5th SFG Lessons Learned 14 Nov 1967

8/4/2019 5th SFG Lessons Learned 14 Nov 1967

1/94

UNCLASSIFIEDAD NUMBER

AD390958CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

TO: unclassifiedFROM: confidential

LIMITATION CHANGESTO:Approved for public release, distribution

unlimited

FROM:DoD Controlling Organization: Departmentof the Army, Office of the AdjutantGeneral, Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITYAdjutant General's Office [Army] ltr dtd22 Oct 1974; Adjutant General's Office[Army] ltr dtd 22 Oct 1974

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED


2/94

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBERAD390958

CLASSIFICATION CHANGESTO

confidential

FROM

secret

AUTHORITY31 Aug 1970 per DoDD 5200.10 documentmarking

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED


3/94

Reproduced FromBest Available Copy,

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMYOFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN RaPtLY RFE1R TOAGAM-P (M) (8 Nov 67) FOR OT RD-670728 14 November 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 5th Special Forces Group(Abn)

Is t Special Forces, Period Ending 31 July 1967PTb15 docum.nt ooortoains rrOt a. :cting the atiorflTISEE BUTIONDefense of the U: "C>-Y - . OfthTO: SEE DEspionage Laws, lit: . -Its transliission or ti. r ,-* ......- ::' < j. awanner to an nthriQfP3 -'LW.1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by

USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC inaccordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and cor-rective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of re-ceipt of covering letter.2. Information contained in this report is provided to insureS>= appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current

r). operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material,C-.') BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

E)NETH G. WICKHAM1 Incl Major General, USAas The Adjutant GeneralDISTRIBUTION:Commanding Generals

US Continental Army CommandUS Army Combat Developments CommandCommandantsUS Army Command and General Staff CollegeUS Army War CollegeUS Army Air Defense SchoolUS Army Armor School "US Army Artillery and Miesile School . .LUS Army Aviation SchoolUS Army Chemical School iii.US Army Civil Affairs School .US Army Engineer SchoolUS Army Infantry SchoolUS Army Intelligence School REWDED UNCM.IsItD

Po R 0o- 9RO WHEN SPARATED FROM-CL IFIED INCL..SURE


4/94

SECRETDISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)US Army Medical Field Service SchoolUS Army M ilitary Police School

US Army Ordnance SchoolUS Army Quartermaster SchoolUS ArTay Security A4ency SchoolUS Army Signal SchoolUS Army Special Warfare SchoolUS Army Transportation SchoolCopies Furnished:Office, Chief of Staff, US ArmyDeputy Chiefs of StaffChief of Research and DevelopmentAssistant Chiefs of StaffChief of EngineersThe Surgeon General

The Provost Marahal GeneralResearch Analysis Corporation (Library)Dr. Martin J. Bailey, OSD(SA)National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Office of Defense AffairsJoint Action Control OfficeDocuments Control Officer, ATTN: W.M. Smith, Bell Aero Systems Co.Commanding GeneralsUS Army Weapons Command, ATTN: AHSWE-CPL101st Airborne Division C-)llth Infantry Brigade (Sep)Commanding Officers5th Battalion, 46th Infantry5th Battalion, 12th Infantry6th Battalion, 31sL Infantry31st Engineer Battalion (Cbt)5th Battalion, 42d Artillery (155mm-T)5th Special Forces Group (Abn), 1st Special Forces

2

MIS

S...... V .... IIf-.-


5/94

SECRET1))Sth SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE)16t SPECIAL FORCES

MI. ."OPERAT0IOI~AL REPORTFUR QUARTERLY PERIODENDIMt 31 JULY 1967 DONT~

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARSSECREDOD DIR 5200. 10


6/94

TABLE OF' CONTENTSPAGE

SECTION 1, Significant Organization or Unit Activities1. General ....... 12. Intelligence ....... 33. Operations and training .4a, Plans 4

b. Operations ...... 4c. Special Operations - -- 15d. Training - - - 16e. Aviation ...- 19f. Combat Developments -- - 194. Logistics ... 205. Revolutionary Development Support Activities - 22

6. Psychological Operations .--- 257. Personnel and Administration -- - 268. Medical ...... 289. Signal ....... 2910. Engineer ....-. 3111. Comptroller ---... 33

SECTION' 2, Commanders' Observations and RecomendationsPart I, Observations (Lesions Learned)

1. Personnel ..... 352. Operations .... 353. Training and Organization -- - 454. Intelligence ..... 465. Logistics -.... 496. Other -... 50

Part II, Recommendations --- 54INCLOSURES

1. Troop Disposition Lists and CTZ Maps2. Stat ist ical Data* 4. Concept of Operations, CY 68* 5. 5th SFGA Reg, Camp Opening, Closing, Conversion* 6. Turnover of Camps to VNSF* 7. Camp Hardening Checklist

8. Combat Developments* 9. Recondo School PO I10. Special ReP.rt on the Action at Camp Trvng Dung, 8 Apr 6f11. After Actior Report, Attack on C-nr Thien**12. After Action Report.. Operation 3lackjack 33***13. After Action Report, OperatLon Pikeseille, 6 Ju. - 3 Ju l 67

**14. After Action Report, Operation Blackjack 34

Fof/ o7 ,Ci 0ONTw470 7,;2 I'G. F 9


7/94

** 15. After Action Report, Blackjack 41 (Phase I and Phase II)** 16. After Action Report, Blackjack 41C (Opurati'cn Arrowhead)** 17. After A.ction Report, Blackjack 142k 18. After Action Report, B-52, OPORD 5-67* 19 . After Action Report, B-41, Le Dinh Dao ].0* 20 . After Action Report, B-41, Le Dinh Dao 9

* 21. Establishment of Rice Buying Association* 22. Report on Sawaill at Tra Bong23. Refugee Resettlement in the Central HighLands24. Misaing Refugees at Ba To I25. Company D Flood Plan (Cys 1 - 8 Only)

* Denotes withdrawn at Hqs, DA** Denotes withdrawn at Hqs, DA , to be published as Combat After Actions Report#67X080 J

*** Denote: Withdrawn at Hqs, DA, to be published as Combat After Actions Report#67X090 I

II


8/94

CON IDE. IIALL'DE", "..... OF.TH.AM.Y

{~HSPECXIAL FORCES &tUP (ATMCRB~~~ 15T SPECIAL F(]ECK;APO San Francisco-'2hO^..oBA?"1 Aus 41P

SUDJiCXT / raon1 t oriaterly Xe,Priod/nding 31 Ju3P 41P7.TRW: Ceounancing GeneralUnited Stat3s Army, Vietnam _ '

AP O 96375

THRUI Commiader-in-Chief "-tbited States Army PacUiiciAP O San Francisco,, %558 J -V 'L14

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force DevelopmentDepartment of the AxmyWashington, D. C. 20310 tI)SECTION I SIONIFICANT (R1GA:,,ATi,A CR UNIT ACTIVITES

1. (C) General Throughout the country OIDG operations during thepast quarter were characterized by aggressive pursuit of enemy units in thefield, numerous large-scale contacts, and several determined attempts by" theenemy to inflict defeats mo friendly elements. Shortly after the beginningof the reporting period, on 4 May, Camp Lang Vai was attacked by an estiiatedoompany size force supported by mozrtars an d aided frcm inside the camp by VCvho had infiltrated the CIDG units posing as recruits. One platoon of VCsucceeded in gaining entry to the camp, but was quickly ejected. Four dayslater, cn 8 hy, amp Con Thien was attacked by two battalions of tne oJ2tnhNVA Regiment with sappers attached. Supported by mortars, rockets, and-flamthrowers, the attackers made brief penetrations into the perimeter.,which was defended jointly by USOC, WhASF, VNSF, aid CIDG personnels Al-though 14 CIDG and 44 Vto Marines were killed In the action, the NVA paida high price. A total of 212 enemy bodies were counted the following day.,and many others were estimated to have been killed by airstrikes andDrt1iA3e1A ./7 DWGRADED AT 3 7R INTRiiV.AISDECLASSIFIED AFMTER 12 YEARS/ I' ')! )DOD D3R 5200,10( ~~ CONFID~ENTI AL


9/94

AVWJ-6 CONJFIDEN'TIAL 15A at 197?UJ]JW OperatiOnal Report fo r Cirt~orly Period Ending 31 July 1967VC and NVA forces have genorally shown increasing willingness toaoucpt. nvefre ]'----- In order- to - aocoxrqpliuh. l1W4+_-,i 6b-Ln qJ-vra.

Oasos during the last three months th e oenemy has massed his forces and madeoonoortod efforts to surround and ovuz-helm smaller C]DO units in the fioldd,dospite taling heavy casualties from airstrikes, artillery, and friendlydefeU1-ri flArs. PA% reaction by lff=-o Force units and sua-,porting fire-poer proved to be crucial factors nm extracting embattled CMG -units onthese occasions.

The increased tempo of fightixg: is mrlected in the statisticaldata for the reporting period. A total of 1,931 VC/NVA were klled, anincrease of 18% over the previous quarter. Also, there was a 26% increasein LW.SF Id.led, a 35% increase in CID0 killed, and a 7% increase in HFAF-killed. A significant number of the increased friendly casualties wore theresult of mines and booby traps.Special operations continued to penetrat, enemy base areas an d inter-dict routes of infiltration. Three operations were particularly noteworthyfor their taotical developments. Blackjack 33 was the first opu.-t!on inwhich a mobile guerrilla force was employed in conjunction with long rangereconnaissance elements (Project Sigma). On 13 May two Mike Force companiesfrom Nha Trang conducted a parachuto assault in the Seven Mountains region ofIV CTZ. A quick reaction operation, the Jump was made only 18 hours afterapproval was given. Blackjack 42 marked the first infiltraLion by sea ofSpecial Forces assets into an enemy base area.In IV CT Z much effort was dovoted to preparations for the upcomingfMlod season. A training program with empbasis on boat tactics and operationewas implemented, and campa were improved and rebuilt to withstand the floodwaters. The airboat facility at Cao Lanh was completed in May, but sufferedsevere damage during the VC attack on 3-4 Jtly. The VC evidently realizethe tactical potential of the airboats in flooded areas and are attemptingto eliminate them before the season begins.Two CIDG camps, Plei Mrong and Vinh Gia, were turned over to VNSFoontrol and the USASF detachments withdrawn. These are the first two campsto be turned over under a program desigred to conserve USASF irsnpower andtlhu facilitate the opewing of new cwnps in other locations.Revolutionary Development support activities were highligbted bytwo highly successful refugee resettlement projects, one at Bmnard in 7!ICT Z and the other In the vicinity of Camps Due Co and PIVi X10 J eProvince. Other highlights were the building of a sawmill at Tm Bong andthe establishment of a riLe buying association in I CTZ. The handling ofrefugees in the vicinity of Ba To left much to be desired, but wa s significantin that many valuable lessons were learned from this experienoe,The Group' a Concept of Employment for CY 1968 was completed this-quarter and was submitted to COMUSMACV for approval. Planning has beeninitiated on the implementation of the proposed concept.

