T2 B4 Team 2 Workplan Fdr- Draft Workplan for Management 573

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    UNCLASSIFIEDCOMM ISSION SENSITIVEDRAFTTEAM #2

    WORKPLAN FOR MANAGEMENTThis memorandum sets forth a workplan for Team #2's investigation of themanagement of the Intelligence Com munity. The workplan has two objectives: (1) to

    produce the definitive account of the facts and circumstances related to the IC'smanagement related to the September 11th attacks and their imm ediate aftermath, and(2) to make recomm endations (if any) for improving the IC's managem ent in order toprevent future terrorist attacks.Section I discussed the need to understand the IC's overall management in orderto provide a comprehensive assessment of the IC's counterterrorism management.Section II outlines a series of questions to be answered regarding the IC's management ingeneral and concerning counterterrorism in particular. Section III provide s a temporalplan for answering the questions in section II.

    I. Understanding The IC's Management Of Counterterrorism Activities RequiresComprehending The IC's Overall Management Landscape.This workplan is founded upon the hypothesis that producing the definitiveaccount of the IC's management related to the September 11 th attacks an d recommendingmanagement improvements to prevent future attacks requires a broad understanding ofthe IC's management beyond the details of the IC 's counterterrorism functions. Merelyfocusing on counterterrorism-related management without initially establishing thebackdrop of the IC's overall managem ent risks crippling the September 1 lth-relatedinquiry by ignoring any systemic managem ent problems in the 1C that played a key rolein the IC's failure to prevent the September 111 attacks and that m ight hinder the 1C in

    preventing future attacks. For example, understanding the ranking of coun terterrorismamong the IC's priorities necessitates analyzing the process by which all 1C priorities areestablished - including which policymakers are involved and their relative formal andinformal authorities.Accordingly, the analytical approach outlined in section II below includes thefollowing broad subject areas which must be analyzed in order to set the stage fo runderstanding th e IC's management related to counterterrorism: Legal authorities underpinning the 1C and empowering the IC's senior officials; The IC 's organizational structure, including its chain of command; Formal relationships w ithin the intelligence community; Informal relations w ithin the intelligence community; Policies andprocedures governing management of the intelligence community asa whole an d each agency relevant to the September 11th attacks; Culture andpractices w ithin the 1C;

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    UNCLASSIFIEDCOMM ISSION SENSITIVEDRAFT The Executive Branch's conduct of covert action, including the decisionmakingof senior Executive Branch officials and the implementation of such decisions bythe CIA and other agencies; Executive Branch leadership and oversight of the 1C; and Congressional oversight of the 1C.

    II. Questions Regarding 1C Management In General And ConcerningCounterterrorism In Particular.This section outlines general questions concerning 1C management that arenecessary to understand the IC's management related to counterterrorism. Included

    within the outline are questions that narrow the general management issues to focusspecifically on counterterrorism.A. 1C Management.1. What is "intelligence?"2. What is the "intelligence commun ity?" How has it changed over time?3. What is the IC's mission(s)? Has there been change over time?4. What statutes, Execu tive Orders, regulations, policies, and proceduresgovern the IC's management (e.g., the DCI's authorities)?5. What is the history of the IC's organizational structure?6. Wh at are the major themes of the IC's management history, e.g., riskperception, successes and failures, denial and deception, and reformproposals?

    ^ How did any of these themes impact the IC's ability to conductcounterterrorism activities?7. W hat is the history of reform proposals? Have any been implemented,and if so, how?

    > Why was the CTC established?8. What is the current state of 1C management, including basic responsibility,authority, and accountability?> What are the respective roles of the DCI, DDCI, DDCI/CM,AD CI/Collection, and ADC I/A&P in the conduct of the IC'scounterterrorism programs and in management?> How was their management direction implemented an d reviewed?9. Who sets priorities for the 1C, and how are they set?> How did the 1C respond to terroris m's placem ent in tier 1 of PDD-35?> How often did the NSC Deputies C ommittee or Principals'Comm ittees review and update PDD-35? W hat policy ormanagement recommendations d id they m ake to the DC I regardingcounterterrorism?

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    UNCLASSIFIEDCOMMISSION SENSITIVEDRAFT> What were the conclusions of the 1995 DCI "hard target" study onterrorism? Who performed the study? Who was responsible forimplementing its recommendations and taking specific action?What follow-up was performed?^ What was the result of the DCI's "declaration of war" on terrorism?

    10. Does the 1C have a process for raising its alert status, akin to the D EFC ONprotocol for DOD?11. Is the 1C organized in order to learn from mistakes?> To what extent did the 1C learn from each of the successiveterrorist attacks in the 1990s and apply those lessons learned toimproving its activities? WTC/1993 FBI arrest of eight ind ividuals threatening to attack NYClandmarks Khobar Towers bombing UBL call for jihad against the U.S. Nairobi andDar es Salaam embassy bombings 9/1112 . What was the effect of secrecy on the IC's ability to perform effectively?

