The Greater Caspian Project 20

contents

07. the Russian FedeRation’ stRategic equation in syRiaGIANCARLO ELIA VALORI

13. a Balance oF PoweRSAudI ARAbIA ANd IRANLuIS duRANI

18. "Pivot to the east" RuSSIA'S SOuthEASt ASIA GAmbIttONy RINNA

21. KazaKhstan’s snaP elections called amidst dissent and economic tRouBlesSAmANthA bRLEtICh

25. gReeK - Russian Relations into PeRsPectiveChRIStIANNA LIOuNtRI

28. the dynamics oF woRld PoliticsINdIA-RuSSIA NuCLEAR dEAL NASuRuLLAh bROhI

31. the PeculiaRities oF the JcPoaSOhAIL mAhmOOd, Phd

37. Putin’s ProblemsJack Pearce

42. iran, syria and saudi arabiaGiancarlo elia Valori

48. Challenges and oPPortunities for russiaafter the north Korean hydrogen bomb testTony rinna

52. interview with lyubov demidovakeSTer kenn kloMeGaH

petra poseGateJa palkoluisa monteironina laVrenteVaGaBriela pasCholati Do amaralBruCe aDrianCeanatolii Baronintroy BaXtersamantha m. BrletiChGreGory Brewnasurullah BrohistaCey Cottoneantony ClementanDy DeahnnenaD DrCa luis Duranisara DysonJareD s. eastonGianCarlo elia ValoriJeffery fishellaura GarriDoorhan Gafarliaaron GooDamy hanlonJeanette "JJ" harper

Jonathan hartnerBrian huGhesanDrii kolpakoVVlaDislaV lermontoVChristianna liountripaula malottmeGan munozelena m.sohail mahmooD, phDnorBerto morales rosataylor morseJohn CoDy mosBeysarah nolDerJoshua pattersonJaCk pearCeDayna riCetony rinnaJessiCa reeDGreGory rouDyBushstephen sartyDmitrii seltserrakesh krishnan simhaeVan thomsenDianne a. ValDezChristopher white

the greater CasPian ProJeCtbi-weeKly digital edition

www.moderndiplomacy.eu [email protected]

Dimitris GiannakopoulosModern Diplomacy, Editor-in-chiefDr. matthew CrosstonThe Caspian Project, Director

authors

“The society that

separates its scholars from

its warriors will have its

thinking done by cowards

and its fighting by fools”

Thucydides

www.moderndiplomacy.eu

ur third edition of the renamed ‘GreaterCaspian Project’ is the fullest blossoming todate of just how expansive and importantthis region is to the world in general. The

greater Caspian region encompasses areas of the worldthat extend all the way from the Atlantic to the Pacificwhen you consider the geostrategic tentacles that comefrom the decisions made. This issue lets readers see thatprocess in explicit detail as subjects cut across Russia,Iran, the Middle East, South Asia, all the way out to East-ern China. As is often the case in the world of global af-fairs and international relations, the tiniest of decisionscan have subtle consequences that grow into huge con-sequences. GCP No. 20 shows us all how real that is.

Truly, this edition may have the largest coverage of dis-parate countries to date, with our readers learning subtleforeign policy issues and diplomatic nuances from Russiato Iran to Saudi Arabia to Syria to Kazakhstan to India toChina to North Korea. Whether considering strategies toend war in Syria, preventing war in North Korea, stop-ping degradation in Kazakhstan, or ameliorating tension

between major rivals in the MiddleEast, No. 20 makes us all realize justhow complicated the world is todayand why local problems often turninto regional discord which explodesinto global tension and conflict.

In the end, we here at Modern Diplo-macy and the GCP remain steadfastand true to the idea that no idea is sa-cred, no one position is the ultimatetruth, and our only true purpose is ex-posing ever more people to the worldas it really is, to the intricate actionsand inner workings of states in theglobal neighborhood game as theyactually transpire. We hope it alwayshelps our readers become more in-formed and more refined in theirthinking and perspectives.

GEOstRAtEGY RuN AMOkthE ExPANDED NEIGhbORhOOD IssuE

Prof. Dr. Matthew Crosston

Senior Editor, Director, The Caspian Project

O

MODERN DIPLOMACY

THE RuSSIAN FEDERATION’

STRATEgIC EquATION

IN SYRIA

THE CASPIAN PROJECT 20 07 /08

GIANCARLO ELIA VALORI

Advisory Board, Co-chair Honoris Causa

Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman.He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders.

Mr Valori has lectured on international affairs and economicsat the world’s leading universities such as Peking University,

the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York.

How are the Russian-Syrian operationsand the operations of the United Statesand its coalition in Syria going and,more importantly, what can we expect

from them? According to Western sources,Isis/Daesh has recently reduced its size by 40% over-all and by 20% in Syria, while it had lost only 14% ofits territory throughout 2015 when the Caliphate’sDaesh expanded - without recovering the sameamount of territory - in Eastern Syria.

Another area where the Caliph Al Baghdadi has lostmuch of his territorial control is the area along theborder with Turkey - while the Caliph has arrived upto the areas along the border with Jordan, the tra-ditional area of smuggling and transit of its mili-tants. Areas towards the Lebanese border and in thePalmira region are reported to be under Isis/Daeshcontrol. Hence, so far, both the US Coalition’s andthe Russian-Syrian pressures do not seem to be suf-ficient to definitively destabilize Al-Baghdadi’sCaliphate, despite its current territorial losses.Therefore Isis/Daesh is likely to restructure itself inthe form of a first-phase Al Qaeda, as indeed it al-ready appears to do.This means that Isis/ Daeshcould create - or has already done so - a small andcentralized organizational structure, with informalperipheral networks in Europe, North Africa andCentral Asia, with a view to organizing mass terroristactions and blocking the Western resistance againstthe jihad, as well as finally disrupting the Europeansecurity forces.

Nevertheless why the Russian-Syrian actions andthe other US-led action do not work fully?Firstly, we must analyze the Caliphate’s weapons: ithas acquired most of the stocks abandoned by theIraqi and Syrian armies, including sufficiently ad-vanced weapons to counter the Russian and theCoalition’s weapon systems.Absolute technological superiority is not needed.The will to fight and the higher mobility of theCaliphate’s armies are more than enough.In essence, Isis/Daesh can avoid attacking the bestequipped areas of both coalitions, while it can pre-dict and avoid the West’s points of attack thanks toa joint and unified command/control centre locatedfar from the lines.

Said centre employs the same technologies as theanti-jihadist forces, as well as similar logics of action.Mimicking the enemy is an effective way of fightingit.Furthermore mobility replaces technological supe-riority and currently nobody - except for the RussianFederation - wants to fight "for Gdansk", whichtoday means fighting for Damascus.

A Caliphate’s conventional strategy "from the weakto the strong" – just to use the same terminology asthe philosophers of war, Beaufre and Ailleret -where the Western weakness is twofold: both onthe ground - where Isis/Daesh is much more mobileand causes politically unacceptable damage to theWest (with the exception of Russia and the Kurdishand Yazidi militias) and within the Western public,slackened off by the fairy tale of "good" immigrationwhich blocks the European governments’ reactionson the necessary presence of Western troops on theground.

H

MODERN DIPLOMACY

Not to mention the fact that Isis/Daesh has takenpossession, on its own territory, of the Hamas linein Gaza: a very thick and dense network of under-ground tunnels, which protects from air attacks andallows the economic activities needed to supportthe organization.Another primary goal of the Caliph Al Baghdadi isto saturate Western police forces and making themactually unusable since they are already scarce innumber and weapons, while Europe dies in "multi-culturalism".This is a primary goal of Isis/Daesh which, in the fu-ture, will certainly attack – probably also territorially– some areas in European countries "from the weakto the strong".

The bell tolls for us, too – just to make reference toJohn Donne’s verse, which became famous as thetitle of Ernest Hemingway’s novel on the SpanishCivil War, which in fact paved the way for World WarII.

Hence, we will soon have a core of militant jihadistsnot necessarily trained in Syria, but connected viathe Internet, and a vast network of "fellow travelers"who can serve as cover, logistical support, recruit-ment area, political and media manipulation for themore gullible or fearful Westerners.

This will be – and, indeed, it already is - the structureof Al Baghdadi’s Caliphate in Europe.


The West will die of soft power, as well as of a lot oftalk with Islamists who do not want to hear it - allconvinced of their alleged cultural, religious andmilitary superiority.Years of peacekeeping, "stabilization" and peace-enforcing have turned the European Armed Forces- already largely undersized at that time - into trafficguards and organizers of elections - always rigged- just to be as quick as possible and go away withoutdisturbing the sleep of European peoples.The very size of the European Armed Forces, con-sidered individually or in a ramshackle coalition"against terror", is not even comparable with thoseof the United States or Russia, after decades ofequally unreasonable reduction of investment inthe military and in the public safety sectors, evenafter the first Al Qaeda attacks.

