FO B1 Commission Meeting 5-21-03 Fdr- Tab 5- Entire Contents- Workplan Team 4- Partially Redacted...

8/14/2019 FO B1 Commission Meeting 5-21-03 Fdr- Tab 5- Entire Contents- Workplan Team 4- Partially Redacted Interview C

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NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACK SUPON THE UNITED STATES

TEAM #4WORKPLAN

TERRORIST FINANCING

Team Members: John RothDouglas GreenburgSerena Wille

Item 1 Key QuestionsItem 2 Suggested Readings and BriefingsItem 3 Document RequestsItem 4 Interview Candidates



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Team #4Item 1: Key Questions1 . What are, and should be, the goals of government efforts in the area of terroristfinancing?

Government efforts concerning terrorist financing appear to have three goals: (1)obtaining intelligence regarding terrorist activities and operations; (2) disruptionof terrorist activities and operations; and (3) depriving terrorists of resourcesthrough executive or judicial action. To what degree has the government pursuedeach of these goals? Have the goals changed over time? How much emphasisshould be placed on each of these goals? The government has stated that the premise of the effort on terrorist financing isthat "money is the lifeblood of terrorism." Given the demonstrated ability ofterrorists to use relatively tiny amounts of money to create significant attacks,should this be the most important goal? Are efforts directed at that goaldetracting from the other goals?

2. Prior to 9/11, what did the U.S. do to identify and stop terrorist funding? The primary public effort within the U.S. was to identify and name specificterrorist groups and then attempt to financially isolate them through the use ofexecutive orders. How successful were these efforts? Various government policies were instituted to allow for more effective trackingand attacking of terrorist assets. What were these policies? Did they work? Whyor why not? There have been a number of the public criticisms about the government's pre-

9/11 efforts: a failure to appreciate the threat, unclear roles among the institutionsinvolved, a failure to share information, no overall strategy, and an unwillingnessor inability to get the necessary cooperation from key foreign governments. Howvalid are these criticisms?3. How were the 9/11 terrorists able to generate and move their money?

What were the identifiable financial transactions of the hijackers? Where did theyget their funding, where did they keep their funds in the United States and howdid they distribute their funds among the 19 hijackers? Did anyone in the UnitedStates itself provide funding to the hijackers? What do these transactions say about how organized, planned terrorist operationsoperate within the United States? Are they different from other terroristoperations, such as ad-hoc terrorist operations or the maintenance of sleeper cells?

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How did Al Qaeda generally raise andmove funds to support itself as aninstitution? For example, how did it raise money to pay for training camps andbring recruits to Afghanistan for training?

4. Does the fact that the 9/11 hijackers were able to evade detection and disruptiontell us anything about the system in place at the time? Were the various anti-money laundering controls in place sufficient to detect the

types of movement of money involved here? Why or why not? Was the existingsystem simply not designed to detect the type of transactions engaged in by the9/11 terrorists?

Was there anyconcerted effort to track contemporaneously known terrorists cellsthrough their financial transactions? Did the government have the technicalability to do so? What would such a system look like?

What were the other deficiencies with the pre 9/11 system? For example, werethere shortcomings in efforts to prevent the abuse of charities, regulate informalmoney transmitters, identify illegal trade-based money movements? Did weeffectively engage key foreign governments, particularly Saudi Arabia, to assist?

5. What are we currently doing, and have these efforts eliminated the deficienciespresent before 9/11? The U.S. government has devoted substantial resources since 9/11, including

enacting significant new regulations, in an effort to disrupt and curtail the fundingof terrorist organizations. What were those changes? Are they effective? Are thedeficiencies that may have contributed to the 9/11 failures still present?

6. What specific, actionable policy recommendations can be made to improve thecurrent efforts in light of the lessons of 9/11? Should the goals of the efforts regarding terrorist financing be changed? If so,how? Is the government effectively organized to provide for adequate coordination

among the various agencies and actors involved in the effort? If not, how couldthe structure be improved?

How has, and how will, the raising and movement of money for terroristoperations change in response to government actions? Is there a move away fromformal financial systems into something more difficult to detect? Can thegovernment recognize and quickly adapt to those changes?

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FOR OFFICIALUSE ONLYCOMMISSION SENSITIVE What is the best approach to increase the ability and the willingness of keyforeign states to track and disrupt terrorist financing?

