T4 B1 Team 4 Workplan Fdr- Outline- 5-19-03- Lines of Inquiry 123

8/14/2019 T4 B1 Team 4 Workplan Fdr- Outline- 5-19-03- Lines of Inquiry 123

1/11

05/19/03

Lines of inquiry1) Intelligencea ) Pre9-ll

i) What was the role of the intelligence communityin gathering intelligence about the flow of fundsto terrorist organizations? (crosscut w ith team#2)(much of this may have been explored in the jointintelligence report)i i ) Did the intelligence community collect useful J ^ ~ f , C : / { ////intelligence in this area? How was thatinformation used? Could have it been put tobetter use?iii) W hat was the intelligence comm unity proposalfor covert action against bin Laden financialaccounts? Why was the proposal not approved?

* . :*"" "b) Post 9-11 Pi) What is the current role of the intelligencecomm unity in gathering intelligence about theflow of funds to terrorist organizations?ii) Is information useful? Is it being put to good use?iii) Is the Foreign T errorist Asset T racking Groupoperational? What does it do? Is it effective?2) Executive/Administrative

a ) Pre9-lli) What was the role of Treasury, particularly ^yuu^n h* c ^^OFAC, in blocking andseizing assets associated 'with terrorist groups generally? Was it effective?ii) W hat role did the State Department play indesignating Foreign Terrorist O rganizations(FTOs)? Was it effective?iii) When were al-Qaida and the Taliban designated?What efforts were made in finding and freezingassets after the designation? Were they effective?How could this be measured? Could anythingelse have been d one?iv ) Congress appropriated money for thedevelopment of the foreign terrorist asset trackingcenter (FTAT) for FY 2000, to be placed inTreasury, but the Center was not operational untilafter 9/11. What were the circumstancessurrounding that delay? What was the impact of


2/11

05/19/03

that delay? W hy did Treasury oppose the W hiteHouse efforts to fund this center? W hat does the9/11 Closed by Statute

v) What was the level of support from th eintelligence and law enforcem ent comm unit ies ingathering evidence to support both the OFAC andFTO designations?

b) Post 9-11i) Domestically:(1) W hat have we blocked and why? Is blockingbeing used in appropriate circumstances?Wh at has been the net effect of the blocking?(a) Who have we designated an d why? Whatha s been the net effect of the blocking?

(2 ) Have there been an y before an d afterassessment of m oney flows that occurred as aresult of blocking? W hat do we thinkterrorists groups have done in reaction toblocking?

3) Law Enforcementa) Pre9-lli) Wh a t was law enforcement's role in investigatingand prosecutin g the finan cing of terroristoperations domestically? How effective was it?(Partial crosscut with team 6)ii) The terrorist fundraising statutes, 18 USC 2339Aan d 2339B, had n ever been used until after 9/11.What was the level of investigative effortgenerally into terrorist funding? If there had notbeen an effort, why not?(1) The FBI knew of the Holy Land F oun dation'sl inks to Ham as as early as 1993. Why n o lawenforcement or blocking action taken againstit unti l 2001?iii) The Financial Crimes En forcem ent Network("FinCEN") is the government's center foranalysis an d distribution of financial crimesinformation. Wh a t was the level of effort prior to9/11?(1) In 1999, there were specific law en fo rcemen trequests to FinCEN, asking fo r assistancefrom its haw ala expert. Those requests were

n ot acted upon. Why? [Washington post]

s. 3r


3/11

05/19/03

iv) Besides the FBI, did other lawenforcementagencies (either federal of state) investigateterrorist financing? Was there any confusion asto the roles of the various law enforcementagencies? What was the general level ofcoordination among agencies?

b) Post 9-11i) Prosecution of charities and other groups. Whohave we prosecuted? What do the investigationsreveal about the nature of terrorist financing?How effective has the use of the terroristfundraising statutes been? Has FinCEN helped?(1) IANA associate "help the needy" prosecutionof charity using Jordan Islamic Bank

ii) What is the level of cooperation with intelligencecommunity? What has been the effect of greaterinformation sharing powers contained within theUSA Patriot Act? (crosscut with team 6)

Hi) What is the level of cooperation within andamong law enforcement agencies? Are theycoordinating efforts? Are there any institutionalbarriers? What can be improved?

