A. Power to Construe 6. National Food Authority v. Masada Security Agency, G.R. no.

163448, march 8, 2005FACTS:

MSA Inc. is a security agency engaged in providing security services to individuals, corporations or government agencies. On September 17, 1996, MSA entered into a one year contract to provide security services to the various offices, warehouses and installations of NFA within the scope of the NFA Region 1. In their agreement, the parties acknowledged the application to their contract of the wage orders issued by the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Boards (RTWPB) which has wage fixing authority within the region including wage orders setting the daily minimum wage rates pursuant to R.A. 6727.

Under Section 4 of R.A. 6727, the statutory minimum wage rates for all workers and employees in the private sector, whether agricultural or non-agricultural shall be increased by P25 per day. Pursuant to this law, RTWPB issued several wage orders mandating increases in the daily wage rate. Accordingly, MSA requested NFA for a corresponding upward adjustment in the monthly contract rate consisting of the increases in the daily minimum wage of the security guards as well as the corresponding raise in their overtime pay, holiday pay, 13th month pay, and rest day pay. MSA also claimed increases in Social Security (SSS) and Pag-Ibig premiums as well as administrative costs and margin. NFA however granted the request only with respect to the increase in the daily wage by multiplying the amount of the mandated increase by 30 days and denied the same with respect to adjustments in the other wage related benefits and remunerations computed on the basis of the daily wage.

ISSUE: Was the NFA correct?

HELD: Yes. The term wage as used in Section 6 of RA 6727 pertains to no other than the statutory minimum wage which is defined under the Rules Implementing said law as the lowest wage rate fixed by law that an employer can pay his worker. The basis thereof under Section 7 of the same Rules is the normal working hours, which shall not exceed eight hours a day.

Hence, the prescribed increase or the additional liability to be borne by the principal (NFA in this case) under Section 6 of RA 6727 is only the increment or amount added to the remuneration of an employee for an eight hour work.

Where a statute by its terms, is expressly limited in certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. Since the increase in wage referred to in section 6 pertains to the statutory minimum wage, as defined therein, principals in service contracts (like the NFA) cannot be made to pay the corresponding wage increase in the overtime pay, night shift differential, holiday and rest day pay, premium pay and other benefits granted to workers. While basis of said remuneration and benefits is the statutory minimum wage, the law cannot be unduly expanded as to include those not included in the subject provision (National Food Authority vs. Masada Security Agency Inc. G.R. 163448 March 8, 2005. 453 SCRA 70).

CASE 6 - National Food Authority (NFA) v. Masada Security Agency, Inc.453 SCRA 70 (March 8, 2005)

Facts:Masada entered into a 1 year contract to provide security services to NFA-REGION 1. Upon the expiration of the said contract, the parties extended the effectivity thereof on a monthly basis under same terms and condition.

The Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board (RTWPB) issued wage orders mandating increases in the daily wage rate. Masada requested NFA to increase the of the monthly contract rate1. NFA only granted the request only with respect to the increase in daily wage

Respondent filed a case for recovery of sum of money against NFA with the RTC.

1 Consisting of: (1)daily minimum wage of the security guards; (2) overtime pay; (3) holiday pay (4)13th month pay; (5) holiday and rest day pay; (6) Social Security System [SSS]; (7) Pag-ibig premiums as well as administrative costs and margin.

1

NFA CONTENTION: Respondent cannot demand an adjustment on the said salary benefits because it is bound by their contract expressly limiting NFA’s obligation to pay only the increment in the daily wage.

Pre-trial Issue: WON respondent is entitled to recover from NFA wage related benefits of the security guards.

RTC Ruling: NFA is liable to pay the security guards’ wage related benefits pursuant to RA 6727, because the basis of the computation of said benefits, like overtime pay, holiday pay, SSS and Pag-ibig premium, is the increased minimum wage. It also found NFA liable for the consequential adjustments in administrative costs and margin.

NFA appealed to the Court of Appeals but was dismissed

ISSUE(Supreme Court): WON the liability of principals in service contracts under Section 6 of RA 6727 and the wage orders issued by the RTWPB is limited only to the increment in the minimum wage.

HELD/ RULING:

Payment of the increases in the wage rate of workers is ordinarily shouldered by the employer. Section 6 of RA 6727, however, expressly lodged said obligation to the principals or indirect employers in construction projects and establishments providing security, janitorial and similar services. The court found merit in NFA’s contention that its additional liability under the aforcited provision is only limited to the payment of the increment in the statutory minimum wage rate i.e. the rate for a regular eight (8) hour work day.

Expresio unius est exclusio alterius. Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. Since the increase in wage referred to in Section 6 pertains to the “statutory minimum wage” as defined herein, principals in service contracts cannot be made to pay the corresponding wage increase in the overtime pay, night shift differential, holiday and rest day pay, premium pay and other benefits granted to workers. While basis

of said remuneration and benefits is the statutory minimum wage, the law cannot be unduly expanded as to include those not stated in the subject provision .

Moreover, the law secures the welfare of the workers by imposing a solidary liability on principals and the service contractors. Under the second sentence of Section 6 of RA 6727, in the event that the principal or client fails to pay the prescribed wage rates, the service contractor shall be held solidarily liable with the former.

The parties therefore acknowledged the application to their contract of the wage orders issued by the RTWPB pursuant to RA 6727. There being no assumption by NFA of a greater liability than that mandated by Section 6 of the Act, its obligation is limited to the payment of the increased statutory minimum wage rates which, as admitted by respondent, had already been satisfied by NFA. Under Article 1231 of the Civil Code, one of the modes of extinguishing an obligation is by payment. Having discharged its obligation to respondent, NFA no longer have a duty that will give rise to a correlative legal right of respondent. The latter’s complaint for collection of remuneration and benefits other than the increased minimum wage rate, should therefore be dismissed for lack of cause of action.

WHEREFORE , the petition is GRANTED. The February 12, 2004 decision and the April 30, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals which dismissed petitioner National Food Authority’s appeal and motion for reconsideration, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 76677, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint filed by respondent MASADA Security Agency, Inc., docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-43988, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon, City, Branch 83, is ordered DISMISSED.

