Streamlining the Procedures of the Canadian House of Commons, 1963-1966

Streamlining the Procedures of the Canadian House of Commons, 1963-1966Author(s): Donald PageSource: The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science / Revue canadienned'Economique et de Science politique, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Feb., 1967), pp. 27-49Published by: Wiley on behalf of Canadian Economics AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/139859 .

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STREAMLINING THE PROCEDURES OF THE CANADIAN HOUSE OF COMMONS, 1963-1966*

DONALD PAGE Toronto

In 1965, many 'Canadian and British writers paid tribute to the seven hundredth anniversary of the founding of the British Parliament, and this year, Canadians celebrate the one hundredth anniversary of theirs. Criticism of parliament has been vigorous and almost continuous throughout all these years, and in the midst of these celebrations Canadians are conscious of an apparent decline in the time-worn institution. On October 8, 1963, the Globe and Mail reprinted excerpts from prominent Canadian newspapers describing parliament as "a farce,"' "a wasteful bore,"2 whose members were "incom- petents and buffoons"3 who "had played the role of clowns."4 If parliament is to remain a vital and central part of our democracy, it must be resurrected from the morass of ineffectuality into which it has fallen. Although much of the criticism can be dismissed as irresponsible because the public does not understand its workings or functions, there still remains a hard core of difficulties that must be examined.

Prominent among the many suggestions made by parliamentarians, writers, academics, and even one private organization5 on how to overcome these difficulties is the idea that the historical and almost sacrosanct procedures of the House of Commons must be changed in order to "streamline" the House in keeping with the 1960's. There have been only nine major overhauls of the procedures since Confederation, three of which have occurred since 1962.6 The Honourable John Bracken, in 1946, said that the procedures were "still in the ox-cart stage of half a century ago."7 Advance has been slow; Prime Minister Pearson has informed us that our political machinery is still in the "horse and buggy" stage of the nineteenth century while we try to keep apace of the jet age.8 The rush to catch up to the 1960's, without unwittingly destroying valuable features of the parliamentary system, can be detected in the twenty reports of the 1964-65 Special Committee on Procedure, governmental legislation of June, 1965, and the establishment of a Standing Committee on Procedures. Offering new ideas to prevent a mere reshuffling of the old

*This paper was originally prepared under the direction of Professor J. E. Hodgetts as part of doctoral studies at the University of Toronto. 1This was the time of the threatened Ralliement des Cre'ditistes filibuster on interim supply. Globe and Mail, Oct. 8, 1963. 2Vancouver Sun, quoted in ibid. 3Globe and Mail, Oct. 8, 1963. 4La Presse, quoted in ibid. 5The Canadian Labour Congress presented a brief to the government demanding procedural reforns. Financial Post, Nov. 20, 1965. 61876, 1906, 1910, 1913, 1927, 1955, 1962, 1964, 1965. 7House of Commons Debates (Canada), March 18, 1946, p. 35. Hereafter cited as Debates. 8"Speech of Prime Minister Pearson at Williamstown, Mass.," June 12, 1966. Toronto Star, June 13, 1966.

XXXIII, no. 1, February / f6vrier, 1967.



28 DONALD PAGE

rules, observers have reported on procedures used in the New Zealand, Australian, French and British parliaments. Contemporary party leaders have stressed the need and sometimes the nature of reforms. The Throne Speech at the beginning of the Third Session of the Twenty-Sixth Parliament stated, "My Ministers believe that it is imperative to reform the procedures of the House of Commons in order that it may accomplish the large volume of work required to meet the needs of the Canadian people in modern times."9 Mr. Diefenbaker warned parliamentarians that "Our responsibility is to ensure that this institution shall not deteriorate in the opinion of the public, much less decay because of the failure on our part to bring parliamentary procedure up to date."'10

Procedural rules are designed to promote the most efficient, orderly, and rapid means of carrying out the functions of the House of Commons in keeping with the wishes of the majority of the members. The procedures must enhance and not hinder several things: the governments orderly transaction of public business without making the House a rubber stamp of the cabinet; the right of the opposition to examine legislation, spending, and administration thoroughly but not obstructively; the opportunities for each representative to express opinions in a succinct and cogent manner; and the possibility of Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition becoming an alternative government. The performance of these functions will preserve the effectiveness and dignity of the House of Commons. If partisan eulogizing, recrimination, and bickering plus interminable procedural wranglings about antiquated rules allow the veterans to meander artfully around the rules, thereby reducing the dispatch of the nation's business to a mere crawl, then changes must be made for the consum- mation of necessary business.

Reasons for reform

Sir John A. Macdonald and his cabinet were sometimes hard pressed to find sufficient work for a three-month session; today, even a fourteen-month session cannot consider or pass all legislation proposed by the government. The sheer pressure of business has vastly increased even within this past decade as governments move into the field of social welfare for a growing population, an expanding economy, and a new role in foreign affairs. The corresponding increase in estimates make it impossible for the House of Commons to work efficiently by the old scrutinizing rules and methods within the same time limits. The complexity of modern legislation also requires more skilled and intense scrutiny. The 136-page Canada Pension bill could not be passed as quickly as the simple legislation of half a century ago.

Recent political slogans, such as "Sixty Days of Decision," have made the public aware of this pressure of business by emphasizing the quantity rather than the quality of legislation. With this criterion for judging the effectiveness of a government, the governing party maintains that it must alter the pro-

9Debates, April 5, 1965, p. 2. 1?Mr. Diefenbaker undoubtedly had the protection of the active role of the opposition in mind. Ibid., March 9, 1964, p. 717.



SIMPLIFICATION ET MODERNISATION DES PROCEDURES DE LA CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES, 1963-1966

DONALD PAGE

L'utilisation abusive par les deputes de procedures parlementaires d9su&tes et le nombre croissant des champs d'activite' avec les problemes administratifs qui s'ensuivent et sur lesquels la Chambre des Communes a droit de regard ont rendu ne6cessaire une modernisation de la proce'dure. Surmontant les obstacles historiques et traditionnels, la Chambre a adopte' les changements les plus conside'rables de son histoire. Ces changements e6manaient des suggestions presentees d'un Comite sur la Procedure en 1964-65 et du Gouvernement en mai 1965.

Une analyse des effets de ces changements, a la lumiere des appre'hensions manifeste'es par les de'pute's au cours de de'bats sur l'adoption de ces suggestions, fait l'objet de cet article. Le fait de sie'ger dix heures et demi de plus par semaine a permis de consacrer plus de temps aux debats, nwis une analyse de la derniere session revele qu'il y a assez peu de lien entre la longueur de la session et le nombre de projets adopte's. L'abolition des appels sur les de'cisions de l'Orateur et le rejet de certaines questions de privilege ont re'duit les pertes de temps procedurieres qui s'e'taient de'veloppe'es recemment et qui de'ge'neraient en querelles partisanes.

Une utilisation efficace des periodes allouees a ete rendue possible grdce 2 l'application stricte, par l'Orateur Lamoureux, des regles sur la pertinence et la repetition et par son rejet des questions orales qui n'etaient pas jugees essentielles. Contrairement a leur crainte initiale, ni les de'pute's sans respon- sabilite's ministe'rielles, ni les partis a faible repre'sentation n'ont e'te' frustre's par la re'duction du debat gengral sur le Discours du Trone et les motions de Subsides. La nouvelle limite de trente jours aux de'bats sur les Subsides semble raisonnable lorsqu'on la compare aux de'bats passes. Il est a esperer que les limites impose'es pour certains de'bats spe'cifiques forceront les de'putes a pre prer des discours plus convainquants, de manie're d permettre lexpression d'autres opinions.

