EuropeanJournalofPoliticalResearch 30: 41-63(J uly 1996). 0 1996 Kluwer AcademicPublishers.PrintedintheNetherlands Thedissatisfiedsociety: Theroots of political change inItaly LEONARD0 MORLINO & MARC0 TARCHIDepartmentofPoliticalScience,UniversityofFlorence, Italy Abstract.Since early1990s in Italythere has beena major changeintheparty system.Some ofthe explanationsthat areoftenmentioned,such as corruption, theApril1993 referendum, the new electoral laws, or the secularization ofthe society and the economic crisis, are important aspects ofa complex funnel ofcausality. Together, however, they do not satisfactorily explain thechange.Thus,we identifyan idiosyncraticfactor,thechronic,widespreaddissatisfaction, thatexisted since the end ofthe1940s, and explore the reasons why this dissatisfaction caused change only in the1990s. The main explanations we suggest provide the basis for some specu- lations on changes in an Italian democracythatis still in a phase oftransformationin the mid- 1990s. Italyinthe1990s: Anannounced earthquake Sincetheearly1990sItalianpoliticshasenteredaphaseofapparently profound transformation. Within a period of just four years its party system, whichhadbeenstableforalmosthalfacentury,hasundergoneabasic realignment(seeMorlino1996). In1991, the oldCommunistParty(PCI) changed its name and its logo, becoming the Party ofthe Democratic Left (PDS) and later, in 1994, even changed its leadership. Anew protest party, the Northern League, emerged from the unificationofvarious local, auton- omistlists.Inthe1992 elections,thecrisisoftheChristianDemocracy (DC)becameevidentandtheprotestinNorthernItalyfoundastrong manifestationin the success ofthe League (see Table 1). In1993, the local elections held in J une and NovemberlDecember saw a rise in the fortunes of the League, the leftist parties, and even the far right Italian Social Movement (MSI). Before the legislative elections of March 1994, the traditionally dom- inant party in Italian politics, the Christian Democrats, and its most impor- tant governmental partner, the Socialist Party, had split and changed names. Anewparty,ForzaZfalia(FI),createdandheadedbytheTVtycoon Silvio Berlusconi, was victorious in these elections. There was also a radical turnoverofthe ruling class, and a subsequent cabinet composedofparties which had either been formed only very recently,such as FI, the Northern League,theChristianDemocraticCenter(CCD),andtheUnionofthe Center (UoLC), or which had previously always been excluded from govern- mentalcoalitions,suchas theItalianSocialMovement-NationalAlliance (MSI-AN). Table1 gives a pictureofthe changes in the parties and their electoral strength during the period1987-1994. 42 Tuble1.Partysystem change: Electoral results (1987-1994)(percentage ofthe vote) 198719921994" Christian DemocracyPopularParty34.329.711.1 Segni Pact --4.7 Communist PartyParty ofDemocratic Left26.616.120.4 CommunistRefoundation-5.66.1 ProletarianDemocracy1.7-- NorthernLeague1.38.78.4 MSVNationalAlliance5. 95.413.5 Socialist Party14.313.62.2 Go Italy! (Forza Italia)--21.0 Republican Party3.74.4- Democratic Alliance--1.2 Liberal Party2. 12.8- Social Democratic Party2. 92.7- Greens2.52.82.7 The Net(La Rete)-1.91.9 RadicalPartyPamella'sList2. 61.23.5 SiidtirolerVolkspartei0.50.5- Others1.64.63.6 aPercentage oftheproportional vote,whichallocates25percentofthetotalseats(seealso notes forclarificationson theelectoral system). Sources:Officialdata. Toappraise morethoroughlyhowsignificant thesepartychanges have been, the enormous amount of shifting in electoral behaviour may be roughly but effectively measured throughthe two main measures ofelectoral vola- tility, total electoral volatility (TEV) and inter-bloc volatility (IBV). These deal, respectively, with the total netshift ofthe vote betweenthe various lists,andtheshifting ofthevotebetweenthetwosides oftheleft-right divide.* Thus, the last general election held under the previous PR electoral law in 1992 had already presented a high degree of both TEV and IBV, that is, respectively 16 and 5percent. But the 1994 elections showed even higher levels of volatilities, at 41and 6 percent. This have not been seen since 1946, when the TEV was 43 percent, with an average TEV of6 percent in 1958- 1987 period and an average IBV of1.5 percent in the same era (see Morlino 1996). The March 1994 elections and the new Berlusconi cabinet, however, did not put an end to the change in the party system or in the democratic regime either. That is, in the mid-l990s,Italiandemocracy is still inan uncertain phase oftransition, as demonstrated bythe schism in the Northern League attheend of1994(OctoberDecember),bythe split ofthenewPopular Party (PPI) in two new formations in early 1995, and even by the victory of the centre-left parties, that is the leftist wings of the Popular Party, the Party of the Democratic Left(PDS), the Communist Refoundation(PdRC) and 43 others, in nine regions out of fifteen in the regional and municipal elections ofApril 1995. Furthermore, these changes are not taking place within the common demo- cratic procedures ofself-transformation that occur in all democracies. They are the consequence ofthe uncovering ofwidespread political corruption in differentsectors, especially inthepublic chemical industry,public works, theprivatebuildingsector,andwelfareinstitutions.Sinceearly1992, a number of prosecutions have been brought against ministers, under-secretar- ies, deputies, and party leaders. In addition, other changes have taken place. These include thetransformationofpartyorganizations in traditional and newparties(seeBardi&Morlino1992; Morlino1996), ofrelationships between interest groups and parties (see Morlino 1996), and of electoral laws (see Bartolini & DAlimonte 1995), that followed an important referendum in April 1993. At the same time, the early 1990s were also characterized by harsh conflicts betweenthe political class and the judiciary, and among the constitutionalpowers,suchastheheadofstate,theprimeminister,the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Council of Magistrature, and other public authorities. In short, there is no doubt that a major upheaval is underway, whichwill eventually resultina Second Republic substituting the First, founded in 1946 in the aftermath ofthe fall offascism and the monarchy. Inthisarticle, ifweassume thatthe explanandumis the change inthe partysystem andofthe constituent parties, whatis the explanans? Some ofthephenomenamentionedabove,suchas corruption,theApril1993 referendum and the new electoral laws, are important aspects ofa complex funnel ofcausality. Additional factors may be added, such as the seculariz- ationofsociety andtheeconomic crisis