2

CHAPTER III. AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION

1. Intrinsic AidsA. Title

CASE 1 - PEOPLE VS. RIVERA

FACTS:

The accused Faustino Rivera was being charged by the crime of Indictment of the Innocent planned and punished under the Art 363 of the Revised Penal Code. The Provincial Prosecutor filed a case against Rivera for filing a complaint in writing and executing an oath accusing falsely and without probable cause Vito Sunday and Felisa Moreno of the crime of theft.

ISSUES OF THE CASE: WON Art 363 of the R.P.C should apply in this case.

HELD:

It does not apply since the law that the crime Rivera was accused of committing is not explicitly stated in the R.P.C (although it is worthy to mention that the crime of indictment of the innocent is present in the Old Penal Code)

The old penal code described it as the charge of the offense is the imputation itself if made in front of the administrative/ judicial officer while the R.P.C defines the offense as the act that leads (tends directly) to imputation of the offense.

The art 363 of the R.P.C was defined or described as “planting of evidence.”

COURT HELD THAT THE ACCUSED FAUSTINO RIVERA IS NOT GUILTY OF THE CRIME FO INCRIMINATION OF THE INNOCENT.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON:

It is well settled law that where the text of a statute is clear, it is improper to resort to a caption or title to make it obscure.

It is a well settled rule that statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. (Lau Ow Bew vs. United States, 144 U. S., 47, 59; 36 Law. ed., 340, 344.)

CASE 1 – PEOPLE v. RIVERA

Facts: Rivera signed and swore to a complaint accusing Vito and Moreno the crime of theft. According to the information, the items stolen were a white American suit with one eyeglasses amounting to P30, one buntal hat which costs P3, and to two buttons which cost P3 each, with the total amount of P39. The justice of the peace dismissed the case. After which, Vito and Moreno filed complaints against Rivera, charging him with incriminating innocent people, which falls under Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code. Rivera objected and claimed that the facts alleged did not fall under Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code, and that, Article 363 of the Codigo Penal does not appear in the Revised Penal Code. Hence, there is no offense embracing acusacion o denuncia falsa.

Issue: Whether or not Rivera can be charged guilty of incriminating innocent people under Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code

Held: No. Not guilty and inapplicable.

Ratio: The crime Rivera was accused of is not explicitly stated in the Revised Penal Code, although the crime of indictment of the innocent is included in the Old Penal Code. Article 363 of the Old Penal Code talks about punishment for false prosecutions. In the Revised Penal Code, Article 363 pertains to punishment for any act which may tend directly to cause a false prosecution. This provision is limited to acts of planting evidence which do not constitute false prosecution but tend directly to cause false prosecutions.

StatCon maxim: The title may indicate the legislative intent to extend or restrict the scope of the law and a statute couched in a language of doubtful import will be construed to conform to the legislative intent as disclosed in its title.

3

CASE 2 – ALALAYAN V. NAPOCOR

24 SCRA 172 – Political Law – Title Must Express One Subject

In 1961, Republic Act No. 3043 (An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred Twenty, as Amended by Republic Act Numbered Twenty Six Hundred and Forty One) was passed. This law amended the charter of NAPOCOR (National Power Corporation). Section 3 of RA 3043 provides that:

a. contractors being supplied by NAPOCOR shall not exceed an annual profit of 12%;

b. if they do, they shall refund such excess to their customers;c. that NAPOCOR has the power to renew all existing contracts

with franchise holders for the supply of energy.

Santiago Alalayan and the Philippine Power and Development Company (PPDC) assailed the said provision.They averred that Section 3 is a rider because first, it was not included in the title of the amending law nor was it included in the amended law. Second, the main purpose of RA 3043 was to increase the capital stock of NAPOCOR hence Alalayan et al believed that Section 3 was not germane to RA 3043.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 3 of RA 3043 is constitutional.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court simply ruled that the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take

appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.

CASE 2 – ALALAYAN v. NAPOCOR

FACTS: This declaratory relief proceeding was started in the lower court by petitioners, Alalayan and Philippine Power and Development Company, both franchise holders of electric plants in Laguna, to test the validity of a section of an amendatory act, empowering respondent National Power Corporation "in any contract for the supply of electric power to a franchise holder," receiving at least 50% of its electric power and energy from it to require as a condition that such franchise holder "shall not realize a net profit of more than twelve percent annually of its investments plus two-month operating expenses." Respondent, under such provision, could likewise "renew all existing contracts with franchise holders for the supply of electric power and energy," so that the provisions of the Act could be given effect. This statutory provision was assailed on the ground that, being a rider, it is violative of the constitutional provision requiring that a bill, which may be enacted into law, cannot embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title, as well as the due process guarantee, the liberty to contract of petitioners being infringed upon. The lower court sustained its validity.

ISSUE: W/N Section 3 of the subject act, which further amends Commonwealth Act No. 121 has a due process infringement on the right to non-impairment of contracts.

HELD: This argument has the ring of futility. Precisely, this Court in an opinion by the present Chief Justice upheld such a figure as against the contention that it was rather too generous to the public utility. To speak of it as confiscatory then is to employ the language by hyperbole. Moreover, in

4

the absence any evidence to demonstrate the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there would be no basis for its nullification, in view of the well-known presumption of validity that every statute has in its favor. In the light of the above, there is thus clearly no occasion for yielding assent to the claim of petitioner that the legislation assailed contravenes the due process clause. Statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a proper exercise by the state of its police power, are applicable not only to those public utilities coming into existence after its passage, but likewise to those already, existence established and in operation.

CASE 3 – CITY OF BAGUIO v. MARCOS

Facts: In April 12, 1912, the director of lands in the CFI of Baguio INSTITUTED the reopening of cadastral proceedings. In November 13, 1922, a decision was RENDERED. The land involved was the Baguio Townsite which was declared public land. In July 25, 1961, Belong Lutes petitioned to reopen the civil case on the following grounds: 1) he and his predecessors have been in continuous possession and cultivation of the land since Spanish times; 2) his predecessors were illiterate Igorots, thus, were not able to file their claim. On the contrary, F. Joaquin Sr., F. Joaquin Jr., and Teresita Buchholz opposed Lutes’ reopening on the following grounds: 1) the reopening was filed outside the 40-year period provided in RA 931; 2) the petition to reopen the case was not published; and 3) as lessees of the land, they have standing on the issue.