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Team #4Item 2: Suggested Readings and Briefings

Council on Foreign Relations, Terrorist Financing, 2002 [Relevance: Mostcomplete discussion of the issue to date. Staffed an d written by leading experts inthe field. Makes specific policy recommendations worth considering.]National Commission on Terrorism, Final Report, pages 26 to 29. [R elevance:Discussion of the issue and recommendations to stop non-state financial supportof terrorism worthy of consideration. Failure to implement recomm endations alsoworth discussion.]Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, SA R Report no. 4 [Relevance: U.S.Government's first efforts at identifying a typology fo r domestic financialtransactions relating to terrorism. Open to question how useful such a typologyis, given the innocuous nature of terrorist-related financ ial transaction s.]Financial Action Task Force, Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing,October 31, 2001. [Relevance: Best efforts to date on international cooperationand standards setting.]Indictment. United States v. Zacarias M oussaou i [Relevance: good illustrationof the use of a financial investigation to determine the scope and nature of theconspiracy.]National Money Laundering Strategy 2002, Goal 2 [Relevance: U.S.government's published strategy on attacking terrorist financial networks]

BriefingsDavid Aufhauser, Treasury General Counsel [Head of US government's policy andcoordination efforts in terrorist financing]Lee Wolosky, Council on Foreign Relations Task Force [co-author of report on terroristfinancing]



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Team #4Item 3: Document Requests

1) Select OFAC decision packagesa) Al-Qaida and bin Laden (8/22/1998)b) Taliban (7/4/1999)c) Other relevant OFAC decision packages2) Relevant documents from Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) for terroristfinancing reflecting policy changes since 9/11.3) Documents relating to Presidential Decision Directives 39 (counterterrorismcoordination), 42 (international organized crime) and 63 (critical infra structu reprotection).4) Relevant documents from NSC's Counterterrorism Strategy Group, pre-9/11.5) Lists and summaries of pre-9/11 FBI terrorist financing investigations.6) FinCEN BSA data and analytical products relating to terrorist financing.7) Relevant State Department docum ents concerning cooperation by foreigngovernments on terrorist financing, particularly concerning states through whichpassed financing for the 9/11 hijackers or Al Qaeda (including relevantcommunications to/from U.S. embassies in these states).8) Financial analysis of 9/11 attacks, created by FBI's Terrorist Financial Review Group

(later renamed Terrorist Financing Operations Section).9) Other docum ents as sugg ested by the Joint Inquiry report.

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Team #4Item 4: Interview C andidates

NSCJody MyersWilliam F. WechslerRichard E. ClarkeCustomsMarcy Forman , Director, O peration Green Quest, US CustomsDirector, US Custom s Service Office of Strategic Trade and IntelligenceFBIDennis Lormel, Terrorist F inance O perations SectionTreasuryJim Johnson, former U ndersecretary fo r EnforcementRon Noble, former Undersecretary for EnforcementElisabeth Bresee, Assistant Secretary for En force mentKenneth Dam, former D eputy SecretaryDavid Aufhauser, General CounselJimmy Gurule form er Undersecretary fo r Enforcement, 2001-03Juan Zarate, DAAS fo r terrorismBob McBrien, OFACRichard Newcomb, OFAC, DirectorJim Sloan, FinCEN, DirectorDavid Voght, FinCEN, Office of IntelligencePeter Djinis, form er FinCEN, Office of Financial Enforcemen tIRSSteven Miller, Director, Exempt Organizations, Tax Exempt/Government EntitiesDivision, IRSMartha Sullivan, Director, Compliance, Small and Me dium Sized B usinesses, IRS(MSBs)StateUnit head, Office of the Coordinator fo r Counterterrorism, C ounterterrorism Finance andDesignation UnitJusticeMichael Chertoff, AAGJames Robinson, former AAGAlice Fisher, DA AGBruce Swartz, DAAGJim Reynolds, former Chief TVCS

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FO R OFFICIAL USE ONLYCOMMISSION SENSITIVEBarry Sabin, Chief CT (formerly TVCS)Jeff Breinholt, CT section, terrorist financingGordon Kromberg, AUSA, EDVAPrivate industry and independent policy analystsJohn Byrne, American Bankers AssociationRick Small, Director for Global Anti-Money Laundering, CitigroupDirector of compliance, SunTrustMichael Zeldin, partner, Deloitte and ToucheKenneth Katzman, Congressional Research ServiceLee Wolosky, Council on Foreign RelationsJon Winer, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of StateSteve Emerson, The Investigative Project


FO B1 Commission Meeting 5-21-03 Fdr- Tab 5- Entire Contents- Workplan Team 4- Partially Redacted...

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