2CONF DENTI AL


10/94

CONFA DENTIAL2. (C) Intelligence:

a. During the reporting period th: orientation and s"bsequintdoployment of the M1 augmentation detachment, throughtout all Four Corps Tac-tical Zones, was accomplished. In consideration of the country-wide missionof -i .'pv rurcea G~roup "bI1n), was concluded the nl auguentation det-ichmept could most effective]y be employed usirg a field team conceyt. Fourfield teams and a headquarte.rs team were organized. The composition of eachfield team is as follows:

1. Counter Intelligence/Counter Espionage Section - 5 to 8personnel.

2. Collection Section - 3 to 6 personnel..Analysis 5ectio

(a) 3. to 3 photo interpreters(b) 2 interrogators(c) 4 to 6 0B specialists

In addition to field teajrs and headquarters team, select persozmel were ass-igned in support of Group spo:cial operations.b. The regulations, directives, reporting procedures, and guido-

lizics outlining the scope, purpose, and objectives of the Group intelligenceprogram were published in final fona. These publications include MilitanfIntelligence Program, Intelligence Infoxmition Reporting Procedures, M ilitaryIntelligence Opcratioral Planning Procedure, Source Ldministratien Procedure,and Intelligence Fvnd Expenditure and Reporting Procedure. A new program,subject: Effective Means of Combating the Viet Gong InfrastruCture, was coM-pleted in draft form. This program is being coordinated with ICEX (U) rep-resentatives fo r region I1 arid ',Lll be coordinated in all carp tattical zones-Aien completed in final form.

c. The emphesis of tha intelligence effort, since formulation ofbasic programs has bar completcd, is shifting to the timely acquisition, add-lvrate reprorting; thorough and speedy analysis, and rapid dissemination of in-telli-eire back down tv ihe "MA-dutschment. Produrti.n of tactical Bcontinuesto reeeive prio:it, emphasis sinice this type intelligence is vital to survivalof the"fi' detachments. Production olf infrastructure intelligence is beingupgraded but will, of necessity, remain the secondary effort at preseit.

3CONFI DENT I AL


11/94

CONF IDENT IAL 5VGB-C 15 Auigs tu,u~rSUJBJFET: Operational Report for Quareriy Perlod Ending 31 Ju]4 19673. (C) Operabioa6 and Training'

a. Plans(1) During this quarter, the companies submitted inputfor the group CY 1968 Conceit of Operations. This input was incorporatedinto the Q.roup country plan end submitted to COWJSMACV. See Incl 4.(2) Contingency plans io r employment at the 5th SFGAassets in a general war posture were published.(3 ) Studies are presently being conducted to determinethe feasibility of utilization of the USkSF/VNSF/CIDG as Vietnamese border

police during the post hostilities period.(4) Planning continues for the implementation of th eremainder of the CY 1967 Group concept fcu deployment of CIDG camps.Dar:ng the second semester of CY 1967, six CIBM campt; will be convertedand six new camps established.(5) Planning has been initiated for the implementationof the propozed CIY 1968 concept of operations.

b. Operations.(1) Summa y of significant operations by Corps Tactical

Zone-s.(a) I CIZ: On 4 May at 0330 hours, Camp Lang Vei,A-101, Quang Tri Province, was subjected to an attack by an estimated com-pany size force supported by mortars. About one platoon of VC gained entryinto the cwmp. With the assistance of fire support from Khe Sanh, enemyelements were repelled from the camp by 0500. Two UASF were killed iud

five wouvded; 17 CIDG were killed, 35 woumded, and 38 missing. Enemy losseswere seven killed and five wounded. Subseouent intelligenue and PW inter-rogation hes indicated that the attackers w.es aided from inside the campVC who had infiltrated the CIDG units posing as recruits. One PW said thathe had been contacted by the VC prior to the attack rnd directed to jointhe CIDG at Lang Vei in order to obtain information on the camp. AfterJoining th 0CDG, subject recruited four other CIDG to assist him. Onemar wa s to dtet.dne the locations o9 f all bunkers within the camp, thestcond was tV ronort on all the buard positions and how well the postswere nkuvned, the thirdwas to make a slei.ch of the camp, and the fourth wasto report on supp'lies brouht into the camp from Khe Sanh. The VC contactedsubject IW on four occasions prior to the 4 May attack to obtain the infor-mation tnat had been collected. On the night of the attack, subject FW andant,"i L CUIDG tv&blolo the camp guards and led the VWforce thiough thewire and s:!ne fJ eld defei.>


12/94

SAVGB-C CONFIDENTIAL15 August 1967SUBJECT: Operational Rep)rt for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967On Tay at 0150 hours, RF OP #1 in Son Ila District, Quang Ngai Prcw-inco, was hit by mortar, recoilless rifle and small arm- fire from an est-imated two company force. RF forces manning the 01' returned fire, supportedby AG-47's and 4.2 inch mortar fire frcza Camp Ha Tlhanh, A-104. The enemyfinally broke -entact at 0735 hours while an airstrike wa s in progress. Anexploitation foree from Camp Ha Thanh confirmed the following enemy losses:

30 VC killed, two wounded, and 14 individual weapons captured. Also, per-sonnel on the OP observed the enemy carrying dead and wounded as they with-drew. Friendly casualties were one RF killed end two wounded.On 8 May Camp Con Thien, A-lie, Quang Tri Frovince, wa s attacked at0230 hours by tw o battalions of the 812th NVA Regiment with sappers attached.The assault was supported by mortars, rockets, and flame throwers. Artil-lery and air support were employed against the enemy throughout the attack.Th e perimeter, vhich was defended jointly by USMC, USAF, VNSF, an d CIDGpersonnel, was penetrated at tw o positions. Of the 212 enemy confirmedkilled in the attack, 38 were credited to USASF/VNSF/CIDG forces. Friendlylosses were 14 CIDG killed, four USASF and 16 CIDG wounded, two CIDG mis-sing, in addition to 44 URIC killed, 11 0 USMC and five USNCB wounded.Enemy weapons captured included four flame throwers, four crew-servedweapons, 12 4Omm rockets, and over 100 individual weapons. Throughout themonth of May the camp wa s subjected to constant harassing fire by mortars,artillery, rockets, and recoilless rifles. The total number of roundsreceived was over 1,500; on one occasion some 250 rounds landed in a per-iod of four minutes,On 13 May a combat patrol from ha To, A-106, Quang Ngai Province,consisting of two USASF and 30 CIDG working in conjunction with elementsfrom Task Force Oregon in Operation Malheur, made contact with an estim-ated platoon of VC, resulting in 21 enemy killed, six wounded, one rifle andtwo LMG's captured. One USASF was wounded. On 18 May another combat oper-aticn of the same composition, while at their night patrol base, made contactwith an estimated squad of VC attempting to penetrate the CIDG perimeter.The engagement resulted in 17 enemy killed, on e 60mm mortar and three AK 50submachineguns captured. Friendly losses were tw o CIDG missing, one ofwhom later returned to the camp. On 25 May a patrol of 50 CIDG qnd twoUSASF from Thuong Duc, A-109, Quang Nam Frovinci, made contact with anestimated tw o squads of VC resulting in nine VC killed, one captured, andfive individual weapons captured. There were no friendly casualties in theencounter.Operations from Tra Bong, A-107, Quang Ngai i rovince, accounted for muchcf the action during June, -ith four significant contacts. On 12 J-ne acompany size combat patrol came under heavy automatic weapons and smallarms fire from a platoon size enemy force resulting in one CIDG killed; threeUSASF, 24 C1DG, and one interpreter wounded. A platoon size helibornecperation engaged an estimated company of VC on 19 June, resulting in twoVC killed, seven captured, 2D bunkers, 159 structures, and 1500 kilos ofrice destroyed. Seven secondary explosions were observed and 57 VC werekilled durirn airstrikes requested by the patrol. On 22 Jume another pla-toom sizs operation from Tra Bong made contact with an estimated company of

5COOF IDENT I AL


13/94

CONF I DENTA LAVGB-C 15 August 1967iUOT'l': Operational Report for Quarterly lturiod Erzdit, 31V.Uy .L7.vVC in fortified positions resulting in two CIDG killed and two wounded.Encmy losses were one VC killed and four bunkers destroyed. Finally, on27 June a reconnai5sance patrol 4ade contact with one eneay squad, produ-cing five VC killed without incurring any friendly casualties. In otheractions during the month, a reconnaissance patrol from Ha Thanh, A-104,Quang Ngai Province, was ambushed on 12 June by two companies of VC. OneUSASF and two CIDG were killed, four CIDG wrunded, and two individualweapons lost. On 28 June a platoon size patrol from Minh Long, A-108,Quang Ngai Province, killed four VC and captured one along with oneweapon. No friendly casualties were sustained in this operation.On 19 July a hleliborne operation from Gia Vuc, A-103, Quang NgaiProvince, received sniper fire from an unknown number of VC while beinginserted. During the remainder of the day/three more contacts were madewith elements up to company size. Total results were nine VC killed, eightVC wounded, one CIDG killed, and seven CIDG wounded. On 25 July a companysize heliborne operation with two USASF from Camp Tien I huoc, A-102, inQuang Tin Province, made contact with an estimated two companies of VC armedwith mortars, automatic weapons, and small arms. The VC succeeded in sur-roundiin, the CIDG, who attempted to break out of the encirclement by adjust-ing airstrikes and artillery fire on the enemy positions but were forced tobreak up into small groups in order to evade the superior enemy force.Helibo- rae medevac, and extraction of small groups of CIDG were =complishedunder intensa enemy fire. A company size reaction force from .... camp wa sunable to link up with the besieged friendly unit due to heavy enemy activity.On 28 July one CIDG company and two USASF from Camp Tien rhuoc and ane con-pany from Camp Thuong Duc, A-109, in Quang Nam Irovince, were heliliftedinto the battle area. Supported by airstrikes and artillery, they conducteda -sweep operation in order to pick up stragglers and recover bodies ofpersonnel killed in the action on 25 July. Ten CIDG bodies were recovered,and one USASF who had been missing since 25 July was able to contact thefriendly unit. The totaI results were 16 CIDG killed, one USASF and sixCIDG wounded, one VNSF and 22 CIDG missing in action. Forty weapons andthree radios were lost. Confirmed enemy losses were 58 VC killed. On20 July a CIDG/RF/i-F operation, with four U-SASF, fram Camp Tra Bong, A-l'7,in Quang Ngai Province made contact with seven'VC while in a blocking posi-tion in support of a comoined ARVN/ROK Marine operation. Six VC werekilled, and two weapons, two grenades, and one improvised mine seized with-out incurring any friendly casualties.

