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ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE

THE SUPREME COURT OF HADEN?

ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE AMENDMENT IS IN VIOLATION OF THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF

THE CONSTITUTION?

ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE AMENDMENT IS ULTRA VIRES TO THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

OF THE LC AND LG COMMUNITY?

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

ISSUE-1: THE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IS NOT MAINTAINABLE BEFORE

THE SUPREME COURT OF HADEN.

To qualify as a legitimate PIL, it must be established that the petitioner is acting in the interest of

the public without any oblique motive and the group of the society which is represented is one

that is discriminated against, and the person or group being represented is due to some disability

unable to directly approach this Court. In the present case, the petitioner has turned a blind eye to

the interest of the general public and the group which she has sought to represent is not one that

is any longer discriminated against or impaired from approaching this Court for redressal. Hence

it is submitted that the present petition is not maintainable before this Hon’ble Court.

ISSUE-2: THE AMENDMENT IS NOT IN VIOLATION OF THE BASIC STRUCTURE

OF THE CONSTITUTION.

The Parliament has the power to abridge to Fundamental Rights, as long as the basic structure is

retained. The importance of a particular feature has to be examined in each individual case to

determine whether it forms the basic structure. Although the concept of LG and LC has been

removed, the essence and the object behind such a concept remains in the Constitution. Hence, as

the Constitution in essence remains unchanged, it is contended that the present amendment does

not violate the basic structure of the Constitution and hence must not be struck down as invalid.

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ISSUE-3: THE AMENDMENT IS NOT ULTRA VIRES TO THE FUNDAMENTAL

RIGHTS OF THE LC AND LG COMMUNITY.

The purpose of the amendment is clearly to bring to effect the abolition of caste system and is in

pursuance of the principle of equality in Art. 14. Moreover, the amendment being made without

prejudice to Art. 15 (4) and Arts. 32 and 226, it is in no way violative of the Fundamental rights

of LC and LG but is in furtherance of equality of status and opportunity and right to life of the

people of Haden. The amendment also protects national interest and is aimed at good governance

in a representative democracy.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED FOR RESPONDENT

1. THE PIL IS NOT MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF HADEN.

A. MATTER IS NOT IN PUBLIC INTEREST.

i. Black’s Law Dictionary defines Public Interest as “Something in which the public at

large, the community at large, has some pecuniary interest, or some interest by which

their legal rights or liabilities are affected. It does not mean anything so narrow as mere

curiosities, or as the interests of the particular localities, which may be affected by the

matters in question. Interest shared by citizens generally in affairs of local, State or

National Government.”

ii. It has been observed by this Court on a previous occasion, that a public interest litigation

is intended to bring justice within the reach of the poor masses, who constitute the low

visibility area of humanity. It is intended to promote and vindicate public interest which

demands that violations of constitutional or legal rights of large members of people who

are poor, ignorant, or in a socially or economically disadvantaged position should not go

unnoticed and unredressed1.

iii. In the present case, it is contended, and is also evident that the parties that the petitioner

has filed a PIL on behalf can any longer be labeled as “poor” or “vulnerable”, having

been given preferential treatment from the time of the country’s independence.

1 People’s Union for Democratic Rights & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (1982) 3 SCC 235.

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iv. Although they may have been part of the population that once constituted the poor and

vulnerable strata of the society, to label them thus in the present time and scenario would

be a poor exaggeration of their condition, as well as an insult to the progress they have

made from the time of independence.

v. It has been held that Courts must do justice by promotion of good faith, and prevent law

from crafty invasions. Courts must maintain the social balance by interfering where

necessary for the sake of justice and refuse to interfere where it is against social interest

and public good2. It is contended that in the present scenario prevailing in the country,

that to even consider this petition would be to turn a blind eye to the plight of those

belonging to the general category, who have, under the guise of an enabling step for the

weaker masses, been disabled themselves. To interfere in the present case would patently

be against social interest and public good.

vi. As regards PILs filed before this Hon’ble Court under Article 32 is has been previously

held by this Court that predominantly, to provide access to justice to the poor, deprived,

vulnerable, discriminated and marginalised sections of the society, this Court has

initiated, encouraged and propelled PIL 3. It is humbly submitted that the domain of

public interest litigation cannot be enlarged so as to include all cases that may have once

had the subject matter to fall within this ambit. To classify those who once belonged to

the discriminated and marginalised sections of the society as still belonging to the same

for any oblique motive would not only hamper their development, but also the

development of the nation itself.

vii. PIL is an opportunity for the government and its officers to make basic human rights

meaningful to the deprived and vulnerable sections of the community and to ensure them

social, economic and political justice4. It is, so to say, a hallowed instrument forged by

this Court to banish any form of oppression and injustice from our society. To use such

an instrument for trivial matters would only work to nullify its sanctity and take away

from the efficacy of its relief.

2 Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2005) 1 SCC 590. 3 State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal & Ors, (2010) 3 SCC 402. 4 Ramsharan Autyanuprasi and Anr v. UOI & Ors., 1989 Supp (1) SCC 251.

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viii. The Courts should be fully satisfied that substantial public interest should be involved

before entertaining the PIL5. In the present case, it is apparent from the facts that public

interest if any, is that regarding the welfare of those people belonging to the general

category, as it is their right to equality that has been disregarded. The petitioner in the

present case seems to be oblivious to the grave injustices faced by those belonging to the

general category.

ix. Public interest litigation is not a pill or a panacea for all wrongs. It was essentially meant

to protect basic human rights of the weak and disadvantaged and was a procedure which

was innovated where a public-spirited person files a petition in effect on behalf of such

persons who on account of poverty, helplessness or economic and social disabilities

could not approach this Court6.

x. In the present case it would be an exaggeration to say that the Libellus Cult and Libellus

Genss are those who are helpless or are socially or economically disabled. It is most

humbly submitted that there has not been any significant damage caused to the LC and

LG, who have themselves not raised an objection to the amendment. A lack of objection

from the people belonging to these classes themselves cannot be construed as them being

socially or economically backward.

xi. Hence, in light of the aforementioned arguments, it is contended that the matter, not

containing sufficient public interest, is not one that is fit for hearing before this Hon’ble

Court.

