Military Review August 1967

7/27/2019 Military Review August 1967

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UNITED STATESARMY COMMANDAND GENERALSTAFF COLLEGE, FORT LEAVENWORTH, NANSAS

COMMANDANTMajor General Michael S. Davison

ACTING ASSISTANT COMMANDANTcolonel Benjamn D. Cap8haw

The Military Review is publ ished by the United States Army Command and GenStaff College in close association with the United States Army War College. It providforum for the expression of military thought on national and military strategy, natisecurity affairs, and on doctrine with emphasis at the division and higher levels of comm


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Military ReviewProfessional Journal of the US Army

Showof Force in ForeignPolic y . . . . COL Drew J. Barrett , Jr., USMC

ArmyForcesin RiverineOperati ons . . . . . LTC JohnW. Baker,USALTC Lee C. Dickson,USA B4

Defensein India . . . . . WG CDR M. K. Chopra, IndianAir Force,Ret

What Pric e China s Bomb? . . . . . LTC JamesW. Barnett , Jr., USA

EarlyAmericanExplorat ionof Lop Nor . . . . . . . Earl B. Shaw

Thai laridInsurgency:A New Cause? . . . . . . . Dennis Menos

Mil it aryTechnol ogyin West Germany . . . . . . TheodorBenecke

Army Nati onbuil ders . . . . . . . . LTC JohnJ. Saalberg,USA

Afro-AsianCount ri es . . . GEN Nguyen Bao Tri, Sout h VietnameseArmy

TheFly in Outer Space . . . . . . . . . . John Erick son

Dofeat irrgCommunism in M alaya . . . . . . . . . C. C. Too

The VictoriousWill . . . . . .LTG Harbak hshSingh, Indian Army B

Mil i taryNotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Af i l it aryB oaks. . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . 107

, ~..T:p.r~. ~.JV Y -X.- --, : -y-q 3L$%~ :.~$?~. .. l~ e?@i;&~?zr*;e$.?i$


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Editor in ChiefCOL Oonald J. Delaney

Associate EditorCOL George S. PappasArmy War College

Assistant E$torLTC A. Leroy Covey

Featuras EditorLTC Charles A. Gatzka

Production EditorHelen M. Hall

Spanish-American EditorMAJ Juan Horta-Merly

Brasilian Editors

LTC Paulo A. F. VianaLTC Samuel T. T. Primo

Pubffcation OfficerLTC Edward A Purcell

Art and OesignCharles A. Moore

Oonald L. Thomas

MILITARY REVIEW-Publlshed monthly by the U. S. Arm Commsnd snd General $teff College, Fort enworth, Kansas, in English, Spanish, and Porfuu ese.i se of funds for printing of this publication hasbeen approved by Headquarters, Department o the Army, 28 May 1955.

second-class postage rid at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Subacriptioo rates $4.00 (US currency) year m the Unltad States, nited Statea military peat offices, and those sountries which ara mambars otha Parr-Amer/can Postal Un!on Gncluding Spain); $5.00 a year in all other countriaq single copy pr50 canta, Addraaa subscwptlon mail to tha Book Daparfment, U. S. Amry Command and Ganeral StCollaga, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027.


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The Military Review announces the selection of the following afilclehorn the June 1967 issue as a MILITARY REVIEW AWARD ARTICLE:

Clausewitz on Limited WarWiUtim D. Franklin

Ihe author writes that Karl von Clausewitz visualized a! spectrum of

:onflict from simple, ~narmed belligerence through total war. He con-:Iudesthat Clausewit%did not look on completely unrestrained violencew tbe only method of/conflict, but offered another alternative-that ofImited war, The conflict in Vietnam is particularly suited to conditions)f limited war in the light of a neo-Clausewitzian strategy.

* * *

COMING:hneral Bruce C. Clark&, Retired, in G2: Member of the Operation Team,writes of the tendency to consider intelligence personnel as technician, thuelowering the influence of the G2 below that of the G3 on the operations team:

Ke suggests that, if both do their jobs well and effectively, each will be acoordinate member of the operations team in a tactical unit.

Lieutenant Colonel George S. Jones III, in Strategic Planning: discuseesthe ro]e of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the development of national security

Micy. They annually prepare a Joint Strategic Objective Plan (JSOP)which is increasingly important as it is an initial point in the developmentofthe annual militsry budget. He euggests that the Joint Chiefs be designated

M the principal military advisors to the Congress.


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SHOWOFFORCE

INFOREIGN OLI

Colonel Drew J. Barrett, Jr.,United .Statee Marine Corps

T WO basic requirements for thesuccessful employment of a showof force are a clearly defined politicalpurpose or objective for the operation,and credibility for the chow of forcethat ie being undertaken. There also

are other considerations, which eitherhave been pertinent to some past situations or appear likely to be importantin the future. Theee are timing, a recognition of the poeeibility of failureand the consequences thereof, the im.pact or acceptability of a show of forcebefore world opinion, and the requirement for close coordination of militaryand political activities in the conductof show of force actions.

A study of several successful examples of the uee of the show of forceindicatee a politiecl reaeon for eaehof them, The purpose of the expeditions againet the pirate rulers of Tan:gier and Algiers was to insure /ecu

rity of commerce on the high seae.When the US Navy wae ueed to deter

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Panama Canal. In the Lebanon operation, the purpose was to inhibit ex-

Colonel D~ew J. Barrett, Jr., USMarine Corpe, ie with the 8d MarineDivieion in Vietnam. He eerved withthe let Marine Division in the Pwficduring Werld War II, in China, andin Korea, Other aeeignmante includedut~ with Marine Cerps Headquarterin Washington, aud en the etaffe ofthe Marine Corpe Schools in Quantico,

~Virgittia, and the 6th Fleet Cemi mmder in tti Mediterranean. He; holds a B.S. in Ecouomice from iUar~ahd Couege, Huntington, Weet Vir~ginia, and is a 1986 .gradwate of the

US Army War College.

it muet be credible. If any circumstance Ieade the intended object of theshow of force to believe that the initiator of the action will not or cannotemploy the force in queetion succeesfnlly, the intended chow of force cannot be successful.

A neeeeeary condition to eetablishthe credibility of an intended showof force is an adequate and properlypositioned force in relation to theetrength that the intended victim canbring to bear. The adversary rnuet also .be convinced that the intent and thewill to employ the force portrayed arepreeent. In addition, timing and suipriee may be important.

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There are several examples whichillnetrate credibility. President Theodore Roosevelts actions in deterring

Colombias expected opposition to thePanamanian revolution in 1903 wascertainly credible to the Colombians.The US desire for a transisthmianroute for the Panama Canal was wellknown; US naval units were known tobe in the area; and the Colombiansknew the limitation of their own

forces in seeking to counter those ofthe United States.When US ships arrived on the scene,

followed a few days later hy officialUS recognition and a promise to protect the new Panamanian Government,no practical choice was left to theColombians. The show of force wasadequate and credible, and the political objective of access to the isthmusfor construction of the interocean canal was a reality.

Lebanon OperationIn the Lebanon action of 1958, Pres

ident Gamal Abdel Nasser of theUnited Arab Republic was well awarethat the United States had indicated

an intention to aid the government ofLebanon., He did not take any steps,however, to reduce the pressures onLebanon until he was actually presented with evidence of that intent.Perhaps, the US intent to provide assistance to Lebanon was not yet credible to him.

President Nasser may have beensurprieed at the speed of the US response to the request of LebanonsPresident Camille Chamoun for assist.ante on 14 July. Nasser undoubtedlyknew that 6th Fleet amphibious forceswere in the Mediterranean since thatwas their habitual location. He mayhave been misled, however, by newspaper accounts that the 6th F1eet waslargely deployed along tbe coast of

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SHOW OF FORCE

Spain at the time. However, Nassermay not have been aware that therewere three US amphibious squadrons

in the Mediterranean at the tilme,rather than the ueual one; and he maynot have known of the speed withwhich Army elements could be placedin Lebanon.

A force of 2,000 Marines landed atBeirut the day following the Lebanese

Commodore Matthew C. Perry

request, and a similar force landed thenext day. Two days later, another suchforce arrived by sea, plus additionalMarines by air from the United States.The following day an Army battlegroup arrived. By D-day plus 12, over14,000 US troopsincluding 6,000 Marines and 8,000 soldiersand 72 tankswere on tbe scene. An impressiveforce, adequate to provide the assistance which had been requested, hadbeen placed in Lebanon in a very shorttime. The intent and will of the UnitedStates had been convincingly demonstrated by the very fact of the troopdeployment.

There is no incontrovertible proofthat the US actions in Lebanon caused

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! SHOW OF FORCEE-the of both the rebe}licmessation

against the Lebanese Government andof the external support to that rebellion. The facts are, however, that both

did stop. The US Ambassador to Lebanon at the time stated that withontthe:

. . . presence of American forcesin Lebanon, the cnei-cwould have continued, and the conetrwctive elementein the countm, whicle ultimately wereable to carrg ont pree$dential electioneand to fimt a eoktivn to the crieic,could not have achieved their parpoee.

