Use of Drones in

Counterterrorism Warfare

Senior Seminar

Michael Kuhns

12/7/15

Introduction

Today, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are becoming widely used in United

States’ foreign policy. These UAVs, more commonly known as drones, are one of the

main tools the United States is using in the War on Terror. Most people think of

drones as modern technology when they have existed for quite some time. The first

time unmanned aerial technology was used for warfare was during World War II.

The Germans had developed a drone, the FX-1400 or Fritz, which flew with a single

bomb while being piloted from a distant location. The first time the United States

used drone technology was in the Vietnam War for reconnaissance purposes, but

the program was cut due to financial reasons (Callam, 2010). Today, the President

authorizes the use of drones for targeted killings of terrorists who pose and

imminent threat to the United States. They also provide surveillance information to

search for and track key terrorist members. While proponents of the drone program

praise UAVs for keeping Americans safe, others attack the program, claiming that

the use of drones in surveillance and targeted killings does not get us any closer to

defeating our enemies. Since the beginning of the War on Terror in 2001, drone

warfare has been carried out in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Afghanistan. I will be

examining the outcomes that occur from drone warfare in each of these countries

along with the overall pattern of the strikes.

Literature Review

Civilian Deaths

This literature will establish the pros and cons associated with the drone

program by scholars from around the world. One of the main arguments against the

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drone program is the number of civilian casualties that are reported in strikes.

Drones are used for the targeted killings of mid-to high-level terrorists, but in the

process, these strikes kill anyone around the target. On August 5, 2009, a drone

strike killed Taliban leader Batilluh Mehsud, along with his father, mother-in-law,

wife and uncle. It took sixteen different strikes over the course of fourteen months

to finally be able to confirm his death. These sixteen different strikes are estimated

to have killed between 207 and 321 others who were mostly civilians (Callam,

2010). David Rohde, a journalist who was captured by the Taliban, saw the

destruction these strikes caused up close. He stated these strikes are causing a real

social problem in the countries they occur. Not only are they killing civilians, but

they are causing a mental fear that prevents parents from allowing their children to

leave their households and keeping citizens from helping the wounded out of fear of

another strike (Boyle, 2013). According to Deegan (2014), there is reasonable

suspicion that the civilian death numbers from drone strikes are exaggerated

because terrorist organizations can use drone strikes as anti-American propaganda.

As former Director of the CIA, Leon Panetta tried to explain that drones are far more

accurate and precise than other air strikes and bombings. They leave far fewer

civilian casualties than bombing or ground troops would cause (Panetta, 2014).

Stern agrees and adds that drone technology has rapidly improved since the

beginning of the War on Terror, and we can see collateral damage decreasing over

time (Stern, 2015).

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The Shrouded Drone Program

Another major argument since the beginning of the War on Terror is the lack

of transparency about the drone program. It is governed by vague rules, especially

when it comes to targeted killings. Even Panetta believed that there should be more

transparency in drone strikes, but also recognized that the president needs certain

tools to keep the nation safe and secrecy is one of them (Panetta, 2014). President

Obama has defended targeted killings by releasing the criteria that a target must

meet in order for drone strikes to be the right option. The terrorists had to be an

imminent threat to the United States, there had to be near certainty that the target

was present, near certainty non-combatants would not be hurt, and feasible capture

of the target was not possible (Sethi, 2015). Even with this information released to

the public the details of the majority of strikes remain classified.

Reason to Join Terror

Terrorist groups may be using drone strikes as anti-American propaganda or

furthermore as a recruitment tool. Boyle and Stern (2013 and 2015) provide an

example of an attack that was motivated by drone strikes. Faisal Shahzad was

arrested for an attempted car bombing attack in Time Square in 2010. When asked

by the judge why he would want to hurt so many innocent people, he responded

that drones are hurting his people. Deegan (2014) also states that strikes are

causing people to seek retribution. “In addition to the number of civilians killed,

each death represents an alienated family, a new desire for revenge, and more

recruits for [whatever] militant movement can tap into that hatred (Deegan, 2014

p.9).” Boyle (2013) agrees with this; the Obama administration has used many

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drone strikes on low-level targets that are not a current threat to the United States.

All of the families of these victims will be angry with the U.S. and probably seek

revenge. Thus, drones are creating more enemies than we are defeating with the

war on terror. Stern (2015) rejects that there is a direct relationship between

number of drone strikes and recruitment by radical organizations. Stern believes

that there are many factors that determine the recruitment success of groups like

Al-Qaeda, such as emotional, financial, and ideological factors. In her opinion, it is a

mistake to assume just drone strikes are causing increased terror participation. On

this topic, all of my sources that address this issue seem to agree except Stern that

drone strikes are increasing recruitment and encouraging future attacks against

Americans.

