Vol.4, no. 11 (november 2014)1

ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION

Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 11 1

- Flora Pidoux & Maria Mundt

This month, Atlantic Voices covers the

salient issue of counter-terrorism. Non-state

actors and the changing nature of terrorism

have called for another Western coalition and

urged the Allies to develop their counter-

terrorism policies. As emerging threats, such as

ISIL and lone-wolfs are threatening the already

unstable security situation the Allies faces, this

once again stressed that terror attacks are

powerful instruments when it comes to getting

the attention of governments. The

developments within modern terror attacks as

asymmetrical threats have the potential to cause

a lot of damage to the societies they target, and

therefore this month's edition will focus on

ISIL and the changing nature of terrorism that

make terror attacks more likely to succeed than

ever. Fortunately, NATO and the Allies have

developed extensive counter-terrorism

strategies in order to deter modern terrorist

threats. However, some Allies, more than

others are still facing new potential terror

threats that impede their security and stability.

(PakistanToday)

NATO & Counter Terrorism

Volume 4 - Issue 11 November2014

Contents:

The Changing Nature Of Terrorism In The Western World

Mr. Fuhrmann explains how terrorism has evolved in the Western World: The

emphasis on counter-terrorism seems to prevent large scale attacks, but “lone

wolves” maintain a feeling of terror by perpetrating hit-and-runs and shift their

focus onto highly populated regions of the South.

Uniting Against ISIS - Stakeholder Engagement & Strategy

Mr. Baltzer Rode examines the conflicting interests that stand in the way of

building an organized strategy for NATO to fight ISIS, focusing on the case of

Turkey, torn between the terrorist threat and toppling Assad’s regime.


seem to be on a dangerous rise. Through constant

propaganda on all different media outlets like YouTube

and Twitter, these groups manage to spur on hit-and-

run attacks in the Western world and convince mostly

young men to join their ranks for the great cause of a

Muslim empire.

Whilst ISIS is engaging in more or less conventional

warfare, applying medieval-like tactics and strategies to

conquer cities and villages in Syria and Iraq, other ter-

rorist groups like Boko Haram and al-Shabaab are using

car bombs, suicide bombers and other methods to ter-

rorize the population in the region. However, it needs

to be noted that most of these “classic” terrorist attacks

are almost always happening outside of the Western

world - in the Middle East and Africa. Ever since 9/11,

counter-terrorism moved rapidly into the focus of the

Western public debate and up on the national and in-

ternational political agendas. One of the reasons for the

surprisingly small number of major terrorist attacks in

the Western world has proven to be the successful

By Rasmus Fuhrmann

M ore than a decade of exhaustive

wars is coming to an end. Ameri-

can troops have left Iraq, hunted

down Osama bin Laden, and NATO combat forces

are preparing to leave Afghanistan for good by the end

of the year. New conflicts have emerged, states in the

Middle East are losing control over their territory and

battles are being fought among terrorist groups, re-

bels and national armies. The vacuum that was left by

the US in Iraq has been quickly filled by the Sunni

extremist jihadist organization called the Islamic State

of Iraq and al-Shams (ISIS). ISIS has expanded its reach

deep into Iraq from Syria, controlling now big parts

of both states’ territories. There is no day when ISIS

would not make it to the headlines. Just recently, it

was reported that Egypt’s most dangerous militant

group, Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, pledged obedience to

ISIS. A few months ago, the al-Qaeda branch in Syria,

the al-Nusra Front, reportedly joined forces with ISIS.