Both baeic ingredient to credibilitywere demopatrated in the Lebanon operation. The force involved wae adequate and present, and the will to employ it had been made believable bythe epeed, scope, and decieivenese withwhich it had been deployed.

National CharacterThere is one other aepect of credi

bility which is important, especially inmodern timee. Starting from the baeicpremise that the primary purpose ofany show of force ie political in nature, it follows that euch an operationhas to be consistent with national

character. The customary behavior ofthe n@ion initiating the action, andita actione just preceding a period ofteneion, can eerve as a valid indication of its resolution and intent. Thue,it ie more likely that a nation whichhae established a pattern of aggressive actilon in its foreign policies willbe believed, if it should undertake ashow of force, rather than one whoeebehavior has bordered on the timid.

Another factor affecting a chow offorce is one of timing although thereare occaeione when it may be relatively unimportant. when the objective state is powerleee to oppose theintervening power aid lacke the meaneof acquiring help, timing may not be

. .

imnortant. There was no reason forha~te in the actkme against the Barbary Statee by Commodore EdwardPreble in 1803 and Stephen Decatur

in 1815. Their actione could have beenconducted either earlier or later withequal etTect.

The came could be said for Commodore Matthew C. Perrys conductin opening Japan to intercourse withthe United States. Perry initially arrived in Japan in July 1858, deliveredhie meseages for the Emperor, andstated that he would return the nextspring with a larger force. On his return the following March, he was succeeeful in negotiating a treaty whichmet US objectives. While there mayhave been some applied psychology inPerrye method of operation, there isno indication that any preciee degree

of timing wae involved in hle success.Timing More l!IIIMWd

In more recent examplee, timing hasaseumed greater importance. Even aweak state can marehal world opinionand, perhaps, outside aesietance ifgiven time. During the Panama incident, timing was important becauee

US recognition of the new Panamanian Government had to be accomplished before Colombia could garnereupport.

Since it is eaeier to extinguish aemall fire than a large one, timing willbe even more important in futureshows of force. Timing waa crucialto the Cuban miesile crieie eince USactions had to succeed before the Soviet missiles became operational. Itwee critical in the Lebanon crisie toprevent the overthrow of the government before corrective measures couldbe taken.

Any nation employing a show offorce runs the risk of embroiling it

eelf in hostilities. Should the adver-

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sary choose to reeiet rather than toaccede to pressure, the choice thenmuet be made by the initiator whether

to continue to preee the matter topoesible hostilities or to desiet andaccept the consequences of havingfailed. In effect, by resisting, the prospective advereary has undertaken ashow of force of hia own.

President Woodrow Wilson undertook a chow of force in 1919 by intro-

SHOW OF FORCEc

intended to imprees Spanish officialsand provide a meane to evacuate American nationals if necessary. This mie

eion initially wasaucceesful, but the

JWne was left in Havana unnecessarily long. when the ship was deetroyed at ite mooring, the public outcry was such that the iesue of war orpeace was removed from the Presidente hands. It is apparent that fhepossible consequence of the dispatch

ducing US forces into Siberia in aneffort to dilute Japanese influence,

hoping to induce the Japanese to withdraw when US forcee did. Tbe President did not expect his ploy to work.He had foreseen the possibility of failure, and, when it occurred, he withdrew without further involvement.

The introduction of the USS Main~into the Cuban revolutionary situation in 1898, on the other hand, waedifferent. The presence of the ship was

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of the Maine to Havana were not adequately considered in advance of the

action.Consideration of the possible consequences of chow of force actions,therefore, must occur during the deliberation which precede their undertaking. These are basically politicalqueetions, tempered by military advice as to capabilities and possible military consequences.

Until recent years, concern about

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SHOW OF FORCE

world reaction to shows of force didnot particularly apply. The use offorce in international relations wasmore or less accepted, and communications were such that the matter probably was ended before it became generally known.

Today, the use of force in international relations is not condoned, andrapid, worldwide communications andpress networks immediately focusworld attention on hostilities or thethreat of them. Presidents Dwight D.

Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy tookimmediate steps to inform both thepublic and international organisationsof actions taken and contemplated, together, with the reasons for them inboth the Lebanon and Cuban missilecrisee.

It can be expected that any futureshows of force by the United States

will be subject to the same conditionand, therefore, must be designed tomeet at least some degree of worldapproval.

Coordination of political and military actions ie essential to a successful show of force. Even in the historical examples cited earlier, coordination was recognized as importantalthough the actual mechanics mayhave amounted to little more than insuring that the mission given to people such as Commodores Decatur andPerry on their departure wae coneietent with the national aims which theiractione were to eupport. The instructions and premission coordination pro

vided Commodore Perry, in whichPerry himself assisted in the draftingof his own instructions, typify the na

ture of the coordination employed.Under current conditions, the need

for coordination assumee greater importance because a close relationshipexists between crises, even though theareas of crises may be separated bythousands of miles. The means with

.which to achieve coordination areavailable and efficient. The Cuban mis.sile crisie provides an example of closecoordination. The bridge of the USSPiercethe destroyer which inter.cepted and inspected the only Cuba-

bound ship that was stopped duringthat emergencywas in direct voicecontact with the White Houee duringthe actual interception.

On the other hand, close coordination during the early etages of theLebanon action was surprisingly deficient. The American Ambassadorknew that the landing would occur,

and when, but he had no direct communication with the amphibians taskforce which would execute it, nor withthe landing force commander ashoreafter the landing had been made. Thissituation wae remedied quickly afterthe landing, and botb communicationsand liaieon were established. The absence of such a mechaniem at the outset, however, invites trouble.

The requirement for coordinationhetween military and political echelons at all levels, from decision throughplanning to execution, is critical. Therequirement for close coordination carries with it the parallel need for adequate communications throughout and

for close understanding of all participants of the importance of the political nature of the entire undertaking.


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DEMOCRAC

DEFENSE in

INDIAWing Commander Maharaj K. Chopra,

Indiaa Air Force, Retired

DESPITE the passage of time,the definition of democracy, a

form of government of the people, hythe people, and for the people, is stillthe best. It is certainly the most suitable definition of Indian democracywhich ie dietinguiehable from at leaettwo other forms of government prevalent today. One is the government of

the class, ae in Communiet countriee,which is aleo sometimes described asdemocratic. lhe other is dictatorship in wh]ch an individual or a caucus dominates.

There are many features whichdistinguish the liberal democracy ofIndia from the latter two, but, preeminently, one is inspired by consentand the others are inspired by force,Therefore, if India is to retain oneof her principal impulses of governance, the control of military power,which represents the moat organizedform of force, is of crucial importance.

The Constitution of the Republicof India provides the mainsprings ofPolicy and the framework and guide

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INDIAN DEFENSE

lines of government. Unlike the USConstitution, the Indian Constitutionie a massive document of about 100,000 worde dealing with diverse subjects in great detail. Four of ite provisions are pertinent.

It provides for a Parliament atthe center and an Assembly for eachof the 17 states of India. The Parliament consists of a President and twoHouses of the Legislature. Of thetwo, the House of the People is themeet powerful and is directly electedon a country-wide basis by the voteof the adult population. The House ofAssembly is similarly elected. TheParliament and the Aeeembliee thenelect the President who becomes thechief executive of the state. ThePresident cane upon the leader

of the largest party in Parliamentto form a Council of Ministers withthe leader ae the Prime Minister,Thue, a Cabinet form of governmentcomes into being, and is responsibleto the Parliament, and, ultimately, tothe people. A similar arrangementaleo comes into being in the statee.

The Constitution providee thatall citizens of India, irrespective ofreligion, caste, or color, but subjectto the prescribed age limits, are entitled to vote. Elections to the Parliament and the Assemblies are, therefore, by all the people. In order thattheee electione be scrupulously fair,the Constitution also laye down themachinery for elections which oper-

Wing Commander Maharaj K.Chopra, Iudtan Air Force, Retired, ismilitary cerreepoudent for the Emglbh-language Indian newspaper, TheIndian Express. A freqctent contributor to the MILrrmY REVIEW, he &the author of Indi& en the NuclearPath which appeared in the Janumw1967 issue.

In&

ates throughout the country under aChief Election Commissioner. Theposition and statue of this officer are

carefully guaranteed and guarded inthe Constitution itself. Each citizen of India hae been

granted the right of freedom whichis one of the seven fundamental rightiguaranteed in the Constitution, Bythis right, which even the Parliamentcannot abrogate, he has the freedomof epeech, expression, and associationwhich are at the heart of the processof chooeing representatives.

The Constitution provides forthe establishment of a judiciary withdetailed eafeguarde for ite independent, impartial functioning. One of itsduties ie to safeguard the citizensfundamental rights.

Thrust et DemocracyAccording to the Constitution, In

dia must hold elections every fiveyears. These have, in fact, been heldregularly since the Constitution wasinaugurated in 1950. The latest election, which was the fourth of its kind,was held in February 1967. There

were 20 main patiles, a few miscellaneous organizations, and a largenumber of independence who took thefield. The Congress Party won absolute majoriti in the national Parliament but with numbers .gm@ly reduced. Only seven of the 17 statesreturned the Congrees Party to pbwer.One state returned Communists,another a purely regional party, athi~d a rightist party, and sevenstatee were forced into coalitiongovernments, with the Congress Partyhaving the largest number eleeted ~neach ease but lacking an absolutemajority.

