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THE JOUllNAL OF COMMUNICATIONVol. 21. March 1971. p. 83-93

A Comparison of the Effects ofPunishment-Oriented and Reward-Oriented

Messages in Persuasive Communication

JA...'\-IESC. MCCROSKEYAND DAVIDW. WRIGHT

Abstract

The effects of reward-oriented (pleasure) and punishment-oriented(fear) appeals were examined in conjunction with initial credibility onattitude change and terminal credibility. Ss were exposed to either areward-oriented or a punishment-oriented message by either a high-credibleor low-credible source. Reward and punishment appeals did not differ-entially affect either attitude change or perceived credibility. Both types ofappeals produced substantial attitude change when presented by a high-credible source, neither produced significant change when presented by alow-credible source.

In conjunction with their general concern for language vari-ables in communication, researchers of the past decade have con-tinued to be fascinated by the impact of fear-arousing appeals.Since Janis and Feshbach's initial study [4], various communica-tion scholars have tested the early finding that strong fear appealsare less effective than mild fear appeals in eliciting desired re-sponses from an audience. When Miller [6] summarized fearappeal studies in 1963,his analysis supported Janis and Feshbach'soriginal finding. When the additional dimension of source credi.

James C. McCroskey is Associate Professor and Director of GraduateStudies in Speech-Communication at Illinois State University. He receivedhis D.Ed. from the Pennsylvania State University in 1966. His primaryresearch interests involve the relationships among source and message vari-ables in the production of attitude change and methods of reducing com-munication apprehension. He is the author of two recently published books,An Introduction to Rhetorical Communication and (with Donald Klopf)Elements of Debate. He is coauthor (with Carl Larson and Mark Knapp)of a forthcoming book entitled An Introduction to Interpersonal Communica-tion. .

David W. Wright is Assistant Professor of Speech-Communication atIllinois State University. He received his Ph.D. from Wayne State Universityin 1969. His primary research interests are in the areas of small groupcommunication, persuasion, and organizational communication. He hasserved as a consultant with both government and industry in small groupand organizational communication.

84 The Journal of Communication, Vol. 21, March 1971

bility was added to later fear-appeal studies, the effects of mildappeals on attitude change appeared to be different. Miller andHewgill [7] found, for example, that strong fear-arousing appealsproduced more attitude change than mild fear appeals from ahigh-credible source; whereas, there appeared to be no significantdifferences between strong and mild fear appeals from a low-cred-ible source. An unattributed source was added to the high- andlow-credible conditions in a study reported by Powell and Miller[9]. Three versions of a message were utilized-low fear (socialapproval), high fear (social disapproval), and neutral (no ap-proval or disapproval). High-credible and unattributed sourcesproduced similar attitude change effects: social disapproval(punishment-oriented) cues were more effective than social ap-proval (reward-oriented) cues. Both high and low fear appealsproduced more attitude change than the neutral message. In thelow-credible condition the most attitude change was affected bythe neutral cues; the approval and disapproval cues produced lessattitude change but did not differ significantly from each other.

Wenburg [10] investigated the relationships among audienceadaptation, source credibility and types of message cues. Hetested reward-punishment cues for the amount of anxiety pro-duced by the messages and found that punishment cues producedsignificantly more anxiety than reward cues, but had no differ-ential effect on attitude change or the authoritativeness or char-acter dimensions of credibility.

Rationale

With the exception of a very few studies, research on types ofappeals has concentrated on fear-arousing appeals. As Cronkhite[3] has suggested, more research needs to be done concerningnon-fear appeals. An examination of the types of messages com-monly employed in the fear-appeals research indicates that usuallythey are clearly punishment-oriented, ie. they discuss the harmfuleffects that will occur if the receiver does not comply with thesource's recommendations. Numerous studies in the area oflearning [2] have led to the conclusion that pl1ni~hment is lessuseful in producing desired responses than is reward. This ledthe present writers to question whether the reciprocal of fear ap-peals, "pleasure" appeals, might be more effective in produGing

McCroskey and Wright: Punishment and Reward Messages 85

attitude change than are fear appeals themselves. In short, arethere circumstances where "reward-oriented" appeals producemore desired change than do "punishment-oriented" appeals?

