TWO HILLS OF THE SAME LAND (Truth Behind the Mindanao Problem)

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TWO HILLS

OF THE SAME

LANDTruth Behind the Mindanao Problem

Rad D. Silva

Mindanao-Sulu

Critical Studies & Research Group

September 1979



Two Hills of the Same Land2



Two Hills of the Same Land 3

Introduction

This book first came out in September 1978; a revised edition was issued in1979. It is now June 2011, only three months short of 33 years. Four thousandcopies later, the question must be asked. What has been the impact of this book

in Mindanao? Nobody has tried to do any survey. But I know of friends andacquaintances alike who felt that they understood the Moro struggle at last. Some who did not know I was Rad D. Silva even encouraged me to read it. Two readers,however, stand out in my memory.

One was a senior citizen, a retired public school teacher, an Ilocana migrantand a Catholic. I never knew her name. I ran into her outside a parish churchone early evening in Cotabato in 1978. Our casual conversation led to an exchangeon the gravity of the Mindanao conflict. At one point I asked her: Do you have

any suggestion on how to end this conflict? She said: Read Two Hills of the Same Land!

The other person was a young man, a Muslim, whom I met for the first timein October 2010 at the 31st National Conference on Local and National History inGeneral Santos City. He excitedly introduced himself as Adz Rasul and went onto recount that he was still a teenager when he read Two Hills; napaiyak talaga

ako, he said.

Why these two people? Because that is exactly what I wanted the book to do,feel the agony of being torn in a war that nobody wants, and in the process clear uppiles of confusion and misunderstanding about the MNLF-led Moro struggle forself-determination. A final peace agreement was signed by the government and theMNLF in September 1996 but to date, nearly 15 years later, several provisions areawaiting implementation. Convinced that the agreement did not fully attain themuch sought for Bangsamoro self-determination, the MILF decided to continuethe fight.

Who is Rad D. Silva? The author’s name is a pen name, isn’t it obvious? Itis meant to deliver a message. Both Latin words, radix means root, and silvameans forest. Read continuously, Rad D. Silva sounds like radix silva, root of theforest. There is so much we do not comprehend about this Mindanao conflict,the forest; we need to go to the roots to be able to come up with a commonunderstanding of the situation. It was also meant to provide cover for me and for




all others who contributed to the making of this book. I fought martial law, I wasa wanted man and using my name in print would not be a wise move. Not for me,not for them. Their participation must remain a secret.

Why reprint? Because the message of the book remains valid; the war is stillthere; the process of comprehending the problem continues, the agony of beingcaught in the midst of the fighting remains. But this is not strictly a reprint. As Iread slowly through every page, I could not help but spot a few details that shouldbe corrected, mostly typos, and some dates that I missed by a year as I discoveredlater. The census data on population for 1970 in the Appendix used to focus onthe Muslims alone; now it includes the Lumad. I decided to remove Appendix A,

the map -- a map I made by hand -- of agricultural colonies and other settlementareas. The book can do without it. On the whole, the book remains the same.

Why Two Hills, in obvious reference to the Muslims and the Christian settlers? Why not Three Hills to include the Lumad? Or tri-people, the more popularexpression today. Because this is also a historical document. The first editioncame out in 1978, and the revised one in 1979. The tri-people concept did notemerge until the mid-80s. The Lumad did not articulate their right to self-determination until June 1986 on the occasion of the Lumad Founding Congress

in Kidapawan, North Cotabato . They became part of the story in my two otherbooks: The Minoritization of the Indigenous Communities of Mindanao and

the Sulu Archipelago (AFRIM, 1994) and A Story of Mindanao and Sulu in Question and Answer (MINCODE, 2003).

Rudy Buhay RodilMindanao Historian & Peace AdvocateRetired Professor of History MSU-Iligan Institute of Technology 19 June 2011




Revised Edition

1979

Addressed to you

WHO DRAW YOUR LIFE FROM MINDANAO AND SULU

Gratitude to you who helped produce

your part has only just begun




Second Revised Edition

2011

Still addressed to you

WHO DRAW YOUR LIFE FROM MINDANAO AND SULU

Gratitude

to you who have helped produce your part continues




Inside this Book

Dear Abdul........................................................... page 9

Part One. Are We Enemies?.................................. page 13

Part Two. Land: Key to Mindanao Problem.......... page 35

Hoaxes about Mindanao..................................... page 53

Part Three. Conclusion, Not the End..................... page 77

Dear Abdul (continued)...................................... page 85

Appendix A - Muslim & Lumad Population inMindanao by Mother Tongue

-1970 Census............................................. page 87




Dear Abdul, Moro friend and brother,

It is more than four hundred years since the Mindanao conflict started and there no sufficient indications that the end is near.

Since the re-escalation of violence a few years ago, ten thousands more lives havebeen snuffed out, thousands more wounded, and a much greater number uprooted from their homes and sources of livelihood.

The climate of mutual animosity continues to hang menacingly in the air. Indeed,

too much bad blood has accumulated over the past few years, an addition to what hasbeen there all along. The government soldiers, for instance, have no good word for the Moro. Take a trip to Jolo, to Basilan, to Zamboanga City, to Cotabato City, to MarawiCity and listen to the soldiers’ spontaneous talks. It is from them that you hear the most saddening and revolting remarks about the Moro. The civilian Christian population especially in the embattled areas have also their negative impressions about the Moro. Naturally, of course, I do not expect your people to have a good word in turn for the government soldiers and our civilian population.

Brother Abdul, the issue of our brotherhood is very much under question. The little goodwill cultivated among a few has been transformed into an atmosphere of hostility.

Many times in the past, whenever the Moros rebelled, or raised the issue of separating from the Republic, our leaders raced forward with their loud proclamations of Muslim-Christian brotherhood. Brother, they come cheaper by the dozen! But as soon as the trouble subsides, usually after massive military campaigns, the loudmouthed politicians suddenly lose their voices and, as if nothing happened, simply continue

with their merry-plundering: depleting the natural resources of Mindanao, expanding their logging operations, their ranches, their plantations, etc.

Such exp0loitative activities are even justified by brotherly admonitions like: “Butwe are also Filipinos! Mindanao is Philippine land! There should be equal opportunities for all!”

Brother, I’m glad you know how to fight. Look at the other hilltribes who do not fight. Where are they now? Who really pays attention to them? Panamin? The churches? Perhaps. Very little is left of their ancestral lands anyway.

Brother Abdul, I wish I could have a talk with you. It has been a long time since we last sat nights together at the beach, sometimes at Parang. At other times at Kusiong. At Linek. A few times on the well-kept campus of Mindanao State University watching




Lake Lanao.

In those curfew-less nights, under the beautiful moon, we talked endlessly about

life, the world, history, philosophy, everything. We swam in the cool waters of the MoroGulf, then talked again. We never discussed Muslim-Christian brotherhood for therewas no need to. It was flowing from you to me, from me to you. That is why, in a way, I feel strange now that I have to address you as brother. But now that I cannot talk with you, it serves as a useful reminder of the good old days.

Of these long talks I remember only one or two occasions when we seriously discussed the delicate situation that confronts our people, yours and mine. These occasions were always solemn, tense, and sad. Somehow, without saying, we both felt

sharply apprehensive that you and I might just find ourselves one day in the same field of battle, rifle in hand, you at one end and I on the other. At these times, we felt the difference between us, you a Muslim and I a Christian.

Always I asked that you do not see me as a Christian but as a Filipino, for thiswas all that was me and I am proud of it. You for your part asked that I see you as a Moro. To you, being a Moro is the lasting symbol that you have never been conqueredby the Spanish colonizers. In contrast, you pointed out, it is because we in Luzon and the Visayas have been conquered and colonized that we have come to be known as

Filipinos. I had wanted to protest to this distinction, but I knew too little of my own history at the time. Besides, the heavy feeling resulting from our discussions often left me speechless. I understood that you were only giving expression to the common view of a people whose maratabat (sense of honor) has been, and still is, being seriously offended. You were taking a difficult position, and you knew it.

Once, for the first and last time, I asked you about Islam. For the next hours, you explained, you described, you lived Islam. Spellbound, I completely lost track of time listening to you. You answered all my questions, even the most trivial ones. Perhaps,

you were not aware of it but I was also reflecting the ignorance of my own people about Islam. Finally, in the end, you invited me to become a Muslim. I was tempted to andwhen I refused, my heart was heavy. Yet I had to refuse.

I remember telling you that if I were to become a Muslim, it would not be for religious reasons. I was mainly because as a people, you and I have a common history, though distinct, and share common aspirations for a better future. Your people and my people are burdened with common problems. And so, I expressed instead my desire to join hands with you in easing up you pains and doing away with the very cause of

this pain. Your people have never been my enemy. If this has yet to be proven, then as a Filipino I shall prove it.

But you are a Moro and I am Filipino, you argued. How can we live together?




But haven’t we been living together? Abdul, you yourself said that when in the early days of Islam, the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) and his followerswere being hounded and persecuted by the rulers of Mecca, it was to the Christians

that they ran for protection.

But that was in the 7 th century, you insisted. After that, Christians and Muslims fought each other in the Crusades. In our own history, from the time Magellan set foot on these islands up to the present, it has been the Christians who have hounded and persecuted you, who have sought to obliterate you from the face of the earth.

Yes, Brother, how indeed can we live together?

That was how we parted.

At home that night, until today, I have been disturbed, restless. Often I would mutter to myself, insisting:

No, that cannot be the ending.

I have not heard from you since, nor have I heard about you. It is not likely thatwe will meet again in the near future. You have your obligations to your kith and kin

and I do not know where to find you. And so I am writing this, hoping it will find you sometime, somehow, if only to remind you that I am still your brother and your friend.

I have been searching. “How can we live together” is deeply etched in my memory.

For the way we parted cannot be the ending.

It cannot be because your people and mine have the same basic causes for the same basic pain. Do we not therefore have the same basic solutions?




Part One

ARE WE ENEMIES?




How can we live together?

But are we enemies in the first place?

Historically, there is sufficient evidence that we have been both victims of circumstancesnot of our own making, least of all for our own benefit. Renowned Filipino and Moro socialscientists agree, moreover, that all the peoples of the Philippine archipelago, with thepossible exception of the Negritos or Agtas, originated from the same Malayo-Polynesianstock, in short, that “the peoples of the Philippines were basically one people.” Let us citesome of the more salient examples.

One Common Bond

Eric Casiño, one of the more noted Filipino Anthropologists, describes the pre-colonialPhilippine situation in very simple terms.1 “At the time the Arabs and the Chinese startedtrading with the peoples of the Philippines, followed later by the Spaniards, the inhabitantsof the archipelago can be classified into three basic segments. The first type… are theNegritos or Agta. The second type are the so-called upland peoples, those who inhabitedthe mountains and the upper reaches of rivers… The Third type inhabited the coastal

regions and the valleys and lower portions of rivers, the lowlanders. “For our purposes, the most important… are those who belong to the second and

third types. “The upland types were technologically less advanced than the lowlanders… The

lowlanders were technologically more advanced.

“And who were these lowlanders and uplanders, where did they come from and

what relationship did they have before the idea of a state and a republic enable them tothink of a single national community? The lowlanders were the ancestors of the presentTagalogs, Tausugs, Samals, Maguindanaos, (Maranaos) and others. And who were theuplanders? They were the ancestors of the Igorots, the Mangyans, Bukidnons, Tedurays,Tagbanuas, and Manobos. Although the uplanders and the lowlanders were differentiatedtechnologically in terms of racial classification and ethnic identity, they were of the samestock and clearly distinguished from Indians and Chinese and Japanese.

1 Casiño, Eric, “Structuralism in the Philippine Cultural Diversities,” Solidarity, July-

August, 1975, pp. 18-29. Also by the same author, “The Anthropology of Christian

and Islam in the Philippines: A Bipolar Approach to Diversity,” Mindanao Journal ,

January-March, 1975, pp. 25-36.




“One of the most important facts to remember regarding our ethnic backgroundsis that since time immemorial the uplanders and the lowlanders formed a single tradingcommunity, or a common market tied together by the rules of supply and demand. The

lowlanders supplied fish, salt, porcelain, iron-work, brasswork, and other trade items tothe uplanders; the latter in turn traded forest products such as rattan, beeswax, resin,honey, rice and gold. The lowlanders themselves were in full trading contact with eachother, from Ilocos to Borneo and beyond to Malacca and Java.

“Nowhere is this network of similarities most evident than in common conceptsand vocabularies reflecting the fact that all the peoples of the Philippines, exceptingperhaps the Negritos, speak languages belonging to the same family of languages, Malayo-Polynesian. Such common concepts and terms covered the most elemental areas of

the people’s lives and environments. Examples of such shared words and ideas are thefollowing:

Environmental Features:

Heaven langitEarth lupa, yuta, tuna Inland, upland ilaya, bulud, bud, guimba Coast, shore pasig, pasil, baybay

Sea, ocean dagat, laud, lautBay lu’uk

Wind hanginS.W. Monsoon habagat, balat, barat

Spiritual Features:Spirit anitoDeities diwata Soul kaluluwa, alua, arua

Conscience budhi, buddiChildbirth monster mantianak, pantianak

Technological Features:Farm, swidden huma, uma Smith panday House bahay, balay, bayay Roof atop, atipNipa leaves nipa Bamboo kawayan, boho’, bugtong Rice (hustked) bigas, bugasRice (unhusked) palay, paoay




Sociological Features:Leader, chief angulo, datu, rajahGrandfather apo

Older sibling kaka Child, offspring anak Male lalakiFemale babaeGreat, noble dakula, dakila, dakuCommunity, group, class bangsa, bansa

“The most fascinating area of similarity in concept and terminology is that of

brotherhood or siblingship. The two archetypal symbols of brotherhood are the umbilicalcord. The majority of Philippine terms for siblingship is derived from the idea of infantsbeing cut from the same umbilical cord.

“Examples of this can be found in the following: Tagalog kapatid Ilocano kabsat Pampango kaputol Ilongo utod Cebuano igso’ or igbugtu’ Palawanun tipusod Yakan bugto’ tina’i

Maranao repud sa pusod

“Besides the idea of being severed from the same womb, there is the other archetypalsymbol of being of the same blood, sandugo. The idea is even widespread in Indonesiaand Malaysia where the term saudara is cognate to the Philippine sandugo or kadugo.

We know that the blood compact was used by the ancient Filipinos, like Sikatuna andSoliman with the Spaniards, to symbolize the closest bond of equality and brotherhood. Itis interesting to note that this ancient tradition of blood compact was resorted to for verysolemn declarations of unity between converted Filipinos Father de la Costa recounts ablood compact between Bwisan of Cotabato and the Waray chiefs of Leyte:

‘They sat down with Bwisan and enteredinto a blood compact with him. They

slashed their wrists and let the blood dripinto a bowl of brandy. Then they dranktheir mingled blood from the commonbowl, and so became brothers.”




“The significant thing about this blood compact is that it was performedbetween Christianized and Islamized Filipinos. Its implications were aptly notedby Majul:

‘Despite the pre-Islamic and pre-Christian character of this ceremonial,the Muslims and the Christianizednatives participated apparently withouthesitation in this ritual. Christians couldnot have failed to recognize that theceremony recalled a pagan past; whilethe Muslim must have known, too well,

that the drinking of blood was a religioustaboo. It may therefore be conjecturedthat the chiefs who entered into the pactmust have recognized, however vaguely,a common racial beginning or culturalhistory that that at bottom the commonenemy of the datus of Leyte andMaguindanao were the Spaniards.’

The blood compact between Bwisan and the Leyte chiefs took place in 1603, andhad been conditioned by the Spanish-Moro wars then raging for several years already.Two important points were observed by Majul: firstly, that there was a mutual recognition,however vague, between the Waray datus who were Christians, and Bwisan, a Muslim,of a ‘common racial beginning or history’; secondly, that the Spaniards were commonenemies of both. This was not the first recorded instance of the recognition of these twopoints, especially the second.

Further Attempts at Forging Unity

During the Philippine Revolution, the revolutionary leaders tried to solicit theassistance of the Moros against a common enemy, the Spaniards. The leaders of therevolution also warned the Moros of the colonial intentions of the Americans. TheHongkong Junta once declared that the Filipinos were forced to fight the Muslims of Suluand Mindanao who “in reality are our brothers, like us fighting for their independence.”Emilio Aguinaldo’s message to the Malolos Congress on January 1, 1899, proposed that the

republican government be empowered “to negotiate with the Moros of Sulu and Mindanaofor purposes of establishing national solidarity upon the basis of a real federation withabsolute respect for their beliefs and traditions.”2

2 Majul, Cesar Adib, Muslims in the Philippines (Q.C. UP Press, 1973, p. 315.




This was followed by a letter of Aguinaldo to the Sultan of Sulu, dated January 19,1899:3

The President of the Philippine Republic very cordially greets his great and powerful brother,

the Sultan of Jolo to whom they are blood by the

ties of race, interests, security and defense in this

region of the Far East.

The Philippine Republic has resolved to respect

absolutely the belief and traditions of each island

in order to establish on solid basis the bonds

of fraternal unity demanded by our mutualinterests.

I therefore in the name of all the Filipinos very

gladly offer to the powerful Sultan of Jolo and to

all brothers who acknowledge his great authority,

the highest assurance of friendship, consideration

and esteem.

Pedro Cuevas of Basilan was asked in another letter “to appraise the Sulu Sultanof all these (that is, how the Igorots and the Aetas had joined the revolution to share inthe victories of their brothers in Luzon and the Visayas) and to assure him that there

would not anymore be repetition of the bloody wars initiated by the criminal ambitions ofthe Spaniards who made brothers fight each other, and to warn him that another power(the Americans) was now trying to succeed the Spaniards. (It was also explained how acombination of the Sulus with the people of Luzon would make it difficult for the outsidersto dominate the Filipinos.”4

Baldomero Aguinaldo, in a letter to the Sultan of Marangas on May 31, 1899, “spokeof one God, but that the Spaniards, especially the friars, in order to sow discord among theFilipino race, made a distinction between the Moros who were described to have a falsereligion, and the Christians who were asserted to have the true religion. Claiming that theircommon god Bathala would not consent to their common subjugation to a barbaric racethat knew no law but only that of force, (he) expressed confidence that as brothers andsons of the same race they would join in the aspirations of independence and liberty.”5

3 Tan, Samuel K., “Sulu Under American Military Rule, 1899-1913.” Philippine

Social Science and Humanities Review, January 1967, p. 26. Hereinafter cited as

Tan-67.4 Majul, ibid .5 Ibid .




These appeals to the Sultans and datus received no favorable response. This shouldnot be interpreted, however, to mean the negation of the ancient brotherhood among thepeoples of the Philippines. It should be viewed more properly as an indication of how

much disunity and bad blood had been sown and nurtured by the Spanish colonizersamong the people.

Spanish Colonizers Sever Common Bond

Samuel K. Tan, a distinguished scholar on Moro history, is no less clear and cogenton the very cause of the rift between Muslims and Christians. Tan traces the roots of thisconflict thus:

“The Muslim hatred for the Christians, whichwas evident during the entire span of the Spanish era and

inherited by the American period, was not a product of

an innate prejudice but was the result of the resentment

over the Christian participation in the so-called ‘Moro

Campaigns’. However, the Moslems later realized that the

Spaniards should be blamed for using Christian Filipinos

as pawns against them in the centuries of bloodshed and

warfare. Thus toward the end of the nineteenth century and in the first decade of the twentieth, the Moslems began

to see and appreciate their common ties with Christian

Filipinos and this vicarious feeling was reflected in a

comment of Sultan Jamalul Kiram. In an interview which

he had with a representative of an evening paper published

in Spanish, he made no secret of the fact that the people

of his region had been hostile in the past to their Christian

brethren, not because of any inborn hatred, but because of certain ‘Machiavellian tricks’ used by those who were

working against the Filipino people.” 6

It must be emphasized, however, that in resolving the conflict that still rages inMindanao and Sulu, there is little to fall back on. The historic Moro-Filipino brotherhood

was practically obliterated by centuries of fighting and bloodshed. The memories of presentday Moros are splattered with the blood of their ancestors who were made to fight each

other. The idea of common ties hardly even constitutes an aspect of the common masses’recollection. It does contribute to the solution but only to a very limited extent. There aremore pressing points to be clarified and more concrete actions to be undertaken.

6 Tan-67, pp. 147-148.




Spanish Divide and Rule Tactics: Christianized Natives Against Muslims

To succeed in their colonial ambitions, the Spaniards resorted to divide and ruletactics as a standard operating procedure. This was already evident when Magellan tried toimpose himself upon the people of Cebu and Mactan.

When Governor Sande went to Borneo on a military expedition in 1574, he had withhim 1,500 Filipino natives and 300 followers of the Bornean chieftain, Pangiran Sri Lala,

whose throne had been usurped earlier by his brother.

When Martin de Goiti assaulted Manila in 1570, he was assisted by 600 Visayans,

again in 1671, by several hundred Visayans. Salcedo’s expedition into Central Luzon andPangasinan were supported by Lakandula of Tondo, and into Morong and Laguna by manynative allies.

The Figueroa expedition to Maguindanao and Buayan in 1596 was assisted by 1,500natives. One squadron of the two-squadron Spanish expedition into Mindanao and Sulu in1628 was composed of natives from Oton, Panay, numbering 1,600.

