case digests involving the executive department

7/22/2019 case digests involving the executive department

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Executive Departmen

Philippine Bar Association v COMELEC, 140 SCRA 455

The validity of the "Snap Election Law" called by the Batasang Pambansa was raised in the case of Philippine Bar Association v COMELEC, 140 SCRA

455 (1985). The issue was raised because of the conditional letter of resignation sent by Mr. Marcos to the Batasan, making his resignation

effective only upon (i) the holding of a Presidential election, (ii) the proclamation of a winner, (iii) the assumption into office by the winning

candidate. It was contended that a conditional resignation was not allowed under the 1973 Constitution, for it did not create a vacancy, and

without a vacancy, there was no reason to call for an election.

But the SC failed to issue a preliminary injunction to enjoin the COMELEC from preparing for the election, thus making "the initially legal question

into a political one." In the meantime, the political parties have started campaigning and the people were so involved in the election that to stop it

on legal grounds would frustrate their very will. And so, failing to come up with the majority to hold the Snap Election Law unconstitutional, the SC

could not issue the injunction prayed for. The election went ahead.

Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317

In Civil Liberties Union vs Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317, the petitioner challenged Ex. Order No. 284 which in effect allowed Cabinet members,

their undersecretaries and asst. secretaries and other appointive officials of the Executive Department to hold other positions in the govt., albeit,

subject of the limitations imposed therein.

The respondents, in refuting the petitioners' argument that the measure was violative of Art. VIII, Sec. 13, invoked Art. IX-B, Sec. 7, allowing the

holding of multiple positions by the appointive official if allowed by law or by the pressing functions of his positions. In declaring the EO

unconstitutional, the SC held that by ostensibly restricting the no. of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or asst. s ecretaries may

hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the govt. and GOCCs, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices

or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Art. VIII, Sec. 13 prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in

the 1987 Constitution itself.

Facts: The petitioner challenged Ex. Order No. 284 which in effect allowed Cabinet members, their undersecretaries and asst. secretaries and otherappointive officials of the Executive Department to hold other positions in the govt., albeit, subject of the limitations imposed therein. The

respondents, in refuting the petitioners' argument that the measure was violative of Art. VIII, Sec. 13, invoked Art. IX-B, Sec. 7, allowing the holding

of multiple positions by the appointive official if allowed by law or by the pressing functions of his positions.

HELD: By ostensibly restricting the no. of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or asst. secretaries may hold in addition to their

primary position to not more than 2 positions in the govt. and GOOCs, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct

contravention of the express mandate of Art. VIII, Sec. 13 prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself

If maximum benefits are to be derived from a dept. head's ability and expertise, he should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities

without the distraction of other govt. offices or employment.

Marcos v Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668, 178 SCRA 760

This is a petition for mandamus asking the Court to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and his immediate family and

to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. The issue is whether or not, in the exercise of

executive power, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.The Constitution provides that the executive power shall be vested in the President (Art. VII, Sec. 1). However, it does not define what is meant by

"executive power" although in the same article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e. the power of control over all

executive depts., bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the commander in chief clause, the

power to grant reprieves, commutations, pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or

guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the power to submit the budget to congress and the power

to address Congress. (VII, Sec. 14-23) The inevitable question is whether by enumerating certain powers of the President, did the framers of the

Constitution intend that the President shall exercise those specific powers and no other?

According to the SC, that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact

what is traditionally considered as within the scope of executive power. Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only

to the specific power enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.

In this case, the President has the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. She has the obligation to protect the people,

promote their welfare and advance the national interest. She has to balance the general welfare and the common good against the exercise ofrights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the

duty of the President, as steward of the people.

Free Telephone Workers Union v Minister of Labor, 108 SCRA 757

Free Telephone Workers Union vs Minister of Labor (108 SCRA 757) had occasion to reemphasize its continuing validity. Here, the power given to

the Minister of Labor to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute affecting the national interest or to certify it for compulsory arbitration was

challenged as an undue delegation of a power which properly belonged to the President. All that was needed to settle the case was to hark back to

the Villena doctrine that the heads of ministries are alter egos of the President. Under the presidential system, all executive and administrative

organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief

Executive and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the

situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed and

promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief


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Executive. Each head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required

by law to exercise authority. The President has the constitutional power of control and direction over such dept. heads and cabinet secretaries.

Under the qualified political agency doctrine, the different executive departments are mere adjuncts of the President. The secretaries are the alter

ego of the President, men of his bosom confidence whom he designated to assist him in his otherwise physically impossible multifarious functions,

the extension of the President in the particular field in which they act. Their acts are presumptively acts of the "President, until countermanded or

reprobated by him". The President can substitute his will over those of the secretaries, and they cannot complain.

Laurel v Garcia, 187 SCRA 797

The subject Roppongi property is one of the four properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement

entered into with Japan on 9 May 1956, the other lots being the Nampeidai Property (site of Philippine Embassy Chancery), the Kobe Commercia

Property (Commercial lot used as warehouse and parking lot of consulate staff), and the Kobe Residential Property (a vacant residential lot). The

properties and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese government for national development projects are part of the

indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property and their suffering during World War II.

The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government through Reparations Contract. The Roponggi property consists of the land and

building "for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy." As intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to

Nampeidai on 22 July 1976 when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. Due to the failure of our government to provide necessary funds,

the Roppongi property has remained undeveloped since that time.

During the incumbency of President Aquino, a proposal was made by former Philippine Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to lease the subjec

property to Kajima Corporation, a Japanese firm, in exchange of the construction of 2 buildings in Roppongi, 1 building in Nampeidai, and the

renovation of the Philippine Chancery in Nampeidai. The President issued EO 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of reparations

capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition. Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of the government

has been pushing, with great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot.

ISSUE

1. Whether or not the Roppongi property and others of its kind can be alienated by the Philippine government.2. Whether there was a conflict of law between the Japanese law on property (as the real property is situated there) and Philippine law.

RULING

1. No. The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of the ReparationsAgreement and the corresponding contract of procurement which bind both the Philippine government and the Japanese government

There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion and is outside the commerce of man. And the property continues to be part of the

public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to

withdraw it from being such.

It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyances must be

authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence.

2. No. A conflict of law rule cannot apply when no conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) there is adispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables, the formalities ofconveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined; and

(2) a foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need

to determine which law should apply. In the present case, none of the above elements exists.

Sarmiento v Mison, 156 SCRA 546

Sarmiento v Mison (Dec. 1987), the SC held that no they did not need to be confirmed. The deliberations of the Con Con showed that a draft simila

to VII, 10 of the 1935 Constitution, which included bureau heads in the list of appointees requiring confirmation, was introduced, but upon motion,

bureau directors were omitted expressly from the draft because they were considered of low rank, and so were thought to be better shielded

from partisan politics. But the SC added that of the 4 categories of public officers requiring confirmation, the 4th must be given a restrictive

construction because confirmation derogates the appointing power of the President. Indeed, it said, only a small class of officers needed

confirmation.

In saying so, however, it did not try to explain certain anomalies that may arise from such restrictive interpretation: (a) If a colonel needed

confirmation, why not the Undersecretary of National Defense who has a higher rank as line officer? (b) If an ambassador needed confirmation,why not the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs who has a higher rank? (c) Why not the CB governor who is so powerful as to plunge the country

into bankruptcy?

