17-Berkeley Tom Stephanie

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    Stephanie Hudon &ThomasJames

    George Berkeley:The Relativity of Perceptions

    Stephanie Hudon & Thomas James

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    e e at v ty o e cept o s

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    Background

    Anti-materialism: one cannot positively know ofthe existence of matter itself (distinct fromperception)

    the universe consists wholly of particular spiritsreceiving particular perceptions (Tlumak 175) Nominalism: all things in the universe exist in

    particular Idealism: all the particular things in the universe are

    active thinking beings

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    Three Dialogues

    Dialogue in which Berkeley articulates the errorsintrinsic to materialism

    Philonous: lover of mind Serves as a mouthpiece for Berkeleys own idealist

    position Eschews esoteric metaphysical explanations in favor

    of conclusions drawn from common sense

    Hylas: derived from the ancient Greek word meaning matter Argues for a nave materialist position, similar to Locke

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    Sensible Objects

    sensible things are only those which are immediatelyperceived by the senses (AW 457)

    sensible thingsareso many sensible qualities orcombinations of sensible qualities (AW 458)

    From this definition, Berkeley will attempt to argue thatsensible qualities are secondary qualities that exist onlyto the mind.

    Berkeley must convince the reader that sensiblethings are not only things with sensible qualitiesbut have no other properties except for sensiblequalities

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    Sound familiar? Lockes primary/secondary

    distinction

    And yet he who will considerthat the same fire that, at onedistance produces in us thesensation of warmth, does at anearer approach produce in usthe far different sensation ofpain, ought to consider himselfwhat reason he has to say thathis idea of warmth, which wasproduced in him by the fire, isactually in the fire; and his ideaof pain, which the same fire

    produced in him the same wayis not in the fire (AW 334)

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    The Fire Example

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    Berkeleys Divergence fromLocke

    Berkeley extends Lockes argument against the actualexistence of secondary qualities of matter against theexistence of matter itself

    Primary qualities are no more inherent to objectsthemselves than secondary qualities

    Philonous argument can be split in two A. the relativity of perceptions that undermine secondary qualitiescan comparably undermine primary qualities

    B. primary qualities (ie. shape) cannot be abstracted fromsecondary qualities (ie. color)

    -We shall focus primarily on the first argument

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    Relativity of Primary Qualities

    But what if the same arguments which are broughtagainst secondary qualities will hold proof against these[primary qualities] also? (AW 465)

    Of Mites and Men Animals, like men, are capable of perceiving extension and figure

    that Locke sets apart as primary qualities

    A mite therefore must be supposed to see his own foot, and thingsequal or less than it, as bodies of some comparable dimension,though at the same time they appear to you scarce discernible(AW 465)

    No absolute position exists from which to judge extension But as we approach to or recede from an object, the visible

    extension variesdoes it not followthat it is not really inherentto the object?

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    Problems with the Extension Argument

    Measurement Berkeley implicitly rejects an absolute standard of

    measurement by which to determine extension

    Although what appears tiny to the man might appearenormous to the mite, the man stands at 6 feetregardless of how the mite perceives his size (Marcus6)

    When quantified by a scale of measurement, extension is notrelative to the perceiver

    A scale of measurement alone, however, is relative tothe perceiver

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    Challenges to Berkeley

    Newtonian absolutism How might Newton respond to Berkeleys contention that primary

    qualities (namely extension and motion) are not absoluteproperties of objects but rather dependent on perception?

    Would Berkeleys conception of space and time square withLeibnizs?

    Divine Author Does an omnipotent, omniscient and otherwise perfect God have

    an absolute perspective on objects?