A long list of these expeditions to Mindanao and Sulu right up to the end of theSpanish colonial regime clearly showed the participation of hundreds, if not thousandsof Luzon and Visayan natives. This was a constant feature of the Spanish-Moro wars. Butbeing a subject people, aside from being highly vulnerable to divide and rule tactics dueto their lack of consciousness as one people, these Christianized natives could not be fullyfaulted for their collaboration.

If in the course of the Spanish-Moro wars, the Christianized native themselvesdeveloped deep hatred for the Moros, this was not due to an innate prejudice as has beencorrectly point by the Filipino revolutionary leaders and Sultan Jamalul Kiram. Rather, this

was rooted in the success of the Spanish masters in implanting and nurturing the seedsof disunity and hatred among the people. To top it all, these divisive tactics were pursuedunder the guise of defending Christianity.

The Spaniards came to these islands to extend their colonial empire; they came toconquer, to subject us, and remain as masters of about two-thirds of the archipelago.Thus, if they had to Christianize, it was because such an action was necessary to extend

and consolidate their colonial holdings and render their rule more effective. If they had tocoerce Christianized natives to fight Moros, this was also a clear extension of their colonialends. It is important, therefore, that Christianization, anti-Moro propaganda (Like Moro-Moro plays still popular in many parts of Luzon and the Visayas), and the Spanish-Moro

wars must never be viewed outside the context of Spanish colonization as many scholarsstill continue to do.




Muslims Against Brother Muslims

The tactics of divide and rule were not limited to playing Christianized natives against

Moros; there were also used to divide the Moros among themselves. It will be recalled thatthe Spanish colonizers had ambitions of conquering the Moluccas and to accomplish thisthey needed Mindanao as a staging point. Aware of this, Bwisan tried to enlist the aid ofthe Sultan of Ternate, Said Din Berkat. To seal the alliance, Bwisan arranged a marriagebetween the sister of the Sultan of Ternate and the Rajah Muda, the heir apparent ofMindanao. The Spanish tried to forestall this match with their own proposal, that theRajah Muda marry instead the sister of the Datu of Tampakan who had already submittedto the Spaniards.

When the Governor finally secured Royal permission in 1605 to attack the Dutch inthe Moluccas, one obstacle stood in the way – the threat of Maguindanao and Buayanattacks in the Visayas in their absence. To obviate this, they entered into a treaty with theRajah of Buayan, careful to insert a shrewd rider. Conscious of the rivalry between Buayanand Maguindanao, the Spanish recognized the Rajah of Buayan as the paramount chief ofMaguindanao. The Spaniards reckoned that with this move they would be able to quiet theRajah and also create dissension between him and his rival, Datu Bwisan, who at that time

exercised control over the entire Pulangi. The Spanish expedition, participated in by 1,613natives was a success, capped by the capture of Sultan Din Berkat alive.

The Spaniards also tried to prevent the consolidation of Maguindanao and Buayan bythe famous Sultan Qudarat. In their 1639 attack on Buayan, the Spaniards were helped byManakior, nephew of Datu Maputi, at that time lord of Buayan. Manakior who had wantedto replace his uncle, aided the Spaniards with 2,000 of his own men. The Spaniards inturn showed their appreciation by promising to recognize Manakior as lord of Buayan,

provided, of course, that Maputi was kept out of the territory. Through this maneuver aSpanish fort was built at Buayan even if temporary.

In Sulu, the Spanish interfered in the succession to the Sultanate. After the death ofSultan Badar Ud-Din II in early 1884, two candidates were in contention for the vacantposition, Rajah Muda Amirul Kiram and Datu Ali Ud-Din. Amirul enjoyed the generalsupport of the southern portion of Jolo, and Ali, the northern part.

Failure to come into agreement about the succession problem resulted in two sultansco-existing at the same time: Amirul based in Maimbung, and Ali in Patikul. Continuousskirmishes between the two groups culminated in the destruction of Ali’s kuta at Patikul.

Ali took flight to Basilan and virtually disqualified himself from the struggle for successionto the sultanate.




Amirul then tried to seek recognition of his sultanate, a political necessity at thattime. However, the Spaniards who were earlier sympathetic to Ali were not inclined to giverecognition to a fiercely independent man like Amirul. They instead proposed to Harun ar-

Rashid, a friendlier and far more pliable man, to become sultan. Harun had earlier beenplaced by the Spanish in charge of governing parts of Palawan and Balabak.

Accepting the offer, Harun went to Manila, and on September 24, 1886 at Malacañang,in the presence of the Governor General and other high officials, was proclaimed sultan.He swore by the Holy Qur’an to be loyal to Spain. A month later, Harun was escorted bySpanish troops to Jolo. He was received coldly by the people. At the same time, AmirulKiram was preparing his forces against him.

This and subsequent events put the Spaniards in an embarrassing position. Theyresorted then to the use of force to coerce the people to submit to Harun. Colonel Juan

Arolas launched a bloody and merciless military campaign in various parts of Sulu. Whilethis was militarily successful, it failed to produced acceptance of Harun’s rule. Thus, whilethe Spaniards succeeded in forcing the defeated datus to accept Harun’s sultanate, thepeople of Jolo and elsewhere showed only signs of rejection. Finally in 1893, when moreand more of his followers were beginning to defy his orders, Harun asked the Spanish

government to relieve him. The embarrassed Spanish authorities were only too happy tocomply.

The most written about and celebrated of Spanish interference in the internal affairsof Sulu was their support of Sultan Azim ud-Din who maintained himself in power with themilitary assistance of the Spanish during the early part of his career. In the first instance,

Azim ud-Din received Spanish support against a rival to the throne. In the secondinstance, he was again supported by the Spanish in his campaign to re-impose his rule

over the rebellious Tiruns, the non-Muslim subjects of the Sulu Sultan along the easternpart of Borneo. What particularly alienated the people from the reigning sultan was hisalien source of support and his decision allowing the Jesuits to set up a mission house in

Jolo. Famous in Spanish annals as the only Sultan who had been supposedly converted toChristianity, Azim ud-Din spent a great part of his life in Spanish–held territory.

During the first quarter of the 18th century, Jafar Sadiq Manamir, a younger brother ofthe Maguindanao sultan, fled to Tamontaka and styled himself the Rajah Muda. Once, he

sent a letter to the Spanish governor of Zamboanga warning the latter of an Iranun attack,under the leadership of Datu Balasi of Butig, on the Zamboanga fort. The warning wascorrect and the attack failed. For this gesture, Jafar earned Spanish support in his bid forthe Maguindanao sultanate. He died, however, without accomplishing his objective.

Jafar’s son, Amir ud-Din Hamza, succeeded as ruler of Tamontaka and continued




friendly relations with the Spanish expecting the same support in his own ambition tobecome sultan. But the combined strength of Hamza and the Spanish forces merelyenabled Hamza to occupy part of the Maguindanao territory and drive the legitimate sultan

and his son to the interior. Even with partial success, Hamza was crowned sultan in thepresence of Spanish officials who in turn dealt with him as if indeed he were the legitimatesultan. Hamza remained in that position until his death sometime in between 1748 and1749. By this time, Hamza had become recognized as the lord of Pulangi.

On the two occasions that the Spaniards tried to subjugate the Maranaos, first in thecampaigns of 1639 and 1640, then in the campaigns of 1891, 1894 and 1895, they had noopportunity to employ divide and rule tactics. There was report, however, of seven sultans,

five datus and four rajahs who claimed allegiance to Spain and helped Spanish troops inthe suppression of Moro resistance in 1898, but this remains to be verified.7

Despite changes of internal policy and tactics with respect to the Moros of Mindanaoand Sulu, never for a moment did the Spanish abandon the idea of exercising realsovereignty over them. The establishment of permanent forts and garrisons in Caraga,Butuan, Dapitan, Zamboanga, and temporary ones in Basilan, Jolo, Sabanilla (aroundthe present Malabang), Iligan and Tampakan, among others, not only served as defense

positions to protect the north from Moro attacks but also as staging points for theirmilitary raids on Moroland. But the generally uncompromising stand of the Moros againstSpanish invasion sustained them through defeats in battle, especially in the last half of thenineteenth century, in spite of the enemy’s divide and rule tactics. Thus they remainedunconquered during the more than three centuries of Spanish attempts. What sovereigntySpain claimed over Sulu on the basis of the treaty of 1878 was at beast a “sovereignty byproclamation not recognition.”8

Divide and Rule Tactics Among Luzon and Visayan Natives

Divide and rule tactics were also used, and more effectively against the Luzon and Visayan natives. The lack of a unifying consciousness that they were one people in struggleagainst a common enemy enabled the Spaniards to keep them in subjection for more thanthree centuries. The chronicle of more than two hundred revolts before the revolution of1896 are replete with concrete examples of how the Spaniards succeeded in suppressinga revolt in one province with the use of natives from another, and vice versa. Still, these

revolts through scattered and sporadic are ample proof that the Christianized nativesgenerally resisted their state of subjection.

7 Tan, Samuel K., The Muslim Armed Struggle in the Philippines, 1900-1941 (Syra-

cuse University, 1973), Ph.D. Thesis, p. 133. Hereinafter cited as Tan-73.8 Ibid ., p. 27.




The Essence of Divide and Rule Tactics

Playing off one group against another, one leader against another to prevent them

from uniting was the essence of Spanish divide and rule tactics. The method was meantto serve their colonial ends. Just as it was to their best interest to keep Luzon and the

Visayas under subjection, so it was that they also tried to extend their rule over the peoplesof Mindanao and Sulu. To pursue these ends, they used the Christianized natives againsteach other, the Moros against their own kind, and the Christianized natives against theMoros. Each threat to their basic , each obstacle to their colonial goals was met by theSpaniards with the most effective measure they would muster, be it by force or deception,or both.

Within the context of Spanish colonialism therefore, it is misleading, in fact, incorrect,to call the conflict in Mindanao and Sulu, the “Moro Wars” or the “Piratical Wars” orthe “Muslim-Christian Conflict.” It was essentially a conflict of basic interests betweenthe Spanish colonizers and the Moros: one determined to subjugate the other; the otherdetermined to remain free.

The participation of the Christianized natives of Luzon and the Visayas in the

suppression campaigns against the Moros was a role forced upon them by their status asa subject people. The Spanish invaders were clearly the subject people’s enemy. Even ifthis consciousness was increasingly realized in the last quarter of the nineteenth century,the damage had already been done.

The Spanish use of divide and rule tactics had succeeded in driving a wedge, deepand solid, between the Moros of the southern region and the Filipinos of the north. Theingrained hostility and suspicion bred by this historic process are definitely not easy to

overcome. Yet, hopefully, the first decisive steps have been done to link once more thecommon bonds of unity.

American Role in Internal Disunity

The American imperialists must share the responsibility for perpetuating thecontradictions between Moros and Christianized natives. To achieve their imperialistends in Asia, the Americans invaded the Philippines. First, they deceived the politically

naïve Aguinaldo leadership, then made war on the Filipino people who had just wontheir freedom from Spanish subjection. Second, in their attempt to extend sovereigntyover Mindanao and Sulu as provided for in the Treaty of Paris, the Americans took stepsto effectively neutralize the Moros. The Americans deceived the Moros with the Bates

Agreement, and with the same instrument hoped to prevent a possible tie-up betweenMoros and Filipinos.




This act of deception was a necessary expedient because the Americans who werethen busy with the Filipino resistance fighters in the north could not at the same time facethe Moros in the south for lack of troops. However, as soon as troop replacements and

reinforcements arrived, the Americans readily and unilaterally abrogated the agreementand went on to impose their “sovereignty” in Mindanao and Sulu.

Such calculated moves, a combination of military force and deception, did in factbecome characteristics feature of American colonial policy. The American imperialists

were equally guilty of employing divide and rule tactics as a means of achieving theircolonial ends. Instances of the American use of these tactics particularly in the early yearsof their regime can be cited.

Maguindanaon Resistance

In Cotabato, the most well-known case illustrating the American’s use of divide andrule tactics was the defeat of Datu Ali of Kudarangan. Datu Ali was the son of Datu Uto, whobefore his death had been the most powerful chief of Maguindanao after Sultan Kudarat.He was also the son-in-law of Datu Piang who took over from Datu Uto.

As soon as the Spaniards evacuated Cotabato in 1899, Datu Ali, along with DatuDiambangan took over immediately. At the start of the American colonial regime, “Datu

Ali not only refused to obey the anti-slavery law but even attempted to raise the entireCotabato Valley in revolt against the Americans. His agents also sought to persuade theLake Lanao Moros to join his Maguindanaon following in the revolt.”9

Ali’s defeat in October 1905, must not only be attributed to the might of Americanarms but also to the American success in taking advantage of weak points in their enemy.

Having won over Datu Piang earlier, the Americans used him to get Ali. Piang provided“vital information to American troops resulting in the suppression of the revolt,”10 thedeath of Datu Ali and several datus who supported the uprising. Moreover, other datus

who had taken the path of Piang in relation to the Americans had allowed their slaves tojoin the First Cotabato Company, the Moro Company of the Philippine Constabulary, in1904. These “Cotabato Moslem Constables, well-versed in the trails, tricks, and traits of

Ali, provided valuable scouting services and intelligence information for the US Army.”11

9 Gowing, Peter, Mandate in Moroland: The American Government of Muslim Fili-

pinos, 1899-1920 (Q.C.: PCAS, UP, 1977), p. 151.10 Tan-73, p. 136.11 Coats, G.Y., “The Philippine Constabulary in Mindanao and Sulu, 1903-1917,”

Bulletin of American Historical Collection, January 1975, p. 12.




Maranao Resistance

The most popular Maranao resistance to American invasion that was led by Datu

Ampuan Agaus of Taraka, suffered the same fate. The notorious Lanao campaigns ofGeneral Pershing, started in 1903, enjoyed the assistance of Datu Pedro, Datu Gamur, andtheir followers at Uato. Pershing met the stiffest resistance from the forces of Datu Ampuan

Agaus. Their encounters culminated in the battle of Taraka Kuta where the Maranaofighters suffered two hundred killed. Twenty-nine surrendered including Ampuan Agaushimself.12

For the brave Datu, however, the surrender was only a tactical move, for in 1906 he

was up in arms again. Except for one decisive encounter near Taraka fort,, where againhe suffered heavy losses, Ampuan Agaus shifted to small-scale encounters, harassing

American soldiers traveling overland from Iligan to Marawi.13

The situation became so uncomfortable that one could not cross the Keithley Road“without getting shot up.”14 In January 1908, despite the presence of a U.S. regimentalpost within the immediate area, Ampuan Agaus led an attack of Dansalan (Marawi) nearlyoverwhelming a constabulary post. A month later, his warriors ambushed a U.S. Infantry

detachment and seriously wounded Allen Gard, the Governor of Lanao.15

Through the intercession of prominent Lanao leaders who had been effectively usedby the Americans to break down the morale of Ampuan Agaus and his fighters, the Maranaoresistance leader again surrendered in 1909.16 Soon, however, Datu Ampuan Agaus wasagain back to the battlefield and fought on until mid-1916.

Determined to break what they considered to be a “heroic but futile resistance to

modernization under American guidance,”17

the American government sent heavyConstabulary reinforcement to Lanao. This finally enabled the troops to organize “asystematic campaign to explore, map, and expand the government’s control of Lanao’shinterland.”18

12 Tan, Samuel K., The Filipino Muslim Armed Struggle, 1900-1972 (Manila: Filipi-

nas Foundation, Inc., 1977), p. 21. Hereinafter cited as Tan-77.13 Ibid.; also Coats, ibid., p. 16.14 Coats, ibid ., p. 17.15 Ibid ., p. 16.16 Tan-77, p. 22.17 Coats, ibid ., p. 17.18 Ibid ., pp. 18-19.




To separate Ampuan Agaus and his fighters from their mass support, Captain GuyFort adopted military tactics “used so effectively by the Constabulary on Luzon from 1901-1906.19 Government forces “encircled the datu’s domain and gradually closed the net,

trying to force him into a decisive engagement or at least drive him into less familiarterritory. Secret service spies saturated the area to gather intelligence information.”20

Muslim constables were sent with instructions to explain the government’s programof peace and material progress to their co-religionists. “These same constables did nothesitate to deal very harshly with those who did not respond.”21 The corrosive effect oftheir divisive activities upon the moral of Maranao resistance fighters and their supporters

was clear. They (the constables) “succeeded where Army bullets failed. Within three

months, 500 warriors surrendered with their rifles.”22 By the middle of 1916, Ampuan Agaus’ forces had disintegrated.23

Tausug Resistance

Coinciding with the resistance efforts of Datu Ali in Cotabato and Datu Ampuan Agausin Lanao was the struggle of Panglima Hassan in Jolo. Although lasting only for less thansix months, from October 1903 to March 1904, the Hassan uprising illustrates not only the

price of disunity within but also the lack of coordination among the three major groups.

Actual fighting started with the attack of 300 to 400 Tausugs on Company K of the17th Infantry. The attackers, which included women and children, were armed withRemingtons, Mausers, German Express guns, old Chinese pieces and bladed weapons.The fighting which lasted for a whole day took a heavy toll on the resistance fighters.

The Americans, worried about the struggle spreading in Cotabato, Lanao and Jolo, but

more anxious about Jolo, sought to relieve the pressure by working for the surrender of Ampuan Agaus. The first surrender of the Maranao datu enabled the Americans to shift asizable force from Lanao to Jolo. It consisted of three battalions of infantry, one platoon ofGetley’s artillery, and two dismounted troops of the 14th Cavalry.24

19 Ibid ., p. 19.20 Ibid ., p. 20.21 Ibid ., p. 28.22 Ibid ., p. 19.23 Ibid ., p. 20.24 Tan, Samuel K., “The Hassan Uprising,” Progressive Review 10, January 23,

1967, pp 24-40. Typewritten copy, 7 pages, pp. 1-2.




Thus in the morning of November 12, 1903, Hassan who had expected a simplefrontal attack was surprised by American troops from various directions: two battalionsof the 28th Infantry, a platoon of Getley’s battery, two troops of the mounted cavalry, and

a detachment of the Engineer’s Corps. The Tausug fighters engaged them in hand tohand combat. Losses to the defenders were thirty dead and an undetermined number of

wounded at the end of the first day.

On the second day, more American troops joined the operation: three companies ofthe 17th Infantry from Jolo, one platoon of Rumbough’s battery and a troop of mountedcavalry under Major Hugh Scott. The battle cost the Tausug fifty to sixty dead and still more

wounded. By early afternoon Hassan’s kuta was assaulted and taken. Hassan surrendered

in the morning of November 15.25 But by a carefully planned ruse, Hassan was still ableto effect an ambush enabling him to escape and leaving behind Major Scott seriously

wounded on one arm which later caused the amputation of his affected fingers.26

In the ensuing fight in another kuta, Hassan’s losses totaled 150 dead. He escapedagain and continued the struggle. He enjoyed the support of his immediately family andthe powerful Datu Laksamana. Together, they continued to harass American troops. He

was finally killed on March 4, 1904, at his hideout in Bud Bagsak.27

As in the case of Datu Ali and Datu Ampuan Agaus, Panglima Hassan’s downfall waspartly caused by lack of local support. The Sulu Sultan who showed no sympathy for hiscause, in fact, led 1,000 of his own men to apprehend the resistance leader. Hassan’shideout was tipped off by Tausug mercenaries.28

Policy of Attraction: A Tool of Subjugation

Perhaps the most deceitful of American instruments of divide and rule that wenthand in hand with military campaigns were those falling under the so-called “policy ofattraction.” The Moro leaders like their counterparts in Luzon and the Visayas who were

won over by this method later became the most active supporters of American rule.