Le changement proce'durier le plus important est la clause qui a trait a la formation d'un comite' inter-parti en vue d'obtenir en trois jours un accord unanime sur un agenda pour chacune ou pour toutes les e'tapes d'un projet de loi. A de'faut d'une decision unanime, on doit accepter un agenda de'ter- mine' par le Gouvernement. Ce pouvoir de re'serve n'a pas ete' utilise, mais plusieurs de'pute's craignent qu'un abus en ce sens puisse de'truire notre syste'me parlementaire. Quoiqu'il en soit, une utilisation raisonnable et limite'e de ce pouvoir peut transformer la Chambre des Communes en un organisme efficace sans, pour atutant, sacrifier les droits d'une minorite'.

Tous les changements proce'duriers ont e'te' discute's au momns deux ans avant adoption et ont e'te' approuves par les deux-tiers de la Chambre. La tdche qui reste a accomplir est de s'assurer qu'ils soient proprement evalues avant d'e'tre rejete's ou adoptes en permanence. On devra donner suffisamment de pouvoir au nouveau Comite' Permanent sur la Proce'dure pour accomplir cette



30 DONALD PAGE

tdche. Les r4formes donnent d'excellents re'sultats et devraient continuer a le faire si l'Orateur remplit ses fonctions avec tact et si les d4pute's siegent de fafon assidue.

cedures to remove impediments that hinder the completion of the promised slate of legislative accomplishments. This line of reasoning can partially explain why the Liberals, after the lengthy flag debate and obstruction in passing interim supply, announced their intention to bring in their own version of streamlining procedures under a business committee.

Unwittingly parliamentary government has become party government, which naturally leads to more intensified procedural wrangling. Accompanying this change in the last four years is the return of minority government which makes debating little more than electioneering. Matters of little consequence are subjected to lengthy tactical debates aimed at frustrating, delaying, embar- rassing, and eventually defeating the government while important controversial measures are cautiously introduced and often lost in a pile of incomplete or cancelled legislative programs. Antiquated procedures are a convenient hook on which to hang a failure when, in fact, it is often lack of leadership in the House that has made the debate on measures, such as the Canada Pension Plan, indecisive and confusing. No matter what mathematical disposition has been given to the House by the electorate, the House has a duty to perform its essential functions in the nation's interests.

At present, there are four opposition parties in the House, and they all believe that they have an unquestionable right to express their opinions on all subjects whenever they so wish without their being restricted by time limits.:" If the Canadian public continues to feel that it needs five different channels for expressing its divergent opinions and political aspirations, procedural rules will have to be adjusted to allow time for our forty-year-old multi-party system to express itself.

The final reason why procedural reforms became necessary can be seen in a statistical survey of three examples of the traditional operation of the House. First, before 1963, there were only six sessions in which questions on the Order Paper numbered more than one thousand. The short 1963 session brought forth a new record of 1906 questions, which was surpassed in the 1964-65 session by 3078 questions including 315 starred questions requiring oral answers.'2 Secondly, in the twenty-eight years between 1931 and 1957, appeals on Speaker's rulings totalled 89. In the two sessions of 1963 and l1The importance of minor party status in the House of Commons can be seen in the efforts

of the Ralliement des Crgditistes to secure recognition as an official party in October 1963. By implication, a party with twelve members has had its party status recognized because of the special treatment afforded its leaders. Before long an effort will have to be made to define legally what constitutes a political party within the House of Commons. At present the procedures are designed for the operation of a two party House. If a minority government compromises on procedural rules to win support from the minority parties, rule changes may conceivably perpetuate the multi-party system. 12Debates, June 7, 1965, p. 2063.



Streamlining the House of Commons 31

1964-,65 there were 23 appeals, only two of which were successful."3 In these two years, the average number of appeals a year has been more than double any previous year. Since many appeals involve protracted debate that could last as long as a day, parliamentarians have infringed opportunities for debate on government business. Thirdly, an examination of the increasing number of questions of privilege reveals the same trend. Between 1957 and 1960 the average number of questions of privilege a year was 32 with the highest being 51 in 1960. Now, this number has more than tripled with 85 in 1963 and 111 in 1964-65.14 Since each question takes from fifteen to thirty minutes to be discussed, this represents the equivalent of seven full days of the 1964-65 session."5 However, this is not the entire problem. Within the first six months of the 1964-65 session, members rose 375 times wishing to bring questions of privilege to the attention of the House. Each occasion required a time-consuming explanation of the point of privilege before the Speaker could decide on its acceptability.

The pressure for the transaction of necessary business has made a change in the operational rules of the House imperative. The alternative to reform may well be the continuation of the rapidly diminishing effectiveness of parliamentary control over the executive or more delegated legislation and authority, with or without effective scrutiny by parliament.

Obstacles to extensive reform

Impatient reformers have demanded prompt and extensive changes, but there are good reasons for the slow implementation of procedural reforms. The fundamental problem is to find the correct balance between the time and means needed by the government to carry out its business and the preservation of free, full, and productive debate in the House of Commons. The 1944 Committee on the Revision of the Standing Orders of the House of Commons correctly observed that these "Two fundamental principles . . . cannot be alienated even if the House, in maintaining them, may protract sessions and lay itself open to severe criticism."'6 If the balance becomes weighted in favour of the government, the cries of dictatorship and arbitrary government are inevitably heard. If interminable debate led by the opposition becomes supreme, then the government is hindered by obstruction from carrying out the nation's essential business. Since this equilibrium can change with each year's legislative program and sometimes with a change in government or drastic change in the parties' numerical representation in the House, the efforts to find a workable and flexible norm become quite difficult but not entirely elusive.

In the past decade Mr. Stanley Knowles has made himself the acknowledged expert on the Standing Orders by his vigorous and effective participation in 13These figures do not take into account the large number of appeals on the Chairman's rulings in the Committee of the Whole House. Ibi ., May 19, 1965, p. 1482. 141bid. 15Calculated on the basis that the average appeal takes twenty minutes. 16Debates, March 7, 1944, p. 1239.



32 DONALD PAGE

all procedural debates. During this time he has consistently emphasized that practical unanimity must be found among the political parties if serious reforms are to be made.'7 In the midst of procedural fights in the House, most rules can be manipulated or circumvented by a thoughtful and determined minority or majority. The orderly operation of parliament can be maintained only if rules are established that have the support of the party parliamentary consensus and preferably of every member. Virtual unanimity is almost impossible to obtain as was discovered by the 1964-65 Special Committee on Procedure and proved by the fact that only five out of eighteen attempts between 1925 and 1966 to reform the procedures extensively have met with success.18 It was this tardy reform, caused by efforts to reach unanimity concerning the proposed changes, that prompted the Liberals to take the initiative two years ago.

When the government attempts to institute its own rule changes, as it did in May, 1965, the opposition feels that its rights are being impeded while the government secures for itself the means of perpetuating its term of office by offering efficient government obtained through muzzling the opposition, thereby destroying parliamentary democracy. The opposition points out that lengthy debates, such as the flag or the Canada Pension debates, produced valuable compromises in the legislation, which would not have been implemented if the government had tyrannical powers. The opposition naturally holds that any rule change might allow the government to conceal faulty legislation or shoddy administration and hinder the opposition's scrutiny. Difficult as it may seem, what is needed, according to Mr. W. E. Harris, is "a gradual recognition on the part of the Opposition that a willingness to expedite the business of the House is not necessarily a sign that it has conceded all to the Party in control."'9

Unfortunately, streamlining the House's procedures has usually entailed decreasing opportunity for backbenchers to express themselves in the only open forum that represents Canadian views from coast to coast. In a diversified country like Canada, regional interests are more accentuated and MPs feel the necessity to uphold the rights of their constituents. In recent years, publicity has made parliamentary performance a more important consideration for re-election, and conscientious backbenchers reflect this pressure in demanding the right to be heard. At present, a last-ditch fight for the representative role of the MP is being waged by active backbenchers, such as Mr. I. Wahn and Mr. A. Peters, who are no longer content to express their opinions only in caucus and dutifully provide the party voting strength and quorum for the House. If the backbenchers are to accept willingly procedural streamlining, it will not likely be along the lines of less debate but rather of more fruitful debate and a more productive private members' hour. Upon analysis, our democratic parliament rests not on an autocratic cabinet government but on the people's representatives.

