The Greater Caspian Project 25

Editorial

thE China-russia axis and Eurasia

GIANCARLO ELIA VALORI

russia and thE amEriCan PrEsidEnCy

DR. MATTHEW CROSSTON

aliCE through thE looking glass

CEntral asia’s EtErnal PrEsidEnCiEs

HEATH ALEXANDER

CPEC: thE rEal gamE ChangEr

for CEntral asia

NASURULLAH BROHI

thE grEatnEss of a ‘normal’ iran

thE rEal ChallEngEs for a Post-JCPoa

STEPHEN SARTY

syria’s ‘ComPEting intErvEntions’

muCh ado aCComPlishing nothing

ALEXANDER S. MARTIN

stratEgiC hatrEd

how Putin manEuvErs with radiCal islam

JEFFERY FISHEL

Russia and isRael impRoving Relations

a geostRategic analysis

GIANCARLO ELIA VALORI

multiple choice

the sco Finds its Way

ANONYMOUS

vitalizing Russia- Japan Relations

DR. ABDUL RUFF

suicidal nucleaR gambit on caucasus

PETRA POSEGA

the connection betWeen tapi-cpec

and aFghanistan

NASURULLAH BROHI

Russia-aFRica

the Realities and the tRuths

KESTER KENN KLOMEGAH

BruCe aDrianCe

KeVin auGustine

anatoLii Baronin

troy BaXter

GreGory BreW

nasuruLLaH BroHi

staCey Cottone

antony CLeMent

anDy DeaHn

nenaD DrCa

sara Dyson

JareD s. easton

GianCarLo eLia VaLori

JeFFery FisHeL

BaHauDDin Foizee

HeatH aLeXanDer

Laura GarriDo

orHan GaFarLi

aaron GooD

aMy HanLon

Jeanette "JJ" HarPer

JonatHan Hartner

Brian HuGHes

rusiF HuseynoV

anDrii KoLPaKoV

nina LaVrenteVa

VLaDisLaV LerMontoV

aLessanDro LunDini

PauLa MaLott

MeGan Munoz

eLena M.

aLeXanDer s. Martin

THE grEaTEr CaSPIaN PrOJECT

BI-WEEKLY DIgITaL EDITION

www.moderndiplomacy.eu

[email protected]

DImITrIS gIaNNaKOPOuLOS

Modern Diplomacy, Editor-in-chief

Dr. maTTHEW CrOSSTON

The Caspian Project, Director

Luisa Monteiro

norBerto MoraLes rosa

tayLor Morse

JoHn CoDy MosBey

saraH noLDer

teJa PaLKo

GaBrieLa PasCHoLati

JosHua Patterson

Petra PoseGa

Dayna riCe

JessiCa reeD

GreGory rouDyBusH

Dr. aBDuL ruFF

stePHen sarty

DMitrii seLtser

ProF. Dr. VLaDisLaV B.

sotiroViC

raKesH KrisHnan siMHa

eVan tHoMsen

Dianne a. VaLDez

CHristoPHer WHite

LoGan WiLDe

tiM WoBiG

authoRs

“The society that

separates its scholars from

its warriors will have its

thinking done by cowards

and its fighting by fools”

Thucydides

www.moderndiplomacy.eu

This edition continues the general GCP trend ofexpanding its scope and geographical reach, asthe issues covered within, founded with initiatorswithin the greater Caspian region, end up takingour readers across the Middle East, Asia, Africa,and deep into the European Union.

Tradecraft is a state essential. It always shall be. Insome ways, the royal and ancient tradition of re-alpolitik has also been at least associated withtrade. We here at GCP think that association in thecyber age with high technology and instanta-neous transfer and interaction is only becomingmore embedded and more manipulated into thepolitical realm. This edition helps us all under-stand that dangerous process in better detail.

he quarter century mark in GCP edi-tions sees us investigating one of themore complicated issues in the worldtoday, but one that will only be in-

creasingly important for both peace and war:strategic trade and the global politics such tradeimpacts. Traditionally speaking, trade has beentrumpeted as a great bridge-builder, a facilitatorof dialogue and connectivity that is even capableof overcoming political discord. But as we movedeeper into the 21st century it seems economicrealpolitik, for lack of a better term, is becoming aprimary engine of international trade: it is not soeasy to assume that interdependence, that greatneoliberal political science word of the late 20thcentury, is going to promote peace as much asdeepening rivalries and exacerbating tensions inthe 21st century. This edition is all about this newface of tradecraft.

