The Greater Caspian Project 18

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The Global Games Issue

Transcript of The Greater Caspian Project 18

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contents

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06. editorial

07. kazakHstan is intended to becoMe a world Hub for develoPMent of green PowerINTERvIEw wITH AkHMETzHAN YESSIMOvDIMITRIS GIANNAkOpOulOS

13. false ProMiseHOw THE TuRkISH-RuSSIAN DIlEMMA uNMASkS NATOEvAN THOMSEN

18. tHe need for aMerican-russian PartnersHiPTHE wOlvES Of ISlAMIC zEAlOTSANDY DEAHN

22. not reallY attaturk vs. lenin10 QuESTIONS fOR THE fuTuRE Of RuSSIA-TuRkEY RElATIONSDR. MATTHEw CROSSTON

25. euroPe’s new geoPolitics followingtHe russian Presence in sYria and iraqGIANCARlO ElIA vAlORI

29. using iranian geoPolitical aMbitionsANATOlII BARONIN, ANDRII kOlpAkOv

32. trYing to reacH nuclear global zeroSARAH NOlDER

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36. StRAtEgIC ALIgNMENtS At SCO

NASURULLAH BROHI

43. BACkLASH DEtERRENCE

EffECTS Of RUSSIAN SANCTIONS ON PERIPHERAL EUROPEANDY DEAHN

46. BROtHERS IN UNEtHICAL ARMS

AMY HANLON

49. tHE CONSERvAtIvE HOLD ON POwER

IN POSt-JCPOA IRAN

STEPHEN SARTY

52. RUSSIA IS INCREASINg ItS INfLUENCE

ON CA StAtES

ANATOLII BARONIN, ANDRII KOLPAKOV

56. AttEMPtINg A BRIDgE tO AfRICA

KESTER KENN KLOMEGAH

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Jonathan hartnerBrian huGhesanDrii kolpakoVVlaDislaV lermontoVpaula malottmeGan munozelena m.norBerto morales rosataylor morseJohn CoDy mosBeysarah nolDerJoshua pattersonDayna riCeJessiCa reeDGreGory rouDyBushstephen sartyDmitrii seltserrakesh krishnan simhaeVan thomsenDianne a. ValDezChristopher white

tHE gREAtER CASPIAN PROJECtBI-wEEkLY DIgItAL EDItION

www.moderndiplomacy.eu [email protected]

Dimitris GiannakopoulosModern Diplomacy, Editor-in-chiefDr. matthew CrosstonThe Caspian Project, Director

authors

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“The society that

separates its scholars from

its warriors will have its

thinking done by cowards

and its fighting by fools”

Thucydides

www.moderndiplomacy.eu

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his issue marks a special excitementfor all of us affiliated with ModernDiplomacy. It signals the officiallaunch of a new brand as The

Caspian Project transforms into The GreaterCaspian Project. This is more than just the addi-tion of a single word, but rather an expansionof our geopolitical focus: it became clear overthe course of 17 previous editions that an ex-amination of the affairs of the Caspian littoralswas routinely cutting across several other coun-tries that will no doubt have a major say and in-fluence on the region in the coming future.Trying to deftly sidestep those countries whilestill attempting to give our readers a full analyt-ical accounting of the Caspian Five ultimatelyproved inefficient and intellectually unfulfilling.The end result is what you see here in its firstform in No. 18, The Global Games Issue.

From this day forward the GreaterCaspian Project will seek outstandingsubmissions from authors the worldover interested in the affairs and inter-ests of not just the Caspian Five lit-torals, but now the countries of Turkey,Armenia, Georgia, Uzbekistan, Tajik-istan, and Kyrgyzstan are also in-cluded. Strategic realities dictated tous here at Modern Diplomacy that notincluding this ‘Expanded Six’ was actu-ally beginning to limit and be a dis-service to how we approach and coverthe Caspian Five. We believe thisgreater coverage will only result in animproved project, deeper analysis, andgreater global issue relevance. It is anexciting future indeed.

This first issue in the new age alreadyreaps the benefits of our executive de-cision. Within its pages readers nowget the opportunity to consider issuesof influence and strategic gamesman-ship that spread out to the ShanghaiCooperation Organization and go asfar afield as India, Pakistan, and Africa.In each case we show how all of theseregions are impacted by and interact-ing with our original focus – theCaspian region. So we welcome all ofour dedicated readers to this new en-deavor and especially embrace all ofthe new readers who will flock to theexpanded geographical coverage. Wehope all of you, new and old, will benothing but informed and inspired.

ThE GLObAL GAMEs IssuE

Prof. Dr. Matthew Crosston

Senior Editor, Director, The Caspian Project

T

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MODERN DIPLOMACY

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kAzAkHSTAN IS INTENDEDTO bECOME

A wORLD HubfOR DEvELOPMENTOf gREEN POwER

INTERvIEw wITH AkHMETzHAN YESSIMOv

Dimitris Giannakopoulos

Modern Diplomacy Editor-in-chief

Journalist, specialized in Middle East, Russia & FSU,Terrorism and Security issues.

THE CASPIAN PROJECT 18 07 /08

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ast August, Mr. Akhmetzhan Yessimov, aman with a great economic and diplo-matic experience and former Akim(Mayor) of Almaty, appointed Chairman

of Astana EXPO-2017 by the President of Kaza-khstan. For the energy rich Central Asian country,EXPO-2017 is more than just an exhibition. It is anevent that will put Kazakhstan in the internationalspotlight throughout the whole of 2017. Mr. Yessi-mov explained in an exclusive interview with Mod-ern Diplomacy, his personal vision on Expo 2017 andthe ways Astana Expo will improve the public imageof Kazakhstan.

What is your personal vision on Expo 2017 andhow will this important event affect the infra-structural development in astana?

Kazakhstan is the first country of Central Asia ac-cepting the exhibition with a century of history.Holding of EXPO in Astana will give an impulse fordevelopment of upper levels of economy - scienceand knowledge-intensive industries. For Kaza-khstan holding of EXPO is primarily economic andinfrastructure project.All progressive ideas and innovations in the field ofnew energy from the planet will be concentrated atthe same venue in Astana. We expect a great num-ber of participants as the theme "Energy of the Fu-ture" combines two the most pressing challengesfor mankind, ecology and traditional power reliefactions in global economy.

Presently 51 countries including France, Germany,the Great Britain, China, Japan, and India confirmedtheir participation in the exhibition. We expectmore than a hundred. The most densely populatedregions of Southeast Asia with great number of"tourist mobile" residents showed interest to EXPO-2017. Eleven international organizations, includingthe World Bank, UNDP, UNESCO, IAEA and othersconfirmed their participation.

Great interest to EXPO in Astana is shown by the in-novative companies of the USA Silicon Valley asGoogle Earth, Stanford Global Thermostat, ObscuraDigital, and Planet Labs. Holding of EXPO will be in-cluded into a triad of events, historically importantfor Kazakhstan, along with the 25th anniversary ofIndependence of the Republic of Kazakhstan andthe 20th anniversary of the capital of Astana. Dueto existing hydrocarbon dependence in the world,shift to alternative energy sources is inevitable. De-veloped and developing countries equally need"green" technologies. We are for universal develop-ment of alternative energy sources. EXPO will ac-quaint the world with more flexible, economic andeffective power sources, against the background ofnegative processes currently proceeding in powerfield.

At the 70th session of the United Nations GeneralAssembly Nursultan Nazarbayev, the President ofthe Republic of Kazakhstan suggested to make thecountry a world hub for distribution of green tech-nologies after closure of the World Fair EXPO-2017.EXPO on the theme "Energy of the Future" in Astanawill entirely support the initiative of the UN "Sus-tainable Energy for All". Healthy global ecologicalenvironment is essential for mankind. EXPO-2017 inAstana will bring up a concern of climate changeand reduction of environmental emissions.

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The exhibition will move up the sphere of renderingservices to the international quality standards. Weprepare complex infrastructure optimization for theexhibition - land and air transport systems as wellas all city services will be ready to accept a largestream of guests. Our objective is not only to payback invested funds, but also to create perspectiveinfrastructure which will be useful for the city andthe country after the exhibition. One cannot writeoff image-based benefits for further promotion ofKazakhstan initiatives in the world.

in what ways will astana Expo improve the pub-lic image of kazakhstan? How do you plan topromote Expo2017 and attract participants andvisitors around the world?

Kazakhstan, the ninth country in the world with va-riety of natural landscapes has enormous tourist po-tential. When 2011 Asian Winter Games took placein Almaty I was Akim of the City, and I am familiarwith details of administrative work at outstandingevents. After Aziada a stream of foreign tourists in-creased several-fold, for example, to Shymbulak, aski resort

THE CASPIAN PROJECT 18 09 /10

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How important is the sustainable energy policyand its promotion for the astana Expo 2017 andfor the international recognition of kazakhstanitself?

Kazakhstan possesses serious raw materials and en-ergy resources.At the end of the last century the Re-public joined the world leaders in oil export.Despite advantages, in long-term prospects it is notthe most favourable scenario for development ofeconomy. Dependence on hydrocarbons will resultin gradual stagnation of economy.Substantial ad-herence to prices for oil and gas, negative conse-quences from fluctuations in the raw market havealready collapsed economies of a series of coun-tries.The perspective to shift to alternative energysources is particularly acute around the world.

In the last decades problems in power field becamesources for global crises.New energy is interestingfor the countries which are concerned in diversifi-cation of economy. Nowadays focus is shifted fromobtaining oil and gas dividends to new, more flexi-ble sources of power and income. Ecological aspectis also important. Presently our objective is to rec-oncile industrial development with requirements ofnature conservation.We need to expand utilizationof low-carbon technologies with maximum possi-ble methods of recycling.

Kazakhstan is intended to become a world hub fordevelopment of green power. New energy has tobecome a tool to start up economy of the future.EXPO-2017 will give a new direction for develop-ment of power field in Kazakhstan and all over theworld. Kazakhstan is ready to actively join in thisprocess.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

I can tell with confidence that we have a developedtourism cluster in large cities belt. In 2016 we willenter an active phase of attraction of member coun-tries to the exhibition.The exhibition will accept 2.5 million people andover 5 million visits.The effect from visiting EXPO-2017 will replicate on expansion of tourist opportu-nities of the regions of Kazakhstan.

We have already signed contracts with the largestworld international tour operators, including IndianSkyway International Travels, STIC Travel Group, andChinese CITS, and we are also intended to work withGerman TUI Group and others.Guests will be ablenot only to visit the exhibition, but also to see alltourist variety of Kazakhstan.We will provide tourpackages as "EXPO + Burabay", "EXPO + Baykonyr","EXPO + Alakol", "EXPO + Charyn", "EXPO + Karkar-alinsk" and others. We have presented the program"Recommended by EXPO-2017" which would pro-vide the tourists only with the best goods and serv-ices during their stay in Kazakhstan.Kazakhstan EXPO-2015 pavilion in Milan wasamong the top three of the most visited ones andwas ready to accept the millionth visitor. Pavilion ofKazakhstan in Milan was quintessence of nationaltraditions and modern achievements of the coun-try.

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THE CASPIAN PROJECT 18 11 /12

How will you use the buildings and infrastruc-ture after the event has finished?

Post-exhibition integration of EXPO-2017 facilitiesinto city architecture and economy is a difficult butresolvable issue. In this matter we considered orga-nizational errors of some fulfilled exhibitions. Kaza-khstan EXPO structures are constructed with dueaccount for all post-exhibition risks and are alreadydesigned for future owners. Today I can state thatInternational Financial Center (IFC) will be locatedat particular part of exhibition territory.

The curator of IFC construction is the National Bankof Kazakhstan and Akimat (Administration) of theCity of Astana. At the moment the task team is cre-ated to work over issues connected with construc-tion of IFC. The International Financial Center will beworking according to the principles of English law.Attractive tax conditions, privileges and preferenceswill be provided for the members of IFC.I can assure that the territory of the exhibition willbe almost completely integrated into the city infra-structure. Astana is a new center, which constantlyrequire various social facilities and in this contextexhibition structures will be foremost applied.