B. PETITIONER DOES NOT HAVE LOCUS STANDI.

i. It has been observed by this Court that Article 32 is a great and salutary safeguard for

preservation of Fundamental Rights of citizens. Anything which endangers or impairs

conduct of anybody either in violation or in derogation of laws, that quality of life and

living by the people is entitled to be taken recourse of Article 32 of the Constitution. But

this can only be done by any person interested genuinely in the protection of the society

on behalf of the society or community7.

5 State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal & Ors, (2010) 3 SCC 402. 6 BALCO Employees Union v. UOI, AIR 2002 SC 350. 7 Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangharsh Samiti v. State of U. P. & Ors., (1990) 4 SCC 449.

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ii. It is submitted that the respondent does not doubt the authenticity of the interest that the

petitioner has in the welfare of the LC and LG communities. Instead what is called into

question is the interest of the petitioner in the welfare of the society as a whole. It is

indeed a noble intention on behalf of the petitioner to look out for the welfare of the LC

and LG communities. But a litigant must not succumb to spasmodic sentiments and

behave like a knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit of issues providing publicity.

iii. It is clear from the facts that the petitioner is a lawyer who has specialised in filing

petitions in matters relating to the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955. But it is to be

made clear that it cannot be said that lawyers only because they have a right to practice in

a Court have “locus standi” to file petitions in respect of every matter concerning judges,

Courts and administration of justice8.

iv. It has been emphasised that the requirement of locus standi of a party to a litigation is

mandatory, because the legal capacity of the party to any litigation whether in private or

public action in relation to any specific remedy sought for has to be primarily ascertained

at the threshold9.

v. Today public spirited litigants rush to Courts to file cases in profusion under the attractive

name. But it is necessary to have some self-imposed restraint on public interest

litigation10.

vi. It is evident from the facts that the Petitioner in the present case, Ms. Kela Tatuia,

although a leading advocate in matters relating to the Protection of Civil Rights Act,

1955, does not appear to have sufficient knowledge on the issue at hand. The Protection

of Civil Rights Act is a piece of legislation to prescribe punishment for the preaching and

practice of - “Untouchability” and for the enforcement of any disability arising therefrom

for matters connected therewith.

vii. Ms. Tatuia, although a leading authority on the aspects of civil right protection and the

like, cannot be considered to be a competent authority on the matter at hand, that is, the

social and economic rights of the LC and LG. This is made evident from her inability to

understand the implications of the present amendment, i.e., it is made so as to ensure the

equality of citizens both within and without the LC and LG bracket. It is of utmost 8 Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary & Ors., (1992) 4 SCC 305. 9 Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary & Ors., (1992) 4 SCC 305. 10 Sachidanand Pandey v. State of West Bengal, (1987) 2 SCC 295.

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importance that those who invoke this Court’s jurisdiction seeking a waiver of locus

standi must exercise restraint in moving the Court by not plunging in areas wherein they

are not well versed11.

viii. Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and

circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that behind the

beautiful veil of public interest, an ugly private malice, vested interest or publicity

seeking is not lurking12. Ordinarily, it is the person aggrieved and directly affected who

must seek the relief himself unless disabled from doing so for a good reason which

permits someone else to seek the relief on his behalf13.

ix. There is nothing in the facts of the case that indicate that the persons who were allegedly

affected by the amendment were impaired in any manner so as to disable them from

approaching this Court for the injury which they have supposedly suffered. This fact

coupled with the fact that that petitioner has a history with the welfare of the LC and LG

would lead one to believe that the present petition was filed frivolously and on a whim. It

has been recognized in recent time by the Hon’ble Court that there have been increasing

instances of abuse of PIL in this country14. It is thus contended on behalf of the

respondents that the present petition is one such petition that has been filed frivolously

and must not be entertained.

x. Hence, in general to satisfy the tests to qualify as a legitimate PIL, it must be established

that the petitioner is acting in the interest of the public, does not have any personal or

oblique motive, the group or section of the society which he seeks to represent is one that

is downtrodden or discriminated against, and the person or group being represented is due

to some disability unable to directly approach this Court for redressal.

xi. It is humbly contended by the respondent that the petitioner has not acted in the interest

of the general public, having turned a blind eye to the plight of the general public, and the

group which she has sought to represent is not one that is any longer downtrodden or

discriminated against and they are definitely not in any way impaired or disabled from

approaching this Court for redressal.

11 S.P. Anand v. H.D. Deve Gowda & Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 734. 12 Holicow Pictures (P) Limited v. Prem Chandra Mishra & Ors., (2007) 14 SCC 281. 13 Krishna Swami v. Union of India & Ors., (1992) 4 SCC 605. 14 BALCO Employees Union v. UOI, AIR 2002 SC 350.

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xii. In the light of the above mentioned, the respondent would like to bring to the notice of

this Hon’ble Court the opinion of some of the learned judges who have helped promote

PIL in the country. In the words of the learned Bhagwati J. “the Courts must be careful in

entertaining public interest litigations” or in the words of the learned Sarkaria J. “the

applications of the busybodies should be rejected at the threshold itself” and as the

learned Krishna Iyer J. has pointed out “the doors of the Courts should not be ajar for

such vexatious litigation”15.

xiii. Public interest litigation has come to stay. But one is led to think it poses a threat to

Courts and public alike. Such cases are filed without any rhyme or reason. If Courts do

not restrict the free flow of such cases in the name of public interest litigations, the

traditional litigation will suffer and the Courts of law, instead of dispensing justice, will

have to take it upon themselves administrative and executive functions16. Hence, not

only to protect the sanctity of the judiciary, but also for the upkeep of the faith of the

public in the judiciary, locus standi must not be relaxed in cases where the litigant does

not act in the interest of the public as a whole.

xiv. Therefore, it is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the present petition is

not maintainable as the subject matter does not warrant interference by the Supreme

Court and the petitioner does not have sufficient locus standi to approach this Court in the

present case.

