Bueno de Mesquita 2005

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The Quality of TerrorAuthor(s): Ethan Bueno de MesquitaSource: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Jul., 2005), pp. 515-530Published by: Midwest Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3647729.

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h e u a l i t y o e r r o rEthanBuenode Mesquita Washingtonniversity

Ipresent modelof the interactionetween government, terroristrganization,ndpotential erroristolunteersnwhich, sa result fanendogenoushoice,ndividuals ith owability r ittleeducationremost ikelyovolunteero ointheterroristrganization. owever,he terroristrganizationcreenshe volunteersorquality.Consequently,he modelis consistentwithtwoseemingly ontradictorympiricalindings.Actual erroristperativesrenotpooror lackingneducation. ndyetlackofeconomicpportunityndrecessionaryconomiesrepositivelyorrelated ithterrorism. hemodel lsoendogenizesheeffect fgovernmentounterterrorismnmobilization. overnmentrackdownsave ompetingeffectsnmobilization:heydecreaseheability f erroristsocarry uteffectivettacksmakingmobilizationess ttractive),andthey oment deologicalppositiono thegovernmentnd mpose egativeconomicxternalitiesmakingmobilizationmoreattractive). hisprovidesonditions nderwhich overnmentrackdownsncreaserdecreasemobilization.

Our biggestproblem is the hordesof young menwho beat on our doors,clamoringto be sent. It isdifficultto selectonly a few. Those whom we turnawayreturnagainandagain,pesteringus,pleadingto beaccepted.

-A senior member of Hamas as reportedby Hassan (2001)

long research tradition in political scienceargues that both ideological and economicfactors are important determinants of vio-lent mobilization (e.g., Gurr 1970; Lichbach 1989;Muller and Seligson 1987). Surprisingly, empiricalfindings demonstrate that terrorist operatives tendnot to be from societies' worst-off socioeconomic

groups (Berrebi 2003; Krueger and Maleckova 2003;Russell and Miller 1977). Terrorists, rather, have levelsof educationalattainment that are at or slightlyabovethesocietal mean and are less likely to live in poverty thanthe averageperson. Kruegerand Maleckova(2002, 2003)claim that this casts serious doubt on the strengthof thecausalinfluence of economic conditions on mobilization.In this article, I suggest an alternativeexplanation. Ter-roristorganizationsscreen volunteers and select the mostcompetent to become operatives.If screeningtakesplace,one cannot reach conclusions about the composition ofthe pool of those who are willing to become terroristsby

studying only those who actually do become terrorists.Building on this idea I argue that the relativelyhigh lev-els of educational attainment and economic opportunitythatcharacterize erroristoperatives,andavarietyof otherempirical findings, can be better explainedwith a modelthat takesboth ideology and economics seriously as de-terminantsof mobilization.Ipresentamodel of the interactionbetweenagovern-ment, aterroristorganization,and apopulation of terror-ist sympathizersin which education or economic oppor-tunity, and opposition to the governmentplayimportantroles in determiningwhether an individualvolunteers tojoin a terroristgroup. In particular,as a result of an en-dogenous choice between economic activityand terroristmobilization, individualswith low abilityor little educa-tion (and consequentlyfew economic opportunities) andstrongantigovernmentdispositions aremost likelyto vol-unteer to become terrorists.However,the terroristorga-nization wants to recruit only the most effective, highlyskilledterrorists.This is because higher ability,bettered-ucatedpeople aremorelikelyto succeedat the demandingtasks requiredof a terroristoperative. Consequently theterroristorganizationscreensthe volunteers.This model is consistent with a variety of empiricalfindings. It explains Russelland Miller's(1977), Kruegerand Maleckova's (2003), and Berrebi's (2003) discov-eries regarding the socioeconomic origins of terrorist

EthanBueno de Mesquita s assistantprofessorof politicalscience,CB 1063,WashingtonUniversity,1 BrookingsDrive,St. Louis,MO63130 ([email protected]).I havebenefitedfrom the comments of ScottAshworth,ClaudeBerrebi,Mia Bloom, BruceBuenode Mesquita,EricDickson,AmandaFriedenberg,David AndrewSinger,MatthewStephenson,and seminarparticipantsat New YorkUniversity,Princeton, he UniversityofCalifornia nstituteon GlobalConflictandCooperation,andWashingtonUniversity.All errorsaremy own.AmericanJournalofPolitical Science,Vol.49, No. 3, July2005, Pp.515-530?2005 by the MidwestPoliticalScienceAssociation ISSN0092-5853

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516 ETHANBUENODEMESQUITA

operatives.Further,ahypothesis derivedfrom this model,that does not follow from the alternative heory that eco-nomics are not an important determinant of terrorism,is that economic contractions will be associated with in-creased violence because decreased economic opportu-nity will make more people willing to mobilize and willincrease the pool of high-quality recruits.This is consis-tent with recent empirical findings that show that eco-nomic downturns are correlatedwith increasesin terror-ism (Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana2004; Drakos andGofas 2004; Honaker2004).The model also addresses the impact of govern-ment crackdowns on mobilization. The government en-gages in crackdownsin orderto preventterrorist attacks.These counterterrorist crackdowns have competing ef-fects. They decreasethe ability of terrorists to carry outeffective attacks.However,they also ideologicallyinflameand impose negative economic externalities on the ter-rorists'sympathizers, making individualsmore willing tomobilize.' The government faces a trade-off; it must bal-ance the securitybenefits of counterterrorismagainstthecosts in terms of mobilizing potential terrorists.

By explicitlymodeling the mobilization decision andthe effects of counterterrorism,I provide an endogenousexplanationof conditions under whichgovernmentcoun-terterror crackdowns will increase or decrease terroristmobilization. This allows me to address the variance thatexistsin empiricalcases of mobilization responsesto gov-ernment crackdowns (Crenshaw 1991; Francisco 1995;Ross and Gurr 1989).

The model also has implications for the compositionof spending byterroristorganizations,when governmentsmight adopt overlyorunderlystringentcounterterrorismpolicies, and whether economic development aidpoliciesarelikelyto reduce the threat of terrorism.