Parliamentary procedure has become an indispensable feature of democracy

17Ibid., Jan. 14, 1955, p. 182, and April 13. 1965, pp. 331-5. 18W. F. Dawson, Procedure in the Canadian House of Commons (Toronto, 1962), 15. 19"A More Business-Like Parliament," Queen's Quarterly, LXIII (Winter 1956-7), 547.




developed over the centuries from the enshrined wisdom of generations. "But we carry on imbued with the belief that because our political institutions worked in the simpler and slower days of the 19th century, they ought to work the same way today. In any event, to alter them would be to tamper with sacred traditions."20 One of the best examples of this is the maintenance of the resolution stage debate on a money bill. Both Mr. Diefenbaker and Mr. Douglas and other parliamentarians have advocated its abolition, but an outdated historical conception of the royal prerogative in section 54 of the British North America Act has kept this procedure intact.21 Public pressure or frustrated MPs will eventually demand sweeping reforms to liberate the House from impossible conditions resulting from antiquated and traditional rules.

A sudden wholesale change in House procedure, even if possible, would not be practical. Rule changes must be grafted onto existing rules if the House is to maintain its orderly and continuous operation without bewildering the MPs.

There are certain desirable changes in the rules that should be implemented; however, the solution is not to pile rule upon rule until the House becomes encumbered with procedural regulations. The consequence of excessive rules would be a parliament that is strait-jacketed and incapable of the flexibility of action needed in times of emergency. The prompt and succinct debate on the sending of Canadian forces to Cyprus in 1964 was a tribute to the House's response to an urgent matter.

Reform for the sake of reform has no direct benefits. The opposition, backbenchers, and tradition impose a restraint on reform, but history has shown us that overzealous reformers have often destroyed the principles on which their reforms are based. The object of reforms must be carefully evaluated before speedy means are used to alter the principal functions of parliament, an action which would make it a truncated and perfunctory part of our governmental system. The problems of or obstacles to procedural reform are surmountable when parliamentarians are convinced of the usefulness of proposed changes.

Do longer streamlined sessions mean greater productivity?

The days of the long speeches and short parliaments that characterized the last century will never return. Parliamentarians must realistically face the problem of examining more business with the same or greater thoroughness within a twelve-month period. Between 1900 and 1960, the average session lasted for five and one-half months,22 but since then we have had two record- breaking sessions: that of 1960-61, which lasted eight and one-half months 20Prime Minister Pearson's speech at Williamstown, Mass., June 12, 1966, reported in the Toronto Star, June 13, 1966. 21Mr. Diefenbaker advocated the retention of debate at the resolution stage (Debates, Oct. 23, 1963, p. 3927), but since then he has recommended its abolition. The NDP has recommended its abolition, unless requested by unanimous consent in its Ten Point Program (Globe and Mail, Sept. 23, 1964). Only Mr. Baldwin has resolutely maintained that the resolution stage should be kept as a time in which alternatives to legislation can be produced. (Debates, Oct. 9, 1964, p. 8929). 22Debates, May 25, 1966, p. 1642.



34 DONALD PAGE

and that of 1964-65, which lasted fourteen months. Shorter sittings but longer sessions have not worked satisfactorily in expediting government business. The reduction of the hours a week for sittings from thirty-one to twenty-five and a half in 1955 was not beneficial. In 1964, three one-half hour additions were made to the evening sittings and nine regular holidays were formally recognized, although they had, in fact, been observed for some time.23 Despite the almost single-handed and determined opposition of Mr. A. Peters, who feared the loss of the "mental objectivity of Members,"24 MPs lost their lunch and dinner breaks on June 11, 1965 (except during the Throne Speech and budget debates, as of January 21, 1966) .25 During normal proceedings, the House now sits for thirty-six hours a week, an increase of 29 per cent since 1964. Moreover, there is also the possibility of sitting past adjournment to finish debate already started earlier in the day if no more than ten MPs object.26 At present these extensions appear to be working quite well. The proceedings to allow for the continuation of debate on three questions from the Question Period after adjournment on three nights a week has provided a useful opportunity for MP-ministerial dialogue that had not been possible under the short replies allowed in the Question Period. Debate during the former dinner recesses has been active and never curtailed by an insufficient quorum. The surprising thing is the number of ministers who have been available at that time to participate in the debate. Extending sittings to complete business under discussion or legislating by exhaustion at the end of a session27 has not become regularized. Even the desire of the 1966 session for a summer recess was not strong enough to permit the extension of sittings past adjournment on July 8, 1966, although the private members' hour was cancelled on July 13, 1966.28

Government legislation involves only about 28 per cent of the House's time and every govemment laments the lack of time that has prevented it from completing its program. For example, in the 1963 session, only ten of the thirty-five items mentioned in the Speech from the Throne were acted upon.29 The 29 per cent increase in the time a week has enabled the present government to be more productive during the first six months of the 1966 session than in the last four sessions and most of the preceding fourteen sessions, without muzzling the opposition. However, from past experience, which is our only way of evaluating the present extension of the duration of the session, more time does not mean a more productive session as indicated in Table I. The lengthy sessions of 1960-61, 1960 and 1956 were not overly productive in relation to the time spent in session, although they showed a tendency to pass a greater number of bills. The most productive sessions are the short ones of 1952 and 1957. Therefore, statistics seem to suggest that the length of the session has little relation to the number of bills passed. Obviously, the duration 2314th Report of the Special Committee on Procedure concurred in October 9, 1964. Ibid., 1964, p. 780. 24Ibid., June 9, 1965, p. 2216. 25Votes and Proceedings of the House of Commons, Feb. 4, 1966, p. ii. 26Standing Order 6, adopted June 11, 1965. Ibid., pp. 3-6. 27At the end of the 1964-65 session, the House sat continuously from 11.00 a.m. until 3.00 a.m. 28Debates, July 13, 1966, p. 7642. 2Financial Post, March 2, 1963.




TABLE I LEGISLATIVE PRODUCTIVITY OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

Average number Year of Sitting Bills of days to session days passed pass a bill

1952 87 31 hours per week 55 1.6 (most productive) 1952-53 108 " " " 54 2.0 1953-54 139 " " " 67 2.1 1955 140 " 60 2.3 1956 152 25' hours per week 50 3.0 1957 71 39 1.8 1957-58 78 " " " 30 2.6 1958 93 " " 44 2.1 1959 127 " 55 2.3 1960 146 " " " 48 3.0 1960-61 (longest) 174 " 64 2.7 1962 (shortest) 65 " 29 2.2 1962-63 72 , , 17 4.2 (most unproductive) 1963 117 " " " 42 2.8

Average 112 47 2.7

1966 Jan.18-Julyl4 117 36 hours perweek 43 2.7 Calculated on a 25' hour per week, excluding the 30 days spent on estimates of last session: 1966 112 43 2.6

NOTE: This table does not include appropriation bills that account for approximately 5 per cent of the total. This table was compiled from information given by Mr. G. Churchill in the House of Commons Debates, May 25, 1965, pp. 1643-4, the Hon. L. T. Pennell, House of Com- mons Debates, July 14, 1966, p. 7727 and from my own calculations. In a general survey it is impossible to take into consideration the changing pattern of party representation and the complexity of legislation.

of the session need not be changed, but rather the time should be spent to improve the quality of their work.