(b) II CTZ: Between 8 and 14 May a search and de-stroy operation from Mang Buk, A-246, Kontum Province, made six separatecontacts resulting in a total of 16 VC killed, one captured, and six weaponscaptured. These results were achieved with no friendly losses. On 15 Mayat 0920 hours, four USASF, four VNSF and 230 0IDG from Dak To, A-244, KontumProvince, received 60mm mortar fire. At 0930 hours, the operation madeheavy contact with an NV A company. On the 16th at 1500 hours, one companyof CM)CG from Dak Seang, A-245, Kontum Province, had been helilifted in toreinforce the Dak To operation. On 17 May, one company of Mike Force and6

CO NF !DENT IAL


14/94

CONF I DENTI 1A LAVGB-C 15 August 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967ono company of CiDG from Dak To were helilifted to reinforce the operation.On the 20th they has returned to their respective locations. Results ofthe operation: tw o USASF and seven CIDG killed, two USASF and 14 CIDGwounded, eight hVAilled and on e weapon captured.T O 4 MVy at 0200, a combined operation, 'ith on e C0iV company fromT; n Rai, A-223, and one CIDG company fram An Lac, A4.234, Darlac I rovir cc,was attacked. Th e multi-company assault came from two directions an d wassupported by 50 to 60 rounds of 81mm mortar fire. The VC were armed withlight machinpguns an d other assorted small arms. The Tan Rai company wasdriven from its position, but the An Lac ccmpany held. At approximately0245 hours, two gun ships and an AC-47 arrived, and the VC attack slowedto sporadic fire fights. At first light thu firing ceased. At 0700 hoursan ARVN Ranger battalion was air landed south of the battle area. The TanRai company suffered one USASF and seven CIDG killed, one USASF and nineCIDG wounded. The An Lac company ha d 10 CIDG killed, two USASF and 19CIDG wounded. VC losses were nine killed, one RYD LMG and two carbinescaptured.On 30 May at 0940 hours, an operation frcm Cung Son, A-221 Ph u YenProvince, made contact with an NVA company plus. Gun ships and fighterswere on station at approximately 1000 hours. The initial contact was brokenat 1145 hours whnen the NVA withdreu. Th e operation was reinforced by an-other search and destroy operation in the same area and gave pursuit.Sporadic contacts continued until 1340 hours. Th e results of the contactwere on e USASF and three CIDG killed, seven CIDG wounded, 16 NVA killed an d11 weapons captured. O n 3 June at 0150 hours, Camp Cung Son received 11rounds of 120mm or 4.2 inch mortar fire. There was no damage since allrounds landed outside the camp's perimeter. This attack - the first timethe camp has ever been mortared - was probably in retaliation for lossessuffered on 29 and 30 May.A patrol from Dong Tre, A-222, V'hu Yen Frovince, came under heavy au-tomatic fire on 5 June. One CIDG company was dispatched to reinforce, butalso came into heavy contact. Numer.ous airstrikes were called in, andon e Mike Force Company from ileiku was sent to the Dong Tre camp to reinforcethe operation. The results of the contact were 28 CIDG killed, seven wounded,nine missing, 14 small arms and on e 60mm mortar lost. There were seven VCkilled. A villager reported that he had helped bury 28 VC bodies on thenight of 5 June. An agent reported 43 VC had been killed in the contact.On the 4th of June a search and destroy operation from Trung Dung, A-502,Khanh Hoa Province, made a series of contacts, resulting in 12 VC killed,nine weapons and various documents captured. On 12 June a patrol fromPlateau Gi, A-234, Kontum Province, sighted an NVA company moving alonga trail. A hasty ambush was set up, and the ensuing fire fight lastedapproximately one hour. Results were on e CIDG killed and two wounded, 23NVA killed, six enemy weapons and documents captured.On 14 June a CIDG cnit from Camp Dak To, A-244, Kontum Province, brokean d fled from their night perimeter under attack by an estimated NVA company.T-w USASF and eight C)DG were left missing, six CIDG killed and Ul CIDGwounded. One NVA was confirmed killed and ten estimated killed. Later

7CONFItD ENTIAL


15/94

CONF DENTIALAVGB-C 15 August 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly leriod Ending 31 July 1967that morning a Mike Force company vdth four USASF was deployed to searchfor and recover the missing personnel. On 15 June the operation initiatedcontact with an estimated hVA campany. The Mike Force unit was overrun,resulting in two more USt.SF missing. Th e Mike Force Company Commanderrallied three squads and attempted to move forward but was beaten back bythe intense fire. As the enemy fire continued, the companr fled leaving thetwo USASF with ten men. After resorting to E&E tactics, these individualsrejoined the main body and established a perimeter. On 16 June, when allstragglers had been gathered, the unit returned to Da k To. Results of thisaction were two USASF and eight Mike Force personnel killed, 14 Mike Forcepersonnel wounded. At 0430 hours the followirg morning, on 17 June, thecamp received a mortar attack lasting approximately on hour. Three USASF,three attached US, seven Mike Force, and five CIDG were wounded; two CIDGand one Mike Force killed. Additionally, five CIDG dependents were killedand seven..wounded.A search and destroy operation from Van Canh, A-223, I hu Yen rrovince,made contact on 19 June uith an NVh company which was well entreched. Sixairstrikes were placed on the enemy positions, after which they withdrew.The CIDG then swept the area. The results were two CIDG killed, one USASFand four CIDG wounded. There were 17 NV. killed and two weapons captured.On 27 June a survillance operation from iolei Kleng, A-241, Kontum rrovince,made contact with tuo NV A compaines. Two airstrikes were called in, res-ulting in nine NV A confirmed killed and another 155 estimated killed.Elements of a screening operation from Plateau Gi, A-243, in KontumProvince, made contact with a reinforced NVIL company at 1500 hours on 11July. Th e operation received autonatic weapons and 82nm mortar fire until2030 hours. At this time contact was broken with the aid of artilleryfire. Results of the contact were six CIDG wounded, nine NV A killed, andtwo AK-47' s captured. On 8 July an ambush and search and destroy operationfrom Trang Phuc, A-233, Darlac Province, made contact with an NV A platoon.A ten minute firefight ensued after which the NV A broke contact. On the9th at 1200 hours, the operation ambushed ten INA moving along a trail.The NV A immediately broke contact and fled. Results of the two contactswere six NV A killed, four small arms and one crew served weapon captured.On e CIDG was wounded. On 18 July a CIDG element from Cung Son, A-221, inIhu Yen Province ambushed one company of NVA carrying large quantities ofrice. The INA were armed with ^dK-47's and two M-16 rifles. Results of theambush were one CIDG killed, one CIDG wounded, nine NV A killed and one M-16rifl e captrued.On the 23rd at 1600 hours, a search and destroy operation from Camp DakSeam', A-245, Kontum Province, consisting of two USASF, two VNSF and 70tCDG, =ade contqct with an estimated company of IAVA preparing night def-ensiv posibioms. A firefight ensued, after which the friendly elementroki contact 7iAth t ho aid of artillery and airstrikes. One CIDG was kIlledcui.Jnie wounded, one VNSF and one CIDG were missing. At 1800 hours on the23rd a 70 ma n r-action force was dispatched to sweep the area of contact,and thv fulloving morning this element was reinforced by an addLitional 80CIDG. At 1100 hours the operation engaged in a brief firefight with an

CONFIDENTIAL


16/94

CONFIDEWT IALAVGB-C 15 August 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967estimated company of NVA, resulting in tnree CIDG woundod. The nexi; day,25 July, the body of on e VNSF that wa s previously carried as missing wasrecovered by the operation. Results of the two contacts were one CIDGkilled, 14 CIDG wounded, on e ClDG missing and one VNSF killed. Equipment1ossev were tw o BAR's seven carbines and tw o HT-I radios.During the reporting period CIDG operations have been conducted insupport of the following major operations in II CTZ: Francis Marion (4thInf Div), Greely (173rd Abn Bde), Stillwell (4th Inf Dive, Pershing (1stCay Div), and ROK operations conducted 9-31 July.

(c) III CTZ: Throughout the reporting periodnumeroUs casualties were caused by mines and booby traps, especially inHau Nghia and Long An Provinces. Camp Prek Klok, A-322, Ta y Ninh Prov-ince, wa s constantly harassed by enemy mortar attacks. US coidhter-mortarradar at Prek Klok plotted enemy positions as close as 1000 meters from thecamp during these attacks.On 9 May, a two company CIDG operation from Hiep Hca was in an advat-tageous position to react to a multi-company VC force which had made an attacon two River Assault Group boats which wore patrolling the Oriental River.The CIDG operation intercepted and pursued the withdrawing VC units. Closeair support an d reinforcements deployed by both Hiep Hoa and Tra Cu, A-352,aided in the destruction of the enemy. Forty-nine enemy were killed duringthis action. Again on 16 1ay, a company operation from Hiep Hoa made contactwith a multi-company VC force. Elements of the 1/27 and 2/27 Infantry, 25thUS Infantry Division, were deployed by helicopter as reinforcements, and theoperation ended i'th 34 enemy killed.On 6 May. Camp Tong Le Chon, A-334, Binh Long irovince, came under aheavy mortar attack by an estimated VC battalion rdinus, resulting in sixMike Force personnel killed, 39 wounded, one CIDG killed and three wounded.On 26 May at Camp Tong Le Chen, a Mike Force operation made contact witha large enemy force including a hospital staff, narses, and patients, approximately eight kilometers north of the camp. Heavy contact was maintainedfor appraximately three hours. The Mike Force assaulted the enemyts forti-tied nsitions. and artillery and airstrikes were called in. The operationreceived an ammunition resupply as well as reinforcements. The enmyfinally withdrew northwest towards Cambodia. Friendly losses in this actionwere one USASF killed, one wounded, four Mike Force killed and 22 wounded.Two VC were killed, an d assorted medical supplies and documents were capt-ured. On 14 May a CIDG company minus operation from Ch i Linh, A-333, BinhLong Province, made contact with an estimated VC company armed with assortedsmall arms and automatic weapons includirg M-16 rifles. A 45 minute fire-fight resulted in one USASF killed, five CIDG killed, 13 CIDG wounded andthree weapons lost. An AC-47, airstrikes, and artillery were called in,which caused the VO to break contact an d flee in all directions. Five VCwere confirmed killed with an unknown number killed or wounded by airstrikesOn 28 May, a CIDG operation from Chi Linh made contact with an estimatedplatoon. The friendly element called in artillery and airstrikes and engage

