academy, 1996.5 G. Dwayne Fuselier, Clinton R.Van Zandt,

and Frederick J. Lanceley, Hostage/Barricade

Incidents: High-risk Factors and the Action

Criteria, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin,

January 1991, 7-12.6 Frederick J. Lanceley, FBI (retired), lecture

at the FBI Academy, 1993.7 Supra note 4.8 See James E. Duffy, Situation Boards,

FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, June 1997,

17-19.9 Supra note 5.

The goal remainsto bring subjectsto the table, notto their knees.

the indicators of high risk. This in-put enables the commander to con-

sider carefully the full range ofresolution options available.

Before making critical deci-sions, commanders should use theAction Criteria to determine if theaction is necessary, risk-effective,and acceptable. In addition, com-manders must be prepared to an-swer why they decided to take ac-tion, what conditions changed fromearlier, and whether they first ex-hausted less risky alternatives.

Above all, commanders should

adopt a philosophy that views tacti-cal intervention as the least desir-able alternative, one to be takenonly when no other choice exists.The police will have to show thatthey demonstrated patience and


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January 1999 / 15

Book Review

The Language of Confession, Interroga-

tion, and Deceptionby Roger W. Shuy, pub-lished by SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks,California, 1998.

A common denominator for all law enforce-ment officers remains the ability to communi-cate with people, whether on the street, during aprotracted investigation, in front of a grand jury,or in the courtroom itself, as well as within theirown organizations. Law enforcement officersneed to understand and be understood throughcommunication. This communication generallytakes written form but also occurs in such mediaas audio or video. The written forma reportis compiled with similar reports and used byprosecutors to assess the viability of formallycharging a suspect. At some point, officersinterview the suspect. The interview may turninto an interrogation and, if successful, willculminate in a confession.

In the first two chapters of the book, theauthor, a distinguished Research Professor ofLinguistics at Georgetown University in Wash-ington, DC, focuses on the language law en-forcement officers use when obtaining confes-sions and conducting interrogations. The author

makes a distinction between the languageactually usedduring these situations and thelanguage intended. For example, some confes-sions contain language that mirrors the elementsof a statute as opposed to the language actuallyused by the suspect during the confession,thereby raising the issue that the investigatormodified the confession in some way to make itfit the elements contained in the statute.

The book branches out to a discussion ofconstitutional rights, truthfulness and deception,and written and unwritten confessions. In onechapter, the author uses case studiescourt

cases where he had direct or indirect involve-ment as a potential witness for the defensetoillustrate situations where the interrogatorbecomes, in essence, a therapist. Although mostof these cases resulted in convictions for the

prosecution, law enforcement readers should not

be lulled into a false sense of security about theimpact of the authors message. The authormakes valid points that if law enforcementofficers do not continue to analyze, review, andlearn from their shortcomings, the credibilitycurrently enjoyed in this profession may be injeopardy. He makes these points, not from theperspective of a law enforcement officer, butfrom that of an academician, who has spentinnumerable hours reviewing and analyzing, lineby line and word by word, the language used byofficers and subjects in investigations. In thecase studies presented, confessionanother areaof law enforcement once thought to be untouch-ablealso receives scrutiny.

Although the research, references, andacademic viewpoints presented early in the bookmay seem overwhelming, the foundation laid bythe author is necessary to apply these conceptsto real situations. By citing nearly all of theicons in the areas of interviewing and interroga-tion (i.e., Sapir, Rabon, Inbau, and Reid), theauthor comforts the reader with his knowledgeof this field of study. He further supports hisopinions with various case studies and draws

constructive conclusions from his experiences.Readers should not take offense at theapparent harshness of the authors commentsdirected at law enforcement but rather shouldview the authors suggestions to audio- andvideotape interviews, interrogations, and confes-sions as opportunities to expand their horizonsinto the inevitable future of the profession.Indeed, The Language of Confession, Interroga-tion, and Deception can help novice and experi-enced law enforcement investigators alikeenhance their success in the interrogation room.