Issue: Whether or not the reopening of the peririon was filed outside the 40-year period provided in RA 931, which was ENACTED on June 20, 1953

Held: The Supreme Court grabted the reopening of cadastral proceedings

Ratio: The title of RA 931 was “An Act to Authorize the Filing in Proper Court under Certain Conditions, of Certain Claims of Title to Parcels of Land that have been Declared Public Land, by Virtue of Judicial Decisions RENDERED within the 40 Years Next Preceding the Approval of this Act.” Section 1 of the Act reads as “..in case such parcels of land, on account of their failure to

file such claims, have been, or about to be declared land of the public domain by virtue of judicial proceedings INSTITUTED within the 40 years next preceding the approval of this act.” If the title is to be followed, November 13, 1922 is the date which should be followed, hence, would allow the reopening of the case. If Section 1 is to be followed, the date of the institution of reopening of the case which was April 12, 1912, the petition would be invalid.

StatCon maxim: The title is an indispensable part of a statute, and what may inadequately be omitted in the text may be supplied or remedied by its title.

PREAMBLE

CASE 1 – PEOPLE v. PURISMA

FACTS:

There are twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law.

Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed before them — the details of which will be recounted below — an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of the crime.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

5

Are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9?

There are two elements to the the offense: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.

The petitioner by having one particular stand of the carrying of any dangerous weapon outside of the residence w/o regard to motive or intent makes this a case of statutory construction.

HELD:

COURT DISMISSED ALL MOTIONS MADE BY THE PETITIONER AND AFFIRMS ALL DECISIONS MADE BY THE RESPONDENT JUDGES.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON:

The problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of a statute, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.

It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequence

CASE 1 – PEOPLE v. PURISIMA

Facts:

These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law.

The respondent-courts are: CFI of Manila Branches VII and XVIII and CFI of Samar

Several informations were filed before the abovementioned courts charging the accused of Illegal Possession of Deadly Weapon in violation of Presidential Decree #9. The counsel of the defense filed motions to quash the said informations after which the respondent-courts passed their own orders quashing the said informations on common ground that the informations did not allege facts constituting ang offense penalized until PD#9 for failure to state an essential element of the crime, which is, that the carrying outside of the accused’s residence of a bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with, or related to to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder.

The respondent courts stand that PD#9 should be read in the context of Proc.1081 which seeks to maintain law and order in the country as well as the prevention and suppression of all forms of lawless violence. The non-inclusion of the aforementioned element may not be distinguished from other legislation related to the illegal possession of deadly weapons. Judge Purisima, in particular, reasoned that the information must allege that the purpose of possession of the weapon was intended for the purposes of abetting the conditions of criminality, organized lawlessness, public disorder. The petitioners said that the purpose of subversion is not necessary in this regard because the prohibited act is basically a malum prohibitum or is an action or conduct that is prohibited by virtue of a statute. The City Fiscal also added in cases of statutory offenses, the intent is immaterial and that the commission of the act is voluntary is enough.

6

Issue: Are the informations filed by the people sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of “Illegal possession of deadly weapon” penalized under Presidential Decree No. 9?

Held:

1. It is the constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

2. Under Sec. 5 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, for a complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the designation of the offense by the statute and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly.

3. The Supreme Court says that the preamble of PD#9 states that the intention of such decree is to penalize the acts which are related to Proc.1081 which aim to suppress lawlessness, rebellion, subversive acts, and the like. While the preamble is not a part of the statute, it implies the intent and spirit of the decree. The preamble and whereas clauses also enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions provided.

The petition is DISMISSED.

CASE 2 – PEOPLE v. ECHAVEZ

FACTS:

Petitioner Ello filed with the lower court separate informations against sixteen persons charging them with squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. Before the accused could be arraigned, respondent Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order dismissing the five informations (out of 16 raffled) on the grounds (1) that it was alleged that the accused entered the land through “stealth and strategy”, whereas under the decree the entry should be effected “with the use of

force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner”, and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land. From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440.

ISSUE: Whether or not P.D. No. 772 which penalizes squatting and similar acts, (also) apply to agricultural lands.

HELD: NO. Appeal was devoid of merit. Trial court’s dismissal was affirmed.

RATIO:

[T]he lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The squating complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas.

The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain.

Punctuation Marks/ CapitalizationCASE 1 – U.S. v. HART, MILLER, NATIVIDAD

CASE 2 – AGCAOILI v. SUGUITAN

G.R. No. 24806. February 13, 1926

FACTS:

Julio Agcaoili was appointed as justice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag, of the Province of Ilocos Norte on the 25th day of March, 1916, with authority "to have and to hold the said office with all the

7

powers, privileges, and emoluments thereunto of right appertaining unto him, subject to the conditions prescribed by law. The conditions prescribed by law" to which the appointee was "subject" at the time of his appointment, are found in section 1 of Act No. 2041 which provides that "All justices of the peace and auxiliary justices shall hold office during good behavior . . . ."

On the 17th day of March, 1923, the Philippine Legislature adopted Act No. 3107. Said Act in section 203 provides for “ That justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years."

On the 9th day of April, 1923, the Undersecretary of Justice sent a to Agcaoili which provides that the former has the honor to advise the latter that he has ceased to be a justice of the peace by operation of said amendment of the Administrative Code.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not Act. 3107 applies to justices and auxiliary justices of the peace who were appointed prior to the passage of said act.

(2) Whether or not Sec. 216 applies to public officers.

HELD:

(1) No. Attention is called to one of the provisions of section 3 of the Jones Law "That no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill." Considering that there is nothing in the title of Act No. 3107 which indicates in the slightest degree that said Act contains a provision "that justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years”, the court is forced to the conclusions that, that provision is illegal, void and contrary to the mandatory provision of the Jones Law, and that said law cannot be applied to justices and auxiliary justices of the peace who were appointed prior to the 17th day of March, 1923; and that when Julio Agcaoili was forcibly, by means of threats

and intimidation, ordered to leave his office as justice of the peace, he was forced to do so illegally, without just cause, and should therefore be restored to his position as justice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag, without delay.