Wldle this fourth election has

underlined the prevalence and thrustof liberal democracy, it has also

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brought into relief the role of military power in India. There can nowbe two lines of future development.Even though there are governmentsof varying political complexions atthe national level and in the states,they could function together smoothlyas in the United States. In that event,3ni&ar?? PQV?a P2r&Wtm ita E4xm&

democracy are the reservoir of powerare important factors in determining political trende.

In present-day India, the soldier isa popular figure. He symholizea orderand efficiency, in contrast to the riotsand the rough and tumble of politicallife. He also evokes sympathy for aYar$%$y& zmw& SC haa m%?akm+

United Nation.

The Indian sokfisr symbolizes order and etliciency and hae contributed much to UnitedNations peace-keeping forces

main functilon of security againstexternal dangers. But they may be atloggerheads, in which case militarypower will be involved in internalthreats as well as external dangers,and will become a key factor in thestability and integrity of the state.

One may ask how the armed forceshave figured in the preeent election,

remembering that the attitudes andresponses of the peopl~who in a

of hie life since independence in difficult border areas, defending thecountry against China or Pakietan.If he met reverses at the hands ofthe Chinese, the fault, it is considered,wae the politicians, not his.

Most families have sent their sonsto the armed forces which have expanded rapidly during the last five

yeare. Expansion coupled with conflicts with the two neighbore have

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INDIAN DEFENSE

engendered countrywide military consciouaneak+ and, therefore, have accentuated appreciation of the role ofmilitary power in national life.

Consequently, all national partiessought to project their military pro-,grams to the public in their mani.festos. True to form, these programs ~made a variety of approaches to the 1defense problems. The Congress Partystayed with its policy of nonalignment dnd cautious arms buildup. The

rightists were in favor of a militaryalliance with Western Powers. ThePore extreme among the rightistsalso advocated such an alliance, hut,i addition, wanted massive militariz tion bf, the people and the produc-Ition of nuclear weapons.

Adequate Military StrengthThere was a universal consensus

on one matter: There should be adequate military strength to ward offaggression and to counter threats.Any government of tomorrow whichis incapable of this will have troublewith the people.

Although wanting strength, thepeople were not worried about how

this was to be achieved, but left thematter to those who were at the helmof government. Military power, assuch, was, theref&-e, not an electionissue. More intimate and immediateproblems swayed the minds of thevoters. These problems included rising prices, unemployment, religious

safeguards, municipal facilities, education, standards of morality in publiclife, and general performance of theruling par~les. Besides, neither theparties nor the people at any timesupported any method other than theconstitutional democratic prncess forgoed government.

The Indian Constitution Iiste twoeeparate sets of responsibilities, one

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for the Union and the other for thestates, with the proviso that, in anemergency, the Union can also takeover the subjects of tbe states. De

fense falls in the Union list, and thearmed forces, militia, and their infrastructure are built, controlled, andadministered by the Central Government. The states have nothing to dowith them, although they can alwaysask for their assistance. A recalcitrantstate must, therefore, face the fact

that it has no military power of itsown, and that the troops stationedwithin its territory owe their allegiance to the Central authority.

Article 53The crncial provision of the Con

stitution in this connection lies inArticle 53 which says that, Thesupreme command of the DefenssForces of the Union shall be vestedin the President and the exercisethereof shall be regulated by law.The President is tbe chief executiveof the state. Since he holds thesupreme command, this signifies thatmilitary authority is subservient tocivil authority. But the command can.not be exercised by the President onhis own in an autocratic manner; ithas to be exercised in accordance withthe law framed by the Parliament.

Insofar as military power is vestedin civil authority and the civil authority has been forbidden ita untrammeled use, this provision forms the

cornerstone of government underliberal democracy.Preoccupied with a host of issues

and being a large body, the Parliamentis concerned with defense only at thehighest level. Of three principal facetsof power-control, strategy, andcommandParliament is interestedmainly with control, seldom with strategy, and never with command.

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Three forms of parliamentary control are prevalent at preeent. By passing the Indian Army, Navy; and AirForce Acts, the Parliament has constituted the three arme of serviceand given a three-pronged structureto the defense services. Only Parliament can alter this structure. Thedefense budget has to be presentedyearly to the Parliament which thusexercises financial control over defense. The Parliament has also estab

lished Estimates Committees whichreview periodically the functioning ofthe defense machinery in its variousaspects.

Chain of CommandThe President holds the levere of

command and operation. His role isnominal; the real power lies in the

hands of the Council of Minieterswhich ie the Cabinet under the PrimeMinister. From the Cabinet, authorityis further channeled to the DefenseMinieter who is equivalent to the USSecretary of Defenee, his variouscommittees and aeeisting councils,and the headquarters of the threeservices. The Defense Minister isnormally a senior member of theCabinet and has a nnmber of committees. The most powerful is onewhich he heads himself and includestwo Deputy Defense Ministers, theDefense Secretary, the three Chiefs ofStaff, the Scientific Advisor, and theFinancial Advisor. All major decisionsof interministerial and interservicecharacter are made here.

The Chiefs of Staff have a dualposition. As a committee, they arethe expert military advisors to theDefense Minister. As individuals,they are the heads of their respectiveservices, and are responsible for the

recruiting, training, eqnipping, andadministration of each of their serv

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INDIAN DEFENSE

ices. Along with their headquarters,they provide a demarcation line between high defense policy on one sideand administration and operation ofthe service on the other.

The fulcrum of this system lies inthe Ministry of Defense headed bythe Defense Secretary. This Ministryplays three rolee. It is the Secretariat

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India

to the Defense Minister, collecting andfeeding him information and provid

ing him with assistance. Aided bythis Secretariat, be discharges hisresponsibilities as the ministerialexecutive of defense, as advisor tothe Cabinet, and as the governmentsspokesman on defense in the Houseof the People. It ie also the bodywhich controls and supervises the

functioning of the army, navy, andair force. Finally, it controls and

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INDIAN DEFENSE

administers a large number of ord- inserted into this machinery andnance factories, defense undertakhgs, yet having a highly distinctive indi

: and military institutions. viduality is the figure of the FinancialThere are certain features of this Advisor. He is not a defense official,

mechanism of defense control which but is the representative of the Minare not obvious but are noteworthy. istry of Finance, an entirely separateThe higher levels of tbe hzgh com- civilian body headed by another bighmand, where policy is made and prin- ranking Cabinet Minister. He notcipal direetilvee are iseued, are pre- only has the final say in the alloca-

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dominantly civilian. Apart from the tion of defense funds, but also super-Supreme Commander, who is a civil- vises their disbursement at all levelsian, the Cabinet is composed of civil- of the military complex from theian Mhisters responsible to the headquarters to the lowest formation.

In theory, as well as in practice, theParliament where military elementepurse strings of defense are in theare negligible. In the echelon below thebands of officials outside defense.Defense Minister, all officers are

civilian except the three Chiefs of As far as status goes, the Chief ofStaff. The Ministry of Defense, com- Staff is high in the Indian hierarchy.posed of many hrmdrede of officials, He is number 22, if he holds the

is completely civilian. rank of full general, in the Warrant

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of Precedence in which the Preeidentis number one. In the body of theIdgb command, however, he ie oneamong many outstanding oIR+sIs. Asa body, the Chiefs of Staff have directaccese to the Defense Minieter, butas individual heads of their respectiveservice, they must approach him onlythrough the Defense Secretary. Theyhave no direct access either to thePrime Minister or the Cabinet.

Thus, in military mattere, theChiefe of Staff make recommendations with regard to the eize, organization, weapons and equipment, andinfrestructure of the armed f orcee.But the ultimate decisions are in thehands of the Cabinet and are implemented by the chiefs only after theCabinet has iesued directives.

Reeourcee for the maintenance ofthe armed forces are produced byorganization which are controlledand administered by the Minietry ofDefense. Theee resources includeweapons and equipment of all types,military installations, cantonmentareae, and etrategic roads, railways,

and airfielde. Scientific reeearch intoweapons systeme and allied mattereis aleo controlled by the Minietry.Tbe armed forces have no authorityand no resourcee of their own tomanufacture arms, but they makerecommendation, provide specifications and technical advice and sometimes make their own experts available to institutions producing weaponsor doing reeearch.

Tbe value of the Indian defensecontrol system, which hae been inoperation for only 17 years, cannotbe fully determined. Certain gape

INDIAN DEFENSE

in it are, in fact, already beingpointed out. It ie said that the Parliament as a whole has been rather

indifferent, leaving matters too muchto ite executive wing which hasallowed defenee to deteriorate. It iealeo eaid that tbe military control isnot only under civil authority, whichis justifiable, but also too much underthe civil servant; which ie not justifiable.