Reviewed bySpecial Agent Craig Meyer

Law Enforcement Communication UnitFBI Academy

Quantico, Virginia


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Alcohol Abuse in PolicingPrevention StrategiesBy John M. Violanti, Ph.D.

Focus on Personnel

lcohol abuse represents an important issue inpolice work. Estimates show that alcohol

a citizens complaint. To deal with such situations,many police agencies adopt a strategy of getting helpfor abusers only afterthey discover a problem. Help

may include a referral to an employee assistanceprogram or alcohol rehabilitation clinic. Agenciesoften use a late-stage treatment strategy becausepolice managers sometimes lack faith in early de-tection approaches and view them as ineffective.Yet, if agencies intervene before officers get intotrouble, they can help officers onto the road torecovery, avoiding damage to both their personaland professional lives.

THE CASE FOR EARLY INTERVENTION

Prevention approaches view the causes of alcoholabuse to be based on the behavior of the officer, as

well as being influenced by the officers socialnetwork. The police social network has similar riskfactors for alcohol abuse as other high-stress occupa-tions. Police officers may endure stress, experiencepeer pressure, and be subjected to isolationallwithin a culture that approves alcohol use.2 Often-times, police officers gather at a local bar after theirshifts to relax over a few drinks with their peers andreinforce their own values. Furthermore, because ofthe close-knit police culture, officers may feel reluc-tant to report colleagues for alcohol-related difficul-ties. Many officers may go to great lengths to protectfellow officers in trouble.

If a police department hopes to effectively reducealcohol abuse, it should intervene early into the verynetwork that reinforces such behavior in the firstplacethe police culture.3 Agencies should getinvolved as early as the police academy stage andfollow up with periodic in-service interventions.

Departments can use numerous strategies forearly intervention. For example, they can

help to improve the fitness and well-being ofofficers;

provide education on lifestyle rather than onalcohol itself;

initiate stress management programs; and

shift the responsibility of detection to individualsother than the affected officer.4

Aabuse among police officers in the United States is

approximately double that of the general populationwhere 1 in 10 adults abuses alcohol.1 While the socialuse of alcohol may be accepted in most professions,excessive use can impair an individuals ability tofunction properly at work and at home. This canprove particularly dangerous for police officers.

Researchers find the occupational and personallosses associated with alcohol abuse among policeofficers difficult to determine, and deficits in jobperformance due to alcohol abuse cannot always beeasily detected. Because alcohol use often is consid-ered part of the police lifestyle, officers who have aproblem seldom get approached by their peers.

Ultimately, officers who abuse alcohol getnoticed by their organizations and sometimes by thepublic. Their drinking problems may lead to anautomobile accident, a domestic violence situation, or

PhotoK. L. Morrrison


18/35

January 1999 / 17

PREVENTION STRATEGIES

Improve Physical and Mental Fitness

Improving physical and mental fitness representsan important first step in alcohol abuse prevention.Experts believe that individuals who live unhealthylives increase their risk of becoming excessivedrinkers. Fitness protects against developing destruc-tive habits, which, over time, can lead to healthproblems. For example, a physically fit individualgenerally does not smoke and drinks only at a low risklevel. Thus, poor physical health may prove compat-ible with excessive drinking because officers may notperceive drinking as worse than other aspects of anunhealthy lifestyle. In this sense, the appropriatetarget for alcohol prevention

becomes the unhealthy lifestyle ofthe officer rather than the drinkingbehavior itself.5

Provide Lifestyle Education

Education serves as anotherpart of an alcohol abuse preventionstrategy. Individuals unaware ofthe effects of alcohol risk thedevelopment of alcohol-relatedproblems. Although the use ofsuch knowledge likely can beaffected by values and beliefs,

experts argue that the presence ofsuch knowledge reduces the likelihood of alcoholabuse. Contrary to common belief, lectures on alco-holism remain one of the least effective methods ofeducational prevention. Providing information abouthow to identify and explore lifestyle factors thatsupport alcohol abuse proves more beneficial. Forexample, smoking cessation clinics identify cues thattrigger cravings for smokers and teach them newresponses to avoid those cues. The point of an alcoholeducation program should be that change in alcoholabuse behavior is unlikely to occur unless factors in

the officers lifestyle are identified and changed.