duringtheseyears.Allofthem together,however,are still unableto explain satisfactorily the phenomena we are discussing. In fact some of the possible causes mentioned above are common to several other Europeancountries, countries wheresimilar profoundpartychange has not taken place. The development of anti-political sentiments is the most evident common feature ofthese countries (see Poguntke1993). Thus, the main explanations ofthe Italian case must be idiosyncratic, but the specifi- cally Italian phenomena we mentioned above are also largely inadequate for explaining why such change took place in the early 1990s, and not earlier or later, For example,corruption and scandals litter a half-century ofItalian democracy, yet crisis and changes of the contemporary magnitude never took place. On the contrary, party stability was very high. Therefore, we needto identify adeeper, long-term, idiosyncratic factor to understand better an apparent, profound change such as we are discussing. Withoutit,anyexplanationisboundtobepartialandincomplete.We contend that such a factor is the chronic, widespread dissatisfaction, that had existed since the end ofthe1940s invarious differentformats, butwhich was only able to manifest itself fully inthe early 1990s when the constraints 44 on its expression disappeared and, simultaneously, certain additional incen- tives for its manifestation appeared. To give empirical support in this article to our main hypothesis, wewill show, first, that there has indeed existed such a long-term factor, which we define as chronic dissatisfaction within Italian civil society and, furthermore, that it has existed since the end ofWorld War Two. The characteristics and reasons for such dissatisfaction will be analyzed by stressing its persistence andtransformationoverhalfacenturyandbycomparing itwiththatof other European countries. Second, the reasons for how and why such dissatis- faction existed for decades,butonlycaused change inthe1990s, willbe explored.Inotherwords,theobstaclesto,andtheincentivesfor,its expression as well as thereasonsforthe weakening ofobstacles andthe emergence of incentives will be identified. The main explanations we suggest will provide the basis for some speculations on change in a democracy that is still in a phase oftransformation in the mid-1990s. Democratic deficit, consolidation and crisis Ifweassume thatademocratic regimeenjoys legitimacy whenthereis a beliefthatthe existing political institutions are the least evil ofthe forms of government (Linz 1978: 18), whatever criteria we adopt to measure this (see Schaar 1981; Weatherford 1992), Italian democracy has had a low level of legitimacy since its beginning in the late 1940s. The prevailing feelings of Italian citizens when they were interviewed about the political system were mistrust and resentment. In the195Os, the majority ofthem considered the state as a separate and inaccessible entity (see Guidorossi 1984). Alienation,detachment and other negative attitudes towards the political system, which some scholars recorded in the 1950s both in elite sectors (see Luzzatto Fegiz 1956) and at the mass level (see Almond & Verba 1963; La Palombara1965), wereakeyfeatureoftheexclusive consolidation(see Morlino 1991) ofpost-war Italiandemocracy. After the fall offascism, it was impossible for the new dominant coalition to integrate into the democ- racythosesocial groupswhichhadwholeheartedlysupportedthequasi- totalitarianregime,anymorethantheleftist forces which viewedthe re- establishmentofpluralism onlyasafirststeptowardssocialrevolution. However,theconsolidationwasachieved essentially becausethegapin legitimacy was compensatedforbya reinforcedcontrol overcivil society through the party penetrationofpublic institutions, mainly in the economic sector (see Morlino 1991). In the context of high bipolarization at the interna- tional level, and with the explicit support ofthe Catholic Church which still enjoyed considerable consensus and prestige within the general p~pul ati on,~ such astrategy wasthewinning solution.Atthesame time,resorting to practices of corruption and patronage,such as a strongly instrumentaluse of public debt and the pursuit ofthe exchange vote, increased the ineffi- 45 ciencyandunresponsiveness ofinstitutions,undermining theirintegrative character (see March & Olsen 1989; Cartocci 1993). Thus, fora long periodthis lack ofsupport expressed itself insporadic outbursts ofdiscontent, but fundamentally it was blocked and channelled by variousconstraining conditions.The ideological bipolarizationdueto the strength of the communist/anticommunist cleavage, the gatekeeping function performed by political parties as regards social demands, and the patronage system ofrelationships between citizens and public administration hampered all concrete designs ofradical transformation ofthe political system. Above all, whenprotestroseto dangerlevels, thepartieswereabletoactas a barrier to change. This is what happened in 1968-1969, when dissent mani- fested itself in a massive way, and in the following years, when terrorism - which was a sign ofthe reflux ofprotest into an extreme minority milieu - removed all desire for change from the moderate segments of public opinion. From1966 to1973, butespecially in1968/69, despite the constraints of strong cultural identities and the role performedby political partiesas the gatekeepersofsocio-economic interests intheparliamentaryarena,Italy experienceda growth ofdissatisfaction whichacquired a higher degree of visibility. Some social movements, such as the student movement,feminist groupsandtradeunions,tooktheleadinprotestcharacterizedbynon- conventional forms ofconflictual participation (strikes, demonstrations,sit- ins, occupying public buildings). The wave of social disorder was compounded by the action of the histori- cal opposition parties. In the 1971/72 elections, the far right MSI reaped the rewardsofastrong lawand order campaign andthenumberofits MPs doubled, whereas in1975/76 the Communists voicedthe demands of pro- gressive sectors of public opinion and came very close to a plurality of votes.4 Itwasevidentthat,twentyyearsafteritsestablishment,thedemocratic regime was still suffering from a legitimacy gap. The opening of the govern- mental coalition to the Socialists since the mid-1960s was not able to close this.Onthecontrary,its sideeffects provedto behighlyheterogeneous cabinets characterized by strong disagreement among the partners on single policies,andconsequentcabinetinstability,compoundedbytheexisting fragmentation and fractionalization ofthe party system (see Sartori 1973). Fromthevantage point ofthe challenges to regime stability, the phase beginning in 1976 was one ofdeep