Following al-Nusra, the Pakistani Tehrik-i-Taliban

soon pledged allegiance to the recently established

caliphate of ISIS, or as they call themselves now, Is-

lamic State (IS). The caliphate, is an attempt to erase

national boundaries and establish a transnational Mus-

lim state with IS as the leader of this movement. In

Africa, terrorist groups, preaching similarly the Islam-

ic radicalization, namely al-Shabaab in Somalia and

Kenya or Boko Haram in Nigeria, are striving to gain

more influence, killing countless people and kidnap-

ping minors. Together with al-Qaeda in the Islamic

Maghreb (AQIM), which stretches from Algeria, Lib-

ya, Mali and Niger, sectarian terrorist organizations

The Changing Nature Of Terrorism

In The Western World

Woolwich, Great Britian 22 May 2013: Two British men of

Nigerian descent, who reportedly converted to Islam, killed the


work of the intelligence services and surveillance systems

that were set up after 9/11. The new counter-terrorism

strategies and laws that were implemented by many

Western governments granted states thorough and com-

prehensive authority to keep suspected terrorists under

surveillance, which in turn seemed to counteract and to

nip possible attacks in the bud quite successfully. Alt-

hough there is never 100 percent reliability on these sys-

tems, as the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and in

London in 2005 clearly showed, hit-and-run attacks are

replacing large-scale terrorist attacks in the West.

The increasing focus on urban security has become

one of the key issues for counter-terrorism experts

around the world. David Kilcullen, an Australian coun-

terinsurgency advisor and scholar, published a book re-

cently in which he describes future scenarios of possible

threats in a highly urbanized world. Predictions about the

future conflict environment are just as vague as climate

predictions; however, Kilcullen offers some available evi-

dence that a few main drivers or trends will shape the

conflict environment in the future. He believes that one

big issue will be urbanization itself. Megacities that are

often located in the Global South will not be able to cope

with the fast growing populations. Some of these cities

like Karachi or Mumbai and even Lagos have the infra-

structure of medium-sized cities and cannot deal with the

huge influx of people; hence slums and the periphery of

cities will be growing around the historical centers of the

particular cities creating a parallel society of poor and low

-income people. Another big issue will be connectedness,

especially networked connectivity. The rapidly growing

slums as well as ungoverned areas are likely to pose a pos-

sible threat to international security like Somalia that is

known for harboring pirates and al-Shabaab. Some of

these areas can actually become safe havens for non-state

armed actors who can go about their illicit activities like

the smuggling of people, weapons and drugs, piracy

and terrorism. ISIS has managed to fill the vacuum the

civil war left in Syria and quickly conquered more of

the ungoverned territories, establishing their own cali-

phate.

The possible future threat is therefore coming from

irregular actors using irregular methods, avoiding di-

rectly confronting military or police powers. Instead

these irregular actors, whether they are terrorists, re-

bels or guerrillas, typically make use of their competi-

tive advantages of stealth, small size, tactical initiative

and local knowledge against conventional militaries,

which though large and powerful, tend to lose their

agility and situational awareness in the complex envi-

ronment of the urban jungle. Another crucial factor

becomes apparent here: irregular actors - whether they

operate in overcrowded and ungoverned urban territo-

ries with little state control or in well-functioning cit-

ies with a high level of security in place – usually know

how to make use of the city for their cause and merge

into the respective society, making it hard to be dis-

criminated from the regular citizens.

The Mumbai attack in 2008 serves as a perfect ex-

ample for this new threat: a non-state armed group,

the Pakistani terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Taliba

(LeT), carried out an extremely sophisticated attack on

the Indian city. Within the course of this raid, a group

Hit & Run Tactics

This tactical doctrine, which dates back to ancient warfare, is mainly used when

fighting against superior enemies. The pur-pose is not to seize control of territory but to

cause damage on a target and demoralize the enemy. Guerrilla fighters and terrorists often

use hit-and-run tactics.


of ten LeT gunmen killed 164 people and wound-

ed 308 in several locations throughout the city.

What is known today is that the group was alleged-

ly trained and supported by some “retired” mem-

bers of the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence

(ISI), who guided and mentored them prior to the

attack and continued to act as mentors, supporters

and coaches during the raid. The group managed

to get into the city from the waterfront, hijacking

fishing boats that took them to the dense and

crowded slum areas at Mumbai’s waterfront where

they could get off board undetected. Once inside,

the terrorists used the city to their advantage. The

supporters back in Pakistan stayed in close contact

to the terrorists, walking some of them through

specific actions step by step over satellite phones.

