4th ID Lessons Learned 25 Oct 1967

8/3/2019 4th ID Lessons Learned 25 Oct 1967

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AUTHORITYAGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980; AGO D/A ltr, 29Apr 1980

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THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITEDAND CLEARED FOR PUBIL:C RELEASEUNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 ANDNO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPONITS USE AND DISCLOSURE#DISTRIBUTI10G STATEMENT AAPPROVED FOR PUBLIC REL,EASFjDISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED,


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SECURITYMARKINGThe classified or limited status of this repoit appliesto each page, unless otherwise marked.Separate page printouts MUST be -marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OFTHE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18,U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OFITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BYLAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or otherdata are used for any purpose other than in connection with a defi-nitely related government procurement operation, the U. S. Governmentthereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; andthe fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in anyway supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is notto be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensingthe holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rightsor permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention thatmay in any way be related thereto.

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CONFIDENTIALDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY00 OwlICl OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

in WASHINGTON. D.C. 20310

00 IgNWLMY RoW ToAGAM-P (M) (16 Oct 67) RD67O469 25 OcSSUBJE rational Lsarned, Headquarters 4thM n aty Divi4ion

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review 4 evaluation byUSACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-1. -d by USCCNARC in0..- accordance with paragraph 6a and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and cor-CD rective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of re-(--' ceipt of covering letter.LL U 2. Information contained in this report is provided to insureappropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during currentoperations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER O TH E SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

NNETH G. WICKlAM1 Incl Major General, USAas Th e Adjutant GeneralDISTRIBUTION:Commanding General& CUS Continental Army Command --

US Army Combat Developments Command nCommandants U DIUS Army Command and General Staff CollegeUS Army War CollegeUS Army Air Defense School L'US Army Armor SchoolUS Army Artillery and Missile SchoolUS Army Aviation SchoolUS Army Chemical SchoolUS Army Civil Affairs SchoolUS Army Engineer SchoolUS Army Infantry SchoolUS Army Intelligence School

'EGRADEDNCLASSIFIEDWHEN SPARATED FROMOSSIFIEO ICL0'.cs(CONFIDENTIAL r7 T


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CONFIDENTIALDISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)

US Army Medical Field Service School4US Army Military Police SchoolUS Army Ordnance SchoolUS Army Quartermaster SchoolUS Army Security Agency SchoolUS Army Signal SchoolUS Army Special Warfare SchoolUS Army Transportation School

Copies furnished:Office, Chief of Staff, UO ArmyDeputy Chiefs of StaffChief of Research and DevelopmentAssistant Chiefs of StaffChief of EngineersThe Surgeon GeneralThe Provost Marshal GeneralCommanding Generals

4th Infantry Division101st Airborne Division (-)1lth Infantry Brigade (Sep)Commanding Officer198th Infantry BrigadeArmy Attache, London (Thru ACSI)

Director, Weapons System Evaluation GroupOSD (SA), Southeast Asia Forces (Dr. Bailey)Documents Control Office, Bell Aero Systems CompanyHq , US Army Weapons CommandJoint Action Control OfficeResearch .nalysis Corporation (Library)

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CONFIDENTIAL


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CO N 1 ID:E R-T IaALDEPARTMENT OF THE AR

HEADQUARTERS 4TH INFANTRY DIVISIONAP O San Francisco 96262

AVDDH-GC 15 June 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report - - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U) D D CTO : SEE DISTRIBUTION 1,EC 19 19b7

B1. (Uf) The attached Operational Report-Lessons Learned for quarter

ending 30 AZril 1967 summarizes the activities of the 4th Infantry Divisionfrom 1 February to 30 April, except those covered in the Combat After AictionReport, SAM OUSTON, which was forwarded to all addressees on 17 May 1967.2. (U) Since Operation SAM HOUSTON terminated on 5 April and the afteraction report covered in detail operations, intelligence, fire support,

PSYWAR and logistics, this report is an add-on and oovers other activitiessuch as civic action, training and base camp development. The tacticallessons learned reported in the SAM HOUSTON After Action jeport and theAfter Action Critique Notes, which presented the tactic commanders' view-point, provided a comprehensive and complete analysis for the reportingquarter, therefore, lessons learned are -rot included in this report.3. (C)COn 6 April 1967 a new operation, Operation FRANCIS MARION, wasinitiated by the 4th Infantry Division and continued at the end of the report-ing period. This operation began after the Division withdrew east of theSE SAN River to conduct surveillance of the CAMBODIAN border and search anddestroy operations in an area of operations generally extending from the CHUPONG mountains north to New PLEI DJERENG. In addition to the primary tacticalmission, the Division also supported the Goverrmnent of VIETNAM's EDAP ENANGprogram involving the resettlement of approximately 8,000 MONTAGNARD nativesand their personal possessions. ,4. (C). The Division had on,- major contact in Operation FRANCIS MARIONduring the reporting period. This involved the engagement of an estimatedNVA battalion south of the Oal, in which an armored infantry company sizetask force decisively defeated t e enemy. The results were 138 NVA killed(body count) with friendly casualties being only one US KIA. Increasedemphasis has been placed on the u ilization of long range reconnaissancepatrols in a border surveillance mission. The success of these patrolshas been beyond expectations, and they have made a most significant con- -tribution to the intelligence gathering effort. One infantry battalion wasconverted to a mechanized infantr-y battalion and initiated operations duringthe reporting period. This unit has successfully conducted mechanizedoperations south, southeast, and southwest of the Oasis. -

l~r1 # P Downgraded at 3 Year Tntervals. Declas-POR 0'.T; 7IS4X .. sified after 12 Years. MOD DMI 5200.10D NT tA'Dow


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C I-N/,"A-- LAVDDH-GC 15 June 19(7SUBE-CT: Operational Report - - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)

5. (C) During the reporting period, enemy tactics and techniques havecontinued to be those employed during Operation SAM HOUSTON, The tacticalconcepts and operations of the 4th Division -,e been essentially the sameas those employed in Operation SAM HOUTSON.

1 Inkl We R. PEMSas Majoz General, US AConviandingDISTRIBUTION:Same as ORLL

'TM. deeumesat ootains Informavion aU..t&fe wig NShomb,Deeae ef the -iittd States within the anaing of %_vtIn~ie s Laws, Title Is. U. S. C., Section 793 and 794.Its treamission or the revelation of it s aolntcts Ir rA9'1,ier to an vr.-utk. priie r o nr#ow3 IW"*, b ed y Ir"v.'

:iS3SWN forCFSTI WRII!ET1011J11ANNOUUED0- STIFICATION ............

... ............. .vz. -.. .':..........D TR' IO/AAILA3ILYUDES

"IST. AVAIL ad/or VECIAL

CoN ENTA;


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OPi.RATIONAL R.PORT - - LESSOAS LEARN1DTABLh OF CONThNTS

SECTION 3 SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIFS PARA . GEGENERAL 1 1

lh WLI,CE2 2OPiRATIOiNS AND TRAINING ACTIVITIES 3 I0LOGISTICS 4 16MILITARY CIVIC ACTION PROG4RAI (MILC.P) 5 17PRSONNEL 6 19aRTITLIRY 7 22hNGIN&R 8 28SIGNAL 9 33INFO.R'TION ACTIVITIES 10 35

SECTION 2 COMI4ANDERS OBS,-RVATIONS ADM RECQ{EMNDATIONSP,.RT I: OBSERVATIONS (LUSSONS UARUD) 1 37

OPERATIONS 2 37TRAINING 3 39IMELIUGNCE 4 40LOGISTICS 5 40SIGNAL 6 41CIVIC ACTION 7 41TRANSPORTATION 8 41

PART -II: RECOM}I' NDARIONSINCLOSURES TITLE

1 Organizational Structure2 Key Personnel3 Chronological Sumnary of Sighificant ictivities4 Air and Ground Defoliation Data5 Tactical and Logistical Displacement of the lst Brigade6 i.bbreviations lit


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FREEDIM PAGE BLANK- NOT FILMED.

DEPARTI,,ENT OF TH E ARMYHFADQX4UARTEHrT 4T H INFANTRY DIVISIONAP O San Francisco 96262

AVDDH-GC 15 June 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report - - Lecssons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)

SECTION 1 (C) SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES1. (C) General.

a. During the period covered by this report, the division terminatedOperation SAM HOUSTON and initiated Operation FRANCIS MARION and OperationHANCOCK. At the end of the reporting period the latter two operationscontinued.b. Organizational Structure.

(1) Combat Operations After Action Report, SAM HOUSTON, containsthe task organization during the period 1 January to 5 April 1967.(2 ) Task organizaticn for Operatioxi FRANCIS MARION for theperiod 6-30 April is at inclosure 1.(3) The attached 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division was OPCONto the ls t Air Cavalr-y Division during the period 1 February to 24 April 1967.

On 25 April the brigade was released from OPCON to the lst Air CavalryDivision and placed OPCON to TF Oregon. Therefore, the 3d Brigade, 25thInfantry Division is not included in this report.(4) Th e 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, attached to the 25thInfantry Division and operating in the III Corps Tactical Zone, is notincluded in this report.

c. Commnders as of the end of the reporting period are listed atInclosure 2.d. Mission.

(1) The missiox, of the 4th Infantry Division is to conductreconnaissance and surveillance of the CAMBODIAN Border and to the eastwithin the assignqd area of operation; to block enemy infiltration routesfrom CAMBODIA/IAOS across the highlands into the coastal provinces; to conductspoiling attacks and ambush operations; to destroy enemy base areas and supplyinstallations; to clear, secure and assist in the development of the TacticalArea of Responsibility; to support the Revolutionary Development and theGovernment of VIETNAM Refugee Resettlement Program; to open, secure andmaintain land lines of communications; to be prepared to deploy forces forthe relief/reinforcement of Civilian Irregular Defense Group, Regional an iPopular Forces and critical signal sites, sector and subsoctor headquarters

Downgraded at 3 year intervals,0 A Declassified after 12 yearsQENT-\IQ DOD DIR52O.lO1


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C AL::I~r"b"AVDDH-GC 1.5 June 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report - - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)

for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)within II Corps Tactical Zone and to provide I Field Force, VIETNAM battalionsize reserve on order.(2) The specific missions of the. division at the end of thereporting period were to conduct Operations FRANCIS MARION and HANCOCK and toprovide maximum support to the Government of VIETNAM's EDNAP ENANG ResettlementProgram..