EmpiricalRegularitiesandCompetingModelsRecent empiricalwork has offered new insight into howvarious factors impact mobilization for terroristorgani-zations. As mentioned, Kruegerand Maleckova (2003)and Berrebi(2003) reportthat the terroristoperativesas-sociated with severalMiddle Eastern erroristgroupstendnot to be from the lowest socioeconomic groups. Rather,terrorists have averageor even slightly better than aver-age educations and are lesslikelyto live below the povertyline than the population in general.This finding is consis-tent with earlierstudies of the composition of Europeanterroristorganizations (Russelland Miller 1977).

Kruegerand Maleckovaalsoexaminesurveydata thatmeasuressupport for terrorismamong Palestinians.Theyfind that support for suicide bombings is more or lessconstant across socioeconomic groups, which they arguesupports the contention that economics is not a majorcausal factor in terrorist mobilization.

While Kruegerand Maleckova mention the possibil-ity that terrorist organizations select for high-skill oper-atives, they favor a different interpretationof their data.They arguethat economic deprivation is not a major de-terminant of terroristmobilization, writing:

A careful review of the evidence provides littlereason for optimism that a reduction in povertyor an increase in educational attainment would,by themselves,meaningfullyreduce internationalterrorism. Any connection between poverty,education, and terrorism is indirect, compli-cated, and probably quite weak. (Krueger andMaleckova2002)

And, indeed, theyadvisepolicymakers o bewareof pursu-ing policies of economic development in the hopes of cur-tailing terroristviolence (Kruegerand Maleckova 2002,2003). This argument has gained considerable currencyin the press and policy circles. For instance, the notedeconomist RobertBarro,writing in BusinessWeek, tatedthe following based on Kruegerand Maleckova'swork: itis naive to think that increases in income and educationwill, by themselves,lowerinternational terrorism Barro2002).Other relevantevidence on the relationshipbetweeneconomics and terrorism is discussedby both Blomberg,Hess,andWeerapana 2004) andDrakos andGofas(2004)who report that economic contractions are positivelycorrelated with increased terrorist violence.2 Similarly,Honaker (2004), in the firststudyto disaggregateCatholicand Protestantdata,reportsthat increases n Catholicun-employment lead to increases n Republicanviolence andincreases in Protestant unemployment lead to increasesin Loyalistviolence.Another relevant empirical fact has to do with thevariable effect of government crackdowns on mobiliza-tion in support of terror (Crenshaw 1991; Francisco1995;Ross and Gurr1989). In differentsituations, crack-downs can increaseor decreasesuchsupport.For nstance,Israeli counter terror measures such as border closingsand bombings have inflamed Palestinianpublic opinion

1DeNardo 1985, especially232-35) providesa relateddiscussion.

2Both of these studies examine economic conditionsin the targetcountry.Inthe latterstudythe majorityof incidentsare domestic.Thus,the terroristsaresubject o the economic conditionswithinthe targetcountry.



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relationship implies that the expected level of economicdamage is strictlyincreasingin the extent of governmentcrackdowns.The sympathizershave to decide whether to engagein economic activity or volunteer for the terroristorga-nization. A sympathizer i is characterizedby his or hertype Oi IR+.Thetypesaredistributedaccordingto somecontinuous, strictlyincreasingcdf 6(-). I assume that thedistribution of types among the sympathizers s the sameas the distribution of types among the population as awhole. While this is clearlyasimplifyingassumption, sup-port isprovidedbythe findingsof KruegerandMaleckova(2003), who report that the level of support for terror-ism among Palestinians s constant acrosssocioeconomicgroups. Below I discuss the implications for the model ifthis assumption is relaxed.

Type is positively correlated with economic oppor-tunity. It can be thought of as innate ability,educationalattainment, or some combination of these and other fac-tors. The key assumption is that an individual's type ispositivelycorrelatedboth with economic opportunityandwith the abilityto carryout the difficult and often compli-cated tasks associated with being a terrorist.The realismof this assumption is discussed in detail below.An individual i gains utility from engaging in eco-nomic activity given by:

Ui = (1 - T(a))f(y, Oi),wheref(.) is increasing,concave in y and 0i, and repre-sents the utility from economic gains. y is a parameterthat accounts for factors-beyond personal characteris-tics (0i) and the effects of government crackdowns(T7)-that influence economic opportunity, such as the generalstate of the economy. I further assume that f(y, 0) =0 for all y. That is, the absolutely lowest ability people(0 = 0) have no economic opportunity.An individualreceives two types of benefits from be-coming a terrorist.The first is an ideological benefit hav-ing to do with fighting back againsta regime blamed forthe loss of freedom, dignity,and rights.This benefit is anincreasingfunction of government crackdownsgiven bye(a), where e(.) is positive for all a and e'(.) > 0. This cap-tures the idea that crackdownscan ideologically inflamesympathizersagainstthe government.4The second benefit an individual receives from join-ing a terrorist organization is a function of his or hereffectiveness and success as a terrorist. In particular, n-

dividualshave a greaterpreferencefor being a terroristifthey are likely to be successful at furthering the organi-zation'sgoals or if they have a chance of being promotedwithin the organization (Adams 1987). Further,terror-ist operativesare often financiallycompensated by terrororganizations. Such compensation is also likely to be in-creasingin ability(this is exploredin greaterdepth later).I also assume that the expected payoff from success as aterrorist is decreasing in the level of government coun-terterror.The greaterthe level of counterterror,the lesslikely any individual is to carry out successful attacks.Consequently,this payoff is given by u(a, Oi),where u(.)is nonnegative for all a and 0, a > 0, ~


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Remark 1. The amount of resources hat the terrororga-nization devotes o terrorism r*) is increasingn thequalityof theoperatives 0).The proof is in the appendix.Given the solution to the maximization problemIcanalso identify which volunteers the terroristorganizationwill accept. The higher the quality of the operatives thegreater he impactof the campaignof violence. This is trueboth becauseof the direct effect ofhavingmore skillfulop-erativesandbecause,asshown in remark(1), the terroristorganizationinvests more resources n terrorismwhen theoperativesareof higher ability.This second effect also in-creases the terrororganization'sopportunity costs. Theseincreasedcosts notwithstanding, the terror organizationwill take the highest qualityvolunteers available.Remark2. Theterroristorganizationchooses he highestabilityvolunteersavailable.The proof is in the appendix.Theterroristoperativeschosen will be thebestamongthe willing volunteers. Further,the amount of resourcesallocated to violence by the terrorist organization is in-creasing in the quality of the operatives. Consequently,the model implies that the level of terrorist violence isincreasingin the level of mobilization.