This is not to say every aspect in the new modernage of trade is secretly holding the danger of waror that every state has ulterior motives kept hid-den from potential trading partners. We are nottrying to completely undermine the positive ca-pacity of global economic interaction. But moreattention needs to be paid at how much politicalinterests and national security concerns andglobal strategic positioning are now informing thetrade agendas being brought forth by states allaround the world.

Tradecraftand Trade Wars

T

Prof. Dr. Matthew Crosston-

Greater Caspian Project, Director

The China-Russia axis

and Eurasia

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

he profound con-nection between theSlavs and the Asianraces has a promi-

nent place in the long-standingtradition of the Eurasist doctrine.At philosophical and geoculturallevels, it is as if the Russians stillrepresented the "Third Rome" -that of the final reconstructionand restoration of the Europeancivilization and its Imperium -which unites with the Asianworld, that is the beginning andthe end of the sapiential develop-ment of mankind.

It is worth noting, however, thatthese doctrines - born in a con-servative context and often advo-cated by the counter-revolutionary “White Guard” - arecurrently the point of reference ofwhat we might call the "Presi-dency ideology" in the years char-acterized by Vladimir Putin’sleadership.

THE GREATER CASPIAN PROJECT 25

Hence Eurasia as dominationover the Asian Heartland - ac-cording to Mackinder’s geopolit-ical theories - and spiritual andpolitical connection with penin-sular Europe, as well as point forcontrolling all "world seas", rang-ing from the Atlantic sea throughthe European peninsula to thePacific sea, which washes theEastern region of the Asian Heart-land.

Eurasia is a strategic invariant.

This is the significant philosophi-cal universe where the new Eura-sist doctrine is developing which,however, suffers the inevitabledistance between the Europeanand Mediterranean peninsulaand the New Continent.Conversely, the rationale – and,indeed, the esotericism - of theAtlantic Pact is a philosophical,rather than a military project,combining the British Masonic

tradition, which defined the ideaof modern Empire, with the Euro-pean Protestantism. Hence theModern values, which are em-bodied in the occult tradition oftheosophy and the end of timepending the Last Revelation.It is worth noting, however, thatthese approaches are not alien tothe geopolitical, strategic andmilitary context which designedthe bilateral confrontation of theCold War. As already mentioned,in the current geophilosophicalframework, the underlyingtheme is the union between theSlavs and Asian races, especiallythe Han Chinese.Therefore theHeartland cultural model is thatof Tradition against the destruc-tion of the Sacred; of Wisdomagainst what Hegel called the"calculation-based science"(Denken als Rechnen); of the peo-ple against individualism, as wellas of social economy against theatomized market.

T

Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and busi-nessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders.Mr Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at theworld’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew Uni-versity of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York.

GIANCARLO ELIA VALORIAdvisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa

All ideas of the spiritualist andpan-Slavist Right which today re-emerge in the Eurasian project,after the USSR collapse. All ideaswhich developed within the Bol-shevik apparata, including the in-telligence, and have spread untilcurrent times.Ironically, these were the ideas ofa saint and a mathematical ge-nius, as well as orthodox priest,Pavel Florenskij, whom Stalin or-dered to assassinate in the con-centration camp of the SolovkiIslands.

Before being shot dead by the se-cret police (GPU), the Russianmystic (another Eurasist fracture:mysticism vs. rationalism) haddiscovered the properties of elec-trical superconductivity at lowtemperatures.Let us revert, however, to currentand future geoeconomic equilib-ria in the Russian-Chinese system.Considering the strong presenceof jihadists in Central Asia, it ishighly likely for Al Baghdadi’sCaliphate - territorially defeatedbetween Syria and Iraq - to be re-built in Central Asia - at the junc-tion between the Russiancivilization and the Han world -on Afghanistan's rubble and inthe now critical region betweenTajikistan and Uzbekistan.According to the latest data,throughout Central Asia 10,000 ji-hadists are fighting ISIS, while3,000 are Russian Islamic terror-ists and only 800 are those com-ing from China.

These figures are such as to causealarm among the various govern-ments in the region.