(2) No. A semicolon is a mark of grammatical punctuation, in the English language, to indicate a separation in the relation of the thought, a degree greater than that expressed by a comma, and what follows that semicolon must have relation to the same matter which precedes it. A semicolon is not used for the purpose of introducing a new idea. A semicolon is used for the purpose of continuing the expression of a thought, a degree greater than that expressed by a mere comma. It is never used for the purpose of introducing a new idea. The comma and semicolon are both used for the same purpose, namely, to divide sentences and parts of the sentences, the only difference being that the semicolon makes the division a little more pronounced than the comma. The punctuation used in a law may always be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining the true meaning of a doubtful statute. It follows therefore that, inasmuch as all of the provisions of said section 216 which precede the semicolon refer to corporations only, that which follows the semicolon has reference to the same subject matter, or to officers of a corporation.

The present case is anomalous under American sovereignty. An officer was appointed in accordance with the law to the judiciary to serve "during good behavior." After he had faithfully and honestly served the Government for a number of years the legislature adopted a new law which arbitrarily, without giving any reason therefore, provided that said officer cease to be such when he should reach the age of 65 years. Said law contained no express provision or method for its enforcement. The Executive Department, through its Undersecretary of Justice, without any authority given in said law, notified the said officer that he was no longer an officer in the judicial department of the Government and must vacate his office and turn the same over to another, who was designated by said Undersecretary. When the officer protested against such arbitrary action, giving reasons therefor, and without answering said protest, he was

8

threatened with a criminal prosecution if he did not immediately vacate his office.

CASE 2 – AGCAOILI v. SUGUITAN

Facts: Julio Agcaoili was appointed as justice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag, Ilocos Norte by Francis Harrison on March 25, 1916, with authority to have and hold the said office with all the powers, privileges, and emoluments thereinto of right appertaining into him, subject to the conditions prescribed by law. Agcaoili received a letter from Luis Torres, Undersecretary of Justice, saying that he should cease to be a justice because he is now over 65 years old. Justice Agcaoili filled a protest through a letter addressed to the undersecretary to which he asserted that he will not cease from the office because he was appointed as justice of peace before the enactment of Act 3107, and he has the right to hold office during good behavior. Agcaoili filed protest at Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Norte. He waited for a reply but nothing came. So, he filed for a petition for writ of quo warranto in the CFI of the Province of Ilocos Norte.

Issue: Whether or not Sec. 216 of Act 190 is applicable to the petitioner with regard to his petition for quo warranto

Held: No.

Ratio: Article 190 provides remedies for the usurpation of office and franchise. Section 216 provides “Nothing herein contained shall authorize an action against a corporation for forfeiture of charter, unless the same be commenced within five years after the act complained of was done or committed; nor shall an action be brought against an officer to be ousted from his office unless within one year after the cause of such ouster, or the right to hold the office, arose.” The Supreme Court held that this provision is applicable only to private officials. Hence, it has no applicability to the petitioner, who is a justice of the peace. The second point the court made is with regard to the rules of Statutory Construction, given that the said provision is applicable to public officials, the sentence after the word “committed;” should not be treated as a separate thought from the

preceding phrase. In the end, the court ruled that the petitioner remain in office.

StatCon maxim: A semicolon is a mark of grammatical punctuation, in the English language, to indicate a separation in the relation of the thought, a degree greater than that expressed by a comma, and what follows that semicolon must have relation to the same matter which precedes it. A semicolon is not used for the purpose of introducing a new idea. A semicolon is used for the purpose of continuing the expression of a thought, a degree greater than that expressed by a mere comma. It is never used for the purpose of introducing a new idea. The comma and semicolon are both used for the same purpose, namely, to divide sentences and parts of the sentences, the only difference being that the semicolon makes the division a little more pronounced than the comma.

Context of Whole Text

CASE 1 - Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales, Inc., G.R. No. 83736

Facts: TMX Sales Inc. filed its quarterly income tax for the 1st quarter of 1981. It declared P571,174.31 and paying an income tax of P247,019 on May 13, 1981. However, during the subsequent quarters, TMX suffered losses. On April 15, 1982, when TMX filed its Annual Income Tax Return for the year ended in December 31, 1981, it declared a net loss of P6,156,525. On July 9, 1982, TMX filed with the Appellate Division of BIR for refund in the amount of P247,010 representing overpaid income tax. His claim was not acted upon by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. On May 14, 1984, TMX Sales filed a petition for review before the Court of Tax Appeals against CIR, praying that the CIR be ordered to refund to TMX the amount of P247,010. The CIR averred that TMX is already barred for claiming the

9

refund since more than 2 years has elapsed between the payment (May 15, 1981) and the filing of the claim in court (March 14, 1984). The Court of Tax Appeals rendered a decision granting the petition of TMX Sales and ordered CIR to refund the amount mentioned. Hence, this appeal of CIR.

Issue: Whether or not TMX Sales Inc. is entitled to a refund considering that two years gas already elapsed since the payment of the tax

Held: Yes. Petition denied.

Ratio: Sec. 292, par. 2 of the National Internal Revenue Code stated that “in any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be begun after the expiration of two years from the date of the payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment.” This should be interpreted in relation to the other provisions of the Tax Code. The most reasonable and logical application of the law would be to compute the 2-year prescriptive period at the time of the filing of the Final Adjustment Return or the Annual Income Tax Return, where it can finally be ascertained if the tax payer has still to pay additional income tax or if he is entitled to a refund of overpaid income tax. Since TMX filed the suit on March 14, 1984, it is within the 2-year prescriptive period starting from April 15, 1982 when they filed their Annual Income Tax Return.

StatCon maxim: The intention of the legislature must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is taken into view.

CASE 1 - Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales

G.R. No. 83736. January 15, 1992

FACTS: Private respondent TMX Sales, Inc. filed its quarterly income tax return for the first quarter of 1981, declaring an income of P571,174.31, and consequently paying an income tax thereon of P247,010.00 on May 15, 1981. During the subsequent quarters, however, TMX Sales, Inc. suffered losses so that when it filed on April 15, 1982 its Annual Income Tax Return for the year ended December 31, 1981, it declared a gross income of P904,122.00 and total deductions of P7,060,647.00, or a net loss of P6,156,525.00. On July 9, 1982, TMX Sales filed with the Appellate Division

of the Bureau of Internal Revenue a claim for refund in the amount of P247,010.00 representing overpaid income tax. This claim was not acted upon by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the ground that "granting, without admitting, the amount in question is refundable, the petitioner is already barred from claiming the same considering that more than two years had already elapsed between the payment and the filing of the claim in Court.