6

Reduce Stress

Minimizing stress in the workplace also can helpto prevent alcohol abuse. Research has shown that

people who experience high stress remain more at riskfor alcohol abuse. Stress can exist on both the organi-zational and individual levels in police work. Within

the organization, managers should identify and min-imize sources of stress as much as possible, particu-larly stress that serves no legitimate organizationalgoal. On the individual level, officers should betaught how to deal with the effects of stress frominside and outside the workplace. For such occupa-tions as policing, where inordinate stress exists,something should be done before alcohol abusebecomes a problem.7

Officers sense of control over the environmentrepresents another factor in the amount of stress theyexperience and, in turn, whether they abuse alcohol.

Officers who feel more in control

of their lives generally feel lessstress. A feeling of participation inimportant decisions that affecttheir work can increase their senseof control, instill confidence,decrease stress, and make themless likely to abuse alcohol.Moreover, allowing officers toparticipate in important workplacedecisions can help them maintainthe self-regulating mechanismsnecessary to control alcohol useunder stressful conditions.

Increasing an individualscontrol of work situations remains a long-standingproblem in military structures similar to policing. Agood starting point can be small, self-reinforcingchanges that make officers feel more in control andbetter about themselves. First-line supervisors areimportant in instilling these feelings.8 They canaccomplish this by emphasizing the officerspositive achievements and recognizing superiorwork performance.

Encourage Early Detection

Some common signals of alcohol abuse may beincreased absenteeism, a change in personality, orpossibly memory lapses such as forgetting workassignments. Detecting these early signs of alcoholabuse can limit its devastating effects and illustrates

Minimizing stressin the workplace

also can helpto prevent

alcohol abuse.


19/35


another factor in prevention. A significant difficultyfor those individuals abusing alcohol remains theirreluctance to admit the problem; therefore, it becomes

necessary for others to intervene.In this regard, first-line supervisors becomeinvaluable. Supervisors should monitor the perfor-mance and activities of their workers and shouldrecognize when problems arise. Complaints fromother workers may focus the supervisors attention ona particular employee. The supervisor can provideconstructive advice on alcohol abuse, which can helpguide the officer toward treatment and possibly evenprevent an officer from becoming an alcohol abuser.Supervisors should become morefamiliar with their officers bygetting to know them both profes-

sionally and personally. Becomingacquainted with the officers in thisway may help supervisors todiscover issues that may laterdevelop into problems. Thus,supervisors, through education andpolicy, can become aware of thesigns of alcohol abuse and respon-sible for detecting them in theworkplace.9

Finally, an officers familyremains an additional source ofdetection. The officers family may suffer as a result

of alcohol abuse, which provides motivation formembers of the family to seek help for the troubledofficer. However, police families, much like fellowofficers, may be reluctant to report alcohol-relatedproblems. Departments should inform families ofknown problems police officers often have withalcohol abuse and emphasize the importance of therehabilitation process for the officers and theirfamilies. Departments also should provide informa-tion to the family regarding the help available forofficers and their families.10

CONCLUSION

A preventive approach has the long rangepotential to reduce alcohol abuse. Police depart-ments should note that proactive prevention strat-egies designed to prevent alcohol abuse are moreeconomical and practical than curing those who abusealcohol.

Based on the prevention strategies of wellness,lifestyle education, and stress reduction, police ad-ministrators should set two goals for dealing with

alcohol abuse. First, they should seek to lower alcoholconsumption levels among all personnel but espe-cially in those who already manifest high intakelevels. They should encourage officers to decreasealcohol consumption while making other changes intheir lives that would sustain that practice. Second,administrators should encourage the minimization offactors, such as stress, that may lead to alcohol abuse.Stress management programs, similar to alcohol-related programs, remain essential in a comprehensive

approach to mental well-being atwork.