There have been a number of suggestions made for reducing the time spent on certain procedures. When, on January 20, 1966, the division bell rang for more than thirty minutes and the recording of the standing vote took an additional twenty minutes, suggestions were once again heard for the use of an American-style electronic voting machine that could produce the results in thirty seconds.30 However, in a normal session the time saved would not be substantial, since the number of recorded divisions is usually quite small. Lengthy division bells have become necessary at times to muster voting strength, although the experience of the pipeline debate with seventy recorded votes in sixteen days has not been repeated.3' Party leaders and most MPs show no inclination to change these traditional methods; therefore, this practice will probably be continued in its present leisurely form.

The recent misuse of appeals on Speaker's rulings for political purposes led to an abolition of appeals on June 11, 1965. Most of them were not really being used to question the validity of a ruling but to force a vote on the position taken by a political party. Since the government normally protects the Speaker

30Mr. J. Drysdale MP has been a consistent advocate of voting machines since 1959. 31Roland Michener, "What's Wrong with the Government," Globe Magazine, June 1, 1963.



36 DONALD PAGE

and the prime minister is the first to rise to sustain the Speaker's rulings, appeals become partisan battles used to delay the progress of a bill. In exceptional cases the House could pass a motion of censure on the Speaker, which is rather harsh, since it reflects not only on the Speaker's judgment but also on his integrity. The Ralliement des Creditistes vigorously opposed the abolition of appeals because of their fear of a partisan Speaker who would favour his party or proposals dealing with his own constituency.32 These objections have few historical antecedents and may soon become obsolete. The debate in the House in June, 1965, indicated that the move towards a permanent Speaker will receive more attention as MPs continue to discuss the three proposals for the choice of an impartial Speaker and Professor Denis Smith's recommendation for a committee to examine the merits of an appeal.33

A second successful attempt to reduce unnecessary time-wasting procedures is the screening of questions of privilege arising from sources outside the present debate. The Speaker now has the right to question the validity of questions of privilege not arising from the debate in progress before they reach the Commons floor.34 Eighty per cent of the questions of privilege that were not really questions of privilege at all in the 1964-65 session would have been eliminated if this streamlining rule had been in operation.35

Minority governments inevitably provoke a stream of time-consuming non- confidence motions. The Social Credit36 and the Ralliement des Cre'ditistes37 parties have advocated the reduction of these motions to certain specific times. The NDP Ten Point Program of September 22, 1964, suggested that the six non-confidence motions on supply could be combined into one unless ten or more MPs objected.38 Tampering with one of the fundamental principles of our governmental system, responsible government, must be done with extreme care and caution; otherwise, we shall gain time but lose the benefits of the Baldwin-Lafontaine struggle.

One of our MPs, Mr. Olson, has explained MPs absenteeism as a revolt against uninterrupted marathon sessions.39 The Inter-Parliamentary Union has concluded from its study of the governments of forty-one countries that repeated lengthy sessions fan "the flames of artificial feuds which do not necessarily reflect the country's real feelings, antagonisms are aggravated and embittered: what is still worse in a parliamentary system, it almost inevitably succeeds in hamstringing the Government by a constant series of motions of censure on trivial matters which leave no time for administration."40 Two of our experts on parliamentary procedure, Arthur Beauchesne41 and Stanlev 32Debates, June 8, 1965, p. 2134. MAUbid., June 9, 1965, pp. 2177-9. 34Standing Order 41A, adopted June 11, 1965. Votes and Proceedings of the House of Commons, Feb. 4, 1966, p. 40. 35Debates, May 19, 1965, p. 1482. 36Ibid., Feb. 21, 1964, p. 316. 37Ibid., June 8, 1965, p. 2139. 38Toronto Telegram, Sept. 22, 1964. 39Debates, May 20, 1965, p. 1540. 40Parliaments: A Comparative Study on the Structure and Functioning of Representative Institutions in Forty-One Countries (London: 1962), 108. 41Arthur Beauchesne, "What's Wrong with Parliament," Canadian Banker, 23 (March 1950), 82.




Knowles,42 have advocated that a parliamentary session be divided into three distinct sections, with each section having certain business assigned to it. This would provide the regularized recesses between sections, which Mr. Olson believes are necessary to allow MPs to re-establish grass-root contacts with their constituencies, to serve on possible inter-session committees, and to allow ministers specific time for the administration of their departments. Great Britain has effectively used this type of division since 1928.43 Finland has adopted a fixed time limit for a session, and Brazil, Belgium, and Denmark have specific opening and closing days.44 No general support for this type of division has been forthcoming in Canada. On a similar theme, the Fifteenth Report of the 1964-65 Special Committee on Procedures recommended that regular weekly adjournments at three-week intervals should be established to allow MPs time for constituency and committee work.45 Both Australia and West Germany use this system, which allows for the proper operation of an active committee system resembling that recently established by the Liberal government. During part of the Second World War, Wednesday sittings were abandoned to allow more time for cabinet and committee meetings, but the experiment was not successful.46 If recent recommendations for greater use of the committee system are adopted, regular breaks for committee work might become a necessity, despite the objections of Mr. Pearson and Mr. Diefenbaker to breaking up the continuity of the session for this purpose.47 These objections, among others, helped to squash the Committee's Fifteenth Report.

Time limits and regular divisions of a session will not directly' lead to streamlining, but they will improve the operation of the House. Deadlines will probably force the MPs to adopt streamlining procedures to maintain the quality of the House's operation within specified periods of time.

Specific time limitations

Abolition of unnecessary questions of privilege and appeals on Speaker's rulings plus the addition of ten and one-half hours per week to the Commons' sittings will allow more time for debate, but streamlining would fail if the hours available were not used efficiently. Although freedom of speech is a central part of our democratic tradition, the rules allow almost endless debate if amendments and subamendments are continually moved. Too often the essential business of parliament is allowed to slip through at the end of the session or before a recess without proper scrutiny while the early days had been spent in leisurely and protracted debate on less important issues. The blame for this last-minute careless rush cannot be irrefutably assigned to the opposition's obstruction or stalling in order to trade approval of money bills

42Stanley Knowles, "Parliamentary Rules and Procedures," in Gordon Hawkins, ed., Order and Good Government (Toronto, 1965), 73. 43Lord Campion, An Introduction to the Procedure of the House of Commons, 3rd ed. (London, 1958), 124-6. 44Parliaments: A Comparative Study, 107. 45Journals House of Commons (Carnada), CXI, Dec. 14, 1964, p. 985. 46Dawson, Procedure in the Canadian House of Commons, 94. 47Debates, March 18, 1965, p. 12547, March 19, 1965, p. 12582.



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for modification of some other bill. The government's leadership in the House frequently leaves much to be desired as it procrastinates in bringing down both bills and estimates in order to diminish or evade criticism and take advantage of MPs' impatience for a recess to hurry through outstanding business. Within a session, a better apportionment of time is needed if the House is to function effectively. Streamlining certain debates to expedite the Commons' work became a necessity in 1955, and further restrictions have been appended or suggested since then.