9CONF IDENT I AL


17/94

CoNFI DENT I ALAVGB-C 15 August 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967the enemy with small arms fire. The enemy' broke contact immediately vwththe friendly element in close pursuit. Several minutes later, the friendlyelement was attacked by an estimated VC company. During the ensuing fire-fight, radio contact was lost with the ground force and a radio was droppedin. Friendly casualties from this action were one USASF killed, one wounded,three CIDG killed, eight wounded, ten weapons and one 1R0-25 radio lost.Five enemy were killed.On 4 June a company size operation in the vicinity of Hiep Hoa, A-351,Hau Nghia Province, made several contacts accounting for a total of nineVC killed. Two USASF were wounded, one CIDG killed and four wounded; mostof the friandly casualties were caused bk booby traps. On 11 June a KikeForce operation it. the vicinity of Chi Linh, A-333, Binh Long I rovince,made contact with an estimated VC company. The enemy was deployed on lineand fired assorted small arms, automatic weapons, and 82m mortars. Friendlyforces returned the fire and called in artillery, a FAC, and a light fireteam. Alter 45 minutes, the enemy broke contact and withdrew, leaving sevenkilled and assorted equipment. No friendly casualties were sustained.A patrol conducted in the vicinity of Loc Ninh, A-331, Binh Long 1ro-vince, made contact on 22 June with five VC. After five minutes the VWbroke contact with friendly elements in pursuit. This contact resulted inone VC killed. Later that afternoon the element in pursuit rmade contactwith a VC battalion which opened fire from three sides using automaticweapons. Th e friendly element took a defensive position and called fo r alight fire team and air strikes which caused the enemy to withdraw. On23 June contact was made with the point elemnt of a VC company, but wasbroken with no casualties reported. At 1400 hours the 4th Mike rorceCompany arrived by helicopter and linked up with the operation. All elem-ents were placod in a deiensive positimn, and H&I fire was directed onsuspected VC locations. At 0837 hours on 24 June, the combined force dis-covered 10 VC killed by airstrikes and two enemy weapons. At 1058 hoursa M EDEVAC aircraft was fired on by two VC squads. After an exchange offire, the VC withdrew, with the combined force in pursuit. Contact wasagain made with two squads of VC firing automatic weapons, and broken at1202 hours. Still in-pursuit, the combined force made contact with anestimated VC company. The VC. broke contact and withdrew after -+4i1 -rand airstrikes had been called in. This entire operation resulted in 21VC killed and five enemy weapons captured. Friendly forces sustained oneUSASF, seven CIDG, two Mike Force personrel, and one interpreter killed;27 CIDG and four Mike Force personnel wounded; five rifles and tow radioslost.

On 28 June an estimated VC platoon initiated contact wi..h anotheroperation from Loc Ninh. Friendly elementp moved into defensive positionswith 105mm and 175mm artillery in support. A light fire team and tacticalaircraft were requested. At 1220 hours the enemy positions were reinforced,bringing the total estimated VC strength to a company or larger. One USASFwas killed, two USASF wounded, five CIDG killed and 24 CIDG wounded. Medicalevacuation could not be accomplished because of intense ensmy fire and adverseweather conditions in the operational area. At 1620 hours two Mike Forcecompanties were helilifted from Loc Ninh to reinforce the friendly elements.

10CONF DENT IAL


18/94

CONFID EtdTI ALAVG8-C 15 August 1967SUBJECT: Operational Repor. for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967T'le two Miku Force Cmp. ies linked up with fri.ndly _Arments i.ithout in-cident. The VC withdrew, and by 1900 hours ovacuation of the dead an dwounded was completed. At dawn on 29 June the contact area wa s assessed,revealing one VC killed by airstrikes and four additional CIDG killed.At 0955 on 12 July a search and destroy operation consisting of 87 CIDGand two USASF from Tcng Le Chon, A-334, Binh Long 1'rovrnce, sighted anostimated VC regimemt moving along a trail. Friendly elements opendd firewith small arms and withdrew to a defensive perimeter, calling in 105mmand 175rm artillery on the enemy positions. Contact wa s broken at IOhours. No friendly casualties were sustained. At 1535 hours this operationmoved back to the contact area to assess the artillery damage and was am-bushed by an estimated two companies of VC. Friendly elements returned thefire, called 105Omm and 175mm artillery into the VC positions, and, under theprotection of an airstrike, withdrew again to defensive positions. Sporadicsmall arms fire was received until 1800 hours. Results of this operationwere three CIDG killed, three wounded and three missing; one USASF wounded,and ten VC killed. At 1140 hours on 19 July a local security element atCamp Irek Klok, A-322, Tay Ninh Frovince, made contact with a VC platoon.After a short.exchange of fire in which one CIDG was wounded, the VC plat-oon withdrew. At 1627 hours Camp 1 ek Klok received 12 rounds of 82mmmortar fire. Ten rounds landed on the inner perimeter and two rounds onthe perimeter wire. Counter-mortar fire was employed and artillery directedinto suspected VC firirn positions. One CIDG was killed; one USASF, 11CIDG and two civilian mechanics wounded. On 27 July a waterborne searchand destroy operation consisting of two companies of CIDG, four USASF andthree VNSF, made contact with an estimated company of VC ten kilometersnorthwest of Ben Sol, A-321, Tay Ninh Province. After a ten rinute firefihtthe VC broke contact and withdrew; results of this contact were one':VC--.-killed and four wounded, two CIDO killed, 1i CIDG and one USASF wounded,nine boats and one .3D ca l light machinegun slightly damageds

(d) IV CTZ: On 2 May,,two companies of CIDG fromMy Phuoc Tay initiated contact with two VC companies. After a two hourfirefight, 21 VC were confirmed killed, And three small arms, a large amountof documents, assorted equipment and ammunition were captured. (X& 4 hayOJAe Lp1.A.?Uat IO 11J 'Llu.Oil VI aUU%;%AA.LI.' C%%, 13,YJU .Ahplatoon. A ten minute firefLight ensued during which the CIDG were supportedby 4.2 inch mortars and 105mm howitzers. Results of the contact were 16VC killed. Camp Ba Xoai, A-421, Chau Doe Province, was attacked by a rein-forced VC company on 19 May. The enemy employed 57mm ana 75mm recoillessrifles, 6Omm and 81um, mortars, machine guns. and small arms in the attack.Th e camp was not physically assaulted; all firing was from approximately600 meters out. Th e camp was supported by artillery from Chi Lang TrainingCenter and by AC-47'aircraft. After a firefight lasting approximately twohours, the VC broke contact and withdrew west toward Cambodia. Frindlylosses were one CIDG killed, three CIDG and four USASF wounded; the teamhouse, vehicles and TR-20 radio were damaged. There were no confirmed VCcasualties, but three litters and bloody clothing were fowid, indicatingat least six VC casualties.

CONF'l b E1NT IAL


19/94

COi'FI DENT IAL

ZVGB-C 15 hug-ust 1967SUBJECT: Operntion!nl Rewport f r Qux.rtvrl-y , ori Ed!cin 31 July 1967A company of CIDG from i hu Quoc, A-441, Kien Giang Province, made con-

tact on 4 June with an unknown number of VC approximately ten kilometerssoutheast of camp. After a short fire fight the VC broke contact and with-drew with the friendly element in pursuit. Friendly losses were on USASFan d tw o CIDG killed, while the emezy suffered 11 killed and 11 weaponsaelzed. Operation Le Dinh Dao 10 , 8-11 June, was the first major foot-mobile operation conducted by the CIDG over a sustained period of time inthe VC controlled area known as the "Pocket" in southeastern Kien TuongProvince. Eight hundred CIDG troops were employed initially, including troopsfrom Camps My An, Kinh Quan II, Tuyen Nhon, and My Phuoc Tay. On the firstday of the operation, 8 Juno, an additional 15 0 CIDG from Camp Binh ThanhThon were airlanded to reinforce units from My rhuoc Tay uhich had madeheavy contact as they moved into the operational area. Contact with theenemy, elements of the 261st Bn of the Dong Thap I Regiment, lasted approx-imately five hours. Sporadic contact continued for the next two days;however, no Ojor VC units wore encountered. Results of the operation in-cluded 32 VC killed, 13 captured (wounded also); five CIDG killed; 25 CIDG,one VNSF, two USASF, and one helicopter crewman wounded. In addition,72 rounds of 81ms mortar ammunition, four weapons, and 10 kg of documentswere captured, and numerous bunker, structures, and sampans destroyed.On 28 June at 0955 hours, Operation Le Dinh Dao 9, a search an d destroyoperation from M oc Hoa, B-41, Kien Tuong Province, consisting of ten com-mitted CIDG companies supported by tactical air and helicopters with threeCIDG companies in reserve, amade contact uith a reinforced VC company approx-imately 30 kilometers south of Moc Hoa. The VC used rockets, 6Omm mortars,.50 cal machine &no,, .30 cal machine guns, and assorted small arms in attack-ing a CIDG comyvny. After five minutes of close combat the VC withdrewsoutheast and deployed in a defensive position. The CIDG company was rein-forced by another CIDM company and air strikes an d armed helicopters weredirected aga.not the VC. Sporadic contact was made throughout the day withcompany sizs elements of the VC 263rd Main Force Battalion. Friendly losseson 23 Jiune wer- three USASF, on e VNSF and 19 CIDG killed; (= jUS, SF, One VN'SFand 20 GIDG woundedl 40 CIDG missing. 'Y losses were 50 killed, four woundedand tw o captured. On 29 June at approximately 0900 hours all the CIDGcompanies were pulled out, and a reaction force consisting of tito Mike Forceand six CIDG companies was committed in the contr.ct area to seal off anddestroy the VC. The Mike Force companies swept south through the contactarea making a total of six cntacts which resulted in 24 VC killed and fourcaptured, with no friendly losses. Thirty-one bodies of the 40 CIDG reportedas missing were recovered. The CIDG companies made two contacts, resultingin one VC killed and no friordly casualties. Th e operatiom terminated on29 June at 1830 hours with tku following overall resultsi friendly losseswere three USASF, on e VNSF, and 53 CMDG killed; on e USASF, on e VNSF and 21CIDG wounded; nine CIDG missing, VC losses were 75 killed, four wounded andsix captured. 12

CONFI DENTI AL


20/94

CONFI DENTIALAVGB-C 15 August 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report fo r Quarterly i'eriod Ending 31 July 1967