4) Regulatory and Privatea) Pre9-lli) What regulatory controls were in place to preventthe U.S. financial system from being used by

terrorists to move money? Were they effective?(1) How much feedback (or SAR reporting) fromfinancial institutions re terrorist financing?(2) Hijacker's financial transactions merited

suspcicious reporting, but none of thosereports reached the proper authorities untilafter 9/11 [Ievitt64](3) There were specific legislative proposals toassist in curbing the unregulated movement ofmoney, identify transactions and also to assistin getting foreign banks to open their books tolegitimate law enforcement requests.(a) Section 311 was administration proposal.W hy not acted on? Eizenstat 10/3/01: bill

with special measures had strong supportby law enforcement.(b ) What was the "know your customer"proposal and why wasn't it implemented?


4/11

05/19/03

(c) Congress had directed FinCEN in 1994 toregulate the money transmitter business,ye t the regulations doing so were not putinto place until after 9/11. Why? Couldthe controls have detected the moneymovements of the 9/11 hijackers?(4) Regulation aside, was the private sector doing

anything?b) Post 9-11

i) USA PATRIOT Act:(1) General background. What does it do? Is iteffective?(2) Policy re general balancing of bank burden,privacy interests and law enforcement utility.(a) What are the burdens on the financial

services industry? Are they too much?Should the,re be more? Are there privacyissues? Can it be made better?

(b) Will the new regulations of non-bankfinancial institutions catch methods usedby terrorists? Who is to regulate non-bankfinancial institutions in this area? Do theyhave sufficient resources?ii) Is BSA data on terrorist finance being used by law

' enforcement? How? Does it result in assistingcases and investigations? Does it contribute toou r understanding of terrorist financinginvestigations? If not, why not?

iii) What have we learned about what th e financialtransactions of a U.S.-based terrorist cell lookslike? Are we able to get any predictive data onterrorist financing?iv) How do we get information, either concerninggeneral trends or specific individuals, to financialinstitutions? How effective is it?v) Is there a way to regulate charities to preventabuse? What do other countries rin?

9/11 Closed by Statute

5) Overall Government Strategy And Coordinationa ) Pre9-ll


5/11

05/19/03

i) Was there an overall U.S. interagency strategy forcombating the financial support given to terroristorganizations?ii) How effective was that coordination? What wasthe level of cooperation among governmentagencies in this area? Between government andthe private sector? If there were shortcomings inthis area, what were the causes?(1) Presidential Decision Directive 42 (1995)ordered other agencies to increase andintegrate efforts against terrorist financing andmoney laundering. What efforts did thedirected agencies make in complying with this

FDD?(2) After the East Africa bombings in 1998, a newinteragency team was created under theauspices of the NSC to look at terrorist

financing. What did this group do?(3) The National Commission on Terrorismreleased a report in 1999, making specificrecommendations in the area of terroristfinancing. Who was responsible for assessingand implementing these recommendations?Were they implemented? If not, why not?(4) To what extent did any identified failures ofcoordination contribute to the failure to detectthe 9/11 hijackers or other Al-Qaeda activity?

b) Post 9-11i) Do we have a government-wide strategy onterrorist financing? How is this enforced withinthe interagency community?ii) What is the current mechanism for coordinatingand ensuring cooperation? Do gaps (still) exist?Is information being shared? Is there somethingelse that needs to be done?iii) How effective are the current efforts to disruptterrorist financing in preventing another 9/11 ormaking another 9/11 substantially more difficultto accomplish?

6) International effortsa) Pre9-lli) What were the U.S. government's diplomaticefforts to ensure that other countries would assist


6/11


7/11

05/19/03

a) What was the source of funds of the 9/11 hijackers,and how did those funds get to the hijackers? Howmuch did the operation actually cost?

b) To what extent was the U.S. financial system used bythe hijackers?c) Why did the financing of the 9/11 operation goundetected? Was it a specific failure of an individualor group, or was the failure more systemic?d) What do the methods of the 9/11 terrorists tell usabout current government efforts?

e) Charitiesi) International Islamic Relief Organization (HRO)

(1) 86 to 94 Muhammad Jamal Khalifa (bin ladenbrother in law) headed UK's Philippine Office,channel money to Al Qaeda affiliates [levitt67]

ii)