Quos Deus perdere vult, dementat - Those whomGod wills to destroy he first deprives of their senses.On the contrary, Russia has implemented a thor-ough reform of its Armed Forces in 2008, after thewar with Georgia, and it has worked much more onthe "human factor" than on technology which, how-ever, has not been neglected.So far the Russian forces in Syria have deployed ar-tillery groups and other ground forces while, ac-cording to reports coming from Russian sources,Russia is deploying batteries of S-400 anti-aircraftmissiles again on Syrian territory, over and aboveproviding “Buk” anti-aircraft missile systems to theArab Syrian Army.The S-400 missile – also known as "Growler", accord-ing to the NATO designation - is an anti-aircraft mis-sile which intercepts aircrafts flying up to 17,000kilometers per hour, while "Buk" (also known asSAM 17) is a surface-to air missile system (alsoknown as "Gainful" according to the NATO designa-tion) with radars for the acquisition of targets, whichare the enemy cruise missiles and strike aircrafts.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

The "branches" of Al-Baghdadi’s Caliphate areequally efficient: in the Barka province in Libya - andnow in the Sirte district with the agreement be-tween the Isis/Daesh and Gaddafi’s tribes – as wellas Jund-al-Kilafah in Algeria, Al Shaabab in Somalia,Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria, Jundallah in Pak-istan and Abu Sayyaf in Malaysia.The void of Western inanity is immediately filled byISIS, which does not know international law, butonly a miserably manipulated Koran.

Hence a mechanism similar to communicating ves-sels is in place: the more the Isis/Daesh crisis deep-ens on its territory of origin, the more threateningand powerful the peripheral groups become.While, at the same time, in Europe we are witness-ing some mass radicalization manoeuvres whichrely on Al Qaeda’s old techniques: at first, the moreor less crazy "Manchurian candidates", who playedhavoc in small areas.Later – as today - mass actions, like that in front ofthe Cathedral and train station in Cologne, whichwill certainly bring good results to the Caliph in thefuture; then again real, visible and very effective ter-rorist attacks.Not to mention similar mass actions in Hamburgand Zurich.

Finally, when and how it will be logistically possible,we will witness the creation of small "Caliphates" inEurope, in the areas which the enormous long-termstupidity of EU leaders has left fully in the hands ofIslamic mass immigration that has seized neighbor-hoods and cities.

The war against the Caliphate is and will be a verylong war and the West - probably with the only ex-ception of the Russian Federation - has in no waythe political and psychological ability, nor thepower to fight it with a view to winning it.


Nevertheless, why does Russia deploy such an ad-vanced anti-aircraft structure if Isis/Daesh has noplanes? The simple answer to this question is be-cause Russia wants to reduce and eventually elimi-nate Western raids, often objectively inconclusiveor scarcely effective, also due to the lack of a net-work for target acquisition. Conversely, Russiawishes to take Syria as a whole, after destroying orminimizing Al Baghdadi’s Caliphate. President Putinneeds a victory in Syria – firstly because the defeatof Al Baghdadi’s Caliphate avoids the jihadist radi-calization of the over twenty million Muslim resi-dents and citizens of Russia.

If the Russian and Central Asian Islam takes fire, Rus-sia can no longer control - militarily or economically- the energy networks towards Europe and theMediterranean region, which is the central axis ofits geoeconomy.Moreover, Vladimir Putin wants to become the onlyplayer of the Syrian crisis because, for Russia, oust-ing the West from a NATO neighboring country,which is pivotal for control over the Mediterraneanregion, means to become - in the future - one of thetwo players or even the first player in the Mare Nos-trum, with strategic consequences which areunimaginable today.

Finally the Russian anti-aircraft missile systems areneeded to wipe out the aircrafts of the powers notcoordinating with Russia and to strengthen militarycooperation with the countries which have ac-cepted the Russian air superiority. For example Is-rael which, for the time being, offsets by Russia thede facto breaking of military and strategic relationswith the United States and the political anti-Semi-tism mounting in Europe.

Furthermore, Putin also holds together – in a hege-monic way - Iran, Bashar al-Assad’s Syria and theLebanese Hezbollah, thus setting himself up as amediator and power broker between the Shi’itebloc and the West when, in all likelihood, the clashbetween the Sunnis and the "Party of Ali" will be-come disastrous and fatal for European security.

Furthermore, the Russian President wants to pushthe United States away from the Middle East defin-itively, regardless of the United States maintainingor not their preferential relations with Saudi Arabia.Finally, within the UN Security Council, Russia willdo its utmost to capitalize on its hopefully futurevictory against Isis/Daesh, by exchanging it with theachievement of other Russian primary interests: themanagement of the Arctic; the forthcoming milita-rization of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization;the regionalization of NATO eastward and possiblya new military agreement with China, which wouldmake the composition of the UN Security Councilcompletely asymmetrical.Not to mention the great attraction which Russiawould hold for a Eurasian peninsula left alone bythe United States and devoid of acceptable de-fenses in the Southeast. In this case, the Eurasiamyth of the Russian philosopher and strategist,Alexander Dugin, would come true very quickly.

a baLanCE Of POwEr

he execution of Sheikh Nimr al Nimr bySaudi Arabia is heating up the Cold Warin the Middle East. The tension betweenSaudi Arabia and Iran has been ratcheting

up since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Butmore so, the recent Iranian nuclear deal has begunto change the geopolitics of the region forever.The latest execution of the leading Shiite cleric inSaudi Arabia was intended to ruffle feathers inTehran and provoke a reaction. Iran responded justlike Saudi Arabia wanted. Under the leadership ofKing Salman, the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia re-flects one of a paranoid regime that is potentiallyon the precipice of collapse due to falling oil pricesand slowly being eclipsed by Iran.

T

MOdErn diPLOMaCY

LUIS DURANI

Luis Durani is currently employed in the oil and gasindustry. He previously worked in the nuclear

energy industry. He has a M.A. in internationalaffairs with a focus on Chinese Foreign Policy and

the South China Sea, MBA, M.S.in nuclear engineering, B.S. in mechanical engineer

and B.A. in political science.He is also author of "Afghanistan: It’s No Nebraska –

How to do Deal with a Tribal State." Follow him for other articles on Instagram:

@Luis_Durani

Saudi arabia and iran

WHAT HAS HAPPENED SO FAR

Ever since the implementation of the Petrodollarpact, the security guarantor for Saudi Arabia hasbeen the US. But with the removal of Saddam in2003, the regional balance of power was perturbed.The new government in Iraq represented the Shiitemajority and many within the government had linksto Iran. A new era of Iran-Iraq relations were usheredin to the detriment of Saudi Arabia. The Iraqi wallthat circumscribed Iran had crumbled and allow forthe Shiite expansion into the Levant. Iran wasgranted unhindered access to its allies in Syria andLebanon through Iraq, creating a “Shiite Crescent”.This northern expansion has created a perceivedsemi-encirclement of Saudi Arabia.

All the while this was happening; the US began topivot away from the Middle East to East Asia undera new strategic imperative. These dramatic changeshave made the royal family uneasy about the US se-curity commitment to the regime. To exacerbate atense situation, the Arab Spring made the Saudisbegan to realize that there was an internal existen-tial threat to their hold on power.

The Saudi royal family became proactive in mattersdealing with its security. It needed to rebalancepower in the region in order to prevent an Iranianhegemony from establishing and subdue any inter-nal dissent. In order to quell the internal outrage,the government increased subsidies to its citizensand imprisoned many who were Shiite. Next, theSaudi military intervened in Bahrain to quell an up-rising by the Shiite majority against its Sunni rulers.The rebellion was suppressed but the Saudis sus-pected Iranian involvement behind the rebellion.

THE CaSPian PrOJECT 20 13 /14

Soon thereafter, Yemen began to fall into disarrayas different factions began an uprising against thedictatorship of Saleh. When the Houthi rebels, Shiitetribesmen backed by Iran, began to make advancestowards the capital, Saudi Arabia once again got in-volved in hopes of crushing yet another Shiite re-bellion at its doorstep. Except this time it appearsSaudi Arabia has created a quagmire of its own. Thecostly foray has begun to take its toll on the inter-ventionist Saudi foreign policy. While its forces arebogged down in Yemen, Saudi Arabia’s backing ofSyrian rebels against Assad has fallen to the waysideas the world unites to battle ISIS. The Saudi-led ini-tiative to remove Assad has failed.

The final ingredient for the perfect storm has beenthe dramatic decline of oil prices. When the price ofoil began to fall in late 2014, it was due to an over-supply in the world markets and a weakening de-mand. But there was a way out, Saudi Arabia, thenation with the largest oil reserves, could have re-duced supplies, which in turn would raise prices butthey did not. The rationale behind this move was to regain mar-ket share rather than profits by eliminating all theAmerican shale producers who had become athreat to the Saudi oil supply. The US, who was oncethe primary recipient of Saudi oil, is on the path tobecoming a major exporter herself.

MOdErn diPLOMaCY

In a bid to outdo the US producers, Saudi Arabia en-gaged in a game of chicken to push prices as low asit can go to drive all competition out. But there hasbeen blowback, the falling prices have caused theSaudis to go into deficit spending and diminishedits cash reserves. The continued low prices are caus-ing internal pressures within the country to arise.There are rumblings of a potential Saudi collapse,which can have devastating effects for the regionas well as US strategic interest. With all the shortcomings going on with its policies, the Saudis arelooking for a way to divert attention from them.

RALLY AROUND THE FLAG

The best way for the regime to distract attention isto create a wag the dog effect. The Saudis knew theexecution of its Shiite cleric Sheikh Nimr would cre-ate a firestorm. The outcome was exactly what theydesired; protest around the Shiite world and espe-cially in Iran where the Saudi embassy was burned.This action set in motion a diplomatic tit for tat,which further caused a wider rift between theSaudis and Iranians. To further inflame tensions, aSaudi missile “accidently” struck the Iranian em-bassy in Yemen.

This back and forth between the two nations is ex-acerbating tensions in an already anxious region ofthe world. But the winners in all this is the Saudiroyal family who are able to shift focus to Iran fromits recent foreign failures in Yemen and Syria as wellas its internal economic bubble.

