The World Trade Organization READING ASSIGNMENT: Busch, Marc. Overlapping Institutions, Forum...

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The World Trade Organization READING ASSIGNMENT: Busch, Marc. Overlapping Instituti ons, Forum Shopping, and Dispute S ettlement in International Trade. International Organization 61(4): 735-761. 1

Transcript of The World Trade Organization READING ASSIGNMENT: Busch, Marc. Overlapping Institutions, Forum...

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The Trilemma

Fixed Exchange Rate

Open Capital Flows

Sovereign Monetary Policy

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Today’s Plan

• History of the WTO

• What it does

• Relation to regional trade organizations

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All markets rest on political structures

Trade?

GATT/WTO

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GATT/WTO• General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade became:

– The World Trade Organization in 1995

• GATT: 1947-1994

• Initial idea: International Trade Organization – discussed at Bretton Woods

• But the ITO failed– Charter drafted 1948– United States Congress failed to approve it

• Meantime, GATT had been initially formed with 15 countries – grew from there.

• On 1 January, 1948 the GATT was signed by 23 countries 5

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Initial GATT members (1/1/1948)

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Take-away:

• The 3rd Bretton Woods Institution – the ITO – was never realized

• The GATT rose to take its place

• A pseudo-Bretton Woods Institution

• Started with narrower membership… deepened… than broadened membership…

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WTO• 153 members as of 2008

– http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm

• Staff of only 635 – IMF: ~2000– World Bank: >10,000

• 2009 Budget: CHF 189,257,600 ~ $170-175 million– http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/budget09_e.htm– World Bank operating budget ~ $1 billion– Total IMF resources approaching 1 trillion…

• Derives most of its income from contributions by its members (size established according to a formula based on share of international trade)– http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/contrib07_e.htm – (Detail: share of international trade (%), based on trade in goods, services

and intellectual property rights for the last five years for which data are available. There is a minimum contribution of 0.015%)

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Take-away

• International organization strength?

• Not a function of size (budget or staff)

• WTO has the smallest budget and staff of any of the major global organizations

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The WTO

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What does the WTO do?

• Provides a forum for negotiations

• Administers trade agreements

• Provides a dispute settlement mechanism

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3 components

1. A set of principles and rules

2. An intergovernmental bargaining process

3. A dispute settlement mechanism

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(1) Principles & Rules

1. Market liberalism• In the aggregate gains from trade outweigh losses• Winners could compensate losers

2. Nondiscrimination

• Most Favored Nation (MFN): Treat all countries as well as its favorite trading partner

• National treatment: prohibits the use of taxes, regulations, other domestic policies to advantage domestic over foreign firms

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Source: World Trade Organization, Legal Texts

Article I

General Most-Favoured Nation Treatment

1. With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III,* any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.

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MFN exceptions

• Regional trade arrangements (RTAs)– Free-trade areas (e.g., NAFTA) ok!– Customs unions (e.g., EU) ok!– (we’ll get back to this later in the lecture)

• Generalized System of Preferences (from 1960s):– Developed countries can apply lower tariffs for

developing countries than for their peers

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Source: World Trade Organization, Legal Texts

Article III*National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation

1. The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges, and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production.*

2. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover, no contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1.*

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(2) Intergovernmental Bargaining Process

• Bargain over what?

• Tariffs and nontariff barriers– Nontariff barriers? Health & safety regulations, standards

(environmental), government purchasing practices, quotas, bans, rules of origin, packaging/labeling conditions, complex regulatory environment, licensing

• Antidumping

• Intellectual property rights

• Textiles, agriculture, services, government procurement, e-commerce…

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9 Bargaining Rounds

• 1947 Geneva

• 1949 Annecy

• 1951 Torquay

• 1956 Geneva

• 1960-61 Dillon Round

• 1964-67 Kennedy Round

• 1973–79 Tokyo Round

• 1986-93 Uruguay Round

• 2002-??? The Doha Round18

Take-away?The rounds are getting longer because remaining issues are more difficult.

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(3) Dispute Settlement Mechanism

• “The dispute settlement mechanism ensures compliance by helping governments resolve disputes and by authorizing punishment in the event of noncompliance.” (Oatley txtbook, p25)

• How do you tie your hands with out a rope?