crisis, but at the same time the bases for recoverywereinplace.Infact,therewasanintensification ofterrorist episodes(seeDellaPorta& Tarrow1986), and, fromthis perspective,a radicalization of political conflict and the creation of a climate of emergency. But such a climate encouraged compromise among the leaders ofthe major parties.In addition to isolating terrorist groups, the cooperative attitude of thePCI,whichenteredtheparliamentarymajoritysupportingthethird Andreotti cabinet in 1976 with the famous formula ofnon-sfiducia, that is, nonno-confidence, andinterruptedits traditionaloppositionduringthe period ofnational solidarity (J une 1977-January1979), allowed the demo- 46 cratic integration ofsome extremist fringes ofthe Left. Thanks to this posi- tion, the regime survived the height of the crisis, epitomized by the kidnap- ping and the murder ofthe President of the Christian Democrats and former Prime Minister, Aldo Moro, in March and May 1978, and provided the basis for re-consolidation, which can be considered to have been accomplished by the beginning of the following decade. Several factors influenced the development of the Italian crisis of the 1970s, which was deeper than the crisis ofgovernability or overload which shook other Western European countries during the same years. First, there was the control that the parties - in spite ofthe increasing criticism oftheir role - still wielded over social actors. During this period, one voter out ofseven was amember ofa party(see Bardi& Morlino 1992). Second, there was the issue ofthe strength ofsubcultural identities. Despite the secularization oftheCatholic peopieand therestructuringofindustrial processes which was transforming the working class, Church hierarchies and trade unions had not in fact lost their capacity to regulate collective tensions. In addition, a third element is the role performed bymass media and opinion-makers in freezing theconfiguration ofpolitical alternatives.Infact, itwasduring these years that certain newspapers, such as La Repubblica and I1 Giorna- le, werecreated:theywereexplicitly designed to orientatethepolitical choices of the middle classes, dispelling the fear of a jump into the darkness. Important editors came out in persuading readers to keep their confidence in the old par tie^.^Once the critical point was passed, protest emerged again from the mid- 1980s around new issues with new actors, and in new ways. Between 1976 and 1983 the non-voters party, which included abstentions, blank and spoilt ballots - possible common indicators ofunease - grew dramatically from 9 to 16 percentofthe electorate (see Nuvoli & Spreafico 1990), but later it stabilized and slightly decreased. In the most developed areas of the country, opinion polls stressed an increased attention to postmaterialist values (see Inglehart 1977). Although in a less pronounced way than in other advanced industrial societies (see Inglehart1990; Inglehart & Abramson1994), these attitudes manifested themselves through ecology movements. In 1985, Green representatives were elected for the first time to city, provincial and regional Councils, and two years later environmentalists arrived in the National Parlia- ment. Moreover,the decreased importance ofclass and religious cleavages openedup aspace fornewdividing lines toemergeandforlocalism to spread beyond its traditional strongholds (South Tyrol, Sardinia, Friuli-Vene- zia Giulia, Valle &Aosta), leading to the electoral success ofthe Liga Veneta in 1983. Outside the institutional arena, the multiplication of voluntary asso- ciations,ad hoc committees, civic initiatives and opinion movements con- siderably expandedthefieldofpolitical participation(seeDellaPorta& Rucht 1992). 47 Whichdissatisfaction? On the basis of existing research,and extrapolating from Di Palma(1970: 30ff.), itispossibletoconceiveatleasttwoformsofdissatisfaction:a pragmatic dissatisfaction, that is an immediate, more pragmatic expression of discontent with the working of democratic institutions, probably concerning a moderate opinion in many ways linked to governmental and centrist parties; and a more active, radicaland deeply-rooted ideologicaldissatisfaction, re- lated and consequent to a disaffection, virtually permanent and more danger- ous for regimestabilitybecauseofits connectionwithalternativecultural values, at least until the early 1980s (see Di Palma1970, and below).6 Fromthe picturewesketched above,the first conclusion we might draw is that both attitudes, as shown by research (see Luzzatto Fegiz 1966; Almond & Verba1963; LaPalombara1965, andothers),andpoliticalbehaviour seemmutuallyconsistent.Thatis,duringthe1950sand1960s,deeper, ideological dissatisfaction finds expression in the vote for anti-regime extrem- ist parties; and, later on, during the next decade and at least since the end of 1960s, dissatisfaction finds numerous other forms of behavioural expression in different types ofprotest (see above). Looking at these years, it also appears that,betweenthetwomainformsofdissatisfaction,theideologicaland radical one prevails, while the pragmatic one is hard to locate, excepting the comments ofcertain moderate conservative columnists. The survey data from Eurobarometer may help us to give empirical support to this seemingly obvious conclusion. As suggested by Kuechler (1991: 280- 281), and in spite of the limits of single indicator measurement, the question on satisfactioddissatisfaction with the way democracy works may be picked upas anunspecific indicatorwherecognitiveandaffectiveelementsare presentatthe same time.From our vantagepoint, the mainasset ofthis indicator is that it has been replicated for more than twenty years since 1973, and trends are easily discernible. At first glance,however,thesedataprovideanimmediatesurprise.As Figure1 clearly shows, the number ofpeople in Italy who openly declared themselves to be dissatisfied with the working of democracy is very high and, inaddition, is considerablyhigherthan inallother countriesoftheEC. Thus, first, ifthe rather dissatisfied and the very dissatisfied are added,7 the gapbetweenthe percentageofdissatisfiedpeopleinItalyand thatofthe other EC countriesneverfallsbelow24 percent(in1988) and risesto 40 percent in 1977, a year characterized by intense terrorist activity and trouble in several Italian universities. Ofcourse, it is hardly surprising that the peak ofthis phenomenonis in the second halfofthe 1970s, whenthe action of mass movements was substituted bya more violent,radicaland Clite form ofprotest, namely terrorism. Tothedifferencesinthelevelsofdissatisfactionaretobeaddedthe differences in the trends. Figure 1 also shows that the trends are only similar insomeyears- 