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8/14/2019 T2 B5 Other Teams Workplans Fdr- Workplan Team 1 (Item 4- Interview Candidates- Redacted- No Withdrawal No

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NATIONAL COM MISSION ON TERRORIST A TTACKSUPON THE UNITED STATESTEAM #1WORKPLAN

AL QAEDA & RELATED TRANSNATIONALTERRORIST GROUPS

TeamMembers: Doug MacEachinTom DowlingDana LesemannYoel TobinJohn TammRajesh DeErnest MayMatt Levit t

Item 1 Key Questions of the Invest igationItem 2 Suggested ReadingsItem 3 Docum ent Reques tsItem 4 Interview C andidates

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Item 1: Key QuestionsI. Lines of Inquiry and Key Questons

A. We propose to organize our initial research around three over-archingquestions, which will be used as principal lines of inquiry:1. What is the history of al Qaeda and its linkages to other terrorist entitiesprior to the 9/11 attacks?2. What can we determine through a comprehensive examination of allevidence now availablesynthesizing the information available earlierwith that obtained post-9/11regarding the planning, preparation,financing, and execution of the 9/11 attacks?3. What is now known of the present composition of al Qaeda and itsaffiliated entities and what threat do they no w pose?

Each of these lines of inquiry is a building block that encompasses many specificcomponent questions. We can identify some of these component questions at theoutset of the research, an d they are listed below as a means of focusing theinitiation of our research. However, new component questions will emerge fromou r discoveries as our research progresses. Thus, one of the aims of the initialresearch is to identify additional key component questions for our research. O neof the crosscutting issues to which we will pay close attention is al Qaeda'scollaborative relationshipsan d connections with various other entities becausethese factors will be critical in assessing al Qaeda's means and capabilities forfuture attacks.B. The following is a list of some of the key componentquestions that will be the

focus of our initial research:1. What is the history of al Qaeda prior to the 9/11 attack?

a) Wh at are al Qaeda's origins, ideological roots, doctrines, andworldview, and how have they evolved over t ime? Who havebeen its key functionaries? How has it recruited personnel?

b) What attacks before 9/11 can we now connect with al Qaeda,either operating alone or in collaboration with other terroristgroups? H ow were they carried out?

c) With what other terrorist groups has al Qaeda been affil iated,either in collaborative operationsor through funding andlogistical support?

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d) How has al Qaeda functioned organizationally and financially?e) What have been its relationships with governments or

government components acting outside the purview of theirown political leadership, including, but not limited to thosegovernments or factions that provided al Qaeda with supportand sanctuary?

2. What can we determine through a comprehensive examination ofall evidence now availablesynthesizing the information availableearlier with that obtained post-9/11regarding the planning,preparation, financing, and execution of the 9/11 attacks?a) What can we now understand regarding the strategic objectives

of the attack?b) How were the targets and means of attack chosen? By whom?

How was intelligence collected and employed for this purpose?c) What do we know of the origins and details of the operationalplanning for the attack, e.g., th e designation of operational

command, th e selection of the hijacking teams, th eestablishment of logistic and financial support? When was theplan finalized? Was it fixed or flexible?

d) What were the key planning and decision variables? Forexample , is there an y evidence of any variables that wouldhave resulted in a decision to abort the plan? Who had thefinal authori ty to carry out the plan or abort it ?

e) What t raining, exercises, and/or rehearsals were carried out?f) What staging areas an d support networks were employed in

carrying out the plan? D id affiliated entities play any role instaging or supporting th e attacks?

3. What is now known of the present composition of al Qaeda and itsaffiliated entities an d what threat do they now pose?a) How has al Qaeda sought to adapt an d compensate for its

losses? W h a t changes have taken place since 9/11 in suchareas as tact ics, doctrine, personnel , an d financial practices?

b ) W h a t is the current s tatus of al Qaeda's act ive membership andit s access to weapons and t r a in ing?

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c) What has happened to the many thousands who passed throughthe training and vetting camps in Afghanistan?

d) What role has al Qaeda played in terrorist attacks mountedsince 9/11, whether thwarted or actually carried out?

e) What has been the role, if any, of affiliated and collaborativeentities in these attacks, and what is the status of theconnections between al Qaeda and other terrorist groups?

f) Is there any evidence that al Qaeda is currently receiving anysupport from any state actor?

g) What is the status of al Qaeda's efforts to acquire WMD?II. Outlining a Research Plan