15 Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary & Ors., (1992) 4 SCC 305. 16 Sachidanand Pandey v. State of West Bengal, (1987) 2 SCC 295.

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2. THE AMENDMENT IS NOT IN VIOLATION OF THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF

THE CONSTITUTION.

A. PRESENT AMENDMENT WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF TRUE MEANING OF “AMENDMENT”.

i. It has been held by this Court that the expression “amendment of the Constitution”

plainly and unambiguously means amendment of all the provisions of the Constitution. It

would be unreasonable to suggest that what Article 368 provides is only the mechanics of

the procedure to be followed in amending the Constitution without indicating which

provisions of the Constitution can be amended and which cannot17 . It has been

continuously held by this Court in a plethora of landmark decisions, save one, that every

part of the Constitution is amenable to amendment by parliament if Parliament so deems

fit.

ii. The criterion for determining the validity of a law is the competence of the law making

authority18. In the present case the authority which has brought forth the amendment of

the Constitution, i.e., the Parliament, is not only a competent authority but also the only

authority which is capable to effectuate such an amendment.

iii. The terms of Article 368 are perfectly general and empower Parliament to amend the

Constitution, without any exception whatsoever. Had it been intended to save the

Fundamental Rights from the operation of that provision, it would have been perfectly

easy to make that intention clear by adding a proviso to that effect19.

iv. While maintaining that the present amendment is made in furtherance of the principles

enshrined in Part III of the Constitution, it is arguendo contended, that even if an

amendment were to abridge the rights contained within Part III of the Constitution, it

would be perfectly valid and within the competency of the Parliament to effectuate such a

change.

v. Although on the dissenting side, Ray J. gave the reasoning behind such a vast amending

power vested with the Parliament in the Fundamental Rights Case20 “When the validity

of an ordinary law is questioned it must be justified by reference to a higher law. In the

17 Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1965) 1 SCR 933. 18 Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, (1992) Supp (2) SCC 651. 19 Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India & State of Bihar, 1952 SCR 89. 20 Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala & Anr., (1973) 4 SCC 225.

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case of the Constitution, the validity is inherent and lies within itself. Law in Article

13(2) of the Constitution could only mean that law which needs validity from a higher

source and which can and ought to be regarded as invalid when it comes in conflict with

higher law. It cannot possibly include a law which is self-invalidating and which is never

invalid”.

vi. Adding to this, it was opined by Khanna J. in the same case that “amendment of the

Constitution is not ‘law’ under Article 13(2). The words in Article 368 that the

Constitution shall stand amended supports the conclusion. In a generic sense ‘law’ would

include constitutional laws, including amendment of the Constitution, but that does not

seem to be the connotation of the word ‘law’ as used in Article 13(2) of the

Constitution”.

vii. In light of this submission, it is contended that an amendment, not being a “law” as per

Article 13(2) of the Constitution cannot be invalidated for being in contravention of Part

III of the Constitution. In fact, it was further opined by Khanna J. that “Fundamental

Rights contained in Part III of our Constitution can be abridged or taken away in

compliance with the procedure prescribed by Article 368, as long as the basic structure of

the Constitution remains unaffected”. In the words of Jaganmohan Reddy J. “Article

13(2) does not place an embargo on Article 368 for amending any of the rights in Part

III”.

viii. Hence, it has been clearly established by this Court on previous occasions, that an

amendment made to the Constitution cannot be held invalid on the same grounds as an

ordinary law. Therefore, the arguments of the petitioner that the amendment is in

violation of the Fundamental Rights of the LC and LG cannot be sustained on even a

preliminary level.

ix. On the other end of the spectrum, it has been opined by this Court that the Constitution is

an organic living document. Its outlook and expression as perceived and expressed by the

interpreters of the Constitution must be dynamic and keep pace with the changing time21.

And when the interpreters of the Constitution are unable to give it an interpretation so as

to keep it dynamic with and in line with the changing times because of its rigid words,

21 State of West Bengal v. Kesoram Industries Ltd. & Ors., (2004) 10 SCC 201.

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then the Parliament must undertake the responsibility of amending the Constitution so as

to keep it dynamic and in pace with the changing times.

x. The word “amendment” postulates that the old Constitution survives without loss of its

identity despite the change and it continues even though it is subjected to alteration. To

destroy its identity is to abrogate the basic structure of the Constitution22. To suggest that

the concept of constitutional recognition for the LC and LG community is part of the

identity of the Constitution would lead to the implication that it was intended to subsist

eternally in the Constitution. This would in turn imply that the conferring of unfettered

privileges to the LC and LG communities was also meant to subsist eternally in the

Constitution.

xi. Such a concept would in fact only run completely counter to the concept of equality and

justice which are embedded in the roots of our Constitution. The main object behind the

theory of constitutional identity is continuity and within that continuity of identity,

changes are admissible depending upon the situation and circumstance of the day. In this

light it is submitted that the circumstance of the present scenario is such that such a

recognition to the LC and LG accorded in the Constitution has become obsolete and need

no longer be maintained therewith.

xii. When testing the validity of a constitutional amendment, it is important to keep in mind

the intention of the legislature and the nature of constitutional amendments. They are

curative in nature. The Parliament in the present case only sought to cure the existing

inequality due to the recognition of LG and LC as a separate category.

xiii. Hence, in summation it is submitted that the present amendment, being both procedurally

and substantially correct falls within the ambit of a valid amendment made under Article

368 of the Constitution and hence should not be struck down as invalid.