MobilizationHavingfound the terroristorganization'sbest responses,Inow turn to the sympathizerswho must chose whether tovolunteer for the terroristorganization or remain activein the normal economy. A sympathizer,i, will volunteerfor the terroristorganizationif and only if U' > Ue. Thisis true when:

e(a) + u(a, Oi)> (1 - 7(a))f(y, Oi) (2)Equation (2) implicitly defines a cut-point (0*) intypespacewherebyllsympathizershohaveabilityOiless than 0* will volunteer for the terroristorganization.The set of volunteers, then, is defined by (0 *).This factis recorded in the next remark.

Remark 3. There exists a cut-point, 0 , such that onlysympathizerswithOi< O*mobilize.Therefore,owerabilityandless-educatedpeoplelow0i) aremore ikely ovolunteerfor a terroristorganization.The proof is in the appendix.Equation(2) also revealshow mobilization is affectedby changes in various parameters.An increase in an indi-vidual'sideological motivation (e(.)) makesvolunteeringmore attractive.Further,a downturn in generaleconomicconditions (y) leads to increased mobilization by mak-

ing economic activity less attractive.I summarize theseresults below.Remark 4. Greater deologicalmotivation (higher e(.))and economicdownturns(lowery ) increasemobilization.Proof. Theproof is immediate from the argumentin thetext and Equation (2). 0

The final question that has to be answered beforeanalyzing the government's strategyis how governmentcrackdowns affect mobilization. RewritingEquation (2)shows that an individual mobilizes only if

G(a, Oi) = e(a) + u(a, Oi) - (1 - 7(a))f(y, Oi) > 0Taking the derivative of G with respect to the level ofgovernment crackdown (a) yields:

8G 8u= e'(a) + + T'(a) f(y, Oi)aa aaIncreasing counterterror has three effects on mobiliza-tion. The first term (e'(a) > 0) representsthe increasein ideological anger against the government that followscrackdowns.The second term (- u< 0) represents he de-terrent effect of counterterror.The greater the level ofcounterterror he more difficult it is for a terroristto carryout an effective attack.The third term (T'(a)f(y, 0i) >0) represents the effect of government crackdowns oneconomic opportunity. Because crackdowns can imposenegativeeconomic externalities,they decrease the oppor-tunity costsof mobilization, thereby makingmobilizationmore attractive.Thus, counterterror increases mobiliza-tion only iflo:

8ue'(a)+ T'(a) (y,0i) > a(3)aaGovernmentcrackdowns can lead to eitherincreasedor decreased mobilization. Crackdowns increase mobi-lization if the marginal effects on economic opportunityand ideology are greaterthan the marginal effect on the'01n omecircumstances,ncreased ounterterroright mproveeconomic onditions atherhan mposing egativeconomic x-ternalities. his couldbe true f, forexample, ounterterrore-creases ttacks ndtherebyncreasesnvestmentn a regionor ifthe counterterrortrategys not one thatdisruptshe economy(suchasblockingerroristinancing).f thisis true,thenT'(a)is negativer zerorather hanpositive.nthis casecounterterrorincreasesmobilizationnlyif e'(a) > -T'(a)f(y, Oi) 2. Thegovernmenttillfacesa trade-off, owevert is now more ikelythatcrackdownsilldecreasemobilization.onetheless,heothermainclaimsof themodelstillgo through, s thestructuref thearguments unchanged.focuson thecasewhere conomic x-ternalitiesrenegativeecausebelieve his sdescriptivefmanyprotractederroristonflicts.However,t isimportanto see hat tisnot essentialor heother esults f themodel ohold.



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THEQUALITYOFTERROR 521

ability of terroriststo carryout effective attacks.Other-wise they decreasemobilization.This is an intuitive feature of this model that has notexistedin previousmodels of governmentpolicy and mo-bilization. By endogenizing mobilization and examiningsecurity gains, economic externalities,and ideological ef-fects of counterterrorism,the model capturesthe possi-bility that government crackdowns can cause either anincrease or a decreasein mobilization. This result is sum-marized in the following remark.Remark 5. Governmentcrackdowns ncrease mobiliza-tion if the marginalimpactson economicopportunityandideologyarelargerelative othemarginal mpactonsecurity.Otherwise,crackdownsdecreasemobilization.Proof: The proof follows from Equation (3). U

Having solved for the effect of counterterrorcrack-downs on mobilization, it is also possible to identify theimpact of crackdowns on the level of resources investedin terror. An increase in counterterror has two com-peting effects on the level of resources that the terrororganization invests in violence. On the one hand, in-creasedcrackdownsdecrease the marginalbenefit of in-vestment by decreasingthe ability of terrorists to carryout effective attacks. On the other hand, if crackdownsincrease mobilization, then the quality of operatives isimproved which, according to remark (1), increases in-vestment. Hence, if crackdownsdecreasemobilization orif the effect of increasedmobilization is more than com-pensated for by the increase in the difficulty of carry-ing out effectiveattacks,then counterterrorismdecreasesthe amount of resources committed to terror.However,if crackdowns increasemobilization and the positive ef-fect on investment of increased mobilization is greaterthan the negative effect on investment of an increase inthe difficulty for terroriststo carryout effective attacks,then crackdowns increase the amount of resources de-voted to terror.This resultis summarizedin the followingremark.Remark6. Ifcrackdowns ecreasemobilization, hentheyalso decrease he amount of resourcesnvested n terror. fcrackdowns ncreasemobilization,then their effecton re-sources nvestedin terrorcan bepositive or negative. Thisdependson whether the negative effect of crackdownsoninvestmentthrougha decrease n the abilityof terrorists ocarryout effectiveattacks sgreateror lessthan thepositiveeffectof crackdownson investmentthroughan increase nmobilization.The proof is in the appendix.

