Saudi_Disad - Fellows

8/14/2019 Saudi_Disad - Fellows

1/45


2/45

Kentucky Fellows 2008 Saudi Arabia Relation

Zavell and Steckler Page

Notes:

This disad makes no sense vs affs that dont clearly affect oil dependence. It links best vs affs that affect thetransportation sector. If you want to read it vs other affs you have to read a link between the plan and oil usecuthats all the Saudis care about.

There are lots of impact scenariosthis is going to be impact turned most times by oil dependency bad..and thoseimpacts are probably on the side of truth/bigger so you have to be nuanced.

Page


3/45



1nc: Uniqueness + Link

A. Uniqueness: The US is the dominant purchaser of Saudi oil, but China is close behind and could pass if

US demand falters.

Richter June 8, 2008 (Paul; Los Angeles Times Staff Writer; New forces fraying U.S.-Saudi oil ties; http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-ussaudi8-2008jun08,0,169219.story)

WASHINGTON For decades, Saudi Arabia worked with its dominant customer, the United States, to keepworld oil markets stable and advance common political goals. But the surging price of oil, which soared more than $10 a barrel Friday to record-high $138.54, has made it plain that those days are over.New forces, including a weak dollar and an oil-thirsty Asia, have blunted theUnited States' leverage and helped sour the two countries' relationship. As gasoline prices have risen, the WhiteHouse has unsuccessfully exhorted the Saudis to step up production, and Congress has threatened retaliation. Butthe situation now is a far cry from the days when the U.S. economy dominated the direction of the petroleummarket. "That gave us leverage," said Greg Priddy, an oil analyst at the Eurasia Group, a New York-based riskassessment firm. "There's certainly a perception that the power equation has changed." The weakening of theeconomic relationship comes when the vital U.S.-Saudi security relationship also has been fraying. In the 1980s, the U.S.-Saubond that kept oil prices low was credited with helping weaken the Soviet Union during the waning days of the Cold War. And it helped keep markets stable after Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. But the Saudi government has

been dismayed by the consequences of the war in Iraq and by what it sees as a weak Bush administration commitment to the Palestinians. The relationship is shaping up as a politicalissue for the fall campaign, certainly among congressional candidates and perhaps among presidential candidatesWith a 20-million-barrel-per-day habit, the U.S. remains the world's largest oil customer, even though its daily consumption over the years has dropped from one-third of total daily production to one-fourth. But the U.Scan no longer guarantee on its own that producers will have the markets they need for their oil. Nor can theSaudis, alone, ramp up production in sufficient amounts to stabilize prices. China and other Asian nations now use about 17 million barrels a day. Thup more than 20% since 2003, and booming growth is expected to continue. With the shift in buying power, the Saudis are cultivating importantChinese customers, analysts say. Saudi Arabia recently contributed $50 million for Chinese earthquake relief, and King Abdullah has visited China. "The relationship is clearlydeveloping rapidly," said Paul J. Saunders, who served in the State Department under President Bush and is executive director of the Nixon Center think tank. Saunders believes that China maybe buying more Saudi oil than the United States in less than a decade. That sets up "a real possibility that Chinawill have more leverage in dealing with Saudi Arabia than we do ," he said. The Saudis helped the United States

for years as "doves" within the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries on the issue of oil prices. Theywere willing to moderately increase production, fearing that high prices could cause the United States and othersto seek alternate supplies or cut consumption, as happened in the 1980s in reaction to the oil price shocks of the1970s. But attitudes have been shifting. Many believe the Saudis have grown more interested in conservingtheir supplies for later generations, and confident that if U.S. consumption drops, the economies ofChina,

India and others will take up the slack.

Page


4/45



1nc: Uniqueness + Link

B. Link: A shift to renewables would lead to loss of economic ties to Saudi Arabia, allowing china to move

in

Marshall January 8th, 2002(Dr. Andrew W.; Director, Net Assessment The Sino-Saudi Energy Rapprochement:Implications for US National Security http://www.rice.edu/energy/publications/docs/SinoSaudiStudyFinal.pdf)

Like the scenario depicted above, this too is unlikely, but it is by no means an impossible one. It is unlikely because the US government has no clear mechanism fordiscriminating among sources of supply, and decisions on supply are left entirely to the functioning of the market and the preferences of individual refiners. Thus, SaudiArabia can, by itself, target whatever level of sales it wants to direct to the US market and, so long as Saudi Aramco prices its crude oil to displace other crude streams

entering the US market, it can maintain its market share. However, it is not impossible to imagine shifts in US policies. Two sorts of shifts are possible. One changein policy would involve a combination of supply and demand side policies that would result in a substantialreduction rather than a growth in the US appetite for crude oil imports. In the aftermath of September 11th, it isconceivable that the US would start to pursue policies that could substantially reduce the role of the oil in thetransportation sector. Raising automobile efficiency standards could reasonably reduced imports by 1 million b/dor more within seven years. Enhanced R&D in fuel cell technology and hybrid vehicle technology, combined wit

a federal procurement program to assure that all US government owned vehicles were fueled by these non-conventional supplies could shave another 1 mb/d from imports within seven years. Under these circumstances,the US would not only cease to be the high growth market for foreign oil. Its market would actually shrink,making it significantly less attractive for any major supplier, including Saudi Arabia . A second route that could be taken towardthe same end is the adoption by the US of a discriminatory import policy. One proposal being vetted, for example, would involve a free trade area in oil for countries thatallowed reciprocity in upstream investments. Those not allowing upstream investments in their oil sectors would, under the scheme, be required to store oil in the UnitedStates equivalent to 90 days or more of average imports. Such a policy would impact very few countries, among them Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Mexico. A policy shift in

this direction would definitely be viewed as a hostile political act by the oil exporters affected by it. 46 There is little doubt that US action couldmake oil sales to the US considerably less attractive in the future than they have been in the past, and that thiscould impact Saudi policy and push the kingdom toward bilateral undertakings with China and potentially otheroil importing countries.

C.

Page


5/45



***Impacts***

Page


6/45



Impact Module: Prolif

Loss of relations with the US leads to Saudi prolif

Feldman 2003(Yana, Senior research analyst at FirstWatch International, Country Profile 8: Saudi Arabia Stockholm International Peace Research Institute;http://www.sipri.org/contents/expcon/cnsc1sau.html)

The strategic situation of Saudi Arabia is such that the Kingdom might considera nuclear alliance with a friendly nuclear power or its own nucleardeterrent an attractive option. The Kingdom is situated between two powerful regional rivals Israel and Iran. Israel is

believed to possess nuclear weapons while it is strongly suspected that the Iranian nuclear programme has been developed to create the option to develop nuclear weapon

As recently as 1991, Saudi Arabia may have depended on the nuclear umbrella of the United States to deter thepossible use of chemical or biological weapons against targets in Saudi Arabia by Saddam Hussein. The continueddeterioration of security ties with the United States might well provide an incentive to secure a viable nuclearalternative. Although Saudi Arabia appears to be a low proliferation threat at this stage, given their considerable level of wealth, links tonations that have known nuclear programmes, the possibility that Saudi Arabia would consider a nuclear weaponoption for the future remains a concern for some analysts.

Saudi prolif leads to fast regional prolif

Center for Contemporary Conflict June 2004 (Conference on WMD Proliferation in the Middle East:Directions and Policy Options in the New Centuryhttp://www.ciaonet.org/olj/si/si_3_8/si_3_8_ruj01.pdf)

James Russell from the Naval Postgraduate School presented an argument that the strategic problems facingSaudi Arabia are causing it to consider acquisition of nuclear capabilities in the context of upgrading and/orreplacing its CSS-2 missiles bought from China in the late 1980s. Russell outlined a set of changing strategiccircumstances, which are combining to bring the issue of nuclear and/or WMD proliferation into play in Riyadh.First, the U.S. relationship upon which Saudi Arabias security has been founded is in an uncertain state. Second,the region environment is becoming more threatening due to Irans nuclear aspirations and the prospect of a

Shia-dominated state in Iraq. Third, internal politics in Saudi Arabia complicate and reduce the maneuver roomavailable to the royal family in addressing its security conundrums. A decision by Saudi Arabia to go nuclearwould cause a cascade of regional proliferation. Potential internal instability within the Kingdom also

makes Saudi Arabia a particularly dangerous proliferation case. Rumors of Saudi involvement in Pakistansnuclear program, in addition to the existing relationship with China through the CSS-2 program are all suggestiveof an interest in nuclear capabilities. Finally, U.S. policy options appear limitedthe United Stated cannot pushSaudi Arabia too far away or hold it too close. Discussions of the issue raised the question, Are Saudi nuclearnoises used as a means to ensure U.S. engagement?