Ineffective Killings

Another critique of the drone program is that drones are ineffective and

inaccurate. Even though drones have surveillance technology, it is always better to

have ground intelligence confirming what you think you see (Callam, 2009). Callam

gives an example of this. In the months following September 11th, drones spotted a

man in the desert thought to be Bin Laden; it turned out they were wrong and killed

three innocent villagers. Drones have proven to be ineffective at destroying Al-

Qaeda. Instead of destroying Al-Qaeda, they have just scattered them to places like

Yemen, Somalia, and Syria where they take their battle skills and knowledge to plan

future attacks. Others disagree and assert that drone use has become more

beneficial over time. The accuracy has improved greatly in drones since the

beginning of the War on Terror, which means collateral damage is decreasing. The

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strikes have whittled away at leaders of organizations to the point where today, no

jihadist organization poses a serious threat to the U.S. (Stern, 2015). Leon Panetta,

who is personally involved in the selection of targeted killings, advocates for the use

of drones. They are far more precise at eliminating targets than air strikes and they

are the best chance we have at locating enemy targets (Panetta, 2014). But he goes

even further than defending the drone program by questioning the claims of those

who criticize the program, “to call our campaign against Al-Qaeda a “drone

program” is a little like calling World War I a “machine gun program” technology has

always been an aspect of war”(Panetta, 2014 p.388). New technologies and weapons

have always dictated the way we fight wars, as Panetta says this is nothing new.

Diminishing Legitimacy

Another problem recognized by experts is when the U.S. sends drones into

another country without that country’s permission. On January 4, 2015, Pakistan

called for the end to such strikes within their borders, claiming that drone strikes

are in violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (Shafer-Reed,

2015). If the Pakistani government is unable to protect its people against strikes

that cause widespread fear, and according to (Stern) 2015, people not being able to

feel secure can lead to terrorist group participation. Weak states like Afghanistan

and Pakistan are unable to protect their sovereignty against drone strikes and other

form of attacks; it is weak states like this that make perfect safe havens for terrorist

groups because of their inability to regulate and control what happens in the

country (Verhoeven 2009 and Deegan, 2014). Afghanistan, Yemen, and Somalia are

all examples of failed states. These states are unable to control their internal affairs,

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and prevent radical groups from operating within them. Pakistan, on the other hand,

is more legitimate and may have the capacity to combat terror threats without

drone assistance from the United States. In Deri’s study, he cites a Pew Poll reported

in 2002 that states, seventy-two percent of Pakistanis believed their government

was capable of doing good for the people. In 2011 the number plummeted to twenty

percent, largely due to unwanted drone strikes. The United States is in a tough

position because while we have refused to end strikes in Pakistan, most strikes

operate using intelligence from the Pakistani government. Without the support of

Pakistan’s government, our ability to combat terror could be seriously inhibited

(Deri, 2012).

Future Drone Wars

Currently, the United States uses drones to conduct targeted killings around

the globe with very little restrictions. We are enjoying a time where the United

States has the most technologically advanced drones in the world, but that could

soon be changing. Boyle believes it is only a matter of time before Iran, Syria, North

Korea, and even non-state actors will soon have access to armed drones. ISIS

reportedly has already used drone technology to coordinate an attack in Syria

(Boyle, 2015). We have already learned that terrorist organizations can use drones

for anti-American propaganda, and soon they will be able to actually harness their

power to conduct attacks. They were bound to adapt to the weapons we use to hunt

them, not only how to avoid them but also how to build and operate unmanned

technology (Johnston, Sarbahi, 2015). The President justified targeted killings

throughout the War on Terror through the Authorization for use of Military Force

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Against Terrorists passed in 2001. Scholars agree that this led to a tremendous

increase in executive power, especially because the War on Terror will not have an

end. What happens if Iran supposedly decides to have a War on Terror and they use

drones for targeted killings around the world? What will happen when Iranian

drones target a threat to them operating inside the United States? We are likely to

soon discover the answers to the questions unless the United States takes a

leadership position in the slowing of drone technology and determining rules to

govern the use of the technology (Boyle, 2015).

Research Design

This research will examine the outcomes of using drones as the primary

weapon in the War on Terror. The outcomes of drone warfare will be evaluated

through the changes that have occurred as a direct result of the use of drone strikes.

The dependent variables in this study are the outcomes and patterns strikes have

caused since the beginning of the War on Terror, thus making the independent

variable the use of drone strikes by the United States against terrorist groups in

Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.

In order to effectively measure the impact of drone strikes, I will be looking

at the four countries in which strikes occur: Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and

Afghanistan. These countries have been selected for strikes because groups are

using them as terrorist sanctuaries. One of the limitations of my study is that drone

strike data on Afghanistan from 2001 through 2014 are not available to the public. I

believe this to be partly because Afghanistan was arguably the most instable state

involved in the drone program. Between Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and warlords there

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was no legitimate sources to report information about strikes. Future studies on the

outcomes of drone warfare will be able to draw more conclusions if the Afghanistan

data ever becomes accessible and reliable. I also believe we have not seen the full

effects of using drones in the War on Terror, because the war is an ongoing conflict

which will likely continue for decades to come.