In addition, they monitored the Indian news and

Twitter and made use of Google Earth to choose

targets. The connectivity allowed the group to

follow their plan because they knew from the live

updates via phones from their supporters in Paki-

stan that the Indian police and counterterrorism

units were not able to respond to the attack in

time. Hence, the attack of Mumbai might actually

represent one of the possible threat scenarios: A

terrorist organization, sponsored by some state-

actors, attacked national and international targets

and leveraged both local and remote networks for

support. They managed to stay undetected for

quite some time because they knew about the lim-

its of the overstretched public safety and policing

infrastructure in dense and heavily populated are-

as.

Under these previously mentioned circum-

stances, non-state armed groups will be able to

merge into the complex environments of big cities

around the globe, avoiding being detected by remain-

ing beneath as well as within the “muddle” of dense

urban areas. In addition, the connectedness of the

different threat networks as well as of the broader

systems and infrastructures on which a city runs,

makes it virtually impossible to target these networks

without also harming the community into which they

merged, which deters some governments from taking

harsh actions because of possible backlash of the popu-

lation.

Future threat scenarios like the Mumbai attack

certainly are appalling. However, as already men-

tioned before, they seem to be happening in rather

overpopulated and ungoverned urban areas. Of

course, illicit networks will be able to nest within

Western societies too, but stockpiling weapons, try-

ing to acquire material to build bombs as well as com-

municating with other networks and supporters poses

a high risk to get detected by the functioning security

systems that are in place. In Germany for example,

the intelligence services of the USA and Germany,

according to official statements, managed in close

concerted action to prevent several planned attacks

through careful monitoring and intercepting of phone

Mumbai 26 November 2008: The Pakistani terrorist organi-

zation Lashkar-e-Taliba ended its raid with taking hostages in

the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel. (New York Times)


tional coalition against ISIS certainly serve most per-

petrators of recent attempted and successful hit-and-

run attacks, and terrorist attacks as a plausible reason

to take revenge for the continuous violence by West-

ern states against Muslim civilians. Although it is cer-

tainly true that the ideology of radical Islam plays a

vital role in making young people willing to fight and

die for the perceived just cause, the proximate cause

of the attacks are plainly political grievances. The be-

lief that engaging in violence against aggressive West-

ern nations is the only way to avenge Western vio-

lence, which is portrayed as continuously killing Mus-

lim civilians, seems to be spurred on by propaganda

videos and tweets.

Take the London knife hit-and-run attack from

2013 as another prime example to understand the

future security threats the Western world needs to

take into consideration but can do little about: Two

men ran over a British soldier with a car, then used

knives and a cleaver to stab him to death. The men

did however not run away but stayed with the dead

body and told bypassing people that they had killed a

soldier to avenge the killing of Muslims by the British

armed forces. These hit-and-run attacks, committed

by so-called lone wolf terrorists happen in an uncon-

ventional manner by people who are nesting within

the society or have just recently returned from the

battlefields in the Middle East where they have been

further radicalized. The ideology of the ISIS caliphate

calls and email communications of different terrorist

networks. Hence, urbanization might rather be a big-

ger problem and possible threat scenario for the

Global South because the cities are not able to cope

with the high influx of people. Connectedness – as

good as it is – poses a threat to everyone if used

wrongly or for any illicit cause. ISIS for example

manages to create new Twitter accounts as soon as

the current ones are deleted. They have a plethora of

supporters on YouTube and Twitter who share their

videos, tweet and spread the sectarian propaganda

globally. Likewise, al-Qaeda, the Taliban and other

extremist groups made use of the social networks to

promote their worldview. Videos, statements and

tweets are not only aiming at recruiting new fighters

– they manage as well to radicalize younger people

quite fast, who in turn commit hit-and-run terrorist

attacks but have neither met nor have had any person-

al contact with the terrorist groups.