1991-1993for example- butnotinothers. Therefore, 48 t 10.0 *O*OII--3- Iialy Figure1.Dissatisfaction withdemocracy,1973-1993. differencesinbothfeatures,levelsandtrends,pointtoidiosyncratic explanatory factors: in looking for such explanations, the common economic aspects have to be excluded as wellas pastauthoritarianexperiences that Greece, Spain and Portugal have also had. The main idiosyncratic factor to recall is thestatism, characterizing the political cultureexpressedinthefamousproverbpiove, govern0ludro (literally, its raining, thief of a government).This is common to societies withintegrationproblemswherethepublicinstitutionsaredistantfrom society, the solution ofany problem is demanded ofthe institutions,and a consequent all-pervading roleofthe governmentis acceptedand even re- quested.Ifthere is such a conceptionand, at the same time, the existing problemsarenotsolvedforseveralreasons(economic,bureaucratic,or others),agapbetweendemandsandoutcomesisclearlyperceivedand dissatisfaction becomes obvious. lo Some empirical support for this hypothesis can also be seen in Figure 2. In fact, it wouldbe possible to maintainthathigh levels ofdissatisfaction are a basic, characterizing aspect of Italian culture, and consequently we do not needany actual causal explanation. This opinion is contradicted by the analysis of another kind ofdissatisfaction, concerning more generally overall life - how people live and evaluate their life. In this context, the differences withtheotherEuropeancountries disappear,andthegapwithpolitical dissatisfaction is very wide, How, though, is it possible to understand better the high Italian dissatis- 49 P 30.0-/- 10.0 20.0t 0 . 0 : IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII Figure2.Different kinds ofdissatisfaction, Italy, 1973-1993. faction? The mostimmediate replycould come from the separation ofthe two levelsofdissatisfaction('rather'and'very'dissatisfied)andfromthe identification of the lower level with pragmatic dissatisfaction and the higher withits ideologicalcounterpart, whichis also more radical.Infact, this is our basic hypothesis. But it needs a few qualifications. When both levels are considered, the meaning ofdissatisfaction changes over time. Figure 3 shows howthe revolutionaryperspectiveon changedisappears fromthe political alternatives whichare presentinItalybetween1976and1980,coincident withthe defeat ofterrorism.At the same time, the reformistalternative is muchfavoured from the beginning,growing withthe passageoftime, and even higher than in other European countries. Furthermore,amongthe dissatisfiedpeoplethemoremoderate option, that is gradual change byreforms,is much higherthan the other two and, during the 1983-1990period, is chosen by up to 78 percent ofthose people. Inaddition, the proportionwanting revolutionarychange declines from16 percentin1976to6percentin1988."This resultis consistentwith,and morespecific than, the previousone, butfrom our perspectiveit confirms thepresenceofan overlapbetweenthe twoforms ofdissatisfaction.The trend,however,seemstobetowardsagrowingpragmatismratherthan towards ideological and extremist options. Finally,inspite ofdoubts manifestedbyKuechler(1991),the choice of 'defending society against subversive forces' is also declining as it goes from themeanof28 percentofthe1977-1981periodto thatof18percentin 50 50.0 #40.0 30.0 20.0 -=-- Gradual c h a w--+-FiOht to pr eMr n ? .t a 0.04IIIIIII: I : ;I :t Figure3.Dissatisfaction withdemocracy and societal change, 1976-1990. 1986-1990.Theeffect ofmoderationevenseems toemergeinthethird choice, in spite ofits lower consistency with the other two. It goes without saying that the identity ofthe very dissatisfied, as well as their willingness to mobilize, changes according to the content ofprevailing issues during the period under consideration. We contend that at least three peaks can be distinguished in the general trend ofdissatisfaction described by Figure 1. The first (1976-1979)is characterized by tensions related to the terrorist challenge to civil order.The second (1983-1984)reflects the reac- tions to the perceived malfunctioning ofthe industrial relations system. The third(1991-1993)is linked to the corruptionscandals. In each phase,the very dissatisfied people, who are supposed to be more sensitive to ideological appeal,emphasize theirnegative evaluationoftheworking ofdemocracy whilstthe others, who appearmorepragmatic,also adopta less negative position on these issues. Thus, as the1980s unfold,the same ideological dissatisfaction seems in- directly and directly to become more moderate. First of all, the democratic choice is really majoritarian. Table 2 stresses again the differences between Italy and other Europeancountries, butat thesame time itdemonstrates thatmorethan70percentofpeoplesupportdemocracy.Inaddition,a more recent survey (see Diamanti & Segatti 1994) points out that in 1994 a preferencefor democracy is declared by 77percentofpeopleand that the other three replies are also the same as those for other EC countries in 1992. This means that there is: (1) an obvious overlap between democratic choice and deep dissatisfaction; (2) a probable overlap between the same democratic choiceandideological dissatisfaction.Infact,withreferencetothefirst point, if the very dissatisfied account for 33 percent in 1991, and 44/49 percent 51 Table 2.Attitudes toward democracy: Italy and European Community (in 70) 19861992 ItalyECItalyEC Democracy is preferable74787278 Authoritarianismis preferable139149 All the same131288 Dont know/No answer0165 EC =12countries. Source: Eurobarometer,November 1986 and Spring 1992 surveys. Table 3. LeWRight self-placement in Italy,1973-1991(in %O 19731980198519901991 Left (1-2)14.816.014.710.39.8 Center-Right(7-8)10.38.19.88.18.8 Right (9-10)5.93.74.53.83.7 Center-Left(3-4)22.222.722.219.617.6 Center (5-6)29.533.935.331.732.8 D.k./N.a.17.215.613.526.527.4 Source: Eurobarometersurveys. inthefollowing years, and democratic solutions are preferred by72 to 77 percent of people, then the partial overlap is very evident, above all in recent years. The overlap between democratic choice and ideological dissatisfaction is additionally suggested by the democratic integration ofextremist parties and the growth of centre positions (see Table 3). This also implies a deradical- ization of ideological dissatisfaction that deserves to be analyzed more closely (see below). Thesestatements mayalsobeconfirmedfromadifferentperspective. Dissatisfaction and criticism, in fact, rarely turn into nostalgia for the pre- vious non-democratic experience. The marginality ofauthoritarian choice is attested to byboth behavioural indicators - civil order and the absence of