World Bank Document · SKP - Transmigration Area Development Unit ... TOR - Terms-of-Reference ......

Document of

The World Bank

FOR OFFICLAL USE ONLY

Report No. 13507

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

INDONESIA

TRANSMIGRATION V PROJECT(LOAN 2578-IND)

SEPTEMBER 8, 1994

Agriculture Operations DivisionCountry Operations IIIEast Asia and Pacific Regional Office

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance oftheir ofricial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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INDONESIA


CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

At Project Appraisal: US$1.00 = Rupiah (Rp) 1,100At Project Completion: US$1.00 = Rupiah (Rp) 2,000

GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA FISCAL YEAR

April 1 - March 31

GLOSSARY

APBN - Government Rupiah BudgetBAKOSURTANAL - National Coordinating Agency for Surveying and MappingDG - Directorate GeneralDG Pankin - Directorate General of Settlement PreparationDG Rahbin - Directorate General of Mobilization and DevelopmentDGSP - Directorate General for Settlement Preparation (MOT)DIP - Directorate of Inventory PlanningDPP - Directorate of Planning and ProgrammingGOI - Government of IndonesiaLRDC - Land Resources Development Center (ODA)MOT - Ministry of TransmigrationODA - Overseas Development Administration (of U.K. Government)PCR - Project Completion ReportPLP - Directorate of Land Preparation (within DGSP)Pusdiklat - Transmigration Training Center (within MOT)Repelita - Indonesia Five-Year Development PlanRePPProT - Regional Physical Planning Program for TransmigrationRSI - World Bank Resident Staff in IndonesiaSAR - Staff Appraisal ReportSFSE - Site Feasibility Studies and EngineeringSKP - Transmigration Area Development UnitSUAT-V - Transmigration V Start-up ActivitiesTAG - Technical Advisory Group (within DGSP, MOT)TAT - Technical Advisory Team (within BAKOSURTANAL)TOR - Terms-of-ReferenceTSSDP - Transmigration Second Stage Development ProjectTST - Technical Support Team (within PLP, MOT)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYTHE WORLD BANK

Washlngton, D C. 20433U.S.A.

Office of Director-GeneralOperations Evaluation September 8, 1994

MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on IndonesiaTransmi2ration V Project (Ln. 2578-IND?

Attached is the Project Completion Report on Indonesia - Transmigration V Project(Loan 2578-IND). Parts I and m were prepared by the FAO/World Bank Cooperative Program forthe East Asia and Pacific Regional Office. Part II is comprised of condensed versions of PCRsprepared by the Ministry of Transmigration and the National Coordinating Agency for Surveying andMapping.

The project was the seventh and final Bank operation supporting the Indonesiantransmigration program. Within its first year, the project was revised due to severe cuts ingovernment funding and over-optimistic expectations at appraisal. The three components of therevised project achieved varying degrees of success. The aerial mapping component was implementedsuccessfully, with foreign consultants transferring skills and technology to the local private consultingsector. The settlement planning component met with mixed success, and the program support andinstitution building component, though having several significant accomplishments, was largelyunsatisfactory.

The PCR reports that the skills mix of supervision missions was inappropriate and thatBank staff at times gave conflicting messages to implementing agency staff. The Bank did notadequately consider its prior experience with Transmigration II and III, and thus overestimatedinstitutional capacities to absorb technical assistance and to manage the large number of contractors.Consequently, there were time overruns in the mapping component, and the project's impact oninstitutional development is rated as modest.

Bank support for site selection and planning was appropriate, and Indonesia now hasits first country-wide land use maps. The outcome of the project is thus rated as satisfactory.However, inadequate dissemination of the new maps and the continued scarcity of governmentresources leave the sustainability of the project achievements uncertain.

The PCR adequately discusses the implementation and outcome of the project. Noaudit is planned.

Robert Picciottoby Hans-Eberhard Kopp

Attachment

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients onty in the performance of theirofficial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


INDONESIA


TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART 1: PROJECT RESULTS FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE

PREFACE ............................................. i

EVALUATION SUMMARY .................................. ii

1. Project Identity. 12. Background .13. Project Objectives and Description. 24. Project Design and Organization. 35. Project Implementation. 46. Project Results. 77. Project Sustainability. 88. Bank Performance. 99. Borrower Performance .1010. Lessons Learned ...................................... 1011. Project Relationship .................................... 1112. Consulting Services . .. ................................. I 1

PART Il: PROJECT RESULTS FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE

BAKOSURTANAL

1. Introduction ......................................... 132. Executive Summary . .14

3. The Transmigration Program .. 154. Major Constraints .. 165. Organization and Management ................. 176. Finances ............... ............................ 187. Conclusions .. 198. Lessons Learned and Follow Up ........................... 19

NIINISTRY OF TRANSMIGRATION

1. Evaluation of Factual Information ....... .................... 222. Evaluation of World Bank Performance ........................ 243. Project Implementation .................................. 25

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performanoc of theirofficial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

Table or Contents (Cont.)

4. Evaluation of Government Performance ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265. Organization and Management of Project ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266. Project Implementation . ..... ......................... ... . 277. Period of Project Implementation ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278. Project Costs ..... . .................................. 279. Lessons Learned ......... .. . .. . . . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . . . 2710. Review of Effectiveness ot Working Relationship Between the Bank

and the Government ......... . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . . . . 28

PART III: STATISTICAL INFORNIATION

Table 1: Related Bank Loans and Credits . ........... . . . . 30Table 2: Project Timetable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30Table 3: Loan Disbursements .. 31Table 4: Project Implementation .......... . . ........... . . . . . . . . 31Table 5: Project Costs and Financing ..... 32

A. Project Costs ......... . .. . .. . . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . .. . 32B. Project Financing . ................ ............. .. . 32

Table 6: Project Results ............... ...... .... ......... .. . 33A. Direct Benetits ....... . ............... .... ..... .. . 33B. Economic Impact . ......................... ...... 33C. Financial Impact ...................... 33D. Studies .33

Table 7: Status of Covenants .. 34Table 8: Use of Bank Resources .35

A. Staff Inputs (staffweeks) .35B. Missions .35C. Costs (unavailable) ..................... ........ .. . 35


INDONESIA

TRANSMIGRATION V PROJECT(Loan 2578-IND)

PREFACE

This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Transmigration V Project inIndonesia for which a Bank Loan (2578-IND) of US$160 million was approved in June 1985. Atotal of US$65.8 was cancelled and the Project was closed two years behind schedule onDecember 31, 1992. As of December 30, 1993, actual disbursements totalled US$94.2 million,or 100% of the revised Loan Amount.

The PCR, prepared by an FAOlWorld Bank Cooperative Program Missionwhich visited Indonesia in January/February 1993, is based on the Staff Appraisal Report andother relevant documents, discussions held with key Government officials responsible for projectimplementation and World Bank resident office staff, and the mission's field observations in Riauprovince where a significant proportion of the settlements planned under the Project has beenimplemented. The Ministry of Transmigration and BAKOSURTANAL, the two main agenciesimplementing the Project, had produced comprehensive PCR reports for their part of the project,condensed versions of which are given in Part II of this report. These agencies also reviewedand commented on Parts I and III of the report.


INDONESi


Evaluation Summary

Objectives

This was the seventh Bank-funded project in support of the transmigration program inIndonesia. The objectives of the Project were to: (a) improve the quality of site selection in order topromote the welfare of transmigrants and local people living in the area; (b) promote institutionbuilding through training and technical assistance; and (c) develop the national consulting industry.These objectives were to be achieved through the implementation of the Project's three maincomponents: (a) aerial photography and base mapping consisting of a national mapping program andland resource survey for Sumatra, Kalimantan and Irian Jaya; (b) transmigration settlement planningfor 300,000 sponsored and spontaneous transmigrant families, including regional, site selection, andsettlement feasibility studies; and (c) program support and institution building, involving technicaladvisory teams, special studies, training and technology transfer to the national consultancy industry.The total cost of the Project was estimated at US$275 million, to be financed by a Bank Loan ofUS$160 million (58 percent) and Government of Indonesia budgetary allocations equivalent toUS$115 million (42 percent). As appraised, the Project included a large consultant component(22,600 staff-months), representing about 80 percent of the total cost.

Implementation Experience

The Project was implemented between 1986 and 1992, running two years behind schedule.It underwent a major downward revision in scale one year after its effectiveness due to budgetconstraints. The settlement planning component bore the brunt of the changes: the target ofpreliminary planning for the resettlement of 300,000 families was reduced to 167,500 families inPhase 11 studies (site selection) and the target of preparing feasibility studies (Phase III) on 225 siteswas reduced to 32 sites. The revised Project also included an additional subcomponent involved withsecond-stage development studies for the improvement of 50 existing settlements, with some 160,000families. The revision led to a reduction in project cost of about US$129 million-from US$275million to US$146 million.

The aerial photography and mapping component met its targets and made a satisfactorycontribution to the national mapping program, but base maps prepared with project funding werecompleted too late to fully benefit the planning component of the Project.

The revised targets of the settlement planning component were also met but with mixedresults. The Phase I land resource mapping and review was extended to cover the whole of Indonesiaand was successfully completed to provide the first national land information system. However, dueto the timing, scale and detail of their output, the land resource studies made only a marginalcontribution to the site selection process. Site selection in Phase II was completed successfuLlly,meeting 96.5 percent of its revised target, and is considered the most successful part of the planningcomponent of the Project.

Phase III feasibility studies were carried out for each of the 32 sites of the revised target.For these, physical plans and feasibility studies were prepared for settling 50,655 families, of whom

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some 20,000 have already been settled. Mission observations of transmigration sites planned underthe Project in Riau province indicate that these settlements are not much different from thoseconstructed outside the project area, except for the critical advantage of having benefited from propersite selection.

In contrast to assumptions made in the Staff Appraisal Report, detailed development plansfor settlements were not prepared. In practice, these were replaced by 'as built' drawings preparedby contractors. The absence of professional adaptation of structure plans to the actual site conditionsreduced the potential benefit of the technical expertise deployed in the earlier phases of planning.

Second-stage development studies were executed in all of the 50 targeted existingsettlements, 46 of which have been recommended for improvement, at a total investment cost of aboutUS$600 million. These investments, however, are beyond the budgetary resources available to theMinistry of Transmigration (MOT) at present.

Consultancy assistance provided through the Project, though not needed on the scale asoriginally planned, was required for achieving the technical output of the Project. Compliance ofterms-of-reference by consultants was generally satisfactory.

The program support and institution building component had deployed three major advisorygroups to the Directorates of Planning and Programming (DPP) and Land Preparation (PLP) in theDirectorate General Pankim, MOT and to the National coordinating Agency for Survey and Mapping(BAKOSURTANAL), with some satisfactory results. The results of special studies carried out inMOT have not always been well focused, or operationally effective. However, environmental studies(manuals, monitoring) have yielded positive results, and contributed significantly to improvedenvironmental awareness within MOT. Contribution was also made to improved communicationbetween directorates, and to better technical procedures and introduction of manuals and guidelines.