The higher echelons are consideredtopheavy and complicated with far toorhan y committee and proceduraltangles to be efficient enough forquick decisions. The Indian syetemie based upon the old pre-1963 Britishmodel which hae eince heen reformedby the creation of a unified interaervice etaff for higher defense planning and strategy. Some such reform,which ie in conformity with thepresent-day requirement of war,should also be introduced in India.There are critics who say that theIndian debacle against the Chinese in1962 was due, at least partially, todeficiencies in the Indian K]gh Com

mand.But these are mattere which relate

to a few parts of the system and theirfunctioning, and not to the eystemae a whole with its characteristicinspiration, character, and mold. Th]ssystem, conforming to the highesttradition of liberal democracy an!rooted in the Constitution and builton the principles of civil-military relationship, has so far enabled India topass with reasonable success throughthe streseee and etorms of the postwar period. It bodee well for thefuture.

iqmt 1967 15


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WHAT

PRICE

CHINAS

Lieutenant Colonel James W. Barnett, Jr., United State8 Armg

T HE successful explosion of Communist Chinas first nuclear device inOctober 1964 was a dramatic event. It brought an automatic membershipfor Communist China in the nuclear club, and produced a radical change inforeign relations between China and her neighbors. The explosion demonstratedvividly the Communist Chinese ability to make it on their own without Sovietassistance, and proved conclusive] y that there had been a revival of science andtechnology in China. It served as an example of the ability of a highly disciplinedCommunist state to focus national energies on a difficult undertaking.

There is a strong possibility that the event signified for Mao Tse-tung, andother high part y officials, an accomplishment that is equivalent to the btirning

18 . Militery Review

k%


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of the mortgage by the average homebuyer. Certainly, there must have beena tremendous sense of relief when the

successful test explosion at last prOvided a return on several years of considerable investment.

Magnitude of TaskWhen the original decision was

made in Peking to embark on a nuclearweapons development program, it isnot certain that the Chinese decision-makers had any real estimate of themagnitude of the undertaking. It alsois doubtf u] that they had any accurateunderstanding of what their true costshad been, even after their first detonation was a success. This is not to saythat they were unable to recount theirannual operating expenses or to inven.tory the new facilities that had been

created ( Figure I).Undoubtedly, they could identify

such costs as the bills that had beenpresented by the Soviets for goods andservices furnished prior to their ideological clash, and they could recapitulate other out-of -pocket expenses.There is a sharp distinction, however,

between a mathematical summation ofthe costs of labor and material and acalculated understanding on the partof the Chinese Communist leadershipof what they have denied their country. By their decision they have diverted a significant fraction of theirstrained economy toward an undertak-

Lieu fenant Colonel James W. Bar-.nett, Jr., is with Headquarter-s, 7thEngineer Battalion, 5th Infantry Di-Vkion (Mechanized), Fort Carson,Colorado. He holds an M.S. degreefrom the Military Ir&titute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts,and, pmov to his present assignment,wea graduated from the US Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

laaust 1967

CHINAS BOMB

ing which can contribute little to theeconomic well being of their nation.

Except for satief ying a normal cu

riosit y, there is little value for Westerners, or even the Chinese themselves,to know the monetary amount of theChinese investment in nuclear development. On the other hand, it mighthelp Western observera to understandthe Chinese better if they recognizethe degree of importance that has beenplaced upon their nuclear program bythe Chinese Commnnist leaders. It isuseful to such an under.qtandie.Otermine how much Peking has beenwilling to sacrifice to obtain theweapon.Itemized Requirements

In my analysis, the requirementfor conducting a nuclear development

program have been itemized with theirvalne estimated in US dollars. The USdollar value was converted into a measure of Chinese value by determiningthe value of complete indnatrial plantswhich could be purchased by Communist China on the international market. A purchase of industrial plants ontbe international market requires thecompletion of a hard money transaction which not only is identifiable, butalso ie translatable into US dollars.Also, such purchases would representa true outlay by Chinaa diversion ofmoney or goods from internal consumption.

By converting estimated outlays fo;

nuclear development into productivecapacity equivalents, one can betterunderstand what the Chinese have denied themselves in future productionof consumer and producer goods byelecting to expend their resources foran economically nonproductive program.

The requirements for producing anuclear device include a supply of fie

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CHINAS BOMB

sionable material of adequate mass tosustain a chain reaction, a meana withwhich to assemble the material rapidlyinto ita critical geometry, and a mech

anism which triggere the entire proceee. These requirements imply a needfor materials, personnel, and facilitiesto work the materials, and a technology that PrOvidea the proper scientificand engineering disciplines necessaryto create the desired end products.Major Operations

Figure 2 identifies the major operations which must be performed to create a nuclear device, and allocates facilities and personnel resources to eachoperation. It estimates the time neces.aary to conduct the operationa priorto the first test firing, and then calculates the cost of operationa in termsof capital investment and operating

expenses of corresponding US operations. The individual values may notbe accurate enough to satisfy a goodaccountant, but they permit an approximation of tbe total cost to bemade.

The Chinese nuclear program from1957 through the first exploeion in1964 cost an estimated 2.5 bill ion USdollars. The current annual cost is 47omillion US drdlara, not including anycosts associated with the developmentof delivery means for nuclear warheads. Several other cost estimateshave been made public.

The wide range of difference shouldbe an adequate caution to use themmore for their qualitative rather thantheir quantitative value. In any event,the point iq not that a determinableamount of money was spent for thefirst Chinese bomb, but that Pekirrgedecision to spend scarce resources forthis purpose had a significantly detrimental effect on an already strained

economy.

As a first comparison, the cost ofthe Chinese bomb can be contrastedwith the benefit to agriculture of amajor capital investment in chemical

fertilizer plants. Nothing is more important to the Chinese people than ag.riculture, and more of the Chineee pee.ple are directly affected by agriculturethan any other sector of the economy.It is a land of 600 million peasants outof a total population of over 700 million. Agriculture probably accounts forroughly one-half of Chinas gross na.tional product.

A new fertilizer plant was purchased by India on the world marketin 1965 at a cost of 65 million doharsand it produces 375,000 tons of chemical fertilizer yearly. Tbe total Chinese production of chemical fertilizerin 1964 was estimated to be approxi

mately 3.25 million tone. Estimates forCommunist Chinaa actual requirements for chemical fertilizer varyfrom 14 million to 40 million tons. Inthe most extreme caae, therefore, 100new fertilizer plants at a total cost of6.5 billion dollars would be required tomeet the demand for 40 million tons.

In the moat conservative estimate, 38new plante, costing 2.4 billion dollars,would provide all of the fertilizerneeded.Other Factors

Unquestionably, there are other fac-tors which muet be added to convertavailable fertilizer into harvestedgrainproper application, favorableweather, and even the transportationnecessary to distribute additional tonnage. Confronted with an absolute rracessity for expanded food grain production and a practical limit to theamount of arable land that can bemade available, Chinas onlf apparentsolution to her dilemma is to increase

the yield per unit of area farmed.

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I BALKHhf .,$fwi-

,1A\.J

sFigure 1.


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M

ayRwoW

2


25/116

CHINASBOMB

Chemical fertilizer, therefore, appeais to be Chinas best hope. for solving her acute food shortage problem.

Furthermore, until sbe can feed herself, only a small fraction of her foreign exchange can he directed towardthe purchase of the capital goods thatare so desperately needed for her industrial growth.ExpansionIs Slow

In spite of the neceeeity to expandher fertilizer industry, China baatsken only modest steps to do so. Anew chemical fertilizer plant has beenconstructed in Shanghai at a cost of25 million dollars and it produces 100,000 tons of fertilizer per year. In addition, China has recently purchasedtwo complete plants from an Italianmanufacturer for the equivalent of 14

million dollars. The capacity of thesetwo plants is estimated to be about50,000 tons per year combined.

Pekings decision to invest 2.5 billion dollars in a nuclear device insteadof in fertilizer plants may have doomedmillione of Chinese to death by starvation at worst, or to chronic malnutrition, at best. Its society desperatelyneeds increased food production. Theprospect of an exploding populationmakes it necessary to feed the equivalent of a new Canada each year. Pekings economy perennially producesshortfalls in farm outputshortfallswhich have an almost immediate impact on industrial production as well

and there is an urgent need to improveyield per acre as the only apparentmeans by which to increase the national production of food grains.

The cost of Chinas nuclear programmay also be thought of in terms ofsteel production had an additional 2.5billion dollars been invested in newsteel plants. ,.

In 1963, the US Government inves

~ August1967

tigated the inclueion of a large steelmill as a part of its economic aid toIndia. Estimatee priced the proposed

miil, with an annual capacity of 2,600,000 ingot tons, at 1.8 billion dollars,or 408 dollars per ingot ton.

By extrapolation, if the ChineseCommunists had elected to invest 2.5billion dollars in new steel capacit~,they could have added approximately3.5 million tons to their annual production. An incremental addition ofthat magnitude is equal to half ofwhat they were able to achieve duringtheir First Five-Year Plan. It wouldbe equivalent to a 25 percent increasein their present national capacity.What effect this would have had onother industry can only be inferred,but tbe successful expaneion of a basic

induetry such as steel could not failto stimulate growth in constructionand manufacturing.Energy Resources

As a third alternative, CommunistChina might have invested 2.5 billiondollars in ite capability to generatetbe energy required for industrialization. Energy resources are a useful index of tbe modernity of a nations society because the replacement of human and animal effort by machines ischaracteristic of all the truly advancednationa of the world.