2. (C) INTELLIGENCEP, General. Enemy activities during this period consisted ofdefensive preparations by the 32dp 66th, 88th and 95B NVA Regiments in thelower PLEI TRAP Valley and in the vicinity of the CAMBODIAN Border west ofroute 14B, against 4th Infantry Division operations in these areas duringOperation SAM HOUSTON, and preparation of positions in the IA DRAWG Valleyand area northwest of DUC CO (YAM40250) for the monsoon campaign. Miningactivity increased along major LUOC's and mortar attacks increased infrequency and intensity.

(1) There were a total of 164 contacts with enemy forces duringthe reporting period. Thirteen of these contacts involved enemy units ofplatoon-size or larger.(2) During February and March, search and destroy operations westof the SE SA N River in the lower PLEI TRAP Valley resdlted in contact andidentification . of the 32d, 66th and 88th NVA Regiments. Operations southwestof Ne w PLEI DJERF1G (YA875457) established contact with an element of the 95B

Regiment east of the CAIBODIAN Border at YA758387.(3) Following the apparent withdrawal of the major portionof these WVA regiments into CAMBODIA in March, an estimated two battalionsof the 95B Regiment infiltrated to ZA107178 where they prepared fortifiedpositions and living areas apparently in preparation for major NVA operationsplanned for May or June 1967,(4) Contacts with UVA units southwest of DUC CO during thelatter half of April resulted in identification of elements of the 88th NVARegiment along the CAMBODIAN Border in the area between the IA ERANG Riverand DUC CO, Other contacts and sightings indicated the presence of NVA unitspossibly belonging to the 88th Regiment in the CHU PONG Mountain area (YA9000S.(5) Northwest of DUO CO contact with elements of the 66thNVA Regiment in late April resulted in discovery of NVA unit positions in-cluding a hospital complex at YA715325.(6) It is believed that the enemy acted during the month ofApril to displace four NVA Regiments of the B-3 Front to positions in the

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Q- CIN V 10T A,


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SUBJECT: F attacksP/ AVDDH-GC 15 June 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report - - Lesso'.. Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)C141 PONG Mountain-IA DRANG Valley-DUC CO area for deployment in attacksagainst DUC CO, PLEI ME , LE THiANH, Dragon Mountain Base Camp and P.MAF unitpositions in the EDAP ENAN= area.

(7) During the reporting period the number and intensity ofenemy mortar attacks showed an increase over the previous rcporting puriod.The heaviest enemy mortar attack occurred on the night of 13-14 March whenthe Forward Command Posts of the 4th Infantry Division and the 1st and 2dBrigade, 4th Infantry Division received an estimated 330 rounds of 82"mmortar fire plus 7,1:m RR and B-40 RL fire at 12 3T (YA850455). On 27 Aprila fire support base occupied by Battery D, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery atYA898382 received the second heaviest attack of the period when 205 rds of82am mortar fire were received with 140 rounds falling vithin the unit'sperimeter.(8) An incident of enemy use of chemical ,elezr was experiencedon 6 April by a CIDG outpost and a US mortar platoon pcsitf.or at YA775223.

b. Operation SAM HOUSTON: Reference Combat After Action Report,Operation SAM HOUSTON.c. Estimated Enemy Composition, Disposition and Strength, as of30 April 1967.

ESTnuhTED LAST REPORTEDUNIT STaI,'GTH LOCATION DA1E SOURCE1st NVA Div 5,500 YA 4966 Apr 67 Agent Report

32d Regt 1,200 YA 6952 3 Feb 67 FW66th Regt 1,605 YA 6055 26 Feb 67 Captive88th Regt 1,459 YA 6058 15 Mar 67 Documents10th NVA Div U1ik CAMBODIA 195B Regt 1,295 ZA 1317 18 Apr 67 Documents1O C Bn 500 YA 75182 21 Nov 67 Documents200th Arty Bn 450,r PIEIKU/KONTUM 18 Apr 67 Agent Report407th MF Bn 500 N. PLEIKU 3 27 Apr 67 Agent ReportH.15 LF Bn 400 E. PLEIKU4 4 Anr 67 Agent R.eportd. Counterintelligence

(1) Increased sightings of mixed NVA, VC and VMC elementsindicate a possil-le effort by the enemy to increase the effectiveness of1The 1st and 10th NVA Division Headquarters are believed to be in CAMBODIA.2The 101C Bn was formerly the lOIC Regiment.3The 407th MF Bn normally operated in platoon or company-sized elements.4The H.15 LF has company-size elements in dispersed locations to the east ofPLEIKU city. 3

SO)NF \bbNTI~


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AVDDH-GC 15 June 3967SUBJECT: Operational Report -'- Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) Vfor Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)

NVAIVMC units by providing NV A cadre to local and main force VC/VMC unitswithin PIEf Province.(2) The VC infrastructure northwest and northeast of PLEIKUcity has suffered some distruption during the reporting period as evidencedby the *ncreased number of propaganda lectures which account for most of theincidents in this area.(3) No incidents of enemy espionage or subversion were reportedduring the period, however, on 16 April, the VO attempted to demolish thebridgE on highway 19E at BRIj5535 causing minor damage. The large number ofindigenous laborers employed by US forces in local area provide the enemy

with excellent opportunities to create incidents of espionage, subversionand sabotage.6. Significant Enemy Tactics and Techniques.

(1) General. During the previous reporting period, enemyactivities had included a sharp rise in intensive VC guerrilla activities.From 1 February through 15 March small scale guerrilla activities continuedwith emphasis on the mining of roads, tax collections and scattered groundto air harassing fires, This coincided with the deployment of tuo US infantrybattalions west of the NAM SATHAY River into the PLEI TRAP Valley. Theincidence of mining activitios throughout the reporting period indicated acoordinated effort on the part of NVA units and VC elements in the 4th InfantryDivision AO. The increase in sightings and reports of mixed NITA and VC/VMCelements in the PIEIKU-EDAP ENAM[ area further indicated increased' VA/VC/VICcooperation in PIEIKU Province.

(2) Significant changes in enemy tactics.(a) Enemy use of mortars: During Operation PATU REVERE IVWA units employed their mortars to support assaults by their infantry againstnight defensive positions and in one instance, against a US fire tupport base.However, during the period February-April the enemy showed a significantchailga in his tactic of attacking prepared US positions. During this periodenemy mortars were the ;rimary weapon in his attacks and his infctry wa s"employed to defend the mortars instead of assaulting prepared US positions.(b) Hugging Tactics: The enemy also demonstrated greateremphasis on "hugging tactics" to reduce his casualties from friendly supporting

fires. Contacts with NVA units were characterized by the enemy's efforts toeither initiate the attack against US units from very close r&nge or, whencontact was initiated by US unitsa, either break contact or move in close to th eUS position with large numbers of snipers.

(c) Use of route watchers:' The enemy has made Teater4

CON- VdENT\T


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AVDDH-GC 15 June 1967\ SUBJECT: Oprto eot Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (1)

use of route watchers than in previous reporting poriods. All indicationspointed to an extensive reconnaissance effort against friendly forward firebases and night defensive positions by positionuing route watcher parties ontrails or routes leading from the US positions. Early warning of thedirection of travel of US units from these positions provided the enemy withthe information necessary for establishment of defensive positions along theUS route. Several contacts initiated by the enemy against US units on the moveshowed his troops occupied hastily prepared positions on the ground -with alarge number of his personnel positioned in trees at the time the contactwas initiated.

(3) Er -my Use of Im~itative Comm.,nicat ions Deception: Severalinstances of the enemy's use of imitative conrmunications deception werenoted during the report peribd. In one instance a voice speaking nglishattempted to answer a call transmitted from a friendly station, however, whenthe statiun wa s challenged it could not authenticate. A homing device in ahelicopter picked up the signal and indicated a location across the CP2BODIANBorder. Another case due'ing the reporting period occurred when a voice,without a trace of oriental accent and using the call sign of a friendly unit,asked for help at a road junction. The sender, when challenged by a friendlyunit, could not authenticatv. A check revealed that no friendly units weren-ar the road junction indicated b, the sender.

(4) Lnemy Use of Chemical Agents: On 6 April, the mortarplatoon, 3rd 3a-;talion, 8th Infantry along writh one platoon of a CIDG corpnrifrom DUC CO Special Forces Camp, experiezeced three separate chemica. attackson their pos "ion at YA775223 between 0050 and 0105 hurs and a fourth attackat 014O hours. Individuals affected were partially incapacitated for severalminutes due to tears, running nose, a burning sensation in the throat,nostrils Pnd eyes; however, they were still able to see. It took three minutesfor the effects to wear off. No nausea, vomiting, or after effects were noted.Th e effects experienced by affected individuals wa s described as being similipzto that of US CN agent. A check of the area revealed 12 dark grey, plasticbegs measuring 4"x7"x3/8"1 containing a white powder which had been strewn onthe ground and wa s carried by a 5-8 knot wind to the friendly positions.

(5) Enemy Propaganda:(a) Enemy Dropaganda directed toward US forces during thereport period followed thc, theme that the United States was waging an unjustwar id VIEITNA; that the US soldiers were buing misled by their superiors;and that all honorable soldiers should refuse to fight and seek repatriation

(sic) to the lUnited States.(b) inumy propaganda directed toward the civilian

5

QON~~ D~~TL\


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AVDDH-GC 15 June 1967"SUBJECT: Operational Report - - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)for Quarterly' Period Endirg 30 April 1967 (U)population during this period followed the theme that the war will be longand hard, that much sacrifice will be required, but that the cause is Justand will bring freedom to all VIETNAM.