This question is impossible to answer on the basis of previousresearch. Research on learning suggests that reward-orientedappeals may be generally superior to punishment-oriented ap-peals. But the results of the only two studies in persuasive com-munication which can be conceived as directly bearing on this

question provide no support for such speculation; Powell andMiller [9] found the exact opposite, Wenburg [10] observed nosignificant difference.

Several of the consistency theories relating to attitude changeprovide a basis for hypothesizing a possible interaction betweeninitial source credibility and type of message appeal. Brieflystated, these theories suggest that when a receiver is induced intoa state of inconsistency by a persuasive message, he tends to alterhis perceptions in order to regain a consistent state. He maychange his attitude on the topic, he may change his attitude towardthe persuader, he may do both, or he may use a variety of meansother than attitude change, sometimes referred to as "leaving thefield." Further, if very little inconsistency is generated, the indi-vidual may "assimilate" the views of the persuader with little orno resulting attitude change; but if considerable inconsistency isgenerated, the individual is likely to "contrast" the views of thepersuader, see them as extreme, derogate the persuader, and alterattitude on the topic little or not at all. Thus, there appears to bea non-linear relationship between the amount of inconsistencyinduced in the receiver and the amount of attitude change pro-duced in him [11]. Little inconsistency produces little change,moderate inconsistency produces maximum change, great incon-sistency produces little change but tends to produce communi-cator derogation. If we presume that a punishment-orientedmessage produces more anxiety in the receiver than a reward-oriented message, as seems reasonable considering Wenburg' s[10] findings, and that the level of anxiety produced is directlyrelated to the amount of inconsistency created, we may hypothe-size that punishment-oriented messages produce more inconsist-ency than reward-oriented messages do. Whether this increasedinconsistency should be expected to produce more attitude change

86 The Journal of Communication, Vol. 21, March 1971

would depend, at least in part, on the perceived credibility of thecommunication source. High inconsistency produced by a low-credible source could be expected to result in contrast effects,little attitude change, and derogation of the communicator. Onthe other hand, when inconsistency is induced by a high-crediblesource, communicator derogation should be more difficult forthe receiver and, thus, greater attitude change might be forth-coming. However, in any case, a reward-oriented message shouldbe more attractive to a receiver than a punishment-oriented mes-sage, and the result should be higher credibility ratings for thesource using the reward-oriented message. This rationale led tothe following hypotheses.

Hypotheses

1. A high-credible source employing a punishment-oriented(fear appeal) message will produce more attitude change than ahigh-credible source employing a reward-oriented (pleasure ap-peal) message.

2. A low-credible source employing a reward-oriented (plea-sure appeal) message will produce more attitude change than alow-credible source employing a punishment-oriented (fear ap-peal) message.

3. A source employing a reward-oriented (pleasure appeal)message will be perceived as more credible than a source employ-ing a punishment-oriented (fear appeal) message.

The essence of the above hypotheses is to suggest that a low-credible source should use pleasure appeals in order to enhancehis credibility and produce more attitude change; whereas, a high-credible source should use fear appeals to produce more attitudechange, although reduced credibility might result.

METHOD

Subjects

Experimental 55 were 228 students in the beginning course inspeech .at Dlinois State University with 176 S5 randomly assignedto the experimental conditions of the study and 58 5s to thecontrol groups. Conditions were distributed randomly for allexperimental and control groups.

McCroskey and Wright: Punishment and Reu:ard Jlessages 87

Procedures

Materials used in the study included instructions, credibilitystatements, messages, and measuring instruments. All of thematerials and media used in the study were written. The experi-mental messages advocated the reduction of the space program'sappropriations. The reward-oriented message emphasized thebenefits that could be derived in three areas: education, medicalresearch, and air and water pollution control. The punishment-oriented message emphasized what would be lost in the samethree areas if appropriations for the space program were not re-duced. The reward-oriented and punishment-oriented messagesare exemplified by the following segments:

Reu:ard-Oriented. First, education. If we spend our money oneducation rather than space, what will be the benefits? Money spenton education is an investment in the future, an investment that returnshard dollars to the treasury as was evidenced by the original G.I. Bill.As you know, the return from that investment has already exceeded theoutlay by 400 percent. Now we can invest in education for the handi-capped and obtain thousands of productive workers who might other-wise turn to criminal life or continue the perpetual cycle of povertyand welfare. We can invest in teachers. salaries and school buildingsand gain the immeasurable benefits of better qualified teacheIS andcomfortable and stimulating educational environments. There are manyother areas of education to which we can turn for our investments, butI don.t believe I need to elaborate further. The main point is that weknow what we will get when we invest in education. The benefits forsociety are there to be gained, and if we revise our priorities we knowwe will gain them.