In 2004, one of the first reported hit-and-run inci-

dents occurred in Europe. Theo van Gogh, a provoc-

ative Dutch filmmaker, was stabbed and then shot

several times by a man who arrived on a bicycle as the

filmmaker was cycling to work in the Amsterdam

East borough. Mohammed Bouyeri, a 26-year-old

man with dual Dutch and Moroccan nationality, ar-

gued during his trial: “In the fight of the believers

against the infidels violence is approved by the proph-

et Muhammad.” Van Gogh directed a movie about

violence against women in Islam, which aired just a

few months before his assassination. Dutch officials

believe that the attack was a direct result of the film

whilst other sources made claims about possible re-

venge for the Dutch involvement in the Operation Iraqi

Freedom. The US-led Global War on Terror

(GWOT) and now the recently established interna-

Lone Wolf Terrorists:

A lone wolf is usually someone who acts alone and independently of other terrorist affili-ates, outside of any command structure and without material assistance from any group. Radical preachers and Islamic propaganda

often spur them on over different media out-lets like YouTube and Twitter.


has further inspired individuals across the world.

The attack at the Jewish Museum in Brussels, Bel-

gium, in May this year, highlighted the threat

posed by homecoming European foreign fighters.

Furthermore, recent hit-and-run attacks against

the Canadian parliament and the New York Police

Department show the spread of lone wolves in the

Western world.

Conclusion

The conflict-ridden regions in the Middle East

and North Africa, vulnerable due to rapidly grow-

ing populations and high unemployment rates of

especially young people, are prone to get caught

up in an ongoing fight against radical terrorist or-

ganizations that want to stretch their influence.

The global security is interdependent and the

Western world can only imagine what the conse-

quences of the rise of extremism in the Muslim

world could mean. The lack of predictability of

future hit-and-run attacks in the Western world by

lone wolves calls for a re-thinking of how to coun-

teract these threats without interfering too much

in the lives of the regular citizens and the sovereign

states of the Middle East and North Africa. Con-

stant anti-Western sectarian propaganda makes it

almost impossible to win the battle of ideologies

between the Western values and the extremists’

worldviews. Weak and failed states, such as Syria

and Iraq, serve as a breeding ground for future

radicalized fighters. ISIS and affiliated terrorist or-

ganizations are only a part of a bigger problem of

ongoing civil wars and ungoverned territories, al-

lowing them to challenge the national borders and

to intensify the humanitarian catastrophe. In order

to manage and eliminate the transnational jihadist

radicalization and thus prevent random hit-and-run

attacks, stability needs to be re-established within the

region by actively supporting the coalition against ISIS

and its affiliates.

Rasmus Fuhrmann is a German-Swedish political

consultant, currently working in Berlin, Germany.

He previously worked at the Embassy of the Federal

Republic of Germany in Stockholm. He holds a BA in

Peace and Conflict Studies from Malmö University

and an MA in Political Strategy and Communications

from the University of Kent. During his academic and

professional career, Mr. Fuhrmann has lived, worked

and studied in Sweden, Jordan, Belgium and

Germany.

About the author


By Carsten Baltzer Rode

O n Wednesday 22-October, the

Turkish parliament reached an

agreement on allowing Iraqi Pesh-

merga (Kurdish militants) to cross from Turkey into

the Syrian town of Kobane, which has become a

stronghold against the advance of ISIS (Islamic State in

Iraq and Syria). The Turkish decision came as a sur-

prise to many observers, who believed that Prime

Minister Erdoğan would block any initiatives aimed at

assisting the Kurds in Kobane. Although encouraging

to many, the announcement should probably neither

be interpreted as a radical shift in Turkish strategy nor

as a turning point in the Kurdish resistance.