(c) Enemy propaganda leaflets recovered during thisperiod showed considerable improvement in composition and printing whencompared with leaflets recovered during the previous reporting period.(6) iAecapitulation of Enemy Battle Losses:

S9AHOUSTON FRANCIS hARION TOTAL(i Feb5 Apr 1967) (6 Apr-30 Apr 1967)7a) Personnel.

KIA (BC) 728 54 782NVAC 8 2 10VCC 6 7 13Detadnees 186 17 2TOTAL 928 235 1, _T3(b) Weapons.

Small Arms, '179 38- 217Crew Served 52 2TOTAL 231 271(c) Ammunition,

Small Arms (rds) 14,316 3,240 17,56Crew Served (rds) 9,593 30 9,62.81/82mm Mortar (rds) 136 9 14560mm Mortar (rds) 9 9 18Grenades 42 6 95 521Mines 59 19 78(d ) Selected Items of Equipment Captured.

Explosivas (ibs) 99 87 !86Documents (inches) 118 26.2 144.2Rice (tons) 8.896 2.,)99 10.995Salt; (ibs) 252.4 10 262.4(e) Material Destroyed.

Structures 1010 141 1151Fortifications 2540 1062 3602 A6

OT

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AVDDH-GC 15 June 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report - - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)f. Significant Sources and Collection Techniques: In the courseof an average month the C2 section received at least 40 different types ofreports on a regular uasis from higher, lower and adjacent units an dcivilian agencies. During an operation however, the majority of informationof imiediate tactical value came from the division's own collection agenciesand in particular the interrogation section of the 4th Military IntelligenceDetttchment at division and brigade level.g. Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities and Probable Courses9f A~cti 0o4

(1) Enemy Capabilities are:(a) Attack single, or multiple targets simultaneouslywith up to multi-regimental size forces supported by local VC elements inthe western portion of the FRANCIS MARION AO.(b) Reinforce the units comnitted in Operation FRANCISMARION with the 24th NVA Regiment in KONTUM Province, elements of the 5th NVADivision PHU YEN and KHANH HOA Province or other as yet unidentified unitsinside CAMBODIA.(c) Defend base areas a-d landing zones in southwesternKONTUM and western PLEIKU Provinces with ur to battalion-size forces.(d) Withdraw V"VAorces into CAMBODIA, thereby avoidingcontact.

(2) Enemy Vulnerabilities.(a' The enemy's logistical system (NVA/VC,,/VMC) isvulnerable to disruption through friendly operations. Enemy units operatingwithin RVN cre reliant on resupply from base areas in CAMBODIA or from pre-positioned pply bases/caches in RVN.

1. Insertion of US Forces between enemy locationsin RVN and the CAMBODIAN Border can interdict logistical support fromCAMBODIA, s demonstrated in Operation PPPL RWfkRE IV.Z. Sustained efforts to search out supply cachesin the area of operation ha.- resulted in numorous Laches being ur.cove.ed.

In the western EDAP ENANG area alone, over 6," tons of rice have been dis-covered since the initiation of Operation PALl. REVERE XV in October 1966.Nb) The enemys need for extensive combat preparationsand his inflexibility in execution of a plan maLzes him vulnerable to pre-emption by spoiling attacks, Locating of enemy units by friendly forcesprior to initiation of major offensives by an enamy force offers theopportunity to destroy the enemy force and dis:rupt major enemy plans formulti-unit operations in an area. 7

(O-) L-)~ )>T


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AVDDH-GC 15 June 1967 /SUBJECT: Operational Report - - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)fox Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)(c) Enemy forces, when massed, are especially vulnerableto air strikes, artillery fires and vertical envelopment by heliborne forces.This vulnerability increases as an enemy force pentrates deeper into RVNfrom CAMBODIA. However, it must be borne in mind that planned, major NVAcontacts initiated by the enemy at relatively extened distances fromCAMBODIA can reasonably be expected to include NVA preparations to ambushUS ground or heliberne reaction forces.

(d) VC dependence on support by the indigenous populationrequires the establishu-nt of a VC infrastructure which must remain in placeto be effective. Individual members of this infrasturcture are vulnerableto detection and apprehension. Sustained friendly operations in an areaproduces a sense of physical security and trust among local inhabitants,and when augnented by intensive village sweep operations, have achievednoticable success in disruption of the VC infrastructure and 'detection andapprehension of VC cadre and officials.

(e) The enemy is vulnerable to the use of chemicaldefoliants and crop destructioz agents. The enemyts need for concealedbase areas coupled with the need to produce his own rice to augment food-stuffs procured from the local populace, renders him partioulary vulnerableto the effects of these weapons.(f) Enemy personnel have .several psychological vulner-

abilities wnich can be exploited as separate targets or used in combinationaiainst specific enemy fruits..1. The enemyls'limited medical facilities, equipmentand supply of drugs and medicines render the NVA susceptible to malaria andpulmonary diseases, especially during the southwest monsoon period.'2. Several intelligence sources have indicated thatdissenaion exists between NVA units commandErs and political officers, andbetween NJA cadre and VC/VM4C cadre in mixed NVA/VC tnits. If such dissensiondoes not already exist, it can be created by persistent psychoiogical attacks.

/ , Intangible vulnerabilities that can be exploitedto our advantage include: Fear of being killed or wounded, fear of improperburial or no burial at all and fear of having to fight a lorg protracted war.(3) Probable Courses of Actions.

(a) The NVA achieved some measure of success in committingbattalion-size forces against company-size br smaller US units, and willundoubtedly ase this same tactic in fatnre operations.(b) During the reporting period, all intelligence (PWreports and captured documents) indicated that the four NVA regiments8 4


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AVDDH-GC 15 June 1967SUBJECT: Opermtional Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)contacted (32d, 66th, 88th and 95B) were initially at 60-70% TO&E strength*These understrengths will greatly reduce their capability to generate signifi-cant combat power in terms of battalion and regiment-size attacks. However,the enemy does retain the caphbility to concentrate or weld understrengthcompanies and battalions into specially tailored forces to attack multipletargets, particularly those targets vulnerable to mortar attacks.

(c) In all probability the NVA will continue to attackUS units operating in the proximity of the CAMBODIAN Border and south of theOasis'. The most probable areas of enemy operations are in the vicinity of theIA DRANG Rvier, in the area west of route 14B, PLEI ME and DUC CO SpecialForces Camps, the EDAP ENANG Refugee Center, THAN AN District Headquartersand US/ARVN unit positions in this general area.h. Recomnended New Techniques and Changes in Doctrine and/or

Organization.V'(i) The Military Intelligence Detachment hac no assigned USpersonnel qualified as VIETNAMESE linguists. This makes counterintelligcaeaand interrogation personnel completely dependent upon ARVN interpreters.The ARVN interpretors have a limited knowledge of military terminology andthe English language. At a minimum two VIETNAMESE qualified lingusits shouldbe assigned to the Military Intelligence Detachment.

(2) A Blacklist for PLEIKU Province was assembled and distributedto divisional units by the 4th MI Detachment. As an additional aid, individualvillage sheets containing all known information on each village were prepared.All units were furnished counterintelligenee EEI worksheets for the purposeof gathering more information from the units operating in these villages.At the present time there are insufficient counterintelligence personnelassigned to anlyze and update the in-coming information for each village.To compensate for this shoitage, daily updating of individual village studysheets wa s discontinued and a counterintelligence supplement to the dailyIWSUM was substituted.(3) Combined infantry and intelligence cordon and searchoperations resulted in'the apprehension of several VC an d VMC suspects andtemporarily upset the VC infrastructurn through the loss of cadre, cacheo andthe security they had previously enjoyed. There were insufficient counter-intelligence personnel available, therefore, villages were not always searchednor people questioned as completely as desired. There is a definite need .toaugment fisild counterintelligence units in direct support of infantry ppera-tions. In addition closer coordination between infantry units and CI person-nel in the selection of villages for search operations will increase theoverall effectiveness of the operation,J ... Poaparison of Intelligence Eatmtes Versus Actual Enemy Found.

As of 1 January, the B-3 Front was accepted as consisting of the 1st and 10th9

r /V,," .. 1


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i' ('A- F' 7. - / ,IAVDDH-GC 15 June 1967'3UBJECT: Operational Report - - Leszons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)NVA Division, with the 32d, 33dand 66th Regiments subordinate to the former,and the 88th, 95 B and lOIC Regiments subordinate to the latter. The statusof the 33d and 101C Regiments was questionable, however, as it was knownthat both had suffered severe personnel losses during Operation PAUL REVERE IV.Several captives had already reported that both regiments had been disbandedand their personnel used as replacements for other regiments. It was furtherestimated that the enemy would 6ommit his forces (both NVA and VC) in se; eralscattered locations to offset US reaction capabilities. The most likely areasat the time appeared to be the KONTUM panhandle and the IA DRANG River valleyfor NVA units; the center of PLEIKU Province for VC main and local force units.This estimate proved valid. The only discrepancy that emerged between theintelligence estimate and the actual enemy found was "Ln the composition of theNVA divisions. The majority of the captives stated that the 1st NVA Divisionnow consisted of the 32d, 66th, and 88th Regiments, Ahich indicated that amaj,;r realignment had taken place since Operation PAUL REVERE IV. At the closeof the reporting period, the status of the 10th NVA *)ivision was not clearas it appeared to have only one major combat element, the 95B Regiment.

3. (C) Operations and Training Activities.a. Plans.

(1) OPORD 2-.67 (FRANCIS MRION), 7 April 1967. The divisionmission included the following tasks: To detect NVA infiltrating intoRepublic of VIETNAM; to destroy NVA/VC troop cc:Acentrations; to providesecurity for engineer construction and logistical installations; to providesecurity fo r Government of VIETNAM resettlement areas within the area ofoperations and to provide security fo r highway 19 east of PLEIKU tovicinity-of MANG YANG pass.