China habitually is regarded as aland where ant-like hordes of cooliestoil at tasks that could be performed

more efficiently by powered machinery.That image will persist, moreover, until the kilowatt-hour and the Britishthermal unit replace tbe arms, Iega,and backs that deliver the bulk ofChinas energy today. Production figures for electricityy, petroleum, andcoal are pitifully low for a nation of700 million people.

An installed kilowatt of thermal

21


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CHINAS BOMB

- electric generating capacity costs approximately 250 dollars. Hydroelectricplants cost slightly more than therrnalelectric, plants in capital investment,

but they operate for Mss. An investment of 2.5 billion dollars in new electric generating atationa would add 10

The cost of the Chinese bomb could heveprovided over 100 milfion barrels of

petrOIeum annually

If an average plant efficiency factor of 80 percent is assumed, this newgenerating capacity would add 70 bil

lion kilowatt-hours to Chinas annualproduction of electric power. This increaae ia more than hvice the electricalenergy produced by China in 1963.Such relatively abundant power couldbe used for many industrial purposes,as welI as for the sorely needed expansion of irrigation in support ofagriculture.

The coet of Chinas nuclear program

could also be compared to an equivalent investment in petroleum. Basedon reasonable cost comparison yardsticks, an investment of 2.5 bfllion dol

lars in the Chinese petroleum industrypotentially would have added 16.8 mii-lion tons per yearmore than twicethe total production in 1963.

It is possible that China nray notpossess the reserves of crude petro.leum neceseary to develop a 24-million.ton-per-year petroleum industry. But

if China doea have substantial untapped reserves in petroleum, aa recentreports indicate, a large investment inits development would result in thegrowth of an industry of great value,both for internal consumption and foruae in the world market.Petroleum in Foreign Exchange

The Cbineee must buy the meanswith which to produce manufacturedproducts until their own industry develops to the extent that it can buildits own new plants, and there ia nodoubt as to the value of petroleum inforeign exchange. Petroleum is one ofthe products for which the worlds demand is expanding rapidly, and thebest customers for petroleum productsalso are the beat eourcee from whichto purchase industrial equipment.

A fourth Cbineee alternative couldhave been the development of a paperindustry. The estimated cost of al,OOO-ton-per-day paperboard mill is

approximately 60 million dollars. Aninvestment of 2.5 billion doliars inpapermills, therefore, could have provided the Chinese with a produtilvecapacity of approximately 41,500 tonsof paperboard per day. At currentprices, this level of production wouldcreate an export potential of approximately 2.5 billion dollara per year.

Compared to Chinaa recent foreign

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CHINAS BOMB

trade volume history of three to fourbillion dollars per year, the additionof 2.5 billion dollars in paperboard ex.ports would be of major significance.A paper industry would be an important complement to Chinas highlyagrarian economy.

Two distinct advantages would accrue from a decieion to turn marginalland to the raising of pulpwood treesand, concurrently, to employ largenumbers of the rural population intheir planting, care, and harvesting.

Pulpwood ie one of the few moneycrops which not only grows on marginal land, but also serves as a conservation measure. There would be rel.atively little retraining necessary forthe people involved in raising and harvesting the trees. It ie one way thatChina could extend her total arableland, and probably turn to a moreprofitable pureuit some marginal landthat ie presently yielding small returnsof other crops.

A final comparison concerns thevalue of improvements in transportation to a country the size of China.The 2.5 billion dollare spent on theChinese bomb could buy the following

representative mix of transportation: 40 airfields at five million dollars. 400 short-range jetliners at 2.75

million dollara. 100,000 trucke (2 ?&on) at 4,000

dollars.o 4,000 miles of two-lane, all-

weather road at 200,000 dollars.This probably is a poor mix for

China today. She needs more railroadeand rolling stock, more roade and automotive equipment, and relatively fewjet passenger aircraft. Nevertheless,it is indicative of tbe tremi?ndoue increase in the ability to move people

Mlgsst1967

and things that could have been obtained with an investment equivalentto that made in nuclear weapon development.

These examplee of productive facilitieswhich could have been obtainedfor the cost of the first Chinese nuclear device-are not suggested as alternative solutions to Chinas economicdilemma. On the contrary, the adoption of any one area to receive the solebenefit of the investment would be asunwise as the decision to ignore them

all. Each separate example does, however, dramatize the impact of diverting large amounts of scarce resourcesto a nonproductive undertaking.

In terms of real value, it might besaid that their first nuclear explosionhas cost the Chinese 14.4 million tonsof chemical fertilizer per year, andthat the lack of 14.4 million tons offertilizer has coat them 36 million tonsof food grains per year.

Alternatively, the cost might beviewed as a Ioet opportunity to tripletheir national production of electricpower or petroleum or to increase theirannual production of steel by 25 percent. Stated another way, the cost

could be considered as 2.5 billion dollars per year of Iost paper exports thatmight have been realized under othercircumstances.

It appears, however, that the priorities established by the Chinese Communist leadership place political gainahead of economic development, andthat possession of nuclear weapons isregarded as a substantial political asset by Peking. It is difficult to foreseecircumstance in which Chinas Poseeesion of the nuclear weapon will beworth the price the people have paidfor its development.

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Early American

of Lop Nor

P ROBABLY few Communist Chinese are aware that an Americangeographer, Elkiworth Huntington,was the first Westerner to explore inthe vicinity of Lop Nor, a salt lakewhich lies near their nuclear test site.

He ie better known for his many publications about the influence of climateupon the progress of civilization thanfor hie explorations in central Asia.In fact, he was pursuing informationon thie climatic philosophy when hetraveled to Lop Nor during the winterof 1905-6. He emphasizes this reasonfor the trip when he states that hewent:

. . . not onlg for the purpoee oflearniwg what ie really there, but alsoto ascertain whether the lake of LoP-Nort now merely a reedy ewamp, hmbeen ewbject to great fluctatimw ineize dunng the gladal epoch, amt evenduring the era of tecorded history.

It is true that another Weetern ex-

Exploration

Earl B. Shaw

plorer, ah Italian, Marco Polo, traveled the caravan route to Cathay,which led just south of Lop Nor, morethan eix centuriee before Huntingtonsexploration, and that Marco Polo iswell known to the Chinese of today.

But the Italian never explored the LopNor Lake; in fact, he had no reasoufor exploring it becauee his main mission was to stndy Chinese life andcustoms in Peking. Moreover, he mayhave been fearful of leaving the knowncaravan route for a look at the ealtlake.

Marco Polo considered his paesagethrough the desert south of Lop Noras one of the worst parts of his entire journey from Italy to China. Hedescribes it as a desert of sandy plains,eterile mountains, and evil spiritswhich were said to lure travelers todestruction with extraordinary illusions.

Lop Nor is located at 40 degrees 30

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minutes north and 90 degrees 30 minutes east. However, it is not its latitudinal location that made. travelingin the area so difficult for Marco Poloand Huntington arid which makes ita useful nuclear testing site for theChinese Reds. Rather, it is its locationwithin an area surrounded by mountain barriers and hundreds of milesfrom the sea that creates the desertenvironment which is so difficult forsurface travel and human occupation,

and consequently suitable for nucleartests.location

The lake lies 1,200 miles north ofthe Bay of Bengal and the ArabianSea, and north of the lofty TibetanPlateau and the high Himalaya Mountains. The Pacific Ocean, also partly

cut off by high mountains and plateaus, is even farther away from Chinas nuclear site. The closest portionof the Arctic Ocean is about 2,000miles to the north and separated fromthe nuclear blasts by a mountain barrier along the Siberian frontier. TheMediterranean Sea is as distant as theArctic, and theAtlantic Ocean is twiceas far away.

Due to these great distances, mois! ture-laden air moving toward the con~ tinental interior drops most of its pre!. cipitation before reaching Lop Nor. It~ is forced to give up moisture on the\ windward sides of surrounding moun-

Earl B. Shaw is Professor of Geography at Assumption College inWorcester, Massachusetts. He r-sceived

1 his Masters degree from WashingtonUniversity, Saint Louis, Missouri, and

; his Ph. D. franc Clark Unhjers$ty inWorcester. The author of several booksand a frequent contributor to prof esskmal geographic magazines, hie arttcle, The McMahon Line, appeared inthe July 1966 issue of the MILITARY

REVIEW.5

iugust1967

LOP NO

tains and warms as it descends the leeward slopes facing the desert, thusgreatly hindering condensation.

The difficult terrain between northern India and the Tarim Basin, andthe primitive means of travel at thebeginning of the 20th century, madeHuntingtons journey toWard centralAsia extremely difficult. He startedfrom Kashmir in April 1905, crossedboth the Himalaya and Kunlun Mountains, and did not reach Charkhlik, onthe southern edge of the Lop NorDesert, until December of that sameyear.

Similar travel time was required forjourneys between Peking and theTarim Basin. Prior to the 1940s, themain movement on the Imperial highway between Peking and Sinkiang

Province, which inchrdes the Lop Norand Takla Makan Deserts, was bystringless, two-wheeled carts, pulledby horses or mules. The long journeytook at least 120 days of actual travel,allowing for the usual rest stops. Today, the traveler may fly to Chinasnorthwest province in a few hours, ormake the trip by automobile or railin a few days.