When police managers imple-

ment such strategies early on, theycan reduce the likelihood of alco-hol abuse within their departments.When officers get the help theyneed from the onset, both the offi-cers and their agencies benefit.

Endnotes

1 E. Kirschman,I Love A Cop (New York:

Guilford Press, 1997), 1582 Ibid., 163.3 M. Braverman,Beyond Profiling: An

Integrated Mult idisciplinary Approach to

Preventing Workplace Violence , symposium conducted at Work, Health,

and Stress 95 Conference, Washington, DC, 1995.4 C. McNeece and M. DiNitto, Chemical Dependency: A Systems

Approach (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1994), 25-56; and B.L.

Schecter, Its More Than Testing, Its Wellness, resource paper,

Prevention Associates, Oakland, CA, 1991.5Ideas for Action on Substance Abuse Prevention: Healthy Lifestyles,

Mandatory Health Programs and Services (Toronto, Ontario, Canada:

1991), 25-35.6 M.A. DiBernardo,Drug Abuse in the Workplace: Employers Guide

to Prevention, U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Washington, DC, 1988),

12-19.7 J.M. Violanti, J. Marshall, and B. Howe, Police, Alcohol, and

Coping: The Police Connection,Journal of Police Science and

Administration 13 (1984): 106-110.8 U.S. Department of Labor,An Employers Guide to Dealing with

Substance Abuse (Rockville, MD, 1990), 12.9 Ibid.10 Supra note 1, 12.

If agencies intervenebeforeofficers get

into trouble, they canhelp officers onto the

road to recovery....

Dr. Violanti serves as an associate professor of criminal

justice at the Rochester Institute of Technology inRochester, New York.


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January 1999 / 19

errorism has become a real-

ity of modern life. Domesti-cally, such extreme acts as

Terrorists seek the shock and

publicity that accompany attacks,and in the past, many have chosenairliners as targets. Yet, as in-creased security measures havemade such attacks more difficult,terrorists have searched for alter-nate venues to deliver their mes-sages. The likelihood of numerouscasualties coupled with an inherentlack of security makes mass transitsystems a suitable mark for terror-ism. Such domestic incidents as theOctober 1995 attack on an Amtrakline in Arizona have highlighted thethreat, while overseas, such inci-dents as the March 1995 poison gasattack in the Tokyo subway under-score the ability to target a large

number of innocent victims. Faced

with these incidents and the pros-pect for future destruction on masstransit systems, law enforcementagencies must prepare for a broadrange of possible assaults aimed atthese types of targets.

PREPARINGFOR TERRORISM

Terrorist attacks not only holdthe potential for massive destruc-tion but also require a responsefrom a multitude of organizations,from law enforcement and emer-gency services to structural engi-neers and heavy equipment opera-tors. Such disparate agencies mayhave never worked together and

Tthe World Trade Center and theOklahoma City bombings havebrought home the reality of bothforeign and domestic sources of ter-ror. Added to the terrorists arsenalof conventional explosives is theuse of chemical and biologicalweapons. In fact, many experts be-lieve that the question is notwhethera major bioterrorist attackwill occur but when such an attackwill take place.1 And, in recentyears, both domestic and foreignterrorists increasingly have focusedon mass transit to maximize massterror.

Mass Transit

Target of TerrorBy KURT R. NELSON, M.P.A.

PhotoPaul Myatt


21/35


may have no experience with thetransit system. Preincident planningand extensive interagency training

can help overcome these weak-nesses. Periodic full dress rehears-als help to ensure that every unitwill be able to meet its assignedtasks when the time comes. Becauseof their experience in responding tocritical incidents, law enforcementagencies must take the lead in pre-paring for terrorist attacks.

DEFINING THETERRORIST THREAT

In order to coordinate the ap-

propriate response, law enforce-ment first must determine whetheran incident can be defined as a ter-rorist act. While obvious acts of ter-rorism can be identified as such,more subtle acts, particularly onesthat come without warning or with-out anyone claiming credit, can de-lay the appropriate response.