The practice of “inviting” independent-minded Moro leaders into exposing themselvesto “high civilization” in northern Philippines was one such policy. “On several occasionsselected Mohammedan and pagan natives, especially those of reputedly pronounced

antipathy toward Christian Filipinos, have been taken by the government to Manila and25 Ibid ., pp. 2-3.26 Ibid ., p. 3.27 Ibid ., pp. 3-4.28 Ibid ., pp. 4-6.




to several of the provinces in Luzon and the Visayas…. Among the individuals selectedfor these educational trips have been the most vociferous in their objection to politicalor social union with Christian natives, but also some leaders of large followings who had

but a few months before submitted to governmental control. A typical case is that of Datu Alamada (of Cotabato) who after many years of evading contact with government agentsand several engagements with troops and constabulary, had, as the result of negotiationsextending over a considerable period, voluntarily come in with many of his men on May 19,1914, and surrendered to the provincial governor of Cotabato, pledging the submission tothe government of his people, numbering nearly 3,000 men, women and children. Somemonths later he accepted an invitation to visit Cebu, Manila, and adjacent provinces witha party of datos and other Mohammedans of local prominence from Cotabato, Sulu, and

Lanao, begging, however, that he be assured permission to carry his kris at all times andthat he would not be required to wear ‘Christian’ clothes. With the assurance that he wouldbe quite free during the entire trip to carry his kris and to wear his customary clothing, he,before the end of the first day, requested permission to discard the weapon, on the groundthat he was embarrassed in finding that he was the only armed person either in the partyor among other people whom he met. Further, before he had been in Manila 12 hours,he had surreptitiously provided himself with a complete suit of ‘Christian’ clothing, exceptthat he substituted a plain Mohammedan cap for the semiturban head cloth customarily

worn by the Cotabato Mohammedans. Since his return to Cotabato he has been insistentin his request for schools, homestead surveys, and colony organization for his people.”29

Another typical case was that of Datu Ampatuan, an old Maguindanaon of greatinfluence and power among the people of upper Cotabato Valley and adjacent mountains.Following is how an official American report told the story. “Although accepting unwillingly

American sovereignty in the abstract, (Ampatuan) had practically conceded nothingthereto except to a limited degree the payment of the cedula or road tax when he felt

that armed force was about to compel payment. He was definitely opposed to theestablishment of the agricultural colonies, the immigration of Christian natives from thenorthern provinces, the establishment of public schools, and, in fact, the intervention ofthe government, directly or indirectly, in the territory constituting his zone of influence.Rather unwillingly he accepted the invitation to accompany a party of datos from his ownand other provinces with the department governor to Luzon and the Visayas. Althoughill with malaria, which developed during the trip, and constantly much fatigued by theunaccustomed and almost constant travel and interference with his ordinary habit of life,he made the greatest effort constantly to see and inform himself regarding all matters ofinterest which were comprehensible to him, the Manila carnival being something he wasnot able to understand. He was especially interested and impressed by the more efficient

29 Report of the Philippine Commission, July 1, 1913 to December 341, 1914 (Wash-

ington: Government Printing Ofce, 1915), pp. 399-400.




methods and industry of the people of the northern provinces in the cultivation of the soil,the public schools for the children, and the commodious homes of the more well-to-doclasses in which he and the members of his party were well received and entertained,

and the great physical benefit he had received from the medical treatment and care givenhim by a Filipino physician and nurse. Since his return to Cotabato he has given constantevidence of disposition to comply with all the advice and orders of the government. Themost recent expression from him has been a protest that the allowance of teachers andpublic schools for his people are inadequate.30

The pensionado program, the equivalent of today’s scholarship grants, had morelasting effects. Under this program, sons and daughters of the Moro elite, as was also the

case in the north, were sent for studies in the United States or in Manila. Graduates camehome with their ‘stateside” values, outlook and beliefs. While the program constituted asmall portion of the public school system, it cannot be regarded lightly. For as envisioned bythe American colonizers, this was part and parcel of the grand design to develop American-oriented leaders from among us under the guise of “training for self-government.” Withthis program, the colonizers, in fact, succeeded in softening our resistance to Americanrule.

It is in light of American success in colonization that the Moro objections to Philippineindependence should be viewed. The desire of the subjugated datus to continue servingunder American rule, and their corresponding refusal to be ruled by “Filipinos” must beequally seen in this proper historical perspective.

A three-page letter sent to the President of the United States in 1935 and accompaniedby nine pages of signature of Moro leaders in Lanao will serve to illustrate what Americancolonization had been able to accomplish by that time. Hereunder is an unedited copy of

the letter.31

Dansalan, Lanao, P.I.March 18, 1935

His Excellency

The President

of the United States

Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

Sir:

We have the honor to inform you that the leading datus of Lanao, all the Hadjis, Imams

and Kalis hold for the second time. In this meeting, we discussed matters that would

\30 Ibid ., p. 400.31 “Lanao Leaders to U.S. President,” Dansalan, March 18, 1935.




redound to the welfare of our people and our later generation. In the agreement that

we arrived at our people gave their unanimous approval. It was then decided the

decision arrived at must be written in the Arabic Characters and then translated

to English. It also decided that the result of this meeting should be forwarded to U.S.Congress through his excellency, the President of the United States of America.

On the outset we want to be excused for daring to forward this petition to safe-guard

ourselves in case of false steps which we may take which may displease the honorable

President.

We would like to inform that because we have learned that the U.S. is going to give

the Philippines an independence through the efforts of Hon. Quezon, Osmeña and others, we want to tell you that the Philippines as it is known to the American people

are populated by two different people with different religion, practices and traditions.

The Christian Filipinos occupy the Islands of Luzon and the Visayas. The Moros

predominated in the islands of Mindanao and Sulu. With regards the forth coming

Philippine Independence is granted these Islands. This condition will characterize by

unrest, suffering and misery and because of this we do not desire to be independent.

It is by living under the Stars and Strips that those hardships would not bear down

against. The American have ever respected our religion, customs, traditions and practices. They have also recognize our rights to our property. The American have

directed most of their efforts for the welfare of our people.

Our Christian associates have for many past years shows their desire to be only the

ones blessed with the leadership and well progressive towns without sharing with us

the advantage of having good towns and cities. One proof of this is that, among us

who are capable of participation in managing and administration government but

they have not been given changes to demonstrate their ability. Another proof is that the Christian Filipinos have taken control of our Insular funds which by right we must

have equal share. Most of these funds are annually appropriated for the provinces of

Luzon and the Visayas and very little are appropriated for the so-called Moro provinces

in the islands of Mindanao and Sulu. As a result their provinces progress by leaps and

bounds and ours behind. Another result is that we have been and are still behind in

advantages of Modern civilization and education.

One more very discriminating set of our Christian Filipino Associates is shown in the

recent written Constitution of the Philippine Commonwealth. In this Constitution no

provision whatsoever is made that would operate for the welfare of the Moros although

in the draft of the Constitution there was a precept leading to take care of our welfare.

The Constitution are all for the welfare of the Christian Filipinos and nothing for the

Moros. As proof of this our delegate did not sign the Constitution.




We have besides those many more reasons for not desiring to be away from the desiring

guidance and protection of the American government. First because we are yet weak

and powerless to depend our rights as an independent nation. Second, because we

are a small nation, unlike other big independent nation. It is not the proper and fitting that a small, weak and poor nation should an independent from a benevolent

powerful nation. Third, we do not want to be included in the Philippine Independent is

that once an independent Philippine is launched troubles between us and the Christian

Filipinos because from time immemorial these two people have not live harmoniously.

If trouble could now happen that the American are still here, how much more troubles

should happen when the American should finally withdraw her sovereignty over these

islands will beyond imagination. It is not then proper to have antagonizing people

live together under one flag, under the Philippine Independence. One proof of this thatwhen Lanao had its Filipino Governor, many leading Moro datus were killed for no

apparent reasons. This trouble has not yet ended up to the present time because our

people can’t and will never forget the bitterness of this incident. Lawlessness in this

province was rampant. When Lanao had the blessing of an American Governor it has

wipe out its bad elements.

The Moros (Islam) of Mindanao and Sulu can be compared to a small child lost in the

thick forest who does not know where to go. The Americans are equivalent if not more than our fathers and mothers who taught us the right thing to do.

Because of these we want our reasons for not desiring to be independent from the

Americans to be heard, considered and weighed considering the fact that we are

economically weak also weak in power and above all we are not educated along the

modern civilization. It is not the legally right that parents should abandon their child

when the child can’t yet live out in this cold and cruel world.

We would like than to pray the American people should not release until we are

educated and become powerful because we are like a calf who, once abandon its

mother would be devoured by a merciless lion. Should the American people grant the

Philippines an independent, the islands of Mindanao and Sulu should not be included

in such independent because we do not deserve at all to be independent. Our public

lands must not be given to other people other than the Moros. We should be given time

to acquire them because most of us have no land. Our people does not yet realize the

value of acquiring land of considerable area. We do not know also how to acquire these lands by the process of law. Where shall be obtain the support of family if our land

are taken us. It will be safe for us that a law should be created restricting the acquiring

of other people for our lands. This will also avoid future troubles.

Our practices, laws and the decisions of our Moro leaders should be respected similar




to what the Americans have extended to us. Our religion should not be curtailed in any

way. All our practices which are incidents to our religion of Islam should be respected

because these thing are what a Muslim desire to live for it. Once our religion is no more

our lives are no more.

We have the honor to request further that this letter be read very well so that its content

may be understood and considered.

Very respectfully,

Hadji Bogabong

Kali sa Onayan

Government policies in Mindanao and Sulu during the period of the Commonwealth(from November 15, 1935) and the Republic (from July 4, 1946) were, in essence, a merecontinuation of basic American imperialist policies.




Part Two

LAND: KEY TO MINDANAO PROBLEM




Problem in Moroland Not Created by Moros

A non-Moro view of the Mindanao conflict is that it is the Moros who are the problem.

This notion has for a long time served as a neat cover for the truth that the land problem isa key issue in the Mindanao question, and it was not the Moros who brought this about.

The Moros have, of course, been a problem to those who have sought to dominatethem. For the whole period of the Spanish colonial regime, the Moros have amplydemonstrated their determined opposition to every attempt to completely subjugatethem. The Spanish policy of direct conquest, spiced in between with diplomacy, took amore aggressive form from the middle of the 19th century. The result of the fierce military

campaigns was staggering in terms of lost lives and property on the Moro side.

The Spanish succeeded in checking the colonial ambitions of their European rivalsin the region. They also weakened further the already tottering sultanates of Mindanaoand Sulu. To the end of their colonial regime, however, the Spaniards failed to establisheffective sovereignty over Moro territories.

In light of this general failure, Governor Blanco advanced an idea (no longer original

by his time) to solve the problem. In 1895, he felt that the solution to the Mindanaoproblem (meaning the best way to neutralize the Moros) was the settlement of the region

with Christian settlers.32 By 1898, however, the whole archipelago had officially passed onto the hands of the Americans. Nevertheless, the idea of settling the region with outsiderspersisted.

To the American colonizers, imposing their “sovereignty on Mindanao met stiff andprotracted opposition from the Moros. This experience gave birth to the “Moro Problem,”a concept which became an integral part of American vocabulary in Mindanao. Theexpression has remained with us.

Imperatives of American Expansionism

The coming of the American imperialists to the Philippines was made not out ofany sense of goodwill, although President McKinley tried to dress it up beautifully in thismanner: “The Philippines are not ours to exploit, but to develop, to civilize, to educate, totrain in the science of self-government. This is the part we must follow or be recreant to amighty trust committed to us.”33

32 Tan-73, p. 96. Underscoring supplied.33 Gowing, ibid ., pp. 15-16.




The American presence was the logical consequence of an expanding capitalism at home.“The time has come now… when new markets are necessary… in order to keep ourfactories going.” This natural search for markets of a capitalist country that reached thestage of monopoly capitalism led to the forcible opening of Japan to Commodore Perry.Next, they secured Pago-Pago from the Germans, then usurped Hawaii from its nativerulers.

Towards the end of the 19th century, the drive was for securing a share in the vastChina trade. China at this time was being partitioned by European powers into spheresof influence, and the United States being a later comer, had only been able to wangle the“open door policy.” To be able to take advantage of this on the same footing as the other

powers, the Americans needed a base nearby. The Philippines was the answer. Thus, The Americans made war on Spain. The same war became the excuse for entering into themuch coveted South American market.34

Bates Agreement: Temporary Cover for U.S. Intentions

At the start, the American colonizers were faced with two serious problems. “On theone hand, there was the insurgent forces to combat with in Luzon and Visayas; on the

other was the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Mindanao and Sulu islands. Since the American troops were too busily occupied with the insurgent forces in Luzon and the Visayas, the Moros took advantage of the situation and immediately occupied the postsabandoned by the Spanish troops.”35

On August 20, 1899, an agreement was entered into between the Sultan of Sulutogether with some of his datus and Brigadier John C. Bates. From the standpoint of the

American colonizers, the agreement was a stoke of diplomatic genius. After prolonged

negotiation, which included threats and counter threats, Bates clinched his work, at leastin the triumphant tone of a certain Captain Smiley, with the display of a phonograph whichshowed the greatness and power of the American nation. That the general also played onthe jealousies of the different Tausug chieftains and at the same time demonstrating thefire power of the American 8-inch gun added punch to the genius.36

The decisive provision of the agreement, to which all other provisions conformed, was Article I which states: “The sovereignty of the United States over the whole Archipelago of

34 Constantino, Renato, The Philippines: A Past Revisited (Q.C.: Tala Publishing

Services, 1975) pp. 287-289 35 Tan-67, pp. 28-29.36 Ibid ., pp. 35-36.




Jolo and its dependencies is declared and acknowledged.”37 Aside from hooking the Sultanfor future political purposes, the agreement served an immediate military objective, thatis, to keep the Moros in a state of un-alarm (neutralized in military vocabulary) and

prevent any possible tie-up with the freedom fighters of the north, while the Americans were busy fighting the latter. According to an American who wrote the history of thePhilippine Constabulary in Mindanao and Sulu from 1903 to 1916, it was “to delay militaryinvolvement in Sulu and neutralize Aguinaldo’s efforts to involve the (Moros) in the waragainst the United States.”38

That the agreement was but a temporary expedient was clearly admitted by Bateshimself. He said: “The Treaty was made at a time when nearly all the state volunteers had

been sent home and other troops had not arrived to take their places. It was a critical time, as all the troops were needed in Luzon. The Government could not afford to stir

up trouble with the Moros. The Treaty was made as a temporary expedient to avoid

trouble. It has served its purpose for three years, and there is now no reason why thetreaty which was but a temporary measure at a critical time, should not be changed inaccordance with the conditions.39

Abrogation of Agreement: Unmasking of Real Intentions

The unilateral abrogation of the Bates Agreement on March 2, 1904 was thereforenot due to the reasons given. In the first place, while it is true that Bates informed theSultan of the U.S. President’s conditional confirmation and approval of the agreement,he deliberately kept the Sultan ignorant of the refusal of the U.S. Congress to act on it.The Congressional non-action had actually rendered the abrogation of the agreementmeaningless. For as far as the U.S. government was concerned, there was no agreement.Nor was it meant to be honored, hence the unilateral abrogation.

Equally meaningless were the official reasons given for the abrogation, such as that“the Sultan and his advisers failed to live up to their obligations under the agreement,”and that the “agreement was an obstacle to the establishment of an orderly governmentbecause it recognized a highly corrupt and arbitrary administration.”

37

“Agreement between General John C. Bates, United States Army, and the Sul-tan of Sulu, together with certain Sulu Chiefs, signed at Jolo, August 20, 1899” in

Alejandro M. Fernandez, The Philippines and the United States, the Forging of New

Relations (Q.C.: NSDB-UP Integrated Research Program, 1977), pp. A-72-74.38 Coats, ibid . p. 8.39 Ibid ., p. 47. Underscoring supplied.




Other factors cited for the abrogation were particulars such as “the frequent killing of American soldiers by juramentado was tolerated if not actually encouraged by the Sultan;” violation of “stipulation against slavery by President McKinley;” the purported stealing by

Moros of “property belonging to the U.S. government;” the supposed failure of the Sultan’sgovernment “to give reasonable protection to the life and property of his subjects;” theallegation that ”Moro laws were cruel and barbarous;” the unprovoked attack by PanglimaHassan and his men in October, 1903, which was claimed to constitute “an open rebellionagainst the U.S. government.”40

These were of course meant not for the satisfaction of the Sultan but for the Americanpublic who all along had been kept ignorant of the imperialist intent of their government on

the Philippines. Even the fact that there was widespread resistance to American presenceall over the country was deliberately concealed from the American public. Such actuations

were also based on the self-righteous assumption that American presence in the island was just, and therefore, any form of resistance was rebellion to duly-constituted-authority.Moreover, these were in reality intended to serve as an excuse to make war on the Morosas the shooting of an American soldier on San Juan del Monte bridge in Manila was usedas an excuse to make war on the Philippines.

The savage wars the Americans had to fight in Mindanao and Sulu were more thansufficient to make them realize the full weight and dimensions of the Moro problem.Military rule was maintained until 1913. Even before the establishment of civil rule, thepolicy of attraction, popular education, training for self-government and the pensionadoprogram had already been employed, selectively at first, as part of the overall plan ofconquest. Moreover, the Americans could not wait to tap the vast natural resources ofMindanao. Attention was, therefore given to resettlement as the more lasting solution. This

would reduce the necessity of maintaining a large army while ensuring, at the same time,

manpower for developing sources of raw materials for American factories.

Early Ideas and Inducements for Resettlement

Programmed resettlement did not start until 1913. It first went through a process ofcrystallization, which started with proposals to import foreigners into the Moro Provinceand jelled into invitations for establishing American plantations in said Province. It finallyended up with the systematic and continuous resettlement of Christian Filipinos toaccompany the steady influx of investors into Mindanao.

In the beginning the idea of resettlement was both scattered and disorganized. There was, for example, the proposal to consider settling the region with Black Americans

40 In Gowing, ibid ., pp. 117-118.




(instead of whites). This was viewed as more advantageous since the blacks would haveless difficulty adjusting to the tropical climate.41

There were also the three other proposals that were noted by the Bureau of Insular Affairs. In 1899, C.A. Muir of Weatherford, Texas, called for the settlement of 12,000 Texasfarmers and mechanics in areas like Mindanao to be followed by other settlers from thepoor sectors. All were offered incentives for colonization.42

In the same year, W.G. Douglas of Baltimore suggested that lands in the Philippinesbe organized into 200 colonies of 1,000 each or 100 colonies of 1,000 and 20 colonies of5,000 each. Then each colonist would be allotted $100 for transportation and $200 as loan

in advance payable in ten years.43

In 1906, R. Macarthy Williamson of San Francisco proposed to the President of theUnited States that the colonization of the Philippines be done by Italians and Greeks, andthat free passage and homestead be given to each settler.44

In 1909, Belgian missionaries indicated interest in opening up agricultural coloniesamong the Tedurays of Cotabato.45

Most interesting for its misdirected magnanimity was a proposal in 1939 (whichfortunately did not materialize) from no less than Quezon himself. He took his cue ofcourse from the State Department of the United States Government which seemed overlyconcerned with the welfare of more than 500,000 political refugees, mostly Jews, escapingfrom the criminal hands of Hitler. Offering to settle 10,000 German and Austrian Jews inMindanao, Quezon discussed the matter with two Jewish colonization experts from New

York, Dr. Stanton Youngberg and Dr. Robert L. Pendleton, who chose the north-central

area of Bukidnon.46

Leonard Wood, who was governor of the Moro Province in 1903-06, was himselfconvinced that a “good class” of American settlers and plantation owners would not onlycontribute to the economy of the Province but would also be an example to the native

41 Tan-73, p. 97.42 Ibid.43

Ibid.44 Ibid.45 Ibid.46 Ibid., p. 131; “Press Statement on Jewish Settlement in Mindanao,” Malacañang,

February 15, 1939; O.D. Hargis et al., Report of the Mindanao Exploration Commis-

sion, October, 1939.




inhabitants. “What is needed here is an influx of such people as built up the West. Thenatives would be stimulated by their examples and educated by their work.”47 He forgot ofcourse that in the opening up of the American West, the American Indians were left with

nothing, not even with the opportunity to learn from the examples of the white men.

For Wood, furthermore, “it is difficult to imagine a richer country or one out of whichmore can be made than the island of Mindanao.”48 The subsequent steps he took wereactually an inducement for more investors. He sought the amendment of the land laws “togive settlers not 40 acres (18 hectares) but 200 (90 hectares)… so that an inducementmight inspire big capital to invest in the cultivation of sugar and other plantation crops ona large scale.49 He urged Manila to reduce forestry taxes so that a lumber industry might

develop there. Then he arranged that the ships making the rounds of Mindanao portsshould make more trips, and those plying between Hongkong and Australia should stop atZamboanga once a month assuring direct entry of cheaper goods into the Moro Province.But these measures generally “benefited the increasing numbers of Chinese, Japanese,

American and Christian Filipino settlers coming into the Province and those few Moros who were in substantial economic conditions. The small Moro or pagan farmers and

traders were little affected. 50

Spurred on by the same basic motives, John Pershing, governor of the Province from1910 to 1913, also recommended that “land laws of the Insular Government be relaxedto allow an increase in the amount of land an individual or a corporation might own inthe Moro Province. (The law set a ceiling of 16 hectares for individuals and 1,024 forcorporations). (He) believed that this would attract more extensive investments in theagricultural industry of the Province and more adequately exploit the region’s vast naturalresources.51

Rubber Interest: Attempts and Successes

More than ten years later, in March 1926, Harvey Firestone, Jr. of Firestone Tire andRubber Company arrived seeking the amendment or waiver of existing public land lawsso that his company could secure 1,000,000 acres or 454,545.45 hectares for rubberplantations in Mindanao. He failed.52 But this was not the last time that Firestone would

47 In Gowing, ibid ., p. 126.48 Ibid ., p. 125.49 Ibid.50 Ibid ., p. 127. Underscoring supplied.51 Ibid ., p. 223.52 Thomas, Ralph, Muslim But Filipinos: The Integration of Muslims, 1917-1841.

University of Pennsylvania, 1971. Ph.D. Thesis, p. 127.




attempt to secure a foothold in Mindanao. It opened its one thousand hectare rubberplantation in North Cotabato in 1957. Two other rubber companies had been perhapsmore fortunate: B.F. Goodrich Company has been operating a rubber plantation in Basilansince 1919; its total hectarage at present is 2,600. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Companyhas been in the business in the province of Zamboanga since 1929 and to date has two bigplantations in Mindanao.53

Among the American Governors General, Henry L. Stimson was one open supporterof the rubber industry. In a speech in September 1928, he also sought amendments tocorporations law and land policy, advocating the entry of American capital to develop therubber industry. He said: “If by a little initiative and skill and the aid of capital we can

ourselves establish a rubber industry in Mindanao, it would be the height of folly not to doit and to let ourselves be frightened away from the whole subject of rubber just becausesome outside capitalist once foolishly asked us to give a hundred thousand hectares ofour land.”54

American Attempts to Separate Mindanao for Imperialist Ends

The most ambitious of the American proposals desired the separation of Mindanao

and Sulu from the Philippines to serve American imperialist interests. On January 10, 1010,the American-dominated Zamboanga Chamber of Commerce passed a resolution “to useevery effort to have Mindanao and the adjacent islands become a territory of the UnitedStates.”55 To them this was the best condition in order to establish American plantations which would later transform the entire region into a prosperous agricultural communityof American planters. This was widely publicized and Pershing, in support of the move,sent out 200 copies of the special industrial issue of the Zamboanga-based The Mindanao

Herald to the Bureau of Insular Affairs for distribution to individual capitalists.56

More than a decade later, on May 6, 1926,Congressman Robert L. Bacon introduceda bill to separate Mindanao and Sulu from the rest of the Philippines and provide it witha distinct government.