strong extremist,anti-regime parties- and survey data. With referenceto the latter, in1985, 16 percent ofthe people who were interviewed on which form ofgovernment they considered to be the best for their country showed a preferencefor authoritarianism;four percentwerepure authoritarians and ideologically motivated.The others (12 percent)could be classified as neo-authoritarians, whose opposition to democracy was caused bydisap- pointmentwiththeinefficacy ofgovernments insolving specific problems (see Morlino & Mattei 1992). The meaning ofdissatisfaction is clarified even more when lefdright self- placement and party voteare considered.Infact from our vantage point, otherclassical variablessuchasincome,age,andregionaremuchless meaningful. As for income, it is sometimes even possible to find high dissatis- 52 faction among the highest income, but this result is too random and just not common enough to support a different hypothesis. With reference to age, it is obvious that during the 1970s, the highest dissatisfaction was expressed by young people aged from 25 to 34, who participated in the juvenile movements and suffered theproblemofunemployment.During the following decade the same phenomenon is less accentuated,and discontentalso emerges at anolderage,around60. Whenthishappens,in1991-1992andlater,it seems to point to the crucial reshaping of welfare institutions, the economic crisis ofthese years and the reactions to them.I3 Another possible interesting variable would be the region where the dissat- isfiedpeoplelive,thatisthegeographical locationofdissatisfaction. The possible salience ofthis variable depends on the fact that it has often been used to explain protestin the early1990s.Many scholars have interpreted the success ofautonomist and federalist Leagues in the Northern regions as an electoral manifestation of discontent by small businessmen and profession- als in the industrial North and North-East. According to such interpretation, theirprotestisorientedagainststatebureaucraciesandthehighcostof an overgrown welfare system, accused ofbeing exclusively orientedto the parasitic development ofthe South (see Diamanti 1995). As a support for this hypothesis,the harsh punishmentinflicted byNorthernvoterson the parties ofthe First Republic is frequently mentioned. A regional disaggregation ofEurobarometer survey data does not, how- ever, corroborate this hypothesis. Apparently, ifvery dissatisfied and rather dissatisfied are seen either separatelyor together, electoral analyses which consider the South and the islands as the core of the Italian protest vote (see Caciagli & Spreafico 1975)are strengthened.The peaksofdissatisfaction always emerge intheSouth andtheislands,withtheexceptionof1985, when a higher dissatisfaction emerges in the Centre. Particularly during the wholeperiod1973-1992,bothNorth-Westernand North-Easternregions only three times show higher figures than the national average. Left/Right dimension, vote and dissatisfaction If we take into account lefdright self-placement, our findings are the expected ones up until the early 1990s, but not beyond that. More interesting, although fairly easy toexplain,isthehighdissatisfaction shown inthe centre(see Figure 4). The simple explanationis that,as seen in Table 3,the centrists are morenumerous.Atthesametime,however,thestrong presenceof thosepeoplewhodidnotexpressdoubtstowardsdemocracybytaking extreme ideological positions, but who nonetheless expressed growing criti- cismagainstthepresentpoliticalinstitutions,hastoberecognizedand stressed. Thevotefordifferentpartiesalsopointstothesalienceofpragmatic dissatisfaction among moderate people. In fact, at various moments this kind 53 45.0 35.0 30.0 25.0 1 20.0 15.0 10.0 5*0 o.ot-t-+-+-iIi :I :IIIIIII :I Figure4.Dissatisfactionwithdemocracyandleft-rightself-placement,Italy,1973-1993. Percentageofthosedissatisfied varyfromvariousgroups:L,left;CL,center-left;C,center; CR, center-right; R,right. ofdissatisfaction among centrist voters is as high as that among leftist ones. Also among the voters for extreme parties, those who are rather dissatisfied are growing in number and sothey reach the same high levels as for centrist voters. Wesuggestthattheconnectionbetweenattitudesofstrongpragmatic criticism, becauseofa negative evaluationofdemocratic performance,and a preference for traditional opposition forces is also confirmed by the analysis ofvoting intentions for specific parties, when the rather dissatisfied and the verydissatisfiedare consideredseparately.Inthe twodecades covered by thesurvey,thehighestdegreeofdissatisfaction hasbeenexpressedeight times byextreme leftist voters (ProletarianDemocracy and Communist Re- foundation), seven times bythe extreme right ofthe MSI, twice bythose of theRadicalParty,thatis the libertarianLeft,and ofthe PCI. However, beyondthe surface appearance, these figures hide a more complicatedsitu- ation. First, i t should be noted that the PCI dissatisfactionfigures reachedtheir apexin1975-1976(Figure5a).Thesewereyearsofhighlycompetitive elections and ofa direct confrontationwith the governments, which sharp- enedtheideologicalpolarizationinthecountry.Inthesame periodthe evaluation of MSI voters also became even more negative (Figure 5b). In the followingyearsdissatisfactiondeclinedconsiderablyand stabilizedaround mediudhigh values, increasing only during the period ofthe Tangentopoli14 scandal for the Communistor ex-Communistleft. For a lot ofCommunist sympathizers, criticism of the defects of the capitalist system is kept distinct 54 80.0 70.0 60.0 50.0 le40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 I Figure5a. PCI-PDS:party voteand dissatisfactionwithdemocracy,1973-1992. 80.0 70.0 60.0 50.0 le40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 0 . 0 4 : 1 IIIIIIIIIIIIIII iFigure56.MSI:party voteand dissatisfactionwithdemocracy,1973-1992. from their judgmentofinstitutions.The national solidarity experience of 1977-1979 had a remarkable influence on such attitudes. With regard to the MSI, its voters maintain a very negative opinion of the Italian model of democracy, with precise ideological implications. As Morlino and Mattei (1992) show, there was a very high proportion ofpure authori- tarians among sympathizers ofthe extreme right movement. However, this trendis constantly declining (Figure 5b), ifwe leave aside the reactions to 55 FigureSc. DC: party voteanddissatisfactionwithdemocracy,1973-1992. 70.0 60.0 1 \\ 50.0 40.0 ap 30.