(2) OPLAN'8-67 (CHASE),, February 1967. It outlines divisionplans fo r the conduct of joint operations for the relief of installations inthe PLEIKU complex to include the PW camp. ARVN forces pursue and driveenemy forces into blocking positions established by 4th Infantry Division units.

(3) OPLAN 9-67 (WALTER REED), 5 March 1967. This plan calls forthe deployment of a battalion task force to northwestern KONTU14 to conductsearch and destroy operation; block infiltration routes; upgrade route 512and construct and record locations of fire support bases within the AO.

(4) OPLAN 10-67 (DRAUUN MOUNTAIN BASE CAMdP AD TAOR DEFENSE),16 April 1967. it prescr:.bes procedures for the organization and the defenseof the division base camp and division TAOR, and for the conduct of hamletvisits within the base camp TAOR.

(5) OPLAN 12-67 (RED BALL), 13 April 1967. It prescribes theprocedures for rescue of personnel, th e security of sensitive documents and

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Cow r /- & u F/4 i_AVDDH-GC 15 june 1967SUBJECT- Operational Report - - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)equipment and recovery operations for downed aircraft.

(6) OPLAN 13-67 (WEST of the SE SAN), 17 April 19?7. The planprovides planning guidance for the employment of one brigade west of the SESAN River.(7) OPLA& 14-67 (LZ CAT), 20 April 1967. Th e Division wouldcontinue Operation FRANCIS MARION; commit a mechanized battalion task forceon an operation from PLEI ME to the CHU PONG mountains.(8) OPLAN 15-67 (101st), 25 April 1967. It provides planningguidance for receipt of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division in supportof 4th Infantry Division operations.

b. Operations.(1) Operation SAM HOUSTON began on 1 January 1967 and continued

until 5 April. The detailed record of division operations is contained inCombat Operations After Action Report, SM HOUSTON, Headquarters, 4th InfantryDivision.(2) The 4th Infantry Division began Operation FRMNCIS MARIONon 6 April 1967. Th3 area of operati.on remained the same as Operation SA14HOUSTON. For a chronological summary of sjigficant activities from 5 April -30 April see inclosure 3.(3) On April 26, Operation HANCOCK I was initiated by FRJAGO 3-1-67

to OPORD 2-67 with change 1. Task Force 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry supportedby Battery C, 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery Battery Group conducted searchand destroy operations in the vicinity of BA N BIECH. At the end of the report-ing period the operation continudd.,

c. Training.(1) The 4th Diviqion Replacement Training program was revised

to incorporate combat lessons learned and to institute changes directed byUSARV in-replacement training pr-ograms. A gas chamber exercise and increasedemphasis on patrolling and aZbush/counter-ambush techniques were among thesignificant changes. Additionally, due to the large number of replacementsbeing received by the division 'nd 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, itwas necessary to ihitiate two replacement training classes per week. Duringthe reportirg, period, 1,387 replacements participated in this training.

(2) The division's Combat- NC O Leadership School program ofinstruction was revised to incorporate combat lessons learned. There were205 students who attended this school, 195 of whom completed the coursesuccessf'_lly.

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AVDDH-GC 15 June 1967SUBJECT: Operatiouial Report - - Lessons learned (RCS CSFOR-65)for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)(3) The Recondo Preparatory Schocl progrem of inst.-uction wasrevised to incorporate training which would better prepare candidates forsuccessfully completing the MACV Recondo School. There were 129 personnelwho successfully completed the recondo preparatory training.(4) 'Division personnel received the following new equipmenttraining: (a) AN/PSR-1 anti-instrusion device. 112 individuals.

(b) Trace metal detection kit. 37 individuals.(c) Position locator. Eight individuals.

(5) Other training conducted by ths division consisted ofprojectionist training to 60 individuals. Rope ladder and rappelling trainingwas presented to a cadre of 27 indfviduals using the divisionto newly con-structed 40 foot tower and CH-47 helicopters. During the period 5 through11 April, Company C, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry presented mortar training to35 CIDG personnel.(6) Projected training: A division sniper and Hawk~eye (hunter-killer) training program will be initiated earlV in May. The POI for this

training is divided into tw o phases of five days each. The first Hawkeyetraining class is scheduled for 24 US personnel and 30 ARVN personnel and51 US personnel will take sniper training.d. Chemicaf.

(1) Chemical operations consisted of defoliation, Riot ControlAgent (RCA) employment, and installaLion and maintenance of flame do.-ices.(2) Chemical operations in support of Operation SA M HOUSTONare contained in Combat Operations After Action Report, SAM HOUSTON.(3) Defoliation Planning. Requests were coordinated andsubmitted for aerial and ground defoliation for portions of PLEIKU, DARfLtand KONTUJM Provinces.

(a) In PLEIKU Province the aerial request was partiallyapproved on 8 April.(b) In KCNTtM Province the request was approved on 17

February.(c) In DARLIC Province erlarged target areas were addedto the initial aerial defoliation request.

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AVD~.. 15 June 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report - - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-6W)for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)(4) Aerial defoliation by the C-1231s of the 12th Air CommandoSquadron in the division AO commenced-on 18 February. Twenty-six missionswere flown, totalling 62 sorties in PLEIKU and southwest KONTUM Provinces.(See inclosure 4 and SAM HOUSTON After Action Report).(5) Ground Based Defoliation.

(a) Ground based defoliation continued throughout the periodusing the UH-iD spray rig. A total of 252 sorties were flown.(b ) On 22 April two sorties were flown using the 179thAviation Company's newly fabriacated spray rig for the CH-47 helicopter (SeeInclosure 4). Characteristics of this rig are:

1. Tank capacity - 600 gallons.a. Rated pump capacity - 80 gallons per minute.3. Tested length of time to spray all defoliant intank - 8.5 to 10 minutes.. Optimum speed and altitude for spraying - 50 knotsat 50 feet., Width of path covered - 12 to 15 meters.

(c) During the period a Buffalo Turbine, on loan from IICrops Engineer (202 Committee) was used to defoliate the Dragon MountainBare Camp Perimeter.(d) A total of 2760 gallons of defoliant were used forthese operations (1860 gal WHITE and 900 gal ORANGE). Since these agentsmust be mixed with a solvent for proper application, ,pproximately 15,000gallons of defoliant mix were sprayed by the Chemical Section using groundbaded defoliation systems over approximately 340 hectares.

(6) Riot Control Agent (RCA).(a) Three Riot Contr. 1 Agent (RCA) drum drops and onegrenade drop were made on suspected enemy positions, In each case the RCAdrop was followed by artillery concererations. Negativte resultj were reported.(b) Two drum drop, were made in support of the 1st, Brigadeat YA 789385.

_. 7 April 1967 - 29 drums (2320 lbs) of CS poWderwere dropped from two Wti-47'sw13

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AVDDH-GC 15 June 1967' isSUBJECT: Operational Report - - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)2. 12 April !967 - 30 drums (2400 ibs) of CS powder

were dropped from two CH-47's.(7) Installation and Maintenance of 55 Gallon Flame Devices.

(a) At the end of the last reporting period Division Chemicalpersorinel had placed 68 operational 55 gallon flame devices on the base campperimeter. During February, March and April, new devices were installedcompletely ringing the Dragon Mountain Base Camp.(b) Thirty-nine of the mines required replacement for thereasons noted:

1. Set off by elcctrical storms 31. (16 on 4 April,10 on 27 April and 5 on 30 April).2. Tested -5.3. Damaged and required destruction - 3 (twro by smallarms fire from the perimeter, one by a bulldozer).

(c) There were a total of 123 operational flame devicesaround the base camp, on 30 April 1967.e. PSYWAR.

%') An overall CA/Psyops evaluation of the indigenous population'sattitude shows an acceptance of both GVN and US officials and the programinitiated in their hamlets. There was a marked increase in the amount ofinformation volunteered by inhabitants and an apparent willingness to openlyassist military and government officials.

(2) During the period over 50 million leaflets, 100 hours ofairborne loudspeaker and 85 hours of ground louspeaker time were used. Thethemes emphasized the strength of Government of VIETNAM and American Forcesand were designed to instill fear into the ranks of the NVA soldiers.Additional themes included the CHIEU HOI program and encouragementcivilians to provide information concerning NVA/VC activities and to denysupport to the NVA/VC. loudspeaker missions were also used to warn thecivilian population of danger.(3) Psychological operations included such new innovations as;No-Doze, CH-47 missions along the CAh4BODIAN Border; floating shingles withpsyops messages for use in the rivers; and pledge of allegiance cards.

Additional psyops "s gained through the use of district psyops Personneland HOI CHANH during visits in the TAOR by the District:hief.,(4) Problem area: The motivation of ARVN Psyops teams attached

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Lof\,) Tj~J/)..AVDDH-GC 15 June 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report - - Lessons Learned (Rcs CSFOR-65)for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)to the 2d Brigade left much to be desired. Many attempts were made to improvetheir effectiveness. Special lectures were presented on the importance oftheir mission and mission schedules wore adjusted to be more is,ine withtheir previous work loads. Comfortable and protective shelters were providedthem and several items of personal equipment w~re temporarily issued for theiradded comfort. All of these efforts produced no lasting impact on theirattikude toward their jobs or an effective psyop program. To effectivelyuse an ARVN psyop team, good p]tunning is necessary. In some villages, aneffectiVe program was implemented thro,'jgh the use of conscientious MONTAGNARD(Civiliam) interpreters.

f. G3 Air operations.(1) Air operations in support of SAM HOUSTON are contained inCombat Operations After Action Report, SAM HOUSTON.(2) The following clove air support missions were flown insupport of Operation FRANCIS MARION during the period 6-30 April.