The Saudi regime is acting “irrationally” in order totake measures it perceives necessary to prevent itsown collapse. With the fall of Iraq and the nucleardeal, the balance of power has begun to shift inIran’s favor. The Saudi attempt to rebalance powerin the region has caused it to go further to the brinkof collapse by its recent short comings. As the USslowly withdraws from the region and oil pricescontinue to tumble, Saudi Arabia finds itself cor-nered. Its foreign policy is being driven with a senseof urgency based on a paranoid belief that its col-lapse is imminent. Thus, it can be expected thatprovocative actions in the form of military or eco-nomic by Saudi Arabia can be a norm in order toshift attention from its short comings until its houseis back in order or the regime collapses.

THE CaSPian PrOJECT 20 15 /16

MODERN DIPLOMACY

"PIvOT TO THE EAST"RuSSIA'S SOuTHEAST ASIA GAMbIT

hroughout 2015, the Russian Federa-tion engaged in a variety of initiativesin a region that often falls outside of theconventional analysis of Russia's foreign

policy- Southeast Asia. After a period of relativeneglect, dating back to the late Soviet era in somecases, Russia has once again emerged as an externalactor in this region.

Of course, Russia has been somewhat active in Viet-nam lately, and has made some inroads with thatcountry, such the re-opening of Cam Ranh to Russ-ian naval vessels. Yet in addition to a revival of Rus-sia-Vietnam ties, there are a few other states in theregion that have generally been closer to eitherChina or the United States with which Russia hasbegun to deepen relations.

T


TONY RINNA

Tony Rinna is a specialist in Russian foreign policyand security affairs in East Asia.

He currently resides in South Korea

It is too soon yet to state that Russia has emergedas a major player in Southeast Asia. Nor is there sub-stantive evidence that Russia will actually attain thisstatus in the region. Nevertheless, Russian overturesto several Southeast Asian states give a clear indi-cation that Russia's policy of "pivot to the East" ex-tends far beyond its relationship with China. In fact,the very fear that Russia's Asian policy orientationmay be limited to, or even subordinate to China islikely one of the biggest reasons why Moscow hasbegun to extend its hand of friendship to variouscountries in the region.

One country with which Russia has not had strongties, but one which Russia has recently reached outto is Cambodia. Dmitri Medvedev, Russia's primeminister, visited Cambodia in November 2015,where he and his Cambodian counterpart, Hun Senreached a number of agreements. The variousmeasures implemented included agreements onforeign investment as well as a memorandum of un-derstanding and cooperation on money launder-ing. It was the first time since 1987 that Moscow hadconducted an official-level visit to the country. Sincethat time, China has been Cambodia's most impor-tant major partner, especially under the leadershipof Hun Sen.

Similar with Cambodia, Myanmar has generallybeen under greater Chinese influence. Moscow's re-lationship with the secretive government in Yan-gon, while growing, especially in terms ofsmall-scale military cooperation, has also beenrather limited.

In the late summer of 2014, however, the Russiangovernment signed an agreement with Myanmarto increase the volume of trade between the twocountries from $117m to $500m, although trade fig-ures indicate that Russia had not been able to sig-nificantly boost its exports to Myanmar going into2015. Nevertheless, the two countries pledged atthe end of 2015 to continue fortifying their bilateralrelationship.

Yet another unlikely potential partner for Russia isthe traditional US ally of Thailand. When Prime Min-ister Medvedev paid an official visit to that countryin 2015, the Thai military government was in aslightly strained relationship with its allies in Wash-ington. For Bangkok, the visit from the RussianPrime Minister offered a sense of legitimacy, espe-cially in light of criticism from the UN. Furthermore,the governments in Bangkok and Moscow, as wellas the Russian and Thai business communities havehoped for a deeper development in economic co-operation. This incudes an increase in Russian armssales to Thailand as well as the possibility of con-ducting trade using the Russian ruble and Thai baht.Of course, such Russian overtures toward the Thaikingdom do not necessarily pose any strategic chal-lenges to the United States and its relationship withits longtime ally.

With Russia experiencing some degree of economicand political isolation for its foreign policy adven-tures over the past two years, Russia has found itselfin a favorable position to develop closer ties withother "isolated" countries.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

This may explain in particular Russia's developingties with Myanmar, as well as Russian overtures tothe current Thai government, which has drawnsome scorn from Washington.

Furthermore, conventional thinking about Russia'srecent overtures to various states in Southeast Asiaseems to be that Russia is attempting to demon-strate to the US that it is a global power with far-reaching interests. While there is certainly merit tothe position that Russia's foreign policy activities inSoutheast Asia have been taken primarily with theUnited States in mind, one must also consider theChina aspect of Russia's growing role in SoutheastAsia.

In fact, there is a high likelihood that Russia is seek-ing not so much to undermine the United States inSoutheast Asia, but rather is attempting to hedgeagainst the rising power of China. With the US'sdeep strategic presence in Southeast Asia firmly es-tablished, especially in places such as Thailand, itmakes little sense that Russia would sincerely at-tempt to undercut the United States in the region,especially when Russia has so little influence oreven historic legacy in Southeast Asia to begin with.

Rather, an increased Russian economic and, in lim-ited terms, security presence in Southeast Asia pro-vides an outlet whereby Russia can show that it isan Asian power independent of its relations withChina.

Furthermore, a stronger Russian presence in South-east Asia allows for Russia to establish itself as acompetitor in what has otherwise, in some respects,been part of a Chinese sphere of influence. This isespecially true given the fact that many Russian pol-icy elites perceive that China has been encroachingon Russia's traditional sphere of influence in CentralAsia.Russia's influence in Southeast Asia will likely re-main dwarfed by that of China and the UnitedStates for the time being. Yet slowly and quietly,Russia is emerging as a player in the region onceagain. Its ability to increase and project influence inSoutheast Asia, an area not traditionally part of itssphere of influence, may in fact be a metric bywhich to gauge the success of Russia's "pivot to theEast".


SAMANTHA M. BRLETICH

Samantha M. Brletich is a researcher and writerspecializing in Central Asia and governance, se-

curity, terrorism, and development issues.She possesses a Master’s in Peace Operations

Policy from George Mason University in Virginia,United States. She works with the virtual think

tank Modern Diplomacy specializing in CentralAsia and diplomatic trends. Her work has

appeared in multiple publications focused ondiplomacy and Central Asia respectively.

She is currently an employee of theU.S. Federal Government.

azakhstan will be holding Parliamen-tary snap elections in March 2016 ulti-mately providing a mandate forautocratic President Nursultan

Nazarbayev. The elections will not produce signifi-cant differences in the country’s political landscapewhich has remained relatively unchanged sinceNazarbayev gained power in 1989.

Arguably, the elections in Kazakhstan are part ofNazarbayev’s attempts to make Kazakhstan appearas a democratic country and are part ofNazarbayev’s managed government or “manageddemocracy.”

K

MODERN DIPLOMACY

KAzAKHSTAN’S SNAP ELECTIONSCALLED AMIDST DISSENT

AND ECONOMIC TROubLES


The elections are being held against the backdropof a failing economy, low oil revenue prices and theoil crash, political dissent, and Nazarbayev’s need tobe reaffirmed by the people of Kazakhstan.

The snap elections stirred up secessionist fervor andpossible chances for political change among Kaza-khstan observers as the country has no secessionistpolicy and is essentially under one-party rule. On 20January 2016, the lower-house of the Senate, theMajlis, voted to dissolve itself; the Majlis is domi-nated by the Nur-Otan Party, Nazarbayev’s party.The elections, originally scheduled for late 2016 orearly 2017, are scheduled for 20 March 2016.

The focus of the snap elections is economic recov-ery and political change. The snap elections are sup-ported by the Majlis, and the miners andmetallurgists to allow for “further implementationof reforms,” under Plan of the Nation (or “100 Steps”)and to “understand how we work in a new way,what laws should be adopted to meet the require-ments of a market economy,” according to theKazakh BNews news portal.

The Head of the Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan(APK) says the elections will benefit the country po-litically and economically. Kazakhstan’s People’sDemocratic Patriotic Party, known as “Aul” Party, alsosupports the snap elections. Support from Aulmakes the elections and the decision not so one-sided appear more competitive. The Astana Times,published astonishing, but not surprising, poll re-sults about voting in a new Majlis and reforms: “92percent of citizens believe the early elections makethe public more confident the new reforms will beimplemented.” Other poll results are similar.

Similar to April 2015 Presidential elections, the elec-tions were held against the backdrop of increasingpolitical dissension in the country. The governmentfears another 2011 Zhana Ozen protest over laborconditions, and protests similar to the protest inMay 2015 in the monocity (or company town) ofTemirtau.

Recently, on 12 January 2016, protests were held inAstana against the Kazakh Bank and the fallingtenge.

In response to economic fears, the Kazakh govern-ment now offers powdered mare’s milk on theglobal market which “can generate product worth$1 billion (a year)” to mitigate declining global oilprices. Another recent incident was the firing of theSovereign Wealth Fund manager, Berik Otemurat,stated Kazakhstan’s National Oil Fund would run outin the next six or seven years. The National Oil Fund,often used as an emergency fund, has fallen 17%from $77 billion since August 2014 and the govern-ment is withdrawing about according to the WallStreet Journal. Two activists in Kazakhstan, Serizkhan Mambetalinand Ermek Narymbaev, were convicted and sent toprison for two and three respectively for Facebookposts “inciting national discord” (Article 174 of theCriminal Code) and the “authorities claimed theclips amounted to a ‘serious crime against peaceand security of humankind’ ” according to HumanRights Watch. The two men were arrested in Octo-ber 2015 and their trial began 9 December 2015. Athird activist, Bolatbek Blyalov, has movement re-stricted for three years and cannot “[change] hisplace of residence or work, or [spend] time in publicareas during his time off.” The punishment for thethree activists violates many of Kazakhstan’s inter-national commitments.

