Widyatama.lecture.applied Networking.iv Week06 Mobile Security 2

8/9/2019 Widyatama.lecture.applied Networking.iv Week06 Mobile Security 2

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Applied Networking-IV (2231114)

Lecture Week-5

Mobile Security-1

1818--MarMar--1010 WidyatamaWidyatama UniversityUniversity--InformaticsInformatics 11

Lecture by:Lecture by: Djadja.SardjanaDjadja.Sardjana, S.T., M.M., S.T., M.M.www.slideshare.net/djadjawww.slideshare.net/djadja

[email protected]@widyatama.ac.id


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Mobile SecurityMobile Security--22

1818--MarMar--1010 Widyatama UniversityWidyatama University--InformaticsInformatics 22

MobileSecurity


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ContentsContents

Introduction to WirelessIntroduction to Wireless Wireless WorldWireless World

Wireless ThreatsWireless Threats

Wireless Security Protocols and CryptographyWireless Security Protocols and Cryptography Security Considerations for Wireless DevicesSecurity Considerations for Wireless Devices

Wireless Technologies and ApplicationsWireless Technologies and Applications Cellular NetworksCellular Networks

Wireless Data NetworksWireless Data Networks

Wireless Standards and TechnologiesWireless Standards and Technologies

-- 33 --

Implementing Wireless LANs : Security ConsiderationsImplementing Wireless LANs : Security Considerations Enabling Secure Wireless Access to DataEnabling Secure Wireless Access to Data

Real Examples from the Wireless WorldReal Examples from the Wireless World

The Wireless FutureThe Wireless Future

Accessing Wireless LANsAccessing Wireless LANs

1818--MarMar--1010 Widyatama UniversityWidyatama University--InformaticsInformatics


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Wireless World (1/2)Wireless World (1/2)

History of Wireless TechnologiesHistory of Wireless Technologies Transmitting the 1Transmitting the 1stst wireless radio signal in 1894 by G. Marconiwireless radio signal in 1894 by G. Marconi

AM radio sets in 1920s by GE, AT&T, RCAAM radio sets in 1920s by GE, AT&T, RCA TV, radio, phone took 20TV, radio, phone took 20--30 years to reach 25% of US population30 years to reach 25% of US population

After world war IIAfter world war II 1970s : 11970s : 1stst wireless networkswireless networks

analog, operated in a limited frequency range, only a low volume of simultaneous callsanalog, operated in a limited frequency range, only a low volume of simultaneous calls

AT&TAT&Ts Advanced Mobile Phone Service in 1979s Advanced Mobile Phone Service in 1979

GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications) standardGSM (Global System for Mobile Communications) standard

1980s : wireless markets start to evolve1980s : wireless markets start to evolve

1990s : wireless networks mature1990s : wireless networks mature 11stst commercial GSM networks in 1991 (2001, 800 M users)commercial GSM networks in 1991 (2001, 800 M users)

2G networks2G networks TDMA, CDMA, Personal Digital CommunicationsTDMA, CDMA, Personal Digital Communications

Wireless LAN standard (IEEE 802.11) in 1990Wireless LAN standard (IEEE 802.11) in 1990

-- 44 --

, , , ,, , , ,

Wireless Internet, WAP in 1997Wireless Internet, WAP in 1997 ObstaclesObstacles

Economics : e.g. wirelessEconomics : e.g. wireless--internetinternet--capable cell phones, high price Bluetooth chipsetscapable cell phones, high price Bluetooth chipsets

User experience : slow and inconvenienceUser experience : slow and inconvenience

Security : stock trading, access to corporate networksSecurity : stock trading, access to corporate networks

Market forecastMarket forecast Wireless LAN (more than $3B) vs. Bluetooth (less than $1B) in 2005Wireless LAN (more than $3B) vs. Bluetooth (less than $1B) in 2005



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Wireless Threats (1/2)Wireless Threats (1/2)

Uncontrolled TerrainUncontrolled Terrain Anonymous, uncontrolled coverage areasAnonymous, uncontrolled coverage areas

EavesdroppingEavesdropping Anonymous attacker passively intercepting radio signals and decoding the data beingAnonymous attacker passively intercepting radio signals and decoding the data being

transmittedtransmitted

Sensitive data such as username and password inSensitive data such as username and password in cleartextcleartext Password encryption algorithms such as MS NTLM can be easily brokenPassword encryption algorithms such as MS NTLM can be easily broken Active eavesdroppingActive eavesdropping ARP spoofing : manARP spoofing : man--inin--thethe--middle attackmiddle attack