It is the terrorist globalization ofthe Islamic jihad, which splits theEurasian project into two, thusrunning away from a more dan-gerous Mediterranean and a nowunmanageable North Africa alsofor the so-called "radical" Islam.

Furthermore the proximity of thenew Islamist circle to the two newpowers, namely Russia and China,allows the unleashing of strongideological and religious tensionsin the Chinese AutonomousProvince of Xinjiang, inhabited bythe Muslim Uighurs of Turkish ori-gin, as well as the future destabi-lization of the Urals and CentralSiberia.

Russia and China does not wantanyone to interfere and intrudeinto the new Heartland, not onlythe jihad but also the other majorglobal powers. This is the sense of tensions inUkraine, the gateway to Asia, or inGeorgia, the possible link be-tween NATO and the Russian sys-tem.

The other option is for the UnitedStates to strengthen their bilat-eral dialogue with China withoutRussian cooperation, but theUnited States keep on supportingthe peripheral countries’ colourrevolutions - a fact which Chinaviews with utmost fear.

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

RUSSIA AND CHINA

DOES NOT wANT

ANYONE TO INTERfERE

AND INTRUDE INTO

THE NEw HEARTLAND,

NOT ONLY

THE JIHAD bUT ALSO

THE OTHER MAJOR

GLObAL POwERS

At economic and financial levels,early this year the Russian andChinese Central Banks have pro-moted a Memorandum of Under-standing for local parities andfinancial exchanges and trading,while the Russian Direct Invest-ment Fund, the Vneshkombanke,and the China-Eurasia EconomicFund have reached an agreementto manage the Chinese invest-ment flows into the Russian econ-omy, especially in Siberia and inthe trans-Baikal region.

Currently the Russian Federationsells advanced weapons to China,but it does not want to create op-portunities for reverse engineer-ing, nor it intends to accept theChinese decision not to sell Russ-ian weapons to China’s competi-tors in Asia, namely India andVietnam.Moreover China keeps on invest-ing in Ukraine, with as many as 15billion US dollars for the construc-tion of housing, while supportingthe technological upgrade ofUkraine’s IT network.

Furthermore, Russia does not ac-cept the Chinese plan to set upan investment bank for the SilkRoad Initiative, thus speeding upthe Chinese choice of establish-ing the Asian Infrastructure In-vestment Bank, which has widergeopolitical relevance and tendsto dilute the Chinese power intothe wider European and interna-tional context.On top of it, Russiadoes not accept the Chinese plan

to create different trading plat-forms, possibly opposed to theWTO. At strategic level, China andRussia offer to their neighbours ofthe Shanghai Cooperation Or-ganization a series of operationalopportunities to achieve internalstability. The starting point wasthe Sino-Russian Agreement ofMay 2015, in which the two coun-tries linked the Eurasian integra-tion to the Chinese Silk RoadInitiative.According to the World Bank,China has already invested 13 bil-lion US dollars in Kazakhstan, asagainst the Netherlands which,however, have allocated 64 USdollars. China is the main opera-tor of Foreign Direct Investment(FDI) in Kyrgyzstan, with 299 bil-lion US dollars, while Russia hasappropriated 161 billion US dol-lars.

Hence probably Russia and Chinawant to continue along theselines, thus avoiding dangerousmilitary implications and invasiveoperations on the territory ofcountries which are also at risk ofjihad. It is also worth recalling theTPP impact on the Eurasianeconomies. As can be easilyimagined, both the Pacific TTPand the Atlantic TTIP are de-signed to enable the UnitedStates to destabilize the Eurasianproject. Furthermore Israel hasexcellent economic and strategicrelations with Kazakhstan, whichsupplies to the Jewish State aquarter of its oil needs.Therefore the Eurasian projectnow reaches up to the Mediter-ranean while, on November 29,2015 Israel broke off negotiationswith the EU regarding the peaceprocess in the Middle East.


MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

Russia and the American

Presidency

perseverance of the Trump cam-paign, the reality beyond Americaseems to show his candidacy isbeing taken quite seriously by othercountries. Some may even be takingit not just seriously but favorablywhen compared to the anticipatedpresidency of another Clinton.At the moment, Russia seems to beone of those countries. However,deeper analysis shows this ‘support’might be more of an indictmentagainst past Hillary positions andstatements rather than based onreal evidence that accurately pre-dicts what a Trump presidencymight mean for Moscow. In fact,looking at both candidates strictlyfrom a ‘what-this-means-for-Russia?’perspective reveals the next fouryears of White House-Kremlin rela-tions could be rather problematicno matter who wins.

hether one trulybelieves in theold adage thatthe President of

the United States is the ‘leader ofthe free world’ and ‘the mostpowerful person on the globalstage,’ it is unquestionable thatwhoever holds the Oval Office inthe White House wields tremen-dous influence and impact far be-yond the borders of America. Asthe world looks on with fascina-tion in 2016 at the coming con-frontation between HillaryClinton and Donald Trump, ques-tions remain as to which candi-date is favored by which foreignleaders. While mainstream Americanmedia is still basically coveringthe race with horrified fascinationat the popularity and

W


Matthew Crosston is Professorof Political Science, Director ofthe International Security andIntelligence Studies Program,and the Miller Chair at Belle-vue University

DR. MATTHEw CROSSTONSenior Editor, Caspian Project Director

level of the President himself,American presidential race his-tory also weighed heavily in ex-plaining these right-of-centerpositions for a left-of-center Pres-ident. This same heavy weight af-fects Hillary just as much asObama and therefore bears re-peating.

Why do liberal leaders in Americabecome largely conservativestatesmen when it comes to realdecision-making on the globalstage? Some of this is undoubt-edly tied to what Democrats havehad to fend off as an entire partyin the past generation of

presidential races: that Democ-rats are too focused on domesticaffairs and are unfit or inexperi-enced to handle world affairs. Inessence, Democrats always haveto defend against the accusationof being foreign policy weaklings.This accusation is never leveledagainst Republican candidates(even when a particular candi-date may be internationally ama-teurish, his party’s reputationallegacy is apparently automati-cally transferred to him. This isclearly happening today withTrump).

This ‘Chamberlain Syndrome’ (De-mocrat-as-global-appeaser) hasexisted for quite some time, but itwas surely exacerbated by 9/11and the new emphasis on na-tional security. It was a major partof the lead-up to the 2004 elec-tion, when some analystswarned, ‘if Democrats are to haveany hope of returning to power in2004, or even of running compet-itively and keeping the U.S. two-party system healthy andbalanced in the coming decade,they will have to convince theAmerican people that they are ascapable as Republicans of pro-tecting the United States fromterrorism and other securitythreats.’ While it was assumed thatit would be quite some time be-fore Democrats could actuallywin national elections based ontheir national security and foreignpolicy stances, the big hope wasto have the party advance far

Hillary Clinton

Before some of the specific state-ments and positions of HillaryClinton on Russia are considered,a subtle comment needs to bemade about the state of foreignpolicy within the DemocraticParty, especially when it comes topotential candidates for Presi-dent. Approximately four years ago Ipublished a very popular piecethat argued how the foreign pol-icy of President Barack Obamawas by and large ‘Republican’ inits conservative orthodoxy. WhileI admitted that this traditionalistapproach could be partially ex-plained by the personal comfort

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

enough so that it would stop los-ing national elections solely be-cause of these two factors. Thiswas arguably the biggest lessonlearned from the Democratic fail-ure of 2004, when Vietnam warveteran, Purple Heart winner, andlong-time Foreign Affairs Senatestalwart John Kerry lost to Bush,who had no such internationalmilitary service accolades to leanon.While in the past Democratscould always criticize Republicansfor being too eager to considerwar (all stick, no carrot), the re-verse accusation thrown back atDemocrats post-9/11 seemedmore damning (all carrot, nostick).

What Democrats as a partyneeded to ensure was that Amer-icans could see them as not tooweak or awkward when it cameto handling said stick. Undoubt-edly this was a legacy lessonmade disturbingly eternal whenMassachusetts Governor MichaelDukakis stuck his head out of atank in 1988, ostensibly to makepeople believe in his toughness,and instead became the butt ofsuch jokes and ridicule that it ar-guably led to his loss to GeorgeH.W. Bush.