Proliferation results in nuclear shootout

Utgoff 2 ( survival v. 44 no 2 summer, p. 90)

Widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons athand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American WildWest of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world mayeven be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury thebodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

Page


7/45



Ext.: Internal Link: Alliance Collapse Causes Prolif

Collapse of US alliance causes Saudi Prolif

Gal Luft and Anne Korin March 2004(Commentary Magazine, Institute for Analysis of Global Security, http://www.iags.org/sinosaudi.htm)

There are some particularly alarming scenarios to consider here. If the Saudis were to begin worrying seriously about a future American seizure of their oil fields, they might well seek wa ys to deter it. Given the weakness of th

own military, one option would be to acquire nuclear weapons. Although talk ofa nuclear-armed Saudi Arabia may, at this juncture, seem farfetched, it is not beyond therealm of possibility. Saudi Arabia could break its military dependence on the U.S. either by entering into analliance with some other existing nuclear power or by acquiring its own nuclear capability. In either case, Chinawould play a crucial role.

Loss of alliance NukesLevi 03(Michael, Science and Technology Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies @ Brookings, Would the Saudis Go Nuclear?,http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/fellows/levi20030602.htm)

Why would Riyadh want nukes now? Because of a potentially dangerous confluence of events. The rapidlyprogressing nuclear program of traditional rival Iran has no doubt spooked the Saudi leadership. Last fall, dissidents revealed theexistence of a covert Iranian uranium-enrichment program, forcing analysts to drastically revise down their estimates of how long it might take Iran to obtain nuclear weapons. Reacting to that development, Patrick Clawson,

deputy director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, recently wrote that "Saudi Arabia is the state most likely to proliferate in response to anIranian nuclear threat" because, he argued, the Saudis fear a nuclear-armed Iran could have designs on SaudiArabia, a Sunni monarchy that is home to a large number of oppressed Shia. After all, Tehran has for years allegedly supported Shia terrorist groups operating in Saudi Arabia and wasblamed by many analysts for the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing. Holding back the Saudi nuclear program, of course, has been the kingdom's relationship with the United States. Though America has never signed a formal treatywith Riyadh, since World War II the United States has made clear by its actionsmost notably, by protecting Saudi Arabia during the 1991 Gulf warand by informal guarantees given to Saudi leaders by American officials thit will protect the monarchy from outside threats. Since the September 11 attacks, though, that relationship has grown increasingly frail. When a RAND analyst last summer told the Defense Policy Board, then chaired by RichaPerle, that Saudi Arabia was "the kernel of ev il, the prime mover, the most dangerous opponent" in the Middle East, he not only raised hackles in Riyadh, he reflected the opinion of many close to the Bush administration. R.James Woolsey, former CIA director and White House confidant, was even more emphatic in a speech last November, referring to "the barbarics [sic], the Saudi royal family." The recent decision by Washington to pull most of

forces out of Saudi Arabia, reducing its deployment from 5,000 to 400 personnel and moving its operations to Qatar, has added facts on the ground to the rhetorical barrage. This recent decline inU.S.-Saudi relations can hardly make the Saudi royal family feel secure. Suddenly removing the U.S. securityblanket just as regional rivalries are intensifying could push the Saudis into the nuclear club. That's a scary prospect, particularly wheyou consider the possibility of Islamists overthrowing the monarchy. Instead, the United States should be careful to maintain Saudi Arabia'sconfidence even as the two nations inevitably drift apart. The United States might even extend an explicit security guarantee to the Saudis, the kind of formal treaty it gaEurope to keep it non-nuclear during the cold war-and the kind of formal arrangement Washington and Riyadh have never signed before. Such a formal deal could raise anti-American sentiment in the desert kingdom. But thealternative might be worse.

Page
http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/fellows/levi20030602.htmhttp://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/fellows/levi20030602.htmhttp://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/fellows/levi20030602.htmhttp://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/fellows/levi20030602.htm


8/45



Saudi Prolif Dominoes

Saudi Prolif Snowballs

McInnis 2005(Kathleen J. coordinator of the Project on Nuclear Issues and a research associate at CSIS. Extended Deterrence: The U.S. Credibility Gap in theMiddle East The Washington Quarterly 28.3 (2005) 169-186. Muse.)

The emergence of a nuclear Iran would undoubtedly send shockwaves through the region that could result in a nuclear domino effect. Therein lies the crux of the problem: If Saudi Arabia were tofollow Irans proliferation route, that would again change the calculations of every other state in the region in acumulative and potentially dangerous manner. Continuing with Egypt, and with other dominos such as Turkeyand Syria poised to fall, the proliferation challenge in the Middle East is uniquely daunting. Perhaps most worrisome is thatthe United States is left, at present, with few good options in the region to thwart this dangerous trajectory.

Page


9/45



A2: Deterrence

Saudi nukes cant be peaceful - Middle East politics are dangerous

Rep. Markey 8(Edward J, D-MA chairman of the Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming, Why Is Bush Helping Saudi Arabia BuildNukes?, Wall Street Journal/ http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121305642257659301.html)

Saudi Arabia's interest in nuclear technology can only be explained by the dangerous politics of the Middle East.Saudi Arabia, a champion and kingpin of the Sunni Arab world, is deeply threatened by the rise of Shiite-ruledIran. The two countries watch each other warily over the waters of the Persian Gulf, buying arms and waging warby proxy in Lebanon and Iraq. An Iranian nuclear weapon would radically alter the region's balance of power, ancould prove to be the match that lights the tinderbox. By signing this agreement with the U.S., Saudi Arabia iswarning Iran that two can play the nuclear game. In 2004, Vice President Dick Cheney said, "[Iran is] alreadysitting on an awful lot of oil and gas. No one can figure why they need nuclear, as well, to generate energy." Mr.Cheney got it right about Iran. But a potential Saudi nuclear program is just as suspicious. For a country with somuch oil, gas and solar potential, importing expensive and dangerous nuclear power makes no economic sense.

Page
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121305642257659301.htmlhttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB121305642257659301.htmlhttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB121305642257659301.htmlhttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB121305642257659301.html


10/45


Zavell and Steckler Page 1

Saudi ProlifTerrorismSaudi prolif causes Nuclear Terrorism

Blank2003(Stephen, Saudi Arabia's nuclear gambit Asia Times http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/EK07Ak01.html)

Obviously, that kind of transformation of the proliferation situation raises the possibility of several more crises in differentregions of the world, all of which could occur in relatively simultaneous fashion and which would all involve thelinked threats of either terrorists with access to nuclear weapons or states possessing those weapons which extendtheir protection and deterrence to those terrorists. Furthermore, there are still more considerations. If one looks at the history of Pakistan's nucle

program there immediately arises the issue of Pakistan's widely-reported assistance to North Korea, which at the same time is apparently proliferating missiles all over th

Middle East. Adding Saudi Arabia to this chain of proliferators only extends the process of secondary or tertiaryproliferation by which new nuclear powers assist other nuclear "wannabes" to reach that state. Thus, the threatexpressed by the US of being at the crossroads of radicalism and technology becomes that much more real

Extinction

Sid Ahmed 04(Mohamed, Al-Ahram Political Analyst, xtinction!, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm)

What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of thenew and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves,police measures would be stepped up at thexpense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would alsospeed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more criticalscenario is if the attack succeeds. This would lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike aconventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollutioninfects the whole planet, we will all be losers .