First in this article, I seek to map the Turkish agen-

da on the situation at Kobane and the wider anti-ISIS

efforts. Second, I examine this supposed change of

attitude by placing it in a larger international context,

chiefly impacted by American policy objectives. I then

briefly turn to the role of NATO in this conflict, and

conclusively reflect on the performance of current

policies. The main contribution of this article is to

give a better understanding of the political objectives

at play for relevant stakeholders in the conflict with

ISIS.

The Turkish Position

On Monday 20-October, Turkey’s Foreign Minis-

ter Mevlut Cavusoglu declared Turkey’s allowance

and assistance of Peshmerga forces to cross into Koba-

ne. The announcement was consecutively labeled a

“major shift” (India Times), an “

abrupt shift” (The Guardian) and a “rare sign of hope

for saving Turkey’s moribund peace process with its

own Kurds” (Freizer, 2014). Common for most of

these accounts was the emphasis on the positive char-

acter of Ankara’s announcement.

Turkey’s relationship with the PYD, the main po-

litical party in Kobane, remains, however, imbued

with suspicion. The PYD is an affiliate of the PKK,

who was engaged in a lengthy armed struggle with the

Turkish state until 2013, and remains to this day con-

sidered a terrorist organization by NATO, the United

States and the EU. Given the historic relationship be-

tween Turkey and the Kurds, it appears at least sur-

prising that Turkey should come to the aid of the

Kurds in this crucial moment.

There is at least one other reason Turkey is reluc-

tant towards aiding the Kurds, namely the larger ob-

jective of imposing a regime change in Syria. Prime

Minister Erdoğan has repeatedly stated that getting

rid of Assad should be the first priority. Although ISIS

may be a potential threat to Turkey, toppling Assad is

an important political aim in which they are more or

less aligned. Turkey has in several occasions been ac-

cused of covertly or at least indirectly aiding ISIS in

Syria, or at the very least refusing to respond pro-

actively to ISIS’ advance near the Turkish border.

Supporting this allegation, United States Vice

President Joe Biden described the Turkish position

Prime Minister Erdogan has repeat-edly stated that getting rid of Assad

should be the first priority

Uniting Against ISIS –

Stakeholder Engagement & Strategy


leading up to the rise of ISIS as one which had poured

vast amounts of money and weaponry into anyone

who would fight against Assad, which then later back-

lashed into the formation and strengthening of ex-

tremist elements of jihadists – a statement he later

had to withdraw because Erdoğan required him to do

so. Supporting the Kurds in Syria is perceived to

counter the objective of getting rid of Assad, seeing

that the Kurds have shown promising signs of stop-

ping the advance of ISIS at Kobane.

From the Turkish point of view, what it comes

down to is essentially this: Turkey’s main objective

remains imposing systemic change in Syria, and nei-

ther aiding the Kurds nor deterring ISIS is forwarding

this agenda. By all means, this is not to say that Tur-

key’s goals are identical to those of ISIS, because for

obvious reasons they are not. Rather, what should be

stressed is that it is impracticable to believe Turkey

will pursue a policy likely to indirectly favor the

Kurds or Assad, especially if it applies to the latter.

Understanding these policy objectives is essential in

order to engage Turkey in the anti-ISIS coalition.

The ‘abrupt shift’ ascribed to Ankara’s announce-

ment may seem to discredit what I have just said.

However, this altered attitude marks only a small and

fairly insignificant step, which is probably best as-

cribed to U.S. pressure and the significance of Kobane

in international media.