FAC CS S SPOOKY TOTALPREPLAN DIMED PEPLAN IMED212 35 64 6 12 329

(q) No, B-52 bomber strikes have been flown in support ofOperation FRANCIS MARION to date.(4) Weather conditions did not significantly restrict airsupport during the period. Twenty of the approved missions were canceleddue to adverse weather.(5) The preparation and submission of preplanned requestsbetween 2400 and 0600 hours facilitated the processing and resulted inmore requests being filled.(6) Orientation flights on "Spooky" missions were scheduledfor commanders and staff officers of the division to provide first handexperience with this weapons system.

g. Army Aviation Operations.(1) The Aviation Battalion enhanced the division's ability toaccomplish its assigned mission with responsive and effective combat aviationsupport. Combat support missions flowm included combat. assault, resupply,comand and control, arned helicopter hnd casualty evacuation.(2) Staff planning was principally directed toward the direct

15


24/71

~ .0,'o / ,,g7"/,9/_~AVDDH-GC 15 Jume 1967 *SUBJECT: Operational Report - - Lessons learned (RCS CSFOR- 65)for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)support and general wipprt role of the Aviation Batta] LOn supported by the52 d Combat Aviation Battalion, This normally consiated of one AssualtHelicopter Company and c- Assault Support Helicopter Company in direct sup-port.

(3) Plans were updated for the improvement of Hensel Army Air-field. Major changes included completion of a 2500 foot hard top runway,the building of four pref-bricated operations buildings and the addition ofa non-directional beacon, The runway was in the process of being -atrendedby 1000 feet and remade into a 3500 foot steel matting runway capable ofhandling C-130 type aircraft at the end of the teriod.

(4) The majority of training was conducted along the lines oflessons learned. Where possible, this tr&afing was spontaneous and con-ducted informally during mission brcaks to a group as small as a helicoptercrew. Concurrent training in gumnery was conducted while on routi ne missions.A free fire range area provided crew training and testing of aircraft gunsystems.(5) Newly assigned aviators were given a thorough in-country

orientation. This training consisted of as much as 200 flying hours in-country prior to an aviator being assigned as an aircraft commander. Newlyarrived in-country persop.nel were asaigned to a~penienced aircraft cormmandersfor on-the-job traiining during operational missicns.4. (C) Logistics.

a. A detailed report of the logistical support cf tactical operationsduring Operatazin SA M HCUSTON is contained in Combat Operations After ActionReport, SA M HOUSTON.b. A chrc.ological and statistical summary of tha 1s t Brigade Istactical and logistical moves from TUY HO A to the 4th "ivision Base Camp is

at inclosure 5.c. 3d Bri;ade, 25th Infantry Division comnanced relocating toDragon Mountain Base Camp by us-Ing organic vehicles on 10 April. The targetdate for compl-tion of rel"ocat.;on is 30 May 39167,d. Base C',=p impr:ovements in logistical support facilities accomplish-ed during the period were:

(1) Construcvion of a buildirg to house tha 1st LogisticalCommand Laundry Detachment wmeq complated. Taundry prod-ition %veraged9,000 pounds per day.(2 ) Construction of a 15 ton ice plant was completed in the

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\ AVDDH-GC 15 June 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report - - Lessons Ixarned (RCS CSFOR-65)

for Quarterl]v Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)Class I distribution area. Ice i* ow I'eing distributed with Class Iratioas.

e. Conver-ion of 2d Battalion, %.h Infantry to a mechanized infantrybatt.alLon was accomplished. The major eqpjippent was shipped in packets fromSAIGON to QUI NHON and arrived at Dragon uouneL Base Uamp on 15 March. AIshortage of tools and spare parts resulted in an approyimate 30 da y delay inconversion.f. Project Counter Teams, Department of the urmy Technical AssistanceTeams, arrived Pt the 4th Infantry Division to assist in purifying PLL's andASL's of units of the &.vi.ion. At the end of the reporting period Project

Counter Teams had completed a review of approximately 50 percent of unit PLL's.g. Division (,CI. eams were organized to maintain high state ofMaterial Readiness. GMAXIs were conducted in ac,:rdance with standardprocedures as outlined in AR 750-8 and DA Phamplet 750-10. Initiation ofthe C1,I and Roadside Spot Check programs emr asised the importance ofpreventive maintenance.,

5. (U) Military Civic Action Program (M!iLAP).a. For detailed report of MIL.Cj? operations in the division AOduring period 1 Febiuary - 5 April see Combat Operations After Action Report,S1,4 HOUSTON.b. On 1 February the Good Neighbor Program was initiated in theTactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) around the Dragon Mountain 3aseCamp and thus became the fecal point of the division's Civic Actions.c. Civic Action activities during the months of February, Marchand April continued to shift to the long-range nation building projectsdesigned to compliment the Goverrment of VILTNAM's Revolutionary DevelopmentProgram. The main effort was directed through the Good Neighbor Progr=m,which 6..;,iding on the earlier H=miet Visitation Program, expanded civicaction activities to visiting 41 hamlets five times per %,eek in the TAOR.Enthusiastic acceptance by the hamlets of these self-help projects led tothe development of -farnning program. irrigation projects, recreationalitems such as swings and seesaws, the opening of a PX souvenir store as anoutlet for the cottage industry and an expanded health workers training

program. A pilot livestock. program was given impetus with the assignmentof a veterinarian to the division.d. The success of this expanded program is reflected in the in-creased .tartic pati-.n by the villagers and GVN officials. Weekly visitsby the IE TRUNG district chief and monthly visits by province officials are

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U N ( L A_A:%S I ED _V /I'VAVbDH-UASC 15 June 1967 'VSUBJECT: Operational Report - - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)welcomed by the poople,, Construction of the Good Neighbor Council housewas begun, and with VXETNAIMSE, MONTAGfiARD and US personnel working side""I sbide -epresented th e growin-g com--unity spirit. As the people becamemore convinced of the GVNs interest in their well being, they began to turnto the local GV N officials for assistance. For example, when a plagueepidemic broke out in one village, the people went to their district head-quarters and within three hours district officials had innoculated 250 people.Th e success of the program is also borne out by a village, which havingobserved the spillway construmtion in a nearby hamlet, purehased cement andpipe in PLEIKU, and with the assistance of the-w neighbors built their ownspillway.

e. To cap`.i6.Lz' on the successes gained in the TAOR and to meetthe increased requests for assistance, Good Neighbor Program was initiatedon i 15 March in t.e forward areast Around the fire bases and CPts of the 1stand 2d Brigade and along highways 14B and 19, the divisional combat elementsbegan visitiig the local hamlets s~ierl times weekly. In. addition theTAOR was extended on 17 Arril to :0 kilometers from the base camp and theGood Neighbor program expanded To 59 hamlets. In a constantly expandingprogram, the 4th Infarntr Divisioa is conducting an aggressive civic actionprogram which is specificollzy designed to assibt the GV N in conductingrevolutionary development in area which is not a National Priority Province.Cooperation between US L-my and ARVN forces, between USAID and GV N represent-atives, and civilians anri Military personuel on both sides is the hallmarkof this "Good Neighbor Program".

f. EDAP ENjilG Resettl,.ment Program.(1) On 2 April the GV N initiated the EDAP ENAiNG ResettlementProgram employing one ranger battalion as a security force and supporting theprogram with 200 TRUNG SON cadre and a staff organization. Altrhough EDAP ENA1Gis an ARVN program, the division is coxmLitted to support this program consist-ent with the tactical mrission.(2) The 2d Brigade assisted in the resettlement program by moving

18 villages with a total population of 2,757 people and 90,000 pounds of foodand rice from in-iecure areas, south of THANH AN District Headquarters, to thesecure resettlement area along route 19 West. The move required more than 90CH-47 sorties and 30 2J ton tnrck loads. Other support included temporaryissue of 21 general purpose tents for shelter, 39 dozer days and five 5 tontruck loads of grairel and sand for construction projects. In additionmedical awsistance was provided 1,hrough the brigade surgeon.

g. Efforts not otherwise mentioned above.(1) Cottage industr:ies 'zere initiatea in PLEI CHUNG KEP, THANH

AN District.

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27/71

AVDDH-GC- i June 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report - - lessons Learnec (RCS CSFOR-65)for Quarterly Period Eneding 30 April 1967 (U)

(2) Audic-visual team accompanied the CA teams on night visitsto hamlets in the TAOR and showed movies during the visit and performed othercivic actions.(3) The division continued its policy of preoiding peekages of

food and sundry items to persons detained and then released as innocentcivilians. In addition, toilet articles and medical treatment were providedto the PW compound.(4) The division veterinary program continued to grow to a

total of 14 hamlets participating. A total of 280 cattle ,iere examined and84 treated for various diseases. Additionally, many chickens and swinewere ex,=incd and two hamlets constructed hog pens in an effort to controldiseases. The units preytided edible garbage to supplement the diet of theanimals.

(5) Twenty hamlet health workers completed their training andgraduated en 15 April 1967. They were presented diplomas signed by theProvince Health Director and the Division Surgeon. Additionally, each waspresented with a complete first aid kit for use in their hamlet. A secondclass is scheduled to begin on 1 May 1967.(6) English classes at the Highland Junior Military Academywere concludfd with the end of the school year. Classes will resume on 2June 1967. Units and perecnnel ha.vc continued to donate reading materialsuch as magazines, books dnd newspapers for use in the school library.(7) Six one hour periods of instruction were presented to

replacenent personnel to emphaze their individual role in Civic Action andPsyops.6. (C) Personnel.

a. Strength. Authorized and assigned strengths at the beginningand at the close of the reporting period were as follows:(1) Beginning of period OFF WO EM AG G

Authorized: 768 164 10897 11829OrganicAttached 3 560 .Total 803 167 11457 12427

Assigned: 816 129 11716 12661OrganicAttached 28 2 5Total 84 1T1 12230 132C519

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I'AVDDH-EC 15 June 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report - - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)

for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)(2) Close of period OFF Wo EM AC.G

Authorized: 763 164 10876 .1803OrganicAttached 2 23 _ 612Total 1011 187 15217 5Assigned W01% 1Organi A. 17 12097 13045OrganicAttached 247 22 14 4Total 1048 lT 1651-7 17734

b. Replacements. A total of 159 officers and 2,857 enlistedreplacements were received. The total division losses were 533. A total. of172 emergency leaves were processed.c. Morale and Personnel Services.