Page 1


11/45


12/45



Impact Module: Dollar Hege 1/2

Relations key to Petro Dollar and Global Economy

Freeman, 9-17-04 (Chas, Middle East Policy Council President, Federal News Service, p. lexis)

The second matter, and far more grave in many ways, is the demonstration of the end of the special relationshipwith Saudi Arabia; the end of the discounts and the end of the Saudi emphasis on primacy in the American markesignals -- because there's another issue you didn't mention, which we will get into, and that is the part of thisspecial relationship has been the defense of the dollar by the Saudis. Twice within OPEC, other members, Iran inparticular, have moved to eliminate the dollar as the unit of account for the oil trade. Were this to occur in thecurrent context of massive budget, balance of trade and balance of payments, deficits for the United States, theresults could be absolutely devastating to the global economy and to our own. The reason the Saudis defended thdollar on the two previous occasions was not economic analysis but political affinity for the United States.Question if that affinity is no longer there, will they play that role? And this is a large issue with people like Paul Volcker, saying there isa very substantial danger within the next five years of some sort of dollar collapse, and this is not a minor, minor matter.

Petro Dollar key to HegeLooney 3/22/04, (Robert E, professor of National Security Affairs, and Associate Chairman of Instruction, Department of National Security Affairs at the NavalPostgraduate School. From Petrodollars to Petroeuros: Are the Dollar's Days as an International Reserve Currency Drawing to an End? Middle East Policy No. 1 Vol.11, p. 26 http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/nov03/middleEast.asp

Political power and prestige. The benefits of "power and prestige" are nebulous. Nevertheless, the loss of key currency status and the loss ofinternational creditor status have sometimes been associated, along with such non-economic factors as the loss of colonies and milita

power, in discussions of the historical decline of great powers. Causality may well flow from key currency status to power anprestige and in the opposite direction as well.[8] On a broader scale, Niall Ferguson[9] notes that one pillar of American dominance can be found in the way successive U.S. government sought to takeadvantage of the dollar's role as a key currency. Quoting several noted authorities, he notes that [the role of the dollar] enabled the United States to be "far lessrestrainedthan all other states by normal fiscal and foreign exchange constraints when it came to fundingwhatever foreign or strategic policies it decided to implement." As Robert Gilpin notes, quoting Charles de Gaulle, such policies led to a 'hegemony othe dollar" that gave the U.S. "extravagant privileges." In David Calleo's words, the U.S. government had access to a "gold mine of paper" and could therefore collect asubsidy form foreigners in the form of seignorage (the profits that flow to those who mint or print a depreciating currency). The web contains many more radical interactions of the dollar's role. Usually something along the

following lines: World trade is now a game in which the U.S. produces dollars and the rest of the world produces things that dollars can buy. The world's interlinked economies nolonger trade to capture a comparative advantage; they compete in exports to capture needed dollars to servicedollar-denominated foreign debts and to accumulate dollar reserves to sustain the exchange value of theirdomestic currencies. This phenomenon is known as dollar hegemony, which is created by the geopoliticallyconstructed peculiarity that critical commodities, most notably oil, are denominated in dollars. Everyone acceptsdollars because dollars can buy oil. The recycling of petro-dollars is the price the U.S. has extracted from oil-producing countries for U.S. tolerance of the oil-exporting cartel since 1973.[10] America's coercive power in theworld is based as much on the dollar's status as the global reserve currency as on U.S. military muscle. Everyone needs oil,and to pay for it, they must have dollars. To secure dollars, they must sell their goods to the U.S., under terms acceptable to the people who rule America. The dollar is way overpriced, but it's the only world currency.Under thcurrent dollars-only arrangement, U.S. money is in effect backed by the oil reserves of every other nation.[11]While it is tempting to dismiss passages of this sort as uninformed rants, they do contain some elements of truth. There are tangible benefits that accrue to the country whose currency is a reserve currency. The real question is: i

this situation is so intolerable and unfair, why hasn't the world ganged up on the United States and changed the system? Why haven't countries like Libya and Iran required something like euros or gold dinars in payment for oilAfter all, with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 the International Monitary Fund's Standard Drawing Rights (unit of account) was certainly an available alternative to the dollar.[12]

Page 1


13/45



Impact Module: Dollar Hege 2/2

Hege Solves Nuclear War

Khalizad, 95 (Zalmay, Analyst at the RAND, Washington Quarterly, Spring)

Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the globalenvironment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chanc

of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally,U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of a nother hostile global rival, enabling the United States and theworld to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange.

Economic collapse leads to nuclear extinction

Bearden 2000(Thomas E., Retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel and director of the Association of Distinguished American Scientists, CEO of CTEC Inc., FellowEmeritus at the Alpha Foundation's Institute for Advanced Study, 6/24/2K, "The Unnecessary Energy Crisis: How to Solve It Quickly",http://www.seaspower.com/EnergyCrisis-Bearden.htm)

History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to the final economic collapse, the stress on nationswill have increased the intensity and number of their conflicts, to the point where the arsenals of weapons of massdestruction (WMD) now possessed by some 25 nations, are almost certain to be released. As an example, suppose astarving North Korea {[7]} launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in aspasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China -- whose long-range nuclear missiles (some) can reach theUnited States -- attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios willquickly draw other nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades thaunder such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are thencompelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary. The real legacy of the MAD concept is this side ofthe MAD coin that is almost never discussed. Without effective defense, the only chance a nation has to survive at all is tolaunch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to take out its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. Athe studies showed, rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs. Today, a great percent of the WMD arsenals that will be

unleashed, are already on site within the United States itself {[8]}. The resulting great Armageddon will destroy civilizationas we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for many decades.

Page 1
http://www.seaspower.com/EnergyCrisis-Bearden.htmhttp://www.seaspower.com/EnergyCrisis-Bearden.htmhttp://www.seaspower.com/EnergyCrisis-Bearden.htm


14/45



Ext: Rels key to dollar hege

Relations key to petro dollar

Islam 2003(Faisal When will we buy oil in euros? The Observer http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2003/feb/23/oilandpetrol.theeuro)

'At various points in time since the early 1970s, oil producers have discussed this, especially in periods when the dollar has been weak. Opinions have tended to be wide-ranging, depending on the strategic and trade alliances certain members have with particular trade blocs,' said Yarjani. That was an elliptical reference to the overwhelmin

influence ofSaudi Arabia, whose government is the staunchest ally of the US within Opec. 'The Saudis are holdingthe line on oil prices in Opec and should they, for example, go along with the rest of the Opec people indemanding that oil be priced in euros, that would deal a very heavy blow to the American economy,' YoussefIbrahim, of the influential US Council on Foreign Relations, told CNN. Last year the former US Ambassador toSaudi Arabia told a committee of the US Congress: 'One of the major things the Saudis have historically done, inpart out of friendship with the United States, is to insist that oil continues to be priced in dollars. Therefore, the USTreasury can print money and buy oil, which is an advantage no other country has. With the emergence of other currencies and with strains in therelationship, I wonder whether there will not again be, as there have been in the past, people in Saudi Arabia who

raise the question of why they should be so kind to the United States.'

Relations key to petro dollar

Chanin and Gause Winter2003(Clifford and Gregory; Middle East Policy U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONS: BUMP IN THE ROAD OR END OF THEROAD? http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa5400/is_200301/ai_n21341616/pg_6)

The Saudis get little credit in American public opinion for their energy policies. First, they almost always take initiatives quietly. They did not publicize their increased production either after 9/11 or in the lead-up to the recentwar. The markets took immediate notice, but there was very little recognition outside of specialist circles. Second, there is a widespread cynicism in the United States about Saudi o il policy, which is seen as serving Saudiinterests. This may be so, but the question remains whether the Saudis define their interests in ways compatible with American interests. Generally, the Saudi government pursues policies that aim at stability in price and supply

This emphasis corresponds with the stated policy goals of successive American administrations. A different government in Saudi Arabia might take a very different stance. It would certainly have tosell oil, but would it have to sell as much? Would it carry the costs of maintaining excess production capacity, soas to be able to bring oil immediately to the market in times of supply disruption? Would it continue todenominate oil transactions in U.S. dollars, thus shielding the United States from the effects of dollar fluctuation

on energy prices? All these issues would be on the table if relations broke down or if a new government took power in SaudiArabia.

.