CounterterrorismPolicyThe governmentengagesin crackdowns in order to mini-mize the impactof violence. In particular he governmentsolves the following maximization problem:

max -v(r, 0, a) - k(a)aDropping the argumentsforeaseof readingand solv-

ing for the first-orderconditions yields the following:av 3v dr*a ar*aao aO* av av ar* k3a ar* 8) + k'(a)= 0 (4)Increasingthe levelof crackdownshas severaleffects.The first term in equation (4) representsthe benefit de-rived by the government from decreasing the ability ofterroriststo carryout effective attacks.The second term-a ) reflects the fact that an increase in governmentcrackdowns changes the terrorist organization's incen-tive to invest in terror.As shown in remark (6) this ef-fect on investment can be positive or negative.The third

term (-a (a- 4+-~ -)) representsthe effect of an in-crease in counterterrorismon mobilization. A change inmobilization (1a) changes

the quality of recruitswhichchanges the quality of terroristoperatives ( ). This, inturn, has two effects. First, there is a direct effect onthe level of violence (a- > 0). Second, a change in thequality of terrorist operatives changes the willingness ofthe terrorist organization to invest resources in terror-ism (-ar- > 0). Whether this total effect increases ordecreases the government's utility depends on whethercrackdowns increaseor decrease mobilization. The finalterm representsthe opportunity costs to the governmentof resourcesdevoted to counterterror.

Recallfrom remark(5) that the effect of a crackdownon mobilization ( ) can be positiveor negativedepend-ing on the relative mpactof crackdownson the economy,ideology, and security.If the marginalsecurity impact isgreaterthan the marginal economic and ideological im-pacts then crackdownsdecreasemobilization.The government is uncertainof the magnitude of theeconomic impact of crackdowns.7(a) is a random vari-able. Consequently, the government makes its decisionwith respect to the expected level of mobilization for agiven level of crackdowns,? (a). Thismeans that in Equa-tion (4) the term representingthe effect of crackdownson mobilization ( a*) is actuallythe expectedeffect. If thegovernment'sestimate of the economic effects of crack-downs (- (a)) is incorrect, then its estimate of the effecton mobilization will also be mistaken.



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The government, in choosing its level of countert-error,balances marginal benefits and marginal costs. Inthe case wherecrackdowns are expected to decreasemo-bilization the only costs associated with an increase incrackdowns are the opportunity costs (k(a)). This is be-cause, if crackdownsdecreasemobilization, all the effectsof increasingcounterterroraregood for the government;it decreases the ability of terrorists to carry out effec-tive attacks,decreases investment in terrorby the terror-ist organization and decreasesmobilization. However,ifcrackdowns ead to more mobilization, then there aread-ditional costs associated with counterterrorism.In par-ticular,when crackdownsareexpected to increasemobi-lization, the governmentchooses a level of crackdowns sothat the expectedmarginalbenefits (the decreasedabilityof terrorists to carryout effective attacksand a possibledecrease in investment in terrorism by the terrorist or-ganization) equal the expected marginalcosts (increasedmobilization and a possible increase in investment in ter-rorismbythe terroristorganization).Thatis, crackdownshave both positiveandnegative impact on the terror cam-paign. The government chooses a level of counterterror-ism to minimize the overall impact of terroristviolenceand the opportunity costs.I can now characterize he equilibrium of this game.Proposition 1. In a subgame perfect equilibriumof thegame the terroristorganizationalwayschooses the highestability (Oi) operativesavailable rom the set of volunteersand thenchoosesa levelofinvestment n terrorism hat olvesequation (1). A sympathizervolunteersor the terroristor-ganization if G a, 0i) > 0. Thegovernmentchoosesa levelof counterterrorismhat solvesEquation(4).Proof: The proposition follows from backwardinduc-tion and the argumentsin the text. a

An Extension:Compensationof TerroristOperativesMany terroristorganizationsprovide economic supportfor theiroperatives n the form of wages,room, andboard.Thus, a question exists as to whether the results of thismodel are robust to an extension in which the terroristorganization can make up for economic opportunitiesforegone by potential volunteers by offering compensa-tion.1 It turns out that, at least under one reasonablespecification, the intuitions developed above are consis-tent with such a model.

Assumethat the terroristorganizationcan offerwagesto potential volunteers (w). It seems unlikelythat the ter-

roristorganizationwould engagein perfect pricediscrim-ination, so assumethat thereisone wagefor alloperatives.Then, a sympathizerwill volunteer only if:e(a) + u(a, 0i) + w > (1 - 7(a))f(,y, 0i).

The key results still follow. There exists a cut-point intype-space, so that low ability types are more likely tomobilize then arehigh-ability types. Indeed, even if therewerepricediscrimination(so that w : R+ --+R+), aslongas w(.) was increasing in 0i (high types paid more thanlow types) and concave, the same argument that provedremark (2) would establish the existence of a cut-point.The only realchangefrom including compensation is thatthe cut-point shiftsup-more sympathizersarewilling tovolunteer becausethere is less economic sacrifice.Further,the comparative statics with respect to the state of theeconomy (y) and government counterterrorpolicy (a)are unchanged.

Of course, one can think of furtherextensions alongthese lines. Forexample, if the government can price dis-criminate, it may choose different quality operatives fordifferenttasks,employing some low-abilityoperativesforlow-skill work in orderto savemoney. Further,economicdownturns might affect the level of resourcesthe terroristorganization has access to, which could diminish com-pensation. In this case, the effect of economic downturnson mobilization would depend on whether an economicdownturn negativelyimpacted economic opportunity orterroristcompensation more. Tofully studythese impor-tant questions one would need a model that more fullyspecifiedthegoals,sources of funding, budgetconstraints,and incentivesof the terroristorganizationand its leader-ship. This lies beyond the scope of the current article andis left for future research.

Verisimilitudeof the ModelBefore turning to a discussion of whether availableem-pirical evidence supports the conclusions implied by theabove analysis,it is important first to assess whether themodel's structure and assumptions aresufficiently realis-tic. Do people actually consider ideology and economicopportunity when deciding whetherto mobilize? Are theskills that increase economic opportunity positively cor-related with those that make for an effective terrorist?Isthere evidence that terroristorganizationsare concernedabout the ability of recruits?Is the supply of potentialvolunteers ever large enough that terroristgroups actu-allyturn awaythose whom they consider unfit?As is common in the study of terror, it is diffi-cult to give decisive answers to these questions. Terrorist

I am indebted o ananonymousreferee or suggesting hisline ofargument.