Nazarbayev’s snap elections fall into a pattern ofmanaged governance or managed democracy. Theinternational community repeatedly chastises Kaza-khstan for failure to execute and commit to demo-cratic reforms, failure to improve human rights

abuses (without little diplomatic and internationalconsequence), and for lack of political freedoms andparty pluralism. Nazarbayev in April 2015 won theelection by a landslide and Nazarbayev said itwould have “looked undemocratic” for him to ques-tion election results.

Edward Schatz categorizes Kazakhstan as a soft au-thoritarian regime that engages in managed infor-mation and “[discourages] opposition and[encourages] pro-regime authorities.” Informationmanagement, according to Schatz, is not onlythrough media, but by staging “many events to con-vey information dramatically.” Nazarbayev has a his-tory of staging political events. Applying this notionto snap elections, Kazakhstan’s citizens know of theeconomic troubles. Snap elections are unnecessaryto highlight the problem and snap elections givethe impression the government is actively handlingthe problem and that political change is welcome.

Besides during election cycles, Nazarbayev effec-tively manages the press, limiting dissent and alter-native political voices. Media freedoms inKazakhstan declined after the Zhana Ozen protests.In-depth legal analysis by France-based group, Ar-ticle 19, provided that Law No. 545-IV on Televisionand Radio Broadcasting (the Law) of the Republicof Kazakhstan, is “open to abuse by government”and “poses a genuine threat to freedom of expres-sion, as well as freedom of information.”

MODERN DIPLOMACY


The newspaper, Pravdivaya Gazeta, critical of Kaza-khstani authorities was shut down February 2014.The Respublika newspaper was shut down in 2013and the Assandi Times faced closure in April 2014after being affiliated with Respublika. The AssandiTimes maintains an empty Facebook page. On 18December 2015, Kazakh authorities raided the of-fices of investigative news outlet Nakanune.kz; as oflate January 2016, the website still operates.

The snap elections in Kazakhstan are not a way toencourage civic participation in political affairs, buta way for President Nazarbayev to consolidate hisautocratic power via other means besides the Pres-idency and to provide the image he is supported bythe people.

The snap elections will not produce different resultsbut will reinforce Kazakhstan’s current policies andways to undertake reforms. As the Kazakh economycontinues to tumble and public dissatisfaction in-creases, it is likely activists and news outlets will facepersistent censorship and scrutiny from the Kazakhgovernment. Nazarbayev’s ability to control themedia and creative interpretations of the nation’scriminal code generates further criticism from inter-national organizations and violate Kazakhstan’s ob-ligations to international commitments.

ver since the establishment of the mod-ern Greek State, Greece has formedstrong, mainly psychological, ties withRussia. Indeed, it was the Russian sup-

port to the Greek National Revolution of 1821, thatset in alarm the other Great European Powers of thetime, internationalized the greek demand for libertyand paved the way for action to be taken to helpthe Greeks.The endgame of the help that was of-fered to Greeks was to prevent Russia from gainingaccess to the Mediterranean, a fact that would havechanged the international balance of power in itsfavor.

CHRISTIANNA LIOUNTRI

E

GREEk - RussIAN RELAtIONs INtO PERsPECtIvE

MODERN DIPLOMACY

It is essential to note that the Russian involvementin the Balkans, when manifested, it is expressed ina very vivid and dynamic way, only to be slowly yetsteadily diminished. This is the case due to the factthat Russia uses this geopolitical area as a lever inorder to improve its position to other issues of for-eign policy that are higher in its agenda. It is safe toargue that the greater area of the Balkans is anarena for Russia to secure its interests andstrengthen its position in other issues. Bearing inmind the proximity that Balkan states feel towardsRussia due to the common orthodox and sovietpast, we can not avoid the observation that ever

since Putin rose to power, Russia implements apragmatic foreign policy, in which narratives suchas “omodoxy” or the communist ideology and affin-ity have absolutely no place. The immediate goal ofPutin's policy is for Russia to regain its status as aGreat Power, through the consolidation of its powerin the former soviet area while, preserving its terri-torial footholds worldwide.

A detached analysis of the current state of Greek-Russian affairs would safely argue that the twocountries never shared a strategic relationship,rather their collaboration was limited in secondaryissues. High expectations were cultivated particu-larly in the period of 2004-2009, which, however,soon failed. The momentum (and interventions ofevery kind) did not favor the conclusion of the pur-sued partnerships, mainly in the energy sector. Toelaborate a bit more, from 1993 onwards, any planthat has to do with the construction of pipelines isnot fruitful. For one, Greece is a very small marketfor Russia to take up the high cost of such projects.Moreover, Greece can not yet pose itself as a transitstate in order to lure investors. Finally, we can notignore that the European Commission is very sus-ceptible towards Russia, due to Gazprom's monop-oly in the European energy market. Clearly, there is a great issue with the sanctions thathave been implemented on Russia and are focusingprimarily on its energy sector, which is undoubtedlythe basic pillar of its economy. For instance, in thelist of sanctions, for the first time, we see that theyname a specific natural gas field, Sahalin, and theyforbid any prospective investors from exploring thechances to participate and invest in any plans to de-velop the particular field. The importance of thisparticular prohibition lies in the fact that the de-posits under development call for high- tech equip-ment, which is not at the disposal of Russian oilcompanies. Therefore, the participation of interna-tional (western) oil companies, which have the tech-nological “know-how” to develop such projects, is anecessity.

tHE CAsPIAN PROJECt 20 25 /26

Taking as a given that the EU has diverged from itsoriginal utopian dimension, attributed to it by itsfounding conventions, Greece needs to understandthe specific axis under which it can shape its policytowards Russia. Firstly, any effort to promote bilat-eral relations in the form of alliances should not beperceived as a competition of a strategic and con-solidated alliance against another possible and in-finite alliance. Secondly, for the balance of power tochange in Europe, Greece needs to ally with otherEuropean countries with which it has common in-terests and goals in order to shape a common pathand present a united front. It is common knowledgethat countries of the so- called core of the EU claimfor themselves the unilateral right to set the pace inthe relations with Russia, usually in accordance to atight interpretation of their national interests. Anyunilateral effort on behalf of Greece to change thecurrent status of Russia's image and participation inthe European affairs is doomed to fail. Greece is ina very weak economic place.

Most importantly, Greece is no longer considered areliable partner: the irresponsible and opportunisticactions of successive governments regarding theeconomic crisis led to the loss of whatever politicalcapital the country had. At the moment and unlesscatalytic events take place, member states sharinginterests and views with Greece can not trust thelatter to be a reliable partner. For instance, we canrefer to the way the Greek government tried to usethe negotiations with Russia, at January 2015:Greece gave the impression of a country that triedto manipulate Russia (and China) in order to setthem against EU and gain leverage in the main ne-gotiations with EU. Both powers perceived this be-havior as an arrogant effort to exploit them. As aresult, they dismissed the efforts of the Greeks assuperficial and meaningless while the bilateral tieswere severed, though not damaged. It remains tobe seen whether the current government can learnfrom its mistakes and make steps towards the rightdirection to restore the balance and save Greece'sface.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

NASURULLAH BROHI

Nasurullah Brohi works as a Senior ResearchAssociate at the Strategic Vision Institute,

Islamabad and can be reachedat nasurullahsvi(at)outlook.com

THE dyNAmICS OfWORld POlITICS

he great powers particularly the de-jure status holders under the NPTframework that only confers the nu-clear status to those states who ac-

quired the technology prior to 1968 and leavesno further room for others who were unable inthe aforementioned timeframe and yet theirpersistent efforts for the acquisition of nuclearcapability labels them as rogue states.

T

INdIA-RuSSIA NuClEAR dEAl


The role and policies of “great-nuclear powers” onthe issues of further nuclear proliferation are someof the persuasive aspects of discouraging manynon-nuclear states to refrain from seeking the nu-clear options, but however, in some cases the situ-ation becomes otherwise and the vested interestsof those powers also imply the options and policiesof cooperation with the non-nuclear weapon statesand conversely eagerly assist in their clandestinenuclear programs.

The business interests and the policies of empow-ering the non-nuclear strategic partners only for thecontainment of the rival states such as the case ofU.S. –India relationship, the strategic partnershipand the nuclear cooperation greatly is motivatesthe economic and military containment of Chinabut as a reaction to such policies additionally giventhe fact that the regional powers consider them sec-ond to none persistently keep-up with the procure-ment of huge arsenals of latest conventional andnon-conventional military equipments merely topreserve their power but as a consequence, thewhole region ultimately drags into the buddingpower struggle.

Similarly, in the end of December, 2015, the visit ofIndian Prime Minister to Moscow concluded with 16new deals between the two countries ranging fromRussian assistance for India in the fields of defence,energy, space cooperation and notably, the procla-mations of procuring Russian nuclear reactors tobuild a nuclear industry in Kudankulam and someother undisclosed nuclear sites in India.

The politically motivated Indo-Russian strategic co-operation is an outcome of the Indian refusal toWestern powers for criticizing the moves of annex-ing Crimea into mainland Russia, whereas, sanction-hit Russia also striving for a variety of options to getnew markets and investment option.