B. PRESENT AMENDMENT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE BASIC STRUCTURE.

i. As regards the power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution so as to abridge the

Fundamental Rights, it can be done as long as the basic structure is retained. Any article

22 M. Nagaraj and Ors. v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212.

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in the constitution can be amended as long as the basic structure and the foundation

remains the same23.

ii. For determining whether a particular feature of the Constitution is a part of its basic

structure, one has perforce to examine in each individual case the place of the particular

feature in the scheme of our Constitution, its object and purpose, and the consequences of

its denial on the integrity of the Constitution as a fundamental instrument of the country’s

governance24.

iii. Although the concept of LG and LC has been removed, the essence and the object behind

such a concept remains in the constitution, that is, the upliftment of those who are

socially and educationally backward. Backward classes will include LG and LC but LG

and LC need not necessarily include backward classes. Certain classes may not qualify

for LG and LC but may qualify for the backward classes.25

iv. In fact, in an earlier case, the Court held that it seems fairly clear that the backward

classes of citizens for whom special provision is authorised to be made are by Article 15

(4) itself, treated as being similar to the Libellus Cult and Libellus Genss. It was further

opined that backward classes for whose improvement special provision is contemplated

by Article 15 (4) are in the matter of their backwardness comparable to Libellus Cult and

Libellus Genss26.

v. It was only in a later case that it was held that backward classes will include LG and LC

but LG and LC need not necessarily include backward classes.

vi. As is well known, the State is under an obligation to take steps for promoting the welfare

of the people by bringing about a social order in which social, economic and political

justice shall inform all the institutions of national life. When such an obligation is thrust

upon the State, then it is only natural that the State also has an obligation to make such

changes to the Constitution so as to ensure that all categories of people receive equal care

and protection and no one group or class is treated as being superior to another.

vii. It maybe be inferred from the aforementioned concept that backward classes are the

genus whereas LC and LG are the species. It is hence submitted that even though this

23 Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala & Anr., (1973) 4 SCC 225. 24 Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299. 25 Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 477. 26 Balaji v. State of Mysore, AIR 1963 SC 649.

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amendment has abolished the concept of LC and LG from the constitution, those who

were previously placed within this category are not deprived of any rights that may have

been afforded due to their backwardness. It is beyond controversy that LC and LG are

also included in the expression “backward class of citizens”.

viii. Arguendo it is additionally submitted that every case in which the fundamental right is

withdrawn will not necessarily result in damaging or destroying the basic structure of the

Constitution27.

ix. The theory of basic structure is based on the principle that a change in a thing does not

involve its destruction and destruction of a thing is a matter of substance and not of

form28 . In the present case, although a form of protection afforded to a certain

community is withdrawn as a result of the amendment, the substance of the subject

matter, i.e., the protection to be accorded to the backward classes and downtrodden

groups, still continues to exist in the Constitution by way of Article 15 (4). And the

theory of basic structure is the only theory by which the validity of impugned

amendments of the Constitution is to be judged.

x. The theory of basic structure is based on the concept of constitutional identity. The idea is

that “the personality of the Constitution remains unchanged”. As previously submitted,

although there is an amendment of the provisions of the Constitution, the personality of

the Constitution remains unchanged.

xi. The constitutional recognition given ultimately would prove fruitless unless certain

benefits accrued from such a recognition, and in the present case, the privilege accruing

from such a recognition is reservation.

xii. Reservation as a concept is very wide. Different people understand reservation to mean

different things. One view of reservation as a generic concept is that reservation is an

anti-poverty measure. There is a different view which says that reservation is merely

providing a right of access and it is not a right to redressal. If that were the case, then the

removal of a right of access would not have as deep an impact as the removal of a right to

redressal.

27 Waman Rao v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 362. 28 M. Nagaraj and Ors. v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212.

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xiii. In the words of this Court, the word “reservation” has to be considered in the context of

Article 16 (4) and it is in that context that Article 335 of the Constitution which provides

for relaxation of the standards of evaluation has to be seen. We have to go by what the

Constitution-framers intended originally and not by general concepts of principles29.

xiv. A relaxation of standards was provided for originally so as to enable the members of the

LC and LG community to achieve equal competency on par with the general category.

Hence, when the goal has been achieved, removal of such an enabling provision is only

in line with what the Constitution-framers had intended originally. Such an act cannot be

said to be in contravention of the basic structure and cannot be invalidated.

xv. The Constitution of Haden, it has to be borne in mind, like most other constitutions, is an

organic document. It has to be flexible and dynamic so that it adapts itself to the changing

conditions and accommodates itself in a pragmatic way to the goals of national

development and the industrialization of the country30. When it has become evident that

certain provisions of the Constitution have ceased to serve their purpose and now act in

contradiction to their original goals, then the removal of such provisions cannot said to be

in violation of the basic structure.

xvi. In the present case, it is evident from the facts that the continuation of the reservation

system has hampered the development of the nation and has contributed to the prolonging

of the nation’s status as a developing nation.

xvii. It has been held that the Courts have to undertake an onerous mission in exploring the

“real intention” and “original meaning” of the Constitution beyond all obscurities and to

expound all principles underlying the philosophy of the Constitution and declare what the

Constitution speaks about and mandates31. In this light, it is not only correct to uphold the

amendment as valid, but rather a duty enjoined to this Court to uphold its validity as it is

in essence what the Constitution really intends and truly means.

xviii. Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from experience of

evils32. In the present case, the evils that were prevailing are evident, i.e., several

29 Ibid at footnote No. 28. 30 Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd. & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., (1990) 1 SCC 109. 31 Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association & Ors. v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 441. 32 Delhi Transport Corporation v. DTC Mazdoor Congress & Ors., 1991 Supp (1) SCC 600.

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meritorious students were denied admission and were resorting to the commission of

suicides due to the continuation of such an obsolete and outdated practice.

xix. In the application of a Constitution, one contemplation cannot be only of what has been,

but what may be33. Hence, in the present case, one must not look at what once was in the

past. At the time of independence, what was required at the time was special provisions

for the upliftment of the LC and LG communities. Now that the goal has been achieved,

the removal of such provisions is not only not in violation of the basic structure, but in

fact, perfectly in tune with the spirit of the Constitution. While looking at what maybe, it

is clearly evident that the continuation of the previous system would only lead to further

damage to lives of those placed unfortunate enough not to be included in the LC and LG

communities.

xx. Hence, it is most humbly submitted that the present amendment does not violate the basic

structure of the Constitution and is exactly as the Constitution-framers intended. It must

hence not be struck down as invalid.

33 Sunil Batra V. Delhi Administration & Ors., (1978) 4 SCC 494.

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3. THE AMENDMENT IS NOT ULTRA VIRES TO THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF

THE LC AND LG COMMUNITY.