(1) Morale throughout the division and attached elements isexcellent.(Z) Decorations awarded:

Distinguished Service Cro 1Silver Star 50Distinguished Flying Cross 26Legion of Merit 4Soldiers's Medal 5Bronze Star W/V Device 186Bronze Star for MeritoriousService 126Air Medal 584Army Commendation MedalW/V Device 50Army Commendation Medal 67Purple Heart 320(3) Combat iBadges awarded:

Combat Infantz7 Badge 487Combat Medical Badge 66Aircraft Crewman Badge 44d, Promotions. A total of 2,765 enlisted personnel were promotedduring the period.e. Reenlistments. A total of 188 reenlistments or extensionactions were completed. The enlistment/extension breakdown was as follows:

(1) First term RA reenlistments 3220.)O, ,t A 7>/,,


29/71

(.s.J,/ " /tItQ ',)( *,.AV`DPH-OC 15 June 1967SUWJECT: Operational Report - - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)(2) Career RA reenlistments 129.

(3) AUJS reerlistments 91(4) HIA extensions 5(5) AUS eytensions 1

f. Postal:(1) Money Order Sales $2,907,914.37(2) Postal and Parcel ?ost Fees $61,527.00(3) Incoming Mail 20,394 sacks

Daily Average 243 sacks(4) Outgoing Mail 5,577 sacks

Daily Average 63 sacks(5) Number of incoming mail days 84(6) Number of outgoing mail days 89

g. Special Services.(1) Total of four US O shows played, to an estimated attendanceof 12,O00.(2) P&R quotas received were 4,980 out-of-country and 200i-n-country.(3) During the reporting period a total of 90 movies andTV films were circulated throughut the division.

h. Chaplain activities:DENOMINATION NUMBER OF SERVICES ATTENDANCERoman Catholic 418 14,459Protestant 370 13,917Jewish 4 69Memorial (Non-Denominational) 17 2,C2i, Maintenance of discipline, law and order.

(1) A total of 194 incidents were reported to the Provost21

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30/71

F-- -- - -. . 7,,g1 ,AVDDH-G0 15 June 1967SUBJECT: Operational rleport - - Lessons learned (RCS CSFOR-65)for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)Xarshali'5 office during the reporting period.

(2) Military Justice.(a) General Courts Martial I(b) Special Courts Martial 80(c) Summary Courts Martial 109

7. (C) Artillery.a. General. During the reporting period the Headquarters andHeadquarters Battery, Division Artillery and the 'ith Battalion, 16th Artillery(-) participated in Operations SAM HOUSTON, FRANCIS i'iARION, and, HANCOCK.Division Artillery was responsible for the defense of the base camp*b. Intelligence.

(1) Metro.(a) Two electronic meteorological sections were employedin the TAOR during the quarter, one from the (th Battalion, 14th Artillery,52d Artillery Group, and one from Division Artillery.(b) It was noted by comparison of meteorological datataken at DUC CO, Ne w PISI DJERENG, and Dragon Mountain Base Camp, that metrodate should be taken from the immediate area in which fires originate. Therewere similarities between data from DUC CO and New PISI DJERENG but unitsoperating in either area ohould use metorological data from another areaonly as a last resort. There were few similarities ncted between DragonMountain Base Camp and the western areas.(c) A continuing comparison will be obtjined for therainy -eason to observe if the change of season increases or decreases thecapability of using metro data from a central location.

(2) Radar.(a) Division Artillery had one ANAPS-25, cn e AN/TPS-33,and one AN/MPQ-4 (235th Radar Detachient) in the base camp. One AN/MPR-4wa s employed in a GS role in the forward area by the 237th ,Ra-d, Detachment.(b) The ANAPS-25 located 316 contacts during the reportingperiod. It was operational 1046 hours, and was non-operational for 77 3/4hours while awaiting parts.

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VDDH-GC 15 June 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report - - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)

for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)(c) The AN/iO-4 RPwar; 23yth Radar Detachment, wasoperational 1012925 hours. The set was non-operational 25.25 hours. Theradar in the forward area operated by the 237th Radar Detachment wasoperational 799 hours and was non-operational 160 hours.(3) Searchlights: The deployment of a searTh-ight in supportof roadblock and check point operations was valuable during the hours ofdarkness. The surprise effect and capabilities of the searchlight toilluminate a larger area assisted the military police in identifying andcontrolling indigenous traffic.

c. Operations.(1) A detailed operational report for Division Artillery andthe attached artillery units for the period 1 February through 5 April 1967can be found in the Combat Operation After Action Report, SAM HOUSTON.(2) Operation VANCIS MARION - 6 Ajrtl - 30 April 1967.

(a) Concept of operations. The concept for artilleryemployment was to provide direct support artillery to the maneuver elements;to use medium and heavy artillery in reinforcing and general support missionsand to provide artillery support for USSF/CILG camps at PLEI ME, DUC CO andNe w PLEI DJEUW.(b) Execution.

I, During the initial phases of the operation directsupport artillery was provided by attaching artillery to the brigades.During the last week of the reporting period the 6th battalion, 29th Artilleryand 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery were detached from the brigades an d givenmissions of direct support. The 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery was placed inDS of the 1st Brigade and the 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery was placed DS ofthe 2d Brigade. There was no additional artillery OPCON during this operation.The 52d Artillery Group had the mission of general support-reinforcing the4th Infantry Division Artillery. With the concurrence of the group comnander;the 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery wa s used to provide DS artillery for the IstSquadron, 10th Cavalry and 1st Battalion, 69th Armor. The remainder of theartillery battalions provided ganeral support reinforcing fires.2. An additional platoon and section from Battery B,4th BatLalion, 60th Artillery was attached to the division and then detachedand placed under the control of the 52d Artillery Group. With the concurrenceof the 52d Artillery Group Commander. , locations of Battery B weapons werenot changed. The weapons of both Batteries B & D, 4th Battalion, 60thArtillery provided increased fire power for artillery fire support bases an dbrigade tactical command posts during the night, while providing strong points

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AVDDH-GC 15 June 196'SUBJECT: Operational Report - - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)for route security during the daylight hours. Their use permitted accomplish-ment of rnultiplt missions with eOcoz2w of force, freeing additional maneuverelements for employment Py the maneuver ba-talions. Decause of rapidlychanging requarements, the flexibility permitted by the attachment of theseunits to the division wa s essential.

(c) Division Artillery headquarters exercised increased controlever artillery amnunition e-cpediturec and provided guidance for expendituresto both direct support and, general support reinforcing artillery. Duringperiods of contact all armmunlition expenditures were increased and likewisewhen contact diminished, expenditures were proportionally reduced. Thesame held true with H&I programs.

(3) Operation HANCOCK I 26 April- 30 April 1967. Light andmedium artillery support was provided by forming one artillery battery groupattached to Task Force, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry. Thp bnttery groupconsisted of Battery C, 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery and Pattery A, 5thBattalion, 16th Artillery.d. Ammunition expenditures.

(1) By caliber 1 February 1967 to 30 April 1967.105

185,908 31,892 18,056 7,737(2) By unit:SAM{ HOUSTON 1 Feb -5 Ap r FRMNCIS &RION 5 Apr-30. Apr

2-9 105T - 17,545 4-42 15T - 12,1464-42 105T - 78,428 6-29 105T - 11,2596-29 105T - 39,083 3.6 105SP - 6,2587-13 105T - 4,177 1-92 155T - 4,8983-& 105SP - 16,618 5-16 155SP- 3,6271-92 155T - 218 5-16 8"SP - 5255-16 155SP- 22,917 6-14 8"SP - 2,3785-16 8"SP - 6,386 6-14 175 - 1,1386-14 8"SP - 8,7676-14 175 - 6,599 HJ.NCOCK I 26 Apr-30 Apr6-29 105T - 3945-16 155SP- 232

e. Training. Scheduled training was.expanded to a minimum of 15hours per week and included MOS refresher training, safety during firing andrules of engagement. To further improve performance, a Division ArtilleryInstruction-Safety Team wa s formed and regularly inspected all batteries.

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I, af0 T IAVDDH-GC V'- June 1967SSUBJECT: Operational Report - - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)

for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)The battalion and battery training programs concentrated on def-Icienciesdicovered during team visits. Lessons learned during operations and reviewsof firing accidents were particulary emphasized during team visits,f. Aviation.

(1) During the quarter the two aircraft attached to the6th Battalion, 29th Artillery were transferred from TU Y HOA to Dregonniountain Base Camp and incorporated into the 4th Division Artillery AviationSection. Helicopter support was provided the 6th Battalion, 29th Artilleryon a mission basis. This method of employment pvovided a more effictentuse of helicopter support, improved maintenance an d increased aircraft use.(2) Each newly assigned aviator received 10 hours of flighttransition orientaticn training prior to being assigned operationxl missions.(3) Disposition of aircraft during the reporting period.

(a) OH-23G.1. 4th Battalion, i,2 Artillery: two.2, 2d Battalion, 77th Art-llery: two.2. Headquarters & Headquarters Battery, 4th DivisionArtillery: three.

(b) 1),-I.C: Attached to 4th Aviation Battalion: two.(4) Operations. The Aviation Section of the 4th DivisionArtillery accomplished the following:

(a) During the mnnth of February, 246 combat supportmissions were flown and 327 passengers were transported requiring 404 sorties.A total of 193 hours were logged and aircraft availability was 69.5%.(b) Ih March 516 combat support missions wtre flown and649 passnegers were transported requiring 776 sorties. A total of 414 hourswere logged and the aircraft availability was $0.1%.(c) In April 694 ombat support missions were flown and739 passengers were transported requiring 1026 sorties. A total of 416 hourswere logged and the aircraft availability was 80.2%.(d) The quarterly totals were:

1. Missions Flown - 1456.25


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C~~rO F / ,'0.7-1,'?1.AVfDDH-GC 15 June 1967 3SUBT=: Operational Report - - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFRP ,65)for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)

2. Passengers Transported - 171.5.3o Sorties Required - 2206.

H.lours Logged on tdrcraft - 1023.. Average Aircraft Availability - 76.6%.