The primary source of data from drone strikes comes from the Bureau of

Investigative Journalism. The Bureau is a non-profit organization with the goal of

educating the public on the realities of power in the world. The data on drone

strikes is reported in a range because of complications such as the secrecy of the

drone program and the difficulty of distinguishing combatants from non-

combatants making it difficult to determine the exact number of casualties. In the

data and analysis section, I will be using the statistics from the Bureau of

Investigative Journalism to compare the success of strikes across Pakistan,

Afghanistan, Somalia, and Yemen. This section will include variables such as the

number of strikes, minimum/maximum killed, minimum/maximum civilian

casualties, and minimum/maximum children casualties.

The Chief of Drone Warfare

George W. Bush

On the morning of September 11th, President Bush found himself responsible

to lead a nation who just witnessed the largest attack on U.S. soil since Pearl Harbor.

That day the terrorist group Al-Qaeda attacked the United States with four

coordinated hijackings killing a total of 2,977 people from ninety-three different

countries. Two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, the third crashed into

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the Pentagon, and the last plane crashed in a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania,

when passengers fought back against their hijackers (9/11 Memorial and Museum).

The events that occurred on September 11th scared the nation for years to come and

set the stage for the decisions made in the War on Terror.

The attacks on September 11th left the nation feeling scared and vulnerable.

There was a widespread fear that another attack could be coming at any moment.

President Bush was aware that such a devastating attack needed a dramatic

response to help Americans feel secure again. What Bush did next was genius from a

presidential point of view; he declared war on terror. Terror is a tactic used all

around the world by different groups, and none of these groups besides Al-Qaeda

had nothing to do with the September 11th attacks. Declaring a War on Al-Qaeda and

maybe even the Taliban seems like the reasonable option, but as history has shown

presidential power dramatically expands in times of crisis and war (Gardner, 2013).

During these times, the nation needed a strong leader and therefore executive

power was not questioned. Terrorism is a concept or strategy that involves the use

of fear to achieve a political objective, because terrorism is a tactic that does not

belong to a single country it is incapable of surrender. The bottom line is the War on

Terror is a war with no end and presidential power will be expanded indefinitely

because of it.

With his increased presidential power, Bush pushed for a series of radical

measures to protect the nation including: The Patriot Act, the redefining of torture,

and the adoption of the President’s Kill List - which is likely the most troubling of all.

With the Kill List the president has the ability to kill anyone in the world who is

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thought to be engaging in terrorist activities, including American citizens. But again,

this was all being done in a time where Americans were willing to sacrifice what

they believed was right for national security.

The President’s authority to implement these radical policies comes from a

joint resolution of Congress, the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). The

President uses this authorization to defend the use of drones for targeted killings.

Although there was a serious flaw in President Bush’s reasoning, Bush interpreted

the AUMF to legitimize their power to declare and conduct the War on Terror.

However, the AUMF only grants the president the power to use military force for

those responsible for the 9/11 attacks. “The President is authorized to use all

necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he

determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that

occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons (The

Authorization for Use of Military Force, 2001).” It is reasonable this gives the

president power to go to war with Al-Qaeda and even the Taliban, because the

Taliban refused to give up Bin Laden and other key members of Al-Qaeda prior to

the invasion of Afghanistan. However, it certainly does not give the president power

to engage in conflict with ISIS, and it certainly should not give the president power

to conduct a global war on terror.

Barack Obama

When Obama became president in 2009 he had the opportunity to clarify the

meaning of the Authorization for Use of Military Force but decided against it.

President Obama should have immediately declared that the AUMF only pertains to

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Al-Qaeda and any groups who directly harbor them like the Taliban. This would

have resolved the problem with the United States being in a never-ending war, with

a vast number of enemies. But from Obama’s perspective that would have meant

limiting presidential power.

While campaigning for President, Obama claimed that he would restore the

United States’ reputation around the word. He promised to make counterterrorism

policies more nimble, transparent, and ethical then they were during the Bush

administration (Stern, 2015). Clearly, his attempts to make counterterrorism

measures more ethical have failed with multiple countries calling for an end to

drone strikes and the United Nation’s Human Rights Council condemning drone

strikes in 2013, stating that they are a violation of international law (Shafer-Reed,

2015).