Staff of both MOT and BAKOSURTANAL benefited from the training support providedthrough the Project and assistance given to the MOT Staff Training Center (Pusdiklat) has been wellutilized.

Project Results

The originally intended project objectives were not fully realized due to a combination offactors: drastic reduction in settlement targets within the first year following Loan Effectiveness;original project design flaws; delays in implementing certain critical activities, and the lack oftechnical as well as financial resources to implement settlement development as planned under theProject.

Aerial photography has been the most successful component. However, delays in theproduction of base maps limited its usefulness to the settlement planning component. Much of theresults of Phase I planning studies became available during or after the completion of Phase 11 studiesand made only a limited contribution to the site selection process. Phase 1I studies which met therevised target constitute the single most significant achievement of the settlement planning component,providing a pool of sites suitable for future settlements. Phase III studies also met their revised targetbut the usefulness and cost effectiveness of their output have been reduced by the limited number ofplans produced. Second-stage development studies were undertaken in all the targeted sites. Nonehave been fully used, and due to the lack of funds, they are unlikely to be utilized in the near future.

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Following the appraisal approach, no economic rate of return has been recalculated for theProject. The settlement planning component, which accounted for the major proportion of projectcost, was found to be the least cost effective.

Sustainability

The Project has generated a capacity for sustaining the surveying and mapping activities tomeet future demand both in BAKOSURTANAL and in the private sector.

The national land resource surveys (RePPProt) can only remain a valuable source ofinformation if regularly updated. No responsibility has been assigned for this task to any agency todate. Therefore, it is unlikely that their usefulness can be sustained.

The Phase II site selection studies have left a reservoir of suitable sites. Given policychanges aimed at involving private sector interests in transmigration settlement development, thosesites which meet the locational criteria of the private sector are likely to be utilized over time,although it cannot be taken for granted that MOT will always give priority to these sites over thosewhich have not been screened. Those Phase III plans not yet implemented, but prepared forsettlements in locations suitable for the private sector and planned for nucleus estate tree crops, arelikely to be utilized albeit with some adjustments.

Whether second-stage development plans in 46 existing settlements can be implementeddepends upon the availability of funds.

The Project's program support activities succeeded in improving technical procedures,introduced manuals and guidelines which remain available for reference, and contributed to a betterawareness of environmental issues and a successful training program.

Findings and Lessons Learned

In the formulation of a large-scale technical assistance program, it is essential to ensure thatthe scale and level of assistance is in balance with the agency's technical absorptive capacity andfinancial resources to ensure sustainability.

If technical assistance is provided only to the planning phase of a proposed development, ithas to be in balance with the technical capacity available for implementation and management, if it isto be productive.

In a country with strongly centralized and sectoral administrative traditions, planning studiesshould be confined to areas within the competence of the executing agency, so that implementation ofrecommendations is not hindered by problems of inter-agency coordination.

Institution-building assistance can only be successful if it is related to specific perceivedproblems (technical, organizational, procedural). No amount of assistance and training will resolvemotivational issues, unless they are accompanied by major changes in the staff compensation system.

For a project as large and complex as the Transmigration V Project, it is imperative that thetechnical skills used for supervision missions are commensurate with the task.


INDONESIA


PART I

1. Project Identity

Project Name Transmigration V (National Mapping and Settlement Planning)Loan No. 2578-INDRVP Unit East Asia and Pacific RegionCountry IndonesiaSector AgricultureSubsector Transmigration

2. Background

2.1 The transmigration program, which dates back to the beginning of the century, isimplemented by the Government of Indonesia (GOI) for the resettlement of people from the denselypopulated 'inner' islands to the sparsely inhabited 'outer' islands of the country. The program hasbeen viewed as a means to reduce population pressure in the overcrowded areas, spearhead balancedregional development, improve agricultural production, employment and incomes, and strengthennational unity. After 1950, it was accorded a high priority in the national development plans, and thescale of the program increased significantly. During the first two Indonesia Five-Year DevelopmentPlans, [Repelita I (1969-74) and 11 (1974-79)], some 46,000 and 83,000 families were resettledrespectively. The number of families moved during Repelita III (1979-84) increased dramatically,peaking in 1982-83 when nearly 100,000 families were settled in a single year and reaching a total ofabout 366,000 settled under the fully sponsored program, in addition to an estimated 169,000 familieswho moved spontaneously during the quinquennium. Encouraged by these results, GOI set anambitious target to resettle 750,000 families during Repelita IV (1984-89), which was later drasticallyreduced due to budgetary constraints and environmental concerns.

2.2 Since 1974, the World Bank has been associated with the transmigration program. Todate, seven loans have been approved and disbursed by the Bank in support of this program. Ofthese, two [(the Bank-financed Transmigration II and III Projects (Loan 1707/Cr. 919-IND and Loan2248-IND respectively)] financed, among other things, site selection and physical planning activities.Building on the experience of these projects, Transmigration V was exclusively designed as amapping, resource evaluation and settlement planning project.

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3. Project Objectives and Description

3.1 The Project was the seventh Bank-funded project supporting the transmigration program.It was prepared by Government with the assistance of consultants engaged under the TransmigrationIII Project. The Project was intended to improve and expand the surveying and mapping of large,relatively unknown areas of Indonesia combined with settlement planning on the required scale, and toimprove the economic and social analyses undertaken in site planning. The Project's main objectiveswere to: (a) improve the quality of site selection in order to promote the welfare of transmigrants andlocal people living within the transmigration areas and provide a sound basis for regional developmentover the ten-year period following the arrival of settlers; (b) promote institution building throughcoordination of training activities and technical assistance to the implementing agencies; and(c) develop the national consultancy industry by the association of foreign and national consultantsunder the large consultant component.

3.2 The main components of the Project included:

(a) Aerial photography and base mapping (US$28.6 million), consisting of a nationalmapping program for the Outer Islands and land resource and land use base maps forSumatra, Kalimantan and Irian Jaya.

(b) Transmigration settlement planning (US$169.5 million) for 300,000 sponsored andspontaneous transmigrant families in Sumatra, Kalimantan and Irian Jaya, includingregional, site screening and settlement feasibility studies, involving three phases, viz.Phase I Studies (regional development maps at scale 1:250,000), Phase If Studies (sitescreening and evaluation at scale 1:50,000) and Phase Ill Studies (feasibility at scale1:20,000).

(c) Program support and institution building (US$77 million) for Directorate Generalfor Settlement Preparation (DGSP) within the MOT, a 1987 transmigration programreview, technical advisory teams and training for the project implementing agenciesand the national consultancy industry.

The Project, estimated to cost US$275.3 million, was appraised in November/December 1984 and aBank Loan of US$160 million was approved in June 1985. The Loan became effective in April 1986after a lapse of about ten months since its approval. As appraised, the Project included a largeconsultant component (22,600 staff-months), representing about 80 percent of total project costs.

3.3 Just before Loan Effectiveness in April 1986, oil prices collapsed, resulting in severeresource constraints and consequent cutbacks in Indonesia's development budget. The transmigrationprogram budget suffered the most. In just one year, its budget allocation was reduced from Rp 208billion in FY86-87 to Rp 79 billion in FY87-88. The corresponding policy changes requiredsubstantial lowering of targets for sponsored transmigration and called for increased spontaneousmigration, special efforts for improvement of existing settlements and emphasis on private sectorparticipation.

3.4 Consequently, the Project underwent major changes within one year of itseffectiveness. The size of the new settlement planning studies was scaled down from 300,000 to167,500 families (in Phase 11 studies) and from 224 to 32 sites (Phase III studies). Additionally,provision was made for second-stage planning studies (Transmigration Second Stage DevelopmentProject (TSSDP I and II)) for the improvement of fifty existing sites settled with some 160,000

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transmigrant families. There were also some changes in program support, while the aerialphotography and base mapping component remained essentially unchanged. Reflecting this, theProject Cost and the Loan Amount were reduced from US$275.3 million and US$160 million toUS$146.4 million and US$94.2 million respectively.

4. Project Design and Organization

4.1 The Project was formulated on the underlying assumption that proper site selection anddetailed settlement planning were prerequisites for the successful implementation of the transmigrationprogram. To this end, the project design: (a) concentrated on and elaborated the methods of the siteselection process; and (b) expanded the scope of feasibility studies and development planning,including the introduction of a wider range of farm models suitable for a variety of physical andsocio-economic conditions. The improved site selection process was recognized to be a significantcontributor to the economic welfare of settlers. In the event of non-utilization of site selection results,the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) considered that such results would be useful for futuretransmigration or other regional or agricultural programs. The principal problem lay with the PhaseIII studies which were intended to be much more detailed (and hence more costly) than wasappropriate or necessary for the program. Further, the fact that MOT cannot exclusively handle thearea planning requirements in the Phase III studies, built on a regional approach, seems to have beenoverlooked.

4.2 The design of the mapping component was appropriate, based on proven surveying andmapping technologies. The scope and scale of this component corresponded to the requirements ofthe Project. In retrospect, however, the Project would have benefited from more emphasis on digitalmapping and geographic information systems as an integral part of its activities. Project design wouldalso have benefited from more emphasis on the production of orthophoto maps, as they can beproduced quickly and also provide significantly more information on land use and vegetation cover.

4.3 Settlement target changes could not have been predicted at appraisal. There was noreason to believe at that time that oil prices would decline by more than 50 percent, leading to severecuts in transmigration budgets and settlement targets. Nonetheless, even without such cuts, the scaleof the settlement planning component was unrealistically large based on overly optimistic expectationsin respect of the rate of settlement uptake and GOI's willingness and ability to implement the plans.Sufficient note was not taken of Transmigration III experience while determining the project scale anddrawing up specifications for planning studies. The Transmigration III Project Completion Reportand Audit Report confirm that only about 5% of the families for whom plans were prepared underTransmigration III were settled (even those plans were not closely followed) and GOI was reluctant toadopt high cost farm models. Yet, under the Project as originally designed, some 60 percent of theconsultancy input assigned to settlement planning was allocated to Phase III studies, following andelaborating the approaches adopted for Transmigration III.

4.4 Project revision (see paras. 3.3 and 3.4) resulted in major restructuring to reflect someof the new priorities. The planning of new settlements was significantly reduced and planning forsecond-stage development in existing settlements, a priority identified in the Transmigration SectorReview (Report No. 6508-IND, dated October 24, 1986), was introduced.