8/11

05/19/03

Documents1) Select OF AC decision packages - Treasury

a) Al-Qaida and bin Laden (8/22/1998)b) Taliban (7/4/1999)c) Al-Barakaat (11/7/2001)d) Holy Land Foundation (Hamas) (12/4/2001)e) Al-Hamati Sweets Bakeries, Al-Shifa' Honey Press

For Industry and Commerce, et al., (the honeycompanies) (10/12/2001)

f ) Afghan Support Committee and Revival of IslamicHeritage Society (1/9/2002)g) Al-Harimain Islamic Fountation (3/11/2002)

2) Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) for terroristfinance minutes and agendas fo r post 9/11 activities.3) NSC documents relating to terrorist financing,

particularly Presidential Decision Directives 39 (counterterrorism coordination), 42 (international organizedcrime) and 63 (critical infrastructure protection), anddocuments relating to the implementation of thosedirectives.

4) Agenda, minutes and notes of meetings ofCounterterrorism Strategy Group, pre 9/11.

5) Lists and summaries of FBI terrorist financinginvestigations, both pre and post 9/11.

6) Lists and summaries of Operation Green Quest or otherCustoms/IRS/Secret Service investigations into terroristfinancing pre and post 9/11.

7) FinCEN BS A data and other information, including preand post 9/11 Suspicious Activity Reports and analyticalproducts resulting from this analysis. Includes 1998report on hawala prepared by Patrick lost.

8) CTC, UBL Task Force materials as it related to terroristfinance (overlap with Team #2)


9/11

05/19/03

9) Cables to/from State Department to US embassiesconcerning cooperation on terrorist financing intelligencegather or law enforcement.

10) U.S. Customs Service Office of Strategic Trade andIntelligence report, October 2001 (re: honey shipments)

11) Financial analysis of 9/11 attacks, created by FBI'sTerrorist Financial Review Group (later renamedTerrorist Financing Operations Section)

12) Other documents as suggested by the joint committee'sreport


10/11

05/19/03

InterviewsNSCJody MyersWilliam F. WechslerRichard E. ClarkeCustomsMarcy Forman, Director, Operation Green Quest, USCustomsDirector, US Customs Service Office of Strategic Trade andIntelligenceFB IDennis Lormel, Terrorist Finance Operations SectionTreasuryJim Johnson, former Undersecretary fo r EnforcementRon Noble, form er Undersecretary fo r EnforcementElisabeth Bresee, Assistant Secretary fo r EnforcementKenneth Dam, former De puty SecretaryDavid Aufhauser, General CounselJimmy G urule' former Undersecretary fo r Enforcement,2001-03Juan Zarate, DAA S fo r terrorismBob McBrien, OFACRichard New comb, OFAC, DirectorJim Sloan, FinCEN, DirectorDavid Voght, FinCEN , Office of IntelligencePeter D jinis, former FinCEN , Office of FinancialEnforcementIRSSteven Miller, Director, Exem pt Organizations, TaxExempt/Government Entities Division, IRSMartha Su llivan , Director, Compliance, Small an d MediumSized Businesses, IRS (MSBs)StateUnit head, Office of the Coordinator fo r Counterterrorism,Counterterrorism Finance and Designation U nitJusticeMichael Chertoff, AAGJames Robinson, former AAG

10


11/11

05/19/03

Alice Fisher, DAA GBruce Swartz, DAAGJim Reynolds, former Chief TVCSBarry Sabin, Chief CT (formerly TVCS)Jeff Breinholt, CT section, terrorist financingGordon Kromberg, AUSA, EDVAPrivate industry and independent policy analystsJohn Byrne, American Bankers AssociationRick Small, Director for Global Anti-Money Laundering,CitigroupDirector of compliance, SunTrustMichael Zeldin, partner, Deloitte and ToucheKenneth Katzman, Congressional Research ServiceLee Wolosky, Council on Foreign RelationsJon Winer, former D eputy A ssistant Secretary of StateSteve Emerson, The Investigative ProjectMatthew Levitt, W ashington Institute for Near East PolicyRachel Ehrenfeld, author, Funding EvilThomas Biersteker, Professor, Watson Institute, Bro wnUniversity

11

T4 B1 Team 4 Workplan Fdr- Outline- 5-19-03- Lines of Inquiry 123

Documents

Transcript of T4 B1 Team 4 Workplan Fdr- Outline- 5-19-03- Lines of Inquiry 123