Neither resolution nor bill prospered, yet one can clearly discern a reflection of the American imperialist drive not only to create a market for American manufactured goods

53 The Philippines: American Corporations, Martial Law and Underdevelopment.

IDOC, International North American Edition, No. 57, November, 1973, p. 127.

Hereinafter cited as IDIC.54 Ibid ., p. 45.55 In Gowing, ibid ., p. 250.

56 Tan-73, p. 98.




but also to build up regular sources of raw materials for their factories. Del Monte andDole pineapples are classic examples of this drive.

Political Implication of Well-Developed Mindanao Emphasized

During the Carpenter administration (1914-1920), a substantial amount ofpropaganda was pushed to attract not only investors but also settlers. He emphasized thepolitical implication of a well-developed Mindanao as a key factor in “the hastening ofnational economic independence.”57 This was not surprising since, earlier towards theend of Pershing’s term, American authorities were already convinced that the economicfuture of the Philippines was linked to the development of the agricultural potential of

Mindanao and Sulu. This view was not without concrete basis since the United States Army itself “saw it as a duty to explore the little known regions of Mindanao and Sulu inorder to discover the topography, mineral and agricultural resources and other physicalcharacteristics of the southern islands. Troops stationed in the vicinity of the unexploredregions were constantly utilized to collect such data.58

This business of “the hastening of national economic independence” was, however,nothing but big empty talk. No less than Paul V. McNutt, the U.S., High Commissioner to

the Philippines, noted in 1945 that “politically we brought the islands through progressivesteps to the verge of independence. Economically we brought the islands throughprogressive steps to almost complete dependence upon our markets. On one hand wesought to sever the ties; on the other we chained them every close to us.”59

American Design on Philippine Economy

A brief discussion of the economic structure that was built by the Americans in thePhilippines and its relation to the U.S. economy not only would shed light on the realities

behind the McNutt statement but would also put our succeeding treatment of Mindanaoin its correct historical framework.

The Taft slogan of “the Philippines for the Filipinos” was often interpreted by manyFilipino leaders as pro-Filipino in intent and content. More particularly, it was takenas an emphatic support for the so-called training for self-government, and by logic, anendorsement of Philippine independence.

For Taft, however, it was nothing but a subtle political position aimed at creating a57 In Gowing, ibid ., p. 291.58 Ibid ., pp. 65-66.59 Abaya, Hernando, Betrayal in the Philippines (New York: A.A. Wyn, Inc., 1946),

pp. 175-176.




Philippine market for American goods. His own words are sufficient proof. His statement:“The promotion of their (the Filipinos’) material and intellectual welfare will necessarilydevelop wants on their part for things which in times of poverty they regard as luxuries,

but which, as they grow more educated and as they grow wealthier, become necessities.The carrying out of the principle “the Philippines for the Filipinos” in first promoting the

welfare, material, spiritual and intellectual of the people of these islands in the one course which can create any market here among the people for American goods and Americansupplies that will make the relation of the United States to the Philippines a profitable onefor our merchants and manufacturers.”60

Taft has thus provided us with a very concrete explanation for the introduction to

these islands of the public school system. In intent and in practice, the public schoolsystem was to be the principal agent of conquest and of Americanization. Such a culturalmechanism re-enforcing the economic structure that was being built at the same time

would actually make a mockery of all this talk about training for self-government andpolitical independence.

Free Trade: Roots of Present Neo-Colonial Economy

The Treaty of Paris had also provided that for a period of ten years, Spanish shipsand goods would be allowed to enter the Philippines in the same terms as Americanships and merchandize. This in effect restricted American businessmen from taking fulladvantage of their new market. Their anxiety was eased when in 1909 the Payne-Aldrich

Act was passed. This law allowed all American goods to enter the Philippines duty-free andin unlimited quantities. It opened the way, in short, for free trade. The only restriction

was the quota imposed on Philippine sugar and tobacco as a concession to Americansugar and tobacco producers who demanded protection for their products, and the total

blockade on Philippine rice (to enter the United States). The Underwood-Simmons Actof 1913 removed all quota limitations and thus institutionalized full free trade operation which was to last until 1934, then back to limited operation from 1946 to 1954.

The overall effect of free trade upon our economy was the colonial pattern of trade wherein we are principally producers-exporters of raw materials desired by Americanmanufacturers , notably sugar, hemp and coconut products, and importers-consumersof U.S. finished goods. In this pattern of economic relationship, we spent more than weearned. We also became captive recipients of dictated terms and prices. Consequently,from 1946 to 1972, we only enjoyed two instances of favorable balances of trade, that is,in 1959 and 1963. We always fluctuated from one deficit to another.

60 In Constantino, ibid ., p. 292.




Free trade also had a decisive influence upon the Philippine landownership system.More lands accumulated in the hands of the wealthy few and the big corporations. Thecultivation of vast landholdings for the more efficient production of the specialized export

crops (sugar, copra, abaca, etc.) demanded by the American economy, furthermore, workedto the extreme advantage of the big corporations and the wealthy few. The structure of thecolonial economy, thus, provided a natural incentive and license for the acquisition ofmore land by the big corporations and the rich families. This aggravated the land problemand in many areas, during the 30s and the 40s, the crisis exploded in several peasantuprisings.

The colonial education that we received, moreover, has made this unjust economic

structure acceptable and especially beneficial to the politico-economic elite and theirforeign masters. Its signal achievement was the transformation of the American fromcolonizer to benefactor.

When American colonizers therefore spoke of the exploitation of the vast naturalresources of Mindanao or its agricultural development, it could not be viewed outsidethe context of free trade between a colonizing country and a colonized country. Land hasbecome a key issue in the Mindanao problem and to understand it correctly, we must not

see it in isolation from basic patterns of development purposely created to accomplishimperialist ends.

Resettlement Program Begins

Colonial government-sponsored settlement of Mindanao began in 1913. The adverseeffects of a drought in Sulu and Zamboanga and grasshopper infestation in Davao in1911-1912 on the level of rice supply in the Moro Province gave Pershing the excuse tocall “for the importation of homesteaders from the over-populated Philippine areas.” 61 To drum up their campaign for settlers in the first agricultural colony in Cotabato Valley,the America colonial government paraded around Cebu a corn stalk, thirteen feet tall,propped up with a bamboo stick, to convince the people of the productivity and fertility ofthe soil in the place. Fifty men responded, the very brave ones, they said, and experts inarnis, a form of Philippine martial art.

To tide them over during the first years, they were provided with initial capital and farmtools on load basis. They were also given assurance of eventually owning homesteads.

Thus was born the first agricultural colony in Cotabato Valley. Its specific aim was toproduce cereals (rice and corn).

61 Gowing, ibid., p. 224.




In 1913, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 2254 creating agriculturalcolonies aimed at financing the rice production effort started in Cotabato Valley. The fivesites selected were Pikit, Silik, Ginatilan, Paidu Pulangi and Pagalungan, all in Cotabato

Valley, and Glan at the present South Cotabato. The objectives of the program were thefollowing:62

To increase food production (especially rice).1)To equalize the distribution of population in the Philippines.2)To bring under cultivation extensive wild public lands.3)To afford an opportunity for the colonists to become land proprietors.4)

Equally, if not more important to the creation of agricultural colonies, though neverstated in the official objectives of the program, was the “amalgamation or blending ofthese various elements into a homogenous whole.” 63 This concern was reflected in thedesign of the colonies. For example, Christian settlers and Maguindanaon natives of theplace (referred to as “colonists” in their own ancestral land!) were purposely mixed inPikit, in Colony No. 2, to be exact, composed of Manaulana, Pamalian, Silik, Tapodok andLangayen. Even in this experimental venture, the American colonial government showedis discriminating hand in the land distribution. The Christian settlers were allotted 16

hectares each, while the Maguindanaons were given only 8 hectares each.64

The American colonial government found the results of the experiment at ColonyNo. 2 and two other sites so encouraging that it decided to locate, as a rule and so far aspracticable, “alternately on adjacent homesteads Christian and Mohammedan or pagancolonists when the relative numbers of the two classes are approximately equal, and incases which will occur of a distinct preponderance of Mohammedan and pagan colonistsin a community the immigrant Christian colonists minority will be as widely scattered aspossible throughout the non-Christian majority.”65

The following year Act 2280 was passed creating the Momungan Agricultural Colonyin Lanao. Its purpose was to give relief to American soldiers and employees who marriedFilipinos and did or could not return to the United States. The Colony also hoped tounite Muslims and Christians.66 This project must have been a failure because in 1927,Governor General Stimson issued Proclamation No. 121 opening the area to homestead,

62 Ibid ., p. 291.63 Report of the Philippine Commission, ibid ., p. 377.64 Millian, Simeon, ed., Cotabato 1952 Guidebook (Cotabato: Goodwill Press), p.

269.65 Report of the Philippine Commission, ibid ., p. 378.66 Tan-73, p. 99.




sale or lease to anyone under the terms of the Public Land Act.67

In 1919, Act No. 2206 was passed authorizing Provincial Boards to manage colonies

themselves at their expense.68 Lamitan in Basilan was opened by Zamboanga province,Tawi-Tawi by Sulu, Marilog by Bukidnon and Salunayan and Maganoy by Cotabato between1919 and 1926 through this Act.

No significant government-sponsored settlement program was put out until 1935. What took place instead was the movement of settlers either on their own or throughthe Interisland Migration Division of the Bureau of Labor. Records show that by 1930,agricultural colonies were in existence in the following areas: 69

Cotabato: Pikit, Silik, Ginatilan, Paidu Pulangi and Pagalungan.1)Davao: Kapalong, Guiangga, Tagum, Lupon and Baganga.2)Zamboanga: Lamitan in Basilan and Labangan.3)

Agusan: Kabadbaran, Butuan and Buenavista.4)Lanao: Momungan and the Kapatagan district.5)

Legislative Act No. 4197 passed on February 12, 1935 otherwise known as the Quirino-

Recto Colonization Act, was the result of the summed up colonization experience to thisdate.70 It became popular as the Organic Charter of Organized Land Settlement. It wasactually for settlement of public land in any part of the country but with special preferenceto Mindanao “because of the great national advantage in carrying out the work in that partof the country and because land settlement work is the only government activity that

will furnish an effective solution to the Mindanao problem.” 71

But before it could be implemented, the Commonwealth government was established.

It decided to concentrate first on road building and public land surveying before againattempting to establish government supported agricultural colonies. The funds earlierappropriated were diverted to the latter priority. Thus inter-provincial roads were opened

with the Lanao-Cotabato-Davao links as first installment. Plans for these highways hadactually been conceived as early as 1928 in response to the difficulties encountered by thegovernment during the Alangkat uprising, suspected but never proved by the Americancolonial government, to be led by Datu Mampurok in 1926-27.

67 Ibid ., p. 100.68 Ibid .69 Silayan, Hilarion, “Settling Mindanao,” The Commonwealth Forthnightly, Octo-

ber-November, 1935.70 Ibid .71 Ibid . Underscoring supplied.




Though opposed to forcible imposition of personal tax and imprisonment for non-payment, compulsory attendance at school, Mampurok led no uprising, merely a religiousmovement. Those who rose in arms were Maguindanaon Muslims who were opposed to

the same colonial impositions and, more, believed that their Datu Ali had come back tolife in the person of Datu Mampurok, a Manobo.72 The uprising spread through the upperCotabato Valley, then to Awang and Upi.73

It was not until 1939 that another settlement law was passed, that is, Commonwealth Act No. 441, creating the National Land Settlement Administration (NLSA).74 Its objectives were as follows:

To facilitate the acquisition, settlement and cultivation of lands whether acquired1)from the government or from private parties.To afford opportunity to own farms to tenant farmers and small farmers from2)congested areas and to trainees who have completed the prescribed militarytraining.To encourage migration to sparsely populated regions and facilitate the3)amalgamation of the people in different sectors of the Philippines.To develop new money crops to take the place of the present export crops,4)

which may suffer from the loss of preferences which they enjoy in the Americanmarket.

The provision for military trainees in the second objective was a reflection of theCommonwealth government’s alarm over the imminent war with the Japanese. It was feltat that time that the presence of these people would improve the security situation of theregion in case of an attack.

The year before the passage of the law, Major General Paulino Santos, formerChief of Staff of the Armed Forces, led a team of key government officials to do areconnaissance survey of Mindanao with the sole purpose of selecting possible sites forsettlement projects. Especially incredible was the brevity of the reconnaissance period.They covered the area from Koronadal Valley to Lake Buluan in six days, that is fromNovember 14 to 19, the Kidapawan district in two days, then the Compostela-Monkayo

72 Maquiso, Elena G. Ulahingan: An Epic of the Southern Philippines (Dumaguete

City: Silliman University Press, 1977), pp. 140-143.73 Sabares, Juan, “The Conquest of Mindanao,” The Commonwealth, March 1937;

Millan, ibid ., p. 8.74 Pelzer, Karl, Pioneer Settlement in the Asiatic Tropics, ‘Studies in Land Liti-

gation and Agricultural Colonization in Southeast Asia {New York: American

Anthropological Society, 1945), p. 138.




region in Davao in three or four days. Less than a month later, he submitted a reportto Quezon recommending the Koronadal Valley as the first choice and the Compostela-Monkayo area as the second. Less than two months later, Quezon signed Proclamation No.383 and 384 reserving the two districts for NLSA. Ten days after this, Santos led the firstbatch of settlers to Koronadal.75

Under the NLSA program, three major settlement areas were opened: the Malligplains in Isabela and the following in Cotabato: 1) Koronadal Valley consisting of Lagao,Tupi, Marbel and Polomolok, and 2) Ala Valley consisting of Banga, Norala and Surala.

When it was abolished in 1950, the NLSA had already resettled a total of 8,300 families.76

In March 1949, the Rice and Corn Production Administration (RCPA) was created topromote rice and corn production.77 It was also involved in resettlement. For its purposesthe following areas, aside from Panacan in Palawan, were opened:

Buluan, Cotabato, and1)Maramag-Wao on the Bukidnon-Lanao border.2)

In October, 1950, both RCPA and NLSA were simultaneously abolished and replaced

by the short-lived Land Settlement Development Corporation (LASEDECO). By thetime this was replaced in June 1954 with the creation of the National Resettlement and|Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) through Republic Act No. 1160, LASEDECO hadresettled 1,500 families. It was also able to open the following areas:78

Tacurong 1)Isulan2)Bagumbayan3)

Part of Buluan4)Sultan sa Barongis5)

Ampatuan6)

From 1954 to January 1963, NARRA administered a total of 23 resettlement all overthe country, a good number of which were in Mindanao and Sulu. This was the record asof January 1, 1963:79

75 Ibid., pp. 141-142.76 Castañeda, Romeo C., “The Settlement Program,” Mimeo (1975), p. 14.77 Huke, Robert, Shadows on the Land: An Economic Geography of the Philippines

(Manila: Bookmark, Inc., 1973), p. 166.78 Ibid .79 Ibid ., p. 169.




Continuing: Total No. of Families A.

Bukidnon: Maramag, Pangantukan 3,6391.

Central Palawan: Aborlan 1,9142.Lanao del Sur: Wao 2,3103.Northern Cotabato: Carmen 2,0884.

Sulu: bongao-Balimbing, Tawi-Tawi __5. 667_10,618

Phasing Out:B.

Camarines Sur: Tinambac-Siruma 8896.Capiz 3397.Central Cotabato: Columbio-Tulunan 2,2908.Davao: Sto. Tomas 6929.Isabela: Angadanan-Echague 1,12110.Laguna: San Pedro Tunasan 40311.Masbate: Uson-Milagros 44712.Negros Occ: Kabankalan 56813.

Negros Occ: Caoyan 85614.Negros Or: Sta. Catalina 65815.Rizal: Tanay-Montalban 1,16416.Tarlac: Concepcion _17. 196

9,573

Closed:C.

Mindoro: Bongabon-Montalban 60618. Cotabato: Ala Valley 3,58219.Cotabato: Daguma 1,68820.Koronadal Valley 1,66021.Isabela: Mallig-Roxas 2,77322.Negros Occ: Isabela-Binalbagan23. 139

9,848

When the Agricultural Land Reform Code was signed into law in August 1963,NARRA was replaced by the Land Authority, thus making land resettlement part of thegeneral program of land reform. Under the Land Authority, about 2,400 settlers wereresettled from 1963 to 1971.80

80 Castaneda, ibid., p. 15.




In September 1971, Republic Act No 6389 was signed by President Marcos creatingthe Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) at the same time abolishing Land Authority.Under DAR the Bureau of Resettlement was charged with the function of implementing

the program of settlement.81

In 1951, When Ramon Magsaysay was the Secretary of National Defense, he initiatedthe establishment of the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) Farms for captured andsurrendered Huks. Administered by the Armed Forces, EDCOR opened six resettlementareas: Peredo Edcor in Isabela; Catanauan Edcor in Quezon; Arevalo Edcor in Sapad,Lanao del Norte; Genio Edcor in Alamada, North Cotabato, and Gallego Edcor and BariraEdcor both in Buldon, Maguindanao. In 1967, Peredo, Catanauan, Arevalo and Gallego

were turned over to the Land Authority and, in 1972, Genio and Barira to DAR.82

As of the end of 1975, DAR administers the following settlements:83

81 Ibid ., p. 16.82 I bid .83 Ibid ., pp. 17-18.

Settlement Project & LocationArea inHas.

No. of Settlers/Families

1. Isabela (plus Peredo Edcor): Echague-Angadanan-San Guillermo 8,920 1,3172. Quirino-Nueva Vizcaya: Maddela-Dupax 40,000 6743. Tarlac No. 1: Concepcion 1,112 198

4. Tarlac (Bagong Lipunan): Bamban-Capas-Botolan 11,039 1,4025. Nueva Ecija No. 1: Pantabangan-Palayan 7,007 1,6526. Nueva Ecija No. 2: Llanera 351 977. Pampanga: Magalang 756 1168. Rizal: Tanay 25,475 1,6669. Quezon (Catanauan Edcor): Catanauan 1,700 19810. Central Palawan: Narra-Aborlan 25,381 3,95111. Laguna: Pakil-Pangil-Siniloan 3,038 4,34712. Camarines Sur: Tinambac-Siruma 8,500 899

13. Masbate: Uson-Milagros 8,800 47114. Capiz: Dumarao-Cuartero-Maayon 25,000 1,60515. Antique: Anini-y 400 12016. Negros Occ: Kabankalan 33,000 2,30417. Negros Or: Sta. Catalina 5,010 1,30418. Southern Leyte: Hihunangan-San Juan-St. Bernard 13,000 78519. Tawi-Tawi: Balimbing-Bongao 15,340 66820. Zamboanga del Norte: Liloy-Salug-Sindangan 35,000 2,34321. Bukidnon: Maramag-Pangantukan-Kalilangan 35,399 3,69722. Agusan del Sur: Prosperidad-Talacogon 16,440 1,662

23. Davao del Norte No. 1: Sto. Tomas-Panabo 11,278 1,647




The settlement figures of 1963 and 1975 do not necessarily match the actual numberof settlers and hectarage. A great number of settlers came on their own and were thereforenever recorded; hectarage was always adjusted with the influx of more settlers. Postwarmigration patterns show nevertheless that migrants generally flowed in the following six

major areas:84 Cotabato Valley 1)

Agusan Valley 2)Bukidnon Plateau3)Eastern Zamboanga del Sur4)Northern Davao5)Digos-Padada district in southern Davao6)

The Digos-Padada district actually covers the present municipalities of Digos,Padada, Bansalan, Matanao, Hagonoy and Sulop. Northern Davao refers to the presentTagum, Asuncion, Mawab, Nabunturan, Compostela, Monkayo and Davao City.

84 Simkins, Paul and Wernstedt, Frederick, Philippine Migration: The Settlement of

the Digos-Padada Valley, Davao Province. Monograph Series No. 16. Yale Univer-

sity East Asian Studies (New Haven, Connecticut, 1971), p. 3.

24. Davao del Norte No. 2: Asuncion 8,221 2,92625. Lanao del Norte No. 1: Tangkal-Magsaysay 13,943 1,27126. Lanao del Norte No. 2: Sapad 3,000 139

27. Lanao del Norte No. 3: Nunungan-Karomatan 19,674 33728. Lanao del Sur No. 1: Wao 18,000 4,00129. Lanao del Sur No. 2: Lumba-a-Bayabao-Bubong 6,939 24630. Lanao del Sur No. 3: Butig-Lumbatan-Bayang-Binidayan-Pagayawan-Tubaran 18,197 77031. North Cotabato No. 1: Carmen 100,000 1,90432. North Cotabato No. 2: (Genio Edcor) Alamada 5,464 24133. Maguindanao No. 1: (Ballego Edcor) Buldon 5,464 24134. Maguindanao No. 2: (Barira Edcor) Buldon 33,000 37535. Maguindanao No. 3: Upi-Dinaig 4,268 150

36. Sultan Kudarat No. 1: Columbio-Tulunan 52,468 2,37837. Sultan Kudarat No. 2: Isulan-Bagumbayan-Surala 52,000 1,497TOTAL 672,584 49,599




HOAXES ABOUT MINDANAO




The government sponsored resettlement program provided the opening wedge forthe massive and systematic exploitation of the vast natural resources of Mindanao. Thisgathered momentum after the last war and has continued without let up to the present,

all in the name of national progress and development.