It seems clear that ever since thatdebacle Democrats have beenquick to overreact to such criti-cism. They thus tend to be even

quicker than Republicans to lineup and show the ‘militarychevrons’ symbolically tattooedon their arms, signifying theirwillingness and capability to de-fend America as aggressively asthe opposing party. This historicalweight was prominent on Obamabecause his past experience as aChicago community organizer,followed by very limited serviceas a single-term Senator, createda hyper-sensitivity to ‘not beinginternationally ready.’ If anything,this same weight is heavier onHillary: not only must she fightthe traditionally sexist accusa-tions made against all womenpoliticians as being ‘peacemakers’and not ‘war-makers.’


MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

dramatically her issue foci andtemperament have adapted overtime.

-Hillary still maintains unofficialand official contacts within herEastern European team that are,amazingly, highly adaptable neo-conservative holdovers from theBush administration and havesucceeded in staying near to theears of Obama, Clinton, and Kerryover time. Anatol Lieven, therenowned scholar at King’s Col-lege London, has openly decriedthat too many of the figures cur-rently surrounding Hillary are oldschool members of the military,foreign policy, and security estab-lishment that chronically viewRussia with Cold War attitudes, re-gardless of evidence.

-During the Crimea crisis in 2014,Hillary tried to make a connectionbetween Putin policy on the se-cession/annexation issue withpolicies pursued by Adolph Hitlerin the 1930s. Given that over 20 million Rus-sians died fighting Hitler, a sacri-fice many historians the worldover consider the crucial lynchpinthat ultimately led to Hitler’s de-feat, and that WWII in Russia is of-ficially known instead as the‘Great Fatherland War,’ it was in-credibly rash and ill-thought tomake such flippantly inaccurateconnections given how impor-tant Russian-American relationswill continue to be to the officeHillary is pursuing.

She also must fight her own per-sonal history, which if anythingbegan as classically feminist andliberal, two things never com-monly associated with the mili-tary or the utilization of hardpower. Given this background,both within the party in generaland her personality in specific, itbecomes much easier to under-stand why Hillary’s commentsand positions over the years havebeen so decidedly skeptical andcritical toward Russia. Easier tounderstand, however, does notnecessarily translate into easier toaccept.

-Many of Hillary’s critics tend tocite her steadfast belief in themythology of ‘American excep-tionalism’ and the country’s self-proclaimed role as ‘leader of thefree world.’ To be fair, most Wash-ington politicians will at least givepublic voice to these same ideasbut few have also been Secretaryof State and maintain very closeties to the military-security com-plex. It was Ralph Nader who de-cried her as both a ‘deepcorporatist and deep militarist…never having met a weapons sys-tem she didn’t like.’ Perhaps mostsignificant, this characterizationwould have been impossible toimagine when she began inWashington as First Lady.

One only need look at the failedmanaged health care initiativeBill Clinton gave to her chargeduring his first term to see how

wHY DO

LIbERAL LEADERS

IN AMERICA

bECOME LARGELY

CONSERVATIVE

STATESMEN

wHEN IT COMES

TO REAL

DECISION-MAkING

ON THE GLObAL

STAGE?


-At the powerful and influentialBrookings Institution, Hillarystated that more needed to bedone to ‘up the costs’ on Russia ingeneral and Putin in specific be-cause of Russian action in Syria.These comments were of coursemade under the aegis of honor-ing international law and wantingan end to conflict, even thoughRussia was formally invited toenter Syria and its interventionwas technically in line with saidinternational law.

Neither statement can be for-mally applied to the American as-sistance given to the chaoticallydiverse opposition groups tryingto overthrow Assad. This type of ‘reworking the narra-tive’ is continually irritating toRussia: what it considers to beblatant and untruthful manipula-tion of the global media coveringevents actually transpiring on theground.

-Hillary has not been very gra-cious when discussing her per-sonal opinion of Putin as a man,having once even described himas having ‘no soul.’ In her book“Hard Choices”, she called him‘thin-skinned and autocratic.’ Thisfuels a general perception withinthe corridors of power in Russiathat perhaps Hillary views this re-lationship too personally: that aslong as Vladimir Putin is Presidentof Russia (which could very wellbe for the entirety of a Hillarypresidency), then she will not

strive to achieve better relationswith the country nor will sheeven treat Russia as an equalpartner on areas of global mutualinterest.