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 n m m r - m m o - ~r - r - c r - r - c m m m 3 $ 5 8 f S % $ ~ 2z m mzzzmzmmmmm- - - - - z z z z z z- -Figure5d.PSI: party voteand dissatisfactionwithdemocracy,1973-1992. the corruption scandals. I t will be interesting to see whether the participation in Berlusconi's government of the MSZ-Alleanza Nazionale will lead its voters to become even less critical ofthe system, accomplishing their (late) integra- tion into democracy in this way, in parallel with that of the (ex-)Communists. Onthewhole,thetrendofthe twogroups ofextremistvoters is similar: decline in the numbers ofthe very dissatisfied and growth in the numbers of the rather dissatisfied. 56 As expected, deeper dissatisfaction is relatively low among the supporters oftraditional governmental parties (DC and PSI)(Figures 5c,d). It is also not surprising that lowest levels ofnegative attitudes are expressed bythe group of Christian Democrat voters. The relevant proportion of the typically discontented among the followers ofthe DC coalition partners (PSI, PSDI, PRI),althoughfollowing sharplyinthecourseofthe1980s,isanother indicator of the peculiar character ofthe Italian malaise. It indicates that for a long time Italians have beenaccustomed to the dominance of the parties which they despise and regard as responsible for the malfunctioning of public life, but at the same time they seek their patronage whenever their personal interestsareinv01ved.l~TheEurobarometersurveysprovideuswithonlyoneobservationon NorthernLeague and the Net(Rete) voters. But even this gives us an idea ofthe relevance ofan anti-party position in an explanation oftheir success inthe1992elections.Thefigures areindeedmuchhigherthanthoseof another recently-formed movement - the Greens - which is equally charac- terized by a non-institutional appeal. l6 Inaddition to Eurobarometer data, other researchconfirms the average profile ofthe dissatisfied citizen as a person with a low propensity towards directpoliticalinvolvement.Hismistrustofpoliticalagents(institutions, partiesandtherulingclass) doesnotoriginate fromignorancebutfrom everyday knowledge ofthe bureaucratic machine, ofits slowness and ofits inefficiency (Rovati 1992): once again pragmatic dissatisfaction emerges as a crucial factor. Disappearing constraints and growing incentives To sum up briefly our results so far: Italian dissatisfaction is the highest in Europe; with the passage oftime the moderate, pragmatic dissatisfaction is growing whereas more extreme, ideological, dissatisfaction is declining. Why the existing pragmatic dissatisfaction is not overtly expressed, in spite of its level, has still to be explained. For a while, and particularly during the 1980s, the prevailing dissatisfaction has beenchanging andthus the possibility of its being expressed is also growing. Even ideological dissatisfaction can be betteranddifferently expressedwhenthegradualintegrationofextreme parties clarifies the fact that they do not offer a radical critique of the regime but rather the option ofdifferent values that are still within the democratic domain. Thus, from our vantage point, the key question is concerned with what allows such dissatisfaction to be expressed in a way that provokes the subsequent breakdown, split and disappearance ofmoderate parties, such as theChristianDemocrats,Socialists andtheothermoderategovernmental parties (Republicans, Liberals, and Social Democrats). The salience ofthequestion weraisealso lies inthe fact that,whereas intentions and behaviours ofthe actors directly involved in protest events - 57 activists and trespassers oflaw, those who dare,to quote Tarrow (1989) - haveoftenbeenanalyzed,thepassive dissatisfied peoplehavealways been ignored or glossed over. And yet, as the 1994 earthquake has demon- strated,evenawidespreaddiscontentwithoutapparentmanifestationsof protest can cause a political upheaval when constraints disappear and other facilitating conditions emerge. l7 Put chronologically, the first constraining factor to mention is the collective memory of fascism and the War. As is well known, since its re-establishment in the second half ofthe 1940s, Italian democracy has enjoyed legitimacy by default,asareactionagainstthepastfascistexperience.Thatis,fora long time the memory offascism has prevented people from acting against democraticinstitutions.In this vein, the manifestation ofdissatisfaction by moderatepeoplehasalsobeenstopped:theperceivedinefficacyof institutionsinfulfilling basic demandswas kept frozen by that memory of some ofthe worst moments in recent Italian history. Throughout the 1970s and, above all, in the following decade, in spite ofthe emergence ofa small young neo-authoritarian component, the memory ofthe past has gradually faded away with the turnover of generations. Fascism is no longer an impend- ing danger from any point ofview. Relatedtothismemory,theanti-communistroleofmoderateparties slowly disappeared following declarations oftheir leaders, first ofall among Christian Democrats. The defeat of terrorism in the early 1980s was the first step inthis direction, buttheintegrationofthe left was thesecond more importantmoment.Therefore,whenanewinternationalsettingemerged outofthebreakdownofEasternEuropeanSocialist regimes,asymbolic momentemerged thatbroughtthe Communists to form a new party.The old fears within moderate opinion disappeared as well, and moderate voters became free to express their dislike for thosesame parties for whichthey had in the past felt compelled to vote while holding their noses. They did this by shifting their consent to new movements. Along with the secularization ofsociety and de-ideologization ofpolitics - twowidespreadphenomenainWesternEurope- andtheconsequent disintegration of Catholic subculture, the diminishing polarization of conflicts weakened all anchors ofpartisanship, party attachments included. Let it be stressedthatatthispointthecompetitivespaceobviously becamemuch broader and more continuous, that is, it became possible for the moderate, centristelectorateto voteforbothleftist and rightist parties withoutany particular fear or with only a limited psychological and ideological resistance. New conflictual issues appeared and previously latent cleavages, such as the centre/periphery cleavage, re-emerged. The same developed party organiza- tions were undermined, as other organizational constraints were also disap- pearing. The bases for the expression of dissatisfaction, becoming ever more pragmatic, were laid. But it was still not sufficient for the latent crisis to turn into an open one. In fact, more than 45years ofregime stability had been fostered by the 58 heterogeneityofdemands advancedbythosewho challenged the regime. From this perspective, the high extent of dissatisfaction is also an indicator of the variety and incompatibility of their motives. In his research on Italian protest cycles, Tarrow (1989) emphasizes