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There is no shortage of security threatsto the NATO alliance: a resurgent andmilitarily active Russia; the territorialand global jihadist threat of DAESH; and

the movements of over 4 million refugees. Now,more than ever, would seem a time where solidarityof purpose and the coordination of logistical andsecurity efforts would serve as a useful mechanismfor minimum basic security. While NATO couldhardly be described as a model of solidarity or effi-ciency, the outlook of NATO has not only dramati-cally changed after the November 24th downing ofa Russian Su-24 warplane, its very purpose for ex-isting may be now called into question.While the data is insufficient at this point, the nar-rative is developing predictably. Turkish PresidentErdogan said that the Russian warplane violatedTurkish airspace and that it failed to respect 10warnings from the Turkish military.

FALsE PROMIsE

EVAN THOMSEN

Evan Thomsen is a graduate of the InternationalSecurity and Intelligence Studies Programat Bellevue University in Omaha, NE and is

currently a Master’s student at the world-renownElliott School of International Affairs at The George

Washington University in Washington, DC. He hasjust joined with the Eastern Congo Initiative as

Strategic Partnerships Officer.

T

HOw tHE tuRkIsH-RussIANDILEMMA uNMAsks NAtO

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Ultimately, “Turkey is a country whose warningsshould be taken seriously and listened to. Don't testTurkey's patience. Try to win its friendship.” Erdogandoubled down by highlighting the estimated 2 mil-lion Syrian refugees in Turkey - a burden that far outpaces any commitment by other NATO memberstates. These are nothing short of targeted threatsand are intended to resonate more within the NATOalliance than act as a hedge against Russia’s militaryactivity on or within Turkish borders.

Russia’s reaction has been equally predictable. Pres-ident Putin has quickly adopted a more harsh tone,not only highlighting the consequences of this ac-tion on Russian-Turkish relations but directly callingthis “a stab in the back by the terrorists' accom-plices.” Thus, the board is set, the die cast, and thepieces moving. The next steps are now what cru-cially matter.

In this sense, it is easy to see why some are ques-tioning how is this not the start of WWIII? We arewitnessing a nearly global response to a series ofmeta-conflicts that have seen tens of thousands oflives lost and millions displaced. Meanwhile, globaland regional powers are now openly brandishingmilitary, economic, and political tools, bound inseemingly contradictory relationships as everyonehas a web of shared/conflicting interests. Forces aregradually being amassed reminiscent of a situationpreparatory to war and now the traditional securitydilemma could be starting to unfold. The only in-gredient missing is a modern day Ferdinand-Principmoment.It would be overly pessimistic to say thatthis is a foregone conclusion. Similarly, it would befoolishly naive to say that the current state of affairsin the Syrian-DAESH conflict is not a potential tin-derbox that could unravel the world’s strongest mil-itary alliance.

tHE CAsPIAN PROJECt 18 13 /14

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The history of NATO was rather simple in this regard:it was designed to be a bulwark against the SovietUnion in a bi-polar world with inter-state securitythreats expected to be fought in conventional the-atres. 25 years on, a lot has changed in the globalpolitical and security landscape. And while NATOhas not adapted one cannot be overly critical: NATO,in effect, served its purpose. If its purpose now is tosupport and extend ad infinitum the status quo of‘Pax Americana,’ then its aims are aspirational andits structure is subordinated to interests based uponvalues (or dogma) rather than security.

It is at this point where we ought to be reminded ofanother set of European values - the specific andchanging interests of the state. To paraphrase thefamous quote from Henry Templeton: “I say that itis a narrow policy to suppose that this country orthat is to be marked out as the eternal ally or theperpetual enemy of [insert country]. We have noeternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies.Our interests are eternal and perpetual and thoseinterests it is our duty to follow.” NATO is not a singlesovereign state and it is no longer singularlycharged to defend the collective interests of Europeagainst the no longer existent Soviet Union. Secu-rity threats and interests change, as do individualstate strategies toward pursuing those interests anddefending against diverse threats. NATO, in its cur-rent structure, no longer adequately addresses thesecurity challenges to its member states nor servesas a convening body to unite a set of similar inter-ests among diverse parties. This alliance is in tattersand basically has been for 25 years. The Turkishstrike on the Russian aircraft was not the straw thatbroke the camel's back, therefore, but simply the re-moval of a blindfold long needed to be removed.

Unfortunately, the varied and inconsistent reactionsby NATO member states are doing little to preventthe pessimistic narrative from becoming reality. Thebrief moment of opportunity and unity of purposebetween the U.S., Russia, and France in light ofDAESH’s global strikes in Paris seem to have been assubstantively robust as internet selfies transposedwith the French flag on Facebook. The Turkish strike,which could technically be called a strike by NATOagainst Russia, has effectively sublimated anyglobal sentiment for transcending traditional rival-ries.While the message from NATO Secretary GeneralJens Stoltenberg was clear (“we stand in solidaritywith Turkey and support the territorial integrity ofour NATO ally”), the responses from leaders of otherNATO member states have been less clear. The re-sponses have been a mix of passively enumeratinginternational law, a call for calm and de-escalation,and confusion, given the many reports citing thatthe Russian aircraft was only in Turkish airspace for30 seconds. This last claim, which comes out of anearly report from the U.S., gives credence to Putin’scharge that this attack from Turkey was far from re-actionary but premeditated. How, ultimately, canthe NATO alliance move forward given the disparatereactions to the events of November 24, their com-peting goals in the two-front challenge of Syria-DAESH and Russia, and the increasingly emotionalpolitical discourse heavily-laden with nationalisticovertones?

It is important to put the NATO alliance into context.It is a military alliance intended to provide mutualsecurity and protection against external threats.This function was a strategic priority of the highestorder.

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MODERN DIPLOMACY

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THE NEED fOR AMERICAN-RuSSIAN

PARTNERSHIP

THE WOLvES Of ISLAMIC ZEALOTS

ANDY DEAHN

Andy Deahn is a 2015 graduate with a Bachelor of Sci-ence degree from Bellevue University’s International

Security and Intelligence Studies program. He is cur-rently employed as a Field Service Engineer at the

Sierra Nevada Corporation (SNC) providing aerial sur-veillance and intelligence analysis for the Department

of Defense throughout various worldwide locations.He had previously worked as Special Tactics-Tactical Air

Control Party member in the U.S. Air Force supportingArmy Special Forces ground teams as a Joint Terminal

Attack Controller.

ellfire awaits you. Europe is shaking.Russia is dying.” These words uttered inan Islamic State (DAESH) propagandavideo in November 2015 projected a

new vision of DAESH ideology.With this statement DAESH pledged that it wishedto overtake the Kremlin by any violent means nec-essary. No longer are wars fought by means of attri-tion and territorial gains. Rather, they are fought byinfluencing the minds of impressionable individualsthrough strong religious identities and extreme ide-ologies. And while the United States and manyother Western powers have been engaged in theWar on Terror for the last decade and a half, theCaspian Five have remained somewhat free of theseextremists’ grasp. But perhaps no more and this de-mands new strategic partnerships and cooperation.

H

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We know that out of the Caspian Five, Russia ishome to the smallest Muslim community overall.Russia’s citizenry is composed of about 75% RussianOrthodox Christian, 11% Muslim, and the remaining14% consisting of Protestant Christian, RomanCatholic, or having no religious affiliation. This de-mographic breakdown illustrates how Russia is lessalike culturally than the rest of its neighbors in theCaspian Region. For example, Iran, Azerbaijan, Turk-menistan, and Kazakhstan are all Muslim majoritynations. Iran, the nation most influenced by its reli-gious heritage, has been issued threats by DAESH.This is because Iran is the regional Shia power andDAESH regards followers of the Shia sect of Islam tobe heretics who should be eliminated. Kazakhstanhouses a slightly smaller percentage (63%) of citi-zens following the Islamic faith, with another 25%of the population being Russian Orthodox. Russiais therefore isolated, Islamically speaking, and lacksthis major common identity unifier with the otherCaspian littorals. While remaining the religious out-lier in the Caspian Sea region is not necessarily aRussian disadvantage, it does pose certain strategicobstacles. Fighting DAESH, an organization thatbases its actions off of its own perverted version ofIslamic discourse, poses unique challenges to Rus-sia’s preferred method of engagement.

For instance, on September 30, 2015, Russia beganits air campaign inside Syria. While the Assad regimewelcomed the blankets of bombs, a vast majority ofthe international community rejected them, believ-ing that the Kremlin was only looking to satisfy itsstrategic goals: namely, to preserve the Assadregime while confirming the Kremlin’s position inthe world as an indispensible power. Moreover, Rus-sia has engaged with Iran in its support for theAssad regime.

While I do have to applaud President Putin for tak-ing action against a vile extremist organization suchas DAESH, the move was not strategically calculatedor adequately coordinated amongst all the playerscurrently participating in military operationsagainst the group. In order to achieve victory, pre-vent political fallout, and reclaim some of its pride,Russia will need to cooperate with the other playersinvolved, most importantly the United States, dueto its leading investment in the fight. In addition,without this necessary coordination, Russia wouldremain an international scapegoat and receive toomuch criticism for a conflict that is not entirely of itsown devising.

Air strikes alone have become the preferred instru-ment with which a nation engages the fight. Whilewinning them political points on the internationalstage, it does not necessarily commit whole-heart-edly to permanently eliminating actual enemies. Itis almost as if this new trend has become the exclu-sive norm for declaring war in the 21st century.Moreover, following a strategy that only commitslocalized air strikes, rather than a combination of airand ground forces, is a half-hearted attempt at bestfor countering such capable zealot organizationslike DAESH. Take for example in January 2015 whenDAESH members burned Jordanian pilot Muath al-Kasasbeh alive. Jordan commenced a bombingcampaign that lasted only a few weeks. Again in No-vember 2015, as we all watched in horror the mur-ders across the streets of Paris, it was only in thewake of such heinous violence that French author-ities committed multiple air assets for a bombingcampaign against DAESH strongholds. These ma-neuvers are reactive rather than proactive in thefight against zealots and ultimately wane as timeprogresses.

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Relating back to Russia, it was only in October 2015when militants in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula bombeda Russian civilian airliner, killing all 224 passengers.Only then did the DAESH extremism in Syria hitclose to home. Russia is a prideful nation, one that Ithink will attempt to not only commit more forcesto the fight just to spite the United States and West-ern powers, but also so as to not project weaknessin the face of tragedy.

While swallowing some of its pride in order to co-ordinate better counter-terrorist efforts may behard for the Kremlin, a perceived defeat in the Mid-dle East would be far more detrimental to Russianpower and domestically generate undesirablesocio-political effects. The Kremlin has now receivedheinous aggressions as well as direct threats fromDAESH. It has more to lose from backing out of thefight now or straying from the most cooperativeand advantageous course.

This is not only due to the increased threat level andprevalence of attacks across the Middle East, butalso because this danger potentially threatensCaspian partners as the expansion of DAESH oper-ations increase in scope and frequency. Turk-menistan worries about increasingly new securitychallenges which may spill over into the RussianFederation. The same worry at least peripherally ap-plies to Azerbaijan as well.This begs a final important question: could a U.S.-Russian partnership provide the necessary leader-ship and direct military cooperation to inspire theworld to eliminate the growing threat of violent re-ligious extremism? Such a partnership could holdthis potential if only old traditions of rivalry and mis-trust can be broken. Going it alone does not guar-antee victory and may de facto ensure defeat. Thewolves of Islamic zealots can only be overcome bythe American bald eagle and Russian bear teamingtogether.

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NOT REALLY ATTATuRk vS. LENIN

ost of the world raised a curious eye-brow when news broke of a Russianmilitary jet being knocked from thesky by Turkey, resulting in the murder

of the Russian pilot and rescue of the fighter’s nav-igator. Tensions and mutual accusations continue tobe lobbed by all interested parties. While some in-quire if this is the spark for igniting the closest wehave come in two generations to WWIII, otherswonder if this might not be the ‘crisis’ needed tobring disparate sides together for a larger and moredangerous fight? For those who wish to understandjust why this incident happened and what will trulyemerge as a consequence of it, certain questionsneed to be answered that so far are barely beingasked by the world’s major news organizations. Soin the interests of providing the essential frame-work, the following ten questions are proffered.How well or how poorly the world finds answers tothese questions will indicate how deeply or super-ficially we will understand the complicated andmulti-layered relationship between Turkey and theRussian Federation.