Communications JammingCommunications Jamming DoSDoS jammingjamming Client jamming : jammed client loses connectivity and cannot access the applicationClient jamming : jammed client loses connectivity and cannot access the application Base station jamming : a rogue stands in for the legitimate base stationBase station jamming : a rogue stands in for the legitimate base station

Injection and Modification of DataInjection and Modification of Data Inserting commands (control messages) to a base stationInserting commands (control messages) to a base station ManMan--inin--thethe--Middle attackMiddle attack

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Rogue ClientRogue Client Rogue Network Access PointsRogue Network Access Points Attack AnonymityAttack Anonymity searching network to gain free anonymous accesssearching network to gain free anonymous access ClientClient--toto--Client AttacksClient Attacks Infrastructure Equipment AttacksInfrastructure Equipment Attacks bypassing virtual LAN security : switch, MAC, routingbypassing virtual LAN security : switch, MAC, routing

attacks (Open Shortest Path First, Enhanced Interior Gateway Routing Protocol)attacks (Open Shortest Path First, Enhanced Interior Gateway Routing Protocol)



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Wireless Threats (2/2)Wireless Threats (2/2)

Attacker EquipmentAttacker Equipment Wireless Network InterfaceWireless Network Interface

Wireless Ethernet NICWireless Ethernet NIC

General Packet Radio Service / Cellular Digital Packet Data cellular telephony handsetGeneral Packet Radio Service / Cellular Digital Packet Data cellular telephony handset

Jammer and specialized softwareJammer and specialized software Omnidirectional antennas (unity cainOmnidirectional antennas (unity cain --> collinear), yagi antenna, parabolic> collinear), yagi antenna, parabolic

Covert Wireless ChannelsCovert Wireless Channels Bridge airBridge air--gap networksgap networks

Roaming IssuesRoaming Issues Mobile IPMobile IP location registration and packet redirectionlocation registration and packet redirection

Replay attacks to capture outbound traffic from the networkReplay attacks to capture outbound traffic from the network

-- 77 --

CDMA/GSM cellular network, wireless Ethernet networksCDMA/GSM cellular network, wireless Ethernet networks

Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) cryptographic mechanism for 802.11cryptographic mechanism for 802.11 Implementation flaws, key management issues (single static key for all users)Implementation flaws, key management issues (single static key for all users)


Wi l S it P t l &Wi l S it P t l &


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Wireless Security Protocols &Wireless Security Protocols &Cryptography (1/5)Cryptography (1/5)

Removing the FUD (Fear, Uncertainty, Doubt) inRemoving the FUD (Fear, Uncertainty, Doubt) insolutionsolution

I m lI m l

Internet modelInternet model simplification of the OSIsimplification of the OSI

Wireless LAN security protocolsWireless LAN security protocols To improve 802.11 security mechanismsTo improve 802.11 security mechanisms

Most using security protocols that exist in the network layer andMost using security protocols that exist in the network layer andaboveabove

Cr to ra hCr to ra h

-- 88 --

Caesar Cipher (Plain text Cipher text)Caesar Cipher (Plain text Cipher text) Primary areas where cryptography is usedPrimary areas where cryptography is used

AuthenticationAuthentication

EncryptionEncryption

IntegrityIntegrity


Wi l S it P t l &Wi l S it P t l &


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Secure Sockets Layer / Transport Layer SecuritySecure Sockets Layer / Transport Layer Security SSLSSL

solution to the security problems with web browserssolution to the security problems with web browsers

successor of Ssuccessor of S}}

Other security protocolsOther security protocols Microsoft's Private Communications TechnologyMicrosoft's Private Communications Technology

Secure Transport Layer ProtocolsSecure Transport Layer Protocols

Wireless Transport layer SecurityWireless Transport layer Security

ApplicationsApplications SSL/TLS HTTP connectionSSL/TLS HTTP connection

-- 99 --

, , ., , .

SSL/TLS relies on TCP for the connection and the addition of the SSL/TLS does notSSL/TLS relies on TCP for the connection and the addition of the SSL/TLS does notchange the HTTP communication.change the HTTP communication.

HTTP over SSL/TLS is implemented over TCP port (443) not 80HTTP over SSL/TLS is implemented over TCP port (443) not 80

used to authenticate and encrypt a connectionused to authenticate and encrypt a connection

The authentication is accomplished by using publicThe authentication is accomplished by using public--key cryptography and is referred to askey cryptography and is referred to asa handshake.a handshake.