Page 1


15/45



Impact Module: Peace DealRelations key to Middle East peace process

Anthony Cordesman 2004. (Ten Reasons for Reforging the US and Saudi Relationship Saudi American Forum. [Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy at theCenter for Strategic and International Studies and is Co-Director of the Center's Middle East Program. He is also a military analyst for ABC and a Professor of National

Security Studies at Georgetown]http://www.saudi-american-forum.org/Newsletters2004/SAF_Item_Of_Interest_2004_02_01.htm)

Cooperation is needed to support the Arab-Israeli peace process. If there is ever to be an Arab-Israeli peacesettlement, or if the current Israeli-Palestinian War is to be contained, both the US and Saudi Arabia need to worktogether as much as possible to push the peace process forward and reduce support for violent extremism on bothsides. The US and Saudi Arabia will never share common objectives or perceptions until there is a just, secure, and lasting peace, but it is clear that the present level oSaudi support and cooperation is far better than indifference or hostility, or what would occur if political evolution was replaced with revolution.

Peace process breakdown causes war

Jerome Slater March 1, 1999, professor of political science at SUNY at Buffalo. Tikkun

There has been a kind of conspiracy of silence over the potential consequences of a breakdown of the peaceprocess, perhaps because in the worst case they are nothing short of apocalyptic. But the risks are real. Israel has hundreds onuclear weapons, Syria has nerve gas mounted on ballistic missiles aimed at Israeli cities, and it is only a matter of time before other Arab states or - far worse- fanatical terrorist groups obtain weapons of mass destruction,whether nuclear, chemical, or biological. Here is the nightmare scenario: The intransigence of the Netanyahu government and its clear intention to continue to dominate the West Bank and deny the Palestinians true nationalcitizenship and sovereignty lead to a resumption of sustained terrorism, this time with the tacit acquiescence or open support of Arafat and the Palestinian Authority and with the general support of the Palestinian population.Israel reacts with economic and military retaliation that creates widespread desperation among the Palestinians, and this results in the eclipse of Arafat by Hamas and other Palestinian extremists. The intifada resumes, this timenot with stones but with guns and bombs. Israel responds with unprecedented repression, and the cycle of communal violence and counter violence continues to escalate until Israel decides to reoccupy the West Bank and perha

Gaza in order to crush the Palestinian movement - maybe even expelling large numbers of Palestinians into neighboring Arab states. An inflamed Arab world greatly increases itssupport of the new intifada or, worse, moderate governments that try to stand clear are overthrown and replacedby extremists in Syria, Egypt, and Jordan. In these circumstances, even if a general war in the Middle Eastcould somehow be averted, there is likely to be escalating international terrorism against Israel and its supporters- sooner or later including nuclear or other forms of mass terrorism.

And these regional conflicts escalate to a global nuclear war

Steinbach, 2 John Steinbach in March 2002 (Source: Nuclear Age Peace Foundation [http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2002/03/00_steinbach_israeli-wmd.htm]

Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has seriousimplications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Shoulwar break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, onceunthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "Thenuclear issue is gaining momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional. "(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union haslong been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satelliteimages of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs

U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateralpossession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for

their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destructiowith U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon - for whatever reason - the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a worldconflagration." (44)

Page 1
http://www.saudi-american-forum.org/Newsletters2004/SAF_Item_Of_Interest_2004_02_01.htmhttp://www.saudi-american-forum.org/Newsletters2004/SAF_Item_Of_Interest_2004_02_01.htmhttp://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2002/03/00_steinbach_israeli-wmd.htmhttp://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2002/03/00_steinbach_israeli-wmd.htmhttp://www.saudi-american-forum.org/Newsletters2004/SAF_Item_Of_Interest_2004_02_01.htmhttp://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2002/03/00_steinbach_israeli-wmd.htmhttp://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2002/03/00_steinbach_israeli-wmd.htm


16/45


17/45



Relations key to US presence/Regional Stability

Relations Key to regional stability

Russel 2002 (James A. Deconstructing the US-Saudi Partnership? Strategic Insights Insights v. 1 i7, Septemberhttp://www.ccc.npa.navy.mil/si/sept02/middleEast2.asp)

U.S. and Saudi air forces might in the future operate together using a coalition operations space within thecombined air operations center at Prince Sultan Air Base. Perhaps officers from other Gulf Cooperation Councilmilitaries could join together with Saudi and U.S. counterparts in this facility to coordinate joint and combined aidefense efforts across the theater. If U.S.-Saudi operational cooperation can be established at PSAB, it couldprovide a model that could be replicated in other Gulf States, leading to activities that would promote mutualconfidence and collective security. While regional military integration among friendly coalition partners maytoday seem a remote scenario, the scenario is at least plausible if Saudi Arabia and the United States lead the wayRegional security integration will surely never flourish without positive U.S.-Saudi bilateral relations.Conclusion Fundamentally altering the U.S.-Saudi bilateral relationship would have serious consequences forSaudi security and peace in the Middle East. It could potentially render the U.S.-trained and equipped Saudimilitary unable to defend the Kingdom and would deny the United States the opportunity to continue workingwith the dominant regional power to achieve collective defense and regional military integration. Any serioussuggestions that the 50-year partnership needs to be fundamentally altered should carefully consider these costs.

Read Steinbeck from other page

Page 1
http://www.ccc.npa.navy.mil/si/sept02/middleEast2.asphttp://www.ccc.npa.navy.mil/si/sept02/middleEast2.asp


18/45



Impact Module: China 1/2

Loss of US relations increases Saudi relations with China

Luft, 2006(Gal, executive director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS) a Washington based think tank focused on energy security, specializein strategy, geopolitics, terrorism, Middle East and energy security. Fueling the dragon: China's race into the oil market, http://www.iags.org/china.htm)

A key component of China's strategy to guarantee access to Persian Gulf oil is the special relations it hascultivated with Saudi Arabia. The ties with Riyadh go back to the mid-1980s when China sold Saudi Arabia intermediate range ballistic missiles. Sincethen, the relations have grown closer. High-level visits of Chinese leaders to Saudi Arabia culminated in 1999 with President Jiang Zemin's state visit in which he pronounced a "strategic oilpartnership" between the two countries. China has offered to sell the Saudis intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Saudis have so farpreferred to turn down many of the proposals and limit their procurement from China in order to maintain their special relations withthe U.S.But continuous deterioration in Saudi-American relationsor, in the longer run, a regime change in the oil kingdom,could drive the Saudis to end their reliance on the U.S. as the sole guarantor of their regime's security and offerChina an expanded role.

War between the US and ChinaLuft2004(Gal, executive director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS) a Washington based think tank focused on energy security, specializesin strategy, geopolitics, terrorism, Middle East and energy security, Los Angeles Times, US, China Are on Collision Course Over Oilhttp://www.globalpolicy.org/security/natres/oil/2004/0202collision.htm)

Optimists claim that the world oil market will be able to accommodate China and that, instead of conflict, China's thirst could create mutual desire for stability in the

Middle East and thus actually bring Beijing closer to the U.S. History shows the opposite: Superpowers find it difficult to coexist whilecompeting over scarce resources. The main bone of contention probably will revolve around China's relationswith Saudi Arabia, home to a quarter of the world's oil. The Chinese have already supplied the Saudis with intermediate rangballistic missiles, and they played a major role 20 years ago in a Saudi financed Pakistani nuclear effort that may one day leave a nuclearweapon in the hands of a Taliban-type regime in Riyadh or Islamabad. Since 9/11, a deep tension in U.S.-Saudirelations has provided the Chinese with an opportunity to win the heart of the House of Saud. The Saudis hear the voices inthe U.S. denouncing Saudi Arabia as a "kernel of evil" and proposing that the U.S. seize and occupy the kingdom's oil fields. The Saudis especially fear that if theircitizens again perpetrate a terror attack in the U.S., there would be no alternative for the U.S. but to terminate its long-standing commitment to the monarchy - and perhap

even use military force against it. The Saudis realize that to forestall such a scenario they can no longer rely solely on theU.S. to defend the regime and must diversify their security portfolio. In their search for a new patron, they mightfind China the most fitting and willing candidate. The risk of Beijing's emerging as a competitor for influence inthe Middle East and a Saudi shift of allegiance are things Washington should consider as it defines its objectivesand priorities in the 21st century. Without a comprehensive strategy designed to prevent China frombecoming an oil consumer on a par with the U.S., a superpower collision is in the cards. The good news is that we arestill in a position to halt China's slide into total dependency

Page 1


19/45



Impact Module: China 2/2

US becomes immersed in a war with china, flashpoints around the world also escalate to nuclear

conflagration, culminating in extinction.