On 3 July At 2400 hours installations in thc town of Cao Lanh, Kienrhong Province, came under heavy VC mortar, rifle grenade, antitank rocketand small arms fire. The primary attack was against the USASF, airbuatfacility with secondary attacks on theB-43 compound, National Police Station,KiQi Phong Sector Headquarters and the CORDS compound. Friendly troopsobserved th e muzzle fLashes of th e VC weapons and returned fire with 4.2mortars, 105mm howitzers arid =al l arms. A FAC and art AC-47 were on statilinat 0035 hours, at which time the VC broke contact. Oni USASF, one civilian(Filipino) tech rep, five CIDG, six security guards, and seven civilianswore wounded; one ARVN soldier and one civilian were killed. kinor damagewas sustained by the buildings in th e B-43 compound. Extensive damage wasdone to the airboat site. The following major items of equipment weredestroyed; one 2i-ton truck, one air compressor, one airboat (complcte),six airboat engires and all spare parts fo r boat repairs to include specialtools. The maintenance shed was totally destroyed, and all buildings onboat site are in need of minor repairs. The VC losses are unknown.On the 14th of July at 0245 hours Camp My Am, A-433, in Kien PhcngProvince; th e town of My An, and two mobile OP's south of th e camp, cameunder attack by an estimated VC battalion. The attack was concentratedon the two OP's withsuppressive fires on th e camp and town so they could notgive sufficient fire support or reinforce th e OPIs. Counter mortar wasfired from the camp and 105mm howitzer from the town. Tactical aircraft andAC-47 were on station at 0330, bringing the VC under fire. The VC broke contactat 0545 hours withdrawing to the sc-utheast taking their dead and wounded in13 sampans. Results of th e attack were 12 CIDG killed; two USASF, two VNSFand 33 CIDG wounded; one .30 cal machine gun and two assault boats withmotors lost. VC losses wwre five confirmed VC killed with an estimated 50additional VC either killed or wounded. One AK-47 rifle and one claymoremine were seized.

On the 17th at 0900 hours, detachment A-441 on Phu Qaoc Island dispatchedtwo USASF, one combat reccn platoon and one company of CIDG on a searchand d~stroy operation in response to intelligence. At 1305 hours tacticalaircraft conducted 11 airstrikes in the target area. At 1430 hours th eairstrikes lifted, and the friendly element, supported by 4.2 inch mortarfire, moved into the area. At 1500 hours the combat recon platoon made contactwith four VC, killing one and wounding another. At 1640 hours the companyof CIDG initiated contact with eight VC, who broke contact after an, eightminute fire fight wich resulted in one VC killed aid two CUIG wounded. By2000 hours a complete assessment of th e target area had been made, revealingan additional six VC killed. A FAC reported seeing a number of VC bodiesbeing carried away. Total results of the operation were two CIDG wounded,eight VC killed, four VC suspects detained, one VC wounded, three structuresdestroyed, 600 kilos of rice, two kilos of documents and three kilos of med-ical supplies captured. On th e 25th at 0645, a platoon 0-f Chieu Hois andtwo USASF from Kinh Quan II, A-412, Kien 1hong Province, ambushed a companyof VC approximately 15 kilometers southeast of camp. A 15 minute firefightensued resulting in six VC killed, two weapons and two kilos of documentscaptured, with no friendly casualties.13C0NF I DENTI AL


21/94

CONFI DENTiA LAVGB-C 15 August 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report fo r Quarterly Period Ending 31 Jiuly 1967

(2) CIDG camps: On 1 May Detachment A-252 was withdrawnfrori. ei Krong, Pleiku Province, leavirg the VNSF detachment to run the campwithout advisors. This was the first test of a now concept designed tocctsierve USASF assets and thru facilitate the deployment of additional campsin new locatiens. The second camo to be turned over to the VNSF under thisprogram was Vinh Gia in IV CTZ. Control of the camp was transferred to theVNSF detacment on 27 June, and USASF Detachment A-422 was with drawn on 30June. See Inclosure 6 fo r a progress report on this program. On 15 May,Detachment B-3] terminated its mission at Xuan Lo c and Nui Thi, and allpersonnel and equipment were move to Company A at Bien Hoa. The buildingspreviously occupied by the detachment were turned over to Sector ontrol.Personnel have been reassigned to other Special Forces detachments through-out the Corps Area. On 26 May three CIDG companies, one CRP, USASF Det-achment A-126 were airlifted to Luong Hoa in Long An Provinc to open anew CIDG camp. The 25th ARVN Division and tha 36th ARVN Ranger Battalionconducted Operation Victory Trail ip support of the camp opening. In IICTZ the closing of Bong Son and the opening of Ha Tay was completed on 12June. On 24 June Detachment A-225A at Le Hai officially turned their postat the Dong Xuan District Headquarters over to an element of MACV Team 28.The CIDG camp at Co n Thien, just below the TIZ, was turned over to the USMCon 25 July fo r use as an outpost. Heavy pressure from NVA forces in thevicinity of the DM Z and the presence of large US4C units in the immediatearea of the camp precluded accomplishment of the CIDG mission.

(3) The designations fo r most of the "AA"etachmentsin IV CTZ were changed effective 1 June 1967. The purpose of the charge wasto more readily identify the '"A" detachments with their parent "B" detach-ments. The first two numbers of each detachment now correspond to thenumber of its "B" detachment. Th e five detachments that'report directlyto Company D have designations starting with the numbers "40". New dcsig--natians are as follows: OLD N]EDon Phuc (Kike Force) A-430 A-401To Chau (lst MGF) A-431 A-402To Chau (9d MGF) A-432 A-403P4 11h Ming A-L]1 A-4O0Ha Tien A-421 A-405My Phuoc Tay A-424 A-411Kinh Quan I1 A-416 A-412Ba Xoai A-429 A-ha21Cal Cal A-412 A-431Thuong Thoi A-425 A-432My An A-426 A-433"PhuQuoc k-427 A-441Ph u Quoc A-428 A-442

(4) l repoav'tion for the coming flo6i seas n was - _.sizedin the IV Corps Area. A training program was implemented with prime.,emphasis on boat tactics and operations to include the employment of sam-pans, assault boats, and airboats. Berms, draii age systems, and pumping

CO,!FI DENTIAL


22/94

CO F IDIENT IALAVGB-C 15 August 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967facilities have been rebuilt and improved to withstand the flood waters.Supplies, aimunition and equipnent arc being pro-stocked in the camps topreclude some of the resupply problems when the floods came. The CompanyD Flood Plan was coordinated with the Senior Advisor, IV CiTZ; uompany A,5th SFGA; US 9th Inf Div; II&IForceV, and representatives from COA'1VF(RVto insure a unified effort (see inclosure 25 , Company D Flood Plan). Theairboat site at Cao Lanh, Kien Ihuong Proviico was completed in May butsuffered severe daniiu dui-'r, t4 . VC attl-k on 3-4 July (aue paragraph3b(l)(d) above).

c. Special Operations.(1) Operation Buckner: Conducted by Detachment B-50(Project Omega), this operation took pl co in western Kontum 1rovince, IICTZ, from 15 April to 15 May. There were 13 reconraissance tean; .and twocompany operations in the AO . Nineteen contacts and seven air strikesresulted in 12 VC killed, four wounded, and four captured. One Mike Forcesoldier was wounded.(2) Blackjack 41: This mobile guerrilla operation beganon 19 January, i.ith 1hase I terminating on 23 March. 1hase II began on17 May. The operational area wa s the Seven Mountai s region of IV CTZ.See Inclosure 15 for after action report. In addition, operation Arrowhead,a Mike Force parachute assualt, was conducted in support of the mobile

guerrilla force. See Inclosure 16.(3) Blackjack 214: This operation was conducted in north-western Kcntum Province by the A-219 Mike Force, the A-217 mobile guerrillaforce, and CIDG elements from A-242 as a diversionary force. It began on

16 March and ended on 19 May, with 16 contacts made during the operation.Friendly casualties were one USASF killed and one wounded, one Mike Forceesldier killed and nine wounded. Enemy losses were 11 killed, six wounded,one captured, 152 buildings destroyed, 13 tons of food destroyed, and fiveweapcn s seized.(4) Blackjack 25: During the period 15 April - 20 Ma y

mobile guerrilla elements made 11 contacts in the area ot operation, whichwas located in central Kontum Province. Friendly casualties were sevenUSASF wounded, two Mike Force soldiers killed and 20 wv red. EaenW losseswere 19 killed, seven wounded, 96 structures and 10 0 kI g of' food des~toyed,and nine weapons captured.

(5) Blackjack 33: This operation wa s conducted in cen-tral III CTZ from 27 April to 24 May. For the first time mobile guerrillaelements were employed in conjunction with long range reconnaissance teams(B-56; i reject Sigma), resulting in an impressive total of 320 enemy killed.See Inclosure 12 for after action report15CONF IDENT IAL


23/94

CONF DENTI!ALAVGB-C 15 August 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

(6) OPORD 5-67: From 10 April t6 15 June reconnaissanceteams an d Ranger companies from I roject Delta, Detachment B-52, operated inthe Ashau-Aloui Valley in I CTZ. See Inclosure 18 for after action report,-

(7) Blackjack 42: This was a mobile guerilla operationconducted in southeastern Vinh Binh Province, IV CTZ, from 3 June to 2 July.It marked the first amphibious infiltration conducted by Spe~ial Forcesadvised elements in Vietnam. See Inclosure 17 fo r after action report.(8) Blackjack 26: Runring from 15 June to 14 July, thiswas a mobile guerrilla operati.'n conducted in northeastern Kontum and north-western Binh Dinh Provinces by the 23rd Mike Force Company (A-219). Onlyfour contacts were made, resulting in three USASF wounded, two Mike Forcesoldiers killed and three wounded. Although there were no confirmed enemy

casualties, 27 strudtu-es and four tons of food were destroyed, and oneweapon was captured.(9) Blackjack 34: Conducted during the period 16-21July, this was a mobile guerrilla operation in northeastern Binh Long andnorthwestern Phuoc Lcrg Provinces. The operation discovered a VC regimentan d killed 126 of the enemy while suffering only three USASF -wounded, oneMike Force soldier killed and 33 wounded. See Inclosure 14 for after actionreport.

d. Training.(1) Recondo School

(a) General1. NR USA3F ASSD ATCH'DOFF EM OFF

May 5 27 1 RO KJun 5 29 1 RO K 1 AUST.Ju l 5 30 2 RO K 1 AUST.

2. During this reporting period the MACVRecondo School received student classes R-13=.67 through R-2-64. Th e fol-lowing is a breakdown of students by units and Corps areas fo r thesm classes.I CORPS IN DROP7D" -GRADUATED CCikLETED_ IN TRAININGlst Mar Div 2 0 1 1 03rd MWF 2 1 1 0 0RO K Marines 2 0 2 0 0

16CONF( DENT IAL

Reproduc~ ropy~_.,St- COPY.