the confluence in the political arena of at least eight different streams of demands, ranging from claims for rights, benefits and special policies to the assertion ofdeniedcollective identities (see Tilly 1978). In Italy, diffidence towards politics presented a composite structure, where radicalism and alienation, desire for new forms ofinvolve- mentandapathy,pragmatismandutopianvisionswerepresentsimulta- neously. In the end, a facilitating factor for governmental action directed at reabsorbing tensions has been the difficult coexistence ofa rightist protest, with some authoritarian aspects; a leftist protest, aimed at the enlargement ofsocial equality and democracy; and also centrist dissatisfaction, already mentioned, mainly ifnot exclusively driven by the desire to improve public services and administrative efficiency. In other words, in a situation of dead- lock such as has just been described, the emergence ofa few incentives has also been decisive in determining the moment when open crisis and change took place. In the Italian case, the incentives which emerge at the very beginning of 1990 are of a different sort, but they can be reduced to three: the delegitimat- ing impact of the inquiry called Mani Pulite, the economic crisis, the referen- dum ofApril1993 and the consequent change ofelectoral laws for Parlia- ment.Letusstressimmediatelythatthereisarecurring,well-known connection in political science between the fading away of constraining condi- tionsandthedevelopment ofincentives forchange,and once again it is confirmed in our case. Thus, first,scandals andcorruptionhave beenrecumng inItalyinthe 1950sandthefollowingdecades:thefrontpagesofall newspapershave recorded all these episodes ofcorruption, but no real political consequence cameofituntiltheearly1990s.Beforethis,theconstraintswerestill functioning. Conversely, in recent years the prosecutors have been conscious ofthe support ofthe people and could find room for higher autonomy vis Ztvis executive power, and this same fact was an important element in develop- ing all prosecutions. But since 1992, the news of the widespread corruption in every sector of public lifeand, above all, the impact ofa specific trial, broadcast bya public channel every evening for almost two months,has provokedastrong delegitimationofallDC and PSIleaders.20 Fromthis perspective, the element to stress is that the action of a neutral power, such as the magistrature, gave the dissatisfied sectors ofcitizenship the stimulus to cut their links with traditional parties.21 Second, for decades the traditional decisional inefficacy ofItalian institu- tions has been counterbalanced by efficacy at the micro-and local level. In fact, a large basic amount ofspecific clientelist demands have been imple- mented through wide ad hoc legislation (the so-called leggine) (see Predieri 1963). This was made possible bythe consociational routine which led ma- 59 jorityandoppositiontocooperateinParliamentarycommittees.Sucha systemofpatronage,whichalsotookotherforms,compensatedforthe disequilibria ofrepresentative functions. To be sure, this meant a growth of sottogoverno, but it also allowed for some sort offunctioning ofthe politi- cal-administrativemachine.Inthenewcontext,theprolongedeconomic crisis and the impossibility ofgoing on with the same patronage system, also a product ofthe waste ofresources involved in it, broughtto the fore the unbearablecosts ofthe protractedpartisanoccupation ofthestate and of that patronage system additionally favoured by the progressive expansion of state intervention. At this point, corruption, exacerbated partisanship, the inefficiency ofthe civil service, and even collusion between institutional powers and organized crime, couldbecomethe maintargets for themobilizing controversiesof new and old political leaders and associations ofprotest with some chance of success. And in fact, the regional Leagues, La Rete, Segnis movement in favour ofreferenda,the Greens, the neo-communists, and the plethora of single-issue lists had already emerged since the 1990 local elections or a little bit later. Let us stress again that with the exception of the Uomo Qualunque in 1946,22discontent caused only modest gains of electoral vote for extremist parties for at least two decades and no mass movement was born until the early 1990s. Third, the April 1993 referendum prepared by some ofthe old traditional leaders- particularly bythe Christian Democrat Mario Segni - expressed the demand ofthe electorate for changing electoral laws in a majoritarian direction, inthe hope thatthis wouldbring a higher decisional efficacy of Parliament. They were the laws, however,that set in motion a well-known process ofanticipated reactions. Thus, whereas the Socialists were actually destroyed bythe Tangentopoliprosecutions,the DC, only partially woun- ded bythe scandals and internallydeeply divided,was caught bythe bi- polarizing tendencies ofquasi-majoritarianelectoral laws passed in August 1993. Thus, eventually the intertwining ofundermined constraints and growing incentives pavedthe wayfor peopleinexpressing theirattitudesofcivis infelixet i r ~ t u s , * ~ for too long hiddenand blockedbyother reasons. This also explains why the change ofthe latent crisis into an open one was an earthquake in terms ofthe change ofparties, and also ofthe party system (see the first section and Morlino 1996). Whatnext? - Concluding remarks According to the picture we have sketched, post-war Italy can be described as a permanentlydissatisfied society, which only survived its latent support deficit because ofa series ofconstraining structural factors. The disclosure ofthe long-repressed dissatisfaction, due to the disappearance ofconstraints and emergence ofincentives, has beenthe basic determining factor inthe abrupt realignmentofthe partysystem and ofits re-orientation towards a bipolar dynamic, which could eventually lead to a regime change. TheconsequencesofthepresentchangeintheItalianregimearestill unclear, although the reasons for the change also suggest why it will be slow and contradictory. As stated above, dissatisfaction arises for several reasons and demands are numerous and conflictual. At the moment it is even difficult to predict whether such a transformation will be restrictedto the turnover ofthe old leadership and to the change of the parties and the party system, or whether it will also imply a reform of governmental institutions. However, the level ofpopular discontent demonstrated by the survey data examined here shows the existence ofa high priority for the leadership.Only a strong increase ofdecisional efficacy and administrative effectiveness will give the