The actual communications using SSL/TLS use a symmetrical encryption algorithmThe actual communications using SSL/TLS use a symmetrical encryption algorithm


Wireless Security Protocols &Wireless Security Protocols &


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Secure Shell (SSH)Secure Shell (SSH) designed to replace Unix programs (telnet, rlogin,designed to replace Unix programs (telnet, rlogin, rshellrshell,, rcprcp))

much like SSL/TLSmuch like SSL/TLS

ublic ke to set u and s mmetric ke for data transferublic ke to set u and s mmetric ke for data transfer

implementation of SSH protocolimplementation of SSH protocol -- UnixUnix sshssh programprogram eliminate security concerns (sniffing, hijacking, injection) witheliminate security concerns (sniffing, hijacking, injection) with telenettelenet

port forwarding featureport forwarding feature

if not (SSH server + SSH tunnel to user), firewall is configured to only allow trafficif not (SSH server + SSH tunnel to user), firewall is configured to only allow traffic

from the insecure network to the SSH server (and then to Efrom the insecure network to the SSH server (and then to E--mail Server)mail Server) ManMan--inin--thethe--Middle of SSL/TLS and SSHMiddle of SSL/TLS and SSH

attackattack

intercept the handshake and replace the public keys exchanged with counterfeitsintercept the handshake and replace the public keys exchanged with counterfeits

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keyskeys

solutionsolution

Public Key Infrastructure with Certificate Authority (holding keyPublic Key Infrastructure with Certificate Authority (holding key--signing parties)signing parties)

testingtesting

''dsniffdsniff' can be used for testing applications using SSL/TLS and SSH for MITM' can be used for testing applications using SSL/TLS and SSH for MITM

attacksattacks




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WTLSWTLS based on SSL/TLS, used by WAP devices (handsets, PDAs)based on SSL/TLS, used by WAP devices (handsets, PDAs)

while SSL relies on TCP for reliability function (e.g., retransmission of lostwhile SSL relies on TCP for reliability function (e.g., retransmission of lostpackets), WAP devices using WTLS cannot use TCP; WAP devices only usepackets), WAP devices using WTLS cannot use TCP; WAP devices only use

..

3 classes negotiated during the handshake process3 classes negotiated during the handshake process

WTLS class 1 : No certificatesWTLS class 1 : No certificates

no authentication takes place, simply used to set up an encrypted channelno authentication takes place, simply used to set up an encrypted channel

WTLS class 2 : Server certificate onlyWTLS class 2 : Server certificate only

client (handset) authenticates the server (by firmware of the handset)client (handset) authenticates the server (by firmware of the handset) WTLS class 3 : Client and server certificatesWTLS class 3 : Client and server certificates

both; implementation of a PKIboth; implementation of a PKI

WTLS similar to SSL/TLS, as WML to HTML, for WAP devicesWTLS similar to SSL/TLS, as WML to HTML, for WAP devices

-- 1111 --

WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy)WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) included in 802.11included in 802.11

packet encrypted by generating an RC4 stream with a combination of 24packet encrypted by generating an RC4 stream with a combination of 24--bitbitinitialization vector and shared keyinitialization vector and shared key

WEP key can be compromised in a few hours.WEP key can be compromised in a few hours.

common key for all users on a given wireless networkcommon key for all users on a given wireless network




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802.1x802.1x layer 2 protocollayer 2 protocol

to authenticate users and can optionally be used to establish encryption keysto authenticate users and can optionally be used to establish encryption keys

IP SecIP Sec lower in the protocol stack than SSL/WTLS, SSH, or WTLS : IP layerlower in the protocol stack than SSL/WTLS, SSH, or WTLS : IP layer

tunnel modetunnel mode

enable all IP traffic to be encrypted and optionally authenticated inside a single sessionenable all IP traffic to be encrypted and optionally authenticated inside a single session

enabling technology behind VPNenabling technology behind VPN

ImplementationImplementation

Encapsulated Security Payload, Authentication HeaderEncapsulated Security Payload, Authentication Header

-- 1212 --

, ,, ,

authentication algorithm for AH : Message Digest 5, Secure Hash Algorithmauthentication algorithm for AH : Message Digest 5, Secure Hash Algorithm ModesModes

Transport mode : only encrypt data of the IP packetTransport mode : only encrypt data of the IP packet