24/94

SC QNF i DEHT IALAVGB-C 15 August 1967SUBJECT: Operaticral Report for Quarterly i'eriod Ending 31 July 1967II CORPSls t Cav Div (AM) 72 24 39 2 74th Inf Div (-) 41 18 18 0 53/5th Inf Div 12 1 10 1 01/101 Abn Div 10 2 8 0 0RO K Forces 43 5 26 6 6Hq Tng Div MACV 1 0 0 0 1III CORPSlst In f Div 48 27 12 0 925th Inf Div(-) 17 7 10 0 0173rd Abn BdO (Sep) 26 2 19 0 5196th Lt In f Bde 4 2 2 0 0199th Lt In f Bde 21 4 9 0 89th In f Div 45 17 15 2 11llth Arm Cav Reg 5 1 4 0 05th SFG 1 1 0 0 0lst Phi l Cag 9 2 4 0 3

- The mission of the MAC V Recondo School isto train selected persoimel fran US/F'MAF units in specialized teclniques andskilleLnecessary to conduct successful long range reconnaissance operationsin the Republic of South Vietnam.(b) Operations and Training Activities.

1. P"lns - N/A2. Operations

a Nuiber/type operation conductedR Nigt Recondo CID(1) Attacks 0 0 0 00) Blocking Actions 0 0 0 0() Escort Action 9 0 0 9(4) Combat Patrols 0 0 0 0G) Recon Patrols 40 0 40 0( l);nbushe3 0 80 80 0

b Number of friendly initiated c)ntactsight Recondo

0 0 0a VC Losses (Confirmed)

V)C Killed: 01.7CONFIDE9TI AL

0I


25/94

CONFIDENT I LAVGB-C 15 August 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967(2) VC Captured: 0Q~) VC Wounded: 0(4) VC Suspicts; 15() VC Weapon: 0

d Friendly Losses USASF RECONDO STD CIDG(1) Killed 0 0 0(2) Wounded 0 0 0Kissing 0 0 0(4) Weapons Lost 0 0 04. Training: Recondo classes now receive a282 houi POI. See Inclosure 9.

(c) Logistics. Th e MACV Recondo School is supportedlogistically by USARV and the 1st. Logistical Command.

(2) Dong Ba Thin VNSF Training Center.(a) Courses graduated or in progress during thereporting period:

CIDG #23 10 Apr - 15 May 10 2CIDG #2 4 15 May - 27 Jun 128CIDG #25 03 Jul - 11 Aug 121CRP #21 17 Apr - 21 May 248CwV? #/22 24 May - 28 jun 232CRP #23 03 Jul - 07 Aug 248CIDG Radio #11O Apr - 28 Aug 37LLDB RCT #6 31 Jul -(b) The Basic,.Airborne Course was attended by MikeForce units from D & C Conpax0 5th Special Forces Group, during the monthsof May, June and July. Also attending were selected US personnel. A totalof 215 sutudents graduated from the basic airborne couse during the reportingperiod. The couse is tagght by USASF personnel assigned to DetachmentB-51. While the airborne course is in session, the Detachment's capabilityto monitor other training and conduct operations is decreased because ofpersonnel shortages.(c) During the reporting period the followingcombat operations were conducted:

OPN SIZE DURATION CONTACTST-10 2 Platoons 3 Days NegT-11'2 Platoons 3 Days Neg

18CONFI DEWI t L


26/94

CONFIDENTIALAVGB-C 15 August 1967SUBJECT: Operatinnal Report fo r Quarterly Feriod Ending 31 Jiily 1967

T-12 2 Platoons 3 Days NegT-13 8 Platoons 5 Days 1 VC KIAT-14 1 Platoons 4 Days NegT-15 8 Platoons 5 Days NegT;16 2 Platooni 2 Days NegT-18 2 Platoons 5 Days NegT-19 3 Platoons 5 Days NegT-20 2 Platoans 5 Days 1 Squad(2 CIDG-WIA)T-21 2 Platoons 5 Days NegT-22 2 Platoons 4 Days Neg

(d) Th e camp nightly deploys four to five squadambushes or security patrols. Th e CIDG leaders cause, the LLDB course andthe CRP course conclude vith field training exercises into areas which provideopportunity for eneny contact and thus add a degree of realism an d serious-ness to field training.

(e) Aviation: Th e tactical airlift liason personnelprovided by the U.S. Air Force increased to three officers in May J.967. Th eGroup is no w suppo: %ed by the senior tactical airlift liason officer at NhaTrang and one assistant for C and B Company and a second assistant for A andD Company. A marked improvement in the efficiency of air movement operationsat the forward supply points has been noted.(1) A p-c-.kret+_s,7Pe nc1ocse air mppnnord. giiide forground commanders was produced. The guide vill be distributed down to the"A" detachments an d will provide the ground commander with a quick referencefor minimum safe distance for each type of air delivered munition and its

pattern of effect.(2) Th e C-7A caribou assets under the opera-tiorna control of the 5th Special Forces Group were increased to eleven air-craft daily. Th e redistribution of assets has enambled the Group to placetwo caribous at each forward supply point.(3) Portable airfield lighting sets were dis-tributed to each "A" detachment, increasing the operational capability of allSpecial Forces airfields in the Reupulbic of Vietnam.

(f) Combat Developments: See Inclosure -8 for atwumary of all projects currently under evaluation.

19

CO F ILtINT IAL


27/94

4. (U) LOGISTICSa. General. From 1 May through 30 4urne 67 the Logistic SupportCenter continued to provide the 5th SFGA' s far flung detac. hments and companieswith all classes of supplies and up to and including 5th echelon ordnance,signal and engineer maintenance. More than 10,000 tona of supplies weredelivered to subordinate units by all methods of transportation. Over 70 0tons of food, ammunition and general supplies were parachuted to isolatedcamps and in support of special operations.b. Supply.

(1) Construction of facilities for a fifth forward supply pointwas initiated with an expected completion date of l September 1967. Thisaction will complete the decentralization of the 5t- SFGA logistics systemand will provide a reduced order-ship time and further dispersal of supplies.(2) Part of the LSC stockage level of critical supplies and equip-

ment, such as weapons and radios, has been dispersed to the Logistical Annexat Detachment B-55 Saigon.(3) A new ration warehouse has been completed, allowing the LSCto store rice in large quantities under optimum storage space. This allowsISC to purchase rice in large quantities when the market price is low. Arecent purchase of 25,000 bags was made at a saving of fifty piasters per bag.(4) Ammunition stockage levels were reduced from a Bixty to a

wl.LLJ.A UJ L VVCyL'V L. AllJ... , f -I,.L.U I.11 qu%.Z LU. lam wLLI J UdLs ...-O... J.Lturned in to Cam Ranh Bay. A rehabilitation plan to construct new berms withinthe ammunition dumip has been implemented with an expected completion date of20 August 1967.

(5) The petroleum storage area has been bermed to reduce possiblefire hazards.(6) POL and ammunition are ro longer placed on the ready lineswithin the LSC. These supplies are now moved directly from their respectivestorage areas to the aircraft loading ramp, thereby furtber reducing fireand explosion hazards.(7) A significant movements achievement was accomplished duringthe month of June when sea shipment tonnage equaled the tonnage shipped by air.

This was the first time in 5th SFGA history that sea shipments equalled airshipments, thereby significaztly reducing the drain on the in-country airliftsystems. Large quantities of bulk, low priority cargo can now be shipped moreeconomically to Danang, Qui Nhon, Can Tho, and Bien Hoa, keeping the high prioritycargo fo r aerial port shipment,(8) A covered, elevated ramp has been constructed to allow moreand larger rigging lines for the preparaticn of loads for air land and airdrop. To decrease aircraft loading time, a direct access gate from the C7A

20


28/94

/

LOGISTICS (CONTD)aircraft parking area to the rigging ramp has been made, and the area is nowin the process of being covered with PSP to provide an all-weather operatingsurface for forklifts.

(9) Direct shipment schedules have been made with the .CounterInsurgency Support Office to our forward supply points in Danang and Bien Hoa.These schedules are designed to reduce handling, reduce the order-ship timean d eliminate re-shipment from Ma Trang. A test delivery schedule is beingmade on rations, cement, and lumber.(10) A logistical briefing has been given to Brig Gen Quang,LLDG Commander, his staff, an d all LLDB "B" Detachment Commanders.(11) LSC security has been improved by the addition of Americanguards and observation towers.(12) All "A" camp generators in the II CTZ are being standardizedto reduce repair parts stockage and to help eliminate repair parts problems.

21


29/94

5. (U) Revolutionary Development Support Activities.a. Th e most significant development in the field of RDSA resultedfrom initiating regular;y scheduled counterpart meetings during the reportingperiod. The mediumt of the joint meeting (i.e. LLDB Political Warfare Sectionand 5ht SFGA RDSA/PSYOPS) has effected a centralized communications channelfor coordinated planning, mutual exchange of ideas and eventually a singleprogram designed to accomplish bi-laterally developed objectives. A summary

of the joint conference is illustrative of the results achieved thus farfrom joint meetings.(1) The meeting held on 12 May 67 , resulted in:

(a) A joint USASF/LLDB field trip to Gia Vuc to analize thereasons for the deterioration in troop morale and lack of motivation toconduct combat operations. OPT Ho, LLDB POLWAR Section accompanied CPTDrollinger to Gia Vuc on 14 May 67 . Joint problem analysis and correctiveaction provided the LLDB Det CO/USASF Det CO the program which ultimatelyresolved Gia Vuc's troop motivation problem.(b) A reevaluation of the organization and capabilities of

the CIDG CA/PSYOP squads. Subject on S-3 concurrence, the TOE strength ofthe squads will be increased frem twelve to sixteen members, with an addit-ional capability of expanding to eighteen members in order to provide flex-ibility as ,.fie TAOR situation may require. Further, the size an d compositionof the squads would be dictated by the mission and TAOR requirements ratherthan by the VNSF/USASF detachment size (i.e. C, B, or A detachmentst). Th erecommended basic squad size and composition is as follows:1. Command ElEment: 1 Team Leader 1 Asst Team Leader2. Political Indoctrination Cell: 1 Troop Education Spec.1 Troop Service Spec.1 Tioop Indoctrintion

Spec1 Athletic and RecreationSpec3. Psychological Warfare Cell: 1 Intelligence Spec1 Civil Motivaticn Spec1 Troop Motivation Spec4. Audio Visual Cell; 2 Audio Visual Spec5. Medical Troop SocialWelfare Cell: 2 Medical Spec1 Social Welfare Spec6. PX/Commissary(Camp Store) 2 Storekeeper

(2) The major objective of the first meeting was to identify LLDBPOLWAR missions as assigned by Joint General Staff RVNAF in order to determine22


30/94

Revolutionary Development Support Activities (CONTD)USASF advisory responsiblitiee so that the 5th SkMA could properly alineRDSA/PSYOP personnel with their counterparts at all levels. As a result ofthe ideas submitted, a joint staff study was initiated on 1 Jun 67, recommendinga combined RDSA/Y'SYOPS Section bc organized to advise the VNSF in conduct of theGVN POLWAR Program, RVNAF. This study will be completed by 15 Aug 67 .