Bautista v Salonga, 172 SCRA 160

F: Petitioner was appointed Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights on 12/17/88. She took her oath of office on 12/22 and thereafter

entered into the discharge of her functions and duties. However, on 1/9/89, she was asked by the Commission on Appointments to submit certain

information and documents needed in the confirmation of her appointment. She refused to do so on the ground that her appointment was not

subject to confirmation. On 1/14/89, the Pres. submitted petitioner's ad interim appointment to the CA, but, considering petitioner's refusal to

submit to the jurisdiction of the CA, the CA disapproved her appointment on 1/25. Petitioner, anticipating the action of the CA, filed a petition for

certiorari w/ the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment by the President of the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) is to be made with or withou

CA confirmation.


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HELD: (1) Only those appointments expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII are to be reviewed by the CA, namely, "the heads

of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, other officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or nava

captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution." All other appointments by the Pres. are to be made w/o

the participation of the CA." Since the position of Chairman of the CHR, an independent office created by the Constitution, is not among the

positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII, appointments to which are to be made with the confirmation of the CA, it follows that

the appointment by the President of the Chairman of the CHR is to be made without the review or participation of the CA. They are among the

officers of the govt "whom he (the Pres.) may be authorized by law to appoint." And Sec. 2 (c) of EO 163, May 5, 1987, authorizes the Pres. to

appoint the Chairman and Members of the CHR.

Quintos-Deles v CA, 177 SCRA 259

F: Petitioner and 3 others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by the President pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, par. 2 and Article XVIII,

Section 7 of the Constitution. However, petitioner and the 3 other sectoral representatives- appointees were not able to take their oaths and

discharge their duties as members of Congress due to the opposition of some congressmen-members of the Commission on Appointments (CA),

who insisted that sectoral representatives must first be confirmed by the CA before they can take their oaths and/or assume office as members of

the House of Representatives.

ISSUE: Whether the Constitution requires confirmation by the CA in the appointment of sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives.

HELD: YES. Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides that: "The president shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on

Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces

from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution x x x".

Calderon v Carale, 208 SCRA 254

F: In March 1989, RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law), amending the Labor Code, was approved. It provides in Sec. 13 thereof as follows:

The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners shall be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the

CA. xxx"Pursuant to said law, President Aquino appointed the Chairman (B. CARALE) and Commissioners of the NLRC. The appointments stated that the

appointees may qualify and enter upon the performances of the duties of the office. The present petition for prohibition questions the

constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments extended by the President to the respondents Chairman and Members of the NLRC,

without submitting the same to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by RA 6715

Petitioners insists on a mandatory compliance w/ RA 6715 which has in its favor the presumption of validity. RA 6715 is not, according to the

petitioner, an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive contained in Sec. 16 of Art. VII of the Constitution. The Solicitor General

contends, on the other hand, that RA 6715 transgresses Sec. 16, Art. VII by expanding the confirmation powers of the Commission on

Appointments without constitutional basis.

ISSUES: (1) W/N Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of appointments extended by the President to

government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution. (NO)

HELD: The controversy in the case is focused on Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution w/c provides: "Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and,

with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministersand consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in

this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those

whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President

alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards." xxx There are four groups of officers whom the

President shall appoint. These four groups are:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the

rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

The second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII refers to all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law

and those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the secondsentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII, more specifically under "those whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint." Undeniably, the

Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16 whose appointments requires

confirmation by the CA.

To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the CA of the appointments of respondents Chairman and Members of the NLRC, it is

unconstitutional because:

1. it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation by

the CA; and 2. it amends by legislation, the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII, by imposing the confirmation of the CA on appointments w/c

are otherwise entrusted only with the President.

Deciding on what laws to pass is a legislative prerogative. Determining their constitutionality is a judicial function.

Supreme Court decisions applying or interpreting the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. No doctrine or principle of

law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc.


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Aytona v Castillo, 4 SCRA 1 (1962)

In Aytona v Castillo, 4 SCRA 1 (1962), the SC ruled that while "midnight appointments" are not il legal, they should be made in the capacity of a

"care-taker" doubly careful and prudent in making the selection, so as not to defeat the policies of the incoming administration. Said the court:

After the proclamation of an incoming President, the outgoing President is no more than a "caretaker" administrator duty bound to prepare for

the orderly transition to the new President, and he should not do acts that would obstruct the policies of his successor.

The filling up of vacancies in important posts, if few, and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of

the need for the appointment and the appointees qualifications, may be undoubtedly permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments in one

night, and the planned induction of almost all of them a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may be regarded as abuse of

presidential prerogatives.

Where the President makes ad-interim (i.e., midnight) appointments, he is bound to be "prudent" to insure approval of his selection, either by

previous consultation with the CA or by explaining his reason thereafter. Where the CA that will consider the appointees is different from that

existing at the time of appointment, and where the names are to be submitted by his successor who may not wholly approve of his selections, the

President should be "doubly careful in extending such appointment.

Jorge v Mayer, 10 SCRA 331 (1964)

In Jorge v Mayer, 10 SCRA 331 (1964), the Court emphasized the rule in Aytona that a prudently made midnight appointment so spaced as to afford

some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointees' qualifications is not prohibited

by law. The circumstances of Jorge's appointment as Director of Lands in this case, based on his 38 years of faithful service and confirmed by the

CA before its adjournment, were found to be judicious.

People v Vera, 65 Phil 56 (1937)

Petitioners, People of the Philippines and Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party

and Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the criminal case. Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of the

Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard the application of Cu Unjieng for probation. HSBC intervened in the case as private prosecutor. After aprotracted trial, the Court of First Instance rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 years

and 2 months of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the offended party, HSBC.

Upon appeal, the court, on 26 March 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from 5 years and 6 months of prision

correccional to 7 years, 6 months and 27 days of prision mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Cu Unjieng filed a motion for

reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial which were denied on 17 December 1935, and final judgment was accordingly entered

on 18 December 1935. Cu Unjieng thereupon sought to have the case elevated on certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States but the

latter denied the petition for certiorari in November, 1936. The Supreme Court, on 24 November 1936, denied the petition subsequently filed by

Cu Unjieng for leave to file a second alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for

execution of the judgment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the People of the Philippines is a proper party in this case.

HELD:YES. The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in the present

proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the

case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really

violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set

aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law

by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws.

Tesoro v Director of Prisons, 68 Phil 154 (1939)

In Tesoro v Director of Prisons, 68 Phil 154 (1939), the SC dismissed the contention that because parole is not mentioned in the Constitution, then

the power to grant parole is also deemed repealed. The Court said that parole is part of the pardoning power of the President. Justice Fernando

points out, however, that this is not accurate. If ever the President has the power to grant parole, it is because the law grants him that power, and

not because parole is part of pardon.