To successfully combat a ter-rorist incident, law enforcementfirst must assume that a terrorist act

has occurred whenever a warninghas been received, credit has beenclaimed by a terrorist group after

the incident, or the magnitude orlocation of the incident would merita cautious presumption of an attack.For example, even a small incidentdirected at a prime government tar-get (e.g., the Metro transit station atthe Pentagon, in Arlington, Vir-ginia) should trigger at least thestart of a counterterrorist re-sponse until investigation has de-termined that such a response isunwarranted.

While the local police depart-

ment initially will treat many terror-ist acts like large-scale criminalacts, important differences exist.Criminal and terrorists acts usuallydiffer in their magnitude and de-sign. For example, in criminal acts,offenders usually do not plan to takehostages. When they do so, it oftenoccurs when their actions are dis-covered by law enforcement earlierthan they had anticipated.2 Bycontrast, terrorists intend to take

hostages and usually do so to ac-complish certain political objec-tives. Moreover, their dedication to

their cause and practiced approachusually makes them a greater threatto the hostages and to the law en-forcement officers trying to protectthe public.

Terrorist acts fall into two gen-eral categories of police incidents,normal and atypical. While someelements remain common to alltypes of police response, each po-tential threat requires a differentlaw enforcement action.

Normal ThreatsNormal threats include bomb

threats and actual bombs, hostage-taking scenarios, and shootings orsnipers. The police frequently en-counter such incidents and havestandard practices and strategies inplace for dealing with them. Al-though the terrorist variants of thesecriminal actshostage takings, po-litically motivated weapon assaults,or bombsrepresent the easiest at-tacks for the police to understand,

terrorist acts often differ in motiva-tion, size, and location. Unfortu-nately, few local law enforcementagencies can amass the response re-quired to combat them.3

Specifically, while most locallaw enforcement agencies canhandle a barricaded felon, when ter-rorists take hostages, their demandsmost likely will reach beyond thelocal authoritys ability to meetthem. Accordingly, local agenciesshould seek assistance from themilitary and from federal law en-forcement agencies, including theFBIs Critical Incident ResponseGroup and the U.S. Marshals

...in recent years,both domestic andforeign terroristsincreasingly havefocused on mass

transit to maximizemass terror.

Officer Nelson serves with thePortland, Oregon, Police Bureau.


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January 1999 / 21

Special Operations Group, by con-tacting the local FBI field office.Until such help arrives, the local

authority should treat the incidentlike any other hostage situation butwith one major caveat. The possi-bility that a terrorist will take thelives of hostages to deliver a mes-sage remains very real, and the on-scene commander should considerthis threat prior to initiating any pre-cipitous action such as an assault.

A series of bombings in At-lanta, Georgia, has revealed the lat-est variant in terrorist activitieswithin a conventional police inci-

dent. These incidents representtypical cases except for one act: theuse of a secondary explosive devicedesigned to attack responders.Thus, the law enforcement author-ity must take control at the bomb-ing scene not only to preserve evi-dence but also to protect emergencyresponse teams from secondaryweapons.

Unfortunately, secondary ex-plosive devices are difficult to de-tect. Explosive detection dogs

prove less effective in areas alreadycontaminated by explosive residue.If detection is not possible, then lawenforcement must create a safetyzone by removing other threats(e.g., towing parked cars) or creat-ing a shielded area in which theresponders can work safely.

To plan for normal terroristthreats, police departments shoulddetermine the maximum responsethey can provide, then locate out-side resources to provide the rest. Ifnecessary, the department shouldsign interagency agreements toensure a complete response whenthe need arises. For example, the

Portland Police Bureaus SpecialEmergency Reaction Team has aninteragency training and response

agreement with such agencies as theWashington County, Oregon,Sheriffs Office Tactical Negotia-tion Team, the Oregon StatePolices SWAT team, and the localFBI offices SWAT team. Theteams regularly train together in an-ticipation of terrorist threats. Al-though the expertise of these groupslies in the tactical arena, a complete

Tokyo subway system, killing 12people. Another attack attributed tothe same group occurred less than 2

months later at another subway sta-tion. Police discovered a simple bi-nary weapon system that prior tomixing, contained the needed pre-cursors for hydrogen cyanide gas.These two attacks, just two of thesix attributed to the group,4 repre-sent types of atypical threats. Fall-ing outside the typical police expe-rience, such incidents include theuse or threatened use of chemical,biological, or radioactive materials.