10 QuESTIONS fOR THE fuTuRE Of RuSSIA-TuRkEY RELATIONS

THE CASPIAN PROJECT 18 21 /22

M

DR. MATTHEW CROSSTON

Senior Editor, Caspian Project Director

Matthew Crosston is Professor of Political Science,Director of the International Security and Intelligence

Studies Program, and the Miller Chairat Bellevue University

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MODERN DIPLOMACY

1.Turkey claims it was simply defending its ownsovereign airspace. Does general global hesitancymean that defending airspace should be put on asliding scale based on real world power and signifi-cance?

2.Just exactly how many times did Turkey warn theRussian fighter jet? Will Turkey provide recordedproof of these warnings?

3.Exactly how much time did the Russian fightercross and remain in Turkish airspace? Will radar ev-idence be presented proving said incursions andtime periods?

4.Was Turkish impatience and assertiveness ex-plained singularly by incursion into sovereign air-space or is it explained more compellingly byirritation with Russian airstrikes against anti-Assadrebels, whom Turkey tacitly supports?

5.Were there in fact bombing strikes by Russianforces in Syria that killed ethnic Turkmen rather thanDAESH fighters, something Turkey alleges? Willproof of casualties be produced to support this ac-cusation? If proven, does this explain Turkish impa-tience with Russia?

6.Is it just coincidence that the Russian fighter wasshot down exactly in an area where Turkey and Syriahave had a long-standing border dispute, andwhich, in the past, Russia has often sided with theSyrian claims?

7.How much political animosity is generated forTurkey toward Russia over the Crimean Tatars, whospeak a Turkic language and have generally op-posed the secession/annexation of Crimea to Rus-sia? (Especially in the recent aftermath of Tatarsblocking the restringing of power lines that weremysteriously blown up, putting nearly the entireCrimean peninsula this past weekend in a totalblackout.)

8.If Russia ultimately responds by only sending adefensive air-missile system to Syria along withtrade and travel restrictions – but no active militaryresponse directly against Turkey – will these exam-ples of ‘military restraint’ from Russia be recognizedand commended by NATO or disregarded?

9.Both Putin and Erdogan have reputations forbeing brash and aggressive in personality. If this in-cident only simmers and then fades away in de-creasing diplomatic/military importance, does thissignify personal agency is not as important a causalfactor for explaining state behavior in internationalaffairs as many Western analysts like to claim?

10.Does a successful de-escalation of this crisis af-firm the argument that the greater fight is againstDAESH and thus potentially creates greater cooper-ation opportunities between unaffiliated actors, likethe United States, France, Russia, Iran, Israel, and theAssad government?

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“The strong do what they have to doand the weak acceptwhat they haveto accept”

Thucydides

www.moderndiplomacy.eu

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EuROPE’s NEw gEOPOLItICsfOLLOwINg thE RussIAN PREsENCE IN sYRIA AND IRAq

GIANCARLO ELIA VALORI

Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italianeconomist and businessman. He holds prestigious

academic distinctions and national orders. Mr Valorihas lectured on international affairs and economics

at the world’s leading universities such as PekingUniversity, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and

the Yeshiva University in New York.

He currently chairs "La Centrale Finanziaria Gen-erale Spa", he is also the honorary president of

Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giantHNA Group and Khashoggi Holding’s advisor.

In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légiond'Honneur de la République Francaise, with this

motivation: "A man who can see across borders tounderstand the world” and in 2002 he received the

title of "Honorable" of the Académie des Sciencesde l'Institut de France

fter the shooting down of the RussianSu-24 aircraft by a Turkish F-16 fighter,some analysts are envisaging a futurescenario of waged war. Nothing can be

ruled out, but the possibility of a third world war -visible and bitterly fought with real weapons - forMesopotamia, the area in which, however, theEurasian identity was born, is not fully rational. Whatis certain is that the Russian Su-24M aircraft wasshot down at 10.24' Moscow time. There is no evi-dence of the ritual communications between twocountries which are not at war with each other, asalways happens in these cases and, however, theNATO rules are strict on these issues. Russia statedthat its plane was shot down four kilometers fromthe Turkish border.

A

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Moreover, we do not know yet what happened tothe Russian helicopter Mi-8AMTSh which hadrushed to the rescue of the Su-24 pilots and was at-tacked, presumably not only by the "Turkmen" op-erating on the edge of the Latakia region, with thefinal destruction of the helicopter with US-madeTOW anti-tank missiles, which probably ended upthere as a result of some triangular operation be-tween the Gulf region, Cyprus and Turkey.

The Russian Federation has already deployed sev-eral S-400 missiles for air defence in al-Humaymin,on Syrian territory and, in all likelihood, they will bethe first military asset against a Turkish attack, un-less Turkey does not organize a "children’ crusade"of EU countries still eager - after the terrible mas-sacre in Paris – to "bring democracy" to Syria.

The problem does not lie in the point where theFencer – as NATO calls the Sukhoi 24 – fell down, butin the political logic underlying this fact. Now, withtheir documents, the news agencies in Moscowdemonstrate that the low-flying Russian bomberwas downed within the Syrian borders, but againthis is not the core of the issue: Turkey, the largestIslamic country of Eurasia, the second NATO militarypower after the United States, wants to make theAtlantic Alliance fall into in the Syrian-Iraqi chaos,with the results we can easily imagine.So far theUnited States have supported Turkey which, how-ever, should be the NATO future geopolitical pivotagainst Russia. The United States look to China and,in the meantime, surround the Russian Federationwith advanced electronic weapons systems. Al-though probably not fully aware of this, the UnitedStates want to separate the Eurasian peninsula fromthe central Sino-Russian system - a new edition ofthe Atlantic system, but without a US military pres-ence on site.

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And even without those guarantees which enabledthe Cold War to full enter into the "thirty gloriousyears", as the economist Jean Fourastié called theyears from 1943 to August 15, 1971, the date mark-ing the end of the Bretton Woods system, based onfixed parities between the US dollar and the curren-cies of Europe, Canada, USA and Japan.What remains of the ''Invertebrate Europe" today, ina context in which the US walk out and, indeed, de-sign the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partner-ship (TTIP) - a complex and still secret commercialtreaty - the Middle East is on fire and the Maghrebregion is becoming - after the Libyan disaster – agun aimed at Italy and Europe which, however, doesnot realize it?Nothing, but it is a nothing deprived of any strategicrationality.Nevertheless we may think of common intents be-tween the European Union, Russia, China and someCentral Asian countries.

Nothing is ever certain in today's intelligence warbetween Turkey and Russia, but some conse-quences are easy to infer from the context of theoperations over the skies of Latakia: 1) Turkey wantsto internationalize the Syrian-Iraqi conflict, by pos-sibly involving the Jewish State.The latter, however, would have no place where tostay. Certainly it cannot side with the Russian-Syr-ian-Iranian coalition - the collection of its fiercestand most traditional enemies, except for Russia.2) The State of Israel cannot even side with theCoalition of "rebels" ranging from the Jabat al NusraFront - the Qaedist branch in Syria - to the "Division30" trained by the United States and then immedi-ately included in the Caliphate’s forces, or with theUnited States which sometimes clash with thesword jihad and sometimes help it against BasharEl Assad.Without a project, without a strategic idea, withoutreal allies and, however, without guarantees for theJewish State - the only Middle East centre we cantrust.

Everyone wages and fights its war on the sameground, without a serious geopolitical goal: theUnited States want to oust the Syrian "tyrant" Assad- obviously the fall of the "tyrant" Saddam Husseindid not teach anything to them, not to mention thefight against the other "tyrant", Muammar Al MinyarEl Gaddafi, which ended as we all know. Everybodyknows that in the Middle East tyrants do not exist.It seems that the United States still want to blindlyapply - in the Arab-Islamic world - the same splittingup theory that Zbigniew Brzezinski had managedeffectively in the Balkans’ case.

Brzezinski, one of the most brilliant foreign policyanalysts of the last decades, was born in Poland andhad the same anti-Communist ideas of General Pil-sudski, who thought that revolutionary Russia couldbe destroyed by breaking it up by ethnic lines andgroups.Today, in the market-world and in global finance,such projects are bound to end quickly: the smallcountries are intended to be either self-sufficient -and then survive – or, when this does not happen,Mozart’s famous “stone guest” - namely organizedcrime - comes and leads them to death.Hence if we do not think in a radically new way, itwill be impossible to redesign the world order effec-tively.Moreover, with its operations in Syria, the RussianFederation has sealed the geopolitical space of theEurasian peninsula.3) Russia has closed the European geopoliticalspace from both directions.Along the border of the former Warsaw Pact, Russiais sufficiently armed to be able to deter an increas-ingly weak and confused NATO.

In the Middle East, with its presence in Syria, Russiacan easily and safely negotiate a peaceful manage-ment and settlement of the dispute with Ukraineand still close the East to the European Union.This is exactly what it needs, with President Xi Jin-ping's new Chinese policy of the "new Silk Road".

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The United States are now clearly withdrawing, thusleaving Mesopotamia to the clash between Shiitesand Sunnis, with a European Union which, reck-lessly, is already full of Islamic people who can beoften radicalized or full of "travel companions."The solution could be a Eurasian pact with Russia.Obviously Eternal Russia targets the Eurasian penin-sula presenting itself as a "Third Rome", accordingto the Eurasian fascinating theories by AlexanderDugin, a close and trusted advisor to PresidentVladimir Putin. Nevertheless, Putin must be re-minded of the fact that two great European politi-cians (dare I say strategists) spoke - before anyoneelse - of the union between the peninsula and theHeartland.One was Pope John XXIII, whose experience as adiplomat and political theorist of the Vatican foreignpolicy in terrible years and during the Cold War isscarcely recalled.

Pope John XXIII spoke of "Europe from the Mediter-ranean to the Urals", while the other supreme states-man planned to unite "Europe from the Atlantic tothe Urals".It was not a threat to the unity of the USSR, as onlya naïve interpretation could lead us to assume.It was the idea of a continuum of civilizations span-ning from the First to the Third Rome, possiblythrough the second, Constantinople, which regardsmany nations’ deep interest.

Russia of European ethnicity cannot be part ofpeninsular Europe, while the large steppes domi-nated in the past by the "Golden Horde" must stillbe exploited and managed with the wisdom of theRoman Empire.Without this union, the Islamic world will engulf us,regardless of the US presence in the Euro-peninsu-lar region.

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trengthening of Russia-Iran alliance inSyria can lead to strengthening posi-tions of Tehran in the Middle East anddisruption of situation in several Gulf

States.There are strong evidences of political and militarycooperation and actions coordination between Iranand Russia in Syria that show probability of enhanc-ing Tehran’s position in the region and using it byMoscow to undermine the Saudi Arabia leadershipas far as stability in the Gulf.

UsINg IRANIAN gEOPOLItICAL AMbItIONs

ANATOLII BARONIN, ANDRII KOLPAKOV

Anatolii Baronin is the Director of the Da VinciAG Analytic Group S

MODERN DIPLOMACY

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Russia – US relations exacerbation ‘caused by Krem-lin’s annexation of Crimea, aggression in Ukraineand attempts to expand influence in Eastern Europeand Baltic region induce Moscow to return to con-frontation with the West using methods of the ColdWar. Russia leadership supposes that the intensifi-cation of intervention in conflicts abroad can be aneffective way to renew cooperation with the West,lift sanctions and come to a compromise on geopo-litical spheres of influence.