F: On Oct. 10, 1934, petitioner Tesoro was convicted in the CFI- Manila of the crime of falsification of a public document and was sentenced. His

penalty was to expire on Oct. 28, 1937. On Nov. 14, 1935, the Gov. Gen. granted the petitioner a parole, which the latter accepted, subject to

certain conditions. One of the conditions was that he will not commit any other crime and will conduct himself in an orderly manner. Dec. 3, 1937,

the petr was charged with the crime of adultery. However, the case was dismissed for non-appearance of the complainant, Jose Nagar. Feb. 1938,

Nagar lodged a complaint with the Board of Indeterminate Sentence, and upon the same facts supporting the crim. action, charged petitioner with

violation of the conditions of his parole. Later, by virtue of an order from the President, the petr was arrested and recommitted to the custody of

the Dir. of Prisons. Petr. contends that sec. 64 (i) of the Rev. Adm. Code, insofar as it confers upon the Chief Executive the power to grant and

revoke paroles, has been impliedly repealed by Par. 6, sec. 11, Art. VII of the Constitution, as the latter omitted to specify such power in connection

with the powers granted therein to the President of the Philippines.

Sec. 64(1) gives the Gov. Gen the ff. powers and duties:


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"To grant to convicted persons reprieves or pardons, either plenary or partial, conditional or unconditional; to suspend sentences without pardon,

remit fines, and order the discharge of any convicted person upon parole, subject to such conditions as he may impose; and to authorize the arrest

and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions, of his pardon, parole, or

suspension of sentence."

The aforementioned Constitutional provision provides:

"The President shall have the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all

offenses, except in cases of impeachment, upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper to impose. He

shall have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of the National Assembly."

ISSUE NO. 1: W/N there has been a repeal.

HELD: NONE. The power to pardon given the President by the Constitution, "upon such conditions and with such restrictions and l imitations as he

may deem proper to impose," includes the power to grant and revoke paroles. If the omission of the power of parole in the Constitution is to be

construed as a denial thereof to the President, the effect would be to discharge unconditionally parolees, who, before the adoption of the

Constitution, have been released conditionally by the Chief Executive. ISSUE NO. 2: W/N the Board has legal authority to investigate the conduc

of the petitioner.

HELD: YES. By the terms of his parole, petitioner agreed to report to the executive secretary of the Board once a month during the first year of his

parole, and thereafter, once every 3 months. By his consent to this condition, petitioner has placed himself under the supervision of the Board. The

duty to report on the part of the petitioner implies a corresponding power on the part of the Board to inquire into his conduct and a fortiori to

make recommendations to the President by whose authority it was acting. The power to revoke paroles necessarily carries with it the power to

investigate and to inquire into the conduct of the parolees, if such power of revocation is to be rational and intelligent. In the exercise of this

incidental power, the President is not precluded by law or by the Constitution from making use of any agency of the govt, or even of any individual,

to secure the necessary assistance.

ISSUE NO. 3: W/N judicial pronouncement to the effect that he has committed a crime is necessary before he can be properly adjudged as havingviolated his conditional parole.

HELD: NO. As one of the conditions of his parole, petitioner agreed that he will not commit any other crime and will conduct himself in an orderly

manner. Thus, the mere commission, not his conviction by court, of any other crime, that was necessary in order that petitioner may be deemed to

have violated his parole. And under Sec. 64 (i), the Chief Executive is authorized to order "the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who,

in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition/s of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence.

ISSUE NO. 4: W/N the courts can review the findings of the Pres. regarding the violation of the conditional parole.

HELD: NO. Where the determination of the violation of the conditional parole rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive, the

courts will not interfere, by way of review, with any of his f indings.

ISSUE NO. 5: W/N upon the expiration of his maximum term of imprisonment, his conditional parole also expires.

HELD: NO. When a conditional pardon is violated, the prisoner is placed in the same state in w/c he was at the time the pardon was granted. He

may be rearrested and recommitted to prison. xxx The rule is well-settled that, in requiring the convict to undergo so much of the punishment

imposed by his original sentence as he had not suffered at the time of his release, the court should not consider the time during which the convictwas at large by virtue of the pardon as time served on the original sentence. (Pp. v. Tapel) This rule applies by analogy to conditional parole.

Torres v Gonzales, 152 SCRA 272

Before 1979, Torres was convicted of the crime of estafa (2 counts) and was sentenced to imprisonment and to pay an indemnity. The maximum

sentence would expire on Nov. 2, 2000. On April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted the petitioner by the President on condition that

petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Phil. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner

prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was released.

On Sept. 8, 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner upon recommendation of the Board of Pardons. The record

before the Board showed that petitioner had been charged with 20 counts of estafa, convicted of sedition w/c is the subject of an appeal, and a

letter report from the NBI showing a long list of charges brought against the petitioner. The petitioner was subsequently arrested and confined in

Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence.

Petitioner claims he did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment of the 20 counts of estafa nor of the

crime of sedition. He also contends that he was not given an opportunity to be heard before he was arrested and recommitted to prison and thusdeprived of due process.

ISSUE: W/N conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for

violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.

HELD: NO. The Court cited 3 cases: Espuelas v. Prov'l Warden of Bohol; Tesoro v. Dir. of Prisons and Sales v. Dir. of Prisons.

The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to

judicial scrutiny.

The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely

executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Sec. 64 (i) of the Rev. Adm. Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction

of violation of a conditional pardon under Art. 159 of the RPC. Where the President opts to proceed under Sec. 64 (i), RAC, no judicial

pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may

be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.


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Barrioquinto, et.al v. Fernandez, 82 Phil 642

Petitioners Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged with murder. Jimenez was sentenced to life imprisonment. Before the period for perfecting an

appeal had expired, Jimenez became aware of Procl. No. 8 which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized

under the RPC in furtherance of resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and committed during the

period Dec. 8, 1941 to the date when each particular area of the Phil. where the offense was actually committed was liberated from enemy control

and occupation. The petitioners submitted their cases to the Guerrilla Amnesty Commission (GAC). The GAC returned their cases to the CFI-

Zamboanga w/o deciding whether or not they are entitled to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, on the ground that inasmuch as neither of

the petitioners have admitted to committing the offense, they cannot invoke the benefits of the amnesty.

HELD: Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because

the courts take no notice thereof; while Amnesty is by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act

of which the courts should take judicial notice.

Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while Amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses,

generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.

Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or

forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does "not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless

such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon," and it "in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity

imposed upon him by the sentence" (Art 36 RPC). While Amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so

overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he

had committed no offense.

ISSUE: W/N in order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Procl. of Sept. 7, 1946, it is necessary as a condition precedent that he

should admit having committed the criminal act with w/c he is charged and allege the amnesty as a defense.

HELD: NO. It is sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant or of the accused, shows that the offense committed comes w/n the terms ofsaid Amnesty Procl. It is not correct to say that "invocation of the benefits of the amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and

avoidance. Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or the Amnesty Commissions

entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. For, w/n he admits or confesses having committed the offense w/ w/c he is charged, the Commissions

should, if necessary or requested by the interested party, conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the accused,

on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy,

and decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to be "regarded as a patriot or hero who has rendered invaluable services to the

nation," or not, in accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation.

ISSUE: W/N the benefits of amnesty may be waived.

HELD: The right to the benefits of amnesty, once established by the evidence presented, either by the prosecution or the defense, cannot be

waived, because it is of public interest that a person who is regarded by the Amnesty Proclamation, which has the force of law, not only as

innocent, for he stands in the eyes of the law as if he had never committed any punishable offense because of the amnesty, but as a patriot or

hero, cannot be punished as a criminal.Dissenting Opinion:

Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime. When an accused says that he has not committed a crime, he cannot have any use for amnesty.