In 1962 specific time limits on three major debates were shortened from their initial limit established in 1955. Despite the shortening of the debate on the Address in Reply to His Excellency's Speech to eight days with specific times for votes on amendments and subamendments and thirty minute speech limits for most MPs, the debate has continued to foster boring, pointless out- pourings on the virtues and shortcomings of individual constituencies. A typical example of a totally irrelevant but illuminating speech is that of Mr. H. A. Olson. After reviewing certain items of party interest, he went on to say, "I should like to tell you in just a few moments what the city of Medicine Hat has planned as part of its centennial celebration. . ."48 Two days later Mr. Chapdelaine expressed the view of all streamliners, "But since, this year again, we have to follow the established rule and talk for eight days, often to say nothing, I shall keep on talking a little more so as not to leave my place to someone else who probably thinks, the same as I do, that these discussions are as useless as they are empty."49 The vagueness of the debate is perpetuated by the form of the Speech from the Throne and the ambiguous amendments that do little to focus debate on the main issues. The debate does provide the opportunity for the opposition parties to make suggestions concerning the proposed legislative program, but this could be done in less than eight days. Backbenchers have used this debate to speak to their constituents; their original fear that they could lose their right to speak has not been sub- stantiated. In the last three debates an average of eighty MPs has participated, usually making the maximum speech time limit their minimum.50 An honest appraisal of practically all speeches shows that they could be delivered, just as forcefully, in less than half the time. Without destroying the opportunity for different sectional differences and parties to be heard through shorter speeches, the Throne Speech debate may be cut down closer to the West- minster size of three days.

A similar type of time allocation has given six days' debate to the motion to allow the House to go into Committee of Ways and Means. The limit has worked quite well, and in April 1966 the opposition suggested that the debate be limited to five days.51 Since the same type of debate is found here as in the Throne Speech debate, one cannot help feeling that this time could be far better spent in useful work in the Committee of Ways and Means discuss- ing and examining the vital means of raising money.

48Debates, Feb. 24, 1964, p. 173. 49Ibid., Feb. 26, 1964, p. 268. 501964.465 session, 76 speakers; 1965 session, 74 speakers; 1966 session, 91 speakers. 51Debates, April 21, 1966, p. 4108.




The third main time allocation involves the various stages of Supply procedures. The House of Commons' historical control over the purse becomes meaningless, unless it be given adequate time and means to consider the estimates in detail. Streamlining changes, begun in 1955 on supply procedure, have not been completed, and if and when the Special Committee on Supply Procedures established in 1965 meets, further reforms can be expected.52 In the last decade important changes have been made to eliminate useless and redundant debate.

The adoption of the Thirteenth Report of the 1964-65 Committee on Procedure attempted to limit repetitious and general debate on money bills.53 Opportunities for extensive general debate occurred at four stages: on the resolution preceding a money bill, second reading, clause 1 discussed in committee, and the main operative clause or clauses of a bill. Accordingly, the resolution stage was limited to a one-day debate with twenty-minute speeches. The only advantage to keeping the resolution stage at all is that it provides the opposition with advance information but not details on the government's intentions in financial matters and it allows the government to make improvements in the bill before it is introduced. Since the debate is general, a strong case can be made for completely abolishing this stage. Mr. Diefenbaker has suggested this change and has offered a simple means of getting around the constitutional difficulty of section 54 of the British North America Act.54 By debating clause 1 of a bill with a short title at the end of the committee debate, repetition has been avoided since consideration of the other clauses has really answered the debatable parts of clause 1 that have already been discussed in second reading. These changes have helped to eliminate useless repetition by focusing attention on more essential parts of the debate.

General debate has also been curtailed by limiting it to two days on each of the six motions to go into Committee of Supply. Although backbenchers find no difficulty in using these twelve days, further limitations have become desirable. Mr. Knowles recently noted that "One of the main problems about these . . . is that when a government calls a supply motion the opposition has to look around and find out what we call the government to account for on this particular day, what we can make a motion of non-confidence on. Instead of having a debate that permits non-confidence because an issue has come up, we have the debate and the issue has to be found."55 The new Committee on Supply Procedures is obliged to find the means for effectively using four motions. Mr. Diefenbaker has recommended that the first motion be debated for two days and the rest for only one day.56 The present limits have worked with commendable success in streamlining supply procedures and a further reduction will do no harm. The pressure of business may eventually reduce

520n May 6, 1966, Mr. Knowles asked Prime Minister Pearson when this committee would be set up; the reply was evasive. 53Journals House of Commons, CXI, Oct. 7, 1964, p. 771. Mr. Knowles, Debates, Oct. 9, 1964, p. 8928. 54Debates, March 9, 1964, p. 718. 550rder and Good Government, 73. 56Debates, March 9, 1964, p. 718.



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the motions to one as in the British system and the one motion required to get the budget resolutions to the committee stage.

Between 1957 and 1964 the House spent an average of 48 days on supply, a record surpassed only by that of 90 days in the 1964-65 session.57 Everyone agrees with the necessity for parliament to scrutinize government spending carefully and thoroughly, but these lengthy debates have been filled with extraneous material that has no direct relation to supply. Extensive debates on interim supply were extended beyond the required one-half day to six full days of obstruction in 1962; in 1964 it became entangled in fifteen days of flag debate and in 1965 with the Dorion Commission. In 1966 the press announced in advance that the subject for debate on interim supply would be Viet Nam. Forced by a majority opposition, the government has debated current issues while patiently waiting for approval of its operating expenses. To curb these tactics recent changes have set an overall time limit for supply debate; hopefully, MPs will now be kept on topic by pressure from the clock. The Nineteenth Report of the 1964-65 Committee on Procedures unanimously approved a time limit of thirty days for the consideration of main estimates in Committee with an emergency addition of one extra day up to a total of fifteen for each department not considered within the original limit.58 Proro- gation of parliament prevented a debate or adoption of this recommendation, but the principle was retained in the legislation passed on June 11, 1965. Although the details are still to be worked out by the proposed Committee on Supply Procedures, an outside limit of thirty days a session has been placed on the consideration of main estimates, interim supply, and supplementary estimates, but not of additional estimates introduced after main estimates. Although the Conservatives strongly objected to the limitation, it is not unduly restrictive. Considering the longer daily sittings, the House will have seventeen more hours for supply debate than the average of the last ten sessions.59 This is still more than the twenty-six days allowed in Britain. The 1965 estimates were examined in the 1966 session in thirty days with no difficulty and last year's examination of ten departments in twelve and one-half days has been commendable.60 What the Committee will have to do is to apportion the thirty days properly to prevent supplementary and final supplementary estimates from being passed automatically because the time has been spent in debating main estimates and interim supply. Apportionment of time becomes imperative since there is no safety valve as provided in the Nineteenth Report. Although this change will forcefully streamline the procedures it will not provide for more effective scrutiny of the estimates. If greater use is made of the expanded committee system in examining estimates and the recommendations of the Glassco Commission for program budgets are implemented, a step towards effectual examination of estimates by the House will have been taken. Then these limits should work quite well. If MPs can genuinely probe into the estimates, general debate may be deterred.

Prime Minister Pearson hoped that these reforms would "prevent debate 57Ibid., May 19, 1965, p. 1478. 58Journals House of Commons, CXII, March 26, 1965, p. 1177. 591957-65 average of 243 hours in a 25'2 hour week; 1966 maximum of 260 hours in a 36 hour week. 60Debates, July 14, 1966, p. 7727.




on supply motions from being used as a technique unreasonably to prevent the House from reaching debate on other matters.' Opportunities for general debate should be reduced but not entirely eliminated, unless a substitute be provided. One reason for this can be seen in the meagre time allowed for the discussion of foreign policy in the House. Debate on the presentation of the Department of External Affairs' Estimates before the Standing Committee leaves much to be desired, and foreign policy questions in the Question Period cannot provoke debate. Canadian external relations have emerged from the isolation period, but the House would never appreciate this if it could not use the opportunities for general debate to discuss viable alternatives to our present foreign policy.