Apparently the current Indian ambitions are aimedat its self-sufficiency in the fields of energy for civil-ian purposes, but essentially these fulfil the broaderobjective of the Modi administration to aggressiveand assertively pursue the goals of thorium reactortechnology and building nuclear power plantsthrough foreign support.

mOdERN dIPlOmACy

The Russian state nuclear company Rosatom agreedto assist India in building new nuclear power plantsbesides, the Russian support for Indian defence pro-duction means for manufacturing Russian¬ de-signed Kamov helicopters in India is the keydefence project envisioned by the Prime MinisterNarendra Modi’s administration for its goals of‘Make in India’ program. The Modi regime’s ambi-tions of regional hegemony through the edge ofadvanced military equipment in the course of thelocal capability and indigenously made weaponssystem rather than importing from abroad are someof the factors pushing the South Asia towards anunending arms race.

India at the moment is one of the world’s largest im-porters of defence equipments and its further plansfor the procurement and modernizing its anti-quated conventional military equipment by spend-ing more than $250bn in the next 10 years.

New Delhi’s endeavour to benefit from Russian co-operation in the energy and defence sectors is prin-cipally the enthusiasm for modernizing thecapabilities of its armed forces, but in turn theseambitions actually contain enduring security impli-cations for the South Asian region.


ranian President Rohani, a pragmatist, waselected in 2013 which led to a diplomaticthaw between the Islamic Republic and theWest. Finally, after 20 months of "strenuous"

negotiations between Iran, the P5+1 and Iran theJCPOA on the nuclear program of Iran was reachedin July 2015 to ensure that Islamic Republic’s futurenuclear program would be exclusively peaceful.

It was a landmark comprehensive nuclear agree-ment after the longest continuous negotiationswith the presence of all foreign ministers of the per-manent members of the United Nations SecurityCouncil. The agreement was very complex. One ofthe signatories, Robert J. Einhorn, a former U.S. De-partment of State official now at the Brookings In-stitution, said of the agreement: "Analysts will bepleasantly surprised. The more things are agreed to,the less opportunity there is for implementation dif-ficulties later on." The agreement had been foundedupon , and also reinforced, the Nuclear Non-Prolif-eration Treaty (NPT) and the International AtomicEnergy Agency IAEA safeguards system.

ThE PECuLIARITIEs

Of ThE JCPOASOHAIL MAHMOOD, PHD

I

MODERN DIPLOMACY

According to several commentators, JCPOA was thefirst of its kind in the annals of non-proliferation andis in many aspects unique. This was the first timethat the United Nations Security Council had recog-nized the nuclear enrichment program of a devel-oping country –Iran–and backed an agreement(JCPOA) signed by several countries within theframework of a resolution (United Nations SecurityCouncil Resolution 2231).For the first time in the his-tory of the United Nations, a country –Iran– wasable to abolish 6 UN resolutions against it –1696,1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, 1929– without even oneday of implementing them. Sanctions against Iranwas also lifted for the first time. The 159-pageJCPOA document and its 5 appendixes, was themost spacious text of a multinational treaty sinceWorld War II. Throughout history of internationallaw, this was the first and only time that a countrysubject to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter–Iran– has managed to end its case and stop beingsubject to this chapter through diplomacy,all othercases have ended to either regime change, war orfull implementation of the Security Council’s deci-sions by the country.

Iran had agreed to strict limits on its nuclear pro-gram and extensive monitoring in return for the lift-ing of sanctions. In addition, it was agreed that Iranwould have cooperate with an inquiry looking intoevidence of past work on nuclear warhead design.

A brief summary of the main points:

1.Iran will not produce weapons-grade plutoniumand limit its stockpile of uranium enriched to 3.67%to 300 kilograms for the next 15 years.2.Tehran also agreed to modernize its nuclear facil-ities and use them for exclusively peaceful pur-poses.3.Sanctions will be gradually removed from Iran.4.The arms embargo imposed by UN Security Coun-cil will be kept in place for five years, ban for sup-plying ballistic missile technologies to Iran - foreight years.5.Experts from the International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA) will monitor nuclear facilities in Iranfor the next 25 years.6.If any points of the agreement are violated by Iran,sanctions against the country will be renewed.

ThE CAsPIAN PROJECT 20 31 /32

A commission made up of a range of IAEA memberswould be set up to judge whether the inspectors’access requests are justified, and would take its de-cision by majority vote.

5.Investigation into past activityIran has agreed a “road map” with the IAEA officialsby which it would provide access to facilities andpeople suspected of involvement in past experi-mental work on warhead design, managed by acentralized and covert unit, mostly before 2004. TheIAEA would have to certify Iranian cooperation withthe inquiry before Iran benefits from sanctions re-lief.

6.Sanctions reliefAs Iran takes the agreed steps listed above to re-duce the capacity and proliferation risk of its nuclearinfrastructure, the US and EU would provide guar-antees that financial and economic sanctions willbe suspended or cancelled. The EU would stop itsoil embargo and end its banking sanctions, and Iranwould be allowed to participate in the Swift elec-tronic banking system that is the lifeblood of inter-national finance. Barack Obama would issuepresidential waivers suspending the operation ofUS trade and financial sanctions.

7.A new UN security council resolution and thearms embargoThe JCPOA will be incorporated into a new securitycouncil resolution intended to replace and super-sede six earlier sanctions resolutions imposed onIran over its nuclear program.

The Main Points of the JCPOA:

1.Uranium enrichment capacityIran’s current capacity of 19,000 gas centrifugeswould be reduced by more than two-thirds to6,104, out of which just over 5,000 would actuallybe enriching uranium. All of them would be first-generation centrifuges based on technology goingback to the 1950s. Furthermore, for the first 15 yearsof the deal Iran would not enrich beyond the levelof 3.67% purity, low-enriched uranium (LEU) of thekind used in nuclear power stations.

2.The enriched uranium stockpileIran’s stockpile of LEU would be reduced from itscurrent level of about 7,500kgto 300kg, a reductionof 96%. The reduction would be achieved either byshipping the uranium abroad or by diluting it.

3.Research, development and future enrichmentcapacityThere would be limits on the R&D work Iran coulddo on advanced centrifuges, so that it could notsuddenly upgrade its enrichment capacity after thefirst 10 years of the agreement and bring its break-out time down from one year to a few weeks almostovernight. Iran would be able to test experimentalnew centrifuges on a small scale according to agradual plan.

4.InspectionsInspectors from the International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA) would have full access to all Iran’s de-clared nuclear sites as at present, but with muchmore advanced technology than they are usingnow. Inspectors would be able to visit non-declaredsites where they think nuclear work might be goingon.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

The resolution will be passed before the end of themonth but the agreement will not take effect for 90days, allowing for the domestic political review tobe completed. An arms embargo on Iran would re-main in place for five years, and a ban on the trans-fer of missile technology would stay for eight years.On July 20,2015 the corresponding resolution onIran’s nuclear program agreement was adopted byUN Security Council.

Adoption October 18, 2015 marks “Adoption Day” under theJCPOA – the day on which the JCPOA becomes ef-fective and participants begin to make the neces-sary preparations for implementation of theirJCPOA commitments.In connection with AdoptionDay, on October 18, 2015, the United States Presi-dent issued a memorandum directing his adminis-tration to take all appropriate preparatory measuresto ensure the prompt and effective implementationof the U.S. commitments set forth in the JCPOAupon Iran’s fulfillment of the requisite conditions. Inparticular, the US President directed the agencies totake steps to give effect to the U.S. commitmentswith respect to sanctions described in the JCPOA.In addition, on October 18, 2015, the Secretary ofState issued contingent waivers of certain statutorysanctions provisions.

These waivers were not currently in effect and willonly take effect on Implementation Day.. Thus, theUS was signaling Iran that the country was ready todo more than whatw as required to implement theJCPOA.

Next StepsJCPOA ‘s Annex V - Implementation Plan1 which de-scribes the sequence of the actions specified in theagreement clearly states in section A. FinalizationDay (2-4) that Iran and the IAEA will start “develop-ing necessary arrangements to implement all trans-parency measures provided for in this JCPOA sothat such arrangements are completed, in place,and ready for implementation”. Meanwhile, in ac-cordance with the UN Security Council resolutionendorsing this JCPOA, the provisions imposed in UNSecurity Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737(2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929(2010) and 2224 (2015) will be “terminated subjectto re-imposition in the event of significant nonper-formance by Iran of JCPOA commitments, and spe-cific restrictions, including restrictions regarding thetransfer of proliferation sensitive goods will apply”.


Thus, the onus of compliance was primarily on Iranand any failure would result in the re-imposition ofthe sanctions regime under the UN. Thus, all con-cessions given to Iran were conditional on verystrict compliance of the JCPOA.

The Role of the International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA)The IAEA, United Nations nuclear watchdog, had acrucial role in the implementation of the JCPOA.There was also separate "roadmap" agreement be-tween Iran and the IAEA, under which the agencywould have to investigate the military dimensionsof Iran's program, issue a report, and then closeIran's decade-old file within before the deal couldcome into effect. For sanctions on Iran to be lifted,the IAEA must first verify that e Iran had honored allits commitments under the July deal, including dis-mantling large numbers of its centrifuges for ura-nium enrichment and filling parts of its Arak nuclearsite with cement. The closure of the IAEA's nuclearweaponization probe was one of the prerequisitesfor the implementation of the JCPA.

The IAEA conducted a 12-year long survey on Iran’snuclear program. Finally, on December 15, 2015 theIAEA closed the book on the possible military as-pects of Iran’s nuclear program, finding that theywere limited to feasibility and scientific studies anddid not proceed beyond 2009, bringing an interna-tional nuclear accord with Iran a step closer to im-plementation. The resolution moved Iran anotherstep closer to large-scale sanctions relief followingits deal with world powers this summer. Thus, Iranhad cleared one of the nuclear deal's most impor-tant hurdles. Iran had yet to complete other provi-sions for implementing the deal, includingremoving the core of its plutonium reactor, scrap-ping much of its nuclear-fuel stockpile and remov-ing thousands of centrifuges from its nuclearfacilities.