A. AMENDMENT IS IN PURSUANCE OF EQUALITY.

i. As is clearly stated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the 101st Amendment to

the Constitution of Haden, it is made in pursuance of Article 14, which is one of the

magnificent cornerstones of Hadenian Democracy34. Art. 14 talks about equality before

law and the equal protection of law. Equality before law is a negative concept while equal

protection of law is a positive one. The former declares that no one can claim special

privileges and all classes are equally subject to the ordinary law of the land. The latter

postulates equal protection of all alike in the same situation and under like circumstances.

This doctrine of equality before law is a necessary corollary of Rule of Law, which

pervades the Hadenian Constitution.35

ii. The concept of equality before the law does not involve the idea of absolute equality

among human beings which is a physical impossibility. All that Article 14 guarantees is

a similarity of treatment contra-distinguished from identical treatment. Equality before

law means that among equals the law should be equal and should be equally administered

and that the likes should be treated alike. Equality before the law does not mean that

things which are different shall be treated as though, they are the same. It of-course

means denial of any special privilege by reason of birth, creed or the like.36

iii. The very blood and soul of our Constitutional scheme is to achieve the objectives of our

Constitution as contained in the Preamble which is part of our Constitution.37 Moreover,

Bhagawati J while proceeding to examine the ‘content and reach’ of the Equalizing

principle enshrined in Art.14 observed that “It is indeed the pillar on which rest securely

the foundation of our democratic republic. And therefore, it must not be subject to a

narrow, pedantic or lexicographic approach.”38

34 Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 477. 35 Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2002 SC 1533. 36 State of Karnataka v. B. Suvarana Malini, AIR 2001 SC 606. 37 Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 477. 38 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248.

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iv. Equality is a binding thread which runs through the entire constitutional text.39 And,

‘Equality before law’ is a dynamic concept having many facets40 and has to continuously

change according to the needs of the society. Also, it is a positive obligation of the State

to ensure equal protection of the laws by bringing in necessary social and economic

changes.41

v. Equality has also been given utmost importance and eternally enshrined in the most

important International documents. Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights, 1948 provides that ‘All are equal before the law and are entitled without any

discrimination to equal protection of the law.’ Also, Article 26 of International Covenant

on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 states that ‘All persons are equal before the law and

are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. Hence, it is

important to adhere to the equality principle and move towards a classless society where

all are equal before the law.

vi. At the time when the Chairman of the drafting committee made it top priority to elevate

the people of Golos to the same status as that of the other castes, Golos were the last rung

of the four castes of Binarism and were discriminated against as untouchables and

completely ostracized from routine life. In Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. UOI and Ors.42, this

Hon’ble Court took note of the CAD discussion and pointed out that “Shri Singh’s

comment43 sums up the limitations on Legislative reservation. TBCs and SEBCs were

excluded and reservations were limited in time. The idea behind giving privileges to LCs

and LGs is that at some point of time, the backward classes would no longer need

reservations.” Hence it is evident that the recognition of LC and LG as a separate

community was to uplift the Golos and hence eliminate the caste system thereby striving

to create a united Haden and not to perpetuate caste by continuing forever the reservation

and other privileges provided to a particular group of people.

vii. It has also been held in a plethora of cases that “Art. 14 enunciates a vital principle which

lies at the core of our republicanism and shines like a beacon light pointing towards the

39 Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka & Ors., (2003) 6 SCC 697. 40 Sri Srinivasa Theatre v. Government of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1992 SC 1004. 41 St. Stephen’s College v. University of Delhi, AIR 1992 SC 1630. 42 Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. UOI and Ors., (2008) 6 SCC 1. 43 CAD Vol.9, p.645, 24th August 1949.

17

goal of classless egalitarian socio-economic order which we promised to build for

ourselves when we made a tryst with destiny on that fateful day when we adopted our

Constitution. If we have to choose between fanatical devotion to this great principle of

equality and feeble allegiance to it, we would unhesitatingly prefer to err on the side of

the former as against the latter.”44

viii. However, Society does not remain static. 45 What the concept of equal treatment

presupposes is existence of similar legal foothold.46 It is an undeniable fact that the

advance on political, social and economic fronts made particularly after the

commencement of the Constitution, the social reform movements, the spread of

education and the advantages of the special provisions including reservations secured so

far, have all undoubtedly seen at least some individuals and families in the backward

classes, gaining sufficient means to develop their capacities to compete with others in

every field. 47 All this having been observed in the Mandal Commission Case in 1983,

the data and statistics taken thereafter in 2001 and 2011 show higher substantive

development in the status of the LC and LG especially in the field of education.

ix. It would be pertinent to note that Learned Author R.L. Chandari in ‘Concept of

Secularism in Indian Constitution’ 184, (1987 ed.) has rightly observed ‘Regarding the

caste and reservation policy, it can be said that the privileges attached to castes have

encouraged casteism since caste is proving very beneficial to the person belonging to

backward castes. Not only this, there is a general desire for the enrolment in the list of LC

and backward classes even among those who are advanced and who have rejected the

caste system for other purposes. Thus, the reservation policy, instead of removing the

caste distinctions has maintained and has encouraged social tensions which retard process

of social integration. It has also created obstacles in achieving the object of casteless

society in Haden.’48

x. The same has also been taken note of by this Hon’ble Court 35 years ago that “Logically

the argument leads to the formulation that each caste and community is bargaining

44 M. Chhagan Lai v. Greater Bombay Municipality, AIR 1974 SC 2009. 45 Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 477. 46 Union of India v. International Trading Co., (2003) 5 SCC 437. 47 Supra at footnote No. 13. 48 D.D. Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India, Vol.2, p.1814, 7th ed., Lexis Nexis.