Groups of Iranian troops have been arriving in Syriavia Bassel al-Assad International Airport in Latakiaprovince as the Syrian army launches a major offen-sive north of the strategic city of Homs backed byRussian military aircrafts. The airport has become ajoint hub for Iranian and Russian forces. Russia, Iran,Syria, and Iraq signed intelligence-sharing agree-ment. Some intelligence data Moscow receives viaTehran from Hezbollah forces. October 13th Iraq hasbegun bombing Islamic State fighters with the helpof a new intelligence center operated by Russia, Iranand Syria. If Russia can provide only satellite andtechnical intelligence support all ground intelli-gence collection with field sources and agent net-work is provided by Iranian and less by Syrianopportunities.

The deeper convergence between Moscow andTehran on Damask became clear since April thisyear after the visit of the Chairman for the Commit-tee for Foreign Policy and National Security of theIslamic Consultative Assembly of Iran AlaeddinBoroujerdi to Moscow.

Also the Iranian military support in Syria began afterhe met the Syrian parliament speaker in Damascus.The discussion issue was the joint operation againstopposition fighters in northwest Syria.

Russia could try to stimulate Iran for increasedground activity in Syria and support Bashar Assad’sregime to break down the negotiation process be-tween Tehran and Washington. The lifting of sanc-tions against Iran is the main threat for Moscowbecause of fall in oil prices prospects. The WorldBank forecast is $10 per barrel fall in case of this sce-nario. At the same time the IMF expects that Russianeconomy will lose 3.4% this year because of sanc-tions and low oil prices in 2015. But this estimationis based on current prices and not includes the sce-nario of Iran’s output on the market after liftingsanctions against Tehran that doubtless will lead tothe deepen crisis in Russian economy. So sanctionsretention against Iran is one of the current main in-tentions of Kremlin in the region. Moscow is achiev-ing this aim by playing on the Tehran’s geopoliticalambitions, i.e. its desire to strengthen regional po-sitions.

Moscow can support Iran in its confrontation withSaudi Arabia and use pro-Iranian Shia communitiesto destabilize several Gulf States. Tensions betweenSaudi Arabia and Iran have not been this high sincethe end of the Iran–Iraq War in 1988. The Saudi For-eign Minister Adel Jubair said in July this year thatthe kingdom is against any Iranian interference inthe Arab world.

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Meanwhile Iran has expanded to the extent whereit now has a military presence in Saudi Arabia’s im-mediate environs: to the north in Iraq, and in SaudiArabia’s southern neighbor Yemen, while its affili-ates are active as opposition groups in Bahrain tothe east. Iran is investing plenty of its manpowerand funds in a project which seemingly aims to laysiege to the Gulf countries. There is an indirect con-frontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran in Syria asforces from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corpsare directly leading militias from Iraq, Lebanon, andAfghanistan to fight in Syria on behalf of the Assadregime. Russia can encourage Tehran to use the po-tential of pro-Iranian Shia political groupings like Is-lahiyyah and Hezbollah Al-Hejaz and battle groupsin Al-Ahsa and Qatif regions (Eastern province) toshake the integrity of the Kingdom. The same ac-tions could be launched in Bahrain, the United ArabEmirates (Sharjah and Dubai emirates) and possiblyKuwait.Such scenario will trigger the oil prices sharpgrowth and eliminating the chance of some EUstates like Poland to diversify their oil supply (savingRussian dominance on European market) by oil pro-duction disruption and maintaining instability inoilfields zones. Creation of the Shia Pro-Iranian gov-ernments or autonomous exclaves in Gulf Stateswill destroy existing interstate geopolitical systemin the Middle East.

The correspondence of this with Russian tactic ofunrecognized states creation in Black Sea regiongives a chance to claim the Russian coordination ofsuch policy using the resources and influence ofIran. It is likely that Iranian uncovered activity inSyria was suggested by Kremlin and not vice versaas affirmed by former Russian president adviser Il-larionov at October, 17.

Russia can be interested in enhancing positions ofIran in Tajikistan as the border state with instableAfghanistan staying the significant threat for Russiafrom the South which also is the gate for radicalgroups backed by some Gulf circles. Russia is vul-nerable rom the South direction facing risks of ISforces deployment in Central Asia states close toRussia borders. In recent years Tajikistan becomesthe center of competition between Iran and KSA inCentral Asia for the influence. Tajik foreign ministerin 2012 called Iran as the best strategic partner. Soin the fighting for influence on Dushanbe betweenMuslim Iran, KSA, Pakistan and Afghanistan Kremlinchoose Tehran as the most loyal and less dangerouspower to support.

Strengthening of Russia-Iran alliance can increasevulnerability of the US and its Western Allies be-cause of the Middle East states integrity risks andlocal conflicts development that will negatively af-fect the world economy.

At the same time Russia tries to use Iranian ambi-tions to undermine the US positions in the Gulf re-gion, increase Kremlin’s value on the world energymarket and finally to include Shia axis states toRussian geopolitical projects confronting US and itsallies.

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SARAH NOLDER

Sarah Nolder is a Master’s student in the InternationalSecurity and Intelligence Studies Program at Bellevue

University in Omaha, Nebraska. She works for theUnited States Air Force as an Intelligence Analyst

and is stationed in Tuscon, Arizona.

on-nuclear weapon states have be-come increasingly disgruntled overwhat they perceive as the nuclearweapon states’ unwillingness to se-

riously commit to nuclear disarmament.The United Nations adopted UN General Assem-bly Resolution A/RES/67/56 in 2012, which es-tablished an open-ended working group to“develop proposals to take forward multilateralnuclear disarmament negotiations for theachievement and maintenance of a world with-out nuclear weapons.”

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Trying To reachnuclear global Zero

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Other non-nuclear weapon states have also createdinitiatives: for example, the New Agenda Coalitioncalled for increased political momentum to createa nuclear disarmament agenda. Many credit thiscoalition with convincing the nuclear-weaponstates to agree to 13 steps toward nuclear disarma-ment. The Middle Powers Initiative launched an “Ar-ticle VI forum” which aimed to “examine the legal,technical, and political requirements to fulfill non-proliferation and disarmament commitments for anuclear weapon-free world.” One of the most influ-ential movements was implemented by four for-merly high-ranking U.S. officials, including GeorgeShultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and SamNunn. They published their proposals titled “A WorldFree of Nuclear Weapons” and “Toward a NuclearWeapon Free World” in the Wall Street Journal op-ed.

The humanitarian argument against nuclearweapons has gained popularity and traction in re-cent years. At the 2015 Non-Proliferation Treaty Re-view Conference, the humanitarian initiative wasthe focal point of discussion. As it continues to gainmomentum and popularity, the nuclear weaponstates will likely have to address and potentiallysupport such initiatives. Recognizing this to someextent, the five formal nuclear weapon states havetaken the “P5 step,” promising that they will con-tinue to work step-by-step toward nuclear disarma-ment. Seven conferences have been hosted by theP5 countries with the goal of increasing dialogueand transparency in regards to the nuclear disarma-ment progress. However, they still have not agreedto any form of timeline or real progress.

Times are changing, however, and a conflict be-tween nuclear-weapon states is still an increasingpossibility. China’s economy is growing and it is setto become a serious competitor to the UnitedStates and Russia across all economic and militaryrealms.

Consequently, it is enhancing its nuclear capabilitiesand delivery systems. Russia is modernizing its nu-clear arsenals and creating waves with its opera-tions in Syria. Traditionally, Russia has depended onnuclear weapons to make up for shortfalls in its con-ventional military capability. It is not feasible to ex-pect any nuclear-weapon state to give up its nuclearweapons soon as long as other states retain theirs.Any real nuclear disarmament will likely have tohappen with all nuclear-weapon states simultane-ously capitulating and including all of theirweapons concurrently.

Because nuclear weapons are the most powerfuland destructive weapons in the world, there hasbeen much research done on the specific arsenals,doctrines, and capabilities of nuclear-weaponstates. The international community places heavyemphasis on the security of the warheads and thematerials used to produce these weapons. However,despite this emphasis, and the treaties that weresigned to minimize the amount of strategicweapons operated by the dominant nuclear powersbut still allowing them to keep arsenals, many ana-lysts, scholars and non-nuclear weapons states re-main staunch proponents of full nucleardisarmament.

The potential policy prescriptions that could bemade to bring this about will depend on one’s spe-cific stance on nuclear weapons. Many academicssplit along extremes: either advocating for com-plete international nuclear disarmament or sup-porting the modernization of and open use ofnuclear weapons as a strategic deterrent. Thosewho do not choose the extremes tend to supporttighter arms control and increased regulation by anunbiased international agency. However unfeasibleat the moment, there are those that advocate for‘Global Zero,’ a complete and total international nu-clear disarmament.

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“The United States can’t rid the world of nuclearweapons on its own; other states, including its ene-mies, get a vote. Russia, China, Britain, France, Israel,India, Pakistan, and North Korea possess nuclearweapons not because they blindly imitate theUnited States but because they fear their neighborsand, in the case of Washington’s enemies, America’sawesome conventional military power.” (Kroenig,2013)

If countries were to get rid of their nuclear weaponsthey would have to rely on their conventional capa-bilities. America’s conventional military capabilitiesare far superior to those of any other country. Russiarecognizes this and would therefore likely nevergive up its nuclear capacity. “Only if we could fun-damentally transform international politics suchthat states no longer faced security threats mightthere be reason to think that the world could bemade safe for Global Zero.” (Kroenig, 2013)

The opposite end of the spectrum rings more true,however, as to what the Russian Federation hasbeen doing. Russian military doctrine has continu-ally emphasized the importance of nuclearweapons in its national security. It has even begunmodernizing and developing new strategic war-heads with advanced capabilities. Many of its nu-clear weapons and warheads are still from the ColdWar era and have not been tested or overhauledsince inception. Therefore, they needed to be up-dated and modernized for safety purposes so as tocontinue to regulate Russian national security andmake its adversaries more readily predictable.Though some argue that maintaining nuclearweapons is an enormous financial burden, the costof modernizing and developing an equally power-ful conventional force that could truly compete withthe United States would be astronomically expen-sive.

The last option, therefore, is the best and most likelyto happen: Russia and the United States will con-tinue to rely on international organizations andarms control methods to monitor and keep track ofnuclear weapon developments. These tighter armscontrol measures could placate the internationalcommunity, making them feel more involved in thelimiting of capabilities of nuclear-weapon states.Currently, Russia and the United States abide bytheir nuclear weapons treaties, continuing to de-commission their strategic nuclear weapons untilreaching the levels outlined by the new STARTtreaty. They will maintain those levels and continu-ally perform maintenance upgrades on their strate-gic delivery platforms and warheads. While this is afar cry from Global Zero, it is still admittedly manysteps below the intermittently open hostility of theCold War era. It seems, for good or bad, the marchto Global Zero will have to be taken with baby steps.

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NASURULLAH BROHI

Nasurullah Brohi worksas a Senior Research

Associate at theStrategic Vision Institute,

Islamabad and can bereached at

nasurullahsvi(at)outlook.com

StRAtEgICALIgNMENtS

At SCO

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he Shanghai Cooperation Organization,initially, the Shanghai Five was created byChina, Russia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, andKazakhstan in 1996 with the aim to re-

solve the border disputes among its member states.Later on, Uzbekistan was also granted full member-ship in 2001 and the Organization was named asthe Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

The Organization promotes and beholds the objec-tives for creating an environment of mutual respect,trust and friendly ties with neighboring and mem-ber states based on enhanced support for the pro-gressive cooperation in the political, economic,cultural, education, scientific technology, power,communication, energy and environmental protec-tion issues.

The collapse of the Soviet Union gave birth to a newworld order based on a unipolar system under theU.S supremacy influencing almost all the majorfields of the international affairs. During the ColdWar era, the world was mainly divided into twomajor blocs having their respective military allianceframeworks where each side had a number of alliedstates under their command; these military al-liances were based on the commitments andarrangements for the collective security of all themember states and the defensive and offensivemodes by all the member states even for the attain-ment of respective national interest goals of any sin-gle member state.Similarly, the member states ofthe U.S led NATO collectively struggled to check thefurther expansion of the Communism to Europeand other parts of the world.

Polarity is a theoretical construct; real internationalsystems only approximate ideal types. The conceptof unipolarity implies a threshold value in the dis-tribution of capabilities among states. How do weknow whether a system has passed the threshold,becoming unipolar? It happens when a unipolar in-ternational system contains one state whose shareof capabilities places it in a class by itself comparedto all other states.