Iranian and U.S. officials have said that could be ac-complished as early as January—one month aheadof parliamentary elections in Iran.

On December 15, 2015, IAEA Director-GeneralYukiya Amano confirmed that Iran was movingquickly to meet its commitments. Iran hoped to putthe restrictions in place within two to three weeks.The restrictions Iran must put in place include dras-tically reducing the number of centrifuges installedat its underground enrichment sites, removing thecore vessel of a reactor at Arak and shrinking itsstockpile of enriched uranium..

Next Steps The IAEA must verify that Iran has put the requirednuclear restrictions in place for sanctions to belifted. Iran had been racing to keep its side of theJCPOA deal. The next step was for Iran to completethe necessary preparatory steps to start implement-ing the JCPOA. On receipt of an IAEA report verify-ing that Iran had taken all actions specified in theJCPOA, the agency would then terminate the rele-vant resolutions it had previously passed in connec-tion with Iran’s nuclear program. This will allow Iranto participate in all IAEA technical cooperation ac-tivities, for instance. Meanwhile, Iran's president,Hassan Rouhani, said on December 16, 2015 thatIran would carry out its remaining obligations andwould now dismantle some nuclear centrifuges andship out a major portion of its stockpile of enricheduranium

Implementation DayThe Implementation Day is a major landmark in theJCPOA and will occur only once the IAEA verifiesthat Iran has implemented key nuclear-relatedmeasures specified in the agreement. Severalpreparatory steps have to be completed by Iran.This will be a major landmark, if and when it occurrs.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

The Future of the JCPOA The United States has taken a step toward lifting atleast some sanctions against Iran, with U.S. Secre-tary of State John Kerry telling the Senate ForeignRelations Committee that Tehran is fulfilling its ob-ligations in a “transparent” and “verifiable” wayunder an international agreement on its nuclearprogram. Kerry made the remarks on December 16,2015. The Obama administration estimated it wouldnot be until spring that Iran would be in compliancewith the terms required for sanctions relief to begin.The sanctions, if and when, lifted would give Iranaccess to billions in frozen assets and oil revenue.Thus, the United States appeared poised to lift atleast some sanctions against Iran -- possibly as earlyas January 2016.

It took a great effort on the part of the US and Iranto reach this agreement. Iran made concessions inorder to get rid of the sanctions regime which wascrippling its economy. The people of Iran alsowanted to end this confrontation with the West. Theadoption of the resolution had become the break-through in relations between IAEA and Iran. Al-though, the IAEA’s report strongly suggesting Iranhad engaged in activities aimed at developing a nu-clear bomb up until 2003 and that there was nocredible sign of weapons-related work beyond2009. Despite the finding, the international re-sponse to the report had been “muted”, indicatinga desire to go ahead with an agreement that “al-layed fears of a wider Middle East war over Iran's nu-clear ambitions, rather than dwell on its pastactions”.

Under the JCPOA Iran pledged never under any cir-cumstances to seek, develop or acquire nuclearweapons, and the UN Security Council is to considerending sanctions imposed for its NPT violationsonce it receives IAEA’s report on verification.

Once the deal was implemented, most U.S., U.N. andEuropean Union economic and financial sanctionswould be suspended, including Europe’s embargoon Iranian energy. However, an arms ban will re-main in replace as well as sanctions on dozens ofpeople and companies associated with Iran’s nu-clear program. Iran will also have to seek permissionto import so-called dual-use goods, which could beused in an illicit nuclear program. Other U.S. sanc-tions related to human-rights abuses and supportfor terror groups, including a “near-comprehensiveembargo” on U.S. trade with Iran, will remain inplace.

Much work lies ahead to reach this agreement anda further sustained effort will be required to imple-ment it. It isn’t gong o be easy at all. With the liftingof sanctions, Iran was poised to add a half millionbarrels a day to the saturated world oil supply bymid-2016, once the sanctions relief goes into effect,said Sara Vakhshouri, a senior energy fellow at theAtlantic Council think tank in Washington. Positivenews on Iran’s nuclear agreement with world pow-ers "could have a psychological downward impacton the global oil prices,” Vakhshouri said. “This couldhappen even before Iran increases its export vol-umes.” Notwithstanding he criticisms, the JCPOAhas the potential to provide stability, security andeconomic prosperity to Iran and thereby help sta-bilize a volatile region.


here has been much to-do in recentmonths and years about what have ap-peared to many to be Vladimir Putin’sbold, aggressive moves in the Ukraine

and Syria. Some have attributed strategic insightand effectiveness to Putin, and some have deploredwhat they consider to be weak, ineffective re-sponses by the leaders of the United States and Eu-rope.But looking only a little beneath the surface ofthese events, one can see Putin as attempting,somewhat ineffectively, to avoid major geostrategiclosses, playing a weak hand, and lacking apparentmeans to avoid further loss.

PutIN’s PRObLEMs

JACK PEARCE

Jack Pearce has served as Assistant Chiefof a section of the United States Justice

Department Antitrust Division responsible forliaison with other Executive Branch agencies,

regulatory bodies, and Congressional bodies asto actions which would impact upon

competition in the US economy

T

MODERN DIPLOMACY

Put in straightforward terms, Russia is losing effec-tive control of the bulk of the Ukraine, one of thecradles of its existence, having a history of inclusion,or identity, going back to the 9th century CE.Historically associated with Russia and the Ukraineis Crimea, providing Russia access to the Mediter-ranean Sea. Putin has physically seized this asset. Hemay hold it. But at substantial cost.The Ukraine is, from the viewpoints of Western Eu-rope and the United States, a potentially useful ad-dition. But it has apparently not been considered acore element in their systems. They have clearlytried to preserve its freedom of action, but not es-calated into a major physical confrontation withRussia.Why, then, does it appear that the bulk of theUkraine is moving closer to Europe, notwithstand-ing obvious displeasure from Russia?A very simple explanation is that the peoples ofmuch of the Ukraine have been able to compare theeconomic and political systems of Europe and Rus-sia, and prefer those of Europe. The institutions ofEurope seem to offer more persuasive promise ofprosperity, civic liberties, and responsible, regular,dependable, and lawful governance.Why, then, does Russia not make itself more attrac-tive to the Ukrainians, in terms of potentials forprosperity, civic liberties, and responsible, regular,and lawful governance?Two reasons suggest themselves.One view would be that Russia lacks the scale,depth, agility, and over all competitiveness of theEuro-American economic complex.

Over the long term, there would appear to be littlePutin can do about that. Even if he were to institutegovernance and economic reforms to try better tocompete, Ukraine would find more attractive Euro-pean connections in a great many areas.

The second reason to be considered is that, in Rus-sia, what appears to be an highly centralized eco-nomic system, dependent on autocratic leadershipwhich economically and politically rewards follow-ers and disadvantages those it finds inconvenient,is not and probably cannot be as diverse, nimble,productive, and rewarding in economic partnershipwith Ukrainian entities. Nor would it appear to beas politically appealing as Western models.

To overcome this handicap, Putin would appear tohave to sacrifice the core of his methods of gover-nance. One may presume he will be loath to do that.And he might not survive having done it.Thus, Putin has been reduced to external bluff andbluster, and to justifying economic hardship to hiscitizenry. This is not a strong position.

In Syria, the major geostrategic asset is, again, a porton the Mediterranean Sea. Syria has been a sourceof sales of military and other products. But thechaos there has made it look like more of an eco-nomic sink than an economic asset. And the en-croachment of radical political Islam in that area isa development potentially threatening, to some todegree, to Russia.

tHE CAsPIAN PROJECt 20 37 /38

In response, Putin’s Russia has again rattled itsswords. But it has been, thus far, forced into an awk-ward partnership with the United States, Europe,and other entities. And the way Russia has deployedits military assets seems repugnant to many whoare actors for these partners.At this point, whether Russia can preserve its localpartner-dictator of choice, Assad, is highly uncer-tain.

All the above is not to say that Russia will lose all itsmarbles either in the Ukraine or Syria. Russia hasavailable to it a lot of geography, major hydrocar-bon assets, geographic proximity to these areas ofengagement, military assets, and a talented andtechnically somewhat sophisticated population.One may confidently expect that there will continueto be economic exchanges with Russia, over time,in both these areas of engagement.

But to depict Putin as boldly outdueling the Westwould not seem accurate. He is bold. But he is upagainst formidable odds, with a bundle of assets no-ticeably less weighty, over all, than those of his com-petitors. And he is obviously having great difficultyin controlling the terms of engagement.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

“The society that

separates its scholars from

its warriors will have its

thinking done by cowards

and its fighting by fools”

Thucydides


IRAN, SYRIA AND SAuDI ARAbIA

MODERN DIPLOMACY

irst and foremost, it is worth analyzingwhat the lifting of sanctions on Iran re-ally means for Iran and the West. The an-nouncement made on January 16 last by

the Iranian Shi’ite government and the P5 + 1 re-garding the lifting of sanctions means that the IAEAhas acknowledged that Iran has complied with allthe terms and conditions of the JCPOA Treaty onthe elimination of nuclear weapons and the controlof the nuclear power for civilian uses by the Shi’iteregime (yet there would be much to add in this re-gard).It is a decision resulting more from the Western eco-nomic crisis than the real Iranian willingness to stopits military-civilian nuclear activities. Neverthelessthe Western geoeconomic collapse is now so fastthat every global strategic choice must be sadlysubjected to the needs of the economic and politi-cal survival of our social systems.The EU, US and UN sanctions have now been basi-cally lifted, especially with regard to the financial,transport, logistics and energy sectors, while the USembargo on Iran is still in place.