However, it was not the numerous small settlers, most of whom came on their own, who assumed the lead role in this drive. Having been themselves eased out of Luzonand the Visayas by the pressures of economic privation resulting from inequitable landownership patters, their main concern, as a rule, was to own a family-size farm lot. It wasthe few members of the country’s politico-economic elite, the big corporations, and theopportunist elements from the Moro elite, who placed the principal role. Naturally, too, it

was they who benefited most from the opening up of Mindanao.

Certain false premises have been propagated and popularized to justify the resettlementprogram in Mindanao and the exploitation of its vast natural resources. These argumentshave proved very useful in covering up the self-serving motives of the ruling elite. Thesemisleading notions may be enumerated under the following headings:

The issue of overpopulation.1)

Resettlement is the lasting solution to the Mindanao problem.2)The exploitation of the vast natural resources of Mindanao and Sulu is for3)national progress and development.The Christians are the culprits in the Mindanao problem.4)The Moros must be blamed for the Mindanao problem.5)

Hoax No. 1: The Issue of “Overpopulation”

As early as 1912, General Pershing already raised the scare of overpopulation whenhe called “for the importation of homesteaders (to Mindanao) from the overpopulatedPhilippine areas.”

Act 2254 creating agricultural colonies in 1913 also articulated the same point inits objectives: “to equalize the4 distribution of population in the Philippines.” Referringto the settlement of public lands, the Secretary of the Interior had this statement in hisannual report in 1914: “Several parts of the islands are seriously overcrowded and newlands must be opened up for the surplus population.”85

85 Report of the Philippine Commission, ibid., p. 100.




Two of the objectives of the NLSA in 1939 noted the same issue: “to afford opportunityto own farms to tenant farmers and small farmers from congested areas…,” and “toencourage emigration to sparsely populated regions….”

The reality or validity of the overpopulation or congestion problem in those times ishighly questionable. In the 1903 census, total population count was 7,635,426 including647,749 non-Christians; in 1918, it was 10,314,310 including 932,953 non-Christians; in1939, it was 16,000,303.

Even granting under-enumeration in the overall population census, it must benoted that “overpopulated” referred to were usually those easily accessible places like

Central Luzon and the Ilocos region where under-enumeration was least likely to haveoccurred. In these areas, social unrest was widespread, but not because of overpopulationor congestion but because of overconcentration of too much land in the hands of the

wealthy few and the landlessness of the many.

If by overpopulation is meant the inadequacy of food and other primary needs inproportion to existing population level at a particular time and place, then the problemmust be rooted in the maldistribution of land and inequitable appropriation of its products.

Another important factor to be considered was the overconcentration of production onexport crops at the expense of staple food items like rice. Thus while the big landownersprofited from the export of cash crops, the tenants and agricultural workers suffered fromlack of cash and basic food items.

The colonial government’s inconsistency and ineptness in the handling of the so-calledoverpopulation problem was dramatically exposed by its choice of the first fifty settlers ofCotabato Valley. These settlers from Cebu were resettled in Mindanao to supposedly ease up

the population problem and help the government’s intensified rice production program.But wonder of wonders “most of them were new to farm work (and) many did not evenknow how to handle the plow.”86 Consequently, many of them became discontented and

wanted to return to Cebu. The government had to take stringent measures to keep themfrom leaving. “One such measure was the banning of colonists from going to market

without a pass. Even then they were closely watched.87

To pose then the issue of overpopulation as a major problem was not only to miss

completely the basic causes of socio-political unrest but also to mislead the people. Indeed,even at present, the overpopulation scare has been conveniently raised to conceal and

sidetrack the root causes of social and economic problems which lie in the exploitative

86 Millan, ibid ., p. 258.87 Ibid ., p. 269.




ownership and use of land by big corporations and the few wealthy families.

Hoax No. 2: Resettlement as the Lasting Solution to Mindanao Problem

Resettlement of Mindanao with Christians from the north was publicized as the lastingsolution to the Mindanao problem. It was envisioned, as Wood did, that “the natives wouldbe stimulated by their (the settlers’) example and educated by their work.

The implication was that the natives, the Moros in particular, would be persuadedto abandon their “backward” unproductive ways and “troublesome” inclinations afterbeing exposed to the settlers’ productiveness. It was also thought that the living together

of two peoples with distinct cultures would eventually result in “the amalgamation of theMohammedan and Christian native population into a homogenous Filipino people.”

The resettlement program was aimed at providing land for the landless and puttingmore lands under cultivation to increase the country’s food supply. The program, however,should be viewed at the same time within the context of the then rapidly worsening landproblem in Luzon and the Visayas which fueled the peasant uprisings of the twentiesand the thirties. These were times when the landless peasants and tenants were actively

organizing to realize their just claims to own the lands which they and their ancestors hadbeen tilling for centuries. These were times of several armed encounters between peasantmovements like the Sakdals, Tanggulan and Colorums with the forces of the governmentand the big landlords.

Thus, the resettlement program in Mindanao was not only aimed at opening up theregion’s frontier for the more systematic exploitation of its vast resources. It was equallyaimed at diffusing the agrarian unrest in Luzon and the Visayas which already erupted into

armed violence in several places.

Mindanao did become, as a matter of fact, a safety valve which provided an outlet forthe simmering social volcanoes in the north. It would not be long before similar volcanoes

would make themselves felt in Mindanao.

The various land reform laws and other legislative measures conceived to resolvethe heightening problem of landlord-tenant relations should also be situated within thishistorical context. The persistent attempt of the landlords and big corporations to evadepartitioning of their vast landholdings is evident in the various exemptions and loopholes

written into these very laws. Thus the big landlords and landowning corporations benefitednot only from the resettlement program in Mindanao but also from the sham land reformlaws which served the twofold purpose of enhancing their public image while keeping theirlands intact. This is confirmed by an analytical study made by Valdepeñas and Bautista.




They said:

“Ever since the 1930s, tenancy, the meager share of agricultural output that went to

the laborer-tenant, and the accompanying sub-human existence and indebtedness of thefarmer, were the source of agrarian discontent and unrest. A number of legislations triedto meet these problems. The Rice Share Tenancy Act and the Sugar Tenancy Contracts Actof 1933 sought to regulate the relationships of tenants and landlords. In 1936 and 1939,the government enacted the purchase of large land estates. And in 1976, Republic Act No.34 raised tenant share to 55 percent. However, by 1948, the tenants who were receiving 50percent or more of the net crop still lived impoverishly. By that time, too, the governmenthad managed to expropriate only 2 percent of the area earmarked for tenant-operated

farms.

“In 1954, efforts were made to transfer land ownership to the tenant through legislativeaction. Even as the landlord-dominated Congress in the regular session of 1954 and 1955stalled approval, President Magsaysay acted to have the Land Reform Act approved in aspecial session. However, the legislation contained clauses which had the effect of keepingthe going tenure relationships….

“The 1954 Land Reform Act was already fated to fail even before it came underCongressional debates and legislation.” 88

The same story would be repeated two presidents later. Said Valdepeñas andBautista:

“A comparison of the tenureship situation in 1948 and 1960 shows that tenantsconstituted the biggest portion of the growing population and were cultivating a smallershare of the total farm area in 1960… In response… President Diosdado Macapagal in1963 forced a reluctant Congress to pass the Agricultural land Reform Code. Limited to

rice and corn land, the objective of the legislation was to convert tenants into leaseholders who would pay lease rental at 25 percent of the average net income during the past threenormal crop seasons. This was meant to be a transitional arrangement until the tenantbecame the owner-cultivator of an economic family-size farm.

“However, the 1963 legislation contained a lot of loopholes. Land converted intoresidential, industrial and other non-agricultural purposes were exempted from pre-

emption or redemption by the leases. The retention limit for expropriation of land wasset at 75 hectares, which was very high for the growing population density. Furthermore,landowners who were paid in bonds could use them as payment for public agricultural

88 Valdepeñas, Vicente and Bautista, Germelino, The Emergence of the Philippine

Economy (Manila: Papyrus Press, 1977), pp. 199-200.




land, thus merely transferring landlordism from one area to another….

“Another program for relieving the growing rural problem was the government

resettlement project….

“Some farmers from Ilocos, Bicol, Western and Eastern Visayas tried to resolve theirproblem by migrating to Pangasinan, Mindoro, Mindanao, Cagayan Valley, Southern Luzonand the adjoining islands. This movement towards the frontier lands accounted for thegrowth output… But, the expansion did not improve the rate of growth of output, since it

was decelerating over the same period.”89

Hoax No. 3: Exploiting Natural Resources for National Development

It was argued that exploiting the vast natural resources of Mindanao was for nationalprogress and development. If this means the physical quantity in the exploitation of naturalresources and the quantitative contribution of the same to the Gross National Product(GNP), then there is indeed national progress and development. If this means, however,more equitable distribution of productive property (land in this sense) and its fruits, thenthe issue is subject to serious debate. In case it happens to be debatable.

The settlement of Mindanao was characterized by certain gross irregularities thatbenefited the rich and deprived the poor. In a speech to the Bureau of Lands officials inNovember 1940, former Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce Benigno S. Aquino, Sr.revealed that “whenever a road was to be constructed through an undeveloped section,homesteaders flocked in rapidly, to find only too often that influential persons who had

been privately informed of the construction even before it was begun had taken up

the choice lands on both sides of the road.” He went on to report that “when I travelled

through the provincial roads from Davao to Cotabato and thence to Bukidnon, I was shown those extensive parcels of land which have been registered in favor of rich

people from the Visayas and Luzon.” 90

The issue of the wealthy outpacing the poor settlers in clear collusion with well-placed bureaucrats assumes greater significance if we consider not only accessibility totransportation facilities but also the fact that in general the provincial roads cut throughthe best parts of Mindanao land. One need only to travel overland from Cotabato to Davaoto see this.

89 Ibid ., pp. 200-202. Underscoring supplied90 Pelzer, ibid ., pp. 112. Underscoring supplied.




We hear very little official statements on how native inhabitants had actually beendisplaced during the settling process. ”But if we take a second look at the haste with

which the government went about this particular activity, then we would be able to gain

a deeper insight into the implication of Quezon’s stated policy for Mindanao during theCommonwealth: “absolute equality before the law.”91 It always works to the disadvantageof the poor and ignorant.

We have already noted the haste of the Santos survey preliminary to the settlement ofKoronadal Valley and the Compostela-Monkayo region. One would get the impression thatthe party, in typical military style, made a review of troops in formation then marched awayas soon as they reached the end of the line. “The survey party had found that Koronadal

Valley was thinly populated, but nobody knew exactly how many Blaans and Moros wereliving in that region, or how much land should be reserved for them. These people wereconcerned about their land rights in the event of an establishment of agricultural coloniesby NLSA… Instead of making definite arrangements for the Blaans and the Moros, themembers of the party (however) merely gave these people oral assurances that theirrights would be respected and told them to declare their land for tax purposes and get taxreceipts as evidence of ownership.92 Norala was settled in 1941 : “despite the protests andunfriendly reactions of the Moros and Blaans.”93

Following are two eloquent statements, obtained in 1973, of how the process hadaffected the native inhabitants.94

A Maguindanaon from South Cotabato:

“I want to tell you what I am feeling. Many years ago, the Christians

came here to our place. They made many promises and encouraged

us to join them, to unite and cooperate with them. They paid money

to the Datu and they claimed our land. I hope you can understand.Our lands are all sold or mortgaged to the Christians. Now we do not

have any land on which to work.”

A Blaan from South Cotabato:

“I want to tell you about our people as they were before the settlers

came. We are the largest number of people then. We lived in the

wide plains of Ala and Koronadal Valleys. It is true that we were not

91 In Thomas, ibid ., p. 263.92 Pelzer, ibid ., p. 142.93 Millan, ibid., p.207.94 Sta. Cruz Mission Report, 1973.




educated but then we were happy; we made our own lives, we lived

in our own way.

“Then the settlers came, our lives became unhappy. We ran to the mountains because we were afraid of settlers. Even today, the Blaan

people are scared of the government officials. Our lands were taken

away because of our ignorance. Now we are suffering. We have been

forced to live in the Roxas and General Santos mountain ranges.

Now we have only a few hectares of flat land to grow our food. And

even with this little land, the government is running after us and

they tell us that the land is not ours, it is the government’s. They say

the lands belong to the forestry. They will put us in jail. Truly we do not think that we are part of the government.”

Sometime in the late 50s, NARRA relocated some 400 families from Luzon to northern

Cotabato and Lanao del Sur, areas which are predominantly Muslim. “Without even theformality of explaining the merits of such program (it) proceeded to relocate these familiesto the dissatisfaction of those who had been occupying lots long before the governmenteven thought of opening resettlement projects in Mindanao.”95

Little wonder that in 1963, the Senate Committee on National Minorities reported:“Among the provinces visited, the most pressing land problems were reported in theprovinces of Davao, Cotabato, Bukidnon and the island of Basilan… Natives in theseprovinces complained that they were being driven away by influential persons and big

companies who have been awarded rights to lands which have long been occupied andimproved by the members of the cultural minorities.”96

Congressman Domocao Alonto made an accurate reading of the overall results ofthe process, although he made the statement in 1955. When he reported to Congressthe atrocities of the military in Jolo during the Kamlon campaign, he said: “This Kamlon

affair is only a dramatic outcome of (the) socio-economic disequilibrium that exists

in the south.” 97

95 Glang, Alunan, Muslim Secession or Integration (Q.C.: R.P. Garcia Publishing

Co., 1969), p. 84.96 “Report on the Problem of Cultural Minorities,” Senate Committee on National

Minorities, Manila, 1963, p. 3. Underscoring supplied.97 “Report of Mr. Domocao Alonto on Military Atrocities in Jolo in Connection

with the Kamlon Campaign,” Congressional Record , Second Session, January 24-

March 15, 1955, pp. 128-140. Underscoring supplied.




If through government neglect and misplaced priorities, the influx of poor individual

or family settlers did cause physical displacements of native inhabitants, the entry of giant

corporations did more and still do. The establishment of Del Monte in Bukidnon, in clear

collusion with the politico-economic elite, Dole in Polomolok, South Cotabato, and the

penetration of Japanese investments in various business activities in Mindanao are classicexamples.

Philippine Packing Corporation (Del Monte)

Philippine Packing Corporation (Philpak), Del Monte’s subsidiary in the Philippines,started with a pineapple plantation in Bukidnon in 1926 and cannery that becameoperational in 1930.98

From its inception Philpak has operated in contravention of the Constitutionalprovision for ownership of public agricultural land of 1,024 hectares for corporation.In 1938, it entered into a 25-year sublease agreement with the Commonwealth-createdNational Development Company (NDC), a public land corporation, involving 7,922.35hectares which earlier had been leased to it by the Philippine government. NDC was notauthorized by its charter to sublease lands in contravention of the Constitution.99

In spite of this questionable legal position, Philpak was able to obtain renewal ofits sublease agreement in 1956, a full seven years before expiration, for another periodending in 1988.100 In addition to the questionable constitutionality of its holdings, Philpakpays a measly amount for its yearly land rental. From 1938 to 1956 it was paying Php 1.00per hectare per year; from 1956 to 1963 this was increased to Php 5.00 plus Php0.25 perton of raw pineapple; from 1963 to 1988 the amount was further raised to Php 10.00 plusPhp0.25 per ton of raw pineapple.101 For a giant multinational company which accounted

for 61 percent of sales in the fruit manufacturing industry in the Philippines in 1971, 102 and enjoyed an average return on equity of 199.25 percent from 1957 to 1963, 103 suchland rental was absolute insult to our common business sense, not to mention the slapon our patriotic sensibilities, and a clear demonstration of our leaders’ total disregard forour national patrimony.

98 IDOC, p. 37.99 Ibid .100 Ibid .101 Ibid ., pp. 37-38.102 Ibid ., p. 40.103 Ibid ., p. Ibid., p. 38.




Philpak has not confined itself to the production and canning of pineapple. It hasdiversified into other products as well: papaya and other fruits for its tropical fruit pack;tomato to broaden the papaya related products like fruit juices, vinegar, tomato juice and

catsup; livestock feeds from a combination of pineapple wastes and certain chemicals;cattle raising of which Philpak’s output constitutes a large share in Mindanao’s totalproduction; banana, controlling 26.89 percent of total hectarage in the industry, and deepsea (tuna) fishing.104

Anticipating the expiration of parity in 1974, Philpak sought to expand its equity. FromPhp 1,750,000.00 in 1931 through 1963, equity increased to Php 48,657,000.00 in 1969,to Php 73,o63,000.00 in 19790 and Php 102,371,013.00 in 1971. Even if it had to divest

itself (at the expiration of parity) of 60 percent of its holdings, it could still recoup severaltimes its initial investments.105

Dole (Castle & Cooke, Inc.)

A subsidiary of Castle & Cooke, Inc., Dolefil entered into pineapple production inPolomolok, South Cotabato in 1963. It is in joint venture with Filipino and Filipino-Chinesebusinessmen whose holdings equal 20 percent; Dole owns the remaining 80 percent.106

Like Philpak, its sublease agreement with NDC involving 6,818.18 hectares is incontravention of the Philippine Constitution. Aside from this, some stipulations of thecontract are blatantly prejudicial to NDC. For instance, “NDC shall, from time to time,

when as requested by Dole, buy, acquire and obtain title to such additional parcels of landas may be needed by Dole in its operations under the agreement..”

NDC also grants Dole “the right and option to renew this agreement upon and subjectto the same terms and conditions as are not contained and set forth herein (or as thesame may be amended in the future by mutual agreement of the parties thereto), for anadditional period of 25 years.”

The agreement finally gives Dole the right even before its expiration to “discontinueits operations, terminate the Agreement and to recoup or recover as much of the moneyas it has invested in such lands as possible.”107

104 Ibid ., pp. 39-40.105 Ibid ., p. 39.106 Ibid ., pp. 40-41.107 Ibid ., p. 41.




be attributed solely to Japanese legal acumen and excellent public relations. They weregenerously helped, with commensurate benefits of course, by Filipino incorporators indummy corporations and Filipino lawyer-retainers (among whom was Jose P. Laurel, Manila

Consulting Attorney to the Ohta Development Company), and with the full knowledge oflocal bureaucrats. These activities, however, were never publicized in official circles assuch. But they were public knowledge.

In 1926, for example, in response to public outcry principally of the national press,calling attention to land law violations in Davao, “a committee of officials of the Bureauof Lands headed by its Assistant Director carried out an on-the-scene investigation … ofthe business dealings and management of all the Japanese corporations, searching for any

substantiation of alleged land law violations. After two months of intensive study… thecommittee reported that all the charges were totally without foundation and that contraryto what had been suggested, the Japanese, acting wholly within the law, had made greatcontributions to the agricultural development of Davao.”111

This portion of Japanese business adventure into Mindanao was cut short by theSecond World War. But after 1973, a spectacular increase in Japanese investments wasnoted, ostensibly spurred by the signing and ratification by President Marcos of the Treaty

of Amity, Commerce and Navigation with Japan at the end of the year. It will be recalledthat this treaty was left pending for ten years by the defunct Congress because of provisionsharmful to Philippine interests. As of the end of March 1978, Japanese corporations hadequity investments in 425 Philippine companies.112

The largest single Japanese investment in the country with 100 percent Japaneseequity amounting to Php478.6 million and representing almost one half of total Japaneseinvestments in the country is Kawasaki’s Philippine Sinter Corporation. It operates at

Villanueva, Misamis Oriental under the protective wings of the government-createdPhilippine Veterans Investment Development Corporation (PHIVIDEC).113

Other major Japanese corporations have crept into vital Philippine business activitiesin Mindanao some of which can be detailed here.

Mitsubishi Corp., Kawasaki Steel Corp., Ltd., Kawatetsu Trading Co., Ltd, and NipponSteel Corp. each acquired in 1968 a1.8 percent equity or a total of 7.2 percent in the Iligan

111 Ibid .112 “Sogo Sosha in the Philippines,” Business Day. Special Report on the Sogo

Sosha, May 31, 1978, p. 10.113 Mamoru Tsuda, A Preliminary Study of Japanese-Filipino Joint Ventures (Q.C.:

Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1978, pp34-35.