It is also self-evident that where the Amnesty Proclamation imposes certain conditions, as in this case, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove

the existence of those conditions. A petition for amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance. The pleader has to confess the

allegations against him before he is allowed to set out such facts as, if true, would defeat the action.

Cristobal v. Labrador, 71 Phil 34 (1940)

In Cristobal v Labrador, 71 Phil 34 (1940), the voter whose right to vote was challenged in an exclusion proceeding because he had been convicted

of estafa which carried the accessory penalty of disqualification from the right of suffrage, and in Pellobello v Palatino, 72 Phil 441 (1941), the

mayor-elect who was not allowed to take his oath because of a previous conviction, for falsification of a private document which likewise carried

the accessory penalty of disqualification, were both allowed to exercise their political right in view of the subsequent pardon granted them. [There

would be no problem if they were pardoned beforehand, for then they would be restored to their political right(s) right away.]

On 3/15/30, Teofilo Santos was found guilty of estafa and sentenced to 6 months of arresto mayor. Upon appeal, his conviction was affirmed. Hewas confined in jail from 3/14/9/32 to 8/18/32. Notwithstanding his conviction, Santos continued to be a registered elector in Malabon, Rizal and

was municipal pres. from 1934 to 1937. Subsequently, The Election Code was approved. Sec. 94, par. (b) of said law disqualifies the resp. from

voting for having been declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against prop." Bec. of this provision, Santos petitioned the Chief Executive for

absolute pardon. The Pres. granted his petition restoring him to his "full civil and political rights, except that with respect to the right to hold public

office or employment, he will be appointed for appointments only to positions w/c are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or prop

responsibility. On 11/40, Cristobal filed a petition for the exclusion of Santos' name in from the list of voters in Malabon on the ground that the

latter is disqualified under par. (b), Sec. 94 of CA 357. LC denied Cristobal's petition holding that Santos' pardon had the effect of excluding him

from the disqualification created by par. (b) of Sec. 94. Hence, this petition for ceritorari.

HELD: There are 2 limitations upon the exercise of the constitutional prerogative of the Pres. to grant pardon: (1) that the power be exercised

after conviction; (2) that such power does not extend to cases of impeachment. xxx An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed

but it also removes all disabilities resulting from conviction. In the present case, the disability is the result of conviction w/o w/c there would be no


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basis for the disqualification from voting. xxx In the present case, while the pardon extended is conditional in the sense that "he will be eligible

for appointment only to positions w/c are clerical or manual in nature involving no money or prop. resp., " it is absolute insofar as it "restores the

resp. to full civil and political rights."

Pellobello v Palatino, 72 Phil 441

Pelobello alleges that Palatino is disqualified from voting and being voted upon. It appears that Palatino was convicted by final judgment in 1912 of

atentado contra la autoridad y sus agentes and sentenced to imprisonment. He was later elected mayor of Torrijos, Marinduque in 1940. It is

admitted that Palatino was granted by the Gov. Gen. a conditional pardon in 1915. It is also proven that on Dec. 25, 1940, the President granted

him absolute pardon and restored him to the enjoyment of full civil and political rights.

ISSUE: W/N the absolute pardon had the effect of removing the disqualification incident to criminal conviction under the then Election Code, the

pardon having been granted after the election but before the date fixed by law for assuming office.

HELD: YES. The SC adopts the broad view in Cristobal v. Labrador that subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power

cannot be restricted or controlled by legislation; an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting

from the conviction; and that when granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the

consequences of conviction. Thus the better view is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of the Chief Executive who, after inquiry into

the environmental facts, should be at liberty to atone the rigidity of law to the extent of relieving completely the party or parties concerned from

the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal conviction.

Under the circumstances of the case, it is evident that the purpose in granting him absolute pardon was to enable him to assume the position in

deference to the popular will; and the pardon was thus extended after the election but before the date fixed by the Election Code for assuming

office.

Lacuna v Abes, 24 SCRA 780

In Lacuna v Abes, 24 SCRA 780, the petitioner was convicted of counterfeiting, and so was disqualified from the right of suffrage. As a result, he

was not allowed to file his candidacy, even if he was already granted pardon, because one of the requirements for the office was that the candidatebe a qualified voter. The SC, after pointing out that the law did not require that he be a registered voter but only a qualified voter at the day of

election, pointed out that, granting arguendo, pardon retroacted to the day of the crime. Thus, on the day of the election, "it is as though he was a

registered voter even if on that day, he was not yet pardoned."

Mayor-elect Abes had been convicted of the crime of counterfeiting treasury warrants and sentenced to prision mayor and a fine. After he had

partially served his sentence, he was released on April 7, 1959 by virtue of a conditional pardon granted by the President, remitting only the

unexpired portion of the prison term and fine. Without the pardon, his maximum sentence would have been served on Oct. 13, 1961. With the

approach of the 1967 elections, Abes applied for registration as a voter but said application was denied. Despite this, Abes fi led his certificate of

candidacy for the office of mayor and later won. On Nov. 16, 1967, he was proclaimed the fully elected mayor. Lacuna placed second. Lacuna filed

his petition for quo warranto with prelim. injunction in CFI-Nueva Ecija. On the same day that the hearing was held on the application for prelim.

injunction, the President granted Abes an absolute and unconditional pardon and restored to him full civil and political rights. CFI dismissed the

petition, declaring Abes' eligibility to the position of mayor. Lacuna contends that the restoration of Abes' civil and pol. rights did not retroact to

remove the disqualification existing anterior to the grant of the pardon.ISSUE: W/N a plenary pardon, granted after election but before the date fixed by law for assuming office, had the effect of removing the

disqualifications prescribed by both the criminal and electoral codes.

HELD: YES. The view consistently adopted in this jurisdiction is that the pardon's effects should not be unnecessarily limited as it would lead to the

impairment of the pardoning power, which was not contemplated in the Constitution (Cristobal v. Labrador; Pelobello v. Palatino; Mijares v.

Custorio).

Monsanto v Factoran, 170 SCRA 190

In Monsanto vs Factoran, 170 SCRA 190, where a woman who was convicted of estafa through falsification of public documents was granted an

absolute pardon, and thereafter claimed she was entitled as a consequence to reinstatement as assistant city treasurer, the SC held that a pardon

cannot mask the acts constituting the crime. These are "historical facts" which, despite the public manifestation of mercy and forgiveness implicit

in pardon, "ordinary, prudent men will take into account in their subsequent dealings with the actor." Pardon granted after conviction frees the

individual from all penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence, it

cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. This must be constantly kept in mind, lest we lose track of the truecharacter and purpose of the privilege. Thus, pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or

forfeited by reason of the conviction, although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office.

A Pardoned Convict is not Entitled to Reinstatement to a Public Office.

F: Petitioner Salvacion Monsanto was Asst. Treasurer of Calbayog City. She was convicted of estafa thru falsification of public documents and

sentenced to 4 yrs., 2 mos. and 1 day of prision correcional, as minimum, to 10 yrs. and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum; to pay fine (P3,500)

and to indemnify the govt (P4,892.50) in a decision of the SB. While her case was pending appeal in the SC, she was granted absolute pardon and

"restored to full civil and political rights" by then Pres. Marcos. The Ministry of Finance agreed to reinstate her w/o necessity of a new

appointment provided this was done not earlier than the date of her pardon. However, on 4/15/86, the new administration held that she was not

entitled to automatic reinstatement on the basis of the pardon granted her. As her MFR was denied, petitioner brought this action to the SC.