This definition reflects the fact that a state’s capa-bilities are measured not on an absolute scale butrelative to those of other states. In keeping with thisdefinition, a unipolar state is preponderant in all rel-evant categories of capability. In a narrow but alsofrequently used, criterion, a system is unipolar if ithas only one state capable of organizing majorpolitico-military action anywhere in the system.After the dismemberment of Soviet led WARSAWPACT, the challenging of the US supremacy was anatural factor due to the US designs to dominatethe former parts of Soviet Union and the Common-wealth of Independent States of Central Asia (CIS)by granting them membership of NATO. Hence un-able to counter the threat alone, the Collective Se-curity Treaty Organization (CSTO) was created as apower balancer to prevent the US dominance overthe Russian sphere of influence. Still it was insuffi-cient on its part because the members of the CSTOwere not that militarily or politically strong, tocounter balance the NATO States.During the ColdWar era, the collective security alliances like WarsawPact under the Soviet and the U.S led NATO werethe organizations which aimed to collectively re-spond the other side in case of any aggression.

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The basic principle behind the creation of organiza-tions was to prevent the other side from any kind ofmilitary, political, diplomatic and economic hege-mony which may turn the other side to dominatethe global affairs single handedly and by that way,the concept of balance of power flourished whereeach side tried to maximize its power through themeans of maximum number of allied states com-mitted to collectively check the growth of other sideto their sphere of influence and respond accord-ingly. Even in recent time, the great power seek op-tion to further enhance their spheres of influenceand such moves close to the theories of neo-colo-nialism have urged the global political system togradually keep moving towards a new Cold War.Such stereotype thinking resulted in an ever growthin the number of Organization like the NATO, EU,SCO, ASEAN, CIS, BRICS, etc.

SCO AS A MAJOR PLAYER IN THE REGION

The increasing engagement of the US and allies inthe Asian region are perceived as serious threats toRussia and China. Particularly, the recent develop-ment in the aftermath of Crimea crisis between Rus-sia and the West and the prevalent perception ofencirclement of China by the NATO forces are someof the pushing forces to look beyond the economicgains and counter the challenges existing nextdoor. This situation of competition is created amongthe states when they found their interests on stakeeach challenging the other to gain the national pol-icy objectives on each other’s expanse.In somecases when the states find it difficult to pursue thepolicy objectives individually, due to intensity com-petition among states. In such a scenario, the states’immediate approach becomes to align themselveswith the other states to form a common alliance.These alliances can be of different kinds i.e.; eco-nomic alliances like E.U., ASEAN, OIC and, militaryalliances like as NATO, WARSAW PACT and regionalalliances like SAARC etc

The member states of these alliances thus sharesome common interests which binds them for col-lective effort; ultimately all aimed at balancing thepower equilibrium against other competing powersso that no single country becomes able to domi-nate the global or regional military and political sce-nario

In global political system states generally create abalance against each others’ powers, when twogreat powers equally maintain the equilibriumcalled bipolarity where both exercise equal statusof power in international affairs and when manystates succeed to maintain the status-quo it is calleda multi-polarity where each posses a particularsphere of influence and in general sense at the in-ternational level as well. The bipolarity or multi-po-larity is not only limited within the concepts ofcompetition for between two states but all themember states of an alliance as a whole maintainthe balance of power equilibrium against the oppo-site side.The Shanghai Co-operation Organization also facessome challenges side by side to the opportunities.Russia envisions several dimensions to the future ofSCO; these include strengthening the major func-tional areas of the cooperation along with expan-sion of the organization in the form of newpartnerships. Although Russian hopes to enlargethe scope of SCO organization by expanding itsmembership list yet the prospective of potentialcandidate states agreeing to the offer does notseem much positive. Members of the SCO hadagreed on the fact that there is a need to pause theprocess of enlargement of the SCO but some Russ-ian experts having completely opposite viewsvoted against it. Anatoly Torkunov, rector MoscowState Institute of International Relations (MGIMOUniversity) stated that SCO would be more effectiveif it if it was identified as a representative of thewhole Asian Pacific Region rather than being iso-lated to the representation of Central Asia alone.

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Moreover, the closely observing analysts of the SCObelieved that the acceptance of India and Pakistanas permanent members would disrupt the currentinternal political arena and will also affect the rela-tions of other members with the rest of the worldparticularly, the countries that are being urged bythe international community to abide by the regu-lations of the NPT. Secondly, the main cause of ten-sion and a bone of the contention, the issue ofKashmir between India and Pakistan would alwaysremain a direct variant to affect the consensus ofthe member on any particular issue related to bilat-eral relations between India and Pakistan, which isnot the kind of message SCO wants to portray infront of the outside world.

Similarly, the case of Iran for the grant of permanentmembership has always remained a controversialtopic. Iran is viewed a potential nuclear state by theinternational community and hence would provokethe USA to further obstruct the organization's work.This is why the Iranian membership in the SCObeing considered controversial although, Russia isalready linked with Tehran for trade purposes andthe SCO members can also largely benefit fromIran's huge energy resources but ultimately the ac-ceptance of Iran as a member state of SCO wouldonly involve severe risk of inviting diplomatic isola-tion of the organization. Moreover, such contro-versy at this point would not be benign for thefurther development of organization into a real bal-ancing power bloc for SCO still needs certain im-provement in various grounds. In case of Iran’s fullmembership of SCO in near future despite of its am-biguous nuclear program which is a pinching pointbetween US and Iran relations, but it would alsopose e direct threat other non- member states ofNATO.

China's growing ties or energy trade with Iran andPakistan is one of the other reasons that Russia doesnot want Iran and Pakistan to join the SCO group.

This could be accomplished by including newstated in SCO. However, the full membership of Pak-istan and India raised two issues for Russia and theSCO. Firstly, both the countries in spite of being nu-clear weapon states are non-signatories of the 1968Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons(Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT) which is a clear con-tradiction of the primary requirements for the beinga member state of SCO.

PROSPECTS OF INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONSAS PERMANENT MEMBERS OF SCO

For Pakistan and India, the period after its inceptionwas the marker of the direction of its foreign policy.The society under the rule British Raj was greatly in-fluence by the Western thoughts and the way ofconducting state affairs in the likely style. The un-lucky movement after one year of their partition,the India and Pakistan fought a war in 1948 in-volved the both states in an unending arms raceand their involvement with various regional and in-ternational alliances and forums in order to meettheir economic and military needs.During the initial period of their status of observerstates at the SCO, the main concern for about thefull membership of India and Pakistan was that itwould cause further trouble to the organization dueto their prolonged hostility that is existent rightfrom their inception, despite the SCO powers Russiasupported the Indian membership so the China toPakistan but their entrance in SCO as permanentmembers was always a gloomy reality that it wouldcreate a de-fragmentation within the organizationand a divide as two different groups one led by theChina and the other by Russia and ultimately itwould become an impression of an organizationwithin organization that yield in a weak institution-alized organization diverted from its main agendato counter-weight the extra-regional powers and ul-timately the SCO would become a less effective or-ganization having very low significance andbenefits for the member states.

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MODERN DIPLOMACY

China is in the process of exploring the opportunityof importing gas through pipeline from Iran andTurkmenistan, with Iran. According to China's view,this gas would be delivered across Pakistan andAfghanistan via a pipeline. Therefore, it is very muchclear that Gazprom, Russia’s largest energy com-pany, would most certainly oppose any such routeplan. Russia would definitely try to restrict the op-tions of China of buying gas from Turkmenistan orincrease its pipeline capabilities to gain access ofgas resources in Central Asia. These concerns are thebasis of Russia’s negativity towards full membershipof Iran and Pakistan with the SCO and according tomany analysts cooperation over energy supplies isprecisely the reason why China wants these twostates to be members of the SCO.

SCO AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF BILATERALRELATIONSHIP OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Although the SCO’s Council of the Heads of Stateshas accepted the proposal for the grant of full mem-bership to Pakistan and India in the Organizationand it is also hoped that by the start of 2016 thesetwo states would gain permanent membershipafter completing certain documentary require-ments. The two states were observer states of theSCO since 2004 and had been trying to get the per-manent membership but the main hurdle betweenthe grant of membership always remained the con-cern about Pakistan and India’s hostility towardseach other. Despite of the fact, the hostility will defi-nitely prevail after becoming permanent membersbut the thing which is being perceived as a ray ofhope that both the states will get a platform to re-solve their bilateral issues effectively.

The basic tenets of the Shanghai Cooperation Or-ganization abide its members to refrain from the in-terference in other’s internal matters and preservetheir self-respect, sovereignty and to encourage thecreation of an environment based on cooperationin their region and neighborhood.

The Organization is further ambitious in promotingthe enhanced support for the economic, cultural,scientific, environmental, communication and edu-cational cooperation. Despite of all these factors,the Organization has never came out of its ambigu-ous nature that whether it’s going to become a per-manent military alliance to counter the Westernbloc or it will only remain a regional economicforum. The ambiguity is because of the creation ofRegional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) that has aremarkable number of quick response forces andthe members of SCO often conduct collective mili-tary and naval drills and demonstrate the militaryand naval power effectively.

Moreover, it is strongly going to become a time oftest of the significance of the SCO as an effectiveplayer to bridge the gap between India and Pak-istan through a series of diplomatic moves thatwould urge both parties to bring an end to the his-torical disputes and hostility between the twoneighboring states. Such success at the part of SCOwould be historical landmark on its credit andwould encourage many others to consult the Or-ganization for their issues and this will ultimatelymake the SCO an ever effective player next to theUNO in the international political arena.

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Apart from the issues of discord between India andPakistan, the Organization will bring immense eco-nomic and trade opportunities for the both as thedominant powers of the SCO i.e. China and Russiaare huge industrial and economic hubs and at theother hand the other Central Asian members areimmensely rich with their oil and natural gas re-sources that are more than enough for energystarved nations like China, India and Pakistan.

ROLE OF DOMINANT SCO POWERS IN BRING-ING-UP PEACE AND PROGRESS IN THE REGION

SCO has not only helped in establishing regionalcalm and stability but has also been successful incontrolling conflicts from spreading to other re-gions. Central Asia, Balkans and the Middle Eastshare a history of complex conflict ranging from re-ligious to ethnic nature. But the formation of SCO inCentral Asia portrayed a much better image of it ascompared to the Balkans and the Middle East. Thepresence of SCO played an important role in pre-venting the Afghan civil war from spreading intoCentral Asia. By doing so SCO managed to developa successful example for the rest of the internationalcommunity struggling with post Cold war condi-tions. It would not be wrong to say that had 'Shang-hai Five-SCO' not been present in Central Asia theAfghan war would have most certainly spread to itsneighboring countries. This depicts how the SCO isacting to maintain the security and stability.

In the light of these achievements, it can be saidthat SCO has played an integral part in maintainingthe regional calm and stability of its member states.Addressing the Afghanistan which is also one theurgent defence and foreign policy issue faced bythe Obama administration, the SCO’s claims of thefailure of US strategy and their growing demandsto new government for setting-up a final time frameto call back NATO troops from Afghanistan.

The current situation is completely against the USand its allies’ troops that are badly stuck inAfghanistan and the further announcement ofsending more troops to the country has raisedmany questions for the SCO members and otherworld as well.In a very short period of less than a decade, the SCOhas established itself as a global security mecha-nism. Successfully being able to marginalize theWestern and American influence in the CentralAsian region therefore, most of times the SCO hasbeen termed as NATO of the East and a counter-weight by Russia and China to challenge the UnitedStates and allies presence in the region. It is also be-lieved, that the Sino- Russian interests will shape thefuture of whole region and more especially of oiland natural gas rich Central Asia.

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FUTURE PERSPECTIVES: CHALLENGES ANDOPPORTUNITIES FOR THE REGION

The phenomenon of continuous shift in poweramong the major players of the world, the face ofinternational relations keeps changing respectively.Given that, it is important that our understandingof the world we live in should also evolve accord-ingly, and we are not stuck with a worldview thathas no relevance with the evolving realities of aworld in transition. Global politics is always charac-terized with three tendencies; namely, cooperation,competition and conflict.