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5. Project Implementation

5.1 The Project was implemented over a period of 6'/2 years instead of 4't2 years whichwas expected at appraisal. Timely revision of the Project leading to adjustments in planning studiesresulted in major (over US$60 million) cost savings. Total Project Cost at completion was Rp 212.3billion or US$122.3 million, compared to the revised cost estimate of Rp 240.4 billion (US$146.4million) and the appraisal cost estimate of Rp 302.8 billion (US$275.3 million). About 80 percent ofthe Project Cost was absorbed by the planning and program support components executed by MOTand the remaining by the mapping component implemented by the National Coordinating Agency forSurveying and Mapping (BAKOSURTANAL). In rupiah terms, there was an overall cost underrun ofabout 16% as compared with the revised cost estimate. Savings occurred mainly in settlementplanning and to some extent in the program support component. In Decemeber 1993, the revisedLoan was disbursed in full.

5.2 Aerial photography and base mapping component. In spite of a two-year delay,this component has been successfully executed. The delay was largely due to difficulties withsecurity clearances and bad weather conditions. Both these factors were well known toBAKOSURTANAL from previous experience, and should have been foreseen while preparing theproject implementation schedule. Dependence on essential inputs (e.g. aerial triangulation data andterrain height information) which were supposed to have been provided by other projects funded fromdifferent sources, added to the problem. The implementation of this component resulted in:(a) nearly 40,000 km of flight lines of new aerial photography (91.3 percent of target); (b) new aerialSynthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) coverage for the whole of Sumatra (100 percent); (c) 1.4 million km:of satellite remote sensing (70 percent); (d) 13,517 km of levelling, with 3,085 benchmarks(150 percent); (e) 952 map sheets at 1:50,000 scale (87 percent) and 121 map sheets at 1:100,000scale (100 percent). Despite the excellent contribution made by this component to the overallmapping requirements of the country, the base maps funded under the Project were completed too lateto fully benefit the settlement planning component of the Project.

5.3 Settlement planning component - Phase I studies for preparing the regional planningcontext for site selection were not carried out under the Project as described in the SAR (page 19).The Regional Physical Planning Program for Transmigration (RePPProT) land resource survey,carried out by Land Resources Development Centre (Overseas Development Administration of the UKGovernment (ODA)) and funded 80% under the Transmigration V Project and 20 percent under anODA grant, was designed as one of the inputs to Phase I studies. Its results, however, only becameavailable in stages between 1986 and 1991, often during or after the completion of Phase 11 studies.When they were available, the RePPProT maps provided background information to the site selectionprocess in Phase IIA, and were useful in dealing with inter-departmental forest boundary disputes.Otherwise, the scale and detail of these maps, which were based on available data and publishedmaterials with only occasional field reconnaissance, limited their usefulness to the Project. TheRePPProT team produced eight regional land resource reviews and 775 map sheets (land systems,land use and land status maps) at 1:250,000 scale, with bilingual legends and separate agro-climaticmaps. The team also produced a data base of land systems and climate information. The digitizedRePPProT maps and the accompanying data base represent the first national land information systemcovering the whole of Indonesia. Copies have been made available to interested central and localgovernment departments, universities and international agencies. If kept updated regularly, theRePPProT maps and reports will remain a valuable source of information on the utilization of landresources of Indonesia.

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5.4 Phase II studies for site selection and evaluation were reduced from screening 330potential sites for 300,000 families to 142 sites for 167,500 families. Despite considerable extensionof the search area (from 4.6 to 10.9 million ha), only 106 suitable sites were identified. In theseareas, 2.5 million ha were surveyed, of which 2 million ha were found suitable for settling 161,600families (96.5 percent of the revised target). This is the single most significant achievement of thesettlement planning component of the Transmigration V Project, both for its thorough methodologyand for the pool of suitable sites it established for future programs.

5.5 Phase III studies were originally planned on 225 sites for 300,000 families, but werefirst reduced to 102 (in 1986/87), and later to 32 sites (in 1988) following the decision to conduct aTransmigration Second Stage Development Program II (TSSDP II) in 40 sites (see para 5.7 below).For these, physical plans and feasibility studies were prepared in Phase IIIA, for settling 50,655families, of whom some 20,000 have already been settled. In contrast to SAR assumptions, detaileddevelopment plans (later called Phase IIIB) did not form part of the consultants' contract under theProject. In practice, the Phase IIIB work has not been carried out, but replaced with 'as built'drawings prepared by the contractors. Consequently, the settlement centers have not been designedand, in the absence of detailed surveys, the simplistic structure plans have not been properly adjustedto the site conditions of the actual locations of the settlements, often leading to poor road alignments.Mission observations of transmigration sites planned under the Project in Riau Province indicate thatthe settlements do not appear much different from those constructed outside the Project without suchprecise planning, except for the critical advantage of having benefited from proper site selection.

5.6 The mission considers that the specifications for Phase III studies were more detailed(therefore more costly) than was necessary. It would have been enough to have selected the sites onthe basis of Phase II plans and developed outline plans for major infrastructure and then to haveproceeded with site development. In reality, none of the site developers/contractors have been able tofollow Phase III plans closely -- primarily because of the variations in the topographical characteristicsnot obvious in the uncleared situation -- between sites for which plans were prepared and the sites onwhich actual development took place.

5.7 Second-stage development studies were included in the revised project, targeting 50existing sites in the Transmigration Area Development Unit (SKP). Ten sites were chosen in 1986(TSSDP I) and 40 sites in 1988 (TSSDP II), containing a total of 160,000 families. Forty-six of thesesites (150,000 families) were found suitable for second-stage development, requiring a totalinvestment of about US$600 million, or about US$4,000 per family. These investments are beyondthe budgetary resources available to MOT at present, and past experience shows that without externalfunding, there is little possibility that these plans would be implemented.

5.8 Consultancy assistance provided through the Project, though not needed on the scale asplanned, was required for achieving the technical output of the Project. In many cases, it was carriedout with acceptable competence. Compliance of terms-of-reference (TOR) by consultants wasgenerally satisfactory with respect to Phase II studies, Phase III physical surveys and second-stagedevelopment studies.

5.9 The program support and institution building component of the Project did notsuffer severe cuts, except in the case of regional staff of the two central advisory teams, viz. theTechnical Advisory Group (TAG) within DGSP, MOT and the Technical Support Team (TST) withinthe Directorate of Land Preparation (PLP), MOT. These central teams assisting the DPP and PLP,both within MOT, have provided satisfactory services in their coordinating/supervisory/technicalassistance roles, as envisaged in the SAR. Liaison between the two teams was good and has led to

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better coordination between the directorates. They have contributed to a more professionalenvironment in their host directorates. However, they did not succeed in changing the basic workingpractices and leaving behind sufficiently trained manpower within MOT to continue the technicalwork undertaken by them. Nonetheless, the main beneficiaries of technology transfer are likely tohave been the local consultants, given their long association and close working relations with theirexpatriate colleagues. BAKOSURTANAL greatly benefited from technology transfer resulting fromthe successful advisory services of the Technical Advisory Team (TAT) within BAKOSURTANAL.Local private companies associated with established foreign companies have similarly benefited andacquired the skills necessary to undertake similar tasks in the future.

5.10 Overall, technical assistance provided through the Project has produced relativelybetter results in BAKOSURTANAL than in MOT. This is largely attributable to the fact thatBAKOSURTANAL staff, comprising higher-level technical and management personnel, were moredirectly involved in implementing the component. In contrast, technical assistance teams in MOTwere located at the level of directorates. As a result, project consultants providing technicalassistance in MOT might not support its policies and programs.

5.11 The Project also assisted in setting up a professionally-designed and secureDocumentation Center within DG Pankim, initially to accommodate all available WB-fundeddocuments, properly sorted and electronically indexed. Documentation of Transmigration III and V,Site Feasibility Studies and Engineering (SFSE) and TSSDP Projects are complete, only thetransparencies of Transmigration V maps have not been stored. A Management Information Systemhas also been set up in MOT, and is operational under competent leadership, but is lacking in fundsbecause of budgetary constraints (recent cut of 80%). The system has been unable to expand itscoverage to all settlements, and widen the range of inputs. Unless its potential is recognized as auseful tool of decision-making by senior management, the system will remain a passive asset.

5.12 Training of MOT staff under the Project was carried out at several levels: formallong-term training benefited 131 individuals, 33 of whom attended degree courses, 13 of which wereoverseas. Short-term leadership courses were attended by 679 participants, while other courses,seminars and workshops were attended by 2,434 participants in Indonesia and 117 overseas. Thetrained personnel are all now on the staff of MOT. Assistance given to the Staff Training Center(Pusdiklat) has been well utilized. SAR expenditure on training was increased by 102 percent in thecourse of the Project, and on-the-job training and skill transfer to local consultants were provided inthe course of the implementation of the consultancy contracts. BAKOSURTANAL also benefitedfrom training courses and from 30 overseas fellowships, all of which contributed significantly to long-term strengthening of mapping capacity.

5.13 Environment and Social Studies. As part of program support, a number of specialstudies have also been carried out on a variety of subjects, including spontaneous transmigration,environmental management, land rights, organizational review and the preparation of operationmanuals. Staff-months allocation for these purposes was increased from the planned SAR allocationof 230 to 1,183 staff-months (including local and foreign consultants). The quality of the studiesvaried considerably. For example, the environmental management study has produced a series ofmanuals and provided a useful basis for a system of environmental monitoring. This study, togetherwith TAG's activities, has made a major contribution to increasing environmental awareness in MOT.Some of the other studies (e.g. land rights and spontaneous migration studies), however, appear tohave been ill-focused and their contribution to the intended objectives had not been achieved, as theirfindings cannot be operationalized.

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6. Project Results

6.1 The originally intended project objectives were not fully realized due to a combinationof factors: drastic reduction in settlement targets within a year after Loan Effectiveness; design flaws;delays in the implementation of certain critical activities; and lack of technical as well as financialresources to implement settlement development as planned under the Project.

6.2 The aerial photography and base mapping component of the Project concludedsatisfactorily in terms of: (a) contribution to the national mapping program; (b) absorption oftechnical assistance leading to strengthening the institutional and technological capacity ofBAKOSURTANAL to undertake similar assignments in the future; and (c) effecting skill transferfrom foreign to local mapping firms. The result of this component was not successful in providingsupport for the transmigration component.

6.3 The transmigration settlement planning component included a national land resourceand land use review (RePPProT) referred to in para 5.3, originally designed as one of the inputs tothe context setting regional development studies in Phase I. As noted earlier, the results of thesestudies came in stages during the project period. Because of the timing of their availability and theinadequate level of their detail, they were of limited use for project purposes and made only amarginal contribution to the Phase II site selection studies. But they represent a significant potentialresource to future national/regional planning as the first national land information system coveringthe whole of Indonesia.

6.4 The results of the Phase II studies have provided a pool of sites suitable for futuresettlement programs.

6.5 Phase III studies have nominally met their revised target of conducting feasibilitystudies on 32 sites. But, the usefulness and cost effectiveness of their output have been reduced bytheir limited number. Given the private sector's preference for potential sites which are easilyaccessible and close to existing population centers and facilities, the plans prepared for settlements inremote areas such as Irian Jaya would not be used in the foreseeable future.