ISIS has emerged as an international concern and

thus elevated the attention on the Turkish-Kurdish

conflict with it. The extensive media coverage of Ko-

bane and the indications of its resilience towards ISIS

have made Kobane a symbolically and politically im-

portant stronghold. Very few stakeholders, including

Turkey and the United States, are interested in send-

ing in military forces to deal with ISIS on the ground,

and the Kurdish resistance thus resembles that of an

effective ground resistance unlikely to be found else-

where. The region of Kurdistan comprises only a

small part of northern Syria and northern Iraq, and

thus, should the Kurds at Kobane prevail, they are

unlikely to take the fight as far as will be needed to

defeat ISIS. So while Kobane may not be at the top of

the long-term strategic agenda for the United States,

it certainly has become a vital immediate goal.

However, political tensions are showing between

the United States and Turkey on what to do with Ko-

bane. In response to the recent U.S. airdrop of mili-

tary material to the Kurds, Erdogan made it clear that

Kobane was not a strategic place for the United

States, but if anything, for Turkey. Yet, U.S. Secre-

tary of State John Kerry stressed that it was the objec-

tive of the coalition effort to degrade and destroy

ISIL, which was significantly present in Kobane.

There appears to be a certain mismatch between the

expectations of Ankara and the objectives of Washing-

ton.

To ‘Degrade And Destroy’

In August this year, President Obama announced

that he would launch air strikes to “degrade and de-

stroy” ISIS in Syria. Simultaneously, he remarked that

Cartoon of a gun suggesting that Turkey and ISIS are one

(aratnews.am)


the United States “don’t have a strategy yet”. President

Obama has promised the public not to put boots on the

ground, thus obliging him to seek partners who are will-

ing to engage in such ground confrontations with ISIS.

Stopping ISIS at Kobane is an important immediate goal,

but does not “degrade and destroy” them as the coalition

has set out to do. In Syria, the coalition against ISIS cur-

rently comprises the U.S. and the U.K. along with Bah-

rain, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab

Emirates. The past sets understandable limits for the fu-

ture, as Americans do not long for another war. Ameri-

can hubris has in many ways paralyzed action in the pre-

sent, as previous efforts have generated massive public

distrust in the outcomes of war.

American, and perhaps Western publics more general-

ly, do not favor an all-in military intervention in Iraq (or

in Syria for that matter), making it extremely difficult to

do what many deem necessary in order to effectively

combat ISIS. Instead, we are left with airstrikes – much

easier to digest for the public and much too short of de-

stroying ISIS. According to Washington Post, in Septem-

ber this year, 71 % of Americans supported air strikes in

Iraq and 65 % in Syria, whilst the support for a military

invasion in the affected areas is likely to receive much less

support. It would appear that although a majority believes

ISIS is a threat to be dealt with, doubt remains as to how

comprehensive the efforts should be.

The current course of action can be summed up as

this: in lack of strategic clarity, ad hoc solutions

(airstrikes) are employed so as to at least do something to

ISIS, which Steven Coll has labeled a “part terrorist net-

work, part guerilla army and part proto-state”. Regard-

less of whether this is the most suitable definition or not,

there is no doubt that ISIS constitutes a geographical and

political coherence, which makes it distinct from al-

Qaeda or the like. Airstrikes alone cannot deal with such

entities, because they are unable to establish and main-

tain a new political agenda. This perhaps unjustly sim-

plistic account is not aimed at discrediting the potential

situational benefits of airstrikes – such as the positive

contribution made by U.S. airstrikes in Kobane – but

to highlight that in the long run, they are simply not

adequate.

In many ways, the current situation in Syria resem-

bles a failure of strategy, as it is clear that airstrikes

against ISIS are inadequate in reaching overall objec-

tives. In the West, most seem to agree that ISIS needs

to be abolished, but the wraiths of previous interven-

tions has put comprehensive actions to a deadlock.

NATO’s Role In Backing Iraqi Forces

At the recent Wales summit, the NATO alliance

acknowledged that a coordinated international ap-

proach is required. It reaffirmed its NATO-Iraq com-

mitments towards building more effective security

forces. However, in the context of Kobane, NATO has

not contributed significantly. This is likely to stay un-

changed, as long as Turkey is not directly involved

with ISIS. As argued above, typical counter-terrorism

efforts, such as those employed against al-Qaeda for

Turkish President Erdogan with American President Obama at

NATO Wales Summit (Reuters)


example, will not do if isolated. What is needed is

a much more comprehensive approach, in which

multi-stakeholder agreements need to be in place.