ISSUE: Does the two-year period to claim a refund of erroneously collected tax provided for in Section 292 or the National Internal Revenue Code commence to run from the date the quarterly income tax was paid or from the date the filing of the Final Adjustment Return?

HELD: Section 292 of the Tax Code should be computed from the time of filing the Adjustment Return or Annual Income Tax Return and final payment of income tax. The Court states that statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be taken into view. Section 292 should be interpreted in relation to the other provisions of the Tax Code in order to give effect to legislative intent and to avoid an application of the law which may lead to inconvenience and absurdity.

In the case at bar, the amount of P247,010.00 claimed by private respondent TMX Sales, Inc. based on its Adjustment Return required in Section 87, is equivalent to the tax paid during the first quarter. A literal application of Section 292 would thus pose no problem as the two-year prescriptive period reckoned from the time the quarterly income tax was paid can be easily determined. However, if the quarter in which the overpayment is made, cannot be ascertained, then a literal application of Section 292 would lead to absurdity and inconvenience.

The most reasonable and logical application of the law would be to compute the two-year prescriptive period at the time of filing the Final Adjustment Return or the Annual Income Tax Return, when it can be finally

10

ascertained if the taxpayer has still to pay additional income tax or if he is entitled to a refund of overpaid income tax.

CASE 2 – AISPORNA v. CA

Facts: Since 7 March and on 21 June 1969, a Personal Accident Policy was issued by Perla Compania de Seguros, through its authorized agent Rodolfo Aisporna, for a period of 12 months with the beneficiary designated as Ana M. Isidro. The insured died by violence during lifetime of policy. Mapalad Aisporna participated actively with the aforementioned policy.

For reason unexplained, an information was filed against Mapalad Aisporna, Rodolfo’s wife, with the City Court of Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act on 21 November 1970, or acting as an agent in the soliciting insurance without securing the certificate of authority from the office of the Insurance Commissioner. Mapalad contends that being the wife of true agent, Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and that policy was merely a renewal and was issued because Isidro had called by telephone to renew, and at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent and so she left a note on top of her husband’s desk to renew. On 2 August 1971, the trial court found Mapalad guilty and sentenced here to pay a fine of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. On appeal and on 14 August 1974, the trial court’s decision was affirmed by the appellate court (CA-GR 13243-CR). Hence, the present recourse was filed on 22 October 1974. On 20 December 1974, the Office of the Solicitor General, representing the Court of Appeals, submitted that Aisporna may not be considered as having violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act.

Issue: Whether Mapalad Aisporna is an insurance agent within the scope or intent of the Insurance Act

Held: Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious whole. In the present case, the first

paragraph of Section 189 prohibits a person from acting as agent, subagent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner; while the second paragraph defines who is an insurance agent within the intent of the section; while the third paragraph prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its violation. The appellate court’s ruling that the petitioner is prosecuted not under the second paragraph of Section 189 but under its first paragraph is a reversible error, as the definition of insurance agent in paragraph 2 applies to the paragraph 1 and 2 of Section 189, which is “any person who for compensation shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this section.” Without proof of compensation, directly or indirectly, received from the insurance policy or contract, Mapalad Aisporna may not be held to have violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act. “Under the Texas Penal Code 1911, Article 689, making it a misdemeanor for any person for direct or indirect compensation to solicit insurance without a certificate of authority to act as an insurance agent, an information, failing to allege that the solicitor was to receive compensation either directly or indirectly, charges no offense. In the case of Bolen vs. Stake,19 the provision of Section 3750, Snyder's Compiled Laws of Oklahoma 1909 is intended to penalize persons only who acted as insurance solicitors without license, and while acting in such capacity negotiated and concluded insurance contracts for compensation. It must be noted that the information, in the case at bar, does not allege that the negotiation of an insurance contracts by the accused with Eugenio Isidro was one for compensation. This allegation is essential, and having been omitted, a conviction of the accused could not be sustained. It is well-settled in our jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every element of the crime must be alleged and proved. After going over the records of this case, we are fully convinced, as the Solicitor General maintains, that accused did not violate Section 189 of the Insurance Act.”

CASE 2 – AISPORNA v. CA

FACTS:

11

1. Rodolfo S. Aisporna was duly licensed by Insurance Commission as agent to Perla Compania de Seguros, with license to expire on 30 June, 1970

2. Eugenio S. Isidro was issued a Personal Accident Policy by Perla thru its author representative, Rodolfo for a period of 12 months with beneficiary as Ana M. Isidro for P5,000

3. Personal Accident Policy insured died by violence during lifetime of policy

4. Fiscal filed against Mapalad Aisporna, wife of Rodolfo with violation of Sec. 189 of Insurance Law for having, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously acted, "as agent in the solicitation for insurance by soliciting the application of Eugenio S. Isidro for and in behalf of Perla Compaña de Seguros, ... without said accused having first secured a certificate of authority to act as such agent from the office of the Insurance Commission, Republic of the Philippines

5. Defense: she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and that policy was merely a renewal and was issued because Isidro had called by telephone to renew, and at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent and so she left a note on top of her husband's desk to renew

6. RTC and CA: guilty as charged

ISSUE: W/N the agent mentioned in the 1st paragraph of Sec. 189 of the Insurance Act is governed by the definition of an insurance agent found on its 2nd paragraph

HELD: NO. Reversed

Section 189 of the Insurance Act

“No insurance company doing business within the Philippine Islands, nor any agent thereof, shall pay any commission or other compensation to any person for services in obtaining new insurance, unless such person shall have first procured from the Insurance Commissioner a certificate of authority to act as an agent of such company as hereinafter

provided. No person shall act as agent, sub-agent, or broker in the solicitation of procurement of applications for insurance, or receive for services in obtaining new insurance, any commission or other compensation from any insurance company doing business in the Philippine Islands, or agent thereof, without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner, which must be renewed annually on the first day of January, or within six months thereafter. Such certificate shall be issued by the Insurance Commissioner only upon the written application of persons desiring such authority, such application being approved and countersigned by the company such person desires to represent, and shall be upon a form approved by the Insurance Commissioner, giving such information as he may require. The Insurance Commissioner shall have the right to refuse to issue or renew and to revoke any such certificate in his discretion. No such certificate shall be valid, however, in any event after the first day of July of the year following the issuing of such certificate. Renewal certificates may be issued upon the application of the company.