Strait Times 2k(No one gains in war over Taiwan; June 25, lexis)

The high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China.If Washington were to conclude that splitting Chinwould better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror ofhorrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war.Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forcesattacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asiawill be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturnthe existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance opower in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan ,each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to GeneralMatthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to sa ve the US from military defeat. In hisbook The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or abroadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against

China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities.Beijing also seems prepared to gofor the nuclear option.A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, presidenof the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong

pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country riskeddismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said thatshould that come to pass, we would see the destruction ofcivilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of anuclear Armaggedon over Taiwanmight seem inconceivable, itcannot be ruled outentirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else..

Page 1


20/45


21/45



***Links***

Page 2


22/45



Link: Energy Independence

Discussion of energy independence is perceived

Henderson June 20, 2008 (Simon, Baker fellow and director of the Washington Institute, Supplicants to SaudiArabia: The Jeddah Energy Meeting http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2906)

Domestic energy policy is emerging again as a key debate in U.S. presidential elections. In the last twocampaigns, rival candidates urged greater independence from oil exporters such as Saudi Arabia. This annoyedRiyadh and resulted in the cutback of expansion plans for oil production, leading, at least partly, to today's high prices. The Jeddahmeeting itself is unlikely to break that vicious circle but it may be a starting point. Saudi Arabia remains a key to lowering oil prices, and if emphasis is placed on its

pricing policies rather than simply its production levels, there might be a way forward.

Page 2


23/45



Link: Dependence

Oil dependence guarentees we will maintain good relations

Sutterfield 2007(Lauren E. United States Oil Dependency: An Overview of the Desperate Times that have Imprisoned Our Foreign Policy and the DesperateMeasures that May Be Required to Liberate it. Baker Center Journal of Applied Public Policy. http://bakercenter.utk.edu/main/journal.php?vol=1&num=1)

Our extensive relationship with Saudi Arabia will surely continue. If current petroleum trends continue in the United States, thekingdoms importance to U.S. energy demands will only increase. Thus, the U.S. must keep Saudi Arabias security at the top of ournational security agenda. However, it is important that the United States move away from oil dependence to allow Washington greater freedom in designing policies

based on other objectives above and beyond oil procurementtoward Saudi Arabia. Until a time when the United States is less reliant onSaudi Arabia for current and future energy needs, Washington must stress the importance of maintaining a strongrelationship with Riyadh, protecting our interests, stabilizing the kingdom, and carefully diminishing criticismand resentment by the Saudi population.

Page 2


24/45



Link: Alternative energies

Saudi Arabia dislikes shifts to alternative energies

Graham-Harrison December 13, 2007 (Emma, Saudi Says No Need to Cut Oil Use to Fight Warming,http://www.planetark.com/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/45986/story.htm)

Oil Minister Ali al-Naimi told UN-led climate talks that the world should focus on research to cut emissions whilcontinuing to use its "huge reserves" of crude, gas and coal. Riyadh is traditionally wary of anything that mightundermine demand for the vast reserves of oil that have transformed it from a small desert kingdom to a powerfuinternational player, and is currently earning near-record prices for its crude. "The trend towards moving awayfrom fossil fuel consumption as a means of addressing climate change does not represent a practical alternative toreducing emissions of greenhouse gases, particularly given the availability of technologies for energy efficiencyand carbon capture and storage," Naimi said. Many governments and groups such as the International Energy Agency are heavily pushing energyefficiency as a way to start tackling emissions problems with existing technology. But no commercial-scale projects yet exist for carbon capture and storage, which is

supposed to pump emissions from coal-fired power plants underground for long-term storage. Naimi also criticised fuel taxes that aim to curb

consumption in some countries, saying they were part of a system that unfairly favoured coal and largelyemissions-free nuclear energy "despite their more adverse pollution and impact on the climate". Naimi said theworld should instead investigate "clean oil", including carbon capture and storage, although he did not explainhow it might be possible to capture and then store emissions from the vehicles that consume a large portion of theworld's oil.

Page 2


25/45



Link: Dependency

Oil dependence key to relations

Sutterfield 2007 (Lauren E. United States Oil Dependency: An Overview of the Desperate Times that haveImprisoned Our Foreign Policy and the Desperate Measures that May Be Required to Liberate it. Baker CenterJournal of Applied Public Policy. http://bakercenter.utk.edu/main/journal.php?vol=1&num=1)

Consistently, the kingdom discourages oil importing countries from creating and maintaining large oil reserveslike the Strategic Petroleum Reserve in the United States. These reserves could weaken Saudi Arabias ability to affect prices and provides thimporting country with some flexibility (Houthakker, 1981, p. 317). Saudi Arabia has close to 3 mbd spare capacity (Morse & Richard, 2002, p. 2). This quantity could

sufficiently replace the oil exports of another major petroleum exporting country in the global market. This spare capacity can benefit the UnitedStates by stabilizing the oil market in times of crisis, yet it can also be used against the United States. Saudispare capacity is the energy equivalent of nuclear weapons, a powerful deterrent against those who try tochallenge Saudi leadership and Saudi goals. It is also the centerpiece of the U.S.-Saudi relationship (Morse &Richard, 2002, p. 2). Saudi Arabias spare capacity makes oil importing countries like the United States reliant on

Riyadh for energy security. Saudi Arabia will remain the most vital oil exporter not only in the Middle East but in the world due to its production capabilityits spare capacity, and its immense proven reserves. As such, oil will continue to play a principal role in U.S. foreign policy makingwith Saudi Arabia. However, Washington must be careful not to incense the Saudi population by its military presence and supporting the often repressive House of Saud. It is more likely for the United Statesassist in stabilizing the country rather than endeavoring to create reforms or revolution (Le Billion & El Khatib,2004,p.16). It is likely the United States will continue to push democratic and human rights issues behind our enerneeds when dealing with Saudi Arabia. It was an un - likely unionBedouin Arabs and Texas oil men, a traditional Islamic autocracy allied with modern American capitalism. Yet it was one that was destined to endure(Yergi1991, p. 428).

Page 2


26/45



Link: Oil

Oil is key to the U.S.-Saudi strategic relationship

Barnes et al 4 /Joe, Amy Jaffe, Edward L. Morse, Special Energy Supplement: The New Geopolitics of Oil,Saudi-US Relations Information Service, January 6/http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/newsletter2004/saudi-relations-interest-01-06.html

The centerpiece of the status quo is "the special relationship" with Saudi Arabia -- a strategic quid pro quo underwhich the United States would guarantee the security of Saudi Arabia in return for Riyadh's cooperation inkeeping a reliable flow of moderately priced oil to international petroleum markets. The first pillar of the specialrelationship is the decisive role that Saudi Arabia plays in international oil markets. Riyadh is not only the world'largest exporter of oil, but possesses a quarter of global petroleum reserves and, significantly, excess capacity foruse in an emergency. The second pillar is the ability and willingness of the United States to intervene militarilyshould Saudi Arabia be threatened. Washington did so, most notably when it rushed troops to Saudi Arabia whenIraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. The September 11 attacks, however, renewed the impetus to reassess the U.S.-Saudi relationship. The fact that Osama bin Laden and 15 of 19 suicide bombers were Saudi nationals lent thelong-standing neoconservative critique of Saudi Arabia great public salience. Since 9/11, neoconservativecommentators have stepped up their attacks on Saudi Arabia, openly branding the kingdom an "enemy", and haveincluded Riyadh in the list of Middle East capitals -- along with Tehran and Damascus -- where "regime change"would be desirable. Despite this firestorm of criticism, the formal U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia has notchanged. Saudi Arabia has diligently -- albeit more quietly -- continued to raise its oil production in times of warand/or market emergency. Senior officials in both Riyadh and Washington also continue to downplay differencesIndeed, Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham has cultivated Saudi Arabia, even going so far as to suggest tacit U.Sapproval of OPEC price bands and financially supporting the establishment of a secretariat for a new internationaenergy forum in Riyadh.

