“What unites men is not well-being, but suffering”

-- Carlos Alberto Mesquita, “O Professor”

Founding member of the Comando Vermelho

Benjamin Lessing

Prison-Based Criminal Syndicates:A New Species of Organized Crime?

• May 2006: Rebellions in 64 prisons. 274 hostages.• Police rush to aid prison guards.• Attacks on police stations and guard towers. 46 police

killed. • Police retreat to defend their HQ

Two Illustrative Incidents: The PCC

• Across the capital, bombings and bus burnings along thoroughfares.

• City is brought to a halt.

• PCC leader Marcola allowed to meet with his lawyer. State “negotiates”; doesn’t “accede”.

• After meeting, attacks stop abruptly.• 2 more waves within 3 months.

Level of Drug Market Organization

Low Middle High

Fragmented <--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------->

Organized { Range of Observed Variation in 9 Communities }

“Micro Drug Dealers”

(Non-slum urban areas)

RC2 RC1------> RC3-------------------------------------------

> SP1 SP3 <--------------------------SP2 POA1 <------POA2

<------------------------------------POA3

CV, TC, ADA etc.(Rio de Janeiro)

SP1-3, POA1-3, RC1-3 = Communities studied in São Paulo, Porto Alegre, and RecifeCV = Comando Vermelho, TC=Terceiro Comando, ADA=Amigos dos Amigos

Why was CV able to dominate and consolidate Rio’s drug market when other groups couldn’t?

History of CV provides examples of benefits of prison dominance:

• Mutual aid / risk pooling

• Decentralized command structure

• Coordination and Cooperation via mechanism for rewarding/punishing members once outside prison. Motivation for model

The Centrality of Prison Dominance

A Simple Model of Syndicate ExpansionSetting:

• A group of n syndicate members break out of prison at the same time.

• Each player commits a crime yielding profit YGame:

1. Each player i contribute profit to syndicate (S) or not (~S)

2. Outcome of round 1 affects syndicate strength (α);

3. Nature moves: each player may be recaptured with prob. Pj

jail

~jail

~jail

pj

jail

1-pj

1-pj

pj

Contribute

i S

~Contribute

i S

J + αB

J + αR + Y

αθF

αθR + Y

N

i

Payoffs: U(S) = pj(J+ αB) + (1-pj)(αθF); U(~S) = pj(J+ αR) + (1-pj)(αθR) + Y

n.b. R<<J<0<B<F; 0<α, θ<1

A Simple Model of Syndicate Expansion – 2/5

Payoffs: U(S) = pj(J+ αB) + (1-pj)(αθF); U(~S) = pj(J+ αR) + (1-pj)

(αθR) + Y

n.b. R<<J<0<B<F;

0<α, θ<1

• J = (dis)utility of imprisonment; F = future stream of benefits from

membership

• B = benefits syndicate provides in prison; R = retribution for non-

contribution

• θ is a fixed multiplier, reflects syndicates’ reduced power outside

prison

• α varies according to outcome of game (i.e. share σ that contribute)

A Simple Model of Syndicate Expansion – 3/5

A Simple Model of Syndicate Expansion – 5/5

Comparative Statics:

• σ * is decreasing in α0 → rising syndicate strength means lower threshold for contribution

• σ * is decreasing in B → better benefits for prisoners means lower threshold for contribution

• σ * is increasing in Y → increased profitability of outside activity increases incentives for defection → basis for modeling schism of CV after drug trade became highly profitable?

• σ * is decreasing in pj

→ higher perceived chance of jail increases bite of syndicate threats and rewards → better policing increases syndicate’s power !?

Empirical Fit:“Of the original core members… two were executed in the street, after escaping from

Ilha Grande, because they refused to share the profits of crime with the Comando Vermelho.” (Amorim 2003)

“Prison Insurance”: a Different Route to Expansion?PCC 2006: reliance on young non-member recruits to carry out

individual attacks under orders from released senior members (Phillips 2006).

Amorim: incentive not $$ but “prison insurance” – promise of benefits in future (when and if jailed).

•Adapt model to this issue?

•Increase of pj swamped by rise in

B?•“Outside benefits” (F)? • If viable, great recruitment tactic•Low opportunity costs, increased policing raise syndicate strength

CV Post-expansion phase:

• Dominance of drug trade / Entrenchment in favelas• New locus of power• Self-sustaining accumulation of strategic resources (Lessing

2005)• Drug bosses gain autonomy• Schisms and new syndicates emerge• Incentives to defection / non-cooperation rise

→ Prison reward/retribution mechanism remains essential for coordination and cooperation

• Most elders remain in prison• Election of “President”, “Vice-President” and outside

“Refernce Point”

Further Uses of Prison Dominance

Conclusions

• Rule of law: Prison as “brown area”. (O’Donnell)

• Transformation of prison into HQ (Misse 2002).

• “Prison trap”? Increase in policing raises

• Counterproductivity of hard-line approach (PSDB-SP).

Prison Pop. up 300% in 12 years → 100,000 new members

• Prison-Based Syndicates as replicable “technology” (Fearon and Laitin 2003)

The PCC’s Ledger