Punishment-Oriented. Fust, education. If we spend our money onthe space program rather than on education, what will we lose? Moneyspent on education is an investment in the future, an investment thatreturns hard dollars to the treasury as was evidenced by the originalG.!. Bill. As you know, the return from that investment has alreadyexceeded the outlay by 400 percent. If we refuse to increase our invest-ment in education we are dooming thousands of handicapped peopleto unproductive lives, and are committing ourselves to ever-increasingwelfare roles to care for these people. If we refuse to increase ourinvestment in education for people in poverty environments, we are .condemning these people to a perpetual cycle of poverty and a con-tinued increase in crime. If we refuse to increase our investment inteachers. salaries and school buildings, we lose the benefits of morequalified teachers and stimulating educational environments. We needto expand the funding of many other areas of education, but I don't

88 The Journal of Communication, Vol. 21, March 1971

believe I need elaborate further. The main point is that jf we refuseto increase our investment in education, we must accept the penaltiesof such action in the form of more people on welfare, increased crime,and poor quality education.

Because of stylistic devices which were deemed appropriate forthe different types of appeals, the length of individual argumentsvaried somewhat between versions of the message. However,this balanced out for the messages as a whole. Each message wasapproximately 625 words in length.

Bogus sources were described to induce levels of initial credibil-ity. The high-credible source was identified as a former AssociateDirector of the NASA Apollo program who had recently re-signed. The low-credible source was identified as a memberof the Students for a Democratic Society (Weatherman faction)who had been involved in a sit-in at the first manned moonlaunching. The messages were described as having been takenfrom testimony by the alleged source before the Space Appropri-ations Committee of the U. S. House of Representatives on Oc-tober 15, 1969. In an attempt to make it appear more likely thatthe SDS source was legitimate, it was noted that he was per-mitted to testify because of a special request by Rep. Peter L.Searing (also bogus) of New York. Ss were asked to writecomments after completing the experiment. Many reacted nega-tively to the SDS individual but none indicated suspicion abouthis existence or about the likelihood of his testifying as indicated.

Semantic differential type instruments were employed to mea-sure attitude toward the primary proposition in the message,source credibility, and for message evaluation. Five scales wereemployed for the concept, "Appropriations for the United StatesSpace Program Should Be Substantially Reduced." These scaleswere right-wrong, true-false, yes-no, correct-incorrect, and Iagree-I disagree. Six scales were used to measure each of threedimensions of source credibility; those developed by McCroskey[5] for authoritativeness and character and those developed byBerIo, et al. [1] to measure dynamism. Five scales were includedfor the concept "The Message You Read:" logical-illogical, well-supported-poorly-supported, reassuring-threatening, objective-subjective, and reward-oriented-punishment-oriented. These wereincluded to check on the manipulation of the message variable and

McCroskey and Wright: Punishment and Reward Messages 89

to determine if the 5s perceived other differences between themessages.

Each experimental packet included one of the credibility state-ments, one of the messages, and the three sets of scales. Thecontrol packets were identical with the exception that no messagewas included nor were the scales included for message evaluation.

Design and Analysis

The design of the study included two factors, initial credibilityand message type. The dependent variable measures were sub-mitted to 2 x 3 analyses Qfvariance with subsequent t-tests whereappropriate and necessary for interpretation. The two levels ofthe credibility factor were high and low. The three levels of themessage variable were reward-oriented, punishment-oriented,and none (control). The message evaluation scales were submittedto 2 x 2 analyses of variance because the control 5s did not com-plete these scales. The .05 criterion was set for significance in alltests.