President Obama has insisted that we must adhere to our values as much as

we protect our safety with no exceptions (McCrisken, 2013). He has taken steps to

help restore the reputation of the U.S. abroad. Even though he is criticized for

leaving Guantanamo Bay open, he has drastically decreased the amount of prisoners

being held there, and also renounced the interrogation tactics used by the Bush

administration (McCrisken, 2013). He has taken several steps to improve the

transparency of the drone program. In May 2013, Obama defended drone strikes by

announcing the criteria for when it is acceptable to eliminate terrorists through

strikes - the terrorists must be a continuing imminent threat to the United States,

there must be near certainty target is present, near certainty noncombatants will

not be killed or injured, and when capture is not a feasible option (Sethi, 2015).

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Although, President Obama was not revealing this information for some time, his

administration failed to disclose any information on targeted killings during the first

three years of the administration (McCrisken, 2013). President Obama attempted to

take was requesting a new authorization of force that pertains to ISIS (The New

York Times, 2015). This would have cleared up the issues of the 2001 Authorization

for Use of Military Force being used to engage groups who were not responsible for

September 11th, but it was not passed by a Congress that distrusts the president.

The targeted killing of American citizen’s Anwar al-Awlaki and his son are

among the president’s top criticisms. Their deaths seriously call into question the

power of the president to kill. Contrary to prior belief, President Obama approves

every single name on the Kill List and even expands on it by recommending his own

targets. Many Americans are uncomfortable with the president being able to

sentence people to death by hellfire missiles. Harold Koh, the legal adviser to the

Department of State, said that all targeted killings must be applied to two main

principles before they are executed, distinction and proportionality. Distinction

limits the strike to military objectives, and civilians cannot be a military objective.

Proportionality prohibits strikes that might cause incidental loss of civilian life,

injury to civilians, or damage to the objects of civilians (McCrisken, 2013). One must

wonder how strictly these principles are followed because when looking at the data,

there are clearly civilian casualties. In regards to the death of Anwar al-Alwaki and

his son, the Obama administration made an unprecedented claim that it has the

authority to kill American citizens it deems to be a threat to the country without due

process (Jaff, LaHood, 2010). A week after al-Awlaki was killed, his son was killed in

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another drone strike which was claimed to be an accident (Brachman, Levine 2011).

Could this precedent eventually lead to a president using drone strikes for targeted

killings on U.S. soil? This scenario is doubtful, in order for drone strikes to begin to

happen on U.S. soil the president would have to completely disregard the feasibility

of capture. Threats that occur within the United States are much easier to capture

than threats plotting against the United States overseas such as in Yemen and

Somalia.

12%

88%

Authorized Targeted Killings in Pakistan

President Bush

President Obama

Figure 1: Authorized Killings in Pakistan

The above chart shows how much each president relied on drones for

targeted killings in Pakistan. President Bush conducted fifty-one strikes killing a

minimum of 410 people while President Obama conducted 370 strikes that killed at

least 2079 people (Bureau of Investigative Journalism). There are two main pieces

of information to be learned from this chart. First, Presidents Bush and Obama used

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drones for different targets. The Bush Administration used targeted killings to

eliminate high-ranking members from Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, while the Obama

Administration appears to target lower level member terrorists (Bergen, 2014). It

appears that Bush’s idea of success was to take out the leaders of terrorist

organizations while Obama appears to be after the organization as a whole. Second,

terrorist activity increased in Pakistan after the invasion of Afghanistan. As the

invasion continued, more terrorists fled into Pakistan, including Bin Laden. Rather

then sending large amounts of troops into Pakistan, Obama decided to pursue our

enemies through the drone program. These two reasons explain why Obama has

harnessed the power of drones far more often than his predecessor.

Pakistan

The drone war began in Pakistan in 2004 when terrorists started fleeing

from U.S. troops in Afghanistan (Bureau of investigative Journalism). President Bush

issued drone strikes for targeted killings of high-level terrorists who are threats to

the United States or its allies. The original hope was that by going after the

leadership of terror groups, the group would collapse and no longer be a threat to

the United States. But counterterrorism experts have learned that groups like Al-

Qaeda are very organized and have a clear hierarchical order. Al-Qaeda has proved

to be a resilient group who is never dependent on a handful of leaders; they have

shown they are adaptable to fill positions of fallen members (Cronin, 2013).

Leaders of terrorist organizations killed by drone strikes consist of Abu Yahya Al-

Qaeda second in command, Hakimullal Meshud former leader of the Taliban; and

Ahmed Abdi Godane former leader of Al-Shabab (Shafer-Reed, 2015). Despite the

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elimination of previous leadership of these groups, new leaders have rose to power,

making these terrorist groups a continuous threat.