Tarim OasinThe Tarim Basin, Asias driest area,

includes approximately 215,000 squaremiles, a region about the size of Colorado and New Mexico combined. Itlies between the Tien Shari Mountainson the north and the Astin Tagh tothe couth. These encircling ranges arresponsible for a pattern of interiordrainage, and no river, not even theTarim, reaches the sea. Wind-erodedsediments also are deposited withinthe lowlands because of the high elevations on all sides.

Huntington describes the TarimBasin as follows:

On every eide except the northeast

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LOP NOR

it ia surrounded by lofty anew.dadmountairw. At their ba80 a barren beltof typical piedmant gravel, like a vest

beach .of shingle from ten to fortymilee wide, eucks into its porouedepthe all but the Zargeet of streamsfrom the anowg mountains. At thelower edge of the sloping gravel plain,pebbles give place to fine coil and clay,and more or leee of the water either.,reappeare in qwinge which irrigatdoaees of vegetation, chiejly gnarledpoplars, tamariske, and reeds. On thesouthern side of the basin, betweenKashgar and iIhotan, the zone has awidth of ten to twent~ milee, but farther east it diminished to almost aothing near Lop-Nor, a thaueand milesfrom Kashgar. All the chief oases areeitcmted in this zone. Farther from the

m.onntaine vegetation di8aMSar8; andthe center of the bath is occupied bytwo great deeert areas. One of the8e,toward the weet, called Takle-Makun,hae been $hown bg fSven A.1 Hedinto be compo8ed almoet wholly of huge8arui dunce ranging up to two or threehundred feet in height; the other the

Lop deeert at the eaetern end, was u+known eoxept on the edgee until thejourtwy described in these pages,proved it to be in large part a vaetsalt plain.

Lop Nor EaploredAfter eecuring equipment, supplies,

and helpers at Charkhlik, Huntington

began hie journey through the LoPNor region on 23 December 1905. Heprobably choee to explore the regionin winter rather than summer becausesummer temperatures are extremelyhigh, with July averages of 92.7 degrees Fahrenheit and a record maximum of 118 degrees Fahrenheit. Also,

he had heard Chinese descriptions ofa part ef the Lap Nor indicating thatit coneisted of muck which could swal

2e

low men and animals, and, if therewas any truth to this tale, the muckshould be frozen during the winter

period.Huntington traveled eastward alongMarco Poloe route with four men, fivecamels, and 45 days provisions. Theeeconsisted of mutton, rice, bread, on.ions, dried apricots, and tea for themen, and two pounds of linseed cakeper camel per day,

Huntington arrived at Miran onChristmas Day. Here, he discoveredthe ruins of an ancient Buddhiet townwh@h wae, perhaps, 1,600 years old.He spent four days at Mlran and atAbdal, a few miles away, probably toestimate their ancient population andstudy the culture briefly. The data hecollected was ueed to support hie the

ory of a eeries of long-term climaticchanges.

Uninhabited RegionOn 29 December, the party con

tinued eaetward, and Huntington madethe following comments about tbiepart of hbJ reeearch:

We entered what ie probablg thegreateet uninhabited continental region in the world, outeide the polarregious. In an area equal to thti ofGreat Britain and ITetand, where thepopnkztion number8 40 ?dtion, thereis not a eingle inhabitant. Much of ithas neser been vieited by any explorer,..or even by the native8 of nearbg areae.

After daye of 8teady travel, we eawabsolutely no sign of living man. Except in rare cazee, there wae no vegetation which even camele could eat, awdno water 8ave bitter poota. BW traveling in the dead of winter when thetemperature fell to zero F. eve~ night,and by carefcdlg cho~ng out aad

melting chunks of hard white ice ffomthe mictkt of the gettowish maehy material covering meet of the pools, we

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managed to get water, which in thatpart of the world is called dmnkable.We were troubled with thirst meet ofthe time, and the indigestion causedbg the 8alt water laeted a month ortwo after we ceased ushzg it.

When Huntington left Abdal, hecontinued east along a former shoreline of LoP Nor:

To the south barren gravekstretched interminably toward the

mountains: to the north the browniehwhite ezpknee of the old lake-bedstretched eullen and unexplored to asea-like horizon, or faded away in adusty haze. Nothing relieved the monotony except a sharp lacwtrine bluff,sixty feet high ri8ing 8uddenly fromthe insignificant zone of vegetation.The zone was a mere .stmp of brownreeds, dotted with bvight blue poolsof brine, unfrozen becauee so saline.

When he reached a section:. . . where the water was not quite

80 eaZty ae eleewhere, we halted to

kl t1967

LOP NOR

make preparation for a plzmge intothe utterly unknown region to thenorth. We estimated that, barrtng accidents, we ought to reach the 8att8pring at Altmieh Bulak in aiz days.The 8prang.@ 90 milee away in an airline di8tance, at the foot of the KurukTagh, qr DrII Mountains. There was nokuowing, however, what delays we

t,might encounter or how leng we mighthave to hunt for the spring. In euch

bitterly cold weather the camels couldgo ten days without water, or, at apinch, twelve. Accordingly, we cuttWelVe da!188upp111of ice, @Uf tatiriek faggote enough to last eight dayeif u8ed very spamngly. Thie, withthirty days provisions which still remained, twenty days linseed cake, andthe camp equipment, made the cameleloads 80 heavy that it was impossiblefer any ene to ride. . . .

For four weary day8 we 8tumblednorthward acrose the interminableealt pfain of the old lake bed. Rough!


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LOP NOR

An ordirwrv frozen ploughed fieldwould seem like a macadam road incomparison. imagine the choppiestsort of a eea foith white-cape a foot

or two high, and freeze it solid. Whenwe camped in what we hoped tWe asoft epot, and tvied to drive in the irontent pegs, most of them bent double.We had to uee an axe to hew downkummocke of rock ealt a foot high befove we could get places emooth enoughfor sleeWug. Each night, when wepulled off our eoft-soled boots, the onlgkind in which we could keep warm,we realized how the bastiwado mustfeel. The elownese of our stumblingprogrese, ,the boundlese-ness of theeea-like h,orizon, the hittev morningwind, and the uncertainty as to ?ohenwe ehocdd find something diferentmade ue feel that the old lake muethave been endless.

Following the above description ofthe rough terrain encountered duringfour days on the unknown northernroute, Huntington gives his theory forthe origin of the irregular surfacefeatures:

ZMrittg the ancient lakee long continued procees of dryi%g up, there wasa deposit of unknown thickneee of almost pare rock salt. When the ealtfinallg became dry, it eplit into pentagom from five to twelve feet in diameter; the procese being similar to thatwhich givee rise to mud-cracke whena mud-puddle dmeeup, or to basalticcolumns when lava coole. The wind, or

come other agency, apparently deposited dust in the eracke; when rain Orenow fell, the .moieture browght n.v rwwsalt from below; and thzw the crackewere solidl~ fil!ed. When aext the plainbecame dry, the pentagons appearedaga$n. Tl@ time the amount of material was larger, and the pentagonebuckled upon the edges, and became

......

)

saucer-ehaped. By comstle.re repetitiocte of th$e procees, or of eomethingamdogous to it, the entire lake-bed became a mass of pentagone with ragged

blistered edges.Twice zoe encountered faiut hollows

where for a mile or two the plain wasdamp and comparatively smooth. Traveling in euch placee was much eaeierthan elselohere; bnt we did our best.to avoid them, for we remembered the rChineee tales of muck which swallowed

horse and rider. 13egond the main bodgof the lake our worst fears were almoet reattzed. The salt aeewmed awhiter fresher appearance, and ~eganto look slightly damp. I toae riding thsbigge.it of the camele whose load ofwood and ice had now been partlgused. Suddenly, I found myself turnin9 a summersault backward ofthe camel. His hind lege had brokenthrough the saline cruet and plungeda yard deep into soft, oozg muck. Ashe strnggled ponderously to extricatehimeelf, his front legs sank in; andwater came bubbliwg UP in muddypoole about the proetrate creatureeetomach. Two other camets fell intothe mire at the came time. In the hastewith which we began to tear off. theloads, I forgot to investigate whetherI was eemouel~hurt. Relieved of theirburden the two emaller camels extricated themselves. My big, heavg animal, however, was eo completely miredthat we had to pat ropee around hislegs and pult them out on to felts

which we epread on the soft mud tokeep him from sinking into it again,It was a grim jeet on the part of Natm-e to lead ue into an rmfrozen watembog in zero weather in a region eocold and dvy that we, were carryingten or twelve dage eupply of ice fordrinking water. If the mud had beena little softer we ehould have lost the

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camels, and might never have r-etww,ed to corroborate the Chinese talesof bottomless muck. . . .

On the f ourth morning of our weargnzarch, we were cheered bg encounteringa shore lke, marked by a steepbluff thirty feet high. On climbing toits top we supposed that we had leftthe old lake bed behind. After walking

~ ----- .-_.