6.6 Second-stage development studies were conducted in all the sites targeted in the revisedProject. None has been used fully yet for want of funds. The mission considers that it would havebeen in the Borrower's interest not to commit resources for these studies without any firmcommitment of interest from funding sources to support the implementation of the projects prepared.More so, because these existing settlements will be handed over by MOT to local governmentadministration in the foreseeable future. The handover will create a new institutional environment forplan implementation, in which the studies prepared may no longer fully apply, or where they doapply, implementation of recommendations would be influenced by local priorities.

6.7 At project completion, the settlement planning expenditure per family wasUS$1,725 2/ in 1992 prices, compared to the appraisal estimate of US$500, or US$780 in 1992prices, representing a real increase of 120 percent. This has resulted from a smaller number of PhaseIII plans produced, lowering the cost effectiveness of the settlement planning component. The other

2/ Based on total cost of US$87.4 million (in 1992 prices) for 50,655 families. This cost comprisesexpenses incurred for settlement planning activities and technical assistance to Bina Program andPLP.

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reasons for this apparently low cost effectiveness are that the cost of settlement planning includespayments made for technical assistance, which was also used in support of TSSDP studies notforeseen at appraisal, and many of the Phase 11 plans prepared under the Project were not taken toPhase III stage.

6.8 Since the benefits of improved mapping and site selection cannot be adequatelyquantified and related to their costs, no economic rate of return calculation was made for the Project.The justification, however, was based on considerations such as identification of sites in more remoteareas, economic benefits which could be expected when the transmigrants would be actually settled onthe sites identified and planned under the Project, planning procedures that would benefit thetransmigrants and local populations and minimize conflicting land claims, and environmental benefitsthat would result from methodical evaluation, screening and selection of sites. Although the Projecthas resulted in the identification of sites in remote areas, e.g. Irian Jaya, many of them have not yetbeen taken for settlement development, partly because of lack of interest by spontaneous settlers andthe private sector, and partly due to GOI's decision to reduce the number of sponsored transmigrants.It would be premature and above all speculative to undertake at this stage an analysis of the expectedeconomic, social and environmental benefits because the benefiting settler families constitute justunder 7% of the originally planned number, and most of the settlements located in the areas plannedunder the Project are too recent (less than three years old) to allow for a meaningful assessment of thesocial or environmental benefits.

6.9 The program support and institution building component had deployed three majoradvisory groups to the Directorates of Planning and Programming (DPP) and Land Preparation (PLP)in the Directorate General Pankim, MOT and to the National coordinating Agency for Survey andMapping (BAKOSURTANAL), with some satisfactory results. The results of special studies carriedout in MOT have not always been well focused, or operationally effective. However, environmentalstudies (manuals, monitoring) have yielded positive results, and contributed significantly to improvedenvironmental awareness within MOT. Contribution was also made to improved communicationbetween directorates, and to better technical procedures and introduction of manuals and guidelines.

7. Project Sustainability

7.1 Sustainability has been assessed from the point of view of: (a) GOI's ability to sustainthe standards achieved by the Project in the preparation of maps and new settlement plans in thefuture; and (b) GOI's ability to utilize in future the plans prepared during the Project.

7.2 Aerial photography and base mapping component. BAKOSURTANAL, which isthe National Coordinating Agency for Surveying and Mapping, generally operates on requests fromother agencies and is staffed with competent technicians. The Project has strengthened the capacityfor sustaining mapping activities and for meeting future demand arising from other developmentprojects both within BAKOSURTANAL and in private sector surveying and mapping companies.

7.3 Transmigration settlement planning component - Phase I studies - the RePPProTland resource reviews and maps have particular potential interest to provincial governments andseveral central government agencies. However, to maintain their usefulness, the land use and landstatus information contained in the RePPProT maps require regular updating. No responsibility hasbeen assigned for this task to date, and MOT does not have the resources to undertake the task byitself. Hence, sustainability of this subcomponent remains uncertain.

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7.4 Phase II studies for site selection and evaluation have generated a significant volumeof valuable information. It is likely that this information will be gradually utilized over time,particularly in areas attractive to the private sector. However, it is known that parallel with theTransmigration V Project, MOT commissioned over 70 local consulting firms using local governmentrupiah budget (APBN) funds to carry out Phase IIIA studies in 440 sites, some of which had not beenscreened for suitability. Therefore, it cannot be taken for granted that already screened sites willalways have priority over others. Regarding the maintenance of the standards of site selection in thefuture, it is unlikely that MOT will have the budgetary resources required to ensure these standardsare met.

7.5 Phase III studies also produced a reservoir of plans for settling some 30,000additional families. As most of these were planned on the basis of a nucleus estate tree crop model inwhich the private sector may be interested, their utilization is likely in the future with minor siteadjustments.

7.6 Second-stage development feasibility studies are available for 46 sites. The utilizationof these would depend largely on acceptable financing arrangements for productive investments

7.7 Program support and institution building. The primary task of the consultantsworking with DG Pankim in MOT was to assist in the implementation of the project components.Their contribution to institution building was incidental. However, it is worth noting that somemiddle-level staff have benefited from associating with the consultants' work and improving workprocedures. However, there is no convincing evidence that the Project succeeded in building upcapacity within MOT to continue the technical work undertaken during the Project without furtherassistance. Consultants working with the Pusdiklat made a valuable contribution through developingtraining modules and materials and assisting to train a core group of trainers (72), in addition to theiractive participation in the delivery of training courses. Technology transfer to local firms appears tohave been more successful in the case of local surveying and mapping companies than in the case oflocal consulting firms associated with the planning activities. The Project succeeded in improvingtechnical procedures; introducing manuals and guidelines, which remain in use or are available forreference; improving communications between directorates; contributing to a much better awarenessof environmental issues; and assisting with the establishment of a functioning Documentation Centerand the start-up of a management information system. These are sustainable achievements of theProject.

8. Bank Performance

8.1 Bank missions correctly identified site selection as the critical area of thetransmigration program requiring assistance, if it was to achieve the targets for implementation set byGOI. The appraisal placed more emphasis on setting large physical targets for settlement planningthan on assessing either absorption capacity or affordability of implementing plans.

8.2 Project Loan administration and budgetary control have been competently handledduring implementation. However, in the early stages of implementation, Bank supervision missionsdid not always include a sufficient number of staff weeks with the necessary technical expertise toadequately supervise project implementation. Technical skills used were not commensurate with therequirements of a project of this magnitude and complexity, proposed TORs for consultant servicesseem to have been accepted without satisfactory review, and there was little substantive comment onthe content of studies. Effort was made, which met with some success, in the later stages of projectimplementation to employ the appropriate skills mix necessary to address these issues.

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9. Borrower Performance

9.1 The Directorate of Planning and Programming relied heavily on TAG at all stagesfrom project preparation to consultant supervision and evaluation.

9.2 The involvement of MOT staff in the formulation and conduct of some of the specialstudies was inadequate to ensure that the results of these studies can be operationalized.

9.3 Slow contracting procedures, frequent contract amendments and consequent changes inTORs and delays in the payment of remuneration, have subjected consultants to pressures whichdistracted their full attention from their technical responsibilities.

9.4 In contrast, the BAKOSURTANAL management team was directly involved inoverseeing the implementation of the mapping component of the Project, with the consequent result ofmore successful absorption of technical assistance.

10. Lessons Learned

10.1 The main lessons of experience learned in the Project include the following:

(a) When large-scale technical assistance is given to improve a critical aspect of agovernment agency's normal activities, special care should be taken to ensure that thelevel of sophistication of such assistance is in balance with the agency's technicalabsorptive capacity and/or financial resources, to ensure sustainability.

(b) Resources spent on technical assistance directed at one stage in a sequence of activities(such as settlement planning, followed by implementation and management), have to bein balance with those available for the subsequent stages. If funding sources andtechnical/managerial capacity available for implementation are not commensurate withthe sophistication of advice given, there is little likelihood that technical assistance willbe effectively used.

(c) In a country like Indonesia, which has a strongly centralized and sectoraladministrative tradition, TORs of planning studies should normally be confined toareas within the competence of the executing agency, so that implementation ofrecommendations can be handled without delays due to problems of inter-agencycoordination.

(d) Technical assistance can be successfully aimed at institution building, if the perceivedweaknesses relate to institutional or technical problems (para. 5.10). However, if theyprimarily relate to motivational factors, significant improvement can only be achievedif accompanied by major changes in the staff compensation system.

(e) The experience of BAKOSURTANAL highlights the problems that can arise, if theimplementation of one project component is dependent on inputs from sources overwhich it has no control. (For example, delays in the delivery of aerial triangulation

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data provided by the Resource Evaluation Aerial Photography (REAP) projectfinanced by CIDA caused considerable delay in the base mapping activities under theProject.) It is highly desirable to ensure, whenever possible, funding from a singlesource.

11. Project Relationship

11.1 Cooperation between MOT and the Bank during project preparation, revision andexecution was good. The tripartite relationship between MOT, BAKOSURTANAL and the Bank wassatisfactory, due to clearly defined and understood responsibilities for planning and mappingactivities.

11.2 BAKOSURTANAL experienced problems of coordination with other projects underseparate funding arrangements, on whose results the implementation of some mapping tasks depended.

11.3 Because of delays base maps and aerial photography needed by MOT could not besupplied on schedule by BAKOSURTANAL; therefore, some of SFSE consultants conducted surveyswithout the specific base maps/aerial photography.

12. Consulting Services

12.1 The implementation of this technical assistance project relied heavily on consultants.In total, 14,146 staff-months of consultancy services were utilized (reduced from 22,586 in the SAR),of which foreign professionals represented 37%, and local professionals 63%. Of this total, 8,436staff-months (60%) was assigned to the settlement planning component of the Project and theremainder to program support and institution building.

12.2 The settlement planning component was implemented by six consortia appointed tocarry out Phase II, Phase III and feasibility studies for second-stage development (TSSDP II) indifferent regions of Indonesia, notably in Sumatra, Kalimantan, Irian Jaya and Sulawesi (for TSSDPII only), while another group of consultants was assigned to prepare the TSSDP I feasibility studies.The DPP in DG Pankim, with the assistance of TAG, issued comprehensive guidelines to theconsultants detailing requirements. The RePPProT resource survey team also made some contributionto Phase II planning activities (see paras 5.3 and 7.3).

12.3 The quality of consulting services in settlement planning was uneven. While the moreexperienced consultancies deployed competent surveyors, soil scientists, agronomists, engineers andphysical planners, there is less evidence of comparable deployment of regional planners and socialscientists. Consequently, those aspects of the reports dealing with the physical and socio-economicsurveys of existing settlements, in a broadly defined 'study area' aiming at the regional integration ofnew settlements, were inadequate. General inability to put fragmented findings into an analyticalframework characterized this aspect of planning studies by the less experienced consultancies. Someof the studies consulted did not succeed in integrating their Phase III socio-economic findings intotheir settlement planning activities, which indicates a conceptual problem inherent in the terms ofreference.