Even routine matters of lesser importance, such as motions for papers, have been given strict time limits.62

The government has two means of streamlining Parliament's operation by gagging debate. The use of the "previous question" can concentrate debate on the main motion, but this does not mean that the debate will be sub- stantially shortened. When it was used in 1955 on the Defence Production bill, it did not really affect the length of the debate.63 The most important means of stifling debate is the use of closure. Since its introduction in 1913, closure has been used sixteen times. In 1956 it was misused by an arrogant government wishing to trample the fundamental rights of parliamentary debate and investigation by applying closure to all four stages of the bill before the debate began. This was a bitter experience; the greatest deterrent against its continued misuse is the need of the government to maintain public support for a coming election. The government's original intention in using closure in the Naval debate was to stifle a parliamentary filibuster where the will of the majority was being systematically obstructed by a minority. Many parliamentarians held that its use after two hundred and fifty-two speeches on the Flag debate was justifiable. The difficulty is to find the nebulous point of the debate between full and free investigation and prolonged obstruction when closure should be used. In March, 1962, both Prime Minister Diefenbaker and Mr. Pickersgill strongly urged the abolition of closure,64 but the idea of a committee to discuss the possibility never matured. Both major parties realize that when they form a government, closure may once again become a reluctant necessity. Indeed, the possibility of an ultranationalist group or a Canadian Parnell may make closure a necessity if the legitimate demands of the government to have its legislation passed are to be met.

Since C. D. Howe's pipeline victory has made closure a contemptible term, new means have been found to make the filibuster an obsolete parliamentary technique. Closure has found a respectable cloak in the new Business Com- mittee or what the Globe and Mail described as "McIlraith's Capital Closure Kit."65 The process and application have been weakened to make it more acceptable and in accordance with the idea of an allocation of time for any 6lIbid., May 19, 1965, p. 1479. 62Standing Order 47(2), adopted on April 20, 1964, restricts the time to two hours and forty minutes. 63Debates, July 11, 1955, p. 5941. 64Dillon O'Leary, "The Sham Battle against Closure," Star Weekly, April 21, 1962. 65June 11, 1965.



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particular bill. The concept of an all-party business committee allocating time by unanimous consent to any particular bill was suggested by Mr. Pearson in 1962,66 supported by Mr. Diefenbaker,67 discussed in the 1964-65 Special Committee on Procedure, approved by the Subcommittee on Procedure,68 adopted by the NDP Ten Point Program of September 22, 1964,69 and implemented by the House under Liberal initiative on June 11, 1965. Liberal House leader George Mcllraith succinctly explained the purpose of Standing Order 1SA: "What we are seeking to do is not in any way to restrict legitimate debate or to reduce the time required for adequate consideration of a measure, but to make it possible to have arrangements for the orderly consideration of business and to ensure that after full debate, decisions can be reached."70 House leaders have always met informally to discuss the legislative program, but the Business Committee will be forced to reach a unanimous decision within three days on time allocations, for any or all of the entire debate, of any stage of the debate, and for limitations on speeches or else submit to ministerial time allocation. It was the "or else" that put teeth into the measure and led the Conservatives to oppose it vehemently as a guillotine measure in the hands of a dictatorial cabinet. If the government cannot get its own way in the Business Committee it arbitrarily applies its own limitations. The original Liberal proposal was modified by sensible cautionary amendments. Two extra days can be added by the Speaker to allow the opposition time to discuss an amendment freely. To prevent unreasonably short time limits, an NDP suggestion was adopted that placed a minimum of two days' debate on Second Reading, two days on Committee Stage, and one day on Third Reading, plus a four-hour extension if representatives of all parties have not spoken previously. On money bills the minimum would include one day's debate at the resolution stage. The five- or six-day minimum is well above the last fifteen-year average of 2.7 days per bill. However, time allocation is not aimed at the average bill but at the controversial bills. Minimum time allocation would be unreasonable if it were applied to measures requiring tedious scrutiny, such as the 136-page Canada Pension Plan. A judicious time schedule must allow for a reasonable presentation of different opinions and a sufficient break between a bill's stages to enable the public to form an opinion. If party organizers wish to present a cogent party viewpoint and allow their backbenchers to speak, they will have to set up thorough and well-planned speaking schedules. Compromises on legislation will have to be achieved by the force of argument in sharper debates rather than by the frustration resulting from lengthy disputations. The Business Committee can facilitate the more adroit leadership of the House and the organization of the parliamentary year. In time it may adopt some of the exemplary regulative aspects of its partial American counterpart, the Congressional Rules Committee.

One may speculate on the advantages and disadvantages of the Business Committee's time allocation. Like closure, it can easily be misused by a 66Debates, Dec. 19, 1962, p. 2835. 67In a speech of Nov. 2, 1962, quoted by the Toronto Star June 10, 1964. 68Knowles, in Order and Good Government, 72. 69Globe and Mail, Sept. 23, 1964. 7ODebates, May 21, 1965, p. 1572.




frustrated government. Possibly it was created only as a threat or reserve weapon for overcoming protracted obstruction on controversial and complex bills or for relief from business congestion. If it is used extensively, a minority opposition will find that usefulness has practically terminated and the real watch-dog of the government will not bark until election year. The opposition to Standing Order 15A came from the Conservatives and Mr. A. Peters. The minor parties supported it after certain crucial modifying amendments had been accepted. Their support can probably be explained by their recognition of the fact that the government must have the means to work or the institution of parliament will be bypassed in favour of stronger cabinet government. At present, only Section 20 of the Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act has been referred to the Business Committee. The ensuing report stated that time allotment was unnecessary.7' Hopefully, time allotment will be reserved for proper use in emergency cases, but its historical use in Great Britain does not indicate this.

Time allotment is a British procedure that has been used sparingly since 1887. The important difference between the British and Canadian systems is the time for introduction. British time allocation measures are not introduced by the government until a bill has met systematic obstruction during second reading or become stagnant in the committee stage. Then a government- instituted daily schedule for the bill will provide for the completion of the remaining business. The idea of an all-party business committee was first tried in 1948 for the Iron and Steel bill. Despite its failure to reach an agreement, the Business Committee became permanent under Standing Order 41(b).72 "Erskine May's Parliamentary Practice" has described allocation of time or closure by compartment orders "as the extreme limit to which procedure goes in affirming the rights of the majority at the expense of the minorities of the House, and it cannot be denied that they are capable of being used in such a way as to upset the balance, generally so carefully preserved, between the claims of business and the rights of debate."73 Only in the case of the Govern- ment of India bill, in 1935, has its use been generally approved. Its effectiveness can be seen in examining its use on three highly controversial bills of 1947-48; the Transport bill, the Town and Country Planning bill, and the Iron and Steel bill. In flowing apologetic terms the Lord President of the Council, Herbert Morrison, moved allocation of time on the 1948 Iron and Steel bill to be met by Eden's rebuff that it was a "defiance of Parliamentary democracy."74 After thirty-one sittings of the Committee considering the complex Transport bill, 37 out of 127 clauses and 94 out of 200 amendments were never discussed at any stage before the guillotine fell. The Town and Country Planning bill fared even worse. After twenty-five sittings in Com- mittee, 52 out of 108 clauses were never discussed and 230 amendments were accepted in the House of Lords.75

71Ibid., April 25, 1966, p. 4215. 72Lord Campion, Sir Thomas Erskine May's Treatise on the Law Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament, 15th ed. (London, 1950), 467-8. 73Ibid., 456. 74Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons (United Kingdom), Nov. 25, 1948, p. 1452. 751bid., pp. 1444-5.