-Hillary has maintained self-serv-ing double standards in inter-views, drawing false distinctionsbetween the presidencies ofMedvedev from 2008-2012 andthe return of Putin after 2012. Onthe one hand, she would decryMedvedev of simply doing thebidding of Prime Minister Putin,but then on the other handwould praise her ability to workand get things done withMedvedev. Medvedev, therefore,has been both a puppet whodoes nothing and a puppet mas-ter who let the United Statesachieve a nuclear arms deal, Iran-ian sanctions, and facilitate fur-ther operations in Afghanistan.

In a massively publicized inter-view with the famous televisionjournalist Judy Woodruff, Hillaryclearly established a stancemarked by distrust and warinesstoward Russia, even if begrudg-ingly acknowledging that it wasstill a country that had to beworked with.While many traditional liberalswithin the Democratic Party haveissues with what they consider tobe the blatantly ‘far right’ conser-vative foreign policy positions ofHillary, the real concern for theRussian Federation is that it seesher as a candidate that, correctlyor incorrectly, wants to use Russiaand Putin as a convenient scape-goat and whipping boy to estab-lish her own ‘toughness’ on theglobal stage and leans on out-dated Cold War rhetoric to ana-lyze contemporary strategies andinitiatives.

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

If Russia is interested in establish-ing new 21stcentury relationswith the United States not be-holden instinctively to the lega-cies of the 20th, then it ishard-pressed to view Hillary Clin-ton as the President that wouldbe willing to create such an envi-ronment. This is what likely fuelsthe quasi-positive statementscoming from Russia about Don-ald Trump. Unfortunately, Russiashould be wary of wanting a Pres-ident just because he isn’t Hillary.While Donald brings a differentstyle and approach to potentialrelations with Russia, it does notmean those relations will pro-duce anything new and innova-tive.

Donald Trump

Having examined some of themore strident comments andcommentaries made by Hillarytoward Russia, it is hard to avoidthe impression that Russia maybe ‘supporting’ a Trump presi-dency in very much the same wayso many Americans are: they sim-ply do not want a Clinton presi-dency. In my university classes Ioften caution students from en-gaging in what I call ‘negativevoting:’ the vote being cast is notso much FOR a particular candi-date but rather AGAINST the op-posing one. When citizens castvotes based on negation ratherthan affirmation, then it is not un-common that the succeedingpresidency is ultimately disap-pointing. I believe this will be ap-plicable to Russia as well if itthinks simply preventing Hillaryresults automatically in a betterpresidency for Russian-Americanrelations. To wit:

-Within Donald’s campaign hasbeen a penchant for making boldstatements that subsequently getwalked back soon after. He did itwith the building of a wall againstMexicans; did it with the promiseto tax the super-rich; did it withthe promise to raise the mini-mum wage; did it with the pro-posal to simply ban allself-declared Muslims from enter-ing the country.

While many Democrats (and Re-publicans for that matter) lamentthis as making it impossible tounderstand just what a Trumppresidency will truly look like,many former business associateshave warned that this spinningand counter-spinning is what hisadministration will be: no solidprinciples, simply a willingness tojump back and forth across dia-metrically opposed positionswith no real logic as to why.

wHILE IN THE PAST DEMOCRATS COULD ALwAYS CRITICIzE

REPUbLICANS fOR bEING TOO EAGER TO CONSIDER wAR

(ALL STICk, NO CARROT),

THE REVERSE ACCUSATION THROwN bACk AT DEMOCRATS

POST-9/11 SEEMED MORE DAMNING

(ALL CARROT, NO STICk).

Ultimately, the accusation is oneof being supremely self-serving.Russia may think this is a person-ality it can work with, but thatmakes an assumption that theself-serving egotism will be ra-tional and predictable. Moscowseems to emphasize the word‘pragmatism’ with Donald. Butthe policy spins, flip-flops, andcontradictions do not indicatepragmatism. They indicate unre-liability.

-Donald has made headlines bysaying he is willing to work withRussia, ‘but only from a positionof strength,’ while also addingthat the United States should bewilling to walk away from Russiaif it is ‘too demanding.’ SinceHillary has so clearly staked out aposition openly antagonistic to-ward Russia, comments like thesefrom Donald make it seem like adramatically different policy. Inreal terms, it is not. The key is clu-ing in to the code words. When-ever a politician in Americaspeaks about positions ofstrength and not wanting to seean opponent too demanding, it isbasically arguing for the verysame position crafted by Hillary:the preferences of the UnitedStates will take priority and work-ing together only takes place ifAmerica is granted the clear lead-ership role.