Petitioner's theory is that the gen. rule on pardon does not apply to her bec. she was extended clemency while her case was still pending in the SC.

She contended that w/o final judgment on conviction, the accessory penalty of forfeiture of office did not attach.


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HELD: (1) Petitioner was granted pardon under the 1973 Consti., as amended, w/c, by deleting the requirement that pardon could be granted only

after final conviction, impliedly authorized it to be granted even before conviction. The 1987 Consti. reverted to the former rule, requiring final

conviction as a condition for the grant by the Pres. of pardon. However, it is immaterial when the pardon was granted, for the result would be the

same. By accepting the pardon, the petitioner is deemed to have abondoned her appeal, w/ the result that the judgment of conviction of the SB

(w/c entailed her temporary absolute disqualification from holding public office) became final.

(2) The modern trend of authorities reject the unduly broad language of Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (1867) to the effect that in the eyes of the

law, the offender who is pardoned is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. While we are prepared to concede that pardon may

remit all the penal consequences of a criminal indictment if only to give meaning to the fiat that a pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should

not be circumscribed by legislative action, we do not subscribe to the view that pardon blots out the guilt of an individual and that once he is

absolved, he should be treated as if he were innocent. For whatever may have been the judicial dicta in the past, we cannot perceive how pardon

can produce such "moral changes" as to equate a pardoned convict in character and conduct w/ one who has constantly maintained the mark of a

good, law-abiding citizen. Accordingly, pardon does not ipso facto restore him to public office may have been forfeited by reason of the conviction

although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office. Petitioner may apply for reappointment but, in

considering her qualifications, the facts constituting her conviction should be taken into account to determine whether she can again be entrusted

w/ public funds.

(3) Nor can petitioner be exempted from the payment of the civil indemnity. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, if for any reason the

sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. VV.

Notes on the case: "Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil

rights. But unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence (w/c is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair

dealing. This must be constantly kept in mind lest we lose track of the true character and purpose of the privilege. xxx"

Llamas v Executive Secretary, 202 SCRA 844 (1991)

"Conviction" may be used in either a criminal case or in an administrative case.F: Pet. Llamas was Vice-Gov. of Tarlac who assumed the position of gov. when Gov. Ocampo was found guilty by DILG of a viol. of RA 3019 and

meted a penalty of 90 days suspension. Administrative conviction was based on complaint filed by petitioners and others charging Ocampo w/

executing loan agreement w/ Lingkod Tarlac Foundation for the amount of P20M, w/c is a non-stock and non-profit org. headed by the gov. as

chairman and his brother-in- law as executive director, trustee and secretary. Loan was claimed to be disadvantageous to the govt. MFR by

Ocampo was denied by DILG. On 3/19/91, Ocampo issued "admin. order" wherein he signified intention to continue in office at his residence in the

belief that pendency of appeal to the Exec. Sec. precluded finality as executory of the DILG order. W/o ruling on the MFR, the Exec. Sec. issued a

resolution granting executive clemency to Ocampo. Llamas filed petition claiming that executive clemency could only be granted by the Pres. in

crim. cases, not in admin. cases.

HELD: According to petitioner, "after conviction by final judgment" applies solely to crim. cases." But, he himself describes the governor as one

"convicted in an admin. case" and thus actually concedes that "conviction" may be used either in a crim. or admin. case. The Const. does not

distinguish bet. w/c cases executive clemency may be exercised by the Pres., w/ the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. If the President can

grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executiveclemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses. However, the power of the President to grant executive

clemency in administrative cases refers only to administrative cases in the Executive branch and not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the

govt.

Under the doctrine of Qualified Political Agency, the different Executive departments are mere adjuncts of the President. Their acts are

presumptively the acts of the President until countermanded or reprobated by her. In this case, the President in the exercise of her power of

supervision and control over all executive departments, may substitute her decision for that of her subordinate. It is clearly within the power of

the President not only to grant "executive clemency" but also to reverse or modify a ruling issued by a subordinate against an erring public official,

where a reconsideration of the facts alleged would support the same. It is in this sense that the alleged executive clemency was granted.

Tolentino v Catoy, 82 Phil 300 (1948)

Petitioner was a Hukbalahap who was found guilty of illegal assembly in furtherance of the Hukbalahap designs. After the judgment was

promulgated, the President issued Proc. No. 76 granting amnesty to leaders and members of the Hukbalahap. Petitioner who was already serving

his sentence, sent a petition to the President for his release under the provisions of the proclamation. No action was taken on his petition. Hethen went to court and filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus.

HELD : Though some members of the Court question the applicability of Amnesty Proclamation No. 76 to Hukbalahaps already undergoing

sentence upon the date of its promulgation, the majority of the Court believe that by its context and pervading spirit the proclamation extends to

all members of the Hukbalahap. It makes no exception when it announces that the amnesty is proclaimed in favor of the leaders and members of

the associations known as the Hukbalahap and Pambansang Kaisahan ng Magbubukid (PKM). No compelling reason is apparent for excluding

Hukbalahaps of any class or condition from its object which is "to forgive and forego the prosecution of the crimes of rebellion, sedition, etc." If

total punishment is foregone in favor of Hukbalahaps who succeeded in evading arrest, it stands to reason that those who fell into the clutches of

the law have a better claim to clemency for the remaining portion of a punishment fixed for the same offense. The avowed practical objective of

the amnesty is to secure pledge of loyalty and obedience to the constituted authorities and encourage resumption of lawful pursuits and

occupation. This objective cannot be expected to meet with full success without the goodwill and cooperation of the Hukbalahaps who have


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become more embittered by their capture, prosecution and incarceration. Fundamentally and in their utmost effect, pardon and amnesty are

synonymous. Pardon includes amnesty. Pardon and amnesty are both construed most strictly against the state.

Vera v People, 7 SCRA 152 (1963)

Amnesty cannot be invoked, where the accused actually denies the commission of the offense charged.

F: In the CFI-Quezon, petitioners Vera, among others, were charged w/ the complex crime of kidnapping w/ murder of Amadeo Lozanes. Upon

petitioners' motion, invoking the benefits of Amnesty Procl. of the Pres, s. of 1946, the case was referred to the Eight Guerrilla Amnesty

Commission, w/c actually tried it. During the hearing, none of the petitioners admitted having committed the crime charged. In fact, Vera, the

only def. who took the witness stand, instead of admitting the killing of the deceased Lozanes, categorically denied it. Hence, the Commission, in

its decision held that it could not take cognizance of the case, on the ground that the benefits of the Amnesty Procl., could be invoked only by defs.

in a criminal case who, admitting the commission of the crime, plead that said commission was in pursuance of the resistance movement and

perpetrated against persons who aided the enemy during the Japanese occupation. Consequently, the Commission ordered that the case be

remanded to the court of origin for trial. A MFR was filed by petitioners but was denied. From this order of the Commission, petitioners appealed

to the CA w/c certified the appeal to us, in view of the legal issue involved.