W e will start our research on the first line of inquiryin effect, theconstruction of the "base building block"in the 1989-1990 time frame, whenUsama bin Laden's "base" or "al Qaeda" was set up in Peshawar, Pakistan, andbin Laden himself returned to Saudi Arabia. After the deployment of U.S. forcesto Saudi Arabia and other G ul f states in 1990, bin Laden began his tirades againstth e "apostate" regimes in the M uslim world and called for the expu lsion of theAmerican "infidels" from the land of the "sacred sites" of Islam. In 1991 binLaden moved his base to Suda n. Some contex t:

During this time frame several major terrorist operations took place inwhich bin Laden is known to have been involved, as well as additionalattacks fo r which there is evidence of, at least, bin Laden's support. Theseattacks include the 1992 bombing of a hotel in Yemen where Americantroops on their way to Somalia were staying; the February 1993 bombingof the World Trade Center (WTC I); the "Day of Terror" plot, targeted atNew York City landmarks, a plot that was broken up by law enforcementin June 1993; the 1995 "Bojinka Plot" in Manila, which included plans toblow up 12 airliners over the Pacific Ocean, assassinate the Pope and theU.S. president, and fly an airplane laden with explosives into the CIA'sheadquarters; and the 1995 bombing of the Saudi National Guardbuilding in Riyadh that killed five U .S. soldiers. In addition, although th eattacks on the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania did not takeplace until August 1998, the planning w as already well undenvay whilebin Laden was residing in Sudan and he reportedly reviewed the plans fo rthe attacks and the reconnaissance photos used for those plans.The multiple connections bet\veen these operations o f f e r insights into theevolving structure of al Qaeda. Fo r example, Wadih el-Hage ser\ed as


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bin Laden's personal secretary while the al Qaeda leader was based inSudan. Prior to that, from 1991 to 1992 El-Hage headed a so-calledcharitable organization in New York City that ostensibly raised funds fo rveterans of the Afghan jihad; the organization had previously raised fundsto support those fighters during the jihad. Wh ile in New York City El-Hage also had contact w ith at least one of the participa nts in W T C I an dhe was later convicted for his role in the 1998 Embassy bombings.Similarly, Ramzi Yousef, who managed WTC I, escaped after the attackan d ended up in Manila, where he work ed with future 9/11 commanderKhalid Sheikh Mohamm ed on the 1995 Bojinka Plot.Ou r research will then follow bin Laden's move to Afghanistan in the spring of1996 and the establishment of his infrastructure there. W e will focus on one of the key

developmental lines during this period, the further expansion of al Qaeda's global reachthrough recruitment, indoctrination, training and the dispersal of its cells, at least some ofwhich played critical roles in the later 9/11 attacks. Some context:A l Qaeda's base an d operational infrastructure expanded by a significantorder of magnitude after bin Laden's move to Afghanistan in 1996,entrenching its "army" infrastructure of bases fo r training in weapons,tactics, an d production of explosive devices. This infrastructure alsoprovided centers for ideological indoctrination and for screening theranks to spot and vet individuals for the inner cadre of terrorist cells. Thiswas the source of a large portion of the individuals dispatched to formcells in cities around the globea process vividly demonstrated in wh at weno w know about many of the 9/11 hijackers.

The hom e base in Afghan istan also facilitated sequestered gatherings forstrategic an d operational planning, an d fo r collaboration sessions withleaders of other terrorist groups. We now understand that a significantexpansion of consortium arrangements with other terrorists took placefrom the Afghan bases. For example, there is evidence that al Qaedacollaborated with two Asian terrorist groups in attacks carried out inManila and Jakarta in December 2000. This same connection was used toset up the January 2000 al Qaeda planning meeting in Kuala Lumpur,including individuals who would later be involved in the attack on the U SSCole in October 2000, the 9/11 attacks, and in the October 2002 Balibombing.Similarly, a report released by the Singapore police reveals that theSoutheast Asian terrorist organization Jema'ah-Islamiyya planned toprovide the foot soldiers for the aborted suicide strikes planned for Man ilaan d Jakarta in early 2002; al Qaeda leaders made the strategic planningdecisions at meetings in Afghan istan and provided the financing and m ucho f the target reconnaissance.