12.4 The program support and institution building component benefited from 5,710 staff-months of consultancy services. A large part of this consisted of three advisory groups, whose

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activities were crucial to the execution of the Project. TAG and TST were competently assisting threedirectorates in DG Pankim, DG Rahbin and the regional MOT office concerned. TAT, which wasassigned to assist in the implementation of the mapping component at BAKOSURTANAL, providedsatisfactory advisory services. Most of the remaining staff-months allocated to program support wereassigned to special studies of mixed results in MOT.

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PART II: BAKOSURTANAL: AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY AND BASEMAPPING IMPLEMENTATION

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Indonesia is the largest archipelago in the world and consists of 17,580 islands with a totalland area of almost two million sq km, and sea area of more than three million sq km. The majorityof its people live on the islands of Java, Bali and Madura where population densities in rural,irrigated areas can easily reach 2.000 persons per sq km. Other major islands have much smallerpopulation densities, e.g. with only about four persons per sq km in Irian Jaya.

1.2 From the beginning of the twentieth century it has been the policy of successivegovernments to promote and support the transfer of people from the densely populated islandsreferred to in para. 1. 1 to the sparsely populated so called outer islands. This has been implementedthrough their transmigration programs.

1.3 The studies which are needed to support the transmigration program are divided into threephase.

Phase 1 - Broad regional planning;Phase 2 - Reconnaissance, project identification and out-line planning;Phase 3.A - Feasibility study, project design and settlement planning; andPhase 3.B - Land clearing, detailed survey and design.

Medium and small scale topographic maps, aerial photography and remote sensing imagery werenecessary to carry out the Phase 1 and 2 studies.

1.4 At the beginning of the 1980s, Indonesia's base mapping was inadequate and incomplete.Before that time an effort was made by BAKOSURTANAL and other government agencies toproduce a new series of base maps at scales of 1:100.000, 1:50.000 and 1:25.000. This effort wasassisted by the Bank-financed National Resource Survey and Mapping Project (Loan 1197-IND) aswell as bilateral aid.

1.5 BAKOSURTANAL estimated that without external assistance, it would take more than 17years to complete the national base mapping program. This would mean that the available aerialphotographs (dating from 1981 and 1982) would become obsolete even before they were used. Toavoid this, BAKOSURTANAL designed a seven-year mapping program to complete the nation's basemapping and requested World Bank financial assistance for this effort .

1.6 Lack of reliable base maps and altimetric networks, particularly in the outer islands,hampered the transmigration program and regional development projects. Under the TransmigrationIII Project (Loan 2248-IND), consultants were engaged by the Ministry of Transmigration (MOT)to prepare maps at a scale of 1:50.000. The production of these maps, under the supervision of anagency which did not specialize in mapping, was time-consuming, inaccurate and expensive.

1.7 To improve the quality of settlement planning, and realize economies of scale, theGovernment of Indonesia (GOI) decided that, for the Bank-assisted Transmigration V Project, all

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aerial photography and base maps needed for the program would be produced under theresponsibility of a single agency, BAKOSURTANAL. This base mapping and aerial photographywas to be expanded and integrated into the national mapping program carried out byBAKOSURTANAL.

1.8 It was further decided to provide program support and to strengthen BAKOSURTANAL'sinstitutional capabilities through the provision of a Technical Advisory Team (TAT) and to providetraining for BAKOSURTANAL's staff.

1.9 Altogether, this would form the mapping component of the Transmigration V Project forwhich BAKOSURTANAL is the executing agency. Aerial triangulation (AT) results, which are aprerequisite for photogrammetric mapping, would be provided under the Canadian-financed REAPproject.

2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

2.1 Planning. Under the Transmigration V Project, the on-going national base mapping programof BAKOSURTANAL was merged with a program to provide basic map and aerial photography datafor the transmigration planning. This resulted in the mapping component of Transmigration V (afollow up of the National Resource Survey and Mapping project, IBRD Loan 1197-IND) with thefollowing components:

a. Aerial photography, covering about 520,000 sq km at a scale of 1:50.000 in WestKalimantan, Sumatra and East Timor.

b. Procurement of satellite imagery, originally not foreseen for TRANS-V, but laterincluded.

c. Base maps at a scale of 1:50.000 of Kalimantan, Sulawesi and part of Irian Jaya(about 1,100 sheets) and at a scale of 1:100.000 of Irian Jaya (about 120 sheets).

d. Levelling networks in Sumatra, Sulawesi and parts of Kalimantan for a total length ofabout 9,000 km.

e. Establishment of a Technical Advisory Team to assist in project management, thedevelopment of software and the solution of scientific and technological problems inautomated cartography, digital mapping and advanced geodesy.

f. Training for staff, including refresher courses, workshops and overseas fellow ships.

g. Procurement of materials, spare parts and maintenance services.

2.2 In order to secure a timely execution of the Transmigration V Project, some Start-UpActivities (SUAT-V) were financed under the Transmigration III Project (IBRD Loan 2248-IND).For BAKOSURTANAL this included the procurement of aerial photography and the productionof photographic maps. This was also a precondition for the effectiveness of the Loan as well asfor disbursement for certain parts of the Transmigration V Project.

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2.3 The Transmigration V Project Loan was originally set for the period mid-1986 throughthe end of 1990.

2.4 Execution. Almost all activities had a slow start but gained momentum as the Projectwas implemented; some could be described as having been an outright success, while others wereonly successful if one looks at the results, and not at the time needed to achieve those results.

2.5 As the executing agency for this Project, BAKOSURTANAL felt responsible for thedelays but it must be added that the major delays, security clearance for aerial photography anddelivery of aerial tri-angulation results, were in fact outside the control of BAKOSURTANAL.Most project components had a built-in transfer of knowledge mechanism through the cooperationof foreign and local contractors.

2.6 The SUAT-V component consisted of aerial photography and the production ofphotomaps. The photography was initially delayed due to the lack of security clearance, but oncethis clearance was received, progress and quality were good except for some major areas inSumatra. Consequently the production of photomaps was also delayed. Delivery of thephotography started slowly and procedures were cumbersome. Eventually, production wasspeeded up and final deliveries were precisely on schedule. In areas in Kalimantan and IrianJaya, with permanent cloud cover, SAR images were acquired from 266 radarmaps at a scale of1:50.000 and 53 at a scale of 1:100.000 respectively.

3. THE TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM

3.1 Aerial photography was needed for transmigration sites at a scale of 1:25.000 and forREAP gaps at a scale of 1:50.000. Eventually, security clearance procedures became lessdifficult and almost all photography targets, albeit after contract extensions, were met. This wasquite an achievement if one considers that over most areas cloud conditions are not favorable forphotography. Purchase of satellite imagery was far below expectations because it was verydifficult to get cloud free images.

3.2 The base mapping program was seriously delayed due to a lack of AT results whichwere to be provided by Canadian contractors under the REAP project and financed by CanadianInternational Development Agency (CIDA). The type of maps to be produced were adjusted inline with state-of-the-art technology and quality of photography. After AT results becameavailable, it became clear that the time limits set for line mapping were too ambitious and thecartographic process formed a bottleneck. Eventually, one contractor succeeded in finishing hiscontract in three years, one contractor needed almost four years and the third needed more thanthree years and a reduction of his workload which was transferred to the Indonesian partner ofthe first contractor. In total, 566 maps at the scale of 1:50.000 were produced by the threecontractors.

3.3 BAKOSURTANAL produced 16 line maps and 120 photomaps. In order to help updatemap information on Sumatra, 600 radarmaps at a scale of 1:50.000 of that island were produced.This was decided after the good results of the SUAT-V radar campaign.

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3.4 The levelling networks were redesigned and a total of 13,517 km levelled, 3,085benchmarks were established and nine tide gauges operated. Gravity was measured along thelevelling lines.

3.5 The TAT produced 533 staff-months of consultancy. Close cooperation withBAKOSURTANAL counterparts was established and work generally went smoothly. Due to thehuge tasks BAKOSURTANAL had to face during these years, it was not always possible toassign the optimal number and quality of counterparts. TAT worked alongsideBAKOSURTANAL in the supervision of other Transmigration V contracts.

3.6 BAKOSURTANAL staff received 219 staff-months of formal education overseas and326 months in Indonesia under the Project. Furthermore they received 72 weeks of overseastraining and 100 weeks of local training.

3.7 Procurement of materials, spare parts and maintenance went smoothly in general.

3.8 Due to the delays in the base mapping program and parts of Transmigration V Projectoutside the responsibility of BAKOSURTANAL, the Loan period was extended twice; initiallyuntil December 31, 1991 and finally until December 31, 1992.

4.. MAJOR CONSTRAINTS

4. 1 In the beginning of the Project it took a long time to obtain the necessary securityclearance for the SUAT-V aerial photography operations which led to long delays in the project.With good cooperation by Pussurta ABRI, the agency responsible for this security clearance, allproblems were eventually solved. In the Transmigration V Project aerial photography and radarcampaign, there were almost no more delays, apart from the first photography contract.

4.2 The base mapping component of the Project was delayed even longer because of thelack of AT results. These data were to be provided by Canadian contractors under a CIDA grantproject but the selection of the contractor by CIDA took quote a long time. Once the contractorwas mobilized he worked reasonably quickly but did not show too much awareness that he wasproducing AT results for a mapping program. Altogether, this delayed the start of the mappingby one to almost two years. On top of this the 1:50.000 photomapping had to be made from aREAP 1: 100.000 photograph flown in 1981/1982. Due to the adverse weather in parts ofIndonesia it is not possible to get photography of homogenous and adequate quality everywhere.It took much time to find the best production method and the final result is still not particularlygood.

4.3 During production of the base maps, the contractors had serious problems in producingproducts which fulfilled the required quality standards. This was also one of the reasons why thework went beyond the two years allowed for in the contract. Technical specifications had to bewritten, bid documents compiled, shortlists made, bids evaluated, contract negotiations finalized,and personnel mobilized. These procedures alone often took two years.

4.4 The transfer of knowledge under the TAT, such as the introduction of new technologiesas computer-assisted mapping integrated in a GIS environment, and SAR mapping, was slow

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because BAKOSURTANAL did not yet have enough staff with the right educational backgroundto be involved in these subjects. The overseas training project was, in fact, a major competitorfor personnel. The complicated project monitoring procedures, requiring skilled technical staff inadministrative functions, did not help to solve these problems.

5. ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

5.1 The Transmigration V Project was coordinated and supervised by the MOT coordinatorfor Bank-assisted projects, the Secretary General. A project working group was set up within theexisting Settlement Planning Technical Team under the chairmanship of the Director of BinaProgram Pankim.