The world affairs are integrative and disintegrativeprocesses are always at continued developmentwhere there are factors contributing to peace andissues leading to war. There is always hectic compe-tition going on among major players of the world.Sometime, this competition causes conflict. Sometime, it leads to peace. All depending mainly uponthe great powers relations with one another, thepresent state of relations cause any shift or smooth-ness of inter-state relations.

In international relations the future of any state-to-state relations is completely unpredictable, but thepresent course of any activity can at least reflect thepossible outcome of their possible action. Thus, cer-tain degree of caution needs to be taken while com-paring the SCO with any of the organizations in theWest for economic and security cooperation in thenear future. It is believed when two for the comingfuture time. It is believed when two friendly stateshaving interest in the same thing, it naturally cre-ates a sense of competition and to some extentmakes them hostile to one another.

Especially while looking into the history of interna-tional relations, most of times it has been seenwhen ever two states have been struggling to pur-sue a common thing as a issue of their vital nationalinterests they ultimately became rivals, as it was inthe case of Soviet Union and US in the post worldwar II era their vital interests, turned their allianceinto confrontation and hostility and finally resulteda prolonged Cold War involving the whole world.The current state of SCO and NATO relations isalarming for a change of global political systemwith a forecast of a new emerging global bipolarpolitical structure.

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CONCLUSION

The grant of permanent membership to India andPakistan by SCO’s Council of Heads of States wouldgive an impetus and a distinguished role of thesetwo states in the international affairs. These twostates would also get access to enormous eco-nomic, political, military and other opportunities.Though the membership in the SCO brings oppor-tunities at one hand but at the other it will open anew Pandora’s Box for the India and Pakistan due tothe fact that the SCO is believed to be a counter-weighted to the NATO and sometimes it is alsocalled a NATO of the East because of its military de-signs and the drills that would pave the way for thetransformation into a permanent military alliance,will generate the sense of competition and an op-position towards the most of European nation andthe American.

For Pakistan and India, there already exists a re-gional forum like SAARC that has hardly effectivelymanaged the crises between the two states. Theless effective role of the SAAR is because the Indiaand Pakistan are never accommodated any accordof the regional organization. Apart from the factthat SCO has immense economic and developmentopportunities but a futuristic role that is not morethan the SAARC would hardly extend SCO’s impor-tance in the regional and international affairs. Evenafter becoming permanent members of the Organ-ization, the upshot cannot be expected that posi-tive but definitely it would only affect the currentprevalent status of the Organization and would onlydrag it towards an unending divide.

The SCO’s demand for a new world order not merelybased on the US dominance over world affairs andother institutions, the economic one is not an ex-ception which brings a growing clash of interestsbetween the SCO and NATO member states. TheSCO poses serious challenges to other organiza-tions in various grounds that are not only for NATObut also for the European Union; the SCO’s eco-nomic strength is also one of turning factor in thepresent global structure.

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LAURA GARRIDO

Laura Garrido is currently finishingher Master’s degree in the International

Security and Intelligence Studies Programat Bellevue University in Omaha, Nebraska,

USA. Her primary research interestscover the post-Soviet space and the fight

against radical Islamism.

S sanctions throughout history have notalways had the best success rate and thecurrent sanctions against Russia maybackfire on the United States, causing

more harm to global US interests than benefit.Not only does the United States need to worryabout the sanctions backfiring, the threat faced byother countries that have been involved with or thatsupport the sanctions - such as Germany, theUnited Kingdom, and the Netherlands - is alsosomething the US needs to take more seriously intoconsideration.Germany is the biggest Europeantrading partner with Russia. It receives nearly 36%of its natural gas and almost 40% of its oil from Rus-sia.

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BACkLASH DETERRENCEEffECTS Of RuSSIAN SANCTIONS ON PERIPHERAL EuROPE

THE CASPIAN PROJECT 18 43 /44

Also, German Chancellor Angela Merkel made thedecision in 2011 to move away from nuclear energy.Immediately after this decision was made eight nu-clear plants were shut down, increasing Germany’sdependence on natural gas. As an ally of the UnitedStates, Germany could be placed in a tough situa-tion if Russia decides to retaliate by decreasing oreven stopping natural gas exports to Germany.While this may be unlikely at the present time dueto Russia’s current economic and military interven-tion situation in Syria, when Russia eventually sta-bilizes its economy, and Russia will, it could enactits own energy deterrence against those who orig-inally supported US sanctions.

Beginning in 2018, Russia will have an alternativemarket in China for its natural gas. In May 2014, Rus-sia and China signed a $456 billion gas deal withRussian state-owned energy giant Gazprom. Thisdeal is a win for both China and Russia becauseChina has secured natural gas from Russia for thenext 30 years (which is desperately needs) and Rus-sia can reduce its independence on European mar-kets (which it vigorously wants).

Russia can also use this deal to strengthen its posi-tion against the sanctions imposed by Westerncountries. Therefore, even though there is not animmediate threat of Russia retaliating against Ger-many by limiting its natural gas exports, it is a veryreal possibility that can logistically occur in justthree years.German businesses are also threatened by the sanc-tions against Russia because of the consequentialdwindling economic relationship. There are approx-imately 6,200 German companies active in Russia,including giants like Siemens and Volkswagen. TheRussian population has already begun boycottingAmerican businesses because of the sanctions, so itis very possible that German companies could suf-fer the same fate. The sanctions are expected tocause a loss of at least 250,000 jobs in Germany asGerman-Russian exports collapse. More than300,000 jobs in Germany are currently dependenton trade relations with Russia. Along with job loss,it is anticipated that Germany will lose over $10 bil-lion in trade according to the Committee on EasternEuropean Economic Relations simply because of itsagreement to support US sanctions.

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The United Kingdom is also feeling the financialstrain of sanctions on Russia. As the leading Euro-pean global financial center, the United Kingdomhas drawn in many Russian companies and individ-ual investors over the past fifteen years. Since recov-ering from the Russian financial crisis of 1997-1998,Russian companies have been turning to the UnitedKingdom to invest in London’s booming residentialproperty market and in British securities. The valueof Russian international investments in London issubstantial. It is estimated that the total value is £27billion with nearly half of that raised between 2004and 2012. The round of sanctions against Russiathat focus exclusively on finance and investmentcould have a serious impact on the United Kingdombecause of this Russian economic engagement.

British companies can also be negatively affectedby Russian sanctions, especially within professionalservices and international arbitration. London-based lawyers and arbitration venues, such as theInternational Dispute Resolution Centre, have ben-efited greatly from being a favorite location forRussian businesses seeking to resolve commercialdisputes over global assets. However, Russian com-panies which enter into arbitration proceedings incountries that imposed or supported the sanctionsare often blacklisted from the Russian market. Thiswill undoubtedly result in a significant weakeningof British arbitration services. This is no small loss asapproximately 75% of the world’s commercial dis-pute market involves Russian entities.

The Netherlands is another major trading partnerof Russia. Rotterdam imports more Russian oil thanany other nation in the world.

Shell, a large Dutch oil company, has major invest-ments in Russia so any energy deterrence Russiamay impose on the Netherlands could have seriouseconomic implications.Also, the Netherlands hasnearly €37 billion worth of business linked to Russia.Dutch exports to Russia fell 35% in the first half of2015 and as much as 50% in some areas. The mostimportant Dutch exports to Russia are flowers andplants which, in 2013, made up a total export valueof over €390 million. Dairy products make up thesecond most important Dutch export to Russia, val-ued at €301 million. Finally, vegetables and fruit arethe third most important export to Russia with avalue of €184 million. Because of the sanctions, Rus-sia has boycotted vegetables, fruit, dairy products,meat, and fish from the Netherlands, meaning thecountry has a potential yearly loss of nearly 1 billionEuros.

Russia is now getting all of its ducks in a row to re-build its economy, in spite of the sanctions, and willfocus on building new strengths in Asia and theMiddle East. Therefore the continuation of sanctionsagainst Russia will likely not do anything that ben-efits the United States or its European allies, butrather just makes the United States look like a bullyand bigger enemy of Russia. In the near future Rus-sia will be taking steps to once again become amajor player in the energy, securities, and trademarkets, leaning on strong new partnerships withkey players outside of Europe such as China andIndia. If the United States keeps isolating Russiafrom the West, it could indirectly cause major en-ergy and security disruptions with some of its mosttrusted European allies. Therefore, the United Statesshould reassess the efficacy of its current ‘sanction-ing path’ with Russia and consider if new strategiesmight be more prudent. It isn’t so much about back-ing down as reducing unwanted collateral damageor incurring future blowback deterrence.

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AMY HANLON

Amy Hanlon is currently finishing her degree in theInternational Security and Intelligence Studies

Program at Bellevue University and has beenemployed as a government contractor for the U.S.

State Department since 2010. All views expressed within this piece are hers and hers

alone and do not represent an official statement orpolicy from the United States government

wo of the largest foreign intelligenceagencies in the world, the UnitedStates’ Central Intelligence Agency(CIA) and the Russian Federation’s For-

eign Intelligence Service (FSB), ironically appearmore similar in their organization, methods, andethics than not.

Similar to the CIA, the Russian foreign intelli-gence service operates under different levels ofconcealment from foreign governments.

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Brothersin Unethical-arms

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Both foreign intelligence services use “official cover”,meaning they pose as government employees inthe country’s embassy which offers diplomatic im-munity if the agent is caught. They also both have“non-official cover” agents (NOCs), where theagents “typically pose as private business employ-ees and are subject to less scrutiny and, in manycases, are never identified as intelligence agents bythe host government."” This role does not providediplomatic immunity if caught (Bender 2015, andFinn 2003). The questionable ethical practices ofboth agencies have tarnished their names in the in-ternational public eye at times. Their politicizationof intelligence, financing of insurgents or rebels inother countries, and the use of torture, havesparked international condemnation from manydifferent corners.

Both foreign intelligence services have been ac-cused of being too political. As noted by RobertGates in his 1992 address to the CIA, discussing re-cent Congressional allegations of the agency’spoliticization of intelligence:

“Almost all agree that [politicization of intelligence] in-volves deliberately distorting analysis or judgementsto favor a preferred line of thinking irrespective of evi-dence. Most consider classic solicitation to be only thatwhich occurs if products are forced to conform to pol-icy maker’s views. A number believe politicization alsoresults from management pressures to define anddrive certain lines of analysis and substantive view-points. Still others believe that changes in tone or em-phasis made during the normal review of coordinationprocess, and limited means for expressing alternativeviewpoints, also constitute forms of politicization”(Gates, 1992).

Similarly, the international community accused Rus-sia’s Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, of politicizingintelligence when he insisted that there were stillserious grounds to believe the deadly chemical at-tack in Damascus was a ‘provocation’ staged by

Syrian rebels, despite evidence in the United Na-tions report that seemed to suggest governmentforces were to blame (Mackey, 2013). In an April2015 interview with retired Lieutenant GeneralLeonid Reshetnikov, one can see a similar exampleof Russian politicization as he discusses how theUnited States ‘ditched Israel’ to work with Iran to ‘en-circle Russia’, overthrow President Vladimir Putin,and divide the country (Chuikov, 2015). Both for-eign intelligence services have done such things ei-ther to promote their own world view or to promotea particular agenda favored by the presidential ad-ministration in power. The problem with politicization is that it distorts in-formation and thus leads to poor analysis and ulti-mately leads to skewed results rather than fair,balanced, and accurate assessments. Skewed intel-ligence hinders policy-makers and governmentsalike and prevents opportunities for understandingand collaboration.

Both the United States and Russia fund insurgentsor rebels throughout the world. Currently, the CIAis funding the Syrian rebels against the governmentof President Bashar al Assad in Syria and ‘vettedrebels’ in Saudi Arabia against the Islamic State(Mazzetti, 2014). Similarly, both the United Statesand the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council ofEurope have accused Russia of financing terrorismwith respect to militarily arming rebels in Ukraine(Office of Foreign Assets Control, 2014 and Eu-roNews, 2015). Arming the rebels, however, in eithercase, is rarely done in a vacuum: this can lead to thearms or finances falling into the hands of other ‘un-wanted’ extremist groups who wish harm theUnited States and/or Russia.