LOP NOR

glittered with innumerable gypsumcrystale, or was spar8ely studded withaeolian mesas, made of pink and greenish clag, and from thirty to sixty feethigh. On the sixth day, the red plaingave place to a maze of mesas. As wewere traveling at rrght angles to theirlong axes we were obliged to makecountless huge zig-zags in order to

.. /

The camels loads were so

a quarter of a mile among aeolianmesas of clay, however, we droppedd~n another bluff, and were in theadt plain again. We had crossed afnger-shaped peninsula, ten or twentytimes as long as it was wide. All thatday and until noon of the fifth dag wemcountered similar peninsula or elongated islands, separated by bays andaoands of similar dimensions. Theszes were all dir%cted northeast and80uthwest. . . .

Shortly after noon of the fifth daywe found easy traveling for a time.A fantastic red plain, the soft dry bed

of an older ezpansion of the lake,

@t 1967

heavy that no one could ride

find breaks through which camelscould pass. Nevertheleee we made fourteen miles that day, and by sunsetwere close to the mountains of KurukTagh, and only eight miles from Altmish Bulak. Before camping for thenight we found driftwood buned ina long dry flood channel. It was thefirst sign of life, or of the work ofrunning water that we had seen forsix days.

By noon of the seventh day, theHuntington party reached one of theirmain objectives, the spring at AltmishBulak. Here was water for both man

and beast.

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LOP NOR

At AItmish Bulak, the party resteda day, chopped new ice, cut fagots, andgot ready for a start the next morning toward the ruins of Lulan, 30 miles

to the southwest. Drrring the stop,however, all the camels but one smallanimal, attracted by a herd of wild

tensive salt plains now surroundingthe water body were covered withwater during the wet phase of thesame cycle.

Here, he disagrees with other scientist who believe that the ealt plainsnear the present lake are merely dry

It was so cold plates had to he put en

camels, etrayed away. The party, howYr, fOund the animals and returnedthem to camp.

The remainder of the Huntingtonstndy of Lap Nor deals largely withhis theory that the lakes small size isthe result of a dry phase of a long-term climatic cycIe, and that the ex-

the fire to keep the food from freezing

playas abandoned by the Tarim River.They reason that, when water evaporates, the salty silt remains, and, assalt and silt accumulate, the lakebedrises. When the river fills one terminallake with silt and ealt, the streamshifts to another which has been lowered by the wind while dry.


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LOP NOR

Huntington took careful notice of the way. He conducted this examinaall features of the geographic emviron- tion on foot or on the backs of slowlyment, both cultural and physical. He plodding animals-the best methods ofcommented on the climate, topography, travel if one wishes to get the feelvegetation, soiis, and geology all along of a region.

.:..-

CONSOLNIATED INDEX

The Military Review announcea publication of the MILITARYREVIEW CONSOLIDATEDINDEX 1922.1965. The index, compiledby the Kansas State University, contains 30,000 subjectentries and 10,000 anthers.This valuable research tool will be available 1 July 1967from the Book Department, US Army Command and GeneralStaff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027. Price $2.00

postpaid. ORDER YOUR COPY NOW

hgllst 1s67 31


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THAILAND 1NSURGENC%

A NEW CAUSE?Dennis hfenos

THE buildup of US forcee in Thailand during tbe latter half

of 1966 dld not go unnoticed by Pekhg, Hanoi, and the so-

called Unitad Patriotic Front of Thailand. According to all indica-

tions, tbe leaders of the Thai insurgency are planning to axploitthe US preeence in Thailand for tbe purpose of injacting new life

ifito tbe Thailand war of national liberation. Thie war, fought

32 Militwy Revieu


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since 1961 primarily on domestic issues, has achieved to date only marginal success.

Strategy ShiftThe chief adversary of the insur

gency has heen the national government at Bangkoka dictatorial regime, in the eyea of the Communists,completely indifferent to the economicplight of the countryside. With thebuildup of US forces, however, a ma

jor shift of emphasis has occurred.Domestic issues are no longer emphasized. The prime opponent haa becomethe United States and, to a lesser extent only, the government at Bangkok.Daily, from across the Mekong Riverin Laos, the clandestine Free ThailandRadio ie calling upon the people todrive out the US imperialists and todeetroy their bases in Thailand.

Only time will tell whether thisshift in Communist etrategy will succeed. No nation wishes foreign troopson its soil, and the Thais, despitetheir pro-American feelings, may notbe an exception.

Of significance ie the fact that Thailand, in her long history, has neverbeen colonized hy a Western Power.The Communists know this too welland understand also the Thai nationalist sentiments, their love for independence, and their devotion to theroyal family. Thus, while holding thenational government at Bangkok re

sponsible for allowing the AmericanstO colonize their country and suppressing the countryside, the Communists have skillfully ahstained from

Dennis Menos has been a Department of Def enss employee since 19.47.He holds an M.A. in International Relations fvom the Georgetown Univer

eit~ Gm.duate School in Washington.D. C., and is a June 1967 graduate of.the US Army War College.

@f 1967

THAILAND INSURGENCY

making any attacks on the person ofthe King or on the Queen.

The Communist attacks on the US

presence in Thailand have become especially severe since November 1966when US helicopter units were committed to a modest counterinsurgencyrole in northeastern Thailand. TheUnited States was accused not onlyof occupying Thailand and maintaining 60,000 troops in the country (the

actual figure wae 35,000), but of terrorizing and massacring people aswell. Again and again, Peking andthe Free Thailand Radio have urgedthe people to rice up againet theAmericans before they make Thailand a eecond Vietnam and a baee ofW3eSSiOII against all Of Asia.

Vulnerable PesitionThe United States may be in a vulnerable position in Thailand from apropaganda standpoint becauee of herstrong presence there and of certainparallels between Thailand today andSouth Vietnam five or six years ago.Obviously, Thailand is far from beinga US colony. She ie a staunch US allywhose troops fought alongside the USforces in Korea and are fighting nowin Vietnam. Her government is one ofthe original signatories of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and a strong supporter of thealliance. In 1962, the United Statesconfirmed her SEATO commitment to

Thailand and pledged to defend he$against Communist subversion as wellas external aggression.

US forces were first stationed onThai coil in 1962 when Preeident JohnF. Kennedy sent 5,000 troops to thatcountry at the height of the Laotiancrisie. The big US buildup in Thailand, however, did not occur until latein 1966. There were 13,000 US troopsin Thailand in March of that year. By

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,

THAILAND liWR6ENCY

the end of the year, there were approximately 35,000 men, mostly airmen belonging to the 13th US AirForce.

The US buildup in Thailand hasbeen accompanied by the improvementand construction of an entire networkof airbases, naval facilities, pipelines,roads, supply bases, and Army Iogietic installations. Communist propaganda refers to these facilities as providing the base for future US aggres

sion in Asia.Facilities

The most important of these facili.ties is the Sattabip base, on the Gulfof Siau twhose navaI and air facilities, when completed, could rival CamRanh Bay in strategic importance. TheU Tapbao airfield at Sattabip, for ex

ample, has a runway of 11,500 feetand accommodates B-52 bombers. Another important facility is the USlogistic center at Hborat, operated bythe 9th US Army Logistical Command:A multimillion-dollar strategic highway, built with US aid, now linksBangkok with Udon Thani, near theLaotian border. A huge radio communications network is under construction.

The United States has given orloaned Thailand, since World War II,approximately half a billion dollars ineconomic aid alone. The amount ofmilitary aid furnished far exceeds th]sfigure when one considers direct aid,training assistance to the Thai armedforces, and the costs incurred in theconstruction and maintenance of air,ground, and naval bases. During thelast few years, aid under the MilitaryAssistance Program has been mostlyin the form of materiel and equipmentneeded in counterinsurgency opera

tions. Military aid for Fiscal Year1967 amounts to 60 million dollare, a

50-percent increase over the Fk.calYear 1966 program.

Communist propaganda has linkedthe US counterinsurgency aid pro.tided Thailand with the so-called oppression of peasante in tbe northeast.It is true that US aid has been generously given the Thai Army and pn-Iice in the form of helicopters, river.boats with which to check infiltrationof guerrillas across the Mekong River,trucks, rifles, and artillery. However,

until November 1966, US forces hadnever been engaged, even indirectly,in counterinsurgency operations inThailand. Furthermore, US militaryadvisors assigned to the Thai Armyhave ~been kept at regimental levelsand have not been allowed to accompany their units in tbe field.

Tanrporary ArrangamantaThe US poIicy has been, and still is,

that the insurgency in Thailand, bsing rather small, can be met effectivelyby the Thais, without the active participation of US forces. Consistentwith this policy, and until such timeas Thai pilots could be trained to operate the belicoptere being fnrnishedThailand, Washington agreed in thesummer of 1966 to provide the rrecessary pilots to ferry Thai troops fromtheir assembly areas to the edge ofcounterinsurgency operational zones.The Washh@on announcement whichdetailed the action was careful tostress that this would be a temporaryarrangement and that the US helicopters and crews involved would beunarmed.

There seems little doubt that theleadership of the Thai insurgent mov~ment is aware that domestic issuesalone cannot bring success. Thailandis actually a poor prospect for a war

of national liberation. The countryhas no colonial history and enjoys a

Military REViVV34


39/116

centuries-old tradition of independence: Economically, it is prosperous,there is adequate land in relationshipto the total population, and the standards of living are comparatively high.