5.2 The Transmigration V mapping component was carried out by BAKOSURTANAL.Within BAKOSURTANAL the Foreign Assisted Projects Coordinator, the ProjectImplementation Unit (PIU) administrator, supported by his staff, and the PIMPRO (PimpinanProyek), were responsible for the execution of the Project. The Chairman of BAKOSURTANALheld the final responsibility.

5.3 Accounts have been audited each year throughout the Project and the audit reports weresubmitted to the Bank in:

July 1988 for fiscal year 86 - 87July 1989 for fiscal year 87 - 88February 1990 for fiscal year 88 - 89October 1990 for fiscal year 89 - 90November 1991 for fiscal year 90 - 91November 1992 for fiscal year 91 - 92

for fiscal year 92 - 931/

5.4 Quarterly and annual progress reports were submitted to the Bank. The yearly reportswere published in April of 1988 (for the period from the start of the project up to 31-3-1988),1989, 1990, 1991, and 1992. Interim reports were prepared when Bank missions visitedBAKOSATURNAL. This was:

1986 November 1990 June, September1987 March, August, November 1991 May, November1988 April, October 1992 August1989 April, September, November

The Bank's detailed mid-term review was done in October 1988. Discussions and decisionsregarding these visits were documented in Aide Memoires produced by Bank staff at the end ofeach mission.

5.5 Cooperation between various Bank officials and consultants was excellent.Administrative and technical problems were dealt with promptly and the success of the

1/ Audit for fiscal year 92-93, not yet received by the Bank.

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implementation of the Transmigration V Project was everybody's first concern. Input from staffat the Bank's resident office in Jakarta (RSI) improved the Project's efficiency.

6. FINANCES

6.1 In the original project planning, a total of US$ 15,526,000 equivalent (Bank) and Rp6,396,000,000 (GOI, DIP) was reserved for the BAKOSURTANAL component of the Project.Eventually, a total of US$ 18.302.000 equivalent was disbursed, along with Rp 7,943,000,000from the Indonesian budget. The detailed overview hereunder uses the revised plan from 1987,at a time when realistic estimates could be made. GOI overhead costs are not included in any ofthe figures below.

WB US$ Equivalent Rp GOICategory Activity planned realized Planned realized

SAK T. /01 L.b/Y1 494 487SPOT images 1.500 837 - -aerial phot. 2.085 4.168 1.440 851mapping 4.051 4.140 2.832 3.775alt. network 1.723 1.520 894 1.759

if Materials 1.250 1.053 410 140III Training 840 760 164 136IV TAT 3.154 4.145 356 795

(US$ x 1.000 and Rp 1.000.000)

The changes are resulted from the devaluation of the Rupiah in September 1986, as well as fromother currency exchange fluctuations, and by changes in the required works. Expenses for 1992to 1993 are as per December 31, 1992.

Cumulative disbursements were scheduled (1985) and realized as follows:

1986 - 1988 16%1988- 1989 41%1989- 1990 65%1990- 1991 83%1991 - 1992 91%1992 - 1993 100%

This shows clearly that the majority of the activities were executed in the years 1988-1991. Thedelays were mainly due to the mapping contracts and consequently a temporization of the TATcontract.

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7. CONCLUSIONS

7.1 The mapping component of the Transmigration V Project was financed by the GOIand Band under Loan No. 2578-IND. The purpose of this Loan was to finance a four-year sliceof BAKOSURTANAL's seven-year mapping program, to acquire aerial photography and satelliteimagery and to establish altimetric networks on several islands. The institutional capabilities ofBAKOSURTANAL would be strengthened through the provision of a TAT toBAKOSURTANAL and the provision of training facilities.

7.2 For the base mapping, AT results would be provided under the final stage of theREAP program. Unfortunately, it was not possible to realize the delivery of the AT results intime which led to an almost 2-year delay in the start of the last part of the base mapping.Problems in the execution of the base mapping contract led to another delay of more than oneyear. Final results of the base mapping contracts are satisfactory.

7.3 For a quick update of imagery over Sumatra, SAR rather than aerial photographywas the selected method. This decision was based on the very good results of the SAR campaignin Kalimantan and Irian Jaya under SUAT-V. The whole island was covered and the resultswere delivered within eleven months.

7.4 The acquisition of RS imagery, i.e. SPOT coverage of all Indonesia wasdisappointing. Due to weak programming and the very nature of this optical satellite system itwas very difficult to acquire (nearly) cloud free images.

7.5 The establishment of altimetric networks was successful, albeit in smaller areasthan originally foreseen, due to a redesign of the original networks. Technically, this led tosuperior results, with twice the original number of kilometers levelled resulting in denser -though still sparse - networks.

7.6 Gravity and GPS networks were established and BAKOSURTANAL extended theseunder it's routine program.

7.7 The purchase of materials and equipment went smoothly and the implementation ofthe training programs were based on availability of staff.

7.8 Cooperation with the TAT went smoothly and the major part of the goals set wereachieved.

7.9 The relationship with the Bank was basically a good one too. No major problemserupted and meetings between Bank officials, it's consultants and BAKOSATURNAL werefriendly, fruitful and conclusive.

8. LESSONS LEARNED AND FOLLOW UP

8.1 The main lesson learned from the Transmigration V Project mapping componentimplementation was that it was very risky to have different sources of finances for project

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activities which are complementary and on the same critical path. Furthermore, mappingcontracts should include the AT work if it has not yet been done. Even with full cooperation ofall agencies involved, there can still be a difference in, for example, administrative requirementswhich would cause unexpected delays which are outside the control of the executing agency.

8.2 The problems with the cartographic work of the contractors were not a completesurprise because of the complicated nature of the work and the lack of experience of thecontractors. Nevertheless no extra time was allowed in the contracts for this. In the Projectdocuments, no attention was given to the problem of the storage of all the materials which was tobe delivered by the contractors. The dissemination of the data, be it digital or conventional, wasalso not discussed. Consequently the marketing aspects of geo information were overlooked aswell. During the last year of the Project this marketing aspect was briefly addressed.

8.3 The levelling and mapping contracts provided for a certain period to conclude thework. Some contractors tried very hard to meet the resulting deadlines which increased the costsof BAKOSURTANAL supervision considerably. Penalty clauses in the contracts would havegiven a stronger position for BAKOSURTANAL to motivate the contractors to stick to theirproduction schedule. However, since a contractor will tend to try and recover such costs, thismight have led to a deterioration of quality standards. A system of positive sanctions (i.e. morework) would perhaps better motivate contractors to fulfil their contractual obligations.

8.4 Another lesson from the mapping contracts is that it is possible to build up nationalcapability in the private sector when this sector is supported by (overseas) experiencedcompanies. This would however, also need considerable extra expert input from the side of theClient. This support and extra input should perhaps last three to five years if one starts from asituation were contractors have only large-scale mapping experience.

8.5 The contract to purchase an analytical plotter contains a very convenient provisionto service the instrument over a three-year period. The TAT contract contained small budgetitems for training and maintenance which increased the flexibility and efficiency of the executionof the Project.

8.6 The base mapping component of the Project is a part of the national base mappingprogram. Under the national base mapping program, BAKOSATURNAL also started themapping, in 1988, of Java, Nusa Tenggara and Timor which is considered to be a spin-off effectof Project. By the end of this fiscal year more than five hundred sheets will be produced; about40% by BAKOSATURNAL and the remaining by outside contractors. A huge mapping taskremains, for which BAKOSATURNAL has secured the assistance of the Norwegian government.Further Bank assistance, however, seems to be required, especially since the transfer fromconvention to digital technology is far from completed. Digital mapping, the production and useof Digital Topographic Databases and GIS will be of utmost importance to BAKOSURTANALand the Indonesian geo referenced information user.

8.7 The knowledge and experience which has been built up by the private sector, at aconsiderable costs to GOI, should be conserved. Therefore ongoing work should be available sothat the contractors have a chance to compete for this.

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8.8 BAKOSURTANAL also started the establishment of a national geodetic network,based on GPS points. Good progress has been achieved but Bank assistance to finish the work isindispensable as well. The same holds for the extension of levelling and gravity networks.

8.9 There are areas in Kalimantan and Irian Jaya which are continuously covered byclouds and it has been nearly impossible to get aerial photography during extended periods oftime. These area should be covered by SAR imagery.

8.10 During the final days of the Project, the island of Flores was struck by a seriousearthquake with devastating tidal waves and maps were desperately needed for reconstructionworks. Within ten days following the earthquake, BAKOSATURNAL produced seven new mapsheets, starting from photos, using digital techniques.

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PART II: MINISTRY OF TRANSMIGRATION: SETTLEMENTPLANNING AND INSTITUTION BUILDING

1. EVALUATION OF FACTUAL INFORMATION

1.1 Results of Project. Generally speaking, in the implementation of the Project all scopeshave been covered. The data presented, compared with those as estimated in the SAR includingthe changes, reflect the success of the project in achieving the main target in terms of thesettlement planning as well as the program support, in spite of the fact that extension of theduration has been made, reduction of the quantity and adjustment to the original plan.

1.2 Settlement Planning. Apart from the volume of Phase III that has been achieved, theMinistry of Transmigration and the SFSE consultant have shown their abilities and understandingof the settlement planning to be made available for the project. The effort to improve the qualitycan be seen in each phase of activities showing the technical aspects, also the socio-cultural,economic and environmental aspects and the recommended pattern of settlement.

1.3 The target of the SFSE contract, seen from the point of view of the number of locations(SKPs) or the total transmigrant families to be resettled, was the main reason of the expandedarea to be surveyed in addition to the restricted process of location selection, since eachconsultant wanted to meet all the requirements of his contract. The result by the end of PhaseIIB was only an area of 2 hectares for 161,617 families, that is 54 percent of the SAR estimation(300,000 families) that have been resettled in proper transmigration settlements.

1.4 This 54 percent of the 6 first round package of SFSE is the real fact of the result of thestudy; only 50,546 families (33 percent of the potential locations or 17 percent of SAR target)have been resettled up to and including Phase IIIA.

1.5 The problem is now the question whether the Ministry of Transmigration has the abilityto utilize the potentials and the opportunity, starting from the remainder of Phase IIB,implementation of Phase IIIA including the area that has been rejected in Phase IIB for other areadevelopment.

1.6 In addition, the opportunity made available by the Bank to select a propertransmigration settlement by the Ministry and consultant. However, together with SFSE studythe Ministry, using the State Budget, has conducted planning up to the physical implementation,such as the Industrial Trees Forest (Hutan Tanaman Industri/HTI), TRANSARANGDFP., etc.,although no appropriate policies and strategies were available. The opportunity, if benefitted,would be able to reduce the study are rejected to make place for wider settlement planning and,perhaps, for program improvement in the future.