Americans like to see drone strikes as a way of saving American lives; we no

longer need to send in ground troops to hostile environments when we can have an

unmanned aircraft fire hellfire missiles at our enemies. According to a Gallup Poll,

sixty-two percent of Americans approve of using drones for targeted killings of

terror suspects in foreign nations, but yet only fourteen percent follow drone strikes

on the news (Albrecht, Chrisian, 2013). It is possible Americans are so willing to use

drones because we do not have to see their harmful effects, “if Americans were

similarly able to contemplate the latent consequences associated with using drones-

the civilian casualties, the destruction of entire communities, and the effect on the

mental health of those who live under drones- would they begin to reconsider their

approval of drones?” (Albrecht, Christian, 2013 p.16). It is certain to say that

Americans might be tolerant towards drones targeting enemies across seas but

there would likely be vast disapproval if drones were used to target threats on U.S.

soil.

The people of Pakistan have expressed their hatred of the drone program

numerous times. Pakistanis see drones as weapons that cause unnecessary pain and

suffering, they kill indiscriminately, they cause vast property damage, and they

cause psychological torture. A Pew Poll found that seventy-four percent of

Pakistanis think of the United States as an enemy because of the strikes (Shafer-Ray,

2015). With strikes causing such a rage among the Pakistan’s population, the

government has formally demanded an end to the drone strikes.

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Pakistan’s government claims to have asked the United States multiple times

to end the drone strikes, asserting that it violates Pakistan’s sovereignty, violates

human rights, and increases extremism (Aljazeera, 2014). The Pakistani

government has taken a huge hit in approval ratings due to its inability to protect

their people from strikes. Many Pakistanis feel betrayed by their government who

they believe is responsible for allowing drone strikes to occur in the country.

According to the Pew Research Center in 2002, seventy-two percent of Pakistanis

thought their government was capable of doing good. By 2011, the government’s

approval dropped down to twenty percent and is estimated to continue its descent

(Deri, 2012). Asif Ali served as Pakistan’s President from 2008 to 2013. Towards the

end of his presidency, his approval rating was down to a mere fourteen percent

(Deri, 2012). This shows that drone strikes cause more than just loss of life; they

destabilize and ruin the legitimacy of governments who are powerless to protect

their sovereignty against such attacks. Although there could be a flaw in this

reasoning, it would be extremely unpopular for the government of Pakistan to do

anything but call for an end to drone strikes. Just like in the United States, Pakistan’s

government has public relations to consider. By calling for an end to drone strikes,

they at least make it appear like they are trying to fulfill the peoples wishes.

Since Pakistan’s government is unable to protect its own people from strikes,

Pakistani citizens have begun to look to terrorist organizations for protection and

revenge. “In addition to the number of civilians killed, each death represents an

alienated family, a new desire for revenge, and more recruits for {whatever} militant

movement can tap into that hatred” (Deegan, 2014, p.9). Terrorists use strikes as

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anti-American propaganda to make it look like they are the ones with the just cause.

Muslims who would otherwise be considered non-violent and moderate will

possibly become terrorist sympathizers or even terrorists. Even though drone

strikes have weakened terror groups by eliminating their leaders, the groups have

thrived in environments that are becoming increasingly hostile towards the United

States (Shafer-Ray, 2015). “Al Shahab (the clouds), the propaganda branch of Al-

Qaeda, has been able to attract recruits and resources by broadcasting footage of

drone strikes, portraying them as indiscriminate violence against Muslims” (Cronin,

2013). While strikes have killed many members of terrorist groups, the terrorists

have learned to adapt by using the strikes as means to gaining more support. The

amount of civilian casualties reported in these strikes are often over exaggerated

when the information comes from terrorists, or terrorist sympathizers.

Drone strikes that weaken the relations between the U.S. and Pakistan will

have negative effects on how we combat terror. Drone strikes are most effective

when there is a ground force presence that supplies information to the drone

operators. Often governments of the countries where strikes occur supply the

ground intelligence; in this example it is the Pakistani government. If Pakistan’s

government refuses to supply us with intelligence, it could seriously hamper our

ability to combat terrorism in the region (Deri, 2012). Without ground intelligence,

drone strikes are likely to cause even more civilian deaths, which will result in more

moderate Muslims becoming radicalized and becoming terrorist sympathizers. An

American hatred is building among the people of Pakistan. This hatred is likely to

make future cooperation very difficult between the United States and Pakistan.