Results

Analysis of variance of the attitude scores on the primary prop-osition of the message resulted in three significant F-ratios. Asignificanteffectwas observedfor credibility(F =6.20), for mes-sage condition (F =10.71) and for the interaction between credi-bility and message (F =3.28). Although all of these significantdifferences were obtained, an Aramin!l.tionof the means of theexperimental conditions indicated that there was no support forthe two hypotheses concerned with attitude change (See Table 1).The obtained significant differences were attributable to initialcredibility, the high-credible source produced more change thanthe low-credible source, and to the persuasiveness of both thereward-oriented and the punishment-oriented messages in com-parison with the control groups. The punishment-oriented mes-sage tended to produce slightly more change than the reward-oriented message, but the difference was not significant (t < 1).The observed interaction can be attributed to the fact that theexperimental Ss exposed to the high-credible source changed theirattitudes much more in comparison to the control Ss than did theexperimental 5s exposed to the Iow-credible source.

90 The Journal of Communication,Vol. 21, March 1971

Table 1Means for Attitude and Source Credibility

High

InitialCredibility

Low

. Possible range of scores is 5-35. The higher the score, the more favorable towardthe concept.

.. Possible range of scores is 6-42. The higher the score, the higher the perceivedcredibility.

Analysis of variance of the authoritativeness scores resulted inonly one significant F-ratio, that for initial credibility (F =232.47).The source intended to be highly credible was perceived that wayby the control group and exposure to the experimental messagesdid not appear to alter Ss perceptions. The source intended to below-credible was perceived as moderately credible (almost exactlyat the neutral position) by the control Ss. The experimental Ssperceived him to be somewhat higher in authoritativeness, butdid not differ significantly from the controls.

Two significant F-ratios were obtained from the analysis ofvariance of the charactersscores,that for initial credibility (F =48.18) and that for message condition (F =23.92). The control Ssperceived the supposed high-credible source as moderately highand perceived the supposed low-credible source as moderatelylow. This difference was maintained subsequent to exposure tothe messages in the experimental conditions, however, both thereward-oriented and the punishment-oriented messages increasedthe perceived character of the experimental sources (See Table 1).

Although examination of the mean dynamism scores for thevarious conditions (See Table 1) indicates that both sources wereperceived as quite dynamic by both the experimental and thecontrol Ss, the analysis of variance of these scores resulted in three

Message Condition

Dependent Reward- Punishment-Variable Oriented Oriented Control

Attitude. 26.9 28.0 18.7Authoritativeness** 37.9 37.7 37.8Character** 32.6 31.7 27.7Dynamism" 34.4 35.1 30.5

Attitude. 21.9 23.1 20.0Authoritativeness.- 27.1 27.8 24.3Character. - 28.0 27.4 22.0Dynamism.- 35.0 35.5 36.2

McCroskey and Wright: Punishment and Reu;ard Messages 91

significant F-ratios; these were for initial credibility (F = 12.58),message condition (F =3.44), and interaction (F =7.50). Allof the cell means were essentially equal, however, except for thesupposed high-credible source in the control condition who wasperceived as considerably less dynamic than the source in anyother condition. This observation indicates that both the reward-oriented message and the punishment-oriented message increasedperceived dynamism in the high-credible condition but neitherhad any effect on dynamism in the low-credible condition.

Taken either individually or as a group, the results of the anal-yses of the three credibility dependent variables provide no sup-port for the third hypothesis of this investigation. No differentialeffects for type of experimental message cues were observed onterminal credibility.

Analysis of the message evaluation scales resulted in severalinteresting findings. The analyses for the "logical-illogical" and"objective-subjective" scales produced no significant F-ratios. Inall conditions the message was perceived as quite logical (5.8to 6.3 on a 7.0 scale) and approximately midway between objec-tive and subjective (3.8 to 4.1 on a 7.0 scale). Analysis of the"well-supported-poorly-supported" scale resulted in significantF-ratios for credibility (F =12.66) and interaction (F =3.95).The former appears to be a type of "halo-effect" in that the high-credible source was perceived as presenting a more well-sup-ported message than the low-credible source. The interactionwas a result of the reward-oriented message being perceived asbetter supported than the punishment-oriented message whenpresented by the high-credible source (6.2 to 5.8) but the punish-ment-oriented message being perceived as better supported thanthe reward-oriented when presented by the low-credible source(5.5 to 4.9). The reason for these perceptual differences is notclear.

Analyses of the results on the final two message evaluationscales provide the most important information bearing on thisinvestigation. Analysis of the "reward-oriented-punishment-ori-ented" scale produced only one significant F-ratio, that for mes-sage condition (F = 87.95). The supposed reward-orientedmessage was perceived as much more reward-oriented than thesupposed punishment-oriented message (5.4 to 2.9 on a 7.0 scale).