FIn this connection, data and statistics are more im-portant than usual: so far the Iranian companies re-moved from the sanctions list are 278 in thetransport sector; 114 in the energy sector; 16 in thefields of engineering, construction and manufactur-ing; 20 in the trading sector; 53 in the activities re-lated to the nuclear cycle and finally 111 in thefinancial and insurance sectors. Moreover, further600 individuals and small to medium size compa-nies have been removed from the list of sanctionson Iran. About half of these 600 natural and legalpersons operate in the transport sector, a funda-mental sector for a nation like Iran whose economyis linked to oil.

In particular the Islamic Republic of Iran ShippingLines, the National Iranian Tanker Company andtheir offices and affiliated companies.In percentage terms, the lifting of sanctions hasplaced back on the scene 20% of Iranian energycompanies, as well as 20% of its banks and insur-ance companies and only 9% of its companiesworking in the nuclear sector.

GIANCARLO ELIA VALORI

Advisory Board, Co-chair Honoris Causa

Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman.He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders.

Mr Valori has lectured on international affairs and economicsat the world’s leading universities such as Peking University,

the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York.

The remaining companies operate in the trading,engineering, construction, manufacturing and theimport-export sectors.Many of these companies, however, result to be stillactive in Iranian missile or anyway military activities.Several banks to which now sanctions are no longerapplied still have ties with the covert networks ofnuclear procurement, while other companies havebeen used as a cover for secret nuclear activities notdeclared to the IAEA.

It is worth recalling that, in accordance with theJCPOA agreement, Iran can still prevent the ViennaAgency’s visits and inspections to the sites having"military relevance" and, in any case, even the AIEAexperts must be subjected to the Iranian govern-ment’s acceptance.

For the EU, however, the following transactionswere excluded from the previous sanctions; thetransfers of funds and the financial and banking ex-changes and transfers between European and Iran-ian entities; the banking activities, with thepossibility for the Iranian credit institutions to openbranches in the EU region; insurance and reinsur-ance activities for the Iranian companies operatingin Europe; the imports of oil, gas and petrochemicalproducts from Iran; the EU investment in the Iranianmining sector; all the shipping and shipbuilding ac-tivities; the exports of gold, gems and coins, inwhich Iran is rich at least since the time of the Thou-sand and One Nights.The United States have liftedtheir sanctions on Iran and on the non-US compa-nies working with Iran, especially in the hydrocar-bon sector, although a clear US government’s banremains for US assets and individuals to still operatewith the Iranian government.

However the sanctions list by sector is largely simi-lar to the list we have already seen for the EuropeanUnion. Nevertheless the United Nations have re-tained the embargo on 36 natural and legal per-sons, while the sanctions regime remains in placefor conventional weapons (lasting five years) and forthe technologies regarding ballistic missiles (lastingeight years). Obviously also the restrictions on thenuclear-related technologies are maintained. It isworth noting that, despite the P5 + 1 agreement,there are hundreds of Iranian natural and legal per-sons that have not been removed from the sanc-tions list.

They include 86 natural or legal persons for theUnited Nations, including the Bank Sepah; over 150natural and legal persons for the European Union,including banks and oil trading companies, as wellas over 160 for the United States. Obviously manyof these entities can be found in all the various lists.So far we have provided the essential data to un-derstand the issue. But what will be the geostrate-gic impact of the new interaction between Iran andthe Western powers of the P5 + 1 agreement? As weall know, we are now faced with a situation of plum-meting oil prices.Certainly Iran plans to flood andinvade the global markets with huge amounts of oiland gas but, in this case, the clash between thecountry of reference of the "Party of Ali" and thecountry of reference of Wahhabi and Sunni purism,namely Saudi Arabia, could be turned from periph-eral tensions - managed by proxies, such as theYemeni Houthi for Iran or the “moderate” jihadistsin Syria - into a direct war between the two entitiesof Islam.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

Some experts estimate that the excess of oil pro-duction in the world amounts to 9-12 million barrelsper day and, as is well-known, this has been lastingfor 16 months approximately.

The United States have endeavoured to reduceprices with a view to destabilizing the economy andhence the Russian power projection betweenUkraine and Syria. Saudi Arabia wants the fall ofcrude oil price to prevent the rise of the US shale oilwhich, in fact, needs a minimum price of 50 US dol-lars per barrel to break even the extraction costs.The European Union is floundering in an economiccrisis and can afford only a smaller amount of oil. Itis a perfect geopolitical storm: the greater the fall inprices, or their irrelevance compared to costs (whichis the real problem), the greater the internal com-petition among producers.

The oil demand has been falling since mid-2014 andEurope is cutting demand substantially, while theUnited States extract ever more shale oil and Chinareduces its oil imports. If OPEC had read only themanuals of liberal neoclassical economics, it wouldhave reduced extraction so as to keep prices high.Conversely, Saudi Arabia has decided to increase ex-traction not to keep prices high (Saudi Arabiareaches the breakeven point with a price of 100 USdollars per barrel), but only to retain its marketshare. Hence the ground for the war between Iranand Saudi Arabia will be the destruction or the driv-ing away from the market – with terrorist and ji-hadist actions - of their respective allies having anoil-dependent economy.The other variable is the rapid recovery of the Chi-nese economy, which could make prices increasebeyond such a limit as to avoid a direct or indirectwar between Shi’ites and Sunnis.


Currently China’s imports have increased by approx-imately 8% as against last year, but China is a majorcustomer for Iran, for obvious technical and geopo-litical reasons, while Saudi Arabia still is the secondlargest oil exporter to China. The first is the RussianFederation.Moreover President Xi Jinping has further improvedthe Sino-Saudi relations, thanks to the visit he haspaid this month to the Middle East.Obviously China does not want the destabilizationof the Greater Middle East and it is distributing itscards among all players so as to be the final brokerof the new regional balance.

Indeed, this is the reason why Russia is actively me-diating between Iran and Saudi Arabia so as toavoid both the confrontation and the expansion ofthe proxy wars which, in the Russian perspective,only benefit "NATO and the West."If the OPEC Islamic region set fire, what would hap-pen to the Russian oil transport lines from CentralAsia?

Furthermore, in view of the lifting of internationalsanctions, Iran has repeatedly stated that its oil willbe managed on the market in such a way as to pre-vent further falls in oil prices.Hence, as Iran has already maintained, it will pro-duce "as much as the market can absorb". But cer-tainly it cannot help affecting the Saudi marketarea.Nevertheless, there is a variable: the demographicand religious distribution of the Saudi population.The Shi’ites living in Saudi Arabia are approximatelyeight million and are concentrated in the Easternareas, where the headquarters of Saudi Aramco arelocated (in Dahran), as well as the largest oil field inthe world, namely Ghawar, and the largest globalterminal, namely Ras Tanura, in addition to the re-finery of Abuqaiq, which is the largest one of thewhole OPEC system.The Shi’ites are the overwhelming majority of work-ers processing crude oil in the region and will be -or probably already are - "managed" by the Iranianbrothers.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

It is not hard to imagine what would happen if aShi’ite uprising in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern provincedestabilized the production of the first OPEC coun-try and added the largest oil production in theworld to the Shi’ite economic and decision-makingsystem.However, keeping prices low allows to dispose ofstocks more quickly.Hence if Saudi Arabia keeps prices low to expand itsmarket share, which is of primary importance com-pared to profitability, it is likely it wants direct con-frontation with Iran.According to the analysts of many Western mer-chant banks, the scenario of a real war between Iranand Saudi Arabia could lead to an immediate pricepeak of 300 US dollars per barrel, before stabilizingat 100 US dollars, which is the profitability limit ofSaudi Arabia’s production.It is worth recalling that Iran has a profitability levelhigher than Saudi Arabia’s. And this is a significantfactor to assess the duration – and hence the win-ner – of the confrontation.

In a conference held last year with the major oil ex-traction companies worldwide, Iran decided tochange the crude oil commercial rules, by allowingthe booking of reserves though maintaining theownership of soil.

Iran will attract at least 30 billion US dollars of in-vestment in its oil, with 25-year contracts for the for-eign companies extracting in the new oil fields andsome offsetting mechanisms for price fluctuations.Despite sanctions, Iran is the second largest econ-omy in the Middle East and the seventh in Asia as awhole. We can imagine what might happen afterthe lifting of sanctions.

It is a struggle for hegemony over oil, throughwhich the world and Western economies are con-trolled and governed and – subject to the carefulRussian mediation and China’s balanced policy be-tween the parties - nothing prevents the worst fromhappening.


ChALLENgEs ANDOPPORtuNItIEs fOR RussIA

AftER thE NORth KOREANhYDROgEN BOMB tEst

MODERN DIPLOMACY

TONY RINNA

Tony Rinna is a specialist inRussian foreign policy

and security affairs in East Asia.He currently resides in South

Korea

ven in situations where diplomatic ne-gotiations over the North Korean nu-clear weapons program are handled ina largely bilateral level, there is still often

an element of multilateralism, as exemplified by thelate Ambassador Bosworth's briefing to Russian for-eign minister Sergei Lavrov regarding DPRK-US bi-lateral talks in 2009. Now, once again, Russia hasreceived a challenge and an opportunity not onlyfor its diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula, but forits broader relations with other states in NortheastAsia and, in particular, the United States.