Attacks do not have to be elabo-

rate or sophisticated to be deadly. Abiological weapon, such as anthrax,can be used in a rudimentary man-ner and still inflict thousands of ca-sualties. For example, wind frompassing trains could circulate an-thrax spores deposited in the under-ground tunnel of a subway systemand claim thousands of lives.5

Nuclear attacks represent thethird type of atypical incident. Inthis case, however, nuclear refers,not to atomic bombs, but to the use

of radiological material scattered byconventional explosives. Such ma-terials prove more subtle and diffi-cult to detect and eradicate, makingthem last longer and able to infect agreater number of people.

Whether biological, chemical,or nuclear, atypical attacks extendbeyond the ability of any law en-forcement agency to counter unas-sisted. But help is available. TheU.S. Marine Corps originally cre-ated its Chemical/Biological Inci-dent Response Force for use at theOlympic games in Atlanta, and theU.S. Army also maintains units ableto combat these threats. The 310th

Terrorist attacks

that occur ontransit systemscan tax even themost seasoned

law enforcementveteran.

response would require the coordi-nation of agencies well-versed inevery area of crisis management.For this reason, the Portland PoliceBureau stages mock incidents onthe transit system and coordinatesthe response between the diverseagencies likely to become involved.

Atypical Threats

In March 1995, the AumShinrikyo religious sect, using fivecanisters of diluted Sarin, an ex-tremely toxic chemical, disguisedas lunch boxes and soft drinks, ex-posed 5,000 to 6,000 persons in the


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Chemical Company represents thefirst military unit able to detect andidentify biological threat agents.Other Army units, such as the 25thChemical Company, are trained todeal not only with chemical threatsbut with environmental hazards, aswell.6 The FBI coordinates the fed-eral response, and local law en-forcement in need of assistanceshould contact the nearest FBI fieldoffice.

Calling on such groups remainsessential because law enforcementagencies themselves cannot detectthese threats early enough to miti-

gate their effects. Most local law

enforcement authorities rely onbomb squads and hazardous mate-rial teams to respond to these in-cidents. While possibly being ableto detect chemical or radioactivesubstances, these teams may fail todetect slower-acting biologicalagents. Moreover, they even mayoverlook the possibility that a bio-logical threat exists.

TRANSIT SYSTEMCONSIDERATIONS

Terrorist attacks that occur ontransit systems can tax even themost seasoned law enforcement

veteran. A hostage situation on a

city bus requires a different re-sponse than an incident on a subwaycar. At the same time, an attack on asubway car or a bus calls for differ-ent measures than one that targets asubway or bus station. To preparefor such attacks, officials must con-sider a number of factors. For ex-ample, at system entrances and ex-its, scores of people congregate,multiplying the potential for injury.Certain fuel types, such as the com-pressed natural gas used in an in-creasing number of buses, could besabotaged to explode. Responseteams could use the external cutoff

switches built into some vehicles

The Infrastructure Protection Task Forcehttp://www.fbi.gov/programs/iptf/iptf.htm

The Federal Transit Administration

(FTA), Office of Safety and Security,Transit Security Newsletterhttp://www.fta.dot.gov/library/program/tsn/tsn.htm

The FTAs Safety and Security Program,includes extensive bibliographyhttp://www.fta.dot.gov/fta/library/planning/TSSP/tssp.html

The FBIhttp://www.fbi.gov

Sources of Additional Information

The Emergency Federal Law EnforcementAssistance Programhttp://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/html/specprog.htm

or http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles/eflea.txt

The National Law Enforcement andCorrections Technology Centershttp://www.nlectc.org

U.S. Department of Statehttp://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/index.html

U.S. Department of Transportationhttp://www.dot.gov

Source: Adapted from Eric Barnes, with Marj P. Leaming, Ph.D., and Linda Cavazos, Protecting Public

Transportation from Terrorists,National Institute of Justice Journal, March 1998, 21.