The people of Thailand are unitedby a common religion, and, despitethe existence of minority groups, thepopulation is ethnically homogeneous.The King and Queen ,are honored

throughout the nation and are re-garded as national symbols, even inthe most remote villages of thecountry.

Although the government, for allpractical purposes, ia authoritarian, itie run by an elite of patriotic men,both civilian and miIitary. These menare supported by an efficient civil service whose top administrators havenearly all been trained in the West.The Communist Party of Thailand has

practically no following. Its present

iegust1967

active membership is probably lessthan 1,000, and the party could notclaim more than 10,000 sympathizers.

The present government came topower without elections in 1963 afterthe death of Field Marshal SaritThanarat. But tbe vast majority ofThais do not really seem to he concerned about the legitimacy of theirgovernment. They give this govern

ment their full loyalty and support, asthe Thais always do with the govern

,ment in power.The principal figures of the preeent

government are Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, the Prime Minister,and General Praphat Charusathien,the Deputy Premier, Chief of Staff ofthe Army, and Minister of the Interior. Both men are committsd to return the nation to constitutional government through the adoption of a

new constitution, the reestablishment

I35


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41/116

The northeast has few towns, and itsroad network is very poor. More significantly, however, the area adjoinsLaos, across the Mekong River, andoffers an excellent sanctuary to theUnited Patriotic Front.

Economically, the northeast is theleast developed part of Thailand and,until recently, her most neglected. The

siderable political vacuum in the area.Resentment and distrust toward thegovernment are strong, a normalaftereffect of centurtes of political isolation of the area from Bangkok whenhighhanded policemen and tax collectors were the only visible organs ofthe government.

The area is inhabited by Thai-Lao

A ,?I w N e w. F..t~,.8The US buiIdup in Thailand has been accompanied by tbe improvement and construction

of many roads and bridges

area has no wealth-giving resources,its soils are poor, and it euffers regularly from seasonal water shortages.The annual income of the peasants inthe area is one-half that of the restof the country.

The northeast also has political andsociological vulnerabilities. Despite recent efforts on the part of the government to close the gap between iteelf

and the people, there still exists a con-Amaf 1967

who, although ethnically a branch pfthe Thai people, are related culturallyand maintain close family ties withthe inhabitants of western Laos. TheThai-Lao speak a different dialectfrom the one spoken in central Thailand. Although the basic loyalties ofthese people should not be questioned,many of them are known to be sympathetic to the Pathet Lao Communists.

There is in northeastern Thailand,

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THAlfANil INSURGENCY

,..>..-~L,.. CHINA I

= -mm OFRIASMmmlmrunr I+ W m w m r r mrsrwwnnouns

however, a second popubition groupwhich is clearly Communiet orientedand sympathetic to Hanoi. These arethe 35,oOO or so Vietnamese refugeeswhohave heen living in the area eince1947 when they left North Vietnamto avoid being caught in tbe fightingbetween the French and Vietminhforces. The Vietnamese are devotedfollowers of Ho Chi-minb and appearto be responding to the direction andleadership of Hanoi and Peking.

The Communiet stronghold in thenortheast is in the area between thePhu-Pan Highlande and the Laotianborder. This is ideal ambush eountry,reminiscent of the CentraI Highlandsof Vietnam. The area is thinly poPulated, its jungles, caves, and forestsoffering abundant hideouts to a guerrilla force. It is not the first time inThai history that this area is beingused as abase for insurgency. DuringWorld War II, the so-called Free Thaisoperated out of here against the Japanese occupation forces.

Impact of InsurgencyIt is extremely difficult to establish

a clear estimate of the insurgency inthe Phu-Pan area and of its potential

threat to tbe northeaet. Alarming reports have heen received, however,from many reporters in the area. Theiralarm is not so much of the militarythreat posed by the 1,500 or so armedinsurgents of the Peoples ArmedForces (PAF), but of the apparent

effects that the insurgency is havingon the peasants of the area. From allindications, theee peasants have received a good dose of terror, and manyappear to be makinga cboicein favorof the insurgence based on fear alone.

Prior to 1966, the PAF seldom ventured outside its hideout except whenfully unopposed and for purposes of

EsEl recruiting new members and obtah

. Mlliiary Review


43/116

THAILAND INSURGENC

ing food supplies. The year 1966, however, witnessed open militancy on thepart of the organization. There wereaPPrOxlmately 100 incidents of insur.gency during that year, ranging from

; assassinations of local officials to hit-and-run raids on small, isolated Thaipolice units.

The raids are of special concern because they tend to undermine the confidence of the peasants in the abilityof the government to defend them.

Further, they offer the insurgents asource for acqniring much-neededweapons and supplies. According tothe clandestine Free Thailand Radio,the PAF engaged the police and armyduring 1966 in 120 battles, killingand wounding 300 enemy troops.

Winning Minds

The greatest success of the PAF todate has been in winning the mindsof men in the countryside through theadoption of the terror tactics employedby the Viet Cong in South Vietnam.The PAFs chief adversaries are thepoliceman, the tax collector, the village headman, and the teacher. Itsweapons are political indoctrination,extortion, and murder.

A common tactic of the PAF is toenter a village, when the poIice are absent, and to address the peasants inemotional terms. Then, the audienceie requested to respond with rice,clothing, or other supplies requiredby the insurgents. Those peasants not

able to provide material goods areasked to join the movement, either asactive members of the PAF or as informers in the intelligence apparatus. Peasants not choosing to cooperate are characterized as police informers or collaborators of theAmericans. By all indications, thedaily incursions by PAF insurgentsinto the villages are gradually bring

ing some of the peasants of the northeast into submission.

The majority of the PAF insurgentsare apparently being trained in NorthVietnam and infiltrate into Thailandacross Laos and the Mekong River.They are organized and opsrate insmall bands perhaps no more than 20men each. While food and clothingare obtained locally, the insurgentsrely on weapons and medicines fromHanoi. Their weapons are of great

varietysome are Red Chinese, othersof Eastern European origin, and evensome US weapons have been reported.The latter were probably capturedfrom Vietnamese forces in Vietnamor were obtained in Laos. In thenortheast, the leader of the insurgenceis Yot T Sawat, a 50-year-old formermanager of a sugarcane cooperate.

Minority GroupsThe second area of insurgency is in

the southernmost part of tbe Isthmusof Kra near tbe Thai-Malaysian bor.der. This is a much smaller area thantbe northeast, but equally isolatedpolitically and geographically fromBangkok. Here, the United PatrioticFront is exploiting the strong discontent of a minority group and tbe remnants of the Malaya guerrilla move

ment of the 1950s. The threat in thisarea, however, is much smaller thanin the northeast. The area lacks asuitable sanctuary where the Communists can raise, train, and equip ,a

large insurgent force.The dissident minority group con

sists of the one-million-strong ThaiMoslems who harbor separatist sentiments and feel etrong affinity for Malaysia. The Thai Moslems do not mixwith the Buddhists and consider themselves an underprivileged majoritygoverned by a privileged few. Theyreceive substantial support from the

] AIISSSS1967Ii 39


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THAILAND INSURGENCY

C)verseas Chinese of Thailand who, al-though inhabiting areas farther to thenorth, are likewise Malaysian oriented.

The second minority group in the

area consiata of the remnants of theguerrilla force (500 to 1,000 strong)which was defeated in 1959 by theBritish in Malaya. Led by the ChineseCommunist, Chin Peng, this force iaoperating out of the jungles and sandylowlands of the Isthmus of Kra.

Until 1965, the counterinsurgency

efforts of the goverriment were conducted mainly by the Thai police. InNovember 1965, however, Thai Armyunits of battalion strength were assigned to reinforce the police.

The Thai armed forces consist ofaPPrOximateb 125,000 men with 84,000 army, 18,000 navy, 20,000 airforce, and 3,000 marines.

With US aid, the national counterinsurgency apparatus is being substantially strengthened, and the government is optimistic about the finaloutcome. The border police and provincial police forces have recently beenstrengthened by a Village DefenseCorps of 25,000 to act as a militia andto provide backup for the poIiee.

Army counterinsurgency unita, similar to the US Special Forces, havebeen trained and are being assignedto sensitive areas to seek out the insurgents before they can become established. Finally, the intelligence andcounterintelligence organizations have

been strengthened.The government of Thailand is not

relying on military action alone. Withsupport and encouragement from tbeUnited States, it has initiated a civicaction program to eliminate the vulnerabilities of the northeast thronghearly development of the political in.

frastructure and aggressive economicand skial reform.

To date, the efforts to close the political gap between government andpeasant have been less successful thanthe economic development of the area.

Irrigation networks and roads havebeen built, school buildings have beenconstructed, and medical aid hasbeen dispensed at a rate never knownheretofore. A program of rural electri.fication bas begun, and water is beingpumped for the first time in manyhomes of the northeast.

The civic action program is beingconducted by Accelerated Rural Development Teams which are continuingtbe efforts begun in 1960 by the Mobile Developmen

Military Review August 1967

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Transcript of Military Review August 1967