– (commitment/enforcement questions)

– COSTS OF ESCALATION

– AND LEGITIMIZING RETALIATION! 19

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Regional trade agreements

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RTAs• Free Trade Area (e.g., NAFTA)

– Eliminate tariffs amongst members

– Members maintain independent trade policies with non-members

• Customs union (e.g., EU)

– Eliminate tariffs amongst members

– Common tariff policy with non-members

• Discriminatory?

– Allowed under GATT Article XXIV – as long as tariffs are no higher than the level applied by (ALL***) countries prior to the arrangement

– (MERCOSUR led Argentina to raise tariffs on non-members – but not above the level of the highest MERCOSUR member)

• Currently 190-250 RTAs in operation (up to 400 on the horizon for 2010)

• More than half are bilateral (e.g., KORUS)

• Most are free trade agreements21

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Customs Unions• Central American Common Market (CACM)

• Andean Community (CAN)

• Caribbean Community (CARICOM)

• Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC)

• East African Community (EAC)

• Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC)

• European Economic Area (EEA) (plus EC – Andorra, EC – Turkey)

• Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

• Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR)

• Southern African Customs Union (SACU)

• West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)

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Why RTAs not the WTO?

• Sign with particularly important markets

• New “forums” Forum shopping! (Busch)

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Why would you go to NAFTA?

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Why would you go to NAFTA?

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Choose the forum that best suits you!

• NB:– In the absence of the regional option, you

may prefer no litigation at all!

• By moving a li’l bit toward free trade under NAFTA– Anti-trade interest groups may weaken– Eventually get to WTO position?– Richardson Hypothesis?

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Take-home points• WTO is a small international organization

• Purposes: Provide a negotiation forum, administer trade agreements, provide a dispute settlement mechanism

• Chief principles: MFN, Nondiscrimination

• Major negotiation issues: tariffs, nontariff barriers, antidumping, intellectual property rights, textiles, agriculture, services

• Regarding disputes - most are settled before full escalation

• So the WTO does not cast many rulings - but it still may have a big effect as a deterrent!

• Regional trade agreements - FTAs and Customs Unions

• Why? Forum shopping28

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Thank youWE ARE GLOBAL GEORGETOWN!

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Concessions and Legal Escalation

Ruling for Complainant

Ruling for Defendant

Consultations

Panel Established, No Ruling

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Stage Dispute Reaches

Pro

bab

ility

Def

end

ant

Con

ced

es

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Source: Busch and Reinhardt 2000

61% of all instances of

full concessions under WTO occur prior to ruling

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Full Concessions Under GATT/WTOBusch & Reinhardt. Developing Countries and GATT/WTO Dispute

Settlement.” Journal of World Trade 37 (4) 2003: 719-735.

NOTE: Displays predicted probabilities from Model 1, holding all other variables at their sample means, moving WTO from 0 to 1 and Complainant's Per Capita Income from its 10th percentile value ($2,152) to its 90th ($29,251), with 90 percent confidence intervals

GATT Developing

WTO Developing

WTO Developed

GATT Developed

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Complainant Status by Period

Pro

b (

Fu

ll C

on

ce

ss

ion

s)

.27-.49

.41-.64

.63-.78

.33-.48

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The WTO Effect• While the rich are doing better than the poor

going from GATT to WTO (as complainants)

• This is NOT because the rich win more often or get more compliance ex post.

• Rather, it is because rich countries settle more in advance of a ruling.

• Remember, the DV is concessions, not wins

• The effect of the WTO is through deterrence

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What is Doha Trying to Get Done?

• Getting a deal done: agriculture for non-agricultural market access (NAMA)

• Rich countries are increasingly voicing demand for services, as per Singapore agenda

• http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=03GU14F2Zb0 (10 minutes)

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Request for Consultation

Request for Panel

Panel Ruling

Retaliation

GATTWTO

Request for Consultations

Request for Panel

Panel Ruling

Appellate Body

Compliance Panel

Arbitration Panel

Dispute Settlement: GATT vs. WTO

•Under GATT, a defendant could block actions.•Under the WTO, this cannot happen

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