(3). The meeting held on 18 Jul 67 resulted in a mutual exchangeof job descriptions and delineation of duties in order to clarify bothLLDB/5th SFMA counterpart responsibilities. Each LLDB sub-section chief inthe POLWAR Section outlined his specific missions and program objectives.In addition, CPT Ky, Political Indoctrination Chief, presented the LLDB con-cept of Revolutionary Development supporting, accordance with comanarl guidance.The next meeting is scheduled to be conducted on 17 August 67 to finalizethe program of instruction for the CIDG CA/iSYOPS squads in all four tacticalzonles as well as to determine 'he employment of these squads (i.e. at selectedtraining centers or company level).

b. On 6 June 1967, the first CIDG rice buying association was or-ganized by the S-5, Co C, Da Nang. The rice buying association is a c3operativeestablished by the CIDG under the guidance of Vietnamese and US Special Forcesfor the purpose bf buying large quantities of rice in Da Nang for shipmentand sales to CIDG dependents. Th e purpose is to :(1) Provide rice at a reasonable price for CIDG dependents liv-ing in remote areas, thus discouraging local rice purchases at exhorbitantprices.(2) Protect the CIDG and their depcndcnts from unsUaulQuse -chants.(3) Discourage the CIDG from pilfering rice from the camps.The experiment has proven highly successful and future implementation of thisconcept is scheduled for II, III and IV CTZ. (See Inclosure 21 )

c. On 4 Ju l 67 , a joint memorandum was issued by the LLDB POLWR andUSASF 3-5 Section of Co A, Bien Hoa, designed to improve the standards ofliving for the CIDG and their dependents by providing subsistance annd mortlecommodities via an established commissary system for all CIDG camps. Th ebi-lingual, memorandum outlined the 60 day trail concept as follows:0() Camps selected to implement the commissar* concept wereTong Le Chon, Vrek Klok and Luong Hoa. All three of these camps have

experienced a gradual decline in troop morale as a result of remote locat-ion and non-availability of such items as beer, cigarettes, and generalmorale commnodities.(2) Supply of cmmrissary goods as well -w the managemant of allcuitAP exchangos are the food contraotor's responsibility, Th e food

23

I.


31/94

Revolutiorary Development Support Activities (CONTD)contractor supplies tho requested comodities on a weekly basis at the sametime the fresh food deliveries are made to the detachments, Fixed prices arepredetermined and agred upon by the LLDB POUTARAYASF S-5 section, Co A,Bien Hoa. Eistablished prices are designed to preclude profiteering activitieswithin the C]DG camps. The trial period terminates 4 Sep 67, and a projdc ,.will be included in the subsequent ORLL.d. Field Evaluation: An extensive evaluation of the Group's nation-wide RD support and civic action programs was begun during June 67. Thecollection phase of this evaluation is now complete, and the findings andrecommendations are expected to be available early in, August. It is expec-vedthat this study .ii, among other things, result in closer integration ofcivic action aMd intelligence efforts, much tighter control on piaster spend.ng,and closer alignment of the USASF advis ory s~'iu'iure with the VNSF POII'JARfunctions.

24


32/94

6. (U) Psychological Operations.a. There has been a significant increase in coorC-Li on and jc.nt

effort between the Group PSYOPSr Officer and appropriate counterparts in theVietnamese Special Forces Political Warfare Scction. A formal conference anda number of informal staff visits have contributed to a closer working rc:l&ationship, A number of projects are being jointly considered. They are:(1) Equipment for CA/PSYOP teams(2) Reorganization of CA/PSYOP teams(3) Lessons (POI) for training of CA/PSYOP teams(4) Introduction of training classes at Dong Ba Thin Traihg center(5) Better integration of POLWAR activities into the CIDG program.

b. 5th Special Forces Group has received a marked increase in air-craft support of PSYOPS. Th e Group presently receives five times the numberof aizrcraft missions fo r the previous reporting period. Although 20% of thetotal missions requested are still not being floem, there are several reasons.They are:

(1) Failure of companies in the CTZ to follow through on missionsrequested to insure all requests have been forwarded to the US Air ForceD. A. S. C.(2) Failure to USASF personnel to properly request aircraft support.(3) Failure to USASF to insure that leaflets and tape recordingsare supplied to the US Air Force properly. Corrective action has been takenon probelms identified, and higher efficiency will be forthcoming.

c. An increase of junior officers in group has generally improvedthe manpower situation in SF detachments resulting in an increase in supportfor PSYOPS. The present manpower status remains fa r below the recogiiizedneeds of the Group fo r 1-SYOFS, however.

25


33/94

7. (U) Personnel & Admirxistrationa. Unit strength:

(1) At the beginning of the reporting period:OF F 518

27 1-(2) At end of the reporting period:

OFF 465Wo 11ER P-1812T57

b. Supply of blank forms & publications: Supply publications hasbeen excellent. The supply of blank forms is marginal.

c. Assignment Instructions upon DEROS: The late receipt of assign-ment instructions for personnel departing this command upon DEROS continuesto be a problem. It is felt that the efforts txpended at all levels to improvethis situntion will reduce the administrative burden and improve morals.

d. Awards and Decorations:[1) Th e following is the status of awards and decorations app-roved during the reporting .period.

(a) Medal of Honor 0(b) DSC 4(c) DS M 0(d ) DF 4(e) Silver Star 48(f) Legion of Merit 14(g) Soldier's Medal 25(h) Bronze Star (V) 1"(i) Bronze Star 350

26


34/94

Personnel and Administration (CONTD)(j) Air Medal (V) 4(k) Air Medal 206(1) ARCOM (V) 33(m) ARCCO4 96(n) Purple Heart 92() CTB 545(p) CMB 57

(2) There are two recommendations for the Medal of Honor curr-ently pending at Department of the Army: ULT Sisler, George K., OFlO0O68and SFC Hoskins, Gomer D., Jr., RA25351557.

e. A&R and Special Services:(1) Athletic and Recreation Frogram: Fourteen additional weightlifting sets were obtained for use at the SFOB and various detachments. Otherathletic equipment has been ordered and will be distributed upon receipt.12) Special Services: Magazines, paperback books and newspapersare walled directly to all detachments w.eekly. A reading rOa ras opened

at the SFOB. There are magazines, newspapers and over 1,000 paperback and hardcover books available; facilities for studying and writing letters have beeninstalled. A tape library was opened in May, and personnel are able to dubtapes, record tapes to send home, and play tapes received from hcine.

f. Post Exchange Facilities: The SFOB 11X annex no w stocks variousitems of electronic equipment, television sets, radios and numerous other items.

g. Labor/Civilian Personnel: In keeping with MACV objectives toreduce the amount of piasters expended, additional consolidatioxr of activi-ties is planned. All hiring and firing of civilian personnel for Group unitsin the Nha Trang area 'ill be centered at the SFOB Civilian Personnel Office.This will permit elimination of most CPO positions at the other four officesin the Nh a Trang area.

27


35/94

8. (U) Medicala. Hospital facilities: The CIDG hospital at Company At Bien Hoa,has been performing major surgical procedures orunCIG patients since mid-May67 . This not only substantially increasce the level of medical care avail-able to III CTZ CIDG, but also decreases dependence upon U.S. military hosp-

i+al f4a"'-' in thn" area.b. Alvisory mission: An immeasurable improvcnent in the relation-ship between the Vietn-mose Special Forces Surgeon and the 5th Special ForcesGroup Surgeon was noted during thih, quarter. Tangiblc rcsultsnc-" de.

(1) Joint M1CAP operations in thu Nha Trang area.(2) Combining the USASF and WISF medical facilities at Detach-ment B-51 an d VNSF Training Center At Dong Ba Thin. This combination precludesduplication of efforL a.-d of resources and serves as one example of resultsobtainable from excellent advisor-counterpart relations. It is planned thatthe combined facilities ill form a nucleus for a pmrojected training coursein advanced medical procedures to be conducted for VNSF aidmen.(3) A data file system on all medical and paramedical personnelwas made available to the VNSF Chief Surgeon. This syste-mwill.enable him tounderstand the personnel resources controlled by him and will assist him inmaking and rotating assignments and in deciding which personnel require addi-tibnal training in certtin fields.

c. Medical civic action- Medical civic action programs continued.Civilian outpatients treated between 1 Jan 67 through 31 Jun 67 totalled505,461.d. Plague prevention: In an attempt to curtail] the perennial in-creasesin the incidence of bubonic plague in "A" detachment areas. 5thSpecial Forces Group (Abn) approved the expeniditure of funds for the purchaseof sufficiet plague vaccine from the Institut 'asteur to immunize 143,000persons. This number includes all CIDG, thtir dependents, and civilians livingin the immediate vicinity of "A" detachments in I and II CTZ. Immunizationswill begin in late September or early October, 1967.e. Emergency Medical Reaction Team: The EART, consisting of onemedical officer and two aidmen, with sufficient supplies, deployed frcm theSFO- tu DetaculuenL A-li0, Con 'ihien, in mid-Hay to provide medical support.This was the first time the team ie-,s utilized, and it was successful inits mission.