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Research into Key Question/Line of Inquiry 2, dissecting an d reconstructing theplanning, preparation, financing and execution of the 9/11 attacks in rigorous detail fromits origins to execution, will proceed in parallel, with part of the team merging newlydeveloped intelligence (including findings emerging from the research on al Qaeda'sorigins an d development) with information from existing sources. O ur specificobjectives include the identification of al Qaeda's links with other entities, includingpossible links with state sponsors. These links could be a major part of the threat alQaeda poses in the future. Some context:

Evidence now available indicates that the concept of using aircraft asweapons crashing them into major sitesway raised with top al Qaedaleaders as far back as the mid-1990's, at the same time th e Manila-basedBojinka Plot was underway. Some have also theorized that the concept ofemploy ing hijackers w ith pilot training evolved from the failed attempt ofAlgerian hijackers to force pilots to steer a hijacked aircraft into the E i f f e lTower in 1995. The process of selecting individuals for piloting theaircraft, bringing together the operational teams, moving the financialsupport for the training and maintenance of the teams, and, most notably,coordinating the actions of the diverse components of the attack enteringthe United States from both sides of the continent, an d coordinating theimplementation of the plot with flights from three ma jor airports ar eprima facie indications of the linchpin role of the "central staff" of alQaeda's inner circle.

The results of these research efforts will provide a base for honing specific areasof focus an d identifying sources fo r pursuing the third line of inquiry: What ha shappened to al Qaeda in the wa ke of the 9/11 attacks and the intensified worldwidecoalition in a war against terrorism , and, of even greater importance, what this revealsabout al Qaeda's present com position and its threat to the United States.

The research on al Qaeda's earlier developments will naturally feed into theunderstanding of al Qaeda's current situation. However, we plan to step back at variousintervals to exam ine w hat specific com ponent questions and branches of inquiry haveemerged from our research into al Qaeda's evolution and use these questions to sharpenour focus on the current threat.

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Item 2: Suggested ReadingsOn the origins and evolution of the al Qaeda global terrorist consortium,

we suggest either Peter Bergen, Holy Wa r, Inc., (Touchstone, 2002) or RohanGunaratna, Inside Al-Qa 'ida (Columbia U niversity Press, 2002). Although bothwere published within a few mon ths after the 9/11 attacks, both authors had beguntheir research into al Qaeda years earlier and both conducted extensive interviewswith key actors in foreign settings. The differences are mainly in presentation.Bergen em ploys a more journalistic narrative style, while Gunaratna is somewhatmore scholarly and offers substantial depth on key points.

For insight into the Washington perspective and w hat was known of theterrorist threat presented by bin Laden and al Qaeda prior to 9/11, we suggestDaniel Benjamin an d Steve Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (Random House,2002).

For a detailed, intima tely informed layout of the complex interconnectionsof individuals and cells involved in the terrorist plots in New York an d severalindividuals who later turned up in various al Qaeda op eration s, read John Milleran d Michael Stone, The Cell (Hyperion Books, 2002).

Bernard Lewis' book What Went Wrong? (Ha rperC ollins 2002) provides aconceptual background introduction to the Middle Eastern an d Islamicenvironment in which al Qaeda grew.

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TEAM #1Item 3: Document Requests

We propose to initiate our research by digging into key known lodes ofinformation. This needs to be understood as a starting point, however, because one of thedesired products of an in-depth research effort is the identification of new branches andpotential sources for farther research. We plan to look preliminarily to open sources,many of which have already been used to begin shaping our detailed timeline of alQaeda's emergence and actions since its formation in the late 1980's. (Some of the mostuseful books are listed in the attached list of suggested reading materials.) We thenpropose to examine the following key sources:

1. The records compiled by the Joint Inquiry, both as substantive sourcesofinformation and as a means of identifying what else to look for and where tolook. All of the documents that have been made available to the Joint Inquiryare maintained in specific storage areas by the agencies from which theyoriginated.

2. The FBI's Penttbom file, which contains th e details of what has been learnedfrom th e investigations of the 9/11 conspiracy, includ ing a detailed tim eline ofwhat the FBI knows of the origins and movements of each of the plot'sparticipants.

3. Records of statements of individuals interrogated in connection withseveral major terrorist prosecutions in the Southern District of New Yorkand elsewhere. This is a critical lode of information fo r examining theevolving cell structure, transnational connections and key players in theevolution. The docu me nts include records of investigations and interrogationsfrom th e first trial of participants in the W TC I attack, which concluded inMarch 1994; the trial of the conspirators in the New Yo rk City landmarkscase, includin g the "Blind Sheikh," which concluded in October 1995; the twotrials of Ramzi Yousef, first for his role in the Bojinka Plot, concluded inSeptember 1996, an d then for his role in WTC I, concluded in November1997; the pre-empted "Millennium strike" on Los Angeles InternationalAirport; and the prosecution of the perpetrators of the Africa n Embassybombings, which concluded in July 2001. In additio n, the gu nm an in the 1990assassination of Meir Kahane, the leader of the Jewish Defense League, waslater convicted for his involvement in the 1993 plot to bomb New York Citylandmarks. W e intend to review the records from the Kahane assassinationan d other related inv estiga tions to determine the origins of the New Yorkterrorist cell.