18

politically for bigger bites of the educational and employment cake so much so merit

becomes irrelevant or takes a backseat and ‘backward birth’ brings a boon.”49 This

formulation has to be done with for good if we have to achieve an egalitarian order as the

very purpose for which reservations were provided are served and continuing to provide

the same will only result in ‘reverse discrimination’50.

xi. The 2001 census51 showed a literacy rate of 54.69% as regards LC and a literacy rate of

47.10% as regards LG. However, the 2011 census depicted the LC literacy rate as

66.07% and the LG literacy rate as 58.96% thereby revealing an increase of 11.41

percentage points in the literacy rate of LC and an increase of 11.90 percentage points in

the literacy rate of LG52. As a logical consequence, it was observed that most of the LC

and LG were receiving higher education and were being well represented in the

Government departments in 2011.53 However, the Government took a careful step and

the decision to amend the Constitution was not one made overnight as the reservation

system was allowed to continue till 2015 though the purpose for which the reservation

system was introduced was served well in advance in 2011.

xii. Also, the reason for providing a special status to the LC and LG was to give them a head

start in the race of equality so as to compensate for the past discrimination against them.

Reservation is necessary for transcending caste and not for perpetuating it.54 Continuing

to provide special status to the LC and LG community is to travel a narrow road towards

equality especially in the present era where they have reached almost the same status as

that of other castes. Hence, the amendment is to give effect to the abolition of caste

system and to create an equal Haden for equality before law can be predicted

meaningfully only in an equal society.55

xiii. Additionally, it can hardly be argued that once a backward class, always a backward

class.56 No class of citizen can be perpetually treated as socially and educationally

49 Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 298. 50 Balaji v. State of Mysore, AIR 1963 SC 649. 51 Census of India, GOI, 2001. 52 http://censusindia.gov.in/Census_Data_2001/India_at_glance/scst.aspx 53 ¶ 8 of the Moot Proposition. 54 M. Nagaraj and Ors. v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212. 55 Sri Srinivasa Theatre v. Government of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1992 SC 1004. 56 Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 477.

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backward.57 And today’s equals cannot be made unequal by saying that they were

unequal 20 years ago.58 While the need for reservation cannot be denied, it must be kept

in check by the demands of competence.59 Thus, to continue the special privileges given

to them would amount to treating equals unequally violating the equality provisions of

the Constitution.60

xiv. Hence, it is clear that the Amendment is not violative of the Fundamental Rights of the

LC and LG and is in pursuance of the equality principle laid down in Art. 14 and is an

attempt to abolish the caste system in Haden.

B. AMENDMENT IS IN FURTHERANCE OF EQUALITY OF STATUS AND OF OPPORTUNITY.

i. The underlying object of Art. 14 is to secure to all persons, citizens or non-citizens, the

equality of status and opportunity referred to in the Preamble of our Constitution.61 The

Preamble which promises Justice, Liberty and Equality of status and opportunity within

the framework of Secular, Socialist Republic projects a holistic perspective. It is the key

to the minds of the framers of the Constitution.62 The amendment endeavours to bring

about an egalitarian and classless society that the Constitution framers wanted the future

of Haden to be as clearly pointed out in the Preamble of the Constitution.

ii. Article 14 is the genus while Art. 16 is one of its species. Art. 14 declares that the State

shall not deny any person equality before the law or equal protection of the laws within

the territory of Haden. Art. 16 gives effect to the Doctrine of Equality in all matters

relating to public employment. Though enacted as a distinct and independent

Fundamental Right because of its great importance as a principle ensuring equality of

opportunity in public employment which is so vital to the building up of the new classless

egalitarian society envisaged in the Constitution.63

iii. What is fundamental as an enduring value of our polity is guarantee to each, of equal

opportunity to unfold the full potential of his personality. Anyone anywhere, humble or

57 Jagdish Negi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1997 SC 3505. 58 Kapoor T.R v. State of Haryana, AIR 1987 SC 415, 421. 59 Jagdish Saran v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 820. 60 Supra, footnote No. 20. 61 Natural Resources Allocation, In Re Special Reference No. 1 of 2012, (2010) 10 SCC 1 (77). 62 Re Berubari Union & Exchange of Enclaves, AIR 1960 SC 845. 63 E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555.

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high, agrestic or urban, man or woman, whatever be the language or religion, place of

birth or residence is entitled to be afforded equal chance for admission to any secular

educational course for cultural growth, training facility, specialty or employment.64 In the

present case, the system of reservation has resulted in a number of meritorious students

being denied admission into many educational institutions. This situation might only

worsen if the amendment had not been brought into force. Moreover, the reservations

were intended to be done with way back in 1975 and it was also intended that merit alone

should count in our future Constitution and nothing else.65

iv. Moreover, Article 13 (1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural

Rights, 1966 provides that ‘The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right

of everyone to education. They agree that education shall be directed to the full

development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen

the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.’ ICESCR also lays emphasis on

the point that higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of

capacity, by every appropriate means.66 Thus, the amendment is in conformity with

important international covenants that Haden has ratified.

v. The Supreme Court has also emphasised that the primary imperative of Arts. 14 and 15 is

equal opportunity for all across the nation to attain excellence. The philosophy and

pragmatism of excellence through universal opportunity is part of the Hadenian culture

and Constitutional creed.67 Moreover, the right of a meritorious student to get admission

in a course is a Fundamental and Human Right which is required to be protected. Such a

valuable right cannot be permitted to be withered down at the instance of less meritorious

student.68

vi. The privileges related to the LC and LG have been removed by the amendment while

retaining the same for the TBC category. This is firstly because the TBC category find no

express mention in the Constitution regarding their rights of reservation and other

privileges, while the privileges are explicitly mentioned as regards the LC and LG

64 Pradip Jain v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 1420. 65 Shri R.K. Sidhva, CAD, October, 1949. 66 Article 13 (2) (c) of the International Covenant on Socio-Economic Rights, 1966. 67 Jadgish Saran v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 820. 68 Dr. Saurabh Chaudri v. Union of India, AIR 2004 SC 2212.