newgovernmentachancetobuildamorestablebasisforsupport,by reabsorbing a relevant part ofthe pragmatic dissatisfaction which has until now endangered the legitimacy ofItalian democracy. This will be possible ifthe serious problems ofItalian politics are solved in some way. But the enormous public deficit, high rate ofunemployment, rather high inflation, corruption, North/South gap, poor public services and low standards ofcare for the elderly are still open problems of which people are conscious. Changes intherulesofgovernmentmaypavethe wayto solving them, but there are also objective difficulties due to the size ofthe problems, the conflicting goals that they present and the scarcity of resources. Thus, the civis irutus and infelixrisks maintaining these same attitudes for a long time. The only difference is that he may now behave consistently with his attitudes. Acknowledgements The main hypotheses suggested in this essay were presented byMorlino in a lecture delivered at the Department of Political Science ofthe University of Athens. We would like to thank Nikiforos Diamandouros and the other Greek colleagues for their comments and reactions. The authors would also like to thank warmly Mr. Daniele Nania for his precious assistance in data analysis. Notes 1.Forza Ifalia was created by Silvio Berlusconi only two months before the March 27/28,1994 elections.In the same period the Christian Democratic right wing split to create the Centro Cristiano Democratico(CCD) and some liberal and centrist deputiesfoundedthe Unione diCentro (UdC). The regionalistmovementswhichfederated into the Northern League had already emerged in early 1990. MSI-AN is an electoral cartel promotedby and mainly composed ofthe Movimento Sociale Italiano,a neo-fascist party which has been in Parlia- 61 ment since 1948. For the analysis of most recent elections of 1994 see Bartolini & DAlimonte ( 1995). 2.On the theoretical and empirical analysis ofvolatility see Bartolini & Mair (1990). 3.Thepersistentlyhighlevel ofconfidenceintheCatholicChurchinspiteofthegrowing secularization ofItaliansociety has beenverified bytwo surveys on thevalues ofItalians carried out in an European comparative perspectivein1980 and1990. See Stoetzel (1983) and Gubert (1992). 4.Inbothcasesnotwithoutdifficulties,becauseofthecompetitionofextraparliamentary radicalmovements like the extremeright Fronte Nazionaleand thegroupuscules ofNew Left (Potere Operaio, Lotta Continua etc.). 5. One ofthese, theleading editorialwriterIndro Montanelli,exhortedmoderate votersto cast their ballots for the DC, holding their noses so as not to smell the stench of corruption. 6.We consider politicalalienationan even stronger form ofdisaffection with clear anti-regime and anti-democratic meanings. For a different conceptualizationofthis term see Lockerbie 7.The two answers in the English translation are not very satisfied and not at all satisfied. Aliteral translation ofthe Italian answers bring us to prefer the different wording adopted in the text. That is, rather dissatisfied and very dissatisfied. 8. Setting aside the period1992-1993, which coincides with soaring popular indignation caused bythecorruption scandals. 9.In his Italy: Fragmentation,Isolation,Alienation, La Palombara also quotes this proverb (1965, 282). 10. The hypothesissuggested bySani & Segatti (1993) on the impact ofCatholic doctrineand thesocialist-communistbeliefsystem inaccountingfor such a high level ofdissatisfaction is less convincing. In fact, ifthere is a difference between the high expectations createdby those doctrines and reality, and iftheconsequence ofthis is the reasonfor dissatisfaction, then such a phenomenon should also be present i n other countries, such asSpain, with both a strongCatholic and Socialist culture.In other words,the hypothesisis notidiosyncratic and in this way less useful for our case. Ofcourse, a certain Catholic doctrine and a socialist system ofbeliefs,relatedto other aspects ofItalianculture, are atthecore ofthestate- centred political culture mentionedin thetext. 11. According to Kuechler (1991: 277) the third possibility, fight to preserve the society against subversiveforces,isinconsistentwiththeothertwoattitudes,asitreferstoanother dimension. (1993: 282-283). 12. Please,note that these figures only referto dissatisfied people. 13. With regards to these years Eurobarometer data do not give a direct empirical evidence of this, but the salience of economic dissatisfaction,that is. from our point ofview, pragmatic dissatisfaction.is shown byLockerbie(1993) for1983-1984,and itis consistentwiththis hypothesis.Inaddition, goingbeyondtheevidenceofthesurvey- onthebasisofthe empirical indicators ofparticipationin protestactions, we can add that young generations, even when not expressing the highest rates ofdissatisfaction, show the strongest inclination towards anti-establishment mobilization.It has been the case not only for the protest cycle of the late1960s. but also for thedramatization ofthe fall ofthe old ruling class involved in the judiciary inquiries on administrative corruption and illegal financing of political parties (see below). 14. The Italianmedia used this expression to designate the cases ofpolitical corruption discov- ered in the early1990s. 15. Thisiswhatemerges inseveralpiecesofresearch.Recently,see, forexample,Sani& Segatti (1993) and Morlino & Montero (1995) for Southern European countries. 16.For this whole set ofdata, see theEurobarometer Bulletins(1973-1993).Inaddition, as expectedfromacloseranalysis ofthetrends, differentkindsofcorrelationsamongthe several variables we maybuild do notgive particularlymeaningful resultsinadding other elements to theanalysis suggested in the text. 17.Let us recall themoderate attitudesshown by trade unions in the agreements signed with both Amatos cabinet and Ciampis cabinet in1992 and 1993. 18.Actually, it had become a method of interest articulation.On this aspect ofItalian democ- racy see Morlino (1991). 19.The trial centredon a few episodes ofkickbacks(tangenti)in the selling ofan important companyinthechemicalindustry.Actually,itbecameatrialagainstthegovernmental class, and the program had an enormous success. 20.Inthe elections of1994, more than 70 percent ofpeople were elected for the first time (see Verzichelli 1995). 21.It also provokedstrong growth ofthe same dissatisfaction(see above). 22.In thatyear,the Fronte dellUomoQualunque,which campaignedagainst bothfascism, because ofits statism, and antifascist parties, collected 5.3 percentofvotes and 30 seats at the elections for the first post-war democraticParliament (Assemblea Costituente). 23.The expression was coined by Sani & Segatti (1990). 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