Totals are exclusive of aircraft attacbed to 4thBattalion, 42d Artillery, 2d Battalion, 77th Artillery, and 4th AviationBattalion.g. Logistics.

(1) Basic loads of artillery &nmunition.WEAPON TYPE OF A1210 BTRY POSITION BN AiO TRAINS BN TOTALl05mn Ho w (3 Btrys HE 15005 1500 6000per Bn) ILL 100 100 400W P i00 I00 400

SM 50 50 200155mm Ho w (3 Btrys HE 700 1050 3150per Bn) ILL 50 50 200WP 50 50 200sWI 50 50 2008 inch Ho w (1Btry) HE 800 200 1000

(2) These basic loads w're developed to insure an adequatestock of ammunition at both the battery positions and the battalionammunition trains area to meet the demands of continuous firing in supportof infantry unit during periods of heavy, prolonged contact. These maximmuranounts wore reduced when the battery positions wore too sm l to safelyaccommodate a large n~mber of rounds, when a move was imminent, or when thenumbe: of rounds being bxptnded daily did not justify stocking a largeamount of ammunition. When the a=.uniVion was not stocked in the batteryposit1ions, it was held at the battalion ammunition trains area and earmarkedfor the batteries, thus insuring resupply when required.(3) The base camp defense ammunition stockage level was revisedand determined to be adeqiat4 for base camp defense purposes based on pastfiring experience:

5Excess of this figure requires division approval.26


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AVDDH-,GC 15 June 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report - - Lessons Luarned (RCS CSFOR-65)for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)WEAPON HE ILL WP SM K81rm Mortar 106 rd,;/wpn 20 rds/wpn !8 rds/wpn4,2 inch Mortar 155 rds/wpn 37 r'./wpn 30 rds/wpn105mn Howitzer 300 rds/wpn 20 rds/wpn 20 rds/wpn 20 rds/wpn15am Howitzer 150 rds/wpn 10 rds/wpn 10 rds/wpn8 Irch Howitzer 100 rds/wpn

(4) FS A atockage levels of artillery ammunition.(a) The FS A Lto~cage level was in accordance with the the-ater stockage level and no real problems were encountered.(b) On 24 April,the FSA at I THJANH V6s closed and DISCOMbegan operation of an FSE by supply point distribution except Class V.Class V supplies were maintained in a trains area. Stockage levels wererevised and are listed below:

IEAPON TYPE OF AN1O BTRY POSITION BN TRAINS AREA1o0mm Ho w (3 Btrys) HE 800 - 1000 3=IT.T. 100 300

16? 100 300SN K 50 300iS5n5m Ho w (2 Btrys) HE 600 1500ILL 60 200WP 5o 200

SM K 50 200(5) On 26 April, Operation 1%0COCK I with one 105 howitzerbattery, one 155 howitzer battery, two 1I42's (Dusters) and two M551s(quad mounted .50 caliber machine guns), began an operation in the BALJ BLECHarea. The following ,mmunition was stocked intially at the battery positionsand tne FSE:

WEAPON TYPE OF AZ240 BTRY POSITION FS E105rm. How HE 1250 2000ILL 100 60WP 100 63SM K 50 60155nm Hcw HE 985 1500L50 51W P 50 51SHK 50 504042 960 14001455 50 Cal 20000 40000

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AVDDH-GC Coro 15 June 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report - - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)for Quarterly Per4.od Ending 30 April 1967 (U)

(6) Available Eupply rate of artillery ammunition:a)l i .e following ASR's were in effect during Operation

SA M HOUSTON and Operation FRANCIS MARION (105mm flow only):PERIOD HE iLL151800 Feb - 281800 Feb 67 30 rds/wpn/daY 2 rds/wPniday281800 Feb - 151800 Ma r 67 30 rds/wpn/day 2 rcs/wpn/day2,51800 Ma r - 311800 Mar 67 33 rds/wpn/day 2 rds/wy,,/day3P.1800 Ma r - 151800 Apr 67 34 rds/wpn/day 2 rds/wpn/day1518 0 Apr - 301800-Apr 67 34 rds/wpn/day 2 rds/wpn/day

(b) f-r--ng the period ending 281800 February, .nits of the4th Infantry Division Artillery were authorized a total of 15,61C rounds of105m HE. A total of 23,662 rounds vere drawn from the FSA for a total of8,052 rounds in excess of 4 u.muthorization.(c) Dur'fn., ;he period ending 151800 March, Division Artilleryunits were authorized a total of 21,660 rounds of 109mn Howitzer HE. A total

of 32,539 rounds were drawn from the FSA for a total of 10.879 rounds inexcess of the authorization,(d ) The over-expenditures were justified by tacticalemergencies due to heavy contact with the enemy.

(7) The average percentage of howitzers deadlined by month :-,s:o_04H M10Ao. =2 1i.0oFE B 1% 2% 2%MAR 2$ 2% 2%APR 5% 6% 0

(8) Th e average percentage of vehicles deadLined by month was:MONTH AVG %D/L

FE B 4%MAR 4%AP R 9%

8. (C) Engineer.a. General. During the period tic 4th Exigineer Battalion effortswere directed in support of tactical operations and development of the

division base camp at Dragon Mountain. Th e battalion participated in Operation28

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AVDDH-GC 15 Jane 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report - - Lessons Learned (RCS CSKQR-65)for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)SAM HOUSTOL (1 Jan - 5 Apr 67) and FRAPCIS MARION (6 Apr - continuing) aswell as Operation PERSHING (1 Mar -. continuing) with Company D, 65thEngineer Battalion. Combat support activitiev; of the battalion expanded,especially base development at the Dragon Mountain Base Camp. The basedeveiopment expansion was due in large measure to reorganized and acceleratedself-help construction programs which facilitated the rapid erection offacilities. Use of self-help &ermitted a better than four-fold increase ofdivisional engineer forces forwcrd in dupport of tactical operations. At theend of the quarter apporylmatelr 50% of the battalion resources were committmdin support of the tactical operat~ons in widely scattered areas throughoutVIETNAM.

b. Operations.(1) Operate:n SAM HOUSTON began, on 1 January 1967 and was com-pleted on 5 April. The /.,h Engneer Battalion supported the operation withCompanies A (-) and B (-) in direct support of the le t and 2d Brigadesrespectively, with Headquarters Company, Company D, and Company E (Bridge)in general support of the division. Company C, with bridge elements ofCompan? E, was attached #'n 18 February to the 3d Brigade, 4th infantry Divi-sion in TI I Corps Tactical Zone. Company D, 65th Engineer Battalion, withappropriate bridge elements, attached to the 4th Engineer Battalion on 12March in support of Operation PERSHING. For a detailed report of tacticaloperations during Operation SAM HOUSTON see: Combat Operations After ActionReport, SAM HOUSTON.(2) Operation FRANCIS MARION beT. o.. AAprlZuu IS. CuI-relU

in progress. The 4th Engineer Battalion continues to support the operationas noted in (1) bove.

(a) Company A H-) provided direct, support to the le t Brigadeat LE THAN (YA892300). The company conducted uiine sweeping operations fromthe 96 grid line west on route 19 to DUC. CO (YA8~ 4 252), and nortn on route 14Bfrom route 19 to route 509, then west on route 509 to the New :-LEI DJEFMGCIDG camp. Mine sweeping operations were conducted from multuple locationsto allow rapid and simultaneous movement of the teams. Secur' y for theoperations was furnished by le t Brigade and le t Squadron, J.Oth Cavalry. On12 April, Company A (-), augmented with two Rome Plows, conbtructed 16,5kilometers of fair weather tactical road (route 4A) from junction withroute 14B westward toward the CAMBODIAN Border to & Are support base atYA760385. The company continued to develop the FSB, helipad, and defensiveperimeter at LE THANH and provided support to the infantry battalions Zorclearence of IZ's and FSBts as required.(b) Company B (-) provided direct engineer support to 2dBrigade at Oasis and provided extensive road and defensive construction at thatlocation. The company constructed numerous interior roads, and laterite

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AVDDM-GC 15 June 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report - - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)surfacing and drainage structures to allow use of the Oasis base on an allweather basis. The readily available source of laterite at the Oasia facil-itated use of the 18 yard motorized scrapers and greatly accelerated the place-nient of laterite on the roads and helipads. The distribution of peneprime asa dust palliative proved, to be most effective in reducing the extensive dustproblem associated .ith helicopter operations. On 9 April Company B wasagumented with two Rome Plows and assigned a land clearing operation in con-junction with EDAP ENANG resettlement program. This required the clearenceof 800 acres of land for the resettlement of approximately 10,000 MONTAGNARDi 'agprs within the FRANCIS MARION AO. Security for the land clearing teams1al '.-'nished by tankdozers or AP C flame throwers from the 4th Engincer1 -,. ion, The Rome Plows cleared an average of 25 acres per day in lightto medium clearing. Small leaves from bamboo thickets clogged radiatorgrills of the dozers and tended to cause overheating and numerous stops tocool equipment. The use of air compressors to blow out radiators aided butdid not solve the problem.

(c) Headquarters and Headquarters Company remained at theDragon Mountain Base Camp and suppDrted tactical operations by augmenting theline companies with items of engineer heavy equipment and security elementsfrom the flame platoon. On 30 April the flame platoon (fer flame-throwerAPCOs) was combined with the tankdozer from each of the four line companiesand the VIR to provide an armored task force for ixdependent engineeroperations. The task force was employed initially in providing security forsand convoys between Dragon Mountain and KONTUM. Use of this task forceenvisions a force capable df securing engineer elements involved in bridgeconstruction, road upgrading, and haul operations within insecure areas.Initial plans for the security force call for securing the upgrading of26 kilometers of route 6C from junction of route 14 to PLEI NE (ZA164003).The use of this armored force to secvre independent engineer operationsgreatly reduced the depencence upon infantry and armored security forces andprovides greater latitude and freeaom of action to the engineer to accomplishpriority missions with his own forces. Headquarters Coimpany personnel, as wellas other general support elements within Lne 4th Engineer Battalion receivedadditional trainrig in infantry, artillery and armor subjects to prepare forthese inderpndzrnL operations.