Any person who for compensation solicits or obtains insurance on behalf of any insurance company, or transmits for a person other than himself an application for a policy of insurance to or from such company or offers or assumes to act in the negotiating of such insurance, shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this section, and shall thereby become liable to all the duties, requirements, liabilities, and penalties to which an agent of such company is subject.

Any person or company violating the provisions of this section shall be fined in the sum of five hundred pesos. On the conviction of any person acting as agent, sub-agent, or broker, of the commission of any offense connected with the business of insurance, the Insurance Commissioner shall immediately revoke the certificate of authority issued to him and no such certificate shall thereafter be issued to such convicted person.”

Careful perusal of the provision shows:

1. First paragraph - prohibits a person from acting as agent, sub-agent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance

12

Commissioner (no necessity that a person solicits an insurance for compensation in order to be called an insurance agent)

2. Second paragraph - defines who is an insurance agent within the intent of this section (a person is an insurance agent if he solicits and obtains an insurance for compensation)

3. Third paragraph - prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its violation

- The appellate court has established ultimately that she did not receive any compensation for the issuance of the insurance policy of Eugenio Isidro.

It must be noted that the information, in the case at bar, does not allege that the negotiation of an insurance contracts by the accused with Eugenio Isidro was one for compensation. This allegation is essential, and having been omitted, a conviction of the accused could not be sustained. It is well-settled in Our jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every element of the crime must be alleged and proved.

CASE 3 - Manila Lodge No. 761 v. Court of Appeals

MANILA LODGE NO. 761 BENEVELONT & PROTECTIVE ORDER OF THE ELKS V CA

FACTS

1. On June 26, 1905 the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1360 which authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. The reclaimed area was to form part of the Luneta extension. The Act provided that the reclaimed area "shall be the property of the City of Manila" and that the City of Manila is authorized to set

aside a tract of the reclaimed land formed by the Luneta extension at the north end for a hotel site, and to lease the same, with the approval of the Governor General, to a responsible person or corporation for a term not to exceed 99 years.

2. Subsequently, the Philippine Commission passed on May 18, 1907 Act No. 1657, amending Act No. 1360, so as to authorize the City of Manila either to lease or to sell the portion set aside as a hotel site.

3. The total area reclaimed was a little over 25 hectares. The City of Manila applied for the registration of the reclaimed area, and on January 20, 1911, original certificate of title was issued in the name of the City of Manila. The title described the registered land [Translation: A land known under the name of Luneta Extension, situated in the district of Ermita.]

4. The registration was subject, however, to the encumbrances mentioned in Article 39 of the Land Registration Act as may be subsisting and [Translation: Subject to the dispositions and conditions provided by Act No. 1360; and subject also to contracts of sale celebrated and entered into by the City of Manila in favor of the Army and Navy Club and Manila Lodge No. 761 Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks (BPOE for short), dated 29th of December 1908 and 16th of January 1909.]

5. On July 13, 1911, the City of Manila conveyed 5,543.07 square meters of the reclaimed area to the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE on the basis of which a transfer certificate of title was issued to the latter over the "parcela de terreno que es parte de la Luneta Extension, Situada en el Distrito de la Ermita."[Translation: Parcel of land which is part of the Luneta Extension, situated in the District of Ermita]

6. At the back of this title was an annotated document which in part reads as follows: [Attempted Translation: That the said city of Manila has the legal option to repurchase the said property solely for public purposes, at any time after fifty years from the 13th of

13

July 1911, at the price previously paid to the buying entity or the future market price of the property, whichever value is higher.]

7. In January 1963 the BPOE petitioned the CFI of Manila, Branch IV, for the cancellation of the right of the City Manila to repurchase the property. This petition was granted on February 15, 1963.

8. On November 19, 1963 the BPOE sold for the sum of P4,700,000 the land together with all the improvements thereon to the Tarlac Development Corporation (TDC, for short) which paid P1,700,000 as down payment and mortgaged to the vendor the same realty to secure the payment of the balance to be paid in quarterly installments. At the time of the sale, there was no annotation of any subsisting lien on the title to the property.

9. On December 12, 1963 TCT No. 73444 was issued to TDC over the subject land still described as "Una parcela de terreno, que es parte de la Luneta Extension, situada en el Distrito de Ermita."

10. In June 1964 the City of Manila filed with the CFI of Manila a petition for the reannotation of its right to repurchase. The court, after hearing, issued an order, dated November 19, 1964, directing the Regrister of Deeds of the City of Manila to reannotate in toto the entry regarding the right of the City of Manila to repurchase the property after fifty years. From this order TDC and BPOE appealed to this Court which on July 31, 1968 affirmed the trial court's order of reannotation, but reserved to TDC the right to bring another action for the clarification of its rights.

11. After trial the court a quo rendered on July 14, 1972 its decision finding the subject land to be part of the "public park or plaza" and, therefore, part of the public domain. The court consequently declared that the sale of the subject land by the City of Manila to Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, was null and void; that plaintiff TDC was a purchaser thereof in good faith and for value from BPOE and can enforce its rights against the latter; and that BPOE is entitled to recover from the City of Manila whatever consideration it had paid the latter.