At the Wales Summit, Obama defended his cur-

rent position by saying that his approach would be

similar to that applied against al-Qaeda. Such an

approach fails to acknowledge that ISIS is not a

fragmented terrorist group, but indeed a type of

‘proto-state’. The distinct character of ISIS is

surely well known to the Obama Administration,

and thus better signifies the aforementioned fail of

strategy caused by a lack of incentive and support

to deal with ISIS effectively.

NATO’s key contribution remains to rehabili-

tate the Iraqi army, as this aligns with the long-

term coalition strategy of defeating ISIS. Enhanc-

ing regional cooperation and empowering those

present groups willing to pick a fight with ISIS, is

key to reaching the overall strategic objective. It

is a long and uncertain haul, something which all

stakeholders are equally aware of. Whilst the im-

pact of NATO efforts to this point seems limited,

they may become crucial in the long run.

Conclusion

The Kurdish resistance at Kobane has chal-

lenged what previously seemed like an unstoppa-

ble rampage of ISIS. Turkish announcements of

aiding the Kurds should not be mistaken for an

altered course; rather, it represents merely tiny

steps, which are probably best ascribed to exter-

nal pressure. Simultaneously, the resistance at

Kobane has gained extensive global attention and

thus become a symbolically and politically urgent

issue. Yet, efforts to combat ISIS remain to this

point rather vague. The overall strategic aim

seems to be clear for most stakeholders – ISIS

needs to be shattered. But domestic political contexts

have made it difficult for Washington to employ ade-

quate means, whilst Turkey remains split by opposing

interests. Understanding the larger array of interests

at play is essential to building a comprehensive re-

sponse to ISIS, and this article has merely contributed

with a few aspects of it. What is required is indeed

effective collective action, and identifying shared po-

litical grounds as well as obstacles is a pivotal back-

drop for such an endeavor.

Carsten Baltzer Rode is an MA student at Copen-

hagen University, studying Security & Risk Manage-

ment under the Department of Political Science. Be-

sides, he is a member of the Youth Atlantic Treaty

Association (YATA) in Copenhagen, which is a youth

forum for the learning and discussing of contempo-

rary NATO and other relevant international security

issues.

Al Jazeera (2014). “Getting rid of ISIL or Assad”. Avail-able at: http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/i n s i d e s t o r y / 2 0 1 4 / 1 0 / g e t t i n g - r i d - i s i l - a s s a d -201410141511554376.html

Coll, Steve (2014). “In Search of a Strategy”. Published in The New York Times. New York: September 2014. Availa-b l e a t : h t t p : / / w w w . n e w y o r k e r . c o m /magazine/2014/09/08/return-war

Filkins, Dexter (2014). “When Bombs Aren’t Enough”. Published in The New York Times. New York: October 2014. Available at: http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/29/fight-lives

Freizer, Sabine (2014). “Turkey Moves Towards Help-ing Syria’s Kurds – And Calming Its Own”. Available at: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/turkish-government-moves-toward-helping-kurds

NATO (2014). “Wales Summit Declaration”. Available a t : h t t p : / / w w w . n a t o . i n t / c p s / e n / n a t o h q /official_texts_112964.htm

The Guardian (2014). “Ten questions Nato faces in its fight to combat Isis”. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/06/10 -questions-nato-faces-fight-against-isis

About the author

Bibliography


On December 1st, delegates from more than 25 member countries of both the ATA and YATA network will gather in Brus-

sels, Belgium for their respective General Assemblies. This event will further motivate discussion among members about the future

security challenges for the Alliance and how to better prepare to face them in the coming year.