(3) Base Development. The 4th Engineer Battalion, continued toconduct an accelerated and expanded base development program at tho 4th InfantryDivision Headquarters at Drgaon Mountain. The program, organized and directedby the 4th Engineer Battalion, used up to 700 self-help personnel from variousunits of the division as well as approximately 200 local hire labors. Self-help construction was facilitatbd by the preparation of simple "do-it-yourself'plans.

(a) A concrete batch plant was expanded to allow use ofsix 16S mixers averaging 175 yards daily production with peaks of over 200yards daily. Engineer operators, truck haul and supervision were furnished30


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I SAA fr~ -m 5 June 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report - - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)by the 4th Engineer Battalion, with self-help from division units assistingin plant operation from 0600 to 0900 hours and 1630 to 1900 hours an dMOITAGNARD villegers (average 70 in number) from 0900 to 1630 hours. CompanyE hauled approximately 4,000 yards of sand from KONTUM for the ba.ch plantwith an average of 15 to 20 five ton bridge trucks. These trucks w-re off-loaded )y /4 ton truck-pulled "scrapers" wielded by two men in the five tontruck bed.

(b ) A laterite cap was placed on 90% of the base camp roads(26 kilometers). A laterite source was developed in an area 500 meters southof the base camp. The removal of a 20 foot overburden was time consuming,however, the use of 18 cubic yard scrapers allowed the use of this pit. Asa result of .the close laterite source, the division airfield runway wasextended from 1500 to 25400 feet (C-123 capability) with a laterite base,.peneprimed, and surfaced with M8Al steel matting. Tw o warm-up aprons andturn arounds 'ave been propared and are to be similafly surfaced With MSAWsteel matting. Work on the aircraft parking apron was legun. Expectedcompletion dates of s-rfacing these areas with MSA1 mat.ing are:

Runway 5 MayWarm-up aprons and turnarounds 10 Ma yAircraft parking apron 31 M ay(c) Construction of semi-permanent wood framed buildingswith concrete floors i3 presently 35% complete for the entire base camp.Approximately 300 buildings have been completed, of which the majority aretroop billets, mess halls, and special purpose i.e. maintenance, headquarters,day room. Prefabrication of the buildings is accomplished by the 20thEngineer Battalion. Unit self-help teams than pour the concrete and constructthe building with assistance and under the direct supervision of 4th EngineerBatta~iorn personnel. The additional manpower, facilit&tes rapid constyuactionand has - -sulted in from 8 to 10 buildigns (20Sx80 average) being pouredand constructed daily, when construction materials are avilable.(d) Construction of buildings in the Community Center is

presently 35% complete. These buildings consist of Red Cross. Post Exchange,PX warehouse and concession buildings, MARS Station, Snack Bar and EducationCenter. Certain of the more complex buildings, have been constructed solelyby engineer units.(e) Thizty perimeter guard towers were prefabricated kdconstructed using self-help personnel. They provide a sand bagged fightingposition thirtx feet at ve the ground on an average of every 60 meters around

the perimeter of the base camp.(f) Company E operated a saodbag fill site for base campunits using MONTAGNARD laborers and the battalion's ditching machine, when

3L .

AI7 L


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AVD15 June 1967?.UBJECT: Operational Report - - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)for Quarterly Puriod Ending 30 April 1967 (U)available. Approximately one half million sandbags were filled.

(g) The Assistant Division Engincer for Base Developmentis continuing preparation of a comprehensive base development plan for thebase camp. The planning includes layouts of all unit areas, showing proposedfacilities, a description and discussion of the required construction effort,and priorities.(1)0 he 4th Engineer Battalion cooperated closely with the20th Engineer Battalion during the past quarter on base development activitiesas well as tactical support. Exchange of engineer equipment and coordinationof construction materials has insured a smooth operation,

(4 ) Company D, 65th Engineer Battalion, ws -attached to the 4thEngineer Battalion by General Order 384 effective 12 March 1967. Company D.,65th Engineer Battalion remains attached (by operation order) to the ?JBrigade, 25th Infantry 'Division in Operation PERSHING in BO'H DINH Province.During the period the company accomplished IZ clearance, destruction of enemycaves and defensive positions, mine clearance, airfield and helipad improvement,perimeter defense construction, and preparation and maintenance of two brigadeforward CP areas. The company constructed a one-lane, class 32, dry-weatherroad (route 506) from it.i junction with highway 1 (BR917720) to an LZ at(BR802830).c. Logistics.

(1) Class II & IV (less construction). The battalion receivedone launcher for the AVIB, but is still short three. New M-60A1 launchersare due in May. Tw o 600 gph water purification sets were received lesscomponents necessary to make them operational. There is still a shortage offour of these sets. Standardization of Caterpillar D7E tractors was completed.All of the tractor-scrapers authorized by the VTOE have been received; i.e.eight Clark Model 290-M tractors with Le Tourneau-Westinghouse Model CT-4scrapers.

(2) Class IV (Construction). The Battalion S-4 continues tohandle construction material for base camp development, including transpcrtionfrom QU I NHON, primarily by bridge trucks. Great emphasis has been placed onbase camp development, during this period,resulting in a *harp increase in th eamount of materials, inclading cement, 2x4ts and corrugated roofing, bu t pro-gress continues on schedule in an attempt to complete as much work as possiblebefore the arrival of the monsoon season.

(3) Water Supply. The battalion continues the support of th eIs t Brigade and 2d Brigade with one vater purification unit each. Duringthis period, one water purification unit was transferred to Company C forsupport of the 3d Brigade. The remaining two units continue operation in base

32A) ~ '7V~


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AVDDH-GC 15 June 19673 QUBJECT: Operational Report - - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)

flor Qarterly Period Ending 20 April 1967 (U)camp. An additional wator point furnished and operated by the 20th EngineerBattaLion was set up in base camp to a2low more rapid distribution. Averagedai2y water production in base camp is now 35,000 gallons of potable waterAnd 65,000 gallons of non-potable water.

9. (C) Signala, General.

(1) On 1 February the Dragon Mountain television station beganbroadcasting on a regular schedule. The normal hours of operation are 1730to 2300 hours Monday thru Friday and =400 to 2300 hours Saturday an d Sundays.(2) On 3 Fabruary a !0-pair cable was activated between theFamous and Favor switchboal, to relieve some of the traffic congestion onthe FamouD switchboard. Twenty-nine Famous telephone subscribers weretransfered to the Favor .ctchboard.(3) On 15 February & teletype circuit was installed betweenDragon Mountain TV station and the II Corps Information Office to be used fornews service.(4) On 9 March the first underground cable conduit was buriedbeneath the north gate in the base camp. At the present time 15 conduitshave been installed in support of the new base camp underground telephonecable system currently under construction.(5) On 10 March General Peers accompanied by BG R.D. Terry, USARVSignal Officer, formally opened the 4th Division Communicationb Center.(6) On 16 April Company C, 459th Signal Battalion departed thedivision base camp for a nvw asaignment. Company A, 324th Signal Battalionhas assumed responsibility for base camp signal center operations.(7) All field telephones (TA-312/PT) have been replaced bycivilian-type sets (TA236/PT)for subscribers of Famous and Favor awitchboards.(8) A public address system was provided and operated at the Ivy

Bowl for the Easter Sunrise eetvice and four US O shows*b. Plans and Operations.

(1) Plans.(a) A plan is being formulated for the removai of th"existing comnunication pole lines throughout base camp as soon azi the new

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AVDDH-GC 15 June 1967 fSUBJECT: Operational Report - - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)for Quarterly Period Ending $O April 1967 (U)underground cable system can support the base telephone requirements.

(b) Plans for moving the VH F carrier equipment from theSignal Center and consolidating it with'the radio equipment on Signal Hill arebeing made. This project will begin when the underground telephone cablesystem has been installed between the Signal Center and Signal Hill.(2) Operations.

(a) VH F radio operations: VEF radio systems hare beenestablished at Dragon Mountain Base Camp providing cownunications betweenthe base camp and the following:1. One 12 channel VH F system was installed in supportof the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division Rear on 1 February.a. Tw o 12 channel VHF systems were installed in supportof the 2d Brigade at Oasis on 26 March.3. One 12 channel VH F system was installed in supportof the 1st Brigade on 28 March at their new location.k. One 12 channel VHF system was installed in supportof 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry on 12 April.5. On 12 chanau.l VHF system was installed in support

of the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry On 2,5 April.(b) AM Radio Operations:

1. On 25 April Division Command Net #4 (Administration/Logistics Radio-Teletype) was activated with two stations in the net, The124th Signal Battalion provided an AN/GRC-26 at Support Gomi&nd for NCS.-,On 26 April in N/GRC-46 radio was atbached to 3dBattalion, 8th Infantry Task Force, for entry into the Division Cormand Net

3. The 124th Signal Battalion continues to operateDivision Command Net #3 an d maintains a station in the I FFORCEV RATT net.

(c) FM Radio Operations.i. On 9 February the Division FM Intelligence Netwas activated on Signal Hill and remoted to the G2 console at the DTOC.2. On 15 February an FM retrananission station was


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AV-DDH-W - -junu 19067\ S-BJ15U : Openational Report - - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)A.'for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)activated on Dragon Mountain in support of the 2d Brigade. This net isoperated an required providing retransmisSiOn for the 2d Brigade Command Net.

(d) Wire Operations.1. On 5 March the installation of lines to supportthe 1st Battalion, 69th Armor's move into base camp was conpleted.a. During the month of March, lines were extended insupport of the Support Comnand Headquarters move across the street,3. On 6 April the installation of lines to supportthe ls t Brigade's move into base camp was completed..

4th ID Lessons Learned 25 Oct 1967

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