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organizations are by their nature clandestine, making itdifficult to analyzetheir innerworkings.Nonetheless, theglimpses that are accessible through journalism and in-telligence provide support for the verisimilitude of themodel.The key assumption of the model is that educationand ability,which create greatereconomic opportunity,also increase an individual's effectiveness as a terror-ist and that terrorist organizations therefore screen forsuch attributes. The most convincing evidence that ter-rorist organizations screen volunteers for ability can befound in the Al Qaedatrainingmanual,which was recov-eredby Britishpolice and is available n translationfromthe Department of Justice(see references).This manual

providesa rare view of the actualoperations of a terroristorganization.Themanual contains a chapterdevotedto instructingAl Qaeda commanders how to recruit operatives.Theseinstructions stress two key qualifications: (1) commit-ment to Islam and Al Qaeda and (2) ability.The manualadvisescommanders in selectingthe traineescarefully,noting, for example; Thenature of hard and continuousworkin dangerousconditions requiresagreatdeal of psy-chological, mental and intellectualfitness.. . (Al QaedaManual).A list of 14 items labeled necessary qualificationsand characteristics for the organization'smembers in-cludes, among other things: intelligence and insight,abilityto observe and analyze,truthfulness and counsel,abilityto act, change positions, and conceal oneself, cau-tion andprudence,maturity,concealinginformation,andpatience.Further evidence for screening by terrorist organi-zations is provided by Hassan (2001), who reports thatan important factor considered by Palestinian terroristgroups in selecting suicide bombers is the ability to passasan Israeli.This includes,among otherthings, the abilityto speakHebrew. This skill is clearlycorrelatedwith edu-cation and, since many of the best-paying jobs areon theIsraeli side of the GreenLine, is also correlated with eco-nomic opportunity. Despite these standards there seemto be plenty of volunteers, making screening feasible. Inaddition to the quotation with which this paper began,Hassan (2001) reports that a senior member of the al-Qassam Brigades stated that The selection process iscomplicated by the fact that so many wish to embarkonthis journey of honor. When one is selected, countlessothers aredisappointed (2001, 39).

Clearly,Al Qaeda,Hamas,and other terroristgroupsareconcerned not onlywith theideological fidelityoftheiroperativesbut with their cognitive and intellectual abili-ties as well. As terrorismexpert James Adams articulates:

A high degree of sophistication has beenadded.., .so that the terrorist is now more likelyto conform to the imageof a middle rankingclerkthan to a gun-toting hoodlum. (1987, 401)The above evidence lends support for the claim thatterroristorganizationsscreenfor ability.This,of course,isnot the only characteristicof potentialoperativesthat ter-rorist organizationscareabout. They are also concernedwith ideological fidelity, limited familial and communalties, and other factors that might impact a recruits com-mitment to the cause.This is consistentwith my model. Itis not necessary,for my argument, that abilitybe the onlycriterionbywhich terroristorganizationsmakedecisions,it simply has to be one of the criteria.Another assumption underlying the analysis is that

potential terroristvolunteers are motivated not only byideological considerations but also by lack of economicopportunity when decidingwhetherto mobilize. Thepri-mary evidence for this will be presented in detail in thenext section because it simultaneously constitutes evi-dence for predictions of the model. In particular,empiri-cal findings indicate that economic contractions arepos-itivelycorrelatedwith increased mobilization (Blomberg,Hess, and Weerapana 2004; Drakos and Gofas 2004).Anecdotally,pressreportsarefilled with individualscitingboth lackof economic opportunity and angerat a regimeas a justification for their participation in violence. Thefollowing quotation by an unemployed Iraqi,discussinghis willingness to participate in guerilla attacks againstAmericanforces, is typical:

Resistance s anindividualdecision.And aslong aswe sufferwithout electricity,without work,with-out safety,everyman in this city will resist.-Reported by Raz (2003).

I now turn from ajustification of the assumptionsofthe model to an examination of how well the resultsof themodel explain existing empiricalevidence.

Interpretation and ResultsAccordingto remark(2) the terroristoperativesselectedwill be the highest ability people available n the set of vol-unteersbecausethe terrororganizationscreensforability.Thisisconsistentwith RussellandMiller's 1977), Kruegerand Maleckova's(2003), and Berrebi's(2003) empiricalfindings that terroristoperativestend not to be from thelowest socioeconomic groups. Krueger and Maleckovaargue that their findings imply that poverty and poor



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education are unlikely to be important determinants ofmobilization. The model presented here, however, alsopredictsthat terroristoperativeswill not be poor or une-ducated,while still arguingthatpeople without economicopportunity orgood educations are more likelyto be will-ing to mobilize.12As argued in remark (3) and revealedin the Al Qaedamanual, the reason that the poor and un-educated are not the modal terrorists is not because theydo not want to be terrorists or because economic fac-tors are uncorrelated with violent mobilization. Rather,terroristorganizations choose not to use low ability anduneducatedsympathizersbecause therearebetteroptionsavailable.

As Kruegerand Maleckova point out, many differ-ent theories could plausibly explain the socioeconomicorigins of terrorists.Since both their argument that eco-nomics are not an important determinant of terrorismand the model presentedhere areconsistentwith the em-pirical fact that terrorist operatives have relatively goodeducations and economic opportunities, this empiricalfinding is insufficient to judge between them.

Kruegerand Maleckovaalso presentsurveyevidenceshowing that support for suicide bombings is basicallyconstant across socioeconomic groups to support theirtheory. This finding, however, is also consistent with themodel presented here. In the model, high-ability peopleare as likely to be among the pool of sympathizersas arelow abilitypeople. However,that does not imply that ev-eryoneisequallywillingto mobilize. While sympathymaybe an across-the-boardphenomenon, I contend that lackof economic opportunity nonetheless exerts apositive in-fluence on willingness to actuallyvolunteer.The evidence considered thus far is consistent withthe model developed here and with the interpretationthat economics do not exert a causal influence on ter-rorism. However, the theoretical arguments yield otherpredictions that are not observationally equivalent andscholarshaveidentifiedempirical regularitieswhichmakepossible a more thorough evaluation based on thesepredictions.

Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana(2004) and Drakosand Gofas (2004) report that in societies with ongoingterrorist conflicts downturns lead to an increase in ter-roristviolence. This empiricalfinding seems inconsistent

with the claim thateconomic conditions and opportunityarenot important determinants of terroristviolence. It is,however,consistent with the model presentedabove. Re-mark (4) implies that when there is an economic down-turn higher ability people become willing to volunteer.Remark (2) shows that the terrorist organization willaccept these high ability volunteers as operatives. Thisincreases the campaign of terrorist violence both byincreasingthe qualityof the operativesandby causingtheterroristorganizationto invest more resources nviolence.