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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 20150

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1100

1200Pakistan Drone Strikes

Min People Killed Max People Killed Min Civilians Killed Max Civilians Killed

Year

Dea

ths

Figure 2: Pakistan Drone Strikes

Pakistan stands out because it has had by far the greatest amount of armed

drone activity than any country in the world. The strikes slowly began with the Bush

Administration in 2004 and escalated until 2010 where strikes and deaths begin to

decrease. As mentioned earlier, the increase could be due to terrorist fleeing into

Pakistan from Afghanistan or a difference in targeting strategy between Presidents

Obama and Bush. 2010 has the most drone strikes at 128 with the highest amount of

reported deaths, but the number of strikes and deaths fall consistently in the

following years. This decrease is because the strikes are effective and are

eliminating targets that pose a threat to the United States and our allies, therefore,

there is not a need for as many strikes. One of the problems with drone warfare

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listed above was it assists terrorist organizations in recruiting new members. If this

were true, and the United States was essentially making more enemies than we

were eliminating, one would suspect that strikes would remain constant if not

increase rather than decrease. Another item to factor in is Pakistan’s government

calling for an end to the strikes. President Obama could be taking this into

consideration when executing strikes because Pakistan is a key ally in The War on

Terror, and it would be detrimental if they stopped assisting the U.S. in

counterterrorism measures.

Yemen

Prior to the War on Terror and the beginning of drone strikes in Yemen, most

Yemenis people did not believe in terrorism’s cause. In the 1990s, the Islamists saw

extremist jihadi groups like A-Qaeda as having no place in Yemeni politics, but today

that has changed (Schwedler, 2015). The United States has used drone strikes in

Yemen to prevent the spread and sophistication of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian

Peninsula (AQAP). But Jillian Schwedler, a political scientist professor at Hunter

College, New York, spent several years doing research in Yemen and found that the

drone program in Yemen is making the population increasingly hostile towards the

United States. Yemenis who once condemned the use of terrorist attacks are now

allowing terrorists more space to operate (Schwedler, 2015). This is very similar to

what my research found in Pakistan. When a nation’s government is unable to

protect its population from outside attacks such as drone strikes, the people turn to

alternative groups such as Al-Qaeda for protection and retaliation.

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On December 5, 2013, Al-Qaeda launched a car bomb attack and an assault

on a hospital that killed sixty-three people. The attackers claimed to have conducted

the attack as revenge for American drone strikes (Sharp, 2015). With pressure from

terrorist attacks like this one combined with the civilian casualties that result from

drone strikes, Yemen’s parliament has been pressured into calling for an end to the

drone strikes on December 15, 2014 (Sharp, 2015). This puts President Hadi in an

extremely challenging position. If President Hadi presses the United States to end

the drone strikes in Yemen, he is giving in to the demands of terrorists, and it proves

that the tactics used by terrorists are working. On the other hand, by allowing the

strikes to continue, Hadi’s leadership will be weakened by angering the people, who

will possibly turn to the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula for leadership (Sharp,

2014).

The people of Yemen are frustrated their government will not protect them

from strikes. An Arab Barometer survey taken in 2007 found that 73.5% of Yemenis

thought it is justified to conduct attacks on Americans wherever they may be

(Schwedler, 2015). This is a big difference from the 1990s where moderate Yemenis

did not believe terrorism was ethical and did not allow sanctuary to terrorists.

Yemen is also faulted the United States for assisting Saudi Arabia in their most

recent conflict over regime change. The United States was providing Saudi Arabia

with surveillance intelligence by drone, which Saudi Arabia used to bomb

indiscriminately (Zenko, 2015).

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2002 2011 2012 2013 2014 20150

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100

150

200

250

300

Yemen Drone Strikes

Min People Killed Max People Killed Min Civilians Killed Max Civilians Killed

Year

Dea

ths

Figure 3: Yemen Drone Strikes

The above chart shows the course of the drone program in Yemen. The first

strikes in Yemen were conducted in 2002 but did not continue until 2011. The in-

between years are left off to improve the graph’s readability. This actually marks the

beginning of drone warfare when President Bush quietly authorizes the strike in

2002. It is interesting to see that the peak of the drone program in Pakistan was

2010, which was followed by a quick decline in the number of strikes and deaths.

The drone program in Yemen essentially begins the following year in 2011 and

peaks in 2012 with a total of 44 strikes. Even though targeted killings are declining,

surveillance drones have been increasingly used over Yemen to supply intelligence

to Saudi Arabia (Zenko, 2015).

Somalia

The case of Somalia is similar to that of Afghanistan because the country was

a failed state when the War on Terror began. Somalia had been unstable for years

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before drone warfare begun; Somalia has struggled to maintain any form of law,

order, and control its territorial integrity (Verhoeven, 2009). It is for this very

reason the United States views Somalia as a breeding ground for terrorists. As we

have seen before failed states can threaten global security, for example when the

Taliban and Al-Qaeda came to power in Afghanistan.

Somalia is undergoing a humanitarian crisis due to famine and malnutrition.

The United Nations, including the United States, was trying to intervene by

delivering aid, but was being blocked by Somali warlords (Mohamed, 2009). The

warlords prevented the aid from reaching the people who needed it most and used

it to further benefit themselves. This is a common problem when sending aid to

developing countries; the most needy people are not the ones receiving the benefits

from the aid. After the disastrous black hawk down, and the horror of American

servicemen being burned and dragged through the streets, the United States and the

international community abandoned Somalia. By leaving the country we guaranteed

that Somalia would remain lawless and ungoverned, and become the perfect

sanctuary for extremist terrorist groups (Mohamed, 2009).