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Forced time allocation can be a powelful weapon in the hands of a careless or autocratic government. As Mr. Diefenbaker once said, "No tyrant could ask for more,"76 but its reasonable and limited use can help to transform the Commons into an efficient business-like operation without unduly sacrificing the rights of a minority.

The time limits currently in use have definitely improved the overall performance of the House, but a cautionary note needs to be sounded. Excessive regimentation will destroy the proper balance between the requirements of stability and of adaptability. The timetable of the House must be sufficiently flexible to allow for an emergency discussion on a definite matter of urgent public importance. "Urgent questions" must have a strict interpretation without appeals on the Speaker's rulings and should not be answerable elsewhere. Between January 18 and April 29, 1966, five questions were raised as being urgent, but in accordance with Standing Order 26 the Speaker refused to receive any of them. Their content scarcely made them urgent as shown by their titles: CBC staff difficulties, farm machinery price increases, Ontario trucking strike, Oshawa newspaper strike, and the winter works program in Quebec. Ministerial inquiries should have sufficed for these matters.

Limitations on specific debates have worked with remarkable success when tried, and even backbenchers do not appear to be unnecessarily restrained by or belligerent towards time limits.

Limitations on speeches

Since the stormy days of the English Parliament in the 1620's, freedom of speech has become a central element of our parliamentary heritage. Parlia- mentarians have often felt that the historical right of freedom of speech has given them a completely unfettered licence of expression. Anything to the contrary was a denial of their basic democratic right. However, democracy must also be given the opportunity of working. Prolix and loquacious debators ought to realize that decisions must be reached and every MP has the right to express his opinion. In analysing the basic reasons for public disgust with Parliament, the 1964-65 Committee on Procedures stated that a frequent complaint was that MPs talk too long without accomplishing anything.77 Streamlining House procedures does not aim at restricting the debate to the leaders but rather at shortening speeches to provide opportunities for all MPs to present different points of view without provoking endless debate. Since 1927, speeches in general debates have been restricted to forty minutes. In 1964 and 1965, the following further limitations were imposed: thirty minutes on speeches in the Committee of the Whole House and Address in Reply to the Throne Speech, twenty minutes in Private Members' Hour and during debates on resolutions preceding money bills, and seven (for the question) and three (for the reply) minutes on speakers in the thirty-minute adjournment debates. Other specific debates have their own rules such as closure and motions for papers. These limits do not apply to the prime minister, leader of the opposition, or other leaders of debate as described in 76Toronto Telegram, June 9, 19635. 77Knowles, in Order and Good Government, 70.




Standing Order 31(1) .78 MPs are speaking for their full forty minutes and many are realizing that the general limit should be reduced to fifteen or twenty minutes, if a sufficient number of speakers are to be heard within the new allocation of time for debate. A diversified country must allow for the expressions of opinion from its main regional areas rather than accepting the party leaders' speeches as conclusive. Since MPs will not voluntarily contribute to the brevity and cogency of debate, rules will have to be made. The twenty- minute limit was used successfully in the recent Capital Punishment debate producing pithy and meaningful speeches. Obviously MPs will have to spend more time carefully preparing shorter speeches and the Speaker will find it difficult, but not impossible, to enforce the ban on reading speeches.79 Strong party discipline has virtually removed the possibility of persuading opponents through a speech in the House. MPs often speak only for the record or for the benefit of their constituencies. Twenty-minute speeches can be just as effective while providing more time for additional speakers and other topics. The House itself can decide on the merits of a speaker and, by exercising fair play and good parliamentary manners, can allow him to continue beyond the time limit.

Minor parties and backbenchers have complained that the worst misusers of time are the prime minister and leader of the opposition. After a division on October 9, 1964, these men were limited to twenty minutes during the debate on the resolution stage of a money bill but their endless freedom to talk was restored on January 21, 1966.80 An NDP suggestion of a ninety- minutes limit for them on all debates has not been taken up.8' Because of the necessity for them to explain and comment on complex issues and general matters of interest, their rights will likely remain untrammelled. No one objected when Mr. Diefenbaker spoke for fifty-five minutes on June 8, 1965, without even referring to or mentioning anything dealing with the topic of debate, Bell's amendment.82 Speakers have been hesitant to question the relevancy of political leaders' speeches. A permanent Speaker might impose stricter restraints on these lengthy, general ramblings through history, philo- sophy, and legislation.

Although the most effective means of shortening speeches is to enforce the rules on repetition and relevancy, it is not easy as former Speaker Lambert discovered after his valiant attempts. Following three efforts by the Deputy Speaker to check Mr. Caron's recent irrelevant statements, Mr. Caron emphatically announced: "It is a fact that on the Budget speech anyone may speak on any subject; it has been that way since the beginning of confederation. I do not believe I should be deterred and required to speak only on the amendment."83 Unabashed, he continued with his irrelevant speech until the

78Votes and Proceedings of the House of Commons, Feb. 4, 1966, p. 26. 79Former Deputy Speaker Pierre Sevigny maintained that this was one of his most difficult tasks while in the Chair. Toronto Star, April 29, 1959. 80Standing Order 61A(2). Votes and Proceedings of the House of Commons, Feb. 4, 1966, pp. 57-8. 8lGlobe and Mail, Sept. 23, 1964. 82Debates, June 8, 1965, p. 2099. 83Ibid., April 21, 1966, p. 4139.



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end of his time limit. Speeches that are prepared days in advance and have no place in the current debate continue to be delivered. In general debate vague amendments and subamendments encourage unrelated discussion. The debate ambulates between the motion and the amendment in an obvious time-wasting manner. Members of the House ought to question whether it is really necessary to express the same point in twenty different phrases. A frustrated former Speaker, Roland Michener, concluded: "It is difficult for the Speaker to enforce the rules. It is up to the individual members. It has been a record of failure."84 As the business pressure increases, the party rather than the Chair will quash flagrant irrelevancies to ensure that a point of view be presented within the allocated debating time limits.85 Televised debates do not necessarily enforce relevancy or eliminate repetition and interruptions, as witnessed by the televised debates of the New York state legislature.

Fewer interruptions would also make a twenty-minute speech limit more practical and restore the respectability of parliament. Anyone who knows what lies behind the "oh, oh" of Hansard will realize the necessity to curb interruptions that, according to Mr. Diefenbaker, "consist of gratuitous statements made for no other purpose than to cause disruption, to disseminate humour, or for some other ulterior purpose."86 Yet he and the other experienced and supposedly mature parliamentarians are the worst offenders.87 A tactful and patient Speaker has a difficult time curbing interrupters who continue to carry on this practice while frankly admitting its disruptive nature.