12. In its decision promulgated on June 30, 1975, the CA concurred in the findings and conclusions of the lower court.

ISSUES

1. WON the property subject of the action was patrimonial property of the City of Manila and not a park or plaza

2. WON the City of Manila is estopped from questioning the validity of the sale it executed on July 13, 1911 conveying the subject property to the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE

3. WON the CA has departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings in that it did not make its own findings but simply recited those of the lower court

HELD:

1. NO. We hold that it is of public dominion, intended for public use. a. Firstly, if the reclaimed area was granted to the City of

Manila as its patrimonial property, the City could, by virtue of its ownership, dispose of the whole reclaimed area without need of authorization to do so from the lawmaking body. Thus Article 348 of the Civil Code of Spain provides that "ownership is the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without further limitations than those established by law." The right to dispose (jus disponendi) of one's property is an attribute of ownership. Act No. 1360, as amended, however, provides by necessary implication, that the City of Manila could not dispose of the reclaimed area without being authorized by the lawmaking, body. Thus the statute provides that "the City of Manila is hereby authorized to set aside a tract at the north end, for a hotel site, and to lease the same x x x should the municipal board x x x deem it advisable, it is hereby authorized x x x to sell said tract of land x x x." If the reclaimed area were patrimonial property of the City, the latter could dispose of it without need of the

14

authorization provided by the statute, and the authorization to set aside, lease, or sell given by the statute would indeed be superfluous. To so construe the statute as to render the term "authorize," which is repeatedly used by the statute, superfluous would violate the elementary rule of legal hermeneutics that effect must be given to every word, clause, and sentence of the statute and that a statute should be so interpreted that no part thereof becomes inoperative or superflous. To authorizemeans to empower, to give a right to act. Act No. 1360 furthermore qualifies the verb "authorize" with the adverb "hereby," which means "by means of this statue or section." Hence without the authorization expressly given by Act No. 1360, the City of Manila could not lease or sell even the northern portion; much less could it dispose of the whole reclaimed area. Consequently, the reclaimed area was granted to the City of Manila, not as its patrimonial property. At most, only the northern portion reserved as a hotel site could be said to be patrimonial property, for, by express statutory provision it could be disposed of, and the title thereto would revert to the City should the grantee fail to comply with the terms provided by the statute.

b. Secondly, the reclaimed area is an "extension to the Luneta in the City of Manila." If the reclaimed area is an extension of the Luneta, then it is of the same nature or character as the old Luneta. Anent this matter, it has been said that a power to extend or continue an act or business cannot authorize a transaction that is totally distinct. It is not disputed that the old Luneta is a public park or plaza and it is so considered by Section 859 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila.

Hence the "extension to the Luneta" must be also a public park or plaza and for public use. TDC, however, contends that the subject property cannot be considered an extension of the old Luneta because it is outside of the limits of the old Luneta when extended to the sea. This is a strained interpretation of the term "extension," for an "extension" it has been held, "signifies enlargement in any direction-in length, breadth, or circumstances.

c. Thirdly, the reclaimed area was formerly a part of the Manila Bay. A bay is nothing more than an inlet of the sea. Pursuant to Article 1 of the Law of Waters of 1866, bays, roadsteads, coast sea, inlets and shores are parts of the national domain open to public use. These are also property of public ownership devoted to public use, according to Article 339 of the Civil Code of Spain. When the shore or part of the bay is reclaimed, it does not lose its character of being property for public use.

d. Fourthly, Act 1360, as amended, authorized the lease or sale of the northern portion of the reclaimed area as a hotel site. The subject property is not that northern portion authorized to be leased or sold; the subject property is the southern portion. Hence, applying the rule of expresio unius est exlusio alterius, the City of Manila was not authorized to sell the subject property. The application of this principle of statutory construction becomes the more imperative in the case at bar inasmuch as not only must the public grant of the reclaimed area to the City of Manila be, as above stated, strictly construed against the City of Manila, but also because a grant of power to a municipal corporation, as happens in this case where the city is authorized to lease or sell the northern portion of the Luneta extension, is strictly limited to such as are expressly or impliedly authorized or necessarily incidental to the objectives of the corporation.

e. Fifthly, Article 344 of the Civil Code of Spain provides that property of public use, in provinces and in towns, comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and public works of general service paid for by such towns or provinces." A park or plaza, such as the extension to the Luneta, is undoubtedly comprised in said article.

15

We have demonstrated that the Luneta extension was intended to be property of the City of Manila for public use. But, could not said property later on be converted, as the petitioners contend, to patrimonial property? It could be. But this Court has already said, in Ignacio v. The Director of Lands that it is only the executive and possibly the legislative department that has the authority and the power to make the declaration that said Property is no longer required for public use, and until such declaration is made the property must continue to form part of the public domain.

In the case at bar, there has been no such explicit or unequivocal declaration. It should be noted that courts are undoubtedly not primarily called upon, and are not in a position, to determine whether any public land is still needed for the purposes specified in Article 4 of the Law of Waters.

2. NO

Ratio The Government is never estopped by mistakes or errors on the part of its agents and estoppel does not apply to a municipal corporation to validate a contract that is prohibited by law or its against public policy.

Reasoning The sale of July 13, 1911 executed by the City of Manila to Manila

Lodge was certainly a contract prohibited by law. Estoppel cannot be urged even if the City of Manila accepted the benefits of such contract of sale and the Manila

Lodge No. 761 had performed its part of the agreement, for to apply the doctrine of estoppel against the City of Manila in this case would be tantamount to enabling it to do indirectly what it could not do directly. The sale of the subject property executed by the City of Manila to the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, was void and inexistent for lack of subject matter. [a park is outside the commerce of man] It suffered from an incurable defect that could not be ratified either by lapse of time or by express ratification. The Manila Lodge No. 761 therefore acquired no right by virtue of the said sale. Hence to consider now the contract inexistent as it always has been, cannot be an impairment of the obligations of contracts, for there was in contemplation of law, no contract at all. The inexistence of said sale can be

set up against anyone who asserts a right arising from it, not only against the first vendee, the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, but also against all its Successors, including the

TDC, which are not protected by law. The doctrine of bone fide purchaser without notice, being claimed by the TDC, does not apply where there is a total absence of title in the vendor, and the good faith of the purchaser TDC cannot create title where none exists. The restoration or restitution of what has been given is in order.

3. NO. We have shown in our discussion of the first issue that the decision of the trial court is fully in accordance with law. It follows that when such decision was affirmed by the CA, the affirmance was likewise in accordance with law. Hence, no useful purpose will be served in further discussing this issue.

Disposition The petitions are denied for lack of merit and the decision of the CA is affirmed, at petitioners' cost.