To make relations worse the United States began funneling money to the

very warlords who are responsible for the starvation of millions, and who killed

Americans. This was known as the Alliance for Restoration of Peace and

Counterterrorism, in which the United States paid regional warlords up to $150,000

per month to oppose the Islamic Court Union (ICU) (Mohamed, 2009). The Somali

people who were suffering under the oppressive rule of warlords saw this as the

United States legitimizing their reign of terror. The United States feared that the

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Islamic Court Union would allow terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab more space to

operate. President Bush declared Somalia to be a safe haven for terrorists, such as

groups like Al-Qaeda who seek out lawless and anarchic environments to train,

operate networks, and plan attacks (Mohamed, 2009). It is conceivable that terrorist

groups are able to make a home in Somalia because the international community

abandoned it and the human rights abuses were allowed to continue.

2011 2012 2013 2014 20150

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Somalia Drone Strikes

Min People Killed Max People Killed Min Civilians Killed Max Civilians killedYear

Dea

ths

Figure 4: Somalia Drone Strikes

The drone program in Somalia began in 2001 and has very few strikes each

year in comparison to Yemen and Pakistan. The most drone strikes that have

occurred in a given year in Somalia was in 2015, which had 9 reported strikes so far

with a wide range of deaths (between 7 and 75 people killed). Again data on drone

strikes can have a large margin of error for multiple reasons such as terrorist

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sympathizers who over stating the number of people killed to make the population

increasingly hostile towards the United States. I think it is likely that will see strikes

in Somalia increase over the years. The United States fears that many terrorists are

fleeing Yemen and seeking sanctuary in ungoverned areas in northern Somalia. It is

estimated that about 600 members of Al-Qaeda fled from Yemen to Somalia after

attacking a prison and rescuing some of their fellow members (Gertz, 2015). This

would cause more drone strikes in Somalia for years to come to try and prevent

them from making a safe haven where they can plan and coordinate attacks. Due to

the rough history with Somalia the drone program probably cannot do much more

damage to relations.

Afghanistan

Drone strikes in Afghanistan made this study more difficult. As previously

mentioned, drone strike data is not available in Afghanistan for 2001-2014. This

proved to be a problem for my study when looking for patterns in drone strike data

to determine the outcomes of using drones as the main weapon in combating

terrorism. One has to wonder why the data on drone strikes is available everywhere

except in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2014. I will be discussing why the data is

unavailable during this time period.

As most people know the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 marked the

beginning of the War on Terror and was a response to the terrorist attacks on

September 11th. What most people do not know is before the majority of American

troops reached Afghanistan the CIA began the war by funneling money to northern

warlords in Afghanistan. The CIA provided money, surveillance, and air power to the

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warlords in return for them killing and capturing members of Al-Qaeda and the

Taliban. Just on a side note these warlords were also paid per prisoner they handed

over to the CIA for interrogation. It did not take them long to realize they could

capture anyone and hand them over to the CIA and still receive their payment. This

is one of the reasons why civilian casualties are so high in the War on Terror.

Members of Al-Qaida and Taliban look just like any other members of the civilian

population, so when these suspected terrorists were interrogated by the CIA they

often had no information to supply since they had never been involved in terrorist

organizations.

In 2001, Afghanistan was absolutely considered to be a failed state. In order

to perform accurate drone strikes it is important to have forces on the ground

supplying intelligence. In the beginning of the war the only intelligence we had to go

on came from northern warlords. There is a reasonable chance when calling for air

support the northern warlords were less concerned about where strikes occurred

than the United States government would have been. This is a reoccurring problem

we see in the War on Terror; rarely is the United States ever on the same page with

our allies when it comes to the rules of engagement. Relying on intelligence from

warlords could cause many more civilian casualties than relying on intelligence

supplied by the Pakistani government.

The President, Congress, CIA, and Air Force are the institutions that

determine which drone strike data is classified and which is released to the public.

Usually strikes that kill high-level terrorist leaders with little collateral damage are

the ones released to the public. On Friday, November 13, 2015, U.S. Army Colonel

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Steven Warren made the announcement that the infamous Jihadi John was killed the

previous night in a drone strike (Botelho, Star, 2015). Jihadi John was a key member

of ISIS who appeared in multiple videos showing the execution of his victims.

Hearing reports such as this one boost Americans’ confidence in the drone program.

But information about the majority of drone strikes remains classified, and is

reported through investigative journalism, eyewitnesses, and terrorist

sympathizers. Many Americans believe the drone program needs more

transparency so that results are publically known. Panetta agrees that the program

is too secretive, but acknowledges that the President needs a wide range of tools to

protect the nation, and secrecy is one of the most important (Panetta, 2014).