Page 2
http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/newsletter2004/saudi-relations-interest-01-06.htmlhttp://www.saudi-us-relations.org/newsletter2004/saudi-relations-interest-01-06.html


27/45



***Uniqueness***

Page 2


28/45


29/45



Uniqueness: Co-op Now

The U.S. and Saudi Arabia are cooperating now but there is room for failure

Bronson 6 /Rachel, former Adjunct Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies, Bronson: Saudis DeeplyConcerned Over Irans Nuclear Program, Council on Foreign Relations, April 3/http://www.cfr.org/publication/10328/bronson.html

Well, theyve changed a few times. Certainly after 9/11 there was the complete rupture in relations. It took theSaudis twenty months to fully acknowledge that fifteen of the nineteen hijackers were Saudi and begin takingresponsibility for it. They didnt do so until after May of 2003 and November of 2003, when successive bombingattacked Saudis and the Saudi royal family. After that, Saudi Arabia got very, very serious about acknowledgingand dealing with its homegrown terrorist problem. The United States also got better at dealing with the Saudis,and we simplified our approaches to the Saudis. We stopped sending over a new delegation every month. Westarted organizing better and appointing one particular person at the National Security Council to take the lead onU.S.-Saudi counterterrorism efforts. Saudi Arabia welcomed the FBI to work shoulder to shoulder more publiclyinside the kingdom and there was a real turnaround in U.S.-Saudi relations at the highest of levels. And then, ofcourse, you got the recent meeting in Crawford in April of 2005, between then-Crown Prince Abdullah andPresident Bush. That was an important turning point. So at the highest of levels things got better. I dont thinktheyre ever going to be what they were, only because theres no longer this overarching set of interests that weshared fighting the Soviet Union, but they have improved. The challenge is now at the popular level, where thepublics are much more involved in the relationship. Neither the American nor Saudi public understands what therelationship is for, nor understands what we get from it, and is extremely angry about the treatment the other hasreceived in the press. So theres a long road to haul in terms of understanding this relationship in its strategiccontext. Coming back to the book, I spent a lot of time thinking about the subtitle, which is Americas UneasyPartnership with Saudi Arabia, and I didnt use the word relationship, because often we think of this as a verypersonalized relationship; we dont like them, they dont like us. But we tend not to think of it in its strategiccontext, about partnerships and alliances; whether or not it serves the United States well and whether it servesSaudi [Arabia] well. I think overall Saudi Arabias been a difficult ally for the United States, but France has beena difficult ally for the United States too. In some ways, Saudi Arabia is the France of the Middle East, and wehave real problems that we must continue to focus onnamely, to continue to watch and regulate the money, andinsist that the Saudis continue to watch where the money goes and demand a high level of accountability. Areyou basically optimistic for the next ten years or so? I am. I do think the relationship will be more difficult thain the past. I dont think its going to be severed, and I dont think were going to ever see the divorce that peoplewere threatening a few years ago. We should expect it to be a bumpy road, though, because the overall strategicinterests arent there the way they were during the Cold War. There are still important pockets of shared interestsand we talked about some of them, but theres obviously not going to be this turn to Oh, but we do agree on theSoviets, the way that we did during the Cold War, and so we should expect it to be a rockier road, but I do expecthe relationship to muddle through.

Page 2
http://www.cfr.org/publication/10328/bronson.htmlhttp://www.cfr.org/publication/10328/bronson.html


30/45


31/45


32/45



No Backstopping

No backstop possiblesaudis dont control marketRoula KhalafJul 01, 2008 (Saudi Arabia on its own cannot control the oil price The Financial Times,

http://www.zawya.com/printstory.cfm?storyid=FTNEWSPLUS_CB20080701_163&l=000000080701)

In spite of the offer of 200,000 extra barrels of oil and the promise of more in the future, the oil price hasstubbornly crept up in the past week, hitting a new record above $143 a barrel.The outcome was partly bad luck: attacks in Nigeria wiped out the immediate impact of the kingdom's extra barrels, while Libya's threat to cut its production, thoughhardly credible, along with Iran-Israel tensions, later sent the price soaring. There was also a measure of bad PR management. The rise in output was revealed days earlieto Ban Ki Moon, secretary-general of the United Nations, who promptly announced it to the world.

Thus many delegates were left wondering why they had flown all the way to Jeddah. The meeting ended just as ithad started, with the same disagreements between producers and consumers, and the same jitters in oil markets.Others were more charitable and agreed with the Saudis that a little more oil and the start of a dialogue were better than no action at all.

Given the conflicting pressures on Saudi Arabia, it was unrealistic to expect a dramatic outcome in Jeddah. For all the noise about what Saudi Arabiacan and wants to do to stabilise the markets, its ability to move prices is constrained.In some ways the summit was characteristic of a kingdom that has become more ambitious but not adventurous, more willing to take a leadership role but not to gamble.

The Saudis genuinely share consuming nations' concern over the impact of a high oil price on world growth. A

recession will undermine demand for their commodity and encourage development of alternative sources ofenergy. At the same time, they are convinced that prices are driven more by speculation than shortage of supply. And they are haunted by the prospect that a big outpuhike would trigger a collapse in prices. So their strategy has been to pump a little bit more oil and try to persuade the market that they stand ready, and indeed have the

capability, to bring on more and meet future demand. But in this balancing game, the Saudis cannot win. Some industry experts argue thatRiyadh showed its irrelevance rather than its leadership in Jeddah. It failed to ease market anxiety or satisfyconsumer nations, and it found itself more isolated than ever within Opec, the oil producers' cartel. Unless it was

prepared to announce a bold move - pumping, for example, an extra 500,000 barrels of oil - it should not have held a summit.

But what if another 500,000 barrels had failed to stem the price rise? The Saudis would have appeared even more irrelevant. Did they not raise productionby 300,000b/d recently without any noticeable effect? Moreover, the more oil Saudi Arabia - the only major producer with spare capacity, putson the market - the less can be rushed to the rescue in times of crisis.The kingdom is also caught between satisfying domestic public opinion and answering to another important audience in America. Having suffered the wrath of Americanfor years after the attacks of September 11, the Saudis want to avoid another setback.But even absolute monarchies have to take their own domestic opinion into account, and what might appear to the west as a daring, responsible, step could be seen at hom

as a sign of weakness.Even among the elite in the Gulf, you hear voices these days complaining that the region has its own development priorities and cannot turn the oil tap on and offdepending on the needs of others.

Bashing Opec and Saudi Arabia, particularly during a US presidential election year, will probably pick up. But relying on the kingdom alone to bringprices down is no longer a realistic assumption.

Page 3


33/45



No Backstopping

No BackstoppingConsensus of Saudi oil experts is they cant undercut the market

Richter June 8, 2008 (Paul; Los Angeles Times Staff Writer; New forces fraying U.S.-Saudi oil ties; http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-ussaudi8-2008jun08,0,169219.story)

By the end of 2007, it was also apparent that the Saudis no longer believed they could substantially affect pricesby increasing production. Now, Saudi oil experts believe that the price run-up is due to such factors as investorspeculation, the weak dollar and limited output from such key producers as Iraq, Iran and Venezuela. "They seethemselves as having lost control of the market," Priddy said.

Page 3


34/45



Independency Snowballs

Loss of Saudi oil relations snowballs, reduces overall middle east dependency

Marshall January 8th, 2002(Dr. Andrew W.; Director, Net Assessment The Sino-Saudi Energy Rapprochement:Implications for US National Security http://www.rice.edu/energy/publications/docs/SinoSaudiStudyFinal.pdf)

Should Saudi Arabia, for whatever reason, change its policy of being the number one supplier to the UnitedStates, US interests in the Middle East oil-producing world could change. Without special Saudi pricing, UScompanies would probably reduce their oil imports from the Middle East from their current level of about 25% toa level closer to 10-15%. Indeed, if US oil demand stagnates and if new supplies from West Africa grow at the topend of their projected level for the next decade, US dependence on Middle East oil could well fall to 5%, if SaudiArabia decides to no longer protect its role as number one supplier to the US. Under these circumstances, the USpublic could turn away from support of the US role as protector of Middle East supply lanes. From an oil supplyperspective, this would be unwise. Even if the US imported no oil from the Middle East, its economy would remain vulnerable to an oil supply disruption. Even if the USimported no oil from the Middle East, it would have an interest in making sure that other countries of concern to the US were not subject to political pressures from anyMiddle East producer.