    > How did secrecy impact the IC's ability to conductcounter-terrorism effectively/12 . W hat lessons can be learned from governmental and private sectorexperiences regarding how the 1C should be managed?13. What alternatives exist for managing the 1C?B. Executive Branch Leadership and Oversight.1. How is Executive B ranch leadership and oversight of the 1C conducted?2. Wh at are the roles of the President, NSC , National S ecurity A dvisor, NSCstaff, OVP, PFIAB, IOB, and OM B, regarding intelligence?> W hat were their roles regarding intelligence collection, analysis,and other activities concerning terrorism?3. W hat is the process by which covert action is authorized?> What covert actions were authorized for counterterrorism purposes?

    ^ What were the directions given by Executive Branchdecisionmakers to the agencies that would implement the covertaction?C. CIA.

    Cl. CIA Management.1. How is the CIA organized?

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    UNCLASSIFIEDCOMMISSION SENSITIVEDRAFT2. How successful has the CIA D irector been in asserting control over theCIA?3. Wh at is the relationship between the DO and the DI?4. Wha t internal mechanisms for oversight does the CIA Director have?5. What is the role of the C IA-IG?C2. Covert Action.

    1. What is the history of the CIA 's performa nce of covert action?> How did the CIA implem ent any covert action authorized b y seniorExecutive Branch officials concerning counterterrorism?D. NSA.E. DIA.F. POD.1. What are the roles of senior DOD officials (e.g., SecDef, DepSecDef,ASDI/C3I, ASD/SOLIC, DOD-IG) regarding intelligence?

    > What are their roles regarding c ounterterrorism?2. What is the history of DO D's performance of covert action?> How did DOD implement any covert action au thorized by seniorExecutive Branch officials concerning counterterrorism?G. INR.

    H. DOJ.I. Dept. of Homeland Security.J. Congressional Ove rsight.1. How does C ongress condu ct oversight of the 1C? Did Congress utilize its

    full legal au thority to conduct oversight?> How did the 1C keep C ongress aw are of terrorist threats to the U .S.,and how did Congress respond?> How was warning intelligence provided to senior Congressionalleadership, and what actions resulted?2. What is the process that Congressional comm ittees e mplo y to determinethe IC's budge t and policy priorities?

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    UNCLASSIFIEDCOMMISSION SENSITIVEDRAFT> What priority did the eight Congressional oversight committeesgive to coun ter terrorism activities in the 1C? How was thispriority manifested in program direction in their report language(including classified annexes) and in their budget m arks?3. W hat is the process that Congressional comm ittees emp loyed to determinethe NFIP 's responsiveness to Congress's priorities?> If Congress established counterterrorism priorities for the 1C, thenhow did Congress confirm that the NFIP responded to Congress'sconcerns?> W as there any report language from 1992-2001 that directed the 1Cto take specific actions to developing capabilities to respond toterrorism? What did the 1C do in response to such language?> Wh at role did GAO play?4. W hat was the process by which Congressional oversight comm itteesdetermined whether 1C planning and operations addressed the DCI'spriorities effectively, and was that process effective?

    5. What factors might limit Congress's ability to conduct effective oversight(eg, security, turnover)?6. How effective were the House and Senate intelligence committees inoverseeing the 1C? Has Congressional oversight led to better performancein the 1C?^ What findings and recommendations resulted from Congressionalinvestigations into the IC's counterterrorism efforts prior to theJoint Inquiry's investigation? How were such recommendationsimplemented?

    III. Temporal Strategy.The strategy set forth below is based upon the assumption that team m embers willno t receive the requisite clearances un til mid-June 2003.A. June 2003.1. Condu ct open source reading2. Read Joint Inqu iry report.3. File requests for information interviews with 1C agencies.B. July 2003.1. Receive informational briefings.2. Subm it document requests to 1C agencies.3. Meet with academics and o ther private-sector individua ls to discussresearch objectives.

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    UNCLASSIFIEDCOMMISSION SENSITIVEDRAFTC. Aug ust 2003.1. Review documents produced.2. File requests fo r interviews.3. Make preparations for travel.D. September 2003 .1. Review documents produced.2. Submit new document requests as needed.3. Interview lower-level current and former officials.4. Travel.E. October 2003.1. Review documents produced.2. Interview lower/mid-level current and former officials.3. Travel.F. November 2003.1. Interview mid/senior-level current and former officials.2. Ascertain whether any gaps in facts and circumstances of 9/11 need to be

    filled.G. December 2003.1. Interview senior current and former officials.2. Begin drafting.

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