ISSUE: W/n persons invoking the benefit of amnesty should first admit having committed the crime of w/c they are accused.

Petitioners contend that to be entitled to the benefits of Amnesty Procl. No. 8, it is not necessary for them to admit the commission of the crime

charged, citing in support of their submission, among others, the case of Barrioquinto, et. al vs. Fernandez, et, al. (82 P642.) to the effect that "in

order to entitle a person to the benefits of Amnesty Procl., it is not necessary that he should, as a condition precedent, admit having committed the

criminal act or offense w/ w/c he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant or the

accused, shows that the offense committed comes w/in the terms of said Amnesty Procl.

HELD: But said cases have been superseded and deemed overruled by the subsequent cases of Peo. vs. Llanita, et. al. (86 P 219), etc. wherein we

held that--

"It is rank inconsistency for appellant to justify an act or seek forgiveness for an act, according to him, he has not committed. Amnestypresupposes the commission of a crime, and when an accused maintains that he has not committed a crime, he cannot have any use for amnesty.

Where an amnesty procl. imposes certain conditions, as in this case, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove the existence of such conditions.

The invocation of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance, which means that the pleader admits the allegations against him

but disclaims liability therefor on account of intervening facts which, if proved, would bring the crime charged within the scope of the amnesty

proclamation." (italics supplied.)

At any rate, the facts established bef. the Commission do not bring the case w/in the terms of the Amnesty Procl. xxx As found by the Commission

the killing of the deceased (Lozanes) was not in furtherance of the resistance movement, but due to the rivalry bet. the Hunter's Guerrilla, to w/c

he belonged, and the Vera's Guerrilla of petitioners.

Lansang v Garcia, 42 SCRA 446

The test to be used by the Supreme Court in so reviewing the act of the President in proclaiming or suspending, or the act of Congress in extending,

is the test of arbitrariness which seeks to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the measure. The question is not whether the President

or Congress acted correctly, but whether he acted arbitrarily in that the action had no basis in fact.Deciding on whether the act was arbitrary amounts to a determination of whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction, which is now made part of judicial power by Art. VIII, Sec. 1, par. 2. This curbs radically the application of the political

question doctrine.

This test was taken from the case of Lansang v Garcia, 42 SCRA 446 (1971). The issue there raised was whether in suspending the privilege of the

writ in 1971, Marcos had a basis for doing so. The SC, in considering the fact that the President based his decision on (a) the Senate report on the

condition in Central Luzon and (b) a closed door briefing by the military showing the extent of subversion, concluded that the President did not act

arbitrarily. One may disagree with his appreciation of the facts, but one cannot say that it is without basis. [In this case of Lansang vs. Garcia, the

SC held unanimously that it has the authority to inquire into the existence of the factual basis in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency

thereof. This holding of the SC is now found in Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 3.]

Facts: On the evening of August 21, 1971, two grenades were thrown at the miting the avance of the Liberal Party killing 8 persons and injuring

many. Thus, on August 23 then President Marcos issued proclamation 889, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Herein petitioners were

apprehended by members of the Philippine Constabulary having invoked the said proclamation. In effect the proclamation implies that theauthority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension of the writ belongs to the President and it expressly states that such

declaration is deemed final and conclusive upon the courts and all other persons

August 30: the president issued proclamation 889-A, amending the previous proclamation.

September 18: proclamation 889-B issued; lifting the suspension on selected provinces/cities.

September 25: proclamation 889-C issued; lifting the suspension on selected provinces/cities.

October 4: proclamation 889-D issued; same as 889-C on selected areas.

In view thereof, 18 provinces, 2 sub-provinces and 18 cities are still under the suspension of writ of habeas corpus

Issue: Whether the court would adhere to its previous decision in Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro vs. Castaneda?

Held: First, Proclamation 889-A superseded the original proclamation and that flaws attributed thereto are formal in nature. Which actually

emphasize the actuality of the intent to rise in arms. Second, The court intervention: In Sterling vs. Constantin, Chief Justice Hughes declared that


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when there is a substantial showing that the exertion of state power has overridden private rights secured by the Constitution, the subject is

necessarily one for judicial review. Thus, the grant of power to suspend the privilege o f writ is neither absolute or unqualified

The declaration of a rebellion as argued by the petitioners need not to be a wide-scale event, it may be declared even if it only involves a small part

of the country. The president decision to suspend the writ was by fact constitutional hence VALID, as he has three available courses to suppress

rebellion. First, to call out the military, second to suspend the privilege of writ and lastly to declare martial law.

Petitions DENIED; the CFI is directed to conduct preliminary investigations

Garcia-Padilla v Ponce-Enrile, 121 SCRA 472

With this test and the new provisions in the 1987 Constitution, the case of Garcia-Padilla v Ponce Enrile, 121 SCRA 472 (1983), is, at last, overruled,

and may it be so always. In that case, the SC held that the President's proclamation of martial law is beyond judicial review, and that the citizen can

only trust that the President acts in good faith.

Aquino v Military Commission No.2, 63 SCRA 546

Military Trial of Civilians Void Even Under Martial Law, If Civil Courts Are Open. (Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 5.).

In Aquino vs Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546, the SC upheld the power of the President to create military tribunals authorized to try not

only military personnel but also civilians even if at that time civil courts were open and functioning, thus rejecting the "open court" theory. The SC

there held: "Martial law creates an exception to the general rule of exclusive subjection to the civil jurisdiction, and renders offenses against the

laws of war, as well as those of a civil character, triable by military tribunals. Public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for

judicial process. The immunity of civilians from military jurisdiction, must, however, give way in areas governed by martial law.

Olaguer v Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144

In the case of Olaguer vs Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144, the Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2 decision was reversed. According to

the SC, civilians who are placed on trial for civil offenses under general law are entitled to trial by judicial process. Since we are not enemy-

occupied territory nor are we under a military govt. and even on the premise that martial law continues in force, the military tribunals cannot try

and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for civil offenses committed by them which are properly cognizable by the civil courts that have remainedopen and have been regularly functioning. The assertion of military authority over civilians cannot rest on the President's power as Commander in

Chief or on any theory of martial law. As long as civil courts remain open and are regularly functioning, military tribunals cannot try and exercise

jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them and which are properly cognizable by civil courts. To hold otherwise is a violation of the

right to due process.

"The presiding officer at a court martial is not a judge whose objectivity and independence are protected by tenure and undiminished salary and

nurtured by the judicial tradition, but is a military officer. Substantially different rules of evidence and procedure apply in military trials. Apart

from these differences, the suggestion of the possibility of influence on the actions of the court-martial by the officer who convenes it, selects its

members and the counsel on both sides, and who usually has direct command and authority over its members is a pervasive one in military laws,

despite strenuous efforts to eliminate the danger.

Araneta v Dinglasa, 84 phil 368 (1949)

In Araneta v Dinglasan, 84 Phil 368 (1949), the Congress granted the President emergency powers to fix rentals of houses. After the war, Congress

held a special session. The SC held that the emergency power lasted only until Congress held its regular session. The fact that Congress could nowmeet meant that there was no emergency anymore that would justify the delegation.

F: The petitions challenge the validity of EOs of the Pres. avowedly issued in virtue of CA 671. They rest their case chiefly on the proposition that

the Emergency Powers Act (CA 671) has ceased to have any force and effect.