Tunnel mode : encrypt entire packet including the headersTunnel mode : encrypt entire packet including the headers

IPSec VPN tunnel : VPN gateway + IPSec tunnel + remote userIPSec VPN tunnel : VPN gateway + IPSec tunnel + remote user


Security ConsiderationSecurity Consideration


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Security ConsiderationSecurity Considerationfor Wireless Devices (1/2)for Wireless Devices (1/2)

Security IssuesSecurity Issues DevicesDevices

laptop, PDA, wireless infrastructure (AP, bridge) mobile phone handsetlaptop, PDA, wireless infrastructure (AP, bridge) mobile phone handset

Physical securityPhysical security

oss o ev ceoss o ev ce --> oc> oc Information leakageInformation leakage

Device security featuresDevice security features

factory or master passwordsfactory or master passwords

Application securityApplication security

embedding passwords or keys into an applicationembedding passwords or keys into an application --> reverse> reverse--engineeringengineering

sensitive applicationsensitive application

Detailed Device AnalysisDetailed Device Analysis

-- 1313 --

ap opap op

loss of data encryption keys (e.g., wired equivalent privacy keys, soft tokens, passwords)loss of data encryption keys (e.g., wired equivalent privacy keys, soft tokens, passwords)

not store the keys on the machine; HIDS, personal firewall software; disabling boot up with CDnot store the keys on the machine; HIDS, personal firewall software; disabling boot up with CD

PDAPDA

poor password protection; input mechanisms (e.g., wireless, infrared port, USB, Bluetooth)poor password protection; input mechanisms (e.g., wireless, infrared port, USB, Bluetooth)

encrypt sensitive data (Elliptic Curve Cryptography)encrypt sensitive data (Elliptic Curve Cryptography)

1818--MarMar--1010 WidyatamaWidyatama UniversityUniversity--InformaticsInformatics

Security ConsiderationSecurity Consideration


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Security ConsiderationSecurity Considerationfor Wireless Devices (2/2)for Wireless Devices (2/2)

Detailed Device Analysis (cont.)Detailed Device Analysis (cont.)

Wireless InfrastructureWireless Infrastructure

disable security features (EAP, WEP) or reveal networkdisable security features (EAP, WEP) or reveal networkconfiguration informationconfiguration information

use secure protocols (SSH, SSL, SNMPv3); disable insecureuse secure protocols (SSH, SSL, SNMPv3); disable insecureprotocols (HTTP, SNMPv1)protocols (HTTP, SNMPv1)

HandsetHandset SMS handler vulnerable to attackSMS handler vulnerable to attack -->> DoSDoS or execution ofor execution of

commands; DES key for SIMcommands; DES key for SIM

-- 1414 --

WTLSWTLS



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Cellular Networks (1/4)Cellular Networks (1/4)

3 Methods for Spectrum Allocation : provides access to a given3 Methods for Spectrum Allocation : provides access to a givenfrequency for multiple usersfrequency for multiple users Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA)Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA) Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA)Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA)

FDMAFDMA used on the initial analog Advanced Mobile Phone System (AMPS)used on the initial analog Advanced Mobile Phone System (AMPS) available spectrum divided into channels; each channel used for a singleavailable spectrum divided into channels; each channel used for a single

conversationconversation FDMA assigns channels even if no conversations are taking placeFDMA assigns channels even if no conversations are taking place -- less efficientless efficient only for voice transmissiononly for voice transmission 2G wireless technologies2G wireless technologies

GSM : 80%, CDMA : 11%, PDC : 5%, traditional TDMA : 2%,GSM : 80%, CDMA : 11%, PDC : 5%, traditional TDMA : 2%, iDENiDEN : 1%: 1%

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digitizes the voice signal and turns the signal into a series of short packetsdigitizes the voice signal and turns the signal into a series of short packets uses a singleuses a single--frequency channel for a very short time and migrates to anotherfrequency channel for a very short time and migrates to another

channelchannel voice packets can occupy different time slots in different frequency ranges at thevoice packets can occupy different time slots in different frequency ranges at the

same timesame time digital signal, better frequency allocation, support for multiple data typesdigital signal, better frequency allocation, support for multiple data types Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) basisGlobal System for Mobile Communications (GSM) basis



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C ll l N k ( / )C ll l N k ( / )


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Security ThreatsSecurity Threats Network Operator's Security GoalsNetwork Operator's Security Goals Authentication, Privacy, Data and voice integrity, PerformanceAuthentication, Privacy, Data and voice integrity, Performance