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specially under Part XVI of the Constitution. Secondly, the reason behind providing

reservation for the LC/LG and TBC are not the same. The object of reservation for

LC/LG is to bring them into the mainstream national life, while the object in respect of

Backward community is to remove their social and educational backwardness.69 In this

light, it cannot be contended that maintaining reservation for the TBC is in anyway

unreasonable.

vii. Although the Amendment is made without prejudice to Art. 15(4), it is settled law that

Arts. 15(4) and 16(4) are enabling provisions and do not impose any obligation but

merely leave it to the discretion of the appropriate Government to take suitable action.70

Art. 15(4) does not make any mandatory provision for reservation and the power to make

reservation under Art. 15(4) is discretionary71 and no writ can be issued to effect

reservation.72

viii. The principle behind Art. 15(4) is that a preferential treatment can be given validly when

the socially and educationally backward classes and LC and LG need it.73 While clause 4

of Art. 15 does not specifically speak of reservation, it has been generally understood to

include that power.74 Also, the 101st amendment is made without prejudice to Art. 15(4)

and if the Government thinks it fit that special provision has to be made for the

advancement for SEBC or LC and LG, it may do so. However, while providing

protective and compensatory discrimination in favour of the weaker sections, one cannot

also ignore the wider interest of society while devising special provisions for them.75

ix. Art. 16(4) neither imposes any constitutional duty nor confers any Fundamental Right on

any one for claiming reservation. 76 Article 16(4) provides for the reservation for

Backward classes by the States if they are not adequately represented. Considering that

Backward Classes include the LC and LG, ‘Whether a particular class is adequately

represented in the services under the State is a matter within the subjective satisfaction of

69 Chattar Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 303. 70 Balaji v. State of Mysore, AIR 1963 SC 649. 71 Pranatosh Roy v. University of Calcutta, AIR 1998 Cal 181. 72 G. Rahan v. Bharat Petroleum Corp. Ltd., 2004 AIHC 2213 (AP). 73 Puvvala Sujatha v. Union of India, AIR Mad 234. 74 Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 477. 75 AIIMS Student’s Union v. AIIMS, AIR 2001 SC 3262. 76 Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 477; Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab, (2000) 1 SCC 430.

22

the appropriate Government based on the materials in the possession of the Government

and the existing conditions in the society.’77

x. The existing conditions of the society are such that the LC and LG are being adequately

represented and the people of the general category are being disadvantaged in the highly

competitive atmosphere. Therefore, there is no violation of the right to equality of status

or of opportunity of the LC and LG community.

xi. Hence, it is the contention of the respondent that the amendment conforms with the code

of equality and neither washes away the rights of the LC and LG altogether nor removes

the discretion of the Government to provide for reservation and to make provisions for

privileges as it is made without prejudice to Art.15(4), Art. 32 and Art. 226.

C. AMENDMENT ASSURES RIGHT TO LIFE AND PROTECTS NATIONAL INTEREST.

i. The Constitution should be interpreted in its true spirit with insight into social values and

suppleness of the changing social needs upholding the Basic Structure of the Constitution

for securing Social Justice, Economic Justice, and Political Justice as well as equality of

status and equality of opportunity.78 The Preamble contains in a nutshell its ideals and its

aspirations.79

ii. Right to life embodies several aspects of life and it includes ‘opportunity’80. Firstly, the

meritorious students of the general category have been denied the opportunity of being

admitted into the educational institutions of their choice and secondly this denial of

opportunity has driven them to the point of suicide which was seen in 2015.

iii. The sanctity of human life is probably the most fundamental of the human social values.

It is recognised in all civilised societies and their legal system and by the internationally

recognised statements of Human Rights.81 To any civilised society, there can be no

attributes more important than the life and personal liberty of its members. That is

evident from the paramount position given by the courts to Art. 21 of the Constitution.

These twin attributes enjoy a fundamental ascendancy over all other attributes of the

77 Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 477. 78 Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 477. 79 Golaknath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC1643. 80 Reliance Energy Ltd. v. Maharastra State Road Transport Corporation, (2007) 8 SCC 1. 81 R (Pretty) v. DPP, (2002) 1 All ER 1.

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political and social order, and consequently, the Legislature, the Executive and the

Judiciary are more sensitive to them than to the other attributes of daily existence.82

iv. In this light, it is but the duty of the State to protect the lives of students by providing a

conducive environment for them to grow and develop. Education today remains

liberation - a tool for the betterment of our civil institutions, the protection of our civil

liberties, and the path to an informed and questioning citizenry. Then as now, we

recognise education’s “transcendental importance” in the lives of individuals and in the

very survival of our Constitution and Republic.83

v. Hence, it is the contention of the respondent that the State while providing for the

protection of life and liberty of the students of the general category through the

amendment is not violating any Fundamental Right guaranteed by the Constitution to the

LC and LG as their right to compete and liberty to join an insititution of their choice, or

their right to education and opportunity at large are not affected at all. All that the

amendment seeks to do is to establish an equal platform for all students of the nation to

gain access to aducation. It cannot be contended that the reservation and privileges have

to be continued because a 2% drop in the presence of LC and LG in the graduation and

post-graduation level has been observed. This is a very small margin when compared to

the 22.5% seats that were being reserved for them and is simply a logical consequence of

the merit based education system as has been rightly justified by the leaders of the ruling

party.

vi. Also, Art. 21 guarantees the right to live with dignity. The Preamble in ICCPR and

ICESCR, 1966 proclaims that ‘recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and

inalienable rights of all members of this human family is the foundation of freedom,

justice and peace of the world.’84 In an organised society, right to live as a human being is

not ensured by meeting only the animal needs of man. It is secured only when he is

assured of all facilities to develop himself and is freed from restrictions which inhibits his

growth.85

82 Kehar Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1988 SC 1883. 83 Avinash Mehrotra v. Union Of India & Ors., (2009) 6 SCC 398. 84 Danial Latifi v. Union of India, AIR 2001 SC 3958. 85 Chameli Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 1051.

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vii. It has been held that right to life under Art. 21 and the dignity of an individual cannot be

assured unless it is accompanied with the right to education.86 Also, in Maneka Gandhi v.