HELD: CA 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session on 5/25/46, and the EOs were issued w/o authority of law.

CA 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness. The intention of the Act has to be sought for in its nature, the object to be

accomplished, the purpose to be subserved, and its relation to the Consti. Art. VI of the 1935 Consti. provides that any law passed by virtue

thereof should be "for a limited period." The words "limited period" are beyond question intended to mean restrictive in duration. Emergency, in

order to justify the delegation of emergency powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said to be an emergency." It is to be presumed that CA

671 was approved w/ this limitation in view. The opposite theory would make the law repugnant to the Consti., and is contrary to the principle

that the legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the constitutional scope of its powers. The assertion that new legislation is needed to

repeal the act would not be in harmony w/ the Consti. either. If a new and different law were necessary to terminate the delegation, the period fo

the delegation would be unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain; "that w/c was intended to meet a temporary emergency may becomepermanent law," for Congress might not enact the repeal, and even if it would, the repeal might not meet w/ the approval of the Pres., and the

Congress might not be able to override the veto. Further, this would create the anomaly that, while Congress might delegate its powers by simple

majority, it might not be able to recall them except by a 2/3 vote.

Rodriguez v Gella, 92 Phil (1953)

At the very least, said the SC in Rodriguez v Gella, 92 Phil 603 (1953), it should cease upon the approval of a resolution by Congress terminating

such grant. In this case, the Congress enacted a bill precisely terminating the grant of emergency power, but this was vetoed by the President. The

SC ruled that the vetoed bill should be deemed a resolution that terminates the grant.

F: On 12/16/41, CA 671 was approved declaring a state of total emergency as a result of war involving the Phils. and authorizing the Pres. to

promulgate rules and regulations to meet such emergency." In 1949, the SC decided that said emergency powers ceased as early as 1945. Here,

the issue again is w/n CA 671 is still effective. It appears that in 1952, the Pres. issued EOs 545 and 546 (for appropriation of funds for public works

and for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, etc.) The Congress passed House Bill 727 declaring that "was has long ended"


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and that the "need for the grant of such unusual powers to the Pres. has disappeared," and for that reason , Congress repealed all the Emergency

Powers Acts of the Pres. However, this was vetoed by the Pres. Petitioners seek to invalidate said EOs.

HELD: Although House Bill 727, has been vetoed by the Pres. and did not thereby become a regular statute, it may at least be considered as a

concurrent resolution of the Congress formally declaring the termination of the emergency powers. To contend that the Bill needed presidential

acquiescence to produce effect, would lead to the anomalous, if not absurd situation that, "while Congress while delegate its powers by a simple

majority, it might not be able to recall them except by 2/3 vote.

Notice the apparent inconsistency bet. the Constitution and the cases. The Consti. [Art. VI, Sec. 23 (2)] states that the emergency powers shall

cease upon the next adjournment of Congress unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of Congress whereas the cases tell us that the emergency

powers shall cease upon resumption of session. To reconcile the two, I believe that it would not be enough for Congress to just resume session in

order that the emergency powers shall cease. It has to pass a resolution withdrawing such emergency powers, otherwise such powers shall cease

upon the next adjournment of Congress.

RA 4860

AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES TO OBTAIN SUCH FOREIGN LOANS AND CREDITS, OR TO INCUR SUCH FOREIGN

INDEBTEDNESS, AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO FINANCE APPROVED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PURPOSES OR PROJECTS, AND TO GUARANTEE, IN

BEHALF OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, FOREIGN LOANS OBTAINED OR BONDS ISSUED BY CORPORATIONS OWNED OR CONTROLLED BY THE

GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PURPOSES INCLUDING THOSE INCURRED FOR PURPOSES OF RE- LENDING TO

THE PRIVATE SECTOR, APPROPRIATING THE NECESSARY FUNDS THEREFORE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Sec. 1. The President of the Philippines is hereby authorized in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines to contract such loans, credits and

indebtedness with foreign governments, agencies or instrumentalities of such foreign governments, foreign financial institutions, or other

international organizations, with whom, or belonging to countries with which, the Philippines has diplomatic relations, as may be necessary andupon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon, to enable the Government of the Republic of the Philippines to finance, either directly or

through any government office, agency or instrumentality or any government-owned or controlled corporation, industrial, agricultural or other

economic development purposes or projects authorized by law: Provided, That at least seventy-five per cent shall be spent for purposes of

projects which are revenue-producing and self-liquidating, such as electrification, irrigation, river control and drainage, telecommunication,

housing, construction and improvement of highways and bridges, airports, ports and harbors, school buildings, water works and artesian wells, air

navigation facilities, development of fishing industry, and other: Provided, That such foreign loans shall be used to meet the foreign exchange

requirements or liabilities incurred in connection with said development projects to cover the cost of equipment, related technical services and

supplies, where the same are not obtainable within the Philippines at competitive prices as well as part of the peso costs, other than working

capital and operational expenses not exceeding twenty per cent of the loan: Provided, further, That in the case of roads, bridges, irrigation,

portworks, river controls, airports and power, the amount shall not exceed seventy per cent of the loan.

The authority of the President of the Philippines as herein provided shall include the power to issue, for the purposes hereinbefore stated, bonds

for sale in the international markets the income from which shall be fully tax exempt in the Philippines.Sec. 2. The total amount of loans, credits and indebtedness, excluding interests, which the President of the Philippines is authorized to incur under

this Act shall not exceed one billion United States dollars or its equivalent in other foreign currencies at the exchange rate prevailing at the time the

loans, credits and indebtedness are incurred: Provided, however, That the total loans, credits and indebtedness incurred under this Act shall not

exceed two hundred fifty million in the fiscal year of the approval of this Act, and two hundred fifty million every f iscal year thereafter, all in United

States dollars or its equivalent in other currencies. All loans, credits and indebtedness under the preceding section shall be incurred only for

particular projects in accordance with the approved economic program of the Government and after the plans for such projects shall have been

prepared by the offices or agencies concerned, recommended by the National Economic Council and the Monetary Board of the Central Bank of

the Philippines, and approved by the President of the Philippines.

Sec. 3. The President of the Philippines is, likewise, hereby authorized, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, to guarantee, upon such terms

and conditions as may be agreed upon, foreign loans extended directly to, or bonds for sale in international markets issued by, corporations owned

or controlled by the Government of the Philippines for industrial, agricultural or other economic development purposes or projects authorized by

law, such as those mentioned in Section one of this Act, including the rehabilitation and modernization of the Philippine National Railways, the cashcapital requirements of the Land Bank , electrification, irrigation, river control and drainage, telecommunication, housing, construction and/or

improvement of highways, housing, construction and/ or improvement of highways, airports, ports and harbors, school buildings, waterworks and

artesian wells, air navigation, development of the fishing industry, iron and nickel exploitation and development, and others: Provided, That at

least seventy five per cent shall be spent for purposes or projects which are revenue-producing and self-liquidating. The loans/ or bonded

indebtedness of government-owned or controlled corporations which may be guaranteed by the President under this Act shall include those

incurred by government-owned or controlled financial institutions for the purpose of re-lending to the private sector and the total amount thereof

shall not be more than five hundred million United States dollars or its equivalent in other foreign currencies at the exchange rate prevailing at the

time the guarantee is made: Provided, That the government- owned or controlled financial institutions shall re-lend the proceeds of such loans

and/ or bonded indebtedness to Filipinos or to Filipino-owned or controlled corporations and partnerships, at least sixty-six and two-thirds per

centum of the outstanding and paid-up capital of which is held by Filipinos at the time the loan is incurred, such proportion to be maintained until

such time as the loan is fully paid: Provided, however, That during anytime that any amount of the loan remains outstanding, failure to meet with


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the capital ownership requirement shall make the entire loan immediately due and demandable, together with all penalties and interests, plus an

additional special penalty of two per centum on the total amount due.