Steel Mills, Inc. (Now National Steel Corporation), one of the country’s largest firms withcapitalization of over Php 735 million as of 1974. Japanese share is in addition to a 12.94percent foreign participation by General Electric Company (4.2%), Blaw Knox (6.54%)and Westinghouse Electric (2.11%).114

Merubeni Corp. has a Php 20.31 million or 2.3 percent participation and MitsuiMining and Smelting Co., Ltd., a Php 13.24 million or 1.5% in the Marinduque Miningand Industrial Corporation (MMIC), third in the 1975 list of mining firms, which operatesa nickel mine in Nonoc Island, Surigao del Norte.115

Mitsui & Co., Ltd. has a 40 percent share in the Mindanao Alloys Corp.116

Mitsubishi Corp. has a 30 percent investment in the North Davao Mining Corporation.This same Japanese corporation is further able to take part in the Cagayan de Oro Oil Co.,Inc., a subsidiary of Legazpi Oil, through its 40 percent equity in the latter.117

In addition to American (10%) and British (20%) investments in the Iligan CoconutIndustries, Inc., Nichimen Co., Ltd. has acquired a 10 percent share.118 Nichimen Companyalso has equity investments in two other manufacturing corporations, 30 percent in

the Mindanao Charcoal Development, Inc. and 10 percent in the Mindanao ChemicalIndustries.119

Davao Central Chemical Corporation enjoys the partnership of two Japanesecorporations, 38.8 percent from Takeda Chemical Industries and 11.1 percent from theMitsubishi Corp. for a total of 50 percent.120

Banana Industry

The most spectacular growth in terms of export stature from foreign participation iseasily observable in the banana industry. Its .05 percent share in the Japanese bananamarket in 1960 jumped to 84.7 percent in 1976. From an insignificant ranking as anexport item, banana captured the 8th position among the country’s top ten export items in

114 Sogo Sosha, ibid ., p. 14.115 Ibid ., p. 16; Tsuda, ibid ., p. 27.116 Sogo Sosha, ibid ., p. 17.117 Ibid ., pp. 11 & 15.118 Ibid ., p. 14.119 Ibid ., p. 16.120 Ibid ., p. 12.




1975, then moved to 6th one year later.121

The banana industry was started in General Santos and Davao in 1966 by

multinational companies from the United States and Japan which entered into growing andmarketing agreements with local entrepreneurs, and lease agreements with a governmentcorporation.

As of 1975, four major concerns controlled the banana industry: Stanfilco (Dole) with a share of 9,000 hectares or 36.76 percent of total hectarage; Philpak (Del Monte) with 6,588 hectares or 22.81 percent; TADECO (United Fruit) with 4,500 or 18.39 percentand the rest are smaller growers, almost all enjoying a high percentage of Japanese

participation. Stanfilco, Philpak and United Fruit combined account for 77.96 percent.

122

Timber Concessions and Wood Industry

The most heavily exploited portion of Mindanao’s natural resources in terms of vasthectarage and a fantastically high rate of return on investments for so few investors is thetimber sector. Log export has been for many years in the top ten export items.

In 1972-73 alone, there were some 156 logging operators in Mindanao, mostly

corporate, with a total concession area of 4,878,895.02 hectares. Of this area, 840,474.02or 17.22 percent was in Region IX (Zamboanga City, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga delNorte, Basilan and Misamis Occidental); 2,294,993 or 47.03 percent was in Region X(Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Surigao del Norte, Surigao del Sur, Misamis Oriental,Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur and Bukidnon), and 1,743,428 or 37.73 percent in Region

XI (Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, North Cotabato, South Cotabato, Davao del Norte, Davaodel Sur, Davao City and Davao Oriental).123 The usual lease period is 25 years.

Aside from being the importer of our logs and wood products, the Japanese have lately

penetrated the local wood industry. Tadashi Kajita has 40 percent equity investment in theSta. Ines-Melale Forest Products Corporations.124 Mitsubishi Corporation has 25.5 percentparticipation in the Agusan Wood Industries, Inc. (formerly D.O. Plaza Enterprises), andC. Itoh Co., Ltd has a 35 percent investment, in addition to 5 percent American, in the

Agusan Paper Corporation,125 whose export to Japan will also be handled by the same Japanese company.126

121 “The Banana Workers of Davao: Special Report,” Asian Alternative, December

1977.122 Bureau of Plant Industry; Japan Banana Export Import Association.123 Bureau of Forest Development, Regions IX, X, XI.124 Sogo Sosha, ibid . p. 19.125 Ibid ., p. 10126 Tsuda, ibid ., p. 31.




Pasture Lands

As of the same period (1972-73), pasture lands under lease or permit come as a poor

second to timber concessions with 296 operators for a total of 179,011.6 hectares. RegionIX had two reported operators for a total of 1,353 hectares or .76 percent of reported totalfor Mindanao; Region reported 154 for a total of 74,943.5 hectares or 41.86 percent,and Region XI stated 140 for a total or 102,715.1 hectares or 57.38 percent. The averagehectarage per operator is 604.76 hectares.127

Conflicts with the small people have of course arisen as a result of the penetration ofMindanao by corporate entities. In the logging sector, for instance, no less than former PC

Chief Brigadier Eduardo Garcia reported to the 1971 Senate Committee investigating thedeteriorating peace and order conditions in Cotabato that the “grant of forest concessions

without previous provisions or measures undertaken to protect the rights of culturalminorities and other inhabitants within the forest concession areas (is) one of the principalcauses of dissatisfaction among the cultural minorities.”128 Representative SalipadaK. Pendatun also pointed out the same government failure to “provide precautionarymeasures in the grant of concessions and pasture leases as contributory to the problem.”129 The Committee itself noted the participation of the military in the “perpetration of outright

violence to gain possession of the lands.130

Corporate Farms

Rice and corn production has been neglected for a long time due to the obsession ofthe government with export production. But with General Order No. 47, issued on May 27,1974, otherwise known as the Corporate Farming Program, corporations with 500 workersor more are enjoined to engage in rice and corn production (or importation) to supply

the cereal needs of their employees. Expect several thousand more hectares to fall intocorporate hands – away from small farmers and exempt from land reform.

As of January 1977 there were 499 registered corporations, 260 or 52.1 percent of which are in actual production/cultivation while 239 or 47.89 percent have opted forimportation. The target total hectarage of the Program is 63,211.22 hectares. Already,22,199.74 hectares or 35.11 percent of the targeted total are under operation in Mindanao,

127 Bureau of Forest Development.128 “Report on the Deteriorating Peace and Order Conditions in Cotabato,” Senate

Committee on National Minorities, April, 1971, p. 7.129 Ibid .130 Ibid .




involving some 22 corporations. All of these are in Region X and Region XI.131

Corporate Presence of Questionable Value to National Development

This is not the complete picture of corporate presence in Mindanao; we have yet togather details regarding their participation in sugar production in Bukidnon, Davao delSur and Matalam, North Cotabato; mining in Zamboanga, Agusan and Surigao; rubberin Basilan, Zamboanga del Sur and North Cotabato; deep sea (tuna) fishing, and oilexplorations in Sulu-Palawan seas. But with the foregoing alone, we can already graspthe immensity of multinational presence, mainly American and Japanese big business,and their decisive influence on the direction of the economy. More than sufficient is the

evidence to demonstrate how local bureaucrats and entrepreneurs (Moro opportunistsincluded), constituting the political-economic elite, have worked together to make thepresent situation possible. They have actually enacted laws to make our own exploitationmore convenient and worse, legal.

The combined contribution of the various corporations to the Gross National Productis enormous. But what remains to be explained is why, if such spectacular developmentsare true, the country can only look back to two instances of favorable balance of trade

from 1946 to 1972, namely, as we have already noted earlier, 1959 and 1963.132

As aresult of this, the government had embarked upon massive foreign borrowing which ledto the $6.4 billion foreign debt by the end of 1972, Yet on the other hand, these bigcorporations, foreign or local or combined, have always found their Philippine operationshighly profitable. Extensive studies show that at the very least, for every dollar invested,these big corporations (mainly American) take out three dollars in profit. In 1971, thesecorporations sent back to their country six out of every dollar invested; and in 1972, nineof every dollar.133

Hoax No. 4: Christians: Culprits in the Mindanao Problem

That Christians are the culprits in the Mindanao problem is true if it means that mostof the landgrabbers could, from the Moro point of view, be identified as “Christians”. It isnot, however, if it means that the Christians must collectively be held responsible for theconflict that now rages in Mindanao.

131 National Grains Authority, Corporate Farming Authority, January, 1977.132 Encarnacion, Jose, Jr. et al, Philippine Economic Problems in Perspective (Q.C.:

Up Institute of Economic Development and Research, 1976), p. 265.133 Augusto Cesar Espiritu, et al, Philippine Perspectives on Multinational Corpora-

tions (Q.C.: UP Law Center, 1978), p. 116.




The principal reason that a large number of Filipino settlers are in Mindanao isbecause, and this has been pointed out earlier, they have been deprived by the politico-economic elite of proper economic opportunities to improve their lives in the north,

and the stimulus to come to Mindanao was provided, first and initially by the Americancolonial administrators for motives already explained, and second, by the elite-dominatedgovernment, whose concern was obviously not the interests of the majority but their own.They were careful, moreover, in covering up their exploitative operations, usually with thenow overused “land for the landless” slogan and other loud proclamations of providingemployment and contributing to much needed foreign reserves, and of course, to nationalprogress and development. Private enterprise was passed on as national enterprise; privateincome was interchanged with national income; promotion of private interests was called

public service.

Such duplicity of the politico-economic elite was analyzed by Constantino, and wecan do no better than quote him in full. And although he was referring to an earlierperiod of history, such a stage performance, if discerned today, should not shock anyoneas something new. Following is Constantino’s analysis:134

“One aspect of colonial politics requires fuller discussion because it gave rise to a

series of betrayals of the people’s unwavering demand for freedom that is as yet littleunderstood. This is the disparity between the official and public views of the leaders andtheir private positions on economic relations with the colonial power as well as on thequestion of free trade relations.

“Upon the expiration in 1909 of the provisions of the Treaty of Paris, the Payne- Aldrich bill providing for free trade was introduced in the U.S. Congress. The Philippine Assembly opposed the measure. Its reasons reveal an accurate appraisal of the ill effects

of this proposal on the economy of the country and on its prospects for sovereignty. TheFilipino leaders contended that in the long run, free trade would be prejudicial to theeconomic interests of the Filipinos. They foresaw the diversion of Philippine exports …from their natural markets in neighboring countries to the United States, a situation which

would result in Philippine economic dependence on that country. Besides favoring onlythe powerful economic interests, free trade would open the country’s commerce, industry,and agriculture to control by big American corporations.

“The Assembly also predicted that economic dependence would pose the threatof economic dislocation when independence was granted. Moreover, American firmsprospering as a result of free trade might well lobby against the grant of independence or atleast for its postponement. Finally, the Assembly charged that free trade would drastically

134 Constantino, ibid . (1st Edition, 7th Printing Feb 81), pp. 326-327.




reduce the revenues of the insular government, which losses would not be covered bylevying additional taxes because the citizenry was already heavily burdened as it was. In

view of the foregoing and despite the prospect of rapid prosperity which its proponents

said free trade would bring, Manuel L. Quezon, then the Majority floor leader, summed upthe Assembly’s position by declaring that the Filipinos would rather opt for slow economicgrowth with the assurance of independence than rapid progress which would meanrelinquishing all thought of freedom forever.

“But Quezon made an about face after a talk with Vice Governor William CameronForbes. The leaders of the Assembly too, backtracked and privately declared themselvesconvinced that free trade was for the good the country.” But to salvage their image, they

maintained a public opposition to free trade. What they did in essence was to protect theirpolitical careers, because free trade being an imperialist imperative would not really bestopped in its advance, even if it meant displacing incumbent leaders.135

Constantino continues, “it was the misfortune of the Filipino people that their leaderschose to allow the Americans to disseminate the view that free trade was beneficial forthe country. True, Filipino leaders could not have stopped the imposition, but they couldhave warned of its dire effects so that the people would at least understand its exploitative

nature. Of course, this would have put the leading politicians in the bad grade of thecolonial master who could, by various devices, undercut them and then build up otherleaders only too willing to dance to their tune.”136

These same opportunist maneuvers led to the continuation of free trade and alsothe beginning of parity from 1946 to 1954, then to the acceptance of the Laurel-Langleyagreement which extended parity to all sectors of business, and other lopsided tradeagreements until 1974. All these moves ensured great benefits to the politico-economicelite and in turn deprived the vast majority of the Filipino and Moro peoples.

There is no attempt here to excuse those among the Filipino masses who haveconsciously participated in the deprivation of the Moro people and the hill tribes ofMindanao. But even they were playing only a secondary role, secondary, that is, to thepolitico-economic elite who have continued and even aggravated the conditions created bythe two previous colonial masters, conditions which encouraged such forms of exploitationeven at the lowest level.

Even as victims of the politico-economic elite, the vast majority of the Filipinos inMindanao have been used as buffers, thus making it appear as though they were the realculprits.

135 Ibid ., p. 327.136 Ibid., p. 328.




Hoax No. 5: Moros Responsible for Mindanao Problem

It is argued that the Moros must be blamed for the Mindanao problem. This is apopular notion, quite real though not necessarily correct, based on ignorance of the Moropeople, not only among the Christianized natives of Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao, butalso and especially among the settler-residents in traditional Moro areas. The bias is rootedin the mutual hostility and antagonism resulting from the more than three centuries ofSpanish colonial rule.

To hold the Moros responsible for the Mindanao problem, however, is to confusethe cause with the effect. Like the Christianized natives, the Moro people are themselves

victims of colonial rule. Throughout the Spanish regime, they indeed gloriously defendedtheir freedom. But the wars they must fight also prevented them from keeping up withmodernization, a consequence from which they still suffer to the present. American armsplaced both Moros and Filipinos in the same status, subjects of a colonial regime. Andto date, victims of the essential continuation of American policies under a prostitutedRepublic. On the whole the exercise of these policies has not only worked against the basicinterests of the vast majority of the Filipino and Moro peoples but has also contributed verylittle to their mutual acceptance of each other.

In the process of resettlement, there were indeed certain legal measures providedfor the protection of the native inhabitants of Mindanao. But, if we are to judge fromthe results exemplified by the present eruptions, it is clear that the American colonialgovernment, the Commonwealth and the Republic have so far failed to protect them

where they are most vulnerable.

Conflict in Landownership Practices

Throughout the entire period of the Spanish colonial regime, and for a great part of American rule, the native inhabitants of Mindanao and Sulu had practiced the communalsystem of ownership. This means a clan or a bigger form of community traditionallyoccupies a definite territory, with clearly defined boundaries; within this larger territory,families, not individuals, may own and cultivate a parcel of land which in turn can betransmitted from generation to generation as pusaka or inherited property. Sale ordonation of land property within the larger territory, whether to fellow clansmen or to

outsiders are subject to traditionally accepted procedures, the most important of which isthe approval of the chieftain.

The government position, on the other hand, is based first of all on the doctrine thatall lands within its sovereignty is public domain and private ownership is a state-grantedprivilege. Individuals or groups of individuals may own property subject to the laws of the




state which, as a matter of law and principle, revolves around the torrens system.

The American colonizers introduced the torrens system into the country. The system

allows and protects private ownership of land by torrens title. Titles may be issued toindividuals or corporations but never to families. The two systems, the traditionalcommunal practice and the private property system, are actually diametrically opposed.

What puts the natives of Mindanao in jeopardy is that the government recognizes only theprivate property system which, when implemented in the resettlement of Mindanao andSulu, actually renders the native occupants virtual squatters in their traditional land. Notonly this, the American colonial government also passed laws which literally discriminatedagainst “non-Christians”. Act No. 2874, for instance, otherwise known as Public Land Act,

passed on November 29, 1919, allowed the “Christian” to apply for a maximum of 24hectares while the “non-Christian” was limited to not more than 10 hectares.

While it is true that the government sought (its only concession to traditional practice)the initial consent of the Moro datus, as in Cotabato, for instance, for the first settlementareas, yet this action was more of a diplomatic gesture. In fact, it was a deceitful ratherthan a genuine recognition of the traditional datu right to make decisions in behalf of hispeople.

It is not possible here to quantify how many Moro families had been displaced andhow many hectares were involved, but official accounts nonetheless give us a reliable ideaof how the process went. In 1930, Governor Dwight Davis reported: “I looked into thecondition of the non-Christian people and found that they are not being well-treated asregards their lands, as in many places their lands are being taken away from them becausethey do not understand the legal procedures necessary to acquire title.”137

In 1935, Salipada K. Pendatun expressed his apprehension in a Memo to V.G. Hayden:“Considering the differences in enlightenment between the Christians and non-Christians,it can easily be seen that the non-Christians cannot stand the race with their Christianbrothers in acquiring lands. Their poor facilities due to ignorance will undoubtedlyhandicap them.”138 Pendatun went on to predict the dire consequences of such a situationupon his people. “If this situation is allowed to continue, the most probably (sic) effect willbe that eventually, the Christian homesteaders will occupy most of the public unreservedlands of Cotabato, making the non-Christians strangers in their own communities… Thisconsequently creates restlessness among the natives that will finally give in to violence in

internecine wrangling.”139

137 In Thomas, ibid ., p. 152.

138 Ibid ., p. 265.139 Ibid ., pp. 265-266.




In 1971, the Senate Committee on National Minorities noted that “after the second world war, the influx of settlers and immigrants to… Cotabato continued. LASEDECO was replaced by NARRA, then the EDCOR, and now by the Land Authority. These agencies

remained of, by and for the settlers. The prior rights of the natives were disregarded andeven trampled upon.140

The CNI: Failed Government Solution

To stabilize the socio-economic disequilibrium created by the elite-orientedresettlement program and the systematic penetration of Mindanao by the wealthy fewand the numerous corporate entities, the government came forward with a “key answer.”

Congress created the Commission on National Integration (CNI) through Republic Act No.1888 in 1957.

CNI remained in existence for 18 years and was finally abolished in April, 1975,ostensibly for its failure to accomplish its avowed tasks. Its guiding policy was “to foster,accelerate, and accomplish by all adequate means and in a systematic, rapid and completemanner the moral, material, economic, social and political advancement of the Non-Christian Filipinos, hereinafter called National |Cultural Minorities, and to render real,

complete and permanent the Integration of all the said National Cultural Minorities intothe body politic.”141

This policy statement is an almost word for word repetition of that of the Bureau ofNon-Christian Tribes which was organized in 1917, namely, “to continue work for theadvancement and liberty in favor of the regions inhabited by the non-Christian Filipinosand foster by all adequate means and in a systematical, rapid and complete manner themoral, material, economic, social and political development of the regions, always having

in view the aims of rendering permanent the mutual intelligence between the completefusion of all the Christian and non-Christian elements populating the provinces of the Archipelago.”142

Such a repetition was an indirect admission of government failure, which in thisparticular instance, means that for forty years, from 1917 to 1958, nothing substantial hadbeen accomplished to check the sowing of socio-economic disequilibrium in Mindanao.Such a failure was, as always, conveniently blamed on the previous administration orexplained away with the standardized charges of corruption and incompetence. The defect,as usual, was not in the law but in those charged with its implementation.

140 Senate Committee Report on National Minorities, April, 1971, p. 22.141 Section 1, R.A. 1888 as amended.142 Senate Committee Report on National Minorities, 1963, p. 2.




But even a cursory examination of R.A. 1888 will show what a bad law is. For all itsgrandiose objectives, it evidently was not meant to succeed, even given the most honestand competent implementers. Take the first two of the CNI’s seventeen functions provided

in Section: 143

To engage in industrial and agricultural enterprises and establish processing(a)plants and cottage industries to lead communities of the National CulturalMinorities in engaging such pursuits and, upon the attainment of these objectives,to sell such enterprises or industries to them at cost.To construct, operate and maintain irrigation systems and dams, power(b)structures and generating plants, electric transmission and distribution lines orsystems for the furnishing of electric light, heat and power to the inhabitants in

the areas not receiving the services of such plants or systems.

Imagine a cost estimate of these two, along with fifteen other functions, and seehow they will fare with an annual appropriation of Php 5 million, the release of whichis to be taken from “any funds in the National Treasury “not otherwise appropriated.144

According to a study made by Filipinas Foundation, Inc., of the five million, “only half wasassured of release.” Moreover, “fully 70 percent of this amount… was allocated to collegescholars, of whom, in fact only less than 18 percent were graduated.”145

Not even the additional allocation of another five million for the next ten years from1965, as provided for by the 1964 amendments to R.A. 1888, saved the CNI-Davao fromsquatting rent-free in 1974 because it did not have rent money. Worse, this office had torequest poor minorities, who came all the way from the hills to seek assistance on theirland problems, to purchase their own paper and envelopes in order that they cases mightbe brought to the attention of proper authorities.

Miseducation Perpetuates Bias Against Moros

The general education the natives of Luzon and the Visayas had received from theSpanish colonizers had painted the Moro image in most unpalatable terms. The Americancolonizers did little to erase the resultant negative Filipino attitude and the equally negativeMoro response to it.

The popular education the Americans propagated in the Philippines was, as pointed

143 Section 4, R.A. 1888 as amended.144 Ibid .145 An Anatomy of Philippine Muslim Affairs (Makati: Filipinas Foundation, Inc.,

19771), pp. 162-163; also in Leon Ma. Guerrero, “Encounter of Cultures: The

Muslims in the Philippines,” BNFI Papers No. 2, n.d., p. 13.




out earlier, an adjunct of their strategy of colonization. By remolding Filipino and Morominds, especially those of the politico-economic elite, into willing and grateful colonialsubjects, the imperialists succeeded in projecting their image of benefactor instead of

colonizer.

It is true that in this system of education, Philippine history, among others, wastaught. But American educators made certain that neither Filipino nor Moro patriotism wasarouse. The role, for instance, of such personalities as Bonifacio, Aguinaldo, Mabini andmany others was deliberately played down. Those who continued to resist the Americans

were promptly labeled and popularized as bandits and outlaws. Moro resistance leaderslike Datu Ampuan Agaus, Datu Ali and Panglima Hassan, to mention but a few, were

also placed in the same category. The result was that both educated Filipinos and Moros were alienated from their people’s history, from the glorious memory of their ancestors’struggles against foreign domination, and the basic differences between them remainedunresolved.