Another reason the data might be skewed anywhere drone strikes occur is

because most of the data comes from people who witness the strikes. The civilian

populations where strikes occur have no prior knowledge of the attack. The attacks

are silent and happen extremely quickly. A common drone used for targeted killings

is the MQ-9 Reaper. The Reaper can fly up to 50,000 ft. and can fire a hellfire missile

1,150 miles away from the target without alerting anyone in the targeted zone (U.S.

Air Force, 2015). So how can an unexpected civilian population possibly be able to

distinguish a drone strike from a cruise missile, or any other kind of air strike?

Without a moderately stable government that supplies information to the United

States about the target, these strikes cannot be 100% accurately reported.

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Conclusion

When examining the data for drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia,

one of the first things that occurs to me is each country is linked by a pattern. I will

be coining this pattern as the “whack a mole effect” after the classic arcade game

where you can whack the mole with all your might, but it will just pop up in another

slot over and over again. This is how I interpreted my results. The moment drone

strikes begin to decline in one country, the drone program appears to start up in

another. This is because terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda avoid strikes by seeking new

sanctuaries, usually in failed states. Drone strikes have not, and will not be able to

destroy Al-Qaeda; it has just scattered them to Yemen, Somalia, Iraq, and Syria

where they take their knowledge and battle skills, and find others to join in their

cause (Boyle, 2013). Today we see a more decentralized structure in terrorist

organizations. So far it has prevented their ability to conduct major attacks like

September 11th, but Michael Leiter, a previous Director of the Counterterrorism

Center, says that this might make groups even more dangerous today. They have

moved towards smaller, simpler attacks with a lower threat level, but the

multiplicity of threats make it harder to stop (Katel 2010). Another conclusion to

draw from the data is that the strikes keep happening year after year, and are

spread to more and more countries. Clearly, the Obama administration must be

confident that drone strikes are making a difference in the War on Terror if we

continue to use them. Terrorist groups keep relocating to avoid strikes so they are

being kept preoccupied with their own survival and unable to plan and conduct

attacks. If drone strikes were as ineffective as some of the sources claim them to be,

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then wouldn’t President Obama make more capable decisions to move on to a

different counter terrorism strategy?

I agree with the many people who criticize the drone program for failing to

defeat terrorist groups. The drone program has been targeting groups like Al-Qaeda

and the Taliban since 2004, yet both groups remain in operation today. I think this

calls into question how the Obama administration measures success in the War on

Terror. If the measure of success is the complete elimination of terror groups then

the drone program is a failure. But if success is measured by the prevention of

attacks on U.S. soil then I believe the drone program has been a success. There has

not been a successful terrorist attack on U.S. soil since the employment of new

counter terrorism measures after 9/11.

The biggest problem with the drone program originates from the lack of

transparency. The president needs a certain amount of secrecy to defend the nation;

however by not releasing details about the strikes we are allowing terrorist

sympathizers to make absurd claims about civilian casualties, which radicalizes

moderate Muslims. For example, in December 2013, a drone fired at a target

believed to be an Al-Qaeda convoy, instead the drone struck and killed 13 civilians

on their way to a wedding party (Dalziel 2014). Whether this claim is true or not is

unclear, but President Obama needs to defend strikes like this that are criticized and

release to the public the exact details of what happened. This should prevent

terrorists from using drone strikes as anti-American propaganda. Others suggest we

go even further and use a court to oversee targeted killings. Senator Dianna

Feinstein, former Chairwomen of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,

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believes court oversight of targeted killings would eliminate fears of accountability

and legitimacy. Perhaps we do need a court for oversight especially with a president

who is not afraid to put American citizens on the Kill List.

To conclude this research, I believe the United States should continue to use

drones for targeted killings, but we should not solely rely on them to defeat terror.

While Americans are strongly opposed to losing solders in the War on Terror we

need to use Special Forces who can effectively infiltrate countries that terrorists use

as sanctuaries. This would improve the intelligence available for drone rely

operations, allow for the capture of terrorists, prevent the further radicalization of

moderate Muslims, and prevent the United States from needing a massive military

footprint in the region. There are also non-violent approaches the United States

could take towards the War on Terror. Instead of focusing entirely on the

elimination of terrorist groups we need to help states like Somalia, Afghanistan, and

Syria stand on their own two feet. As previously mentioned terrorists specifically

look for weak states that cannot control their own internal affairs. Right now drones

and targeted killings are a short-term solution to the War on Terror; building up

weak states to a level where they can deny terrorists sanctuary could be the long-

term solution to the War on Terror. This is the only foreseeable way the United

States would be able to withdraw all military personnel from the region and

withdraw from the War on Terror.

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