The North Korean nuclear program is a case-in-point of where defense and diplomacy meet, forboth are highly important factors in the Korean nu-clear crisis. Given the highly multilateral nature ofinternational handling of Pyongyang's WMD pro-gram, the Russian Federation, which has been asomewhat lesser yet significant actor in diplomaticnegotiations with the DPRK, may have a chance toplay a greater role in this most recent development,and thus mitigate some of its own diplomatic isola-tion.

To be sure, there is some speculation and uncer-tainty as to whether North Korea has a truly func-tioning hydrogen bomb, or if it is a close butyet-incomplete hydrogen explosive device. Never-theless, there can be little doubt of a new shift inthe security landscape of both the Korean Peninsulaand the broader Northeast Asia region.

Regardless of whether this test means that NorthKorea currently does possess a functioning hydro-gen bomb or is close but not in full possession yet,the Korean security game has been ratcheted up toa new level. Seeing as a hydrogen bomb has evenmore destructive power than a nuclear weapon, thestakeholders in the Korean nuclear crisis must nowcontend with an ever higher-stakes situation thatwill require even more diplomatic finesse.

Among the members of the former Six Party Talks,the Russian Federation was in a rather unique posi-tion. After the collapse of the USSR, its relationshipwith North Korea took a dramatic downturn, espe-cially as post-Soviet Moscow established diplomaticrelations with Seoul. Russia's official policy towardNorth and South Korea was often described as"equidistance" toward the two Korean states. China,for its part, stepped into the void and became moreclosely aligned with North Korea.

After ties between China and the DPRK began toworsen once again, Russia has moved in as a part-ner for North Korea once again. This partnership hasbeen limited largely to economic considerations.The DPRK and Russia have, however, initiated somelimited cooperation on security issues, such as thesigning of an agreement on preventing dangerousmilitary activities in Northeast Asia. Yet even withthese developments, there are certain limits to thisrevived partnership between Pyongyang andMoscow.

E

thE CAsPIAN PROJECt 20 47 /48

A common perception of the budding DPRK-Russiapartnership is that both countries see an opportu-nity to essentially team up against the West. A cru-cial point to remember, however, is that whileRussia may be willing to cooperate with NorthKorea on some economic and even security issues,North Korea's nuclear program remains a source ofanguish for Moscow just as it does for other coun-tries in the region.Shortly after the test, Konstantin Kosachev, thehead of the foreign affairs committee of the upperhouse of Russia's parliament, declared on his Face-book page that such activities directly affect Rus-sia's national security interests.Not only has North Korea's nuclear test drawn con-cern from Moscow, but Russian citizens in PrimorskyKrai (the Russian federal division that shares a smallborder with North Korea) have also expressed con-cern about the potential for nuclear fallout to reachinhabited areas.

The Primorsky Weather Center, however, has de-clared that citizens did not need to worry, as the testwas underground, and that radiation will not be car-ried by the wind into any residential parts of the re-gion.

In response to the test, South Korean president ParkGeun-hye has called for the UN Security Council toissue new sanctions against North Korea. TheJapanese government has also condemned thetest, and has stated that it will be in close contactwith other regional governments, including that ofthe Russian Federation, regarding the incident.

One of the most crucial factors in Russia's stance to-ward the North Korean nuclear crisis is that it hasbeen a major proponent of multilateral talks andnot just bilateral discussions between Pyongyangand Washington.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

thE CAsPIAN PROJECt 20 49 /50

To be sure, while the Six Party Talks have officiallybeen defunct since North Korea walked out after itssecond nuclear test in 2009, informal negotiationsand interactions between regional stakeholdershave continued in earnest. This does not mean,however, that they have in any way been equal. Justas Russia fought hard to earn a place at the Six PartyTalks against American wishes, Russia has onceagain found its interests affronted in the unofficialinterstate interactions over the DPRK's nuclear ca-pabilities. Russia regarded the Sino-American coop-eration on UN Resolution 1718 as an unpleasantsurprise.The news surrounding the North Korean test maypresent an opportunity for Russia to mitigate itsdiplomatic isolation. The last North Korean nucleartest occurred in 2013, before Russia's annexation ofCrimea and the attendant international condemna-tion. As a permanent member of the UN SecurityCouncil, Russia has a chance to present itself as a co-operative and constructive actor on the interna-tional stage.

As Russia shares concerns with the US, there may bea chance for Russia to mend some of its broken tieswith the US.Yet while Russia has been condemnatory of theDPRK's nuclear adventurism in the past, it has alsobeen less outspoken than the United States in thisregard. Depending on the extent to which Russiaconsiders its revived partnership with North Koreato be important, Moscow's diplomatic calculationsmay lead it to either take a harder stance toward Py-ongyang, or continue in its role of condemningNorth Korea's tests but not in the same way as theUS. Regardless of which direction Russian diplo-macy takes, the North Korean nuclear test will likelyprovide Russia yet another major opportunity to ex-ercise some level of influence in inter-Korean andNortheast Asian affairs. In the end, the Kremlin willdo what it feels is best for Russia's own national in-terests. Yet it may also be a chance for Russia tomend broken bridges, or at least portray itself onceagain as a responsible member of the global states'system.

INtERvIEw wIth LYubOv DEMIDOvA

MODERN DIPLOMACY

ecognizing the huge untapped poten-tial in their economic cooperation,Russia and Africa have taken steady ef-forts in raising the level of trade and

business promotion over the past few years. Russiais now aiming to increase trade with Africa than be-fore.Our Moscow correspondent, Kester KennKlomegah, interviews Lyubov Demidova, deputychairperson of the Regional Chamber of Commerceand Industry in Moscow Region, who hinted the re-viewing of the Russia-Africa business, pointed outthe achievements and challenges for 2015 and thehighlight the vision for 2016.

How would you describe the current economic co-operation and business partnerships betweenRussia and African countries?

At the regional level of the Chamber of Commerceand Industry of the Moscow region, the coopera-tion can be assessed as insufficiently active com-pared to those capabilities possessed by Russia andthe countries of the African continent. Our countryhas great economic potential, which just needs tobe used.

thE CASPIAN PROJECt 20 51 /52

RI hope that the Regional Council for the Develop-ment of Relations with African countries (abbrevi-ated RCDRA) will serve as a good mechanism for thedevelopment of fruitful cooperation in variousfields.

Do you think the crisis can boost interest of poten-tial Russian industries and companies to swift tothe African region? Is that really the case for thesetwo years?

Russia has a large scientific and technical potential,and the Moscow regional region also is historicallydeveloped as an industrial and scientific center andhas good opportunities to develop their export po-tential. I would not want to associate the crisis in theWest and in Europe with the development of rela-tions between Russia and African States.

In our opinion, cooperation between our countryshould not depend on third parties, and should de-velop independently for the benefit of peoples ofour States. The primary task of RCDRA is to make thecooperation as comfortable, convenient and safefor both parties.

KESTER KENN KLOMEGAH

Kester Kenn Klomegah is an independent researcherand writer on African affairs in the EurAsian region

and former Soviet republics.

To put a time frame is absolutely impractical. It alldepends not only on Russia but also on AfricanStates, and for its part, the Council will make everyeffort to establish large-scale, long-term and mutu-ally beneficial cooperation and hopefully we willmeet the some positive results on the part ofAfrican States. In some areas we will be able to co-operate fast enough, and some other areas will re-quire years of hard work to get effective andpositive results.

In your expert view, what are the key challengesand problems facing Russian companies and in-vestors that wanted business operation in Africa?

The main obstacle is insufficient knowledge of theeconomic potential, on the part of Russian entre-preneurs, the needs and business opportunities ofthe African region. This is exactly what RCDRA plansto help members of the business community of allcountries to address issues for effective and mutualeconomic cooperation.

On the other hand, why the presence of Africancompanies on the Russian market is still extremelylow? Why trading in Russia is not attractive toAfrican exporters?

I think African companies in Russia face the sameproblems similar to that of the Russian companiesface in Africa. On the question of activities, Africancompanies on the Russian territory, in our opinion,is also associated with inadequate knowledgeabout business practices (rules and regulations) inRussia, local demand, opportunities for the devel-opment of commercial activity on both sides. Wehope that our future advice will help to better buildbusiness confidence for the African entrepreneursand potential exporters to the Russian market.

Under the circumstances, what should be done toimprove the present situation? What are your sug-gestions as an expert on Africa at the RussianChamber of Commerce and Industry?

The most promising option for solving the problemof intensification of bilateral contacts is the practicalwork to establish links between individual compa-nies, business associations from both sides, whichwill gradually accumulate positive experience ofworking together, to understand the capabilitiesand needs of each other leading to the develop-ment of the economy both with Russian and withthe African side.

Given the relevance for this stage of cooperationbetween African countries and Russia, obtainingpractical experience, it was decided to createRCDRA at Chamber of Commerce and Industry(Moscow Region) and the beginning of practicalwork at the level of the Chamber of Commerce andIndustry (Moscow Region), like business associa-tions, on the basis of which the main social organi-zation in the Moscow region, Business Russia,OPORA Russia.

In addition, the Chamber of Commerce and Indus-try in the Moscow Region covers almost all the mu-nicipalities of the Moscow Region, and in theaggregate, the largest Chamber in the system ofChambers of Commerce and Industry of Russia. Welook forward to working closely with the diplomaticcommunity of African States accredited in Russia.This collaboration will definitely accelerate and bol-ster the process of rapprochement between busi-nessmen of Russia and Africa.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

“The strong do what they have to doand the weak acceptwhat they haveto accept”

Thucydides


The Greater Caspian Project 20

Documents

Transcript of The Greater Caspian Project 20