4. Documentary reports of information relating to the 9/11 attacks and thehistory of al Qaeda that were obtained from indiv idua ls and materialtaken into custody since 9/11. The Intell igence Com mu nity has obtained avast amoun t of information from th e large number of operatives, documents .


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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYCOMMISSION SENSITIVEand equipment captured since 9/11. W e will start w ith the Director of CentralIntelligence's Review Group, which has been tasked w ith accum ulating allinformation on bin Lad en, al Qaeda, an d terrorist plots against the Un itedStates worldwid e.This informa tion is critical to the task of examin ing al Qaeda's development,structure, key players and collaborative ties with other regional andtransnational terrorist entities, which is particularly important in assessing thethreat al Qaeda currently poses.Many key individuals and materials have been captured since the conclusionof the Joint Inquiry, includ ing, according to media accounts, individuals whoplayed key roles in the al Qaeda leadership circle, such as Khalid SheikhMohammed and Abu Zubaida, as well as key field operators such as RamziBinalshib, Umar Faruq and Mohammed Mansour Jabarah. The latter two aresources for information on al Qaeda's global reach because of their centralroles in the collaboration of al Qaeda an d Southeast Asian terrorist groups inthe December 2000 attacks in Manila and Jakarta, the planned multiple attacksin Singapore and Malaysia that were thwarted by local authorities inDecember 2001, and the October 2002 Bali bom bing .Other individuals currently in custody, such as Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi,served as regiona l points of contact with al Qaeda in coordina ting terroristactions, and funnel ing money and ma terials to operatives.

5. Reporting from foreign intelligence and law enforcement entities. Thisbody of information, in combination with the information from detainees,provides the largest amount of information about al Qaeda that ha s beenobtained since the 9/11 attacks. In addition to what has been provided throughmore traditional allies, th e reporting provided by Singaporean and Malaysianauthorities is a rich lode, as exemplified by the January 7,2003,SingaporeMinistry of Home Affairs report to Parliament detailing connections betweenal Qaeda and Jema 'ah Islamiyya.

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TEAM #1Item 4: Interview Candidates

The following is a preliminary list of individuals an d categories ofindividuals who are probable interviewees. We will prioritize initial interviewsbased on their potential for prov iding guidance and clues to mining know n andpotential sources of information. W e will take up additional interviews as theresearch process proceeds, with th e guiding principle that th e effectiveness an dproductivity of factual interviews is direcdy related to the availability of relevantdocuments, and the time an d effort given to preparatory research. In other words,th e more informed th e interviewer, th e more effective th e interview.i

U.S. Intelligence Community IGeorge Tenet (DCI) !Gen. Michael Hayden (Director, NSA) i|9/11 Closed by tatute ^^Gofer Black (former head, Counterterrorist Cen ter, CIA)Rudy Russo (DCI Review Team)9/11 Closed by S t a t u t e

New York C rimin al Cases and PENTTBQM Inves t igat ionRobert S. Muel le r , III (FBI Director)Louis Freeh (former FBI Director)Dale Wa tson (former Deputy Exe cutive Assistant Director, FBI)Patrick Fitzgerald (former Assistant U.S. Attorney , S.D.N.Y.)York Police Departm ent)9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy- ... . _ , _ >

York Joint Terrorism Task Force)[FBI N ew York)9/11 L aw E nforcem en t Pr ivacyCW York)

| [FBI NewYork)K en Karas (Assistant U.S. Attorney, S.D.N.Y.)Andrew McCarthy (Assistant U.S. Attorney, S.D.N.Y.)Mary Galligan (FBI Headquarters, lead agent on Pent tbom invest igat ion)

9/11 Law Enforcement p'rivacyleadquaTterS)Michael Rohnce (FBI Headquar ters )PasQuale J . D 'A m ur o (Deputy-Execut ive Assistant D irector, FBI)9/11 Law Enforcement PrTvacyMeW York)Scholars and Outs ide Ex p e r t sBruce Hoffman ( R A N D Corporat ion)Daniel Benjamin (CSIS)Steven Simon (RAND)Rohan Gunara tna (Saint An d re ws)

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FO R OFFICIAL US E ONLYCOMMISSION SENSITIVEMagnus Ramstrop (St. Andrews )Zachary AbouzaBernard LewisU.S. Department of State/NSC

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Richard Clarke (former Chair, CSG, NSC )Barbara Bodine (former U.S. Ambassador to Yemen)Prudence Bushnell (former U.S. Ambassador to Kenya )Michael Shaheen (former Coordinator for Coun terterrorism)Foreign ServicesOfficials from various foreign services, potentially including officials

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