1.7 Program Support and Establishment of Institutions. Since the very beginning, theprogram support has been designed to adjust and to set up policies for transmigrationdevelopment in medium and long term. Strategically, this matter has not been done verysatisfactorily. The increased special studies and other technical support have only put emphasison the problems discovered in the National Inventory of Transmigration Sites (NITS) studyresults.

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1.8 Although very important and included in the activities required for the project, thesetting up of strategies and, in long term, the program improvement for new transmigrationsettlements/PTBs have been put aside.

a. Special Studies

As important matter that has not been studied thoroughly is the ability of the Ministryand the Bank to improve transmigration settlements and surrounding areas through theSecond Stage Development Program/SSDP. After the completion of the Trans VProject, the Bank assistance seems to be aimed at supporting this program; severalattempts have been made to support the TSSDP I and TSSDP 1I program by means ofadditional studies, such as on Land Tittle, Environmental Impact and Direction ActionProgram, in addition to improvement of infrastructure using the budget of theGovernment.

It might be better, if the TSSDP 1I study which is being made by modifying the SFSEcontract, be carried out after the implementation of TSSDP 1, in order to reduce therisks in using the resources, time and fund for the study. The Bank has actuallyprogram a mission to evaluate the proposal for TSSDP 1, however, owing to theGovernment policy on monetary affairs in terms of Investment Credit Value (NilaiKredit Investasi) which is known as January 1990 Package, the plan for the missionwas rejected, because the approaches in the proposal were not in accordance with thereality. As for the TSSDP I locations that have already been transferred to the localgovernment, the follow up of the study has been left to the local government, while thefollow up of the locations that are still under the guidance of the Ministry ofTransmigration is being considered.

b. Establishment of Institutions

The available of TAG consultant through direct negotiations with Trans III is verycorrect; the gap of time can be avoided and there is guarantee that professional andexperienced personnel will be obtained.

The implementation of this project cannot be separated from the role of the TAGconsultant, since a great part of the project represents the activities of consultant. Thesuccess of TAG in setting up a pattern for implementing the TSSDP study andguidelines for Phase IIA, IIB and IIIA are very helpful for the Ministry ofTransmigration in supervising, controlling and evaluating the consultant's activities.

The assignment of the TST consultant in the SAR has not been considered properly inthe project planning, because it has wasted fund. The Support Team for theimplementation of the construction was already available, whereas the technical designof SFSE had not yet been established. However, although the assignment of TST wasnot very rational, in order that the resources would not become idle its activities wereto support the implementation of the program during Repelita IV and part of RepelitaV.

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The establishment of TST at regional level has been decided from the plans of 7 teams,the location selected is the province of Riau. The selection of TST in Sumatra is stillthe largest transmigration receiving area during the life of the project.

The use of staff-months for local personnel, which exceeded that in the SAR estimationwas due to the extension of the assignment; however, if observed more clearly, thisimplies the great trust of the Bank in local consultants owing to the improved capabilityof the personnel. It means that one of the objectives in improving the capabilities oflocal consultants has been achieved.

In relation to the above matter, the hope for transfer of knowledge from expatriate tonational consultants, in particular technical affairs, is often to other way round. Thisexpatriate personnel does not always concur with the reality. The result is waste ofsources and fund, which becomes the burden of the Ministry and the consultant'scounterpart.

c. Training

The hope for improving the capabilities of the personnel of the Ministry could actuallybe achieved, because there have been so many kinds of training and participants duringthe implementation of the project. In addition, the technical assistance for TAG andTST, which together with the personnel of the Ministry control the project directlyshould also be able to improve the capabilities of the personnel and management of theorganization. The challenge is now how to take benefit from the personnel as much aspossible and to develop them in order to prevent change of profession, because theincentives and need for qualified personnel in the private sector are continuouslyincreasing.

2. EVALUATION OF WORLD BANK PERFORMANCE

2.1 Bank's support to transmigration V Program has been continued, despite it were besetby criticism on all sides. This is the main issue which could be proclaimed as the main strengthsof Bank's Performance.

2.2 Formulation and Scope of Project. The experience obtained from the programimplementation in the past, in particular in handling World Bank assisted projects and theevaluations of the program implementation, has in general been benefitted in the formulation andthe scope of the project. The approaches made to achieve the objectives of the project throughimproving the quality of settlement planning of the three phases in a continuous way have beenaccepted as most appropriate and at the same time have wiped out the negative image from theprogram implementation in the view of the world society. This applies especially to the socialand environmental impacts, in particular the treatment of tropical forests.

2.3 The Bank also provides mitigating alternatives to the Ministry in selectingtransmigration patterns including adjustment or policies to be developed in accordance with theavailable resources. It is a pity, however, that the interest in the subject of the program, that iswould-be transmigrants, has not been touched at all. Although the results of the settlement

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planning recommended provide inputs for proper human resources, it is no easy work to getthem. Because, as is known, the target of the program covers people with limited knowledge andcapabilities.

2.4 Technical support that can help aspects of mobilizing and developing the society wouldbe very helpful for establishing policies, systems and techniques of selection including training towould-be transmigrants in the sending areas. Another matter that the Bank should take intoconsideration is the support from other agencies to the implementation of the studyrecommended.

2.5 The Bank officials are fully aware that there are always problems in coordinating andintegrating the program which delay its progress and improvement. In the context of selecting atransmigration pattern, which puts emphasis on non-food activities in spontaneous transmigration,the implementation of the program will very much depend on the technical ministry. In otherwords, the role of other agencies is of supportive nature, they are no pioneers; from the technicalpoint of view the program schedule by the Ministry is ready for implementation.

2.6 The Bank seems to be too confident that the problem can be solved by setting up aworking group and technical committees with members from all the related agencies, but it is apity that the personnel for these are still missing.

3. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

3.1 It cannot be denied that the success of the Ministry in completing the project activitiesincluding the adjustment/changes is also the success of the Bank. The working system of theBank, applied by the RSI staff and Supervision Team has a positive influence and has improvedthe capabilities of the organization. The periodic and continuous supervision is a very goodexample to be imitated by the Ministry, especially for the officials who have authority over theproject so that they can directly know the situation of the project.

3.2 During the process of contracts procurement learning from past experiences the Bankshould strongly encourage MOT staff which have had the experience in Trans 11 and Trans III tooffer their independent judgement on each part of the process rather than reducing MOT staffresponsibilities. G.O.I. concludes that in these respects the Bank has not used its wideexperienced gained during Transmigration III project. There were inconsistency of thoughtamongst the Bank Managers.

3.3 Bank urged the recruitment committee in MOT to speed up the selection process and toensure that the supervision consultants are engaged when contractors are ready to commence theworks, on the other hand Bank permitted tendering of Settlement Planning project only after allsar imagery and Base map were available. These inconsistencies of thought amongst the Bank'smanaging staff reflected one of the weakness of Bank's performance. The personnel of theSupervision Team and RSI assigned by the Bank during the duration of the project are sometimessubstituted by other personnel; this matter places the Ministry and consultants in a difficultposition, especially in the problems being experienced or if directives are required to solve them.

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3.4 The understanding of the Bank personnel about the project is sometimes divergent andtheir personal opinion stands more out than the Bank policy. The Bank is also optimistic that theprogram formulated from the recommendations of the consultant to this project could beimplemented without any guarantee of fund from the Government or Bank by means of acommitment of further assistance. This recommendation has also caused the delay in completingthe project which has resulted in extension of the loan termination.

4. EVALUATION OF GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE

4.1. Planning and Scope of Project. In our further analysis, the approach we select in achievingthe final target of the project is more focussed on the technical aspects in using the naturalresources supported by policies which are in accordance with the recommendations.

4.2 The scope of the project, seen from the point of the kinds of activities gives much hopethat the two aspects could be achieved. The existence of regulations to study the programimplementation in the previous years and the attempts to solve the problems discovered at thattime, however, have given way to changes in the project priorities.

4.3 Viewed from the quality of providing settlement planning (Phase IIIA) which representsthe main objective of the project, the target determined is only based on the needs, and no limitedfactors or risks, in particular the fund and policies at the time of implementation, have been takeninto consideration. In relation to the mitigation for a more selective settlement pattern in order toimprove the welfare of transmigrants in long term, a large sum of fund will be required besidesother innovative policies.

5. ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF PROJECT

5.1 The organization and management of the project with the several divisions which arebased on the duties and function of the project implementation unit may indeed be capable tosupport the achievement of the first object of the project. For the final target, however, i.e. thereadiness for implementation seems to need integrity of the program support form other agencies.Coordination is very decisive in this phase, which should be overcome by establishing a workinggroup with officials from the related agencies at director level as members. It is a pity that thisworking group has never been established specifically.

5.2 Within the Ministry of Transmigration there seems to be the impression that the projectactivities are only to support settlement preparation matters, because nothing exists in the loanthat supports mobilization and development are implicitly included. The role of the SecretariatGeneral is the supervisor of World Bank assisted projects including the changes because of therestricted capabilities of the personnel still concerns with administrative matters and cannot yettouch upon technical aspects, management and program integrity.

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6. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

6.1 What was worried about as risk during the stage of project has become reality. Thetarget of settlement planning (Phase IIIA) has only been achieved for 17 percent of the schedule.Although the opportunity exists for improving the target, the financial condition of theGovernment which is not very favorable during this period is hampering; the policy of prioritiesby placing quantity entering Repelita V in 1989 should also be taken into account.

6.2 The result of the NITS study appears to go parallel with the policy taken by theGovernment, but it puts too much emphasis on rehabilitation of existing transmigrationsettlements/PTAs through TSSDP I and TSSDP II, whereas those for new settlements/PTBs havebeen put aside. It seems that the good-will of the Ministry and the Bank has been exposed toomuch, as if the implementation of it in the past was not very successful so that the program givesthe impression as one that had not been studied carefully.

6.3 It may be wiser if the study of TSSDP II be made after the implementation of TSSDP I,while the modification of the 6 packages of the SFSE contract can be directed at alternativeselection of other transmigration settlement patterns including clarification of the strategy forimproving the quality of PTBs.

7. PERIOD OF PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

7.1 Considering the period of project implementation, all components of the Ministry'sactivities could only be completed after 2 years extension of the loan, which means that theimplementation of the project would need 6 years and 8 months after the effective date of theloan. A fact that cannot be denied is that not any of World Bank assisted project could becompleted at the right time. This delay is understandable, because most of the project activitiesconsist of activities of the consultant; reports of assumptive nature and at the same timesatisfactory for the Ministry and the Bank are always subject to debates.

8. PROJECT COSTS

8.1 The cancelled amount from the loan, i.e. US $ 63 Million or 40 percent of the totalwhich was due to the reformation of the project, has indeed lessened the burden of theGovernment. Since the singing of the loan agreement, the Government has to bear thecommitment fee which is computed from the amount that has not yet been used; so delays inpayment of the loan increase the burden of the Government.