Union of India,87 it was observed that this Fundamental right represents the basic values

cherished by the people of their country since Vedic Times and they are calculated to

protect the dignity of the individual and create conditions in which every human being

can develop his personality to the fullest extent. Judicial interpretation in an innovation

has extended the scope of Article 21 of the Constitution and, thus, it has been held to be a

duty of the State to act and create conditions conducive for a life of dignity as opposed to

a mere animal existence.88 Thus, removal of such recognition will not only improve the

lives of the general category but will also remove any feelings of bias that may have

existed towards the LC and LG community due to such a tag placed on them.

viii. Under the Hadenian Constitution, while basic liberties are guaranteed and individual

initiative is encouraged, the State has got the role of ensuring that no class prospers at the

cost of other class and no person suffers because of drawbacks which are not his but

social. 89 Therefore, the general category cannot be allowed to suffer in today’s

competitive atmosphere due to the policy of reservation and special privileges for a class

of persons who have been benefitting from such policies right from 1954.

ix. It would be constitutionally immoral to perpetuate inequality among majority people of

the country in the guise of protecting the constitutional rights of minorities and

constitutional rights of backward and downtrodden. All the rights of these groups are part

of right to social development which cannot render national interest and public interest

subservient to right of an individual or right of community90 and where individual liberty

comes into conflict with an interest or security of the State or public order the liberty of

the individual must give way to the larger interest of the nation.91

x. At that level where International measure of talent is made, where losing one great

scientist or technologist-in-the-making is a National loss, the considerations we have

86 Mohini Jain (Miss) v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1992 SC 1858. 87 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597. 88 Ashwani Gupta v. Government of India & Ors., 117 (2005) DLT 112. 89 M. Nagaraj and Ors. v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212. 90 Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka & Ors., (2003) 6 SCC 697. 91 Sunil Fulchand Shah v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 1023.

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expanded upon as important lose their potency.92 To devalue merit at the summit is to

temporise with the country’s development in the vital areas of professional

expertise…Excellence cannot be allowed to be compromised by any other considerations

because that would be detrimental to National interest.93 In the era of globalisation,

where the nation as a whole has to compete with other nations of the world so as to

survive, excellence cannot be given an unreasonable go by and certainly not

compromised in its entirety.94

xi. Art. 334 fixed a 10-year time limit on the legislative reservations provided in Arts. 330

and 332.95 This was however continuously extended time and again stating various social

and economic reasons that ‘Although the LC and the LG have made considerable

progress in the last 60 years, the reasons which weighed the Constituent Assembly in

making provision with regard to the aforesaid reservation of seats and nomination of

members have not ceased to exist.’96 Now, the Government has come to a conclusion that

the reasons for reservation no longer exist and has therefore decided to achieve real legal

equality through the Amendment.

xii. Moreover, past practice is not always the best practice.97 We cannot allow the dead hand

of the past to stifle the growth of the living present. Law cannot stand still; it must change

with the changing social concepts and values.98 Reference also needs to be made to the

Constituent Assembly, where Dr. B.R. Ambedkar had observed that conceding the

demands of backward classes to the fullest extent would destroy the first proposition

which is equality in opportunity.99

xiii. It should be noted that the ultimate constitutional goal is to attain equality.100 A dynamic

movement towards a certain objective means certain changes taking place which is the

essence of movement101 and should not be rejected outright. When an amendment is made

in furtherance of the intention of our forefathers, the makers of our Constitution, it is 92 Jagdish Saran (Dr.) v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 820. 93 Pradeep Jain (Dr.) v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 1420. 94 AIIMS Students Union v. AIIMS, (2002) 1 SCC 428. 95 Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. UOI and Ors., (2008) 6 SCC 1. 96 Statement of Objects and Reasons, The Constitution (95th Amendment) Act, 2009. 97 State of Uttar Pradesh v. Neeraj Avasthi, (2006) 1 SCC 667. 98 National Textile Worker’s Union & Ors. v. P.R. Ramakrishnan & Co., (1983) 1 SCC 228. 99 Delhi Jal Board v. Mahinder Singh, AIR 2000 SC 2767, 2768. 100 Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka & Ors., (2003) 6 SCC 697. 101 Waman Rao v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 362.

26

uncomprehensible as to how such a change could be challenged as violative of

Fundamental Rights.

xiv. Hence, the Amendment is also in furtherance of the right to life embedded with a dignity

and is also conducive to the growth of national interest as a whole.

D. DOCTRINE OF GOOD GOVERNANCE IN A REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY.

i. While dealing with the concept of democracy, the majority in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj

Narain 102 stated that ‘democracy’ as an essential feature of the Constitution is

unassailable. The said principle has been reiterated in a number of cases.103 It was

pronounced with asseveration that democracy is the basic and fundamental structure of

the Constitution. There is no shadow of doubt that democracy in Haden is a product of

the rule of law and aspires to establish an egalitarian social order. It is not only a political

philosophy but also an embodiment of constitutional philosophy.104

ii. This Hon’ble Court has observed that the doctrine of good governance requires the

Government to rise above their political interest and act only in public interest and for the

welfare of its people.105 One of the principles of good governance in a democratic society

is that smaller interest must always give way to larger public interest in case of

conflict.106

iii. In a representative Democracy like Haden, the welfare of the people has to be given top

most priority irrespective of any political interest. Hence, it is the humble contention of

the respondent that the amendment facilitates good Governance in Haden and is in

pursuance of Art. 14 to give affect to the abolition of caste system and thereby does not

violate the Fundamental Rights of the LC and LG.

102 Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299. 103 Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India, AIR 2006 SC 3127. 104 Manoj Narula v. Union of India, (2014) 9 SCC 1. 105 A. Abdul Farook v. Municipal Council, Perambalur and Ors., (2009) 15 SCC 351. 106 State of Maharastra & Ors. v. Jalgaon Municipal Corporation and Ors., (2003) 9 SCC 731.

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PRAYER

Wherefore, in the light of issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is humbly

prayed before this Hon’ble Court that it may be pleased to:

1. Uphold the 101st Amendment, 2016 to the Constitution of Haden and

2. Dismiss the Writ Petition.

And pass any further orders as it may deem fit in the light of equity, justice and good conscience.

Sd/-

(Counsel for Respondent)