After receiving the bogus Philippine independence in 1946, the elite-dominatedgovernment continued the same basic educational orientation, and by so doing wasactually sustaining the rift between the Moros and the Filipinos.

Popular education had been, and still is, a potent force in bringing two peoples,separated by centuries of war and hate, towards greater unity and, ultimately, finalacceptance of each other as distinct but one people. But a cursory glance at presentday Philippine history textbooks will show not only its foreign orientation but also itsfailure to present both Moros and Filipinos to each other in their proper historical light.Little surprise that the Moro masses generally look upon the government as gobirno a

saruwang a tao or the government of an alien people, and the Filipino masses generally

find it difficult to imagine how the Moros can be their brothers.




Part Three

CONCLUSION, NOT THE END




Our Common Roots

We have pointed out that all the people of the Philippines, with the exception of the

Aetas, share a common racial and cultural origin in the Malayo-Polynesian stock. This ismost evident in our vocabularies. Other traces of community are also found in certainpractices like the blood compact.

Thus, even if the Teduray, Manobo, Subanun, Tausug, Maranao, Maguindanaonand others differ in many ways, their closely similar if not identical vocabularies andpractices strongly indicate that they have been “severed from the same womb,” kadugo,for short. This common racial beginning, despite more than three hundred years of

colonial experience, has not been forgotten.

In spite of tribal differences characteristic of our period of history at the coming ofthe Spaniards, we were taking the natural course of development towards higher forms ofunity as evidenced by the lead taken by the Moros both in the north and in the south, Sulu,in particular, had already a sufficient socio-economic base to support a sultanate.

Natural Development Disrupted by Colonialism

This natural course of development was, however, disrupted and preempted by analien force, the Spanish colonizers. Taking advantage of the relatively low level of socialand organizational development in the north and using the tactics of divide and rule, theysucceeded in conquering the native inhabitants of Luzon and the Visayas and kept them,in spite of numerous revolts, under subjection for more than three centuries.

Spanish attempts to extend their colonial success to the south was expressed in the

more than three centuries of Spanish-Moro wars which became the breeding ground formutual Filipino-Moro antagonisms. The participation of Christian natives in these wars was the result of their new status as a conquered and subject people and not of willfulaction. The Moro response expressed in raids and assaults upon Spanish strongholds andSpanish-held settlements was to be expected and fully justified as acts of self-defense.

Neither (Christianized) native participation nor Moro response must be interpretedas a negation of their ancient brotherhood, but rather as a product of Spanish pursuit

of colonization through divide and rule tactics. It is on record that Datu Bwisan ofMaguindanao and the Christianized datus of Leyte reaffirmed their brotherhood througha blood compact in 1603. The leaders of the 1896 Revolution also acknowledged thisrelationship and sought to re-establish solidarity with the Moros because, “they werebound by ties of race, interests, security and defense.” Both Bwisan and the leaders ofthe Revolution cited the Spanish as a common enemy; the latter also warned against the




American imperialist intentions in the entire archipelago. These same basic points werelater confirmed as valid by Sultan Jamalul Kiram of Sulu. The Spanish colonizers, in short,must be held mainly responsible for creating and sustaining Filipino-Moro rift for this part

of Philippine history.

American Policies Aggravate Mindanao Problem

The American imperialists, too, must be held culpable for their contribution to theMindanao problem not only for the duration of the American colonial regime but also forthe present. Using a combination of military force and deception as instruments of divideand rule, the Americans succeeded in bringing the native inhabitants of Mindanao and

Sulu under effective colonial rule through such methods as the organization of the MoroCompany of the Philippine Constabulary, the Bates Agreement, the policy of attractionimplemented partly through popular education, the pensionado program and the so-called training for self-government.

It must be pointed out, however, that the same conquest of the Moros also broughtabout a convergence of Moro and Filipino interests which for more than three centuries

were at loggerheads. The continuation of basic American imperialist policies into

the Commonwealth and the Republic has now transformed this convergence into a common defense of common interests against a common threat. For now, by theiradoption of basic imperialist policies, the politico-economic elite including their Morocounterpart must be held responsible, too, for the Mindanao problem.

The colonial pattern of trade relationship with the United States started with theenactment of the Payne-Aldrich Act of 1909 and the Underwood-Simmons Act of 1913.Free trade continued until 1934. The Philippine Trade Act of 1946 extended limited

free trade until 1954 and also contained the obnoxious parity provisions which gave American citizens and corporations equal rights as Filipino citizens and corporations inthe exploitation of the natural resources and the operation of public utilities. The Laurel-Langley agreement of 1955 discontinued free trade but besides extending parity from1956 to 1974, the American imperialists were allowed to enter into all kinds of businesses.Other nationals were also allowed in, provided their holdings were limited to a maximumof 60 percent of total equity of the concern in which they were participants.

Together, these laws built the foundations of the present export-oriented economicsystem in which we are chiefly producers-exporters of raw materials needed by foreignmanufacturers and importers of foreign finished products. The American and Japanesecorporations are the main beneficiaries in this economic system. Furthermore, in thisdependent relationship, we spend more than we earn and are actually captive recipientsof imperialist-dictated terms and prices, and never able to save enough capital for the




development of our own vital industries. We are thus rendered highly vulnerable to foreignborrowings, foreign aid, foreign investors, foreign technology and foreign dictations, and tothe ebb and flow of international capitalist economy.

Consequently, we now see the fulfillment of the Taft slogan of “Philippines for theFilipinos” which in essence and in intent was to make our economic relationship withthe United States highly profitable for American businessmen. Taft conveniently forgot tomention that this would also make us economically dependent upon the United Stateseconomy.

In 1945, Paul V. McNutt, the U.S. High Commissioner to the Philippines noted that

“politically we brought the islands through progressive steps to the verge of independence.Economically we brought the islands through progressive steps to almost completedependence upon our markets.” Our economic situation became so bad that from 1946to 1972, we can only cite two instances of favorable balance of trade; we actually fluctuatedfrom one deficit to another.

Our Leader’s Duplicity

The local politico-economic elite made a correct reading of the disadvantageouseffects of free trade upon our national economy, but in an act of duplicity aimed to protecttheir political careers, keep the U.S. interests secure in the Philippines and at the sametime maintain the support of the people, they accepted free trade in private but maintainopposition to it in public. This act of collusion with their foreign masters to perpetuateforeign interests here and their private interests at the expense of the vast majority of thepeople has been the characteristic feature of our so-called leaders since then.

Free Trade’s Effects on our Landholding System

Free trade had a decisive influence upon the internal structure of our landownershipsystem. The production of raw materials for export demanded vast landholdings. Sincethe landed few were in the best position to meet this requirement, or even expand currentlandholdings if necessary, the land policy practiced by the American colonial government(and also by the Commonwealth and the Republic) actually favored them over the smalllandholders and the landless tenants.

Not even the various land reform laws enacted by the different administrations fromthe Commonwealth period created any substantial dent on these vast private or corporatelandholdings. There has been in fact a steady rise in the rate of tenancy which in turnbecame the breeding ground for social unrest.




The opening up of Mindanao to resettlement, to foreign investors and to corporateentities both foreign and local was started within the American colonial framework, underthe imperialist umbrella of free trade. After the grant of bogus independence in 1946,

resettlement was pursued under the legal protection of parity, and within the overridinginstitution of free enterprise.

Resettlement, in particular, was undertaken purportedly to ease social pressurecreated by population congestion. But this was only a cover up, first, to rid the big landlordsof troublesome tenants in Luzon and the Visayas and thus save their vast landholdingsfrom being partitioned; second, to enhance the politico-economic elite’s public imageas public servants interested only in the welfare of the poor majority, and third, to enable

them to “legally” exploit the vast natural resources of Mindanao to their best advantageand that of their imperialist masters.

Sustained Penetration by Multinationals

Rampant collusion and connivance between these two groups, namely, the politico-economic elite and foreign investors, were noted in the entry and rise to economicprominence of Japanese agri-corporations in Davao from 1905 to 1939; in the establishment

of Philpak in Bukidnon and Dole in South Cotabato; in the rapid spread and increase oflogging concessions in practically all provinces of Mindanao to a total of more than fourmillion hectares in 1972-73; in the boosting of the banana industry from an insignificantconcern in 1967 to the giant that it was in 1976 when it occupied the sixth position in thetop ten primary export items; in the securing of pasture leases and permits, and in manyother business activities, resulting in the massive displacement of native inhabitants andthe corresponding deprivation of real opportunity to improve their lives.

Effects on Mindanao Social Situation

In the resettlement process itself, very little and usually only token protection wasprovided for the native inhabitants as exemplified by the Santos-led reconnaissance partyin Koronadal Valley. The ignorance of the native inhabitants on the titling procedures andtheir system of communal ownership, long their practice before the arrival of the Republic,

were practically ignored.

What prevailed was the race for landownership under “absolute equality before thelaw” propagated by Quezon. This naturally worked to the advantage of those who knew thelaw and how to get around it, and of course those who had the proper connections andmoney.




Little wonder that the Senate Committee “Report on the Deteriorating Peace andOrder Conditions in Cotabato” noted that the resettlement agencies remained of, by andfor the settlers. Prior rights of the natives were disregarded and even trampled upon.

The net effect of this systematic penetration and exploitation of the vast naturalresources of Mindanao, with the politico-economic elite and their foreign masters playingthe key role, is what Alonto calls the “socio-economic disequilibrium,” or the extension ofthe state of social unrest in Luzon and the Visayas to Mindanao.

Undertaken under the guise of contributing to national progress and development,the enterprise proved to be highly profitable to those few who steadily made, and still are

making millions of dollars while the national economy sank and floated. As of the end of1977, the country was saddled with a foreign debt of $6.4 billion.

At the same time, the vast majority of Moros and Filipinos continue to suffer increasingpoverty. Theirs is the simple case of having been deprived by the wealthy few of the basicopportunities to improve their own lives. True, the Filipinos in Luzon and the Visayasenjoyed a cultural and technological advantage compared to the Moros, but this did notmake them any less victims than the latter.

Role of Elite-Oriented Education

Aside from the mass media, the educational system has also served as a key advertisingagency for the politico-economic elite and their foreign masters.

Social science courses, especially those related to economics, continually glorify freeenterprise, foreign investments, foreign technology, export production, foreign borrowings

and foreign aid as indispensable to national progress. Overpopulation is almost alwaysposed as a serious problem or cause for our poverty when in fact the problem has beenand still is misdirected production.

Courses in social studies and Philippine history have, despite repeated eruptions inMindanao and Sulu, continually failed to even attempt to erase the mutual ignoranceand misinformation that persists between Moros and Filipinos. The educational systemhas been and still is, as a result, a most subtle tool of divide and rule – worse, becauseit reinforces the more divisive activities of the politico-economic elite and their foreignmasters.

Common Burden Common Threat

The resolution of the Mindanao problem is unmistakably though not solely




conditioned upon the resolution of the land issue which in concrete terms, at present,means having to reckon with the combined force of local bureaucrats and entrepreneurs(constituting the politico-economic elite) and their foreign masters, mainly the American

imperialists and their Japanese counterparts. Until then, all pronouncements on Moro-Filipino brotherhood will serve no useful purpose except to divert the attention of the vastmajority from the real causes of the problem.

Combined, these few exploiters of the vast majority of Moros and Filipinos have becomea social force that is at the same time the basic cause of and the primary obstruction to theresolution of the Mindanao problem.




They have become the leech that sucks away the lifeblood of two nations – one people;

They have become the bad weed that saps the wealth of two hills of the same land.

p.s. This is not the end of the story.




Appendix A

ISLAMIZED AND LUMAD POPULATION

IN MINDANAO, SULU AND PALAWAN

BASED ON MOTHER TONGUE,

BY MUNICIPALITY, 1970 CENSUS

Compiled by Rudy B. Rodil




PROVINCE TOTAL MUSLIM % LUMAD %

OTHER

INDIGE-

NOUS

INHABI-

TANTS

%

Agusan delNorte

278,053 1,350 0.48 1998 0.72 3 ---

Butuan 131,094 1,148 0.87 869 0.66 0 ---

Buenavista 24,753 33 0.13 21 0.08 0 ---

Cabadbaran 34,729 34 0.09 237 0.68 0 ---

Carmen 12,851 12 0.09 0 --- 0 ---

Jabonga 12,129 69 0.56 333 2.74 0 ---

Kitcharao 9,960 0 --- 0 --- 0 ---

Las Nieves 6,782 24 0.35 155 2.28 3 ---

Nasipit 23,306 14 0.06 0 --- 0 ---

Santiago 5,005 0 --- 383 7.65 0 ---

Tubay 10,065 7 0.06 0 --- 0 ---Magallanes 7,377 9 0.12 0 --- 0 ---

Agusan del Norte: Muslim: Magindanao – 906, Maranao - 524; Lumad : Manobo - 1,540;Mamanwa - 437; Negrito - 24; Other Indigenous Inhabitants: Davaweño – 3

Agusan del Sur 174,682 1,036 0.59 29,531 16.91 21 ---

Prosperidad 23,328 120 0.51 947 3.98 0 ---

Bayugan 37,816 251 0.66 2,465 6.51 0 ---

Bunawan 8,646 0 --- 1,057 12.22 0 ---

Esperanza 21,051 53 0.25 3,389 16.09 0 ---

La Paz 7,971 5 0.06 5,289 66.35 0 ---

Loreto 13,057 0 --- 4,325 33.12 0 ---

San Francisco 17,636 349 1.97 1,312 7.43 0 ---

San Luis 7,531 9 0.11 3,454 45.86 0

Santa Josefa 3,601 0 --- 558 15.49 2 ---

Talacogon 7,719 12 0.15 1,481 19.18 0

Trento 11,815 37 0.31 3,285 27.80 16 ---

Veruela 6,626 0 --- 1,338 20.19 3 ---

Rosario 7,885 200 2.53 631 8.00 0 ---

Agusan del Sur: Muslim: Magindanao – 935, Maranao - 99, Iranun 2; Lumad : Manobo - 28,568;Banuaon - 952, Mandaya - 23; Other Indigenous Inhabitants: Davaweño – 18; Chavacano – 12

Bukidnon 414,762 4,155 1.00 73,359 17.68 5,533 1.33

Malaybalay 47,074 54 0.11 11,102 23.58 49 0.1

Baungon 11,251 19 0.16 881 7.83 899 7.99

Dangcagan 13,458 35 0.26 157 1.16 0 ---

Don Carlos 32,639 35 0.1 335 1.02 43 0.13

Impasugong 9,169 0 --- 6,966 75.97 3 ---

Kalilangan 12,325 1,748 14.18 0 --- 0 ---

Kibawe 56,239 396 0.7 3,728 6.62 0 ---

Kitaotao 14,708 0 --- 2,763 18.78 39 0.27Lantapan 14,523 0 --- 6,084 41.89 32 0.22

Libona 14,988 6 0.04 1,063 7.09 0 ---

Malitbog 8,230 0 --- 2,591 1.48 3,998 48.68

Manolo Fortich(Maluko)

27,159 0 --- 6,480 23.85 0 ---

Maramag 21,839 72 0.32 929 4.25 0 ---




Pangantucan 17,458 398 2.25 2,716 15.55 0 ---

Quezon (Pulangi) 38,084 0 --- 1,386 3.63 87 0.23

San Fernando 6,698 0 --- 4,115 61.43 5 ---

Sumilao 6,528 0 --- 5,109 78.26 378 5.8

Talakag 22,649 1,292 5.7 12,896 56.93 0 ---Valencia 39,708 100 0.25 4,058 1.02 0 ---

Bukidnon: Muslim: Maranao - 7,869; Magindanao – 122; Lumad : Bukidnon - 117,589; Manobo -14,249; Bagobo - 47; Other Indigenous Inhabitants: Cagayan de Oro - 5,530; Chavacano – 3

Cotabato 1,136,007 438,134 38.56 62,326 5.49 4,703 0.41

Alamada 14,813 3,781 25.52 181 1.22 0 ---

Ampatuan 33,867 9,680 28.58 1,240 3.66 0 ---

Bagumbayan 26,231 8,163 31.11 2,439 9.24 0 ---

Buldon 18,549 15,011 80.92 0 --- 0 ---

Buluan 49,158 32,266 65.63 389 0.79 0 ---

Carmen 42,840 18,105 42.26 2,296 5.35 0 ---

Columbio 20,748 8,846 42.63 2,011 9.69 0 ---

Cotabato City 61,184 22,373 36.56 0 ---- 2,741 4.48

Datu Piang 44,391 41,116 92.62 1,503 3.38 52 0.12

Dinaig 42,827 32,226 75.24 5,234 12.22 69 0.16

Isulan 29,850 4,397 14.73 363 1.21 0 ---

Kabacan 22,769 5,144 22.59 86 0.37 0 ---

Kalamansig 15,875 2,127 13.39 2,402 15.13 191 1.2

Kidapawan 46,820 1,384 2.95 2,266 4.83 0 ---

Lebak 27,538 4,264 15.48 2,891 10.49 0 ---

Libungan 19,029 628 3.3 1,521 7.99 17 0.09

Lutayan 9,581 4,898 51.12 135 1.4 0 ---

M'lang 44,844 4,584 10.22 0 --- 0 ---

Maganoy 33,846 30,020 88.69 1,401 4.13 0 ---

Magpet 30,869 288 0.93 7,611 24.65 0 ---

Makilala 35,796 927 2.58 3,244 9.06 0 ---

Matalam 36,036 5,840 16.2 1,210 3.35 0 ---

Midsayap 47,093 12,285 26.08 262 0.55 0 ---

Pagalungan 27,859 24,893 89.35 0 --- 0 ---

Palimbang 31,696 15,142 47.77 2,008 6.33 377 1.19

Parang 31,667 16,690 52.7 0 --- 731 2.3Pigkawayan 26,845 9,314 34.69 402 1.49 0 ---

Pikit 55,423 33,523 60.48 64 0.11 39 ---

President Roxas 20,639 220 1.06 3,522 17.06 0 ---

Sultan Kudarat 40,377 32,673 80.91 232 0.57 109 0.27

Sultan saBarongis

45,421 18,840 41.47 22 0.04 0 ---

Tacurong 29,796 446 1.49 0 --- 0 ---

Tulunan 24,538 1,126 4.58 137 0.55 0 ---

Tumbao 11,465 10,313 89.95 0 --- 0 ---

Upi 35,727 6,601 18.47 17,254 48.3 377 1.05

Cotabato: Muslim: Magindanao – 402,234 , Maranao - 21,762, Iranun - 7,937, Sangil - 155, Tausug- 460, Samal - 563, Calagan - 1,527; Lumad : Teduray – 28,632, Manobo – 23,992; Bagobo -

5,923, Bla-an - 4,082, T’boli – 495; Other Indigenous Inhabitants: Chavacano - 4,703

South Cotabato 466,110 28,349 6.08 43,908 9.42 109 ---

Banga 36,319 2,076 5.72 701 1.93 0 ---




Gen. Santos City 85,861 3,871 4.5 3,535 4.11 0 ---

Glan 37,879 2,689 7.09 7,888 20.82 0 ---

Kiamba 21,424 2,762 12.89 4,024 18.78 0 ---

Koronadal 54,413 1,545 2.84 1,486 2.73 0 ---

Maasim 17,201 2,057 11.95 2,478 14.40 109 0.63Maitum 17,511 2,147 12.26 2,261 12.91 0 ---

Malapatan 19,993 2,467 12.34 4,314 21.57 0 ---

Malungon 13,629 2,812 20.63 2,101 15.41 0 ---

Norala 34,131 726 2.12 378 1.1 0 ---

Polomolok 32,570 2,037 6.25 2,221 6.81 0 ---

Surala 45,631 706 1.55 6,632 14.53 0 ---

Tampacan 10,731 283 2.64 770 7.17 0 ---

Tantangan 15,943 1,103 6.92 933 5.85 0 ---

Tupi 22,874 1,068 4.67 4,186 18.3 0 ---

South Cotabato: Muslim: Magindanao - 22,699, Maranao - 1,297, Kalagan - 2,571, Sangil - 1,266,Tausug - 355, Iranun – 161; Lumad : Bla-an - 29,181, T’boli – 13,095, Manobo – 863, Teduray -

769; Other Indigenous Inhabitants: Chavacano – 109

Davao del Norte 442,543 10,223 2.86 17,390 3.40 5,754 1.3

Tagum 47,324 1,222 2.58 0 --- 1,289 2.72

Asuncion (Saug) 36,033 735 2.04 2,498 6.93 1,112 3.09

Babak 17,640 452 2.56 1,053 5.97 212 1.2

Carmen 20,385 90 0.44 499 2.44 452 2.22

Compostela 17,159 237 1.38 321 1.87 116 0.68

Kapalong 20,225 96 0.47 2,862 14.15 52 0.26

Kaputian 17,086 236 1.38 1381 8.08 82 0.48

Mabini (DñaAlicia)

18,343 854 8.65 1,371 7.47 111 0.6

Maco 29,693 1,076 3.62 841 2.83 439 1.48

Mawab 13,537 127 0.94 26 0.19 470 3.47

Monkayo 24,597 33 0.13 2,395 9.73 175 0.71

Montevista 11,945 11 0.09 1,157 9.68 0 ---

Nabunturan 27,689 32 0.11 347 1.25 42 0.15

New Bataan 19,978 286 1.73 1,959 9.8 31 0.16

New Corella 18,745 299 1.59 577 3.07 82 0.44

Panabo 42,920 444 1.03 0 --- 395 0.92Pantukan 21,890 1,334 6.09 0 --- 521 2.38

Samal 16,113 2,659 16.5 0 --- 0 ---

Santo Tomas 21,241 0 --- 103 0.48 173 0.8

Davao del Norte: Muslim: Kalagan - 699, Tausug – 1,417, Magindanao - 4,502, Maranao - 1,635; Lumad : Mandaya – 12,651, Manobo - 170, Ata - 2,242, Teduray - 35, Bla-an - 26, Samal (Isamal?)