Page 3


35/45



Terror Good: Solves Oil Dependency

Terror key to solve dependency

New Statesman, 6/7/2004, Vol. 133 Issue 4691, p6-6, 1p Why al-Qaeda may save the world. Ebsco

The great strides in energy efficiency made by manufacturing industries have been offset by an increasingly profligate use of energy in the service industries and in privaconsumption: the growth of external lighting and even external heating; the boom in SUVs and 4x4s; the growth of long-distance commuting and out-of-town superstorethe explosion of short-break overseas holidays; the development of centralised food distribution that requires a carrot to travel halfway across the country before it can ge

to a shop a few miles from where it was grown, and a pig to cross international borders to become ham before returning to the country it started from. All this is theresult of low oil prices, which encourage unnecessary energy consumption and discourage innovations inalternative energy. The corrupt rulers of major oil-producing countries have every reason to heed westernentreaties to hold prices down. By doing so, they keep out new entrants to the energy market. As a former Opecsecretary general once observed, the Stone Age did not end because people ran out of stones. It ended whenpeople found something better. The same is true of oil which, despite some forecasts, is unlikely to save us all by running out. The world hastwo hopes. One is to engineer a soft landing from oil by gradually raising taxes and otherwise penalising its use. So Gordon Brown, the Chancellor, should resist, in his

best Calvinist manner, the planned protests against fuel taxes which are being encouraged, with typical opportunism, by Michael Howard, the Tory leader. The second

hope is terrorism in the Middle East. This can bring about a hard landing by knocking out the Saudi oil industry and

with it, 10 per cent of world oil production. The soft landing is infinitely preferable. But if governments cannot dthe job, the world may yet have cause to be grateful to al-Qaeda.

Page 3


36/45



China is Realist

China is realist and views the U.S. as a threat to its international emergence

Heller 3 /Eric Nathaniel, published international security author University of Illinois, Power Projections of thePeoples Republic of China: An Investigative Analysis of Defensive and Offensive Realism in Chinese ForeignPolicy/ https://www.ideals.uiuc.edu/bitstream/2142/34/1/HellerOP.pdf

As these sentiments and desires are molded into a comprehensive, grand national strategy, the Chinese leadershipseeks to assure that China will rise to great power status by shaping the conduct of the international system ratherthan responding to its conditions.4 As such the intention seems to be focused on forming the internationalconditions that provide the opportunity to increase the relative capabilities of the Chinese and in doing so work toprevent the United States from usurping Chinas rise. To that end, China views military power as the primaryguarantor of comprehensive security, while viewing and embracing multilateral diplomatic efforts as partial anconditional.5 This point seems to pose one explanation as to why China asserts that disputes concerningsovereignty issues ought to be set aside rather than settled in multilateral fora as there is much more to beobtained in terms of relative capabilities by keeping the sovereignty question undecided, especially out of thehands of the major powers and largest international decision-making bodies. Where it suits the PRC to do so,though, Chinas government has integrated a policy of partnership cultivation to deflect and avoid controversyduring its period of economic and military expansion. The Chinese leadership believes that if great powers are puin a position to press China on controversial issues, the benefits that China can potentially reap from therelationship such as trade and investment will be put into jeopardy. Rather it seems more beneficial to employpolicies that make China attractive to great powers while at the same time remaining flexible by avoiding decisivalignments with particular states.6 As such, the Chinese are pursuing a setting that is most conducive tosuccessful pursuit of Chinese national interests.

Page 3
https://www.ideals.uiuc.edu/bitstream/2142/34/1/HellerOP.pdfhttps://www.ideals.uiuc.edu/bitstream/2142/34/1/HellerOP.pdf


37/45



***Aff Answer***

Page 3


38/45



Saudi Prolif Good

Saudi prolif deters Iran nuclearization

Lalwani 8 /Sameer, Another Take on Saudi Arabia's Nuclear Agenda, June 10/http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/2008/06/another_respons/Finally, though its true that nuclear assistance might be playing with fire, there seems to be a very legitimatestrategic calculus to assisting the Saudi government -- namely, signaling to Iran the cost of going nuclear. Rightnow Iran has conventional weapons superiority in the region but a drive to nuclear weapons that results inproliferation would eliminate their advantage through nuclear-provided strategic parity. If Iran actually believesthat other states in the gulf region are ready and capable of also going nuclear, it might rethink its strategiccalculations and turn back from weaponization. Certainly one must be wary of this spiraling into an arms race, buthere is also a conceivable strategic logic to the moves being played by the US and Saudi Arabia. Saudi and theGCC have already indicated interest in this nuclear project but also in dissuading Iran from its nuclear ambitionsand ultimately developing a regional security architecture for the Gulf states as Thomas Lippman hasargued. If some sort ofSaudi/GCC peaceful nuclear venture is inevitable, its better the US be involved in guiding it -- commanding greater influence and knowledge of capabilities -- rather than

China or Russia stepping in to assume the role of nuclear patron.

Iranian proliferation leads to Israeli launch and nuclear war

Commentary 98 /December p146/

Now, once again, the question has arisen of what forcible steps Israel might take in order to deny nuclear weaponto its enemies. This past September, Ephraim Sneh, a general in the Israeli army reserves and a leading member othe opposition Labor party, spoke publicly of the possibility that the IDF might be compelled to "deliver aconventional counterstrike or preemptive strike" against Iranian atomic facilities. This was not long after Teheran tested itsShahab-3 missile--to the yawns of the international community--and then displayed the missile in a military parade with banners draped from it reading, "Israel should bewiped from the map"--to still more yawns by the international community. Sneh was roundly criticized at home for his remarks, not because he was wrong but because, a

Uzi Landau, the chairman of the Knesset's foreign-affairs and security committee, explained, "unnecessary chatter" could heighten the likelihooof Israel's being targeted for attack. But whether or not Sneh should have spoken out, the option he referred to may be less viable than it once was. BothIran and Iraq have already taken measures--concealment, dispersion, hardening, surface-to-air defense--to ensure that the feat performed by Israel's air force in 1981, andfor which it was universally condemned at the time, including by the United States, could not easily be repeated. If preemption is largely ruled out as an option, what then

To reduce its vulnerability--enemy missiles can arrive within ten minutes from firing--Israel may well becompelled to adopt a "launch-on-warning" posture for both its conventional and nuclear forces. For the purpose ofconsidering this eventuality, we may assume that Israel has indeed developed a secure retaliatory force of the kind Tucker saw as essential to stability. Even so, however,this would not offer much reassurance. Unlike its neighbors, and unlike the U.S., Israel is a tiny country, and in a nuclear environment it would not have the luxury of

waiting to assess the damage from a first strike before deciding how to respond. Thus, in any future crisis, at the first hint from satelliteintelligence or some other means that a missile fusillade was being prepared from, say, Iran or Iraq, Israel, toprotect itspopulace, would have to punch first. And it would have to strike not only at missile sites, some of which it might well miss, but at a broader range oftargets--communications facilities, air bases, storage bunkers, and all other critical nodes--so as to paralyze the enemy and thus rule out the possibility of attack. These are

the implications of launch-on-warning. Clearly, such a posture presents grave problems. Lacking secure second-strike forces of their own, and aware that Israel would nodoubt try to hit them preemptively, Iran and Iraq w ould be under tremendous pressure to launch their missiles first--to "usethem or lose them." In other words, what this scenario leads to is the prospect of both sides' moving to apermanent position of hair-trigger alert. It is a nightmarish prospect. The possibility that nuclear war might breakout at any moment--by accident, miscalculation, or design--would inevitably place an intolerable strain on Israel'sfreedom of military movement, and take a no less heavy toll on civilian morale.