28


36/94

9. (U) Signal:a. Airboat communications: The high noise level associated withairboat operations has made use of radios with issue-type handsets impos.-aible. The Electronic Maintenance section of the Signal Company resolved

h e problan by developing a completely different earphone-mizrcphone-intercomsystem. Earmuff headsets, such as those used by personnel -'orking near jetengines, reduced outside noise to an acceptable level, These headsets weremodified .with receiver diaphrams removed from old headsets. The minrophoneproblem was resolved through the use of the Air Force oxygen mask with abuilt-in microphone. An intercom set between the ginrer and driver allowsfree coversation, and both individuals can operate the AN/iRC-25. Thicequipment was constructed by using two modules from the AN/PRC-25, poweredby the AN/IRC-.25 battery and packaged with the nexcssary switches in a .30cal ammunition can. The problem of the whip antenna in overhanging vegetationwas eliminated by attaching a wire doublet to the boat.

b. Communications from small outbaard craft and LCVP's.(1) The following pertains to commiunications using AN/1-RD-25'sfrom small outboard craft and LCVIP's with normal operating vanges 8-12 KM.arnd frequently up to 25 Kit.(2) Extra precautions must be taken to waterproof radios andhandsets. Additional batteries have to be carried and kept waterproofeduntil put into operation.(3) To achieve extended ranges, long antennas and RC-292 exped-ient antennas are frequently required.(4) Inter-communication within a single boat is not required.Each boat should have a means of communication from boait to boat, All comm-

uhication equipment should be located either against the bulkhead or inrecessed areas so as not to inturfer with personnel movement and so thatequipment will be protected from the elements as much as possible.(5) ifreferred operating frequency is from 53-75 M Hz (highband). Marny older helicopters cannot net wIth the low band (30-52 IIHz)on a PRC-25. The frequency selected should fall on a hundred KHz channelsince many fixed wing aricraft cannot net with a 50 KHz channel.(6) Conmand and Control (C&C) Boats.

(a) The GRC-125 or an AN/VRC-46 or 47 is preferred asthe main C& C radio since it has a greater range and the antenna system ispreferable to mounting a 292-type antenna in a boat. Th e LCWi has a 24volt power source.29


37/94

4(b) The C&C boat must also have a back-pack radio so thatthe command group can, iU necessary, disembark and control ground operations.(c ) The C&C clement. shoud have the ability to monitor two

nets aimultar-cusly. This facilitates control of such a-tion as medicalevacuations, resupply missians, or administrativo traffic with maneuverelemenets and also allows commuriPcation vith rear base control statior on afrequency othenr than the tactical command frequency.(d) Distanceas and dispersion of maneuver elements ma yrequire that a forward control boat and an intermiediate control boat beused. In all cases the rear overall control ehould be either land! based in"arelatively secure area which affoeCt sophisticated communications, or on"a large vessel which affords the same capabilities.

(7 ) All radio operators, must have headsets ii order to monitortransmissions while the boat engine is rvnning. Headsets arc a necessity.

30


38/94

CONF iDENT IAL1.0. (C) Engineer.

1. Organization: During this reporting period, two significantactivities took place with respect to organization. First, the cntire eng.-.neeringeffort of the Group was placed under the supervisinn of the StaffEngineer. The advantages of this move are:

a. Simplicity and more continuity fo r f-unding pugposes.b. A centralized engineer organizatin within the Group to

eliminate duplication of effortThe second organizational change has been th e official notification receivedby this organization that the 31st Engineer Detachment will be assigned toreplace the 539th Engineer Detachment o/a 22 Sept 67. The 539th Engr Det,which is now in country on TDY from the 1st Special Forces Group (Abn), willthen return to their home station in.Okinawa.

2. CONEX Bunker Desigrn: During the last monsoon season in the deltaregion, many bunkers were flooded resulting in amnunition becoming wet andthus malfunctioning. Design has now been completed fo r bunkers in this region.Basically the design consists of placing the CONEX on its back, doors up, andwaterproofing the interior. A protected entrance is provided at the top ofthe container. This design will keep the bunker dry at all times when th ewater in the camp is six feet or less.

3. Airfield Surveys: A continuing problem in the Special Forcescamps, ,jsecially the net. ones, has been timely surveys and classification ofthe airfields so that the fields can be placed in operation shortly afterconstruction, Due to the shortage of personnel, the USAF has no t been able togo to these fields as rapidly as desired. Arrangements were completed withthe USAF in May that wi.ll allow the Group to classify the airfields locatedin the vicinity of the Special Forces camps. The survey, which is made inaccordance with published USAF standards, is conducted by a team from th eGroup consisting of the Staff Engineer, the TAIO and a representative fromthe Engineer Section, IFFV.

4. Prestocked CIDG Camps: As reported in th e last ORLL, two com-plete CIDG cxaps wrere being stocked in the LSO. During May and J-te, twocamps were shipped, one to Camp Wang Buk and one to Camp Ha Tay. The conceptof prestocking the camps in the ISC and then shipment directly to the campsite has proved successful, and plans are being made to continua this methodof camp construction.

5. Camp Construction: The following is a progress report fo r con-struction program during this quarter.

31.ONFI OENTUAL


39/94

CONFIDE NT IALEngineer (CONTD)T V, '. IT A TflP. CONS UINTT AIRFIELD STATUSCo n Thien Subsurface MCB-4 (Seebees) C7A CompletedIan g Vei Subsurface MCB-II C-130 Under ConsHa Tay Surface Staff Engr C7A Under ConsMang Buk Surface 539th Engrs C7A Under ConeBunard Surface 539th Engrs C-130 CompletedLuong Ho a Surface 539th Engrs None Under ConsAirboat Fac. N.A Contract None CompletedCao Lanhkirboat fac. N/A 539th Engrs None Under ConsMoc Hoa

32CONFI DEtTIAL


40/94

IISEC:RE T11. (S) Comptroller.

a. iJNO~i: (U) in view that the Cauu Finance is basically partof the 5th SFGJ, Comptroller Section, beginning % ith his reporting period allCIDG Finance activities will be reported under the Comptroller Section toprevent any duplicaticos.b. CIDG Fundings: (3) During the reportirg period the FY 1968

Command Operating Budget was submitted thru proper channels to Departmentof the Army on 24 May 1967 and the FY 1969 Command Budget Estimate wassubmitted to USARiAC 22 June 1967 for disposition. F6116wing is the generalbreakdown and comparison of funds fo r FY 1967, 1968 and 1969. For 1967the Anrual Funding Frogram (AFP) and the actual costs incurred are listed.TITLE 1967 1968 1969AFT ACTUAL AFK APP

In-Country OMA. 45,498 42,000 51,209 56,056Out-of-Country OM A 21,125 22,600 24,835 25,467

PEMA .31,210 26.000 29,196 2,0TOTAL $97,835 $90,600 $105,240 $109,932(a) (b) (c)

(1) Excess funds of 7.2 million dollars were generated by:a. Over-budget in IEL - primarily in ammunition whichdecreased from $24.0 to $11.1 million. Increasing of 'thOr bucdJct projectscaused a net decrease in i FN of only '5.2 million.b. Short fall in the number of troops recruited was dueto slippagein the conversion of DIE, troops to the RF/I F program.

(2) The budget fo r FY 1968 is based upon a gradual increasein company equivalents from 336 at. year--end 1967 to 337 at year-end 1968.The FY 68 budget is a $4.7 million decrua:.e frcmr the approved 4 68 budgetestimate of 109.9 million dollars.

(3) Budget fo r Ff 1969 is based upon 337 eonmpany equivalentsfor the entire year.(4) Approximately 72% of the in-country OM A is used to paysalaries and subsistence of the CIDG troops. A 10 % increase has beenincluded in FY 1968 and FY 1960 budget, in anticipation of an expectedpay increase.

c. CIDG Fund Audits: (U) Unannounced on-site audits of 26detachments were completed by CIDG Finance auditors. Findings of theseaudits indicated improvement in all areas of reporting Mnd th-t properaccountability of funds is being maintained. ai.n shortcomings note'33

SECRET


41/94

Comptroller (CONTD)in some detachments were the purchase of non-expendzble items without theprior approval of the Group 3-4.

d. iroject Numbers: (U) Effective 1 July 1967, a project numuvrsystem was established fo r approved construlction projects. The project numberwill provide a better means of identifying and conpilihg cost data fo r th eComptroller Section. Thus far in FY 1968, $73,883.75 has b1,en approved for19 construction projuxts.

e. Non-Appropriated Fund: (U) A comparative, BalanCL Sheet andComparative I rofit and Loss Stateiments based on monthly input fram the unitsconcerned has been established for each "B" ana "C" detachment operating amess association. As monthly financial reports are posted and trends areduveloped, anall'sis of these trends can now be made, and units concerned arenotified to take corrective iaction.

f. .ivilian Personnel TD : (U) A review of the indigenous civi-lian persormel at the SFOB was conpleted2 June 1967. As a result of thissurvey, the civilian TD was revisqd and updated. The new TD of 505 posi-tions eliminated 54 old positions, added 48 new positions with a ne t reductionof 6 positions. This reduction of 6 positions will save approximately$7,319 annually. Thirty-one of the new positions were used to exannd th ecarpe ter shop, R&U and electrical sections. In -ddition to the TD strength,a 63-nan temporary lbor force was organized to support SFOB constructionprojects. A saving of $50,000 to $60,000 will be realized by employing thisconstruction section to reduce the number of construction projects contractedout to local contractors.

34


42/94

CONF I DE TiALAVUB-C 15 August 19675tUBJECTI Operational Report fo r Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

SECTION 2 (C) COMMANDERS, OBSERVATIONS AND REXIMMENDATIONSPAUT I - Observations (Lessons Learned).

1. (U) Personnel: None2. (C) Operations:

a. n_%M: Attack on Lang Vei, h May 1967. (Source Co C)(1) DTSCUSSIONT: Enemy initiated tUn attack at 0315.The enemy is increas.-777-n7tacking between the hours of 0200 and 0400. In-

creased vigilance and alertness are required during this period.(2 ) D3COiSSION: The attack was preceded by smail arms and rocketfire. Observation -The enemy realizes th e advantages of employing direct fireiritially due to greater accuracy. The security screen must be in sufficientdepth from the carmp to keep the enemy ou t of direct fire range.(3 ) DISC1SSION: The assault force consisted of relatively fewpeople. Observation Theassault will not necessarily be executed by a largefcrca. A snmAll, woll-r3hearsed assault against a camp's weak point can be justas dangerous.(4) DISCUSSION: The attack was aided from inside the camp by VC"V.-o had infiltrated EF3 0IDG units posing as recruits. The attackers had adatailed knowledge of specific targets inside the camp and were oriented toward

those targets. Observation: Effective counterintelligence is essential. Theloyalties of all personnel in the camp must be determined and frequently re-s-,-aed 0 See also item ha below.

(5) W]SCUASSION- The detacIment commander and XO were killed andthe team sergeant wounacd simultarnously in th e some bunker. Observation: Keyiarsonnel must be dispersed throughout the camp at all times. -Alternate' F m a n dposts must be established .nd manned.

(6) D3SGUSSION: Radar bombing missions were not called intediatelyIn support of the cam,' p. .Lrvation- lan wiitt the Air Force to provide support.Estuabolish primary an d alter.at-e nears for reque .ting suppvrt. Rebearuts t plainto insure it will work., The 7th Air Force has tasked specific units to supporteach camp. Find out who they are,

5th SFG Lessons Learned 14 Nov 1967

Documents

Transcript of 5th SFG Lessons Learned 14 Nov 1967