Security Risks and ThreatsSecurity Risks and Threats Network and systems availability (Network and systems availability (DoSDoS), Physical protection, Fraud (cloned or pirated handsets)), Physical protection, Fraud (cloned or pirated handsets)

Types of Cellular FraudTypes of Cellular Fraud theft of handsets, sign up for services using false id, handset cloning,theft of handsets, sign up for services using false id, handset cloning,

Combating FraudCombating Fraud encryption (Electronic Serial Number), blacklist (track the ESNs of stolen phones), traffic analysis, legislationencryption (Electronic Serial Number), blacklist (track the ESNs of stolen phones), traffic analysis, legislation

General Security PrinciplesGeneral Security Principles EncryptionEncryption -- size of key : 56size of key : 56--bit in DESbit in DES

GSMGSM handsets with SIM card (smart card with 32K/64K EEPROM)handsets with SIM card (smart card with 32K/64K EEPROM) base transceiver stationbase transceiver station base station controllerbase station controller mobile switching centermobile switching center

-- 1717 --

home location register / visitor location registerhome location register / visitor location register operating and maintenance centeroperating and maintenance center

GSM securityGSM security authentication algorithm for handset (A3)authentication algorithm for handset (A3) block cipher algorithm to encrypt voice and data (A5/1 or A5/2)block cipher algorithm to encrypt voice and data (A5/1 or A5/2) key generation algorithm (A8)key generation algorithm (A8)


C ll l N k (4/4)C ll l N k (4/4)


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CDMACDMA a 64a 64--bit symmetric key (called Abit symmetric key (called A--Key) for authentication, no SIM cardKey) for authentication, no SIM card why not public keyswhy not public keys -- hardware limitation, infrastructure requirementshardware limitation, infrastructure requirements AuthenticationAuthentication

encryption algorithm CAVE (cellular authentication and voice encryption)encryption algorithm CAVE (cellular authentication and voice encryption) ---- ,,

stepssteps commence a call; MSC retrieve subscriber info from HLR, MSC generates 24commence a call; MSC retrieve subscriber info from HLR, MSC generates 24--bit random number for unique challengebit random number for unique challenge

(RANDU); RANDU is transmitted to the phone, phone generate 18(RANDU); RANDU is transmitted to the phone, phone generate 18--bit AUTHU, MSC calculates AUTU which shouldbit AUTHU, MSC calculates AUTU which shouldmatchmatch

ConfidentialityConfidentiality 6464--bit Signaling Message Encryption Key (SMEKEY)bit Signaling Message Encryption Key (SMEKEY)

ShortcomingsShortcomings no mutual authenticationno mutual authentication poor security algorithms (replacing CAVE with SHApoor security algorithms (replacing CAVE with SHA--1)1) no consistent SIM card mechanism on handset for key storageno consistent SIM card mechanism on handset for key storage voice encryption not alwaysvoice encryption not always

-- 1818 --1818--MarMar--1010 Widyatama UniversityWidyatama University--InformaticsInformatics

Wi l D t N t k (1/3)Wi l D t N t k (1/3)


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Wireless Data Networks (1/3)Wireless Data Networks (1/3)

General DemandsGeneral Demands faster throughputfaster throughput more global roaming capabilitiesmore global roaming capabilities interoperability with internetinteroperability with internet

Wireless Data NetworksWireless Data Networks Cellular Digital Packet Data (CDPD)Cellular Digital Packet Data (CDPD) MobitexMobitex General packet Radio Service (GPRS)General packet Radio Service (GPRS)

Cellular Digital Packet Data (CDPD)Cellular Digital Packet Data (CDPD) standard developed in US in 1990sstandard developed in US in 1990s

offering wireless data services using AMPS (Advanced Mobile Phone Service) infrastructureoffering wireless data services using AMPS (Advanced Mobile Phone Service) infrastructure

advantagesadvantages speed (19.2 Kbps), TCP/IP based (compatible with Internet), quick call setupspeed (19.2 Kbps), TCP/IP based (compatible with Internet), quick call setup

architecturearchitecture similar to wireless voice networkssimilar to wireless voice networks mobile end system ... mobile database stationsmobile end system ... mobile database stations -- mobile data intermediate systemmobile data intermediate system -- Internet (firewall)Internet (firewall)