The following Web sites contain information on terrorism in general, as well as details on masstransit attacks:


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January 1999 / 23

in a tactical maneuver to thwartterrorists.

Light-rail vehicles require spe-cial consideration. Overhead powerlines could fall to the tracks, andelectricity from the third rail couldjeopardize rescue efforts. In addi-tion, approaches to such vehicleschange in relationship to where thevehicles are on the tracks. Specifi-cally, different strategies and re-sponses must be planned for sta-tions, where doors open ontoplatforms, and assaults between sta-tions, where doors are at a consider-able height above the rail bed.

Evacuation from the systemmay represent a formidable ob-stacle in the event of a terroristthreat. Only preincident planningand practice can effectively evacu-ate passengers, staff, and tenantswho may surround the transit sta-tion. Transit officials for LondonsUnderground plan for evacuationby training shopkeepers and prac-ticing regularly. By doing so, majorstations can clear out 3,000 to 4,000individuals in 3 to 4 minutes. In

1991, transit personnel evacuated60,000 people from the entire tran-sit system in 10 minutes.7

Evacuation plans should in-clude the selection of staging areas,where passengers can await trans-port to safe locations, as well asalternate locations, in the event thatthe first site is downwind from ahazardous gas release. Extra busescan serve as shelter for victims, wit-nesses, and workers and, equallyimportant, can accommodate the

transit needs of passengers who ar-rive at the scene expecting to enterthe system. If possible, alternativesto the affected transit line or sys-tem must be established in order

to diminish the crowds that wouldotherwise accumulate at the scene.

In short, agencies preparing formass transit terrorism cannotmerely apply their typical criticalincident response plan. Instead,they must consider the unique needsof transit systems and tailor theirresponses accordingly. Yet, even ameticulously planned and flaw-lessly executed response cannotsubstitute for preventing an attackfrom occurring in the first place.

officials to detect tampering, canprovide a basis for increased patrolduring times of heightened concern.Further, training all employees, ten-ants, and patrons of the transit sys-tem to become aware of suspiciouspackages, smells, and passengerbehavior can further deter terroristattacks.

Environmental Design

Unfortunately, the design tradi-tionally used for mass transit sys-tems represents the antithesis of ap-propriate security. Mass transitsystems are designed to be open andinviting, which creates ample op-portunity for a variety of attacks.Still, transit officials can make thesystem inviting, while decreasingthe possibility of a terrorist attack.For example, New York CitysMetropolitan Transit Authoritycompleted a security review of itssystem after the gas attack in To-kyo. Improvements included re-moving open spaces behind ticketbooths, a natural hiding place forbombs, and placing antitampering

devices in the subways ventilationsystem.8

Retrofitting an existing facilitymay prove difficult; it remainsmuch easier to design new facilitieswith crime prevention and terrorismreduction in mind. For example, inLondon, garbage cans were re-moved from the street because ofthe potential for members of theIrish Republican Army to use themto hide bombs. A similar threatcould take place in the nations tran-

sit systems and underscores theneed for officials to consider suchdetails when designing new facili-ties. In a new facility, trash chutescould move litter from areas where

Preparationremains the key tocombating masstransit terrorism.

PREVENTION STRATEGIESPrevention represents a key ele-ment in preparing for terrorism.Part of the prevention plan must in-clude an aggressive effort to usesecurity and detection, as well asenvironmental design, to stave offterrorist attacks before they can beimplemented.