Angrist (1995) presentsanotherpiece of relevantem-pirics. During the 1980s therewere two important trendsin the Palestinian labor market. First,the level of educa-tion among Palestinians rose. Second, therewas a seriouseconomic contraction. Unemployment increased n everysocioeconomic group. Angrist reports that between 1981and 1985 unemployment for Palestinian men increasedby anywhere from a factor of 3 to 5 depending on so-cioeconomic group. Hence, while the skill of Palestiniansincreased this did not translate into increased economicopportunity due to a recessionaryeconomy. Accordingtoremark(4) this situation isexpectedto causean increase nmobilization. Further,the lack of economic opportunityfor the most skillful (Angrist reportsthatunemploymentfor Palestinian males with a high level of education wasaround 15%) is expected to make the resulting increasein terrorismparticularlystrong by increasingthe pool ofhighly qualified volunteers. And, indeed, this period ofeconomic downturn was concomitant with the outbreakof the first Intifada.

Similarly,Honaker (2004) reports that in NorthernIreland, increases in Catholic unemployment led to in-creases n Republicanviolence and increasesin Protestantunemployment led to increases in Loyalistviolence.The model is consistent with another fact about theconflict between Palestinians and Israelis. Keller(2002)reports that the amount of money paid to the familiesof suicide bombers increased during the second Intifadafrom $10,000 to $25,000. This fits the predictions of themodel in two ways. The second Intifada coincided withsignificant Israelicounterterrorismcrackdowns that hadan enormous negative economic impact on Palestiniansliving in Gaza and the West Bank.The model, hence, pre-dicts an increase in mobilization and in the quality ofterroristrecruits. Remark(6) demonstrates that when theeconomic impact of crackdowns is large,the resultingin-crease n mobilization (andconsequentlyon the qualityofterroristrecruits)is likelyto givethe terroristorganization(and its backers) an incentive to increase the amount ofresources devoted to terror.This is because the marginalreturn to investment in terror is greater the higher thequality of the operatives.

12This s,of course,dependenton theassumption hatsympathizershave a similardistributionof abilityto the populationas a whole.As discussedearlier,Kruegerand Maleckova 2003) providesomeempirical ustification or thisassumptionwith theirsurveyresults.Further,f the distribution s not the same, it is still the case thatthe terroristswill not be drawn from the worstof the population,though there will be a naturaldownward bias in the quality ofterrorists f the pool of potential volunteersis of systematicallylowerability hanthe population n general.



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THEQUALITYOFTERROR 525Themodelis alsoconsistentwith the increasedpayfor suicidebombers f one considers he supplyof anddemandfor terroristoperatives.Forreasonsexogenousto the model(forexample,a desire o underminepeacenegotiationsKydd ndWalter 002)oranincreasenthemilitancy ftheterrorist rganization'seadershipBuenode Mesquita2005)) the terrorist rganizations'emandfor high-quality perativesmayhavegrownduringthesecondIntifada tanevenfaster ate hanthe increasenmobilization,hereby reatinga shortageof high-abilityoperatives.faterrorist rganization ants oincrease hesupplyof high-qualityerrorists,t canincrease electiveincentives ssociatedwithjoiningthe terrorist rganiza-tion. Thatis, as shown in the sectionaddressing om-pensation,addinga positivetermto the left-handsideof Equation 2) will increase hecut-point or mobiliza-tion. Thus,the increasen payfollowingan increasendemand sconsistentwiththeclaim hatacomparison f

economicopportunityandthe benefitsof volunteeringfor a terroristorganizationplaysa role in determiningwhobecomesa terrorist.Anotherway n which erroristsan ncrease ecruit-ment,accordingo Equation 2), is to increaseantigov-ernment entiments.Thus,themodel alsopredicts hat,during imesofincreased emand oroperatives,erroristorganizationsre ikelyoengagenpropagandand deo-logicalmanipulationnorder o fan heflamesofantigov-ernmentresentment,herebymproving ecruitment.Themodel alsoaddressesmpiricalindingsregard-ing the typeof placeswhere errorism s likely o occur.Recall rom remark 4) that mobilization s increasingin the ideologicalbenefitsassociatedwith being a ter-rorist.Theseideologicalmotivationsmaybe greaterncountrieswithrepressiveegimes, imitedcivilliberties,or contentiousethniccleavages.Krueger 2003) identi-fiesthesetypesof factorsaskeydeterminantsf whethera countrywill experienceerrorism, onsistentwith thepredictions f themodel.In additionto providinga theoretical ccountthatintegratesheseempirical indings he modelyieldsad-ditional implications. Equation (4) shows that the gov-ernment chooses the level of counterterrorism to mini-mize the total impactof terrorism. It does so by balancingseveral factors: the ability of terrorists to carry out ef-fective attacks, the effect of crackdowns on the level ofresources that the terrororganizationdevotes to violence,the impact of crackdowns on mobilization and on thequalityof terrorists,and the opportunity costs of spend-ingresourceson counterterror.Thegovernmentchooses alevel of counterterrorism hat most favorablybalances thetrade-off between heightened security and the expectedlevel of mobilization. However,the government is uncer-

tainabouttheextent o which ts counterterrorismoli-cieswill havenegative conomicconsequences7(a) is arandomvariable).Thus, hegovernmenttrikes his bal-ancewithrespecto theexpected conomicconsequences(t(a)).If the actualeconomicconsequencesurn out to begreater han expected(r(a) > Ta)), then governmentcounterterrorismffortshavethe counterintuitiveffectof increasingheamountof terrorist iolencerelative o amore axsecuritypolicy.This s due to the factthatwhenthe government nderestimateshe economic mpactofits counterterrorismoliciesit engages n more coun-terterrorismhanis productive,uch that the increase nmobilization ominateshe increase n security.Thus, ncaseswherestronggovernment rackdowns ccur andhave economicconsequenceshat aregreater han an-ticipated, he model suggests hat the level of terroristviolencecouldbe diminishedby a lessaggressiveoun-terterrorismolicy.Similarly,n caseswhere hegovern-mentdoesnotengagenstrong ounterterrorismecauseit overestimatesheimpact hat crackdownswill haveonmobilization,violencecouldbe reducedby imposingastronger ounterterroregime.Thisresult s summarizedin thefollowingproposition.Proposition2. When rackdownsncreasemobilization,if the levelof economicdamageromgovernmentrack-downssgreaterhanexpectedT a) > t (a)), then he otallevelof terroristiolencev(r*,0), a) couldbe diminishedby decreasinghe levelof counterterrorism.f the levelofeconomic amageromgovernmentrackdownss less hanexpected,henthe total evelof terrorist iolence ouldbediminished y ncreasinghe evelofcounterterrorism