Sec. 4. The implementation of this Act shall be subject to, and governed by, the provisions of Executive Order 236, dated February 13, 1957,

prescribing procedures for the planning of development finances, the issuance of government securities, and the disbursement of proceeds and

creating the Fiscal Policy Council and the Technical Committee on Development Finance, as amended by Executive Order No. 236, dated May 26,

1966, not inconsistent with this Act, which are hereby adopted by reference and made an integral part of this Act.

Sec. 5. It shall be the duty of the President, within thirty days after the opening of every regular session, to report to the Congress the amount of

loans, credits and indebtedness contracted, as well as the guarantees extended, and the purposes and projects for which the loans, credits and

indebtedness were incurred, and the guarantees extended, as well as such loans which may be reloaned to Filipino-owned or controlled

corporations and similar purposes. Sec. 6. The Congress shall appropriate the necessary amount of any funds in the National Treasury not

otherwise appropriated, to cover the payment of the principal and interest on such loans, credits or indebtedness as and when they shall become

due.

Sec. 7. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved, September 8, 1966.

Does Congress have to be consulted by the President when he contracts or guarantees foreign loans that increase the foreign debt of the country?

The affirmative view cites Art. VI, Sec. 24 which holds that all bills authorizing increase of the public debt must originate exclusively from the House

of Representatives, although the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

The negative, and stronger view, is that the President does not need prior approval by Congress because the Constitution places the power to

check the President's power on the Monetary Board and not on Congress. Congress may, of course, provide guidelines for contracting or

guaranteeing foreign loans, and have these rules enforced through the Monetary Board. But that Congress has prior approval is a totally different

issue.At any rate, the present power, which was first introduced in the 1973 Constitution, was based on RA 4860 or the Foreign Loan Act. What used to

be a statutory grant of power is now a constitutional grant which Congress cannot take away, but only regulate.

Commissioner of Customs v Eastern Sea Trading, 3 SCRA 351

In holding that treaties are formal documents which require ratification with approval of the Senate, while executive agreements become binding

through executive action without need of a vote by the Senate, the SC in Commissioner of Customs v Eastern Sea Trading, 3 SCRA 351 (1961), said

that the difference between a treaty and an executive agreement is that a treaty is an international agreement involving political issues or changes

of national policy and those involving international arrangements of a permanent character, while an executive agreement is an international

agreement embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-established national policies and traditions, and those involving arrangements of a

more or less temporary nature.

Examples of treaties are an agreement on tax, extradition, alliance. Examples of executive agreements are agreements relating to postal

conventions, tariff rates, copyright, most- favored nation clause.

F: Resp. Eastern was the consignee of several shipment of onion and garlic w/c arrived at the port of Mla. from 8/5 to 9/7/54. Some shipmentscame from Japan and others from HK. Inasmuch as none of the shipments had the certificate required by CB Circulars Nos. 44 and 45 for the

release thereof, the goods thus imported were seized and subjected to forfeiture proceedings for alleged violations of Sec. 1363 (f) of the Rev.

Adm. Code, in relation to the said circulars. Said goods were then declared forfeited in favor of the govt by the Commissioner of Customs-- the

goods having been, in the meantime, released to the consignees on surety bonds. On review, the Court of Tax Appeals reversed the Commissioner

of Customs and ordered the aforementioned bonds to be cancelled and withdrawn. According to the CTA, the seizure and forfeiture of the goods

imported from Japan cannot be justified under EO 238, not only bec. the same seeks to implement an Executive Agreement-- extending the

effectivity of our Trade and Financial Agreements w/ Japan-- w/c agreement, is of dubious validity xxx owing to the fact that our Senate had not

concurred in the making of said Executive Agreement.

HELD: The concurrence of said House of Congress is required by the Consti. in the making of "treaties", w/c are, however, distinct and different

from "executive agreements," which may be validly entered into w/o such concurrence. [The court went on to distinguish a treaty from an

executive agreement.] The agreement in question, being merely an executive agreement, there is no requirement of concurrence.

USAFFE Veterans Association v Treasurer, 105 Phil 1030F: The central issue in this case concerns the validity of the Romulo-Snyder Agreement (1950) whereby the Phil. Govt. undertook to return to the

US Govt. in ten annual installments, a total of $35 M dollars advanced by the US to, but unexpended by, the National Defense Forces of the

Philippines. The USAFFE Veterans contended that the money delivered by the US were straight payments for military services and that therefore

there was nothing to return to the US and nothing to consider as a loan. They also contended that the Romulo-Synder Agreement was void for lack

of authority of the officers who concluded the same.

HELD: The funds involved have been consistently regarded as funds advanced and to be subsequently accounted for. Such arrangement therefore

includes the obligation to return the unexpended amounts.

In this case, Pres. Quirino approved the negotiations. He had power to contract loans under RA 213 amending RA 16. As to the contention that

the agreement lacks ratification by the Senate, it was held that the yearly appropriations by Congress of funds as compliance with the agreement

constituted ratification. But even if there was no ratification, the agreement would still be valid. The agreement is not a "treaty" as the term is

used in the Constitution. The agreement was never submitted to the Senate for concurrence. It must be noted that a treaty is not the only form


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that an international agreement may assume. For the grant of treaty making power to the Executive and the Senate does not exhaust the power of

the govt. over international relations. Consequently, executive agreements may be entered into with other states and are effective even without

the concurrence of the Senate. From the point of view of international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in

their binding effect upon states concerned as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. The distinction between an

executive agreement and a treaty is purely a constitutional one and has no international legal significance.

CIR v Gotamco, 148 SCRA 36

F: The World Health Organization (WHO) is an international organization which has a regional office in Manila. It enjoys privileges and immunities

which are defined in the Host Agreement entered into between the Philippines and the said organization. One of the provisions is that WHO shall

be exempt from all direct and indirect taxes. When it decided to construct a building to house its own offices, it entered into a further agreement

with the govt. exempting it from paying duties on any importation of materials and fixtures required for the construction. WHO informed the

bidders that it was exempt from the payment of all fees, licenses and taxes and that their bids should not include such items. However, the CIR

demanded from its contractor, Gotamco, the payment of 3% contractor's tax. The CIR questions the entitlement of the WHO to tax exemption,

contending that the Host Agreement is null and void, not having been ratified by the Philippine Senate.

HELD : While treaties are required to be ratified by the Senate, less formal types of international agreements may be entered into by the Chief

Executive and become binding without the concurrence of the legislative body. The Host Agreement comes within the latter category. It is a valid

and binding international agreement even without the concurrence of the Philippine Senate.

Qua Chee Gan v Deportation

case digests involving the executive department

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