92 The Journal of Communication, Vol. 21. March 1971

It is clear from this result that the messages were perceived asintended. The analysis of the "reassuring-threatening" scaleresulted in two significant F-ratios, those for message condition(F == 18.42) and interaction (F == 6.19). While the punishment-oriented message was perceived as somewhat more reassuringthan the reward-oriented message when presented by the low-credible source (4.8 to 4.4 on a 7.0 scale), it was perceived asmuch more reassuring when presented by the high-credible source(5.7 to 4.2 on a 7.0 scale). If we take this scale as an index of feltanxiety (which we are not sure we should do), the results are thereverse of what might be expected. Talking about rewards shouldbe more reassuring than talking about punishments. However, thefact that the punishment-oriented message provided resolution forthe anxiety it attempted to create might explain why it was per-ceived as more reassuring. It was perceived as more reassuringbecause it needed to be, since it created more anxiety. Since it waseven more threatening when presented by a high-credible source,there was a need to resolve anxiety of even greater strength, thusit was perceived as even more reassuring. The foregoing, ofcourse, is purely speculative. There may be other, more parsi-monious explanations for these results.

Discussion

When results of research do not confirm hypotheses either oftwo circumstances may obtain. Either there are flaws in the de-sign of the research, or the hypotheses are not correct. In thisparticular case data obtained from the control groups indicatethat the credibility statements were perceived generally as in-tended. The low-credible source was not perceived as "superlow" but certainly low enough to provide a valid test of ourhypotheses unless our hypotheses are only relevant to the rarecase of the extremely low-credible source. Similarly, data obtainedfrom the experimental Ssindicated that they perceived the reward-oriented and punishment-oriented messages as intended. If therewere a differential effect on attitude or credibility produced bythese types of messages, it should have been observed in this in-vestigation. It was not.

It is very possible that some other variable not manipulated inthis investigation enters into the persuasive equation and con-

McCroskey and Wright: Punishment and Reu;ard Messages 93

founds the effects of these types of message appeals. If this is notthe case, the research on fear-arousing message appeals may in-deed tell us more about other types of message appeals than wehave yet realized. This will remain for later investigations to con-sider. At any rate the current investigation fails to provide suffi-cient evidence that reward-oriented and punishment-orientedappeals function differentially in persuasiye communication asthey would be expected to according to learning and consistencytheories.

~CES

1. Berlo, David K., James B. Lemert, and Robert J. ~Iertz. "Dimensionsfor Evaluating the Acceptability of ~fessage Sources:' Research Mono-graph. Department of Communication, Michigan State University, 1966.

2. Bugelski, B. R. The Psychology of Leaming Applied to Teaching. In-dianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964.

3. Cronkhite, Gary. Persuasion: Speech and Behaciorol Change. Indian-apolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1969.

4. Janis, Irving L., and Seymour Feshbach. "Effects of Fear-ArousingCommunications," Journal uf Abnormal and Social Psychology, 48:78-9-2,1953.

5. McCroskey, James C. "Scales for the Measurement of Ethos." SpeechMonographs, 33:65-72, 1966.

6. Miller, Gerald R. "Studies on the Use of Fear Appeals: A Summaryand Analysis," Central States Speech Journal, 14:117-124, 1963.

7. Miller, Gerald R., and M. A. HewgilI. "Some Recent Research on Fear-Arousing Message Appeals," Speech Monographs, 33:377-391, 1966.

8. Powell, F. A. "The Effect of Anxiety-Arousing Messages when Relatedto Personal, FamiIia1, and Impersonal Referents," Speech Monographs,32:102-106,1965.

9. Powell, F. A., and Gerald R. Miller. "Social Approval and DisapprovalCues in Anxiety-Arousing Communications," Speech Monographs, 34:152-159,1967.

10. Wenburg, John R. "The Relationships Among Audience Adaptation,Source Credibility and Types of Message Cues," Doctoral dissertation.East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1969.

11. Whittaker, J. O. "Resolution of the Communication Discrepancy Issuein Attitude Change." In: Attitude, Ego-Involcement and Change.(Edited by Carolyn W. and Muzafer Sherif) New York: Wiley, 1967,159-177.