- 4,426; Other Indigenous Inhabitants: Davaweño - 5,723; Chavacano – 31

Davao Oriental 247,991 1,818 0.73 11,503 4.64 84,308 34.0

Mati 53,242 881 1.65 1,637 3.07 8,465 15.90

Baganga 27,678 177 0.63 793 2.86 16,190 58.49Caraga 16,618 0 --- 3,554 21.38 11,839 71.24

Cateel 14,633 0 --- 0 --- 13,359 91.29

Gov. Generoso 28,329 65 0.22 1,871 6.6 2,733 9.65

Lupon 32,456 268 0.82 1,327 4.08 1,787 5.51

Manay 21,114 17 0.08 350 1.65 18,645 88.31

San Isidro 24,270 226 0.93 0 --- 1,485 6.11




Tarragona 9,464 121 1.27 1,889 19.95 4,464 47.17

Banay-Banay 14,866 63 0.42 82 0.55 845 5.68

Boston 5,321 0 --- 0 --- 4,496 84.50

Davao Oriental: Muslim: Magindanao - 714, Maranao - 926, Tausug – 178; Lumad : Mandaya -9,149, Manobo - 2,354; Other Indigenous Inhabitants: Davaweño - 84,297; Chavacano – 11

Davao del Sur 785,398 9,027 1.15 92,666 11.80 12,297 1.57

Bansalan 33,374 79 0.23 2,186 6.55 1,889 5.66

Davao City 392,473 1,964 0.5 17,367 4.42 4,913 1.25

Digos 47,588 1,071 2.25 1,589 3.33 246 0.52

Hagonoy 23,008 1,107 4.81 28 0.12 996 4.53

Jose Abad Santos(Trinidad)

29,576 1,209 4.08 17,917 60.57 2,188 7.40

Kiblawan 24,549 158 0.64 2,320 9.45 109 0.44

Magsaysay 30,920 117 0.37 2,393 7.73 0 ---Malalag 34,764 351 1.0 3,322 9.55 0 ---

Malita 46,060 1,019 2.2 28,512 61.90 0 ---

Matanao 26,889 70 0.26 2,317 8.60 154 0.57

Padada 14,402 53 0.36 0 --- 0 ---

Santa Cruz 34,762 598 1.72 5,554 15.97 1,183 3.4

Santa Maria 24,271 508 2.09 8,922 36.75 619 2.55

Sulop 22,762 723 3.17 239 1.03 0 ---

Davao del Sur: Muslim: Kalagan - 804, Tausug – 796, Magindanao - 1,744, Maranao - 4,159,Sangil - 1,209; Lumad : Bagobo - 25,572, Tagakaolo - 23,908, Manobo – 23,611, Bla-an - 17,462,

Ata - 2,727, Mandaya - 314, Teduray - 142; Other Indigenous Inhabitants: Davaweño – 12,297

Lanao del Norte 349,942 83,921 23.98 999 0.29 11 ---

Bacolod 10,685 1,930 18.0 0 --- 0 ---

Balo-i 23,644 18,426 77.93 0 --- 0 ---

Baroy 11,076 19 0.17 0 --- 0 ---

Iligan City 104,493 4,197 4.1 999 0.95 0 ---

Kapatagan 20,140 143 0.71 0 --- 0 ---

Karomatan 18,741 5,439 29.02 0 --- 6 ---

Kauswagan 12,316 2,787 22.62 0 --- 0 ---

Kolambugan 14,318 2,210 15.43 0 --- 0 ---

Lala 22,544 296 1.31 0 --- 0 ---

Linamon 8,822 511 5.79 0 --- 5 ---

Magsaysay 7,999 3,598 44.98 0 --- 0 ---

Maigo 10,578 794 7.5 0 --- 0 ---

Matungao 10,315 6,934 67.22 0 --- 0 ---

Munai 5,219 5,149 98.65 0 --- 0 ---

Nunungan 3,863 3,599 93.16 0 --- 0 ---

Pantao Ragat 6,306 6,260 99.27 0 --- 0 ---

Salvador 10,813 4,447 41.12 0 --- 0 ---

Sapad 12,723 5,109 40.15 0 --- 0 ---

Tagoloan 5,900 3,834 64.98 0 --- 0 ---Tangcal 6,309 5,318 84.29 0 --- 0 ---

Tubod 23,138 2,921 12.62 0 --- 0 ---

Lanao del Norte: Muslim: Maranao - 83,678, Magindanao – 179, Tausug - 68; Lumad : Bukidnon(Higaunon) - 999; Other Indigenous Inhabitants: Chavacano – 11




Lanao del Sur 455,508 404,359 88.77 89 0.02 0 ---

Bacolod Grande 15,609 15,509 99.35 0 --- 0 ---

Balabagan 18,234 13,093 71.8 38 0.2 0 ---

Balindong (Watu) 14,678 14,590 99.4 1 --- 0 ---

Bayang 23,772 23,685 99.63 0 --- 0 ---Binidayan 14,542 14,473 99.52 0 --- 0 ---

Bubong 8,144 7,937 97.45 27 0.3 0 ---

Butig 9,370 6,351 67.78 0 --- 0 ---

Dianaton 7,042 5,961 84.64 0 --- 0 ---

Ganassi 13,277 13,057 98.34 1 --- 0 ---

Kapai 5,169 4,906 94.91 12 0.23 0 ---Lumba a Bayabao 18,012 17,780 98.71 0 --- 0 ---

Lumbatan 17,790 17,432 97.98 0 --- 0 ---

Madalum 7,937 7,885 99.34 1 --- 0 ---

Madamba 12,161 11,895 97.81 0 --- 0 ---

Malabang 28,692 22,164 77.24 0 --- 0 ---Marantao 15,861 15,830 99.8 1 --- 0 ---

Marawi City 55,708 41,921 75.25 0 --- 0 ---

Masiu 12,550 12,482 99.45 0 --- 0 ---

Molundo 15,961 15,583 97.63 0 --- 0 ---

Pagayawan 10,566 10,526 99.62 0 --- 0 ---

Piagapo 7,248 7,183 99.1 2 0.02 0 ---

Poon a Bayabao 10,780 10,728 99.51 0 --- 0 ---

Pualas 7,705 7,608 98.74 0 --- 0 ---

Ramain 16,331 15,790 96.68 0 --- 0 ---

Saguiaran 18,003 17,767 98.67 0 --- 0 ---

Tamparan 11,939 11,799 98.82 4 0.03 0 ---Taraka 10,644 10,510 98.74 0 --- 0 ---

Tubaran 18,994 18,889 99.44 0 --- 0 ---

Tugaya 12,262 6,395 52.15 2 --- 0 ---

Wao 16,577 4,630 27.93 0 --- 0 ---

Lanao del Sur: Muslim: Maranao - 402,799, Magindanao – 829, Tausug – 728; Lumad : Bukidnon -39, Teduray - 38, Subanen - 9, Bla-an – 1, Mamanwa - 1, Manobo – 1

Misamis

Occidental

326,855 485 0.15 2828 0.87 0 ---

Ozamis City 64,643 214 0.33 0 --- 0 ---Tangub City 30,918 44 0.14 37 0.11 0 ---

Oroquieta City 38,575 35 0.09 114 0.30 0 ---

Aloran 18,540 13 0.07 7 0.03 0 ---

Baliangao 18,086 21 0.18 0 --- 0 ---

Bonifacio 16,095 39 0.24 136 0.84 0 ---

Calamba 12,482 13 0.11 31 0.24 0 ---

Clarin 17,806 9 0.05 264 1.48 0 ---

Concepcion 3,046 0 --- 991 32.53 0 ---

Jimenez 18,551 10 0.05 105 0.56 0 ---

Lopez-Jaena 16,464 12 0.07 1 --- 0 ---

Panaon 6,570 6 0.09 0 --- 0 ---

Plaridel 21,627 24 0.11 0 --- 0 ---

Sapang Dalaga 13,704 9 0.06 143 1.04 0 ---

Sinacaban 11,871 28 0.23 46 0.38 0 ---

Tudela 17,877 8 0.04 953 5.33 0 ---




Misamis Occidental: Muslim: Maranao - 460, Magindanao - 34, Tausug - 1; Lumad : Subanen -2,825, Bagobo - 3, Mamanwa – 1

Misamis

Oriental

482,756 656 0.14 2,601 0.54 312 0.06

Cagayan de OroCity

128,319 397 0.3 1,048 0.81 311 0.24

Gingoog City 65,522 129 0.19 465 0.7 0 ---

Alubijid 11,720 4 0.03 0 --- 1 ---

Balingasag 26,389 11 0.04 5 0.01 0 ---

Balingoan 5,821 3 0.05 0 --- 0 ---

Binuangan 4,045 0 --- 0 --- 0 ---

Claveria 16,816 0 --- 355 2.11 0 ---

El Salvador 14,529 4 0.02 25 0.17 0 ---

Gitagum 8,000 2 0.02 0 --- 0 ---

Initao 16,904 8 0.04 0 --- 0 ---Jasaan 15,732 10 0.06 0 --- 0 ---

Kinogitan 6,473 5 0.07 0 --- 0 ---

Lagonlong 9,332 2 0.02 138 1.47 0 ---

Laguindingan 10,292 10 0.09 0 --- 0 ---

Libertad 6,523 16 0.24 0 --- 0 ---

Lugait 7,457 5 0.06 0 --- 0 ---

Magsaysay(Linugos)

19,194 2 0.01 0 --- 0 ---

Manticao 13,503 2 0.01 0 --- 0 ---

Medina 15,185 9 0.05 42 0.27 0 ---

Naawan 8,718 1 --- 71 0.81 0 ---

Opol 10,275 4 0.03 333 3.24 0 ---

Salay 13,386 11 0.08 97 0.72 0 ---

Sugbongcogon 15,276 1 0 --- 0 ---

Tagoloan 11,468 9 0.07 0 --- 0 ---

Talisayan 14,988 8 0.05 22 0.14 0 ---

Villanueva 6,889 3 --- 0 --- 0 ---

Misamis Oriental: Muslim: Maranao - 603, Magindanao - 47, Tausug - 3; Lumad : Bukidnon -2,032, Manobo - 470, Subanen - 99; Other Indigenous Inhabitants: Cagayan de Oro - 311;

Chavacano – 1

Sulu 425,617 412,591 96.94 1573 0.36 581 0.14

Balimbing 10,556 9,377 88.83 352 3.33 0 ---

Bongao 20,983 19,851 94.6 0 --- 99 0.47

Cagayan de Sulu 12,577 12,124 96.39 0 --- 19 0.15

Indanan 26,380 25,686 95.09 294 1.11 0 ---

Jolo 46,586 40,373 86.66 203 0.43 341 0.73

Luuk 26,860 26,690 99.36 2 --- 0 ---

Maimbung 15,557 15,356 98.7 0 --- 9 ---

Marunggas 1,341 1,139 84.93 202 15.06 0 ---

Panamaw 17,431 17,303 99.26 0 --- 23 0.13Pangutaran 16,172 16,038 99.17 0 --- 4 ---

Parang 21,115 21,006 99.48 0 --- 4 ---

Pata 8,077 7,712 95.48 3 0.03 0 ---

Patikul 22,577 22,385 99.14 2 --- 11 ---

Siasi 51,425 51,033 99.23 0 --- 38 0.07

Simunul 12,135 12,018 99.03 0 --- 19 0.16




Sitangkai 13,738 13,410 97.61 209 1.52 0 ---

South Ubian 12,749 12,645 99.18 0 --- 0 ---

Talipaw 32,111 31,909 99.37 0 --- 0 ---

Tandubas 27,069 26,936 99.5 6 0.02 9 ---

Tapul 20,694 20,494 99.03 0 --- 5 ---Tungkil 9,095 8,721 95.88 299 3.28 0 ---

Turtle Islands 389 385 98.97 1 --- 0 ---

Sulu: Muslim: Tausug - 278,194, Samal - 124,114, Pullon Mapun - 10,168, Magindanao - 44,Maranao - 51, Iranun - 21; Lumad : Badjao - 1,274, T’boli – 294, Subanen - 4, Mamanwa - 1; Other

Indigenous Inhabitants: Chavacano – 581

Surigao del

Norte

238,714 430 0.18 386 0.16 1 ---

Surigao City 51,496 241 0.46 0 --- 0 ---

Libjo (Albor) 6,959 2 0 --- 0 ---Alegria 5,346 10 0.18 0 --- 0 ---

Anao-aon 6,486 0 --- 37 0.57 0 ---

Bacuag 9,021 8 0.08 0 --- 0 ---

Burgos 1,958 5 0.25 0 --- 0 ---

Cagdiano 4,827 18 0.37 4 0.08 0 ---

Claver 9,659 0 61 0.63 0 ---

Dapa 13,309 28 0.21 0 --- 0 ---

Del Carmen(Numancia)

11,186 13 0.11 0 --- 0 ---

Dinagat 6,714 6 0.08 0 --- 0 ---

General Luna 8,476 7 0.08 1 --- 0 ---Gigaquit 11,097 9 0.08 117 1.05 0 ---

Loreto 5,020 10 0.19 0 --- 0 ---

Mainit 14,759 22 0.14 90 0.6 0 ---

Malimono 9,412 2 0.02 66 0.7 0 ---

Pilar 6,291 2 0.03 0 --- 1 ---

Placer 11,693 6 0.05 0 --- 0 ---

Basilisa (Rizal) 5,047 0 --- 0 --- 0 ---

San Isidro 3,829 3 0.07 0 --- 0 ---

Santa Monica(Sapao)

5,438 8 0.14 0 --- 0 ---

Sison 5,377 7 0.13 10 0.18 0 ---

Socorro 6,946 10 0.14 0 --- 0 ---

Tagana-an 8,063 8 0.09 0 --- 0 ---

Tubod 6,665 1 --- 0 --- 0 ---

Tubajon 3,660 4 0.01 0 --- 0 ---

Surigao del Norte: Muslim: Tausug - 163, Maranao - 258, Magindanao - 7, Yakan - 2; Lumad :Mamanwa - 320; Negrito - 34, Subanen - 28, Bagobo - 4; Other Indigenous Inhabitants:

Davaweño – 1

Surigao del Sur 258,680 1701 0.66 2204 0.85 698 0.27Tandag 19,847 703 3.5 0 --- 698 3.52

Barobo 16,717 16 0.09 8 0.04 0 ---

Bayabas 4,810 4 0.08 0 --- 0 ---

Bislig 40,405 152 0.37 0 --- 0 ---

Cagwait 10,622 9 0.08 0 --- 0 ---

Cantilan 16,617 17 0.1 717 4.31 0 ---




Carrascal 8,240 9 0.01 0 --- 0 ---

Cortes 9,428 6 0.06 0 --- 0 ---

Hinatuan 22,578 405 1.79 0 --- 0 ---

Lanuza 11,528 21 0.18 0 --- 0 ---

Lianga 18,742 38 0.2 29 0.15 0 ---Lingig 13,836 29 0.2 103 0.74 0 ---

Madrid 11,059 0 --- 182 1.64 0 ---

Marihatag 7,254 6 0.06 334 4.6 0 ---

San Agustin(Oteiza)

7,100 36 0.5 0 --- 0 ---

San Miguel 9,307 14 0.15 831 8.92 0 ---

Tago 17,550 218 1.24 0 --- 0 ---

Tagbina 13,040 18 0.13 0 --- 0 ---

Surigao del Sur: Muslim: Samal - 356, Tausug – 349, Maranao - 354, Magindanao - 642; Lumad :

Manobo – 2,080, Subanen - 66, Mamanwa - 50, Mandaya - 8; Other Indigenous Inhabitants:Chavacano – 698

Zamboanga del

Norte

411,381 22,098 5.37 43,684 10.62 3,050 0.74

Dapitan City 37,781 13 0.03 89 0.23 0 ---

Dipolog City 46,368 55 0.11 36 0.07 0

Katipunan 23,073 5 0.02 7,547 32.7 7 ---

La Libertad 8,351 11 0.17 207 2.47 3 ---

Labason 23,999 1,891 7.88 2,527 10.52 0 ---

Liloy 26,449 269 1.01 1,161 4.38 0 ---

Manukan 27,288 17 0.06 5,350 19.6 0 ---

Mutia 6,093 2 0.03 307 5.03 0 ---

Piñan (NewPiñan)

12,335 0 --- 738 5.98 0 ---

Polanco 19,087 8 0.04 159 0.83 0 ---

Pres. ManuelRoxas

18,851 8 0.04 2,987 15.84 0 ---

Rizal 12,092 6 0.04 0 --- 3 ---

Salug 28,688 1,261 4.40 3,517 12.25 0 ---

Sergio Osmeña,Sr.

17,300 14 0.08 3,180 18.38 0 ---

Siayan 9,193 21 0.22 4,280 46.55 0 ---Sibuco 14,257 7,408 51.96 2,004 14.05 2,413 16.93

Sibutad 8,935 411 4.59 176 1.96 46 ---

Sindangan 43,349 402 0.92 6,637 15.31 13 ---

Siocon 18,842 5,313 28.19 2,658 14.1 408 2.17

Siraway 9,050 4,983 55.06 124 1.37 157 1.73

Zamboanga del Norte: Muslim: Kalibugan - 8,050, Tausug - 5,013, Samal - 4,650, Magindanao -2,881, Maranao - 1,053, Iranun - 333, Yakan - 173; Lumad : Subanen - 43,736, Bukidnon - 10;

Other Indigenous Inhabitants: Chavacano - 3,050

Zamboanga del

Sur

1,029,479 178,146 17.3 47,103 4.58 154,710 15.03

Alicia 19,272 3,701 19.2 534 2.77 2,105 10.05

Aurora 25,975 105 0.4 15 0.05 6 ---

Basilan City 143,829 91,033 63.29 0 --- 25,085 17.44

Bayog 13,599 22 0.16 2,911 21.4 33 0.24




Quezon 18,735 9,190 49.05 514 2.74 1,341 7.16

Roxas 16,341 0 --- 94 0.57 9,650 59.05

San Vicente 5,388 0 --- 360 6.68 2,080 38.60

Taytay 11,920 0 --- 131 1.09 4,446 37.30

Palawan: Muslim: Pinalawan, Molbog, Pullon Mapun, Obian, Tausug, Maranao, Magindanao;

Lumad : Pinalawan, Batak, Tagbanua, Bukidnon, Tagakaolo, Banuaon; Other Indigenous

Inhabitants: Agutayano - 5,186; Cagayano - 77,341; Kalamian – 1,497; Kene - 11; Palaweno -

7,399

SUMMARY

ISLAMIZED AND LUMAD POPULATION

IN MINDANAO, SULU AND PALAWAN BASED ON MOTHER TONGUE,

BY MUNICIPALITY, 1970 CENSUS

PROVINCE TOTAL MUSLIM % LUMAD %

OTHER

INDI-

GENOUS

INHABITA

NTS

%

Agusan del Norte 278,053 1,350 0.48 1,998 0.72 3 ---

Agusan del Sur 174,682 1,036 0.59 29,531 16.91 30 ---Bukidnon 414,762 3,998 0.96 73,359 17.68 5,533 1.33

Cotabato 1,136,007 438,134 38.56 62,326 5.49 4,703 0.41

South Cotabato 466,110 28,349 6.08 43,908 9.42 109 ---

Davao del Norte 442,543 10,223 2.86 17,390 3.40 5,754 1.3

Davao Oriental 247,991 1,818 0.73 11,503 4.64 84,308 34.0

Davao del Sur 785,398 9,027 1.15 92,666 11.80 12,297 1.57Lanao del Norte 349,942 83,921 23.98 999 0.29 11 ---

Lanao del Sur 455,508 404,359 88.77 89 0.02 0 ---

Misamis

Occidental

326,855 485 0.15 2,828 0.87 0 ---

Misamis Oriental 482,756 656 0.14 2,601 0.54 312 0.06

Sulu 425,617 412,591 96.94 1,573 0.36 581 0.14

Surigao del Norte 238,714 430 0.18 386 0.16 1 ---Surigao del Sur 258,680 1,701 0.66 2,204 0.85 698 0.27

Zamboanga del

Norte

411,381 22,098 5.37 43,684 10.62 3,050 0.74

Zamboanga del

Sur

1,029,479 178,146 17.3 47,103 4.58 154,710 15.03

MINDANAO 7,924,47

8

1,598,322 20.17 434,148 5.48 272,100 3.43

With Palawan:

Palawan 236,635 32,328 13.66 9,353 3.95 91,434 38.64

General Total 8,161,11

3

1,630,650 19.98 443,501 5.43 363,534 4.45

TWO HILLS OF THE SAME LAND (Truth Behind the Mindanao Problem)

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Transcript of TWO HILLS OF THE SAME LAND (Truth Behind the Mindanao Problem)