Extrinsic AidsA. Dictionaries

CASE 1 – ESTRADA v. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

1. Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate Informations charging Estrada for violation of Plunder Law, among others.

2. Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation and for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses to give the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause. (Vagueness of law never raised in the Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law)

16

3. Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding that “a probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused”

4. Motion for reconsideration was filed by Estrada but was denied by Sandiganbayan

5. Estrada moved to quash the Information on the ground that the facts alleged did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was UNCONSTITUTIONAL for VAGUENESS.

a. Failure for the law to provide definition of the terms “combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt or criminal acts”

b. They render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and violative of his fundamental right to due process

6. Sandiganbayan denied Motion to Quash. Issues for resolution raised before the Supreme Court.

Issues: WON R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on the following grounds: I. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE FOR ITS VAGUENESS II. IT VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO KNOW THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM III. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE BY LOWERING THE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE NECESSARY FOR PROVING THE COMPONENT ELEMENTS OF PLUNDER

Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

Ratio: In view of vagueness and ambiguity Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly

expressed in the Plunder Law. Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, 7 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words 8 The intention of the lawmakers — who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers — to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:"

Combination — the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters. Series — a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal succession.

Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law. As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan 9 that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2. . . under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him, follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.

With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case. The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed

17

conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld — not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.

Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute.

In view of due process On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy. The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.

What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill- gotten wealth.

B. Legislative History

a) Greenfield v. Meer, 77 Phil 394 FACTS:

Since the year 1933, the plaintiff has been continuously engaged in the embroidery business. In 1935, the plaintiff began engaging in buying and selling mining stocks and securities for his own exclusive account and not for the account of others. The plaintiff has not been a dealer in securities as defined in section 84 (t) of Commonwealth Act No. 466; he has no established place of business for the purchase and sale of mining stocks and securities; and he was never a member of any stock exchange. The plaintiff filed an income tax return where he claims a deduction of P67,307.80 representing the net loss sustained by him in mining stocks securities during the year 1939. The defendant disallowed said item of deduction on the ground that said losses were sustained by the plaintiff from the sale of mining stocks and securities which are capital assets, and that the loss arising from the sale of the same should be allowed only to the extent of the gains from such sales, which gains were already taken into consideration in the computation of the alleged net loss of P67,307.80.

ISSUE: Whether the personal and additional exemptions granted by section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 466 should be considered as a credit against or be deducted from the net income, or whether it is the tax on such exemptions that should be deducted from the tax on the total net income.

Held/Ratio: Personal and additional exemptions claimed by appellant should be credited against or deducted from the net income. "Exception is an immunity or privilege; it is freedom from a charge or burden to which others are subjected." (If the amounts of personal and additional exemptions fixed in section 23 are exempt from taxation, they should not be included as part of the net income, which is taxable. There is nothing in said section 23 to justify the contention that the tax on personal exemptions (which are exempt from taxation) should first be fixed, and then deducted from the tax on the net income. *SEE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

b) David v. COMELEC, GR No. 127116 18

FACTS:Barangay Chairman Alex David raised the question of when the

barangay elections should be held and questions the COMELEC’s schedule of holding such elections on the 2nd Monday of May 1997. The COMELEC’s basis is R.A. 7160 or the Local Government Code which mandates barangay elections every 3 years. Petitioner David contends that an earlier law, R.A. 6679, should be the one followed. R.A. 6679 provides that barangay elections should be held every 5 years. He also contends that there is a violation of Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the Constitution.

ISSUE:1. What the term of office of barangay officials is.2. W/N there was a violation of Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the Constitution.

HELD:1. It is basic in cases of irreconcilable conflict between two laws that the later legislative enactment prevails. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Paras v. COMELEC had the opportunity to mention when the next barangay election should be when it stated that “the next regular election involving the barangay office is barely 7 months away, the same having been scheduled in May 1997”.

2. No. Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that, ‘The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years…” It is not to be construed as prohibiting a 3-year term of office for barangay officials.

B. Explanatory Note

a) People v. Lidres, 108 Phil 995

FACTS: Dionisio Lidres and Josita Diotay filed their applications as substitute teacher for Magdalena Echavez. The Supervising teacher requested Diotay to sign an agreement, wherein both Diotay and defendant agreed to take over Echavez’ position on a “50-50” basis, e.i that is the period from January to March 1954, would be equally divided between them. Diotay then took over and began teaching.

However, on February 12, 1954, Lidres went to the school with a letter of resignation and asked Diotay to sign it, the latter refused. Lidres told Diotay that whether she like it or not, he would take over her class on February 22, 1954. True to his word Lidres went to the said class and insisted to take over. He held class with the half of the class and erased Diotay’s name from the attendance chart and place his own. Diotay informed the principal and the following day they were summoned by the supervising teacher, ordered Diotay to continue her teaching and advised Lidres not to go back to the school. Without heeding the said instruction Lidres without any authority whatsoever, again took over Diotay’s class against the latter’s will. Lidres was charged and prosecuted with the crime of Usurpation of official functions as defined and penalized in R.A. No. 10.

ISSUE: WON R.A. No. 10 is only applicable to members of subversive organizations engaged in subversive activities.

HOLDING: Court ruled that in examination of the discussion of House Bill No. 126, which became R.A No. 10, discloses indisputably that said Act was really intended as an emergency measure, to cope with the abnormal situation created by the subversive activities of seditious organizations at the time of its passage in September 1946. Hence, the elimination of the element of pretense of official position required under Article 177 of the RPC. And since it is neither alleged in the information nor proved during the trial that defendant is a member of a seditious organization engaged in subversive activities, he could not be liable or found guilty under said provision of R.A. No. 10. Granting, arguendo, that R.A. No. 10 is an amendment to Art. 177, and not merely an implementation thereof, the subsequent enactment of R.A. 379, effective June 14,1949, would constitute an amendment thereof restoring the element of pretense of official position in the offense of usurpation of official functions. Under R.A. 379, the law in force at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, pretense of official position is an essential element of the crime of usurpation of official functions. But the information specifically charges that defendant committed the offense “without pretense of official position.” Under the circumstances, the facts alleged in the information fail to constitute an offense.

19