The proof is in the appendix.The result conformsto observation.Thereare situationswheregovernmentsengage n actions hatseemto fan the flamesof conflict.While hereareseveral otential xplanationsor thisbe-havior forinstance, governmentmaynotbe interestedinachieving eaceormay acedomesticpoliticalpressuresto crackdown)the modeloffersa plausibleone. Some-times government policies have more adverse effects interms of mobilizing the other side than were anticipated.The uncertaintythat the government faces regardingtheconsequencesof its actionsmeans that sometimes thegov-ernment will make a mistake, engaging in overlyrepres-sive policies that increase, rather than decrease violence.Of course,as shown in theproposition, theopposite is alsopossible. Sometimes a government may overestimate theextent towhich crackdownswill mobilizeterroristsympa-thizers.This will lead the governmentto take too gentleanapproach to counterterrorism (from its perspective). In



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presshavereachedbased on the evidenceregardinghesocioeconomicorigins of terrorists e.g., Atran2003;Barro2002; Eisner2002; Krueger2003; KruegerandMaleckova002,2003).Thesewriters onclude hat,be-cause terrorists end not to be poor or undereducated,economicopportunitys notamajordeterminant f ter-rorism.Consequently,heyargue,growthaid,whilepo-tentiallyaudable or otherreasons, hould not be usedto prevent error.Themodelpresented eresuggestshatthis s anunwarrantedonclusion.Asstatedattheoutset,becauseof screening ne cannotreachconclusions boutwho swilling obecomeaterrorist nlybystudyinghosewho actuallydo becometerrorists.Theargument haveadvanced howsthat whena broader angeof empiricalfindingsareconsidered, modelthattakesseriously heeffectof ideologyandeconomicson mobilization andconsequently n violence)fits the evidencebetterthanthe contention hateconomicsdonot exerta causal ffecton terrorist iolence.It simportantoqualifyhispredictionna fewways.First, f, asresourcemobilizationheoristshaveargued,terroristroup's esourcesncreasewithgeneral conomicconditions, hen the terroristsmaybe ableto competi-tivelybid forhigh-qualityecruits.Further,ftheterroristorganizations able to increase ts budget n thisway, tmaybe in an evenbetterposition,asthepoolof qualifiedoperatives xpands.Thus,the policyrecommendationsof this modelshouldbe takenasequivocal.Nonetheless,the modelprovides tleastsomereason o reconsiderhepolicyconclusions hathavebeenreached asedon the ev-idenceregardinghesocioeconomic riginsof terrorists.

ConclusionI havepresenteda model of the interactionbetweenaterrorist rganization, government,ndapopulation fpotential errorist olunteerswhich is consistentwith ahostof empiricalindings n theterrorismiterature.The model takesseriously he impactof ideologyandeconomicconditionson the mobilizationdecisionsof heterogeneous individuals. It also posits that terror-ist organizations may not be indifferent to the abil-ity of their operatives. Consequently, even though lackof education and economic opportunity are determi-nants of mobilization-so that the pool of volunteersis drawn from the lowest socioeconomic groups-theset of actual terroristoperativeswill be the highest abil-ity, best educated people from within that pool. Hence,the model is consistent with Russell and Miller's(1977),Krueger and Maleckova's (2003), and Berrebi's (2003)findings regardingthe characteristics of terroristopera-

tivesbutalsoexplainshefinding nBlomberg,Hess,andWeerapana(2004), Drakos and Gofas (2004), andHonaker 2004)thatterrorismncreaseswheneconomicconditionsworsen.The model also shedslight on the differenteffectsthatgovernmentrackdownsanhaveon terroristmobi-lization.On the one hand,government rackdowns e-crease heabilityof terroristso carry ut effectiveerror-ist attacks,decreasingmobilization.On the otherhand,government rackdownsmposenegativeeconomicex-ternalities n the sympathizersnd increase deologicalmotivations,makingparticipationn the normalecon-omy essattractivendmobilizationmoreattractive. hisendogenousaccountof the effect of counterterrorismprovidesa frameworkorunderstandinghe differencesacross ountriesnmobilizationesponsesogovernmentcounterterrorismolicies.Finally,he modelhas implicationsorwhy repres-siveandethnically ivided ocietiesmightbeparticularlyprone oterrorism,ieldspredictions bout hecomposi-tionofspending yterrorist rganizationshatareconsis-tentwith ournalisticvidence, uggests onditionsunderwhichgovernmentsmightadopteitheroverlyorunderlystringentcounterterrorismolicies,and positsa causalmechanism ywhicheconomicdevelopment idpoliciesmightreduce hethreatof terrorism.Themodel s alsoamenableoextension.Asdiscussedabove,onekey ssue o considershowterrorist rganiza-tionschoose he evelofcompensation rovidedoterror-istoperatives.Anothernterestingssueto explorewouldbe the heterogeneity f terrorist rganizations. erroristgroupsare often splinterednto rivalfactions.It seemslikelythat sympathizers ejectedby one factionmightturn o another action.Thiscouldhave mportantmpli-cationsfor the make-upof competing actions.Indeed,coupledwith the discussionof compensation,t mightsuggesthat maller,esswell-endowed,adical roupswillrecruitmorereckless,owerabilityoperativeswho wererejectedby moremoderateorganizations. uch a modelcouldprovidemicrofoundationsor extantmodelsthatassume heexistenceof moderate nd extremistactionswithin terroristmovements (Bueno de Mesquita2005a, b;Kyddand Walter2002) and could further the discussionof the emergenceof purelypoliticalpartiesaffiliatedwithterroristorganizations (Weinberg1991).