The ATA members will gather for their annual General Assembly. Among other topics, reports from the President, the

Treasurer, the Secretary General Designate and YATA President will be presented to the participants. The ATA will also elect

three new vice-presidents and formally elect the President and Secretary General during the Statutory Assembly. This Council

Meeting will focus on the future of the Atlantic treaty Association, its plan and priorities for 2015.

YATA delegates will also gather for their General Assembly. They will first have their Council Meeting led by their Presi-

dent, Executive President and Secretary General Secretary. YATA International report will be then presented to the delegates,

followed by the presentation of each chapters’ report. Elections of local bureaus will take place before moving on to YATA’s

action plan for 2015. The second part of the day will be dedicated to workshops that aim to provide guidance on fundraising,

leadership, building partnerships and communication.

The day will end with a reception at the Embassy of the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia*.

*Turkey recognizes with the constitutional name

Atlantic Treaty Association &

Youth Atlantic Treaty Association

General Assemblies

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Atlantic Voices is always seeking new material. If you are a young

researcher, subject expert or professional and feel you have a valuable

contribution to make to the debate, then please get in touch.

We are looking for papers, essays, and book reviews on issues of

importance to the NATO Alliance. For details of how to submit your

work please see our website. Further enquiries can also be directed to the

ATA Secretariat at the address listed below.

Editors: Flora Pidoux & Maria Mundt

ATA Programs

On November 26th, in collaboration with the Belgian Royal Mili-

tary Academy, the Atlantic Treaty Association will present the Global

Terrorism Index in Brussels, Belgium. This index will be presented by

Mr. Killelea, founder of the Institute for Economics and Peace. The

Global Terrorism Index entails 162 countries over the last 14 years (from

2001 to 2014). It scores countries by aggregating the number of terrorist

incidents, number of fatalities, injuries and the amount of property dam-

age, and then weighting the results over five years .

The Global Terrorism Index will be used to explore significant

correlations with other important indicators such as education, poverty,

governance, etc. Moreover, it will uncover trends in terrorism over the

last 14 years, allowing analysis of which regions and countries have seen

to biggest growth/reduction in terrorism.

Images should not be reproduced without permission from sources listed, and remain the sole property of those sources. Unless otherwise stated, all images are the property of NATO.

Atlantic Voices is the monthly publication of the Atlantic Treaty Associa-

tion. It aims to inform the debate on key issues that affect the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization, its goals and its future. The work published in Atlantic

Voices is written by young professionals and researchers.

The Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) is an international non-

governmental organization based in Brussels working to facilitate global

networks and the sharing of knowledge on transatlantic cooperation and

security. By convening political, diplomatic and military leaders with

academics, media representatives and young professionals, the ATA promotes

the values set forth in the North Atlantic Treaty: Democracy, Freedom,

Liberty, Peace, Security and Rule of Law. The ATA membership extends to 37

countries from North America to the Caucasus throughout Europe. In 1996,

the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association (YATA) was created to specifially

include to the successor generation in our work.

Since 1954, the ATA has advanced the public’s knowledge and

understanding of the importance of joint efforts to transatlantic security

through its international programs, such as the Central and South Eastern

European Security Forum, the Ukraine Dialogue and its Educational Platform.

In 2011, the ATA adopted a new set of strategic goals that reflects the

constantly evolving dynamics of international cooperation. These goals include:

the establishment of new and competitive programs on international

security issues.

the development of research initiatives and security-related events for

its members.

the expansion of ATA’s international network of experts to countries in

Northern Africa and Asia.

The ATA is realizing these goals through new programs, more policy

activism and greater emphasis on joint research initiatives.

These programs will also aid in the establishment of a network of

international policy experts and professionals engaged in a dialogue with

NATO.

The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Atlantic Treaty Association, its members, affiliates or staff.

Vol.4, no. 11 (november 2014)1

Documents

Transcript of Vol.4, no. 11 (november 2014)1