The question period

The 1964-65 Committee on Procedure singled out the Question Period as part of the parliamentary system urgently needing reform.88 The Question Period has become one of the most vital and formidable opposition devices for obtaining first-hand information. By asking penetrating supplementaries, the opposition focuses public and government attention on a particular problem. Oral questions directed to ministers are supposed to seek urgent information. Too often they have become means of boosting the MPs ego and of securing electioneering propaganda. The misuse of the Question Period was aptly described by the Montreal Gazette: "if the Opposition back-benchers have not been able to come up with any $64 question they have apparently decided that 64 different $1 questions will do the trick just as well."89 Former Speakers, Michener90 and Lambert,91 laid down excellent guidelines for evaluating questions that were written into the Second Report of the 1964-65 Special

84In a speech to the Women's Auxiliary of the Toronto Western Hospital. Toronto Star, Jan. 26, 1959. 85This has been tried by the Liberal party, but it has been a difficult struggle according to Deputy Whip James Walker. Ibid., May 24, 1963. 86Debates, April 20, 1964, p. 2347. 87Two typical unnecessary interruptions of Mr. Diefenbaker occurred on June 3, 1965: "What is this, a speech?" "That is too general a statement." Ibid., June 3, 1965, p. 1938 and p. 1941. 88Knowles, in Order and Good Government, 70. 8NQuoted in Dawson, Procedure in the Canadian House of Commons, 157. 9ODebates, Feb. 26, 1959, p. 1393. 91Ibid., Oct. 16, 1962, p. 564.




Committee on Procedures and approved by the House.92 Oral questions must require an immediate answer but must not question newspaper statements, involve a legal opinion, require a lengthy or detailed answer, or provoke debate. The guidelines are there; the problem is to get the MPs to follow them. Mr. Lambert provoked constant procedural wranglings by enforcing the rules. His successor was not as strict; therefore, unessential and provocative questions93 often extended the Question Period beyond one-third of a day's sitting. The heavy hand of Speaker Lamoureux has been quite effective and, on the average, four questions a day are ruled out of order. His rulings have been strict but fair, impartial and necessary.94 If the existing rules were tact- fully enforced, the Question Period could be quite beneficial to both sides of the House. It has been suggested by Mr. Diefenbaker that television coverage of the Question Period would improve its quality. This suggestion needs more consideration because squabbles for the limelight and speaking for the constituencies might produce more problems than would be solved.

Since 1957 the Question Period has mushroomed into a lengthy and tedious quiz program often designed to generate more heat than light. The new thirty-minute Question Period, except on Monday when it is sixty minutes, was approved on April 20, 1964.95 Since then, it has been extended to forty minutes on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Fridays96 to allow extra time for ministerial statements that had previously cut into question time.

The limitation of the Question Period brought forth anguished cries of despair from the minor parties and backbenchers. The Ralliement des Cre'ditistes wanted to be granted a certain number of questions a week to ensure that they would still have a voice in the shortened Question Period.97 The general fear of the backbenchers was ably expressed by Mr. R. Scott: "cprivate members from now on will have virtually no part at all in the question period, because in the half-hour there will not be enough time for them to participate, due to supplementaries, etc. from the front benches."98 Contrary to Mr. Scott's fears, party leaders asked only 14 per cent of the questions in June, 1966. Conservative backbenchers feared that Liberal backbenchers would plant friendly questions to prevent the opposition from asking questions. Table II gives a comparison of the Question Period before and after the time limit, which shows that up to the present the worst misgivings have not, in fact, been fulfilled while streamlining has saved fifteen full days an average session.

If the government promptly answered written questions on the Order Paper,

92Journals House of Commons, CXII, April 20, 1965, p. 225. 930ne typical example: Mr. L. J. Pigeon asked, "I should like to ask him [Secretary of State] whether he feels that it is decent and proper for the wife of a minister of the crown to continue being mistress of ceremonies on a C.B.C. program." Debates, Feb. 27, 1964, p. 286. 940n June 20, 1966, Mr. H. W. Herridge was stopped from asking a question on a pamph- let entitled Methodist Federation for Social Action. On June 21, 1966, Mr. Diefenbaker was stopped from quoting a newspaper and Mr. R. Basford told to put a question concerm- ing the paving of the Alaska Highway on the order paper. (Ibid., 1966, pp. 6611, 6677, 6682). 95Journals House of Commons. CXI, April 20, 1964, p. 223. 96Votes and Proceedings of the House of Commons, Feb. 4, 1966, p. 36. 97Debates, May 21, 1965, pp. 1564-5. 98Ibid., June 10, 1965, p. 2242.



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TABLE II PERCENTAGE OF QUESTIONS ASKED BY PARTY

Ralliement des Conservatives NDP Social Credit Creditistes Liberals

October, 1963 56 20 22 - 2 June, 1966 49 29 9 7 6

many MPs would use this means of seeking information. Improved research facilities should also contribute to a reduction of questions. Members could help themselves if they split their questions among the departments involved. The detailed nature of many questions makes a time limit for replies practically impossible. Although only 10 per cent of the questions are starred, even these could be abolished in favour of written answers now that further information about unsatisfactory replies can be obtained between 10.00 p.m. and 10.30 p.m. three nights a week. The alignment of our foreign policy with UN or NATO activities and the delegation of authority to Crown corporations have made it more difficult for ministers to give direct replies. Possibly our channels of information should be examined.

With a co-operative ministerial attitude, an earnest and cordial opposition and a forthright but tactful Speaker, the Question Period can function with efficiency and proper decorum.

Conclusion

Of the recent changes in the rules that have been put into practice, all appear to be contributing to streamlining for efficiency without destroying the functions of the House. There will always be those who complain that parliamentary procedure is too slow, but we have chosen the democratic means of transacting business for good reasons. Winston Churchill once said: "The parliamentary system is the worst kind of government, except all others."99

Monumental changes have been made in the past three years, but none of them is really radical. All of them had been suggested within the House at least two years before implementation and every change, including the Business Committee, was supported by two-thirds of the House. Minority government has contributed to the necessity for procedural reforms, but it has not hindered reform. In most cases the government accepted useful amendments that did not detract from the operation of the procedure, but they did remove the tyrannical flavour.

These changes are temporary and must be evaluated by the new Standing Committee on Procedures before being altered or permanently accepted by the House. Streamlining procedures are of no value if they merely save time; they must contribute to efficiency and maintain basic parliamentary functions. Despite the lengthy diversions from normal parliamentary business to the Spencer and Munsinger cases, the first six months of the 1966 session have indicated that the temporary procedural changes are working reasonably well. 99Quoted by Mr. Jorgenson. Debates, June 4, 1965, p. 2073.




Nevertheless, problems will arise that will cause parliamentarians to demand further reforms unless the Standing Committee on Procedures is given the authority to review the operation of the present procedures and make recommendations. Unfortunately, the committee's work has been wasted on considering the advisability of accepting certain petitions.'00 Past changes have provided the means of speeding up the old procedures and curtailing their misuse; they have not fundamentally touched the historical procedures themselves. Within the context of the necessary functioning of Parliament the methods must also be reviewed and possibly cast aside for more adaptable ones.YOl Other parliamentary systems must be carefully examined and attention must be given to suggestions from political scientists and the forthcoming Speaker's study of procedure in the British Commons.

No academic or parliamentarian can believe that procedural reforms, themselves, will solve all of parliament's problems and automatically streamline its operation. A step has been taken and many of these reforms need to be extended and made permanent. In the final analysis, even streamlined rules will only work if the individual MPs diligently use their powers of self- discipline.

'00Both reports of the 1966 Standing Committee on Procedures have dealt with petitions- June 16, 1966 and July 5, 1966. lOlThe committee system is beyond the scope of this paper on streamlining procedures. If the anticipated use of committees comes into effect, it will reduce House time, provided that the House does not rehash committee work. The use of the committee has many merits and has become necessary if the House is to continue its scrutinizing role. More first-rate work can be done in less time, and the House will have more hours to spend on other matters. However, the committees must be given the means and time to operate efficiently and not be in competition with the House. The use of procedural rules in standing and select committees is a subject deserving its own special study.



Streamlining the Procedures of the Canadian House of Commons, 1963-1966

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