AppendixProofofRemark1: We have alreadyseen that r* is inte-rior.I furtherclaim that UT(r, 0, a) hasstrictly ncreasingincremental returns in r and 0, and therefore Edlin and



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Shannon's1998)MonotonicityTheoremmplies hatr*isincreasingn0.Allthathas o bedone s toprove trictlyincreasing ncrementalreturns which can be seen asfollows:a2UT 82v) > 0.a&Or a6ar

Sothe claim s true. aProofofRemark: Theterrorist rganization'stility nequilibriums givenbythe value unction:

V(0, a) - UT(r*(a, 0), 6, a)= v(r*(a, 0), 0, a) - c(r*(a, 6)).

Theenvelope heorem mplies hataV(O) _ v(r*(a, 6), 0, a) > 0-e aoThus heterrorist rganization'squilibrium ayoff s in-creasingn thequalityof itsoperatives. UProofofRemark : Definethefunction:

G(a, 6) = e(a) + u(a, Oi) (1 - 7(a))f(y, Oi)Anindividual volunteers or the terrorist rganizationfanonly f G(a,0i) > 0. Notethat t is clear hatG(a,0) >0.Asympathizerf type0 = 0 alwaysmobilizes.Further,thederivative f Gwithrespect o 0 is&G au af-_=- (1 - 7)-.ao a aoConsider wocases(fora fixeda):

1. ( > (1- 7)u'(0). (O < (1-T7)

Incase1,G is anincreasingunctionat0 = 0. Therearenow twopossible ubcases.(a) fl > (1 - ) forall(b) There exists at least one 0' such that u(') =(1 -7) f()In subcase (1.a), the derivative is positive for all 6which means that the function G is everywhere positive.Thus all sympathizersmobilize.In subcase (1.b), there exists at least one value of 6such that the derivativeequals zero. Label the first suchvalue 6'. For all 6 < 6' it is clear that G is positive sincethe derivativeof Gis positive. Recall that - is increasing,

which implies that - is decreasing.Since % is decreasing,it is clear hatfor all6 > 6',the derivative f G snegative.Thus,6' isunique. Once the derivative urnsnegativethere

are wopossible ub-subcases.1.a.i) Gmaydecreaseorall0 > 6' but nevercrosszero, n which caseallsympa-thizersmobilize. 1.a.ii) Gmaycrosszero at somepoint0. In thisevent,onceGcrosses ero t willremainnegativeforall0 > 0 since,as we havealreadyeen,G'sderivativeis negativeor all0 > 0'.In case2, G is a decreasingunction at 0 andwillremaindecreasingorever, ince -7 is decreasing.Thus,justas is subcase 1.b) above here are two possibilities.(2.a) Gmaydecreaseorall0 > 0 but nevercrosszero, nwhich caseallsympathizersmobilize.(2.b) Gmaycrosszeroat somepoint0. In thisevent,once G crosses ero twill remainnegativeor all0 > 4 ince,aswe havealreadyseen, ts derivatives negativeor all6.We haveseen that eitherG is alwayspositive(cases1.a, 1.b.i,and 2.a) or it crosses0 at some value4, andremainsnegative orall0 > 4(cases1.b.iiand2.b).Thecut-point,0*,can be definedasfollows:0* = oo if G is everywhere ositive0 such thatG(0) = 0 if Gcrosses0Thus, tfollows hatonly ndividualswith0 < 6* mobilize,which establishesheresult. 0ProofofRemark : Thelevel of resource nvestmentsdefined mplicitlyby the first-order onditions n Equa-tion (1). By Edlinand Shannon's 1998)MonotonicityTheorem,r* s increasingn a if the cross-partials pos-itive and decreasingn a if the cross-partials negative.Thecross-partials:

a2UT a2v a2v ao2*= + (5)aaar ar*aa ar*86 8 a aaNotethat 2 > 0 and -e > 0. Further,f mobilizationis decreasingn crackdowns,hen *< 0 and if mobi-lization s increasingn crackdowns,hen > 0. Thisimplies hat he second ermofEquation5),whichrepre-sentsthe effecton investment of a changein mobilization,is negative if mobilization is decreasing in crackdownsand positive if mobilization is increasingin crackdowns.The first term of Equation(5), which representsthe effecton increasedcounterterror on the effectiveness of terror-ism is strictly negative.Thus, if mobilization is decreasingin crackdowns, then both the first and second terms ofEquation (5) arenegativeand so a < 0. If mobilizationis increasingin crackdowns,then is positive if the firstterm of Equation (5) is largerthan the second term andnegative otherwise. U



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Proofof Proposition2: a* is defined implicitlyby Equa-tion (4):dv dv dr*

Sa r* da86 a* (v dv dr*+ = + + k(a) = 00* da O+ dr* dO)

Further, Equation (2) demonstrates that wheni (a) > T(a) the actualeffectof counterterrorismon mo-bilization (call ita)

is greaterthan the expected effectthatthe governmentusedto solvethemaximizationprob-lem (*). Callthe solution to the maximization problemwith this actualeffecta*. It is clearfrom Equation(4) that* < a* because -* is part of the marginalcosts.Recall that a is chosen to minimize the level of ter-rorism (v(r, 0, a)). Thus, the factthat the optimal choiceof counterterrorism (a*) is less than the amount actu-ally chosen (a*) when 7(a) > Tf(a), demonstrates thata decrease in counterterrorwould decrease the level ofviolence. An identical argument proves the result when7(a)


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Rosendorff,Peter,andTodd Sandler.2004. TooMuch of aGoodThing?TheProactiveResponseDilemma. ournal fConflictResolution8(5):657-71.Ross,Jeffreyan.1995. TheRiseand Fallof QuebecoisSepa-ratistTerrorism: QualitativeApplication f FactorsromTwoModels. Studies n Conflict nd Terrorism8(4):285-97.Ross,Jeffreyan,and TedRobertGurr.1989. WhyTerrorismSubsides:A Comparative tudyof Canadaandthe UnitedStates. Comparativeolitics 1(4):405-26.Russell, Charles,and Bowman Miller. 1977. Profileof aTerrorist. Terrorism: n International ournal1(1):17-34.Sandler,Todd,JohnT. Tschirhart,nd JonCouley.1983. ATheoreticalAnalysis f Transactional errorism. mericanPolitical cienceReview 7(4):36-56.Silke,Andrew. 999. Rebel's ilemma:TheChangingRelation-shipbetween heIRA,SinnFein,andParamilitaryigilan-tism in Northern reland. Terrorismnd PoliticalViolence11(1):55-93.WorldReview: pain. The rishTimes:CityEdition,December

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