9. LESSONS LEARNED

9.1 Based on the experience during the project implementation, several matters can belearned for formulating and planning similar projects in the future, as follow:

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a. It is very risky to formulate such a project without any assurance or guarantee thatthe result including the recommendations would be beneficial or funded for furtheractivities, especially for large scale projects.

b. In order not to waste resources, time and fund, the formulation of a project shouldbe emphasized on the physical implementation; the consultant only supports, notthe other way round.

c. In formulating a transmigration settlement planning project, orientation should notonly be directed at technical development of natural resources, but also shouldcover all aspects for developing human resources (transmigrants), policies andother non-technical aspects.

d. A more realistic scope of the project should be set up by taking into considerationthe restricting factors by means of identification of the problems, such asresources, institutions, regulations and funding and the alternatives for solution inorder to minimize the risk.

e. Involve directly all implementing agencies/units in each stage of the planning, sothat the program can be established in an integrated way and all aspects of theproject understood similarly at the time of implementation.

f. Carry out the commitments agreed upon by all parties, in particular those thatrelate to the project organization and establishment of other teams required duringthe project implementation.

g. Assign experienced and selected companies, personnel, expatriate and national, andtake strict action in case they do not meet the necessary requirements.

h. Involve senior officials who are authorized to make decisions in supervising theproject, so that the situation of the project can be known as best as possible.

10. REVIEW OF EFFECTIVENESS OF WORKING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEBANK AND THE GOVERNMENT.

10.1 The relationship between the Government and the Bank and among the Ministry ofTransmigration and the related agencies and consultants was quite satisfactory during theimplementation. The RSI staff in particular, was very helpful for strengthening the cooperationbetween the Bank and the Government, among the Government agencies and with other parties.

10.2 However, for improving the effectiveness in the future, both parties should makeattempts to introduce to each other their differences such as in the working mechanism,orientation and perception. Appointment of experienced and other communicative personnel forboth parties will also be very helpful. Knowledge of the duties and responsibilities of each partywill certainly create a more effective relationship.

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10.3 One thing that should get the attention of the Ministry, in particular the World BankRSI is the provision of a new project when the Trans and SRDP-II have ended in June 1993. Ifthis cannot be met within a short time, the close relationship which has been maintained so far isfeared to fly away.

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PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION

1. Related Bank Loans/Credits

Fi' ofTide Purpose approval Status Comments

Tranamigration I Pilot Schemes for New Settlement and 1976 Closed PCR issued 1983Project Rehabilitation. Apr. 13,(Ln.1318-IND) 1983

Tranamigration nI Settlement, rehabilitation, site 1979 Closed PCR issued 1988Project screening and evaluation. Dec. 31,(Ln.1707/Cr.919-IND) 1986

Transmigration III Site selection and evaluation, 1983 Closed PCR issued 1989Project (Ln.2248-IND) settlement development and program Dec. 31,

support. 1988

Transmigration IV Settlement in East Kalimantan and 1983 Closed PCR issued 1991Project (Ln.2288-IND) program support. March

1991

Swamp Reclamation I Swamp Reclamation and 1981 Closed PCR issued 1988Project (Ln.1958-IND) Transmigration Development Dec. 1989

Swamp Reclamation 11 Swamp Reclamation and 1984 Closed PCR under preparationProject (Ln.2431-IND) Transmigration Development Dec. 1993

2. Project Timetable

Item Planned Revised Actual

Identification

Preparation Nov/Dec. 1984 /a

Appraisal Mission Nov/Dec. 1984

Loan Negotiations May 10, 1985

Board Approval June 11, 1985

Loan Signature - - June 18, 1985

Loan Effectiveness Oct. 16, 1985 Feb. 3, 1986 /b Apr. 29, 1986

Project Completion Dec. 31, 1989 Dec. 31, 1990 Dec. 31, 1992

Loan Closing Dec. 31, 1990 Dec. 31, 1991 Dec. 31, 1992

/a Prepared by GO] with the assistance of consultants, financed under Bank-funded Transmigration [II project.

/b Certain conditionsofeffectivenesshad not been met by GOI. Severe cuts in GOl's transmigrationprogrambudget necessitatedproject revision.

Amendments to Loan Agreement: June 30, 1987; October 28, 1987; December 14, 1988.

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3. Loan Disbursements

Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursementsin US$ million

World Bank Fiscal Year 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

Appraisal Estinate 13.0 26.0 61.0 118.0 150.0 160.0 160.0 160.0

Revised Estimate - - - 59.5 74.7 87.8 95.0 97.0

Actual Disbursement - 15.6 36.3 57.9 74.7 88.5 92.3 94.2

Actual as % of Appraisal - 60.0 59.5 49.0 49.8 55.3 57.6 58.9Estimate

Actual as % of Revised - - - 97.2 100.0 100.8 97.1 97.1

Estimate

Date of last disbursement: I June, 1993.

4. Project Implementation

Key Indicators - Physical Targets

Indicators Appraisal ActualEstimate (or PCR Estimate)

Settlement 300,000 families 161,600 families(330 sites) in Phase II (106 sites)

300,000 families 50,655 families(225 sites) in Phase III (32 sites)

Consultants 22,600 staff-months 14,146 staff-months

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5. Project Cost and Financing

A. Project Cost

Appraisal Estimate Revised Estimate Actual as of DecemberComponent 31, 1993

Rupiah US$ Rupiah US$ Rupiah US$(Billion) (Million) (Billion) (Million) (Billion) (Million)

Aerial Photography 25.2 22.9 36.2 22.1 39.7 22.9and Base Mapping

Settlement 146.1 132.9 76.4 47.5 68.9 40.9Planning

Program Support 62.6 56.9 104.5 62.5 103.7 58.5Special Studies

TOTAL BASE 233.9 212.7 217.1 132.1 212.3 122.3COSTS

Physical 23.4 21.2 6.8 4.1 - -contingencies

Price contingencies 45.5 41.4 16.5 10.0 -

TOTAL PROJECT 302.8 275.3 240.4 146.2 212.3 122.3COSTS

B. Project Financing

Source Planned Final as of December 31, 1993

US$ million (%) US$ million (%)

IBRD: Air Photos and 12.7 12.6Maps

2.1 1.6Equipment and Supplies

127.1 75.6Consultants

Training 3.4 4.4

Sub-total 145.3 94.2

Unallocated 14.7 0.0

TOTAL 160.0 58 94.2 77

GOVERNMIENT:

MOT 101.3 37 24.1 19

BAKOSURTANAL 14.0 5 4.6 4

TOTAL 275.3 100 122.3 100

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6. Project Results

A. Direct Benefits

Appraisal Estimate Estimated at Estimated atClosing Date Full Development

Benefiting families300,000 20,000 50,655

B. Economic Impact

NOT APPLICABLE

C. Financial Impact

NOT APPLICABLE

D. Studies

Studies Purpose as Status ImpactDefined at

SAR

1. Formulation of Repelita V of n.a. Completed Useful to adjustthe MOT May 1988 settlement targets

2. Study of Spontaneous n.a. Completed Not operationalizedTransmigration March 19, 1992

3. Organization, Review and n.a. CompletedPreparation of Administrative May 1992Manuals

4. Organization of Operation n.a. CompletedManuals for the MOT Dec. 31, 1990

5. National Inventory of - Completed 1987Transmigration Sites (NITS)

6. SSDP I n.a. Completed Not operationalizedJune 1988

7. SSDP 11 n.a. CompletedAugust 1991

8. Land Rights Studies and n.a. CompletedTechnical Assistance July 1990

9. Environmental n.a. Completed Encouraged MOT toManagement/SEL April 1990 undertake EIA

10. Documentation System n.a. Completed Resulted in theJuly 1991 establishment of

Documents Center

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7. Status of Covenants

Agreement Section Description of Covenant Status

Loan Art. 3.02 (B) Phase 11 and Phase III studies to be carried out in accordance with TOR Compliedsatisfactory to Bank.

Loan Art. 3.03 Carry out detailed review of Transmigration Program by 09/30/87. CompliedDiscuss review with Bank and carry out modifications or additionalstudies to resolve problems in project by 11/30/87.

Loan Art. 3.04, No. I GOI to use existing committees/teams to discuss existing land use and Partially complied.compensation, etc. Teams and committees

do not meet regularly.TA has been providedto improve situation.

Loan Art. 3.04, No.2 GOI to use existing committees/teams to assess social and environmentalissues, etc. on local peoples.

Loan Art. 3.04, No.3 GOI to use existing committees/teams to advise on development ofsettlements. etc

Loan Art. 3.05 Project working group to be established Complied.

Loan Art. 3.06 Ensure settlement on site identified under project occurs in areas where In compliance for sitessuitability has been established. settled to date.

Loan Art. 5.01 (A) 165 of potential settlement sites for Part nI studies shall have been Complied.selected by Bina Program Pankim.

Loan Art. 5.01 (B) Aerial survey data and base maps for about 110 settlement sites Complied.completed by BAKOSURTANAL.

Loan Art. 5.01 (C) Consultant contracts for central technical support team (PLP) and Complied.technical advisory team (BAKOSURTANAL) shall have been signed.

Sch. I, para 3 No Phase Il/Phase Ill expenditures. No longer relevant.

Loan Sch. I, para 3 Aerial survey data and base maps for second third of settlement sitescompleted by BAKOSURTANAL.

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8. Use of Bank Resources

A. Staff Inputs (staffweeks)

LENP LENA LENN SPN PCR 1aL

1984 12.5 12.51985 22.9 49.0 8.5 80.41986 11.4 11.41987 19.3 19.31988 12.3 12.31989 18.1 18.11990 15.2 15.21991 9.5 9.51992 9.7 9.71993 2.0 22.9 24.91994 2.0 2.0

Total: 35.4 49.0 8.5 97.5 24.9 215.3

B. Missions

Special- Perform-Month/ No. of Days in ization ance Rate Types of

Year Persons Field Repres./a Status Lb Problems /c

Preparation 12/84 4 30 E,A,OAppraisal 11/94 6 3- E,A,OBoard Approval 06/85Supervision 09/85 1 27 E 3 F/M

12/86 6 30 E,A,O 3 F/M08/87 2 15 E,A 2 M05/88 2 28 E,A 2 F/M10/89 1 24 E 207/90 1 17 E 211/90 1 9 E 211/91 3 4 E,A,O 2

/a A = Agriculturalist; EG = Engineer, E = Economist; L = Loan Financing; FA =Financial Analyst; MP = Mapping.

/b 1 = No problems: 2 = Moderate problems; 3 = Major problems./c F = Financial; M = Managerial; LC = Loan Covenants; I = Implementation.

C. Project Costs(not available)

World Bank Document · SKP - Transmigration Area Development Unit ... TOR - Terms-of-Reference ......

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Transcript of World Bank Document · SKP - Transmigration Area Development Unit ... TOR - Terms-of-Reference ......