In other words, the secret maneuvers often canbackfire and strengthen the very opposition the CIAor FSB had hoped to defeat. As noted by PresidentObama, there aren’t many examples of pure successwhere the CIA [only] provided financing and armsto an insurgency (Mazzetti, 2014).

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In addition to the politicization of intelligence andthe financing of ‘rebels’ a third aspect where boththe CIA and FSB are similar is in their use of tortureto ‘confirm’ intelligence. In October 2012, during the49th Session of the UN Committee against Torture,the United Nations reported that Russia’s intelli-gence services participated in torture, includingbeatings, removing finger and toenails, and sodom-izing a subject with a bottle (United Nations Com-mittee Against Torture, 2012, p. 4). Similarly,according to a previously released Senate Intelli-gence Committee report on the details of ‘harsh CIAinterrogation techniques,’ the CIA has participatedin torture including rectal feeding, sleep depriva-tion, insects, use of diapers, and mock executions.(Business Insider, 2014) Since the report’s release,the Senate Intelligence Committee has removed itfrom their site. However, several news agenciesquoted the report:

“The CIA led several detainees to believe they wouldnever be allowed to leave CIA custody alive, the re-port’s executive summary says. One interrogator toldanother detainee that he would never go to court, be-cause we can never let the world know what I havedone to you. CIA officers also threatened … to harmthe children of a detainee … sexually abuse themother of a detainee, and … to cut [a detainee's]mother's throat."

These methods were often found to have achievedlittle to no actionable intelligence. For example, inan email titled "So it begins," a medical officer wrotethat a detainee gave "NO useful information so far,"but had vomited several times. “It's been 10 hourssince he ate so this is surprising and disturbing.Weplan to only feed Ensure for now,” the officer said.(Business Insider, 2014) As noted by the Senate In-telligence Committee report, torture does not usu-ally produce actionable intelligence.

Veteran and former prisoner-of-war, Senator JohnMcCain agreed: “I know from personal experiencethat the abuse of prisoners will produce more badthan good intelligence. I know that victims of tor-ture will offer intentionally misleading informationif they think their captors will believe it. I know theywill say whatever they think their torturers wantthem to say if they believe it will stop their suffer-ing.” (McCain, 2014)

In conclusion, ethically speaking, both the UnitedStates and Russia’s foreign intelligence services areunfavorably similar to each other as both partici-pate in practices that hurt their international repu-tation for little national security gain. Arguably,none of these activities provide their governmentwith fair, balanced, or accurate intelligence andquite often the moral ambiguity encourages cor-ruption and repression, let alone global condemna-tion. Thus, both intelligence services are similar innature, organization, methods, and ethics – to theirdetriment. They are brothers-in-unethical-arms.

the casPian ProJect 18 47 /48

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ithin the Iranian domestic politicalscene the use of the nuclear pro-gram to affect elections has been inplace for the past decade or more.

Earlier, conservatives within the regime used anagreement between Iranian reformists and the EU3foreign ministers to label reformists as traitors, spies,and agents of the West.

Unable to recover the crumbling economy, the con-servatives leaned on their ability to deliver a nuclearprogram as their main source of legitimacy to apublic weary of years of hardship.

STEPHEN SARTY

Stephen Sarty is a graduate student in theInternational Security and Intelligence Studiesprogram at Bellevue University in Omaha, NE,USA. He is a former U.S. Marine and has livedand worked in the Middle East for the last 23

years.

W

ThE CONsERvATIvEhOLD ON POwER IN POsT-JCPOA IRAN

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In 2009, however, splits within the conservativesstarted to appear as President Ahmadinejad at-tempted to reach an agreement on nuclear fuel ex-change. The deal was ultimately unable to bereached largely due to the efforts of opponentsfrom Ahmadinejad’s fellow conservatives.The election of President Rouhani in 2013 came asboth a shock as well as an indication that thedecade of crippling sanctions had finally taken theirtoll not only on the people of Iran but on the Iranianruling elites as well. His election also represented amajor shift in the political landscape of Iranian pol-itics. Running as a moderate, Rouhani emerged vic-torious from a group dominated by conservatives.

During the election Ayatollah Khamenei stressedthe need for continued resistance against Westernforces and warned against those who felt that com-promise with the West would lead to positives re-sults. Rouhani maintained that Iran had a right to itsnuclear enrichment goals but also advocated for asomewhat softer stance, while also advocating forincreased diplomacy with the West to work towardlifting Iran from its diplomatic and economic isola-tion. His final numbers in the election showed notonly that an overwhelming number of Iranians fa-vored a more moderate approach to domestic andforeign policy but also caused a reevaluation of theopinion that Khamenei had absolute political con-trol over Iran.

The popular consensus now is that the nuclear dealbetween Iran and the West will change the balanceof power in Iranian domestic politics in favor ofmoderate forces. There will also be considerableposturing by the various players within the politicalelite to claim credit for the deal in order to enforcetheir positions in upcoming Parliamentary and As-sembly of Experts elections. There is also agree-ment, unfortunately, that much of the money influxfrom the lifting of sanctions will be squandered dueto widespread corruption or diverted into the mili-tary machine to continue Iran’s numerous proxywars within the region.Keen to defray credit for the agreement benefitingmoderates and to prevent a Rouhani victory lap,conservatives were quick to call for a Parliamentaryreview of the nuclear deal, headed by Ali Reza Za-kani, and pounced on Rouhani when he vigorouslyopposed it. Principalists, a faction of the parliamen-tary conservatives, attacked Rouhani claiming it wastheir right and duty to conduct such a review. WhenKhamenei came out firmly on their side, their hardwon victory damaged Rouhani. Khamenei, whilebacking the negotiations, has ultimately not comeout and approved or disapproved the deal, therebyspurring additional motivation to those attackingRouhani.

ThE CAsPIAN PROJECT 18 49 /50

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Real reform would largely undermine the grip andcontrol that the ruling elite currently has on power.This reform, however, would in large part consist ofa continued movement towards more normalizedrelations with the outside global community andthe creation of a domestic environment that pro-motes foreign investment, both of which arestrongly opposed by conservatives. But it could wellbe the overwhelming interest in retaining powerwill ultimately force the conservatives’ hands. Withoil prices still quite low due to a strategic effort onthe part of regional rival Saudi Arabia, Iranian eco-nomic woes continue. An additional wildcard in de-termining where the future of Iranian domesticpolitics are headed could well reside with the Aya-tollah himself. At 75, Khamenei still has no heir ap-parent and his death will likely bring about a fiercecompetition to choose a successor. Given the levelof power still innate to his position, this will be amajor factor in determining the path Iran ultimatelytakes.

It is likely that conservatives will continue to movealong their path to marginalize the impact of anyeconomic benefit in the wake of the nuclear agree-ment and, considering the level of control thatKhamenei possesses over the state-run media, it willbe difficult for Rouhani to counter conservativespin. Also, with conservatives effectively controllingthe state’s purse strings, it is likely that they couldalso prevent any real economic improvements fromreaching the general public where it would benefitRouhani’s pledge to restore the nation’s economy.

Additionally, the upcoming Parliamentary and As-sembly of Experts elections will hold the real key tothe Iranian future. In a move that again does notbode well for the reformists, a prominent hardliner,Guardian Council secretary Ahmad Jannati, waschosen to head the committee that will oversee theelections. In his role Mr. Jannati has the ability to de-clare candidates ‘unworthy’ to run for election andwill likely do so to those supportive of Rouhani toensure that the full authority of the Ayatollah willstill remain unchallenged through any electoralprocess.

But the question still remains: can the conservativesfind a way to make the adjustments needed tomove the country forward in a manner acceptableby the nation’s populace? Is it possible to find a sortof middle ground as nations such as China havefound, where there is a maintained political ortho-doxy balanced against the expansion of civil liber-ties and the enactment of economic reforms suchas expanded industrial privatization, increased for-eign investment, and the creation of a more accom-modating international posture? It is possible. Butin the short term it is unlikely that any real changewill occur. Currently, even though Rouhani wasswept into office with impressive support, there ap-pears to be no person or group with the real depthof power needed to threaten the conservativestranglehold on domestic leadership. Given the cur-rent generational shift and deep-rooted frustrationswith the government, coupled with Iran’s long his-tory of both political and social unrest, however, itis likely just wishful thinking if the conservativesthink that this will hold for the long-term withoutany real substantive change on their part in the do-mestic status quo

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RuSSIA IS INCREASINg

ITS INfluENCEON CA STATES

ussia uses risks of ISIS expanding inAfghanistan to increase its influ-ence on CIS Central Asia states, theirarmed forces and to expand CDTO

membership. Moscow could try to developNATO analogue of collective defense in the re-gion on the base of Collective Defense Treaty Or-ganization as the core of pro-Russian regionalintegration model.

The ISIS group is trying to strengthen positionsin Afghanistan, winning over a growing numberof sympathizers and recruiting followers in 25 ofthe country’s 34 provinces. The militant grouphas been trying to establish itself in Afghanistan,challenging the Taliban. Russian leadership con-siders the probability of moving ISIS to CIS Cen-tral Asia states as the main threat for southernborders of Russian Federation and Caucasus sta-bility. Their fears are based on facts of active par-ticipation of citizens from Central Asia states inSyria and Iraq on ISIS side.

At October 16th leaders of post-Soviet states inKazakhstan during the summit of CIS signed aconcept of military co-operation until 2020. Rus-sia has been pushing its military presence acrossthe region and this document will certainly fitthis policy. Moscow struck deals with Tajikistanand Kyrgyzstan to extend its bases till 2042 and2032 respectively. It has announced an increasein troops in Tajikistan, its largest foreign 201stbase, from 5,900 to 9,000 soldiers by 2020. Russiais planning to renew the fleet of its airbase atKant, Kyrgyzstan by 2016.

R

THE CASPIAN PROJECT 18 51 /52

ANATOLII BARONIN, ANDRII KOLPAKOV

Anatolii Baronin is the Directorof the Da Vinci AG Analytic Group

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Prospects of such alliance are very weak because ofinability to share control over opium poppies plan-tations, narrow ideology congruence and low ISISsupport by local tribal leaders. ISIS numbers are stillsmall in Afghanistan. Though ISIS in Afghanistan hasregrouped and recruiting new members the overallconclusion is that ISIS does not yet represent a sig-nificant strategic threat to Afghanistan in the next6 months.Despite this Moscow justifies building up a militarypresence in the region by highlighting the threatCentral Asia and Russia are facing from Afghanistanand beyond, pointing main risks for the leaders tobe overthrown. Kremlin via security and intelligenceservices underlines the internal risks for Central Asiaregimes coming from radical organization operatedin Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzs-tan like Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Islamic Movement of

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It has already sent a dozen of new and modified ver-sions of Su-25 fighter jets to replace older aircrafts.Russian MoD announced upgrading other equip-ment at the bases: trucks, armored personnel carri-ers (APCs) and drones. The Central military districtrecently announced that it will dispatch a helicopterunit to be stationed at the airbase in Ayni, Tajikistan.Moscow has been trying to gain access to this air-base since at least 2004.Today it is unlikely for Taliban forces to move in thenorth direction beyond Afghanistan borders. Therewere no signs of such intentions even in 1996 whenTaliban was more powerful and have no centralizedopponent as ISIS. So expanding ISIS in Afghanistandepends on its potential to cooperate with Taliban.But for several months violent clashes with the Tal-iban continued, ending questions about possible al-liances.

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Uzbekistan, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement,or the Islamic Jihad Group, Hizb un-Nusrat. In somecases, these risks are exaggerated.Russia is positioning itself as the only one force toprotect Central Asia regimes that make them morepliable. Kremlin counterworks US regional positionsintensification endeavoring to keep control over au-thoritarian leaders, playing on their weakness andfears of losing power as the result of ‘Arab spring’scenarios and civil war outbreaks. Obviously US ef-forts in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan could not letWashington to compete effectively with Russia inCentral Asia.Russia will try to expand rashly its military presenceby intensifying of training programs for regionaltroops and military supplies. At first this will giveKremlin ‘a legitimate right’ to intervene with Russiantroops at the early stage of a conflict.