Security and Detection

When assessing sites and ve-hicles to develop a planned re-sponse, law enforcement shouldevaluate and safeguard vulnerableparts of the system, such as en-

trances, exits, and potential hidingplaces. Regular monitoring of thesevulnerable parts of the system,coupled with the use of anantitampering design, which allows


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people congregate to a lower level asafe distance away. Just as everynew construction project must un-

dergo an environmental impact re-view, law enforcement personnelcould conduct a security review asanother part of the design process.

CONCLUSION

In the past, local law enforce-ment believed, with some justifica-tion, that terrorists would targetonly such major cities as New Yorkor Washington, DC. They assumedthat other, smaller cities remainedsafe from such attacks. Now, law

enforcement officers in every juris-diction, large and small, urban andrural, must at least recognize thepotential for attack and plan accord-ingly. And, because of their poten-tial for massive casualties and de-struction, combined with aninherent lack of security, mass tran-sit systems can become easy preyfor terrorists.

Preparation remains the key tocombating mass transit terrorism.First, law enforcement agencies

must recognize terrorist acts, thenrespond accordingly. The appropri-ate response depends on a numberof factors, including the type ofthreat encountered and the area ofmass transit affected. Local law en-forcement must work with a myriadof diverse agencies to neutralize thethreat and deal with its aftermath.Such a massive undertaking cannotbe left to chance; responding agen-cies must prepare for every contin-gency and drill to maintain a stateof readiness. As important, localagencies must recognize when anincident reaches beyond their

capabilities. State and localauthorities should not hesitate tocontact the FBI for assistance;

any delay could have seriousconsequences.Finally, law enforcement ad-

ministrators should work with tran-sit and government officials totighten security on mass transit andto design new systems to thwart actsof terrorism. When officials limitthe ability of terrorists to functionfreely,9 they keep the citizens theyserve safe.

Endnotes1 Robert Taylor, All Fall Down,New

Scientist, May 11, 1996, 32.2 Sgt. Martin Rowley, team leader, Portland

Police Bureaus Special Emergency Reaction

Team, interview by author, 1996.3 Law enforcement units preparing to

combat terrorist acts include the Washington,

DC, Metropolitan Police Departments

Emergency Response Team; the New York

Police Departments Emergency Service Unit;

the Los Angeles Police Departments Special

Weapons and Tactics Team; the Chicago Police

Departments Hostage, Barricaded/Terrorist

Team; the Portland Police Bureaus Special

Emergency Reaction Team; the Metro-Dade,

Florida, Police Departments Special ResponseTeam; and Kansas City, MO, Police

Departments Tactical Response Team. See

Samuel M. Katz, The Illustrated Guide to the

Worlds Top Counterterrorist Forces (Hong

Kong: Concord, 1995), 4.4 Henry I. DeGeneste and John P. Sullivan,

Transit Terrorism: Beyond Pelham 1-2-3, The

Police Chief, February 1996, 46.5 Supra note 1, 34-35.6 Shirley L. DeGroot, Comment and

Discussion: Who Will Answer the Chem/Bio

Call?Proceedings, March 1997, 120.7 Joseph Scanlon, Passenger Safety and

Efficient Service: Managing Risk on Londons

Underground, Transit Policing, Fall 1996, 12.8

Lenny Levine, Terrorism,Metro, July/August 1996, 26.9 Supra note 3, 11.

Wanted:Photographs

heBulletin staff isalways on the lookoutT

for dynamic, law enforce-

ment-related photos forpossible publication in themagazine. We are interestedin photos that visually depictthe many aspects of the lawenforcement profession andillustrate the various taskslaw enforcement personnelperform.

We can use either black-and-white glossy or colorprints or slides, although weprefer prints (5x7 or 8x10).

Appropriate credit will begiven to contributing photog-raphers when their workappears in the magazine. Wesuggest that you send dupli-cate, not original, prints aswe do not accept responsibil-ity for prints that may bedamaged or lost. Send yourphotographs to:

Brian Parnell, ArtDirector,FBI Law

Enforcement Bulletin,FBI Academy, MadisonBuilding 209, Quantico,VA 22135.


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