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Stephanie Hudon &ThomasJames
George Berkeley:The Relativity of Perceptions
Stephanie Hudon & Thomas James
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e e at v ty o e cept o s
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Background
Anti-materialism: one cannot positively know ofthe existence of matter itself (distinct fromperception)
the universe consists wholly of particular spiritsreceiving particular perceptions (Tlumak 175) Nominalism: all things in the universe exist in
particular Idealism: all the particular things in the universe are
active thinking beings
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Three Dialogues
Dialogue in which Berkeley articulates the errorsintrinsic to materialism
Philonous: lover of mind Serves as a mouthpiece for Berkeleys own idealist
position Eschews esoteric metaphysical explanations in favor
of conclusions drawn from common sense
Hylas: derived from the ancient Greek word meaning matter Argues for a nave materialist position, similar to Locke
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Sensible Objects
sensible things are only those which are immediatelyperceived by the senses (AW 457)
sensible thingsareso many sensible qualities orcombinations of sensible qualities (AW 458)
From this definition, Berkeley will attempt to argue thatsensible qualities are secondary qualities that exist onlyto the mind.
Berkeley must convince the reader that sensiblethings are not only things with sensible qualitiesbut have no other properties except for sensiblequalities
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Sound familiar? Lockes primary/secondary
distinction
And yet he who will considerthat the same fire that, at onedistance produces in us thesensation of warmth, does at anearer approach produce in usthe far different sensation ofpain, ought to consider himselfwhat reason he has to say thathis idea of warmth, which wasproduced in him by the fire, isactually in the fire; and his ideaof pain, which the same fire
produced in him the same wayis not in the fire (AW 334)
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The Fire Example
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Berkeleys Divergence fromLocke
Berkeley extends Lockes argument against the actualexistence of secondary qualities of matter against theexistence of matter itself
Primary qualities are no more inherent to objectsthemselves than secondary qualities
Philonous argument can be split in two A. the relativity of perceptions that undermine secondary qualitiescan comparably undermine primary qualities
B. primary qualities (ie. shape) cannot be abstracted fromsecondary qualities (ie. color)
-We shall focus primarily on the first argument
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Relativity of Primary Qualities
But what if the same arguments which are broughtagainst secondary qualities will hold proof against these[primary qualities] also? (AW 465)
Of Mites and Men Animals, like men, are capable of perceiving extension and figure
that Locke sets apart as primary qualities
A mite therefore must be supposed to see his own foot, and thingsequal or less than it, as bodies of some comparable dimension,though at the same time they appear to you scarce discernible(AW 465)
No absolute position exists from which to judge extension But as we approach to or recede from an object, the visible
extension variesdoes it not followthat it is not really inherentto the object?
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Problems with the Extension Argument
Measurement Berkeley implicitly rejects an absolute standard of
measurement by which to determine extension
Although what appears tiny to the man might appearenormous to the mite, the man stands at 6 feetregardless of how the mite perceives his size (Marcus6)
When quantified by a scale of measurement, extension is notrelative to the perceiver
A scale of measurement alone, however, is relative tothe perceiver
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Challenges to Berkeley
Newtonian absolutism How might Newton respond to Berkeleys contention that primary
qualities (namely extension and motion) are not absoluteproperties of objects but rather dependent on perception?
Would Berkeleys conception of space and time square withLeibnizs?
Divine Author Does an omnipotent, omniscient and otherwise perfect God have
an absolute perspective on objects?
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