Secondly it could give the opportunity to set loyaland controlled high and middle echelon commandstaff in armed forces of these states. In third placeKremlin receives a chance to organize military coupd’états in the case of risks to lose influence in the re-gion because of elite/leader changing (due to deathor mass protests).

Kremlin can change configuration of the CDTOmaking an offer to Bashar Assad (Alavite controlledterritory) and Iran. The ultimate goal is to build therapid reaction forces joint staff under Russian com-mand, i.e. the opportunity to control and commandthe more battleworthy units of national armedforces of CDTO. But this project could face noncom-pliance by Belarus, Kazakhstan not to mention sup-positional membership of Iran.

Nevertheless Russia’s activity in the region meansthe strengthening bet on military-based integrationdriver. It is the significant change taking into ac-count economic-based integration driver asEurasian Economic Union promoted by Kremlin inrecent years in the region. It is also the strong signof totally militarized foreign policy of Moscow thatturning back to the Cold War strategy and opposi-tion to the US and the West.

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AttEMPtINg ABRIDgE tO AfRICA

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KESTER KENN KLOMEGAH

Kester Kenn Klomegah is an independentresearcher and writer on African affairs

in the EurAsian region and former Soviet republics.

hile Russia's interest in the sub-Sa-haran Africa is nothing new, Russianauthorities have realized that it’stime to move back primarily to re-

claim its economic footprints and to find old Soviet-era allies, but that step comes with new challengesespecially from other foreign players and thechanging internal political and economic condi-tions in Africa. For the past few years, Russia author-ities have taken steady and strategic steps at thepossibility of pushing huge investments in lucrativesectors as ways to strengthen bilateral relations andexpand economic cooperation in a number ofAfrican countries. That show of corporate invest-ment and business interests have been sealed intovarious agreements, for instance, were the resultsfrom high-powered state delegations that fre-quently visited both regions, Russia and Africa, lastyear and during the first half of 2015.

tHE CASPIAN PROJECt 18 55 /56

WKeir Giles, an associate fellow of the Royal Instituteof International Affairs (Chatham House) in Londonexplained to me in an email interview that "Russia'sapproach to Africa is all about making up for losttime. The Soviet Union's intense involvement inAfrican nations came to an abrupt halt in the early1990s, and for a long time Moscow simply didn'thave the diplomatic and economic resources to payattention to Africa while Russia was consumed withinternal problems."

According to Giles "that changed in the last decade,thanks to two things: the arrival of PresidentVladimir Putin with a new foreign policy focus, andthe massive influx of cash on the back of increasedoil prices, which transformed Russian state finances.Russia is interested both in economic opportunitiesand in rebuilding political relationships that had insome ways been on hold for over a decade."

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In order to raise Russia's economic influence andprofile in Africa, in June 2009, the CoordinatingCommittee on Economic Cooperation with Sub-Sa-haran Africa, popularly referred to as AfroCom, wascreated on the initiative of the Russian FederationChamber of Commerce and Industry and Vneshe-conombank to help promote and facilitate Russianbusiness in Africa. Since its creation, it has had full-fledged support from the Russian Government, theFederation Council and State Duma, the Ministry ofForeign Affairs and the African diplomatic commu-nity.The vice-president of the Chamber of Commerceand Industry of the Russian Federation, GeorgiPetrov, noted at the AfroCom's annual executivemeeting held in April 2015 that "in view of the cur-rent geopolitical situation in the world and the eco-nomic situation in Russia Russian businesses haveto look for new markets. In this regard, of particularinterest is the African continent, which today is oneof the fastest growing regions in the world with anannual GDP growth - 5%. In addition, opportunitiesfor projects in Africa are opened with the accessionof South Africa to the BRICS bloc." Brazil, Russia,India and China are members of BRICS.Reports also showed that Russia has startedstrengthening its economic cooperation by open-ing trade missions with the responsibility of provid-ing sustainable business services and plans tofacilitate import-export trade in a number of Africancountries. But, these Russian trade centers mustnecessarily embark on "Doing Business in Africa"campaign to encourage Russian businesses to takeadvantage of growing trade and investment oppor-tunities, to promote trade fairs and business-to-business matchmaking in key spheres inAfrica.Maxim Matusevich, an associate professorand director, Russian and East European StudiesProgram at the Seton Hall University, told me in aninterview discussion that "in the past decade therewas some revival of economic ties between Africaand Russia - mostly limited to arms trade and oil/gasexploration and extraction.

Russia's presence in Africa and within African mar-kets continues to be marginal and I think that Russiahas often failed to capitalize on the historical con-nection between Moscow and those African eliteswho had been educated in the Soviet Union.""It is possible that the ongoing crisis in the relationsbetween Russia and the West will stimulate Russia'sleadership to look for new markets for new sourcesof agricultural produce. Many African nations pos-sess abundant natural resources and have little in-terest in Russia's gas and oil. As it was during theSoviet times, Russia can only offer few manufac-tured goods that would successfully compete withWestern-made products. African nations will prob-ably continue to acquire Russian-made arms, butotherwise, I see only few prospects for a diversifica-tion of cooperation in the near future," addedMaxim Matusevich.

As Buziness Africa gathered in May 2015, RussianForeign Minister Sergei Lavrov has held talks duringthe first quarter of this year with a number of statedelegations at various levels and that included For-eign Ministers from Burundi, Tanzania, Algeria,Gabon, Guinea, Madagascar, Libya and Zambia.And also at the start of this year, the high-rankingRussian delegation headed by special presidentialrepresentative for the Middle East and Africa,Mikhail Bogdanov, participated in the 24th OrdinarySession of the Assembly of Heads of States and Gov-ernments of the African Union and on the sidelinesheld series of diplomatic discussions with represen-tatives from some African countries in Addis Ababa,Ethiopia."On the sidelines of the forum, Mikhail Bogdanovhad meetings and talks with President of the Re-public of the Congo Denis Sassou Nguesso, Presi-dent of Mauritania, Mohamed Abdel Aziz, Presidentof Madagascar Hery Rajaonarimampianina, Presi-dent of Equatorial Guinea Obiang Nguema Mba-sogo, President of Gabon Ali Bongo, Vice Presidentof Angola Manuel Vicente, Deputy Secretary Gen-eral of the Arab League Ahmed Ben Helli."

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"The parties discussed current bilateral and regionalagendas, further improvement of diverse coopera-tion between Russia and Africa, including coopera-tion with sub-regional organizations of thecontinent," according to the transcript posted to theofficial website of the Foreign Ministry. Further tothat, Lavrov held a meeting on the sidelines of the69th session of the United Nations General Assem-bly in New York. The meeting was attended on theSADC side by representatives of Zimbabwe (theSADC presiding country), Angola, Zambia, Namibia,Mauritius, Malawi, Mozambique, Seychelles, Tanza-nia, the Republic of South Africa, as well as SADC Ex-ecutive Secretary.

Without doubts, Russia's strategic return to Africahas sparked academic discussions at various levelswhere academic researchers openly admitted thatpolitical consultations are on track, arms exportshas significantly increased, but other export prod-ucts are extremely low. Russia's involvement in in-frastructure development has also been low for thepast decades on the continent.

In an interview, Themba Mhlongo, Head of Pro-grammes at the Southern Africa Trust, thinks thatAfrica should not expect higher trade flows withRussia simply because Africa has not engaged Rus-sia. Mhlongo told Buziness Africa media that "thereis still low Africa-Russia Dialogue or mechanism fordialoguing with Russia, and on the otherhand, Rus-sia has not been as aggressive as China in pursuingopportunities in Africa because Russia has naturalresources and markets in Eastern Europe, SouthWest Asia. Russian exports to Africa might be dom-inated by machinery and military equipment whichserves their interest well."

He suggested that Africa must engage all BRICSmembers equally including Brazil and Russia inorder to build alliances and open trade opportuni-ties including finance and investment opportuni-ties. Also African countries must not seem to showpreferences in their foreign policy in favour of West-ern Europe if they want to benefit from trade rela-tions with Russia. They must learn to be neutral!

Mhlongo suspects that Africa still holds an old viewabout Russia being a communist state and lesstechnologically developed or unsophisticated com-pared to Western Europe. But, Russia never colo-nized Africa and therefore there are no colonial tiesbetween the two. "If you look at African trade flowsto Europe they reflect colonial ties most of the time.However, modern Russia is now one of the impor-tant emerging market countries and a member ofBRICS. The Russian society is also closed and orien-tation is towards Western Europe in particular theUnited States (probably as a result of the period ofbi-polar global power system that existed before).Although Russia exports to Africa but rarely sets upbusinesses. The language (or culture in general)could be one of the barriers to the development oftrade relations with Russia," he pointed out.He further proposed that both Africa and Russia caninitiate a dialogue in the form of Africa-Russian busi-ness summit to explore economic opportunities be-tween them. However, there are other avenues toengage each other through the BRICS bloc orthrough bilateral diplomatic channels. Russia hasembassies in Africa and African countries havediplomatic representations in Russia. Africa mayhave to pay special attention to cultural issues andtry to understand Russia in this ever changing envi-ronment and find an entry point to engage Russia.

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On her part, Alexandra Arkhangelskaya, a senior re-searcher at the Institute of African Studies under theRussian Academy of Sciences and a staff lecturer atthe Moscow High School of Economics told Buzi-ness Africa in an interview that Russia and Africaneeded each other – “Russia is a vast market notonly for African minerals, but for various othergoods and products produced by African countries.”The signs for Russian-African relations are impres-sive - declarations of intentions have been made,important bilateral agreements signed - now it re-mains to be seen how these intentions and agree-ments will be implemented in practice, she pointedout in the interview.The revival of Russia-Africa relations should be en-hanced in all fields: political, economic, trade, scien-tific, technological, and cultural. Obstacles to thebroadening of Russian-Africa relations should beaddressed. These include in particular the lack ofknowledge in Russia about the situation in Africa,and vice versa, suggested Arkhangelskaya."As we witness rapid deterioration of relations be-tween Russia and the West unfold, Russia's decisionto ban the import of some agricultural productsfrom countries that have imposed sanctions againstMoscow offers great opportunities for the expan-sion of trade of such products from Africa," the aca-demic professor observed in her discussion.Experts, who have researched Russia's foreign pol-icy in Africa, at the Russian Academy of Sciences' In-stitute for African Studies, have reiterated thatRussia's exports to Africa can be possible only afterthe country's industrial based experiences a morequalitative change and introducing tariff prefer-ences for trade with African partners.

As a reputable institute during the Soviet era, it hasplayed a considerable part in the development ofAfrican studies in the Russian Federation.

"The situation in Russian-African foreign trade willchange for the better, if Russian industry undergoestechnological modernization, the state providesRussian businessmen systematic and meaningfulsupport, and small and medium businesses receivewider access to foreign economic cooperation withAfrica," according the views of Professor AlekseiVasiliev, the director of the RAS Institute for AfricanStudies and full member of the Russian Academy ofSciences, and Evgeny Korendyasov, an expert at theRAS Institute for African Studies.

Statistics on Africa's trade with foreign countriesvary largely. For example, the total U.S. two-waytrade in Africa has actually fallen off in recent years,to about $60 billion in 2013, far eclipsed by the Eu-ropean Union with over $200 billion and China,whose more than $200 billion is a huge increasefrom $10 billion in 2000, according to a recent"Africa in Focus " website post by the Brookings In-stitution. According to the Chamber of Commerceand Industry of the Russian Federation, Russia'strade with Africa, south of the Sahara, is only $3.2billion.

In one of his speeches posted to the official website,Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov notedfrankly in remarks: "it is evident that the significantpotential of our economic cooperation is far frombeing exhausted and much remains to be done sothat Russian and African partners know more abouteach other's capacities and needs. The creation of amechanism for the provision of public support tobusiness interaction between Russian companiesand the African continent is on the agenda."

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