-- 1919 --

similar to wireless voice network (CDMA) : unique id called NEI (Network Entity Identifier)similar to wireless voice network (CDMA) : unique id called NEI (Network Entity Identifier) no tamperno tamper--resistant hardware such as SIMresistant hardware such as SIM DiffieDiffie--Hellman key exchangeHellman key exchange vulnerabilitiesvulnerabilities

no mutual authentication, local key storage (no SIM to store NEI)no mutual authentication, local key storage (no SIM to store NEI)




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Wireless Data Networks (2/3)Wireless Data Networks (2/3)

MobitexMobitex wireless data technology developed by Ericsson inwireless data technology developed by Ericsson in

1980s1980s operate n one o 4 requency am es 80 z, 400 z, 800 z, 900 zoperate n one o 4 requency am es 80 z, 400 z, 800 z, 900 z

8Kbps rate, 5128Kbps rate, 512--bytpe block transmissionbytpe block transmission royaltyroyalty--free licensefree license

architecturearchitecture peerpeer--toto--peer ... base stationpeer ... base station -- local switchlocal switch -- regional switchregional switch -- national switch /national switch /

InternetInternet

application of the network : Blackberry wireless eapplication of the network : Blackberry wireless e--mail pager offered by Canadianmail pager offered by Canadian--based Research inbased Research inMotion (RIM)Motion (RIM)

-- 2020 --

RIM device (32RIM device (32--bit Intel 386 processor, 2MB flashbit Intel 386 processor, 2MB flash memmem, 304Kb static RAM) security, 304Kb static RAM) security

model focused on MS outlook & Lotus cc:Mailmodel focused on MS outlook & Lotus cc:Mail

RIM security architectureRIM security architecture desktopdesktop -- mail servermail server -- firewallfirewall -- InternetInternet -- mobile network ... RIM handheldmobile network ... RIM handheld

MobitexMobitex vs. CDPD (vs. CDPD (MobitexMobitex will outlast CDPD)will outlast CDPD)

network infrastructure (eliminating AMPS hardware), strong industry associationnetwork infrastructure (eliminating AMPS hardware), strong industry association((MobitexMobitex Operators Association led by Ericsson), greater coverageOperators Association led by Ericsson), greater coverage




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Wireless Data Networks (3/3)Wireless Data Networks (3/3)General Packet Radio Service (GPRS)General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) GSM developed in 1990sGSM developed in 1990s

packetpacket--basedbased compatibility with the Internetcompatibility with the Internet alwaysalways--on connectionon connection

higher throughputhigher throughput use many time slots in paralleluse many time slots in parallel data split into chunks and sent simultaneously on multiple channels to a handsetdata split into chunks and sent simultaneously on multiple channels to a handset

handsetshandsets Class A terminal (support GPRS and GSM and the simultaneousClass A terminal (support GPRS and GSM and the simultaneous operation)operation)

Class B terminal (support GPRS and GSM but not simultaneously)Class B terminal (support GPRS and GSM but not simultaneously) Class C terminal (only GPRS)Class C terminal (only GPRS)

architecturearchitecture base stationbase station -- base station controllerbase station controller -- SGSNSGSN -- HLR / GGSNHLR / GGSN -- InternetInternet

-- 2121 --

GGSN : gateway GPRS Support NodeGGSN : gateway GPRS Support Node other network components : charging gateway, border gateway, DNSother network components : charging gateway, border gateway, DNS,, firewall andfirewall and NMSNMS

security issuessecurity issues DDoSoS against GGSNagainst GGSN IP address spoofingIP address spoofing GGSNGGSN -- InternetInternet -- VPN serverVPN server -- corporate LANcorporate LAN

not endnot end--toto--end security(SGSNend security(SGSN--GGSN), added cost(VPN), trust issue (enterpriseGGSN), added cost(VPN), trust issue (enterprise -- mobilemobileoperator)operator)



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Conclusion & Final WordsConclusion & Final Words

1818--MarMar--1010 Widyatama UniversityWidyatama University--InformaticsInformatics 2222

MobileSecurity

Demo


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ConclusionConclusion

Threats to organizations are real andThreats to organizations are real and

ncreas ng, seam ess mo y requ resncreas ng, seam ess mo y requ rescareful security planningcareful security planning

Security incidents involving mobile andSecurity incidents involving mobile andwireless environment are increasingwireless environment are increasing

holistic approach that address people,holistic approach that address people,processprocess andand technologytechnology

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Widyatama.lecture.applied Networking.iv Week06 Mobile Security 2

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