Page 3
http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/06/12/11/10088620.htmlhttp://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/06/12/11/10088620.htmlhttp://www.mideasti.org/files/nuclear-weapons-saudi-strategy.pdfhttp://www.mideasti.org/files/nuclear-weapons-saudi-strategy.pdfhttp://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/06/12/11/10088620.htmlhttp://www.mideasti.org/files/nuclear-weapons-saudi-strategy.pdf


39/45


40/45



No Saudi Prolif

Saudi Arabia cant and has no incentive to proliferate

Lippman 8 /Thomas, former Middle East correspondent and a diplomatic and national security reporter for TheWashington Post/

It is far from certain, however, that Saudi Arabia would wish to acquire its own nuclear arsenal or that it iscapable of doing so. There are compelling reasons why Saudi Arabia would not undertake an effort to develop oracquire nuclear weapons, even in the unlikely event that Iran achieves a stockpile and uses this arsenal to threatenthe Kingdom. Money is not an issue if destitute North Korea can develop nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia surely has the resources to pursue such a program. Inthe fall of 2007, the Saudis reported a budget surplus of $77 billion, and with oil prices above $90 a barrel, Riyadh is flush with cash. But the acquisition ordevelopment of nuclear weapons would be provocative, destabilizing, controversial and extremely difficult forSaudi Arabia, and ultimately would likely weaken the kingdom rather than strengthen it. Such a course would bedirectly contrary to the Kingdoms longstanding stated goal of making the entire Middle East a nuclear weaponsfree zone. According to Sultan bin Abd al-Aziz, the Defense Minister and Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, nuclear weapons by their nature contravene the tenets ofIslam. Pursuing nuclear weapons would be a flagrant violation of Saudi Arabias commitments under the NuclearNonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and would surely cause a serious breach with the United States. Saudi Arabialacks the industrial and technological base to develop such weapons on its own. An attempt to acquire nuclearweapons by purchasing them, perhaps from Pakistan, would launch Saudi Arabia on a dangerously inflammatorytrajectory that could destabilize the entire region, which Saudi Arabias leaders know would not be in their countrys best interests. The Saudisalways prefer stability to turmoil. Saudi Arabia and the NPT Saudi Arabia, like Iran, is a signatory to the NPT and participates in the safeguard regime of the InternationaAtomic Energy Agency. It signed the treaty only under duress, but its reluctance was not based on a desire to develop nuclear wepons. The Kingdoms position was that itwould be happy to join the NPT system when Israel did so. But then in 1988 it was virtually forced to sign the NPT because of intense pressure from the United States.

Page 4


41/45



A2: China Aggression

China is pursuing a peaceful entrance into the international order

Heller 3 /Eric Nathaniel, published international security author University of Illinois, Power Projections of thePeoples Republic of China: An Investigative Analysis of Defensive and Offensive Realism in Chinese ForeignPolicy/ https://www.ideals.uiuc.edu/bitstream/2142/34/1/HellerOP.pdf

However, realists also argue that a competitor will strive to emulate the policies and general characteristics of thestate to which they aspire in order to be viewed as similar and non-threatening by the hegemon and internationalcommunity.8 To support this argument is Chinas bid for the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing and the drive foradmission into the World Trade Organization (WTO). Neither policy would seem to improve the security of Chindrastically; however, being a member of the WTO and hosting the Olympic Games bring economic implicationsand prestigesigns of a powerful nation on the rise. No longer would the PRC be viewed as a rogue power,engaged in diplomatic tiffs over Taiwan and a downed US Navy plane, but as a mainstream country capable ofrivaling what is at times viewed as a heavy-handed United States. Great powers are rewarded if they appearbothstrong and potentially dangerous because states ally with the strongest and most threatening powers.

No US-China conflict in the Middle East

Luft and Korin 4 /Gal, executive director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, and Anne, directorof policy and strategic planning at IAGS, The Sino-Saudi Connection, Commentary Magazine, March/http://www.iags.org/sinosaudi.htm

Of course, many other factors must be weighed in the balance. The Chinese may well find fishing in MiddleEastern waters to be a risky business, entailing high costs in relations with other powers, and in particular with thU.S. Already there are signs of growing disquiet in Washington over China's role in the Middle East. The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, agroup created by Congress to monitor relations between the two countries, issued a warning in 2002 over China's provision of "technology and components for weapons mass destruction and their delivery systems" to such Middle Eastern states as Iran, Syria, Libya, and Sudan. This was characterized as "an increasing threat to U.S. securiinterests." Significantly, the report took special notice of China's growing dependence on imported oil, calling it a "key driver" impelling relations with "terrorist-

sponsoring governments" in the region. If such concerns continue to mount, China could find itself gaining in one region only to lose inanother. The Chinese economy may be heavily dependent on Middle Eastern oil, but it is also heavily dependenton trade with the U.S. The shelves of Wal-Mart alone account for 10 percent of China's exports to the U.S. and 1percent of China's GDP. Whether and under what circumstances the U.S. would ever choose to exercise itsleverage is another matter. Right now, any collision over Middle Eastern oil is more a potential than an actualthreat. Besides, if predicting the future is risky at all times, the present moment makes the exercise almostfoolhardy. That the Middle East is in an exceptionally volatile condition goes without saying. And as for China,its astonishing economic growth may yet turn out to be a bubble; if it pops, so will its high rates of energyconsumption. Then, too, even if stellar economic growth continues, the Chinese may find attractive alternatives to

oil: the country is extremely rich in coal and natural gas, and, since it has not yet invested heavily in an expensivepetroleum infrastructure, it could develop ways to harness fuels produced from coal and biomass (both of which has in abundance) and thus overcome its dependence on imported oil altogether.

Page 4
https://www.ideals.uiuc.edu/bitstream/2142/34/1/HellerOP.pdfhttp://www.iags.org/sinosaudi.htmhttps://www.ideals.uiuc.edu/bitstream/2142/34/1/HellerOP.pdfhttp://www.iags.org/sinosaudi.htm


42/45


43/45



Relations Resilient

Concern over Iran will sustain relations

Bronson 6 /Rachel, former Adjunct Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies, Bronson: Saudis DeeplyConcerned Over Irans Nuclear Program, Council on Foreign Relations, April 3/http://www.cfr.org/publication/10328/bronson.html

The important thing to remember with the U.S.-Saudi relationship and one of the key points in my book is that,while oil is very important, the relationship is also supported by two other very important pillars: Saudi Arabiasstrategic locationwhere it actually physically sits on the maphas been very important going back to WorldWar II and remains that way in the present. The fact is that it borders on Iraq and is across the Persian Gulf fromIran, and is quite close to Israel. In addition, Saudi Arabias religiosity has been very important in the region. Forexample, in terms of its strategic location in the contemporary period, Saudi Arabia is extremely concerned overthe possibility of Irans nuclear proliferation, and about its seeming relentless bid to acquire a successful nuclearprogram. So it shares a U.S. concern? On Iran it most certainly does. One of the things weve seen from theSaudis is a call for a nuclear-free Arabian gulf. In the past theyve talked about a nuclear-free Middle East withclear reference to the Israelis. Now theyre very focused on their immediate neighbor to the east and theirimmediate efforts are to try to ensure a nuclear-free Arabian or Persian gulf.

Page 4
http://www.cfr.org/publication/10328/bronson.htmlhttp://www.cfr.org/publication/10328/bronson.html


44/45


45/45



Low Prices Relations Link Turn

Insert Plan Lowers Oil Prices

Low oil prices key to US-Saudi relations

The Daily Telegraph, 5/16/2008 (Day of truth for US-Saudi axis Bush's warm relationship with King Abdullah istarting to cool down, as he seeks Riyadh's help over oil prices. Ambrose Evans-Pritchard reports, lexis)

WHEN President George W Bush went to see Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah in January to plead for higher oiloutput, he was politely rebuffed. The rematch today is likely to be a great deal more strained. If the Saudis denyhelp once again, they risk incalculable damage to their strategic alliance with Washington. The price of crude hasrocketed by over $30 a barrel since that last fruitless meeting, briefly touching the once unthinkable level of $127Goldman Sachs fears a "super-spike'' to $200 a barrel this year. Asked what he would tell King Abdullah thistime, Mr Bush said caustically: "The price is even higher.'' Indeed, it is, especially the political price. The US-Saudi tango has been on thin ice ever since the te

Saudi_Disad - Fellows

Documents

Transcript of Saudi_Disad - Fellows