This attitudinal arrogance hasbeen sanctified in Russian-Amer-ican relations since the dissolu-tion of the Soviet Union and noPresident so far has seemed will-ing to blaze a new path. Donald’scomments are not trailblazing:they are secretly masked to hidewhat will simply be more of thestatus quo. He will be partner toPutin as long as Putin accepts asubordinate role, which, obvi-ously, seems highly unlikely.


-The previous point is a perfectsegue to what will likely be thereal fuel between Trump andPutin – ego and machismo. Thesetwo things are currency to Don-ald. It is clearly what he admiresabout Putin: whether countriesaround the world approve or dis-approve of Putin policies and ini-tiatives, one thing is never denied– his power and undeniablesense of authority over his ad-ministration and system.

That Donald sees this as some-thing to admire does not in factindicate a willingness to be ‘men-tored’ by Putin. Rather, it is farmore plausible that the relation-ship devolves quickly into a battleof egos. In America, this is oftendenigrated as a ‘pissing contest.’When Putin called Donald a‘bright person, talented withouta doubt,’ it inspired Trump to re-spond: ‘I like him because hecalled me a genius. He said Trumpis the real leader.’ In other words, substance mat-ters not. Just be sure to stroke theDonald’s ego and he will consideryou a ‘friend’ and ‘partner.’ Butwhat will his mercurial personal-ity do when a disagreement onsubstance overrides any mutualadmiration society based onstyle? For Donald, it will be theend of partnership, the end offriendship, and thus, the end of‘new’ Russian-American relations.Ironically, Russia may find outthat only Putin is the pragmatist.Donald is simply a narcissist.

-In a bit of reverse psychology,Russia should be wary when oneof the most biting opponents ofPutin, the former world chesschampion Garry Kasparov, vocif-erously proclaims how Trump isthe American version of ‘Putinism’and that Donald’s presidencywould be the ‘best hope’ for Rus-sia.

Kasparov’s logic is that the elec-tion of Donald would severelyweaken American democracyand rip apart positive trans-At-lantic relations. Put simply, Kas-parov treats Donald like a defacto agent of Russian interests,ie, Donald would be willingly sub-ordinate to Putin. As mentionedbefore, ego and narcissism willnot allow that. In the current stateof Russian-American relations,when so many Americans arebeing fed stories about the adver-sarial aggressiveness of Russia,there simply is no evidence-based thought process to makesomeone believe Donald wouldbuck American opinion about aso-called enemy. Rather, he ismuch more likely to sycophanti-cally cater to American paranoia,in order to guarantee his ownneed for self-aggrandizement.

-Finally, the comments of Kon-stantin Kosachev, Chairman ofthe Upper House Committee forForeign Affairs, illustrate perfectlyhow much of the hope on Donaldis really just about the lack ofhope with Hillary:

“New chances may appear onlyas radically new tendencies in theWhite House, and we are talkingnot only about pro-Russian senti-ments, we simply need somefresh air, some ‘wind of change’ inWashington.

JUST bECAUSE

DONALD IS NOT

HILLARY

DOES NOT MEAN

HE IS bETTER

OR MORE

APPROACHAbLE

fOR RUSSIA.

HIS TRACk RECORD

AND PERSONALITY

INDICATE OTHERwISE

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

Then, we can reset certain thingsand agree on continuation of thedialogue…In the context of thesetwo factors Trump looks slightlymore promising…At least, he iscapable of giving a shake toWashington. He is certainly apragmatist and not a missionarylike his main opponent Clinton.”

What this article has establishedis how misplaced such faith tendsto be when considering Donald.People in Russia are making falseconnections: if you are not a mis-sionary, then you must be a prag-matist. There are other moredangerous and damaging op-tions in that equation. It is not bi-nomial, 0 or 1. To repeat: justbecause Donald is not Hillarydoes not mean he is better ormore approachable for Russia.His track record and personalityindicate otherwise.

There are in fact some figures ofcautious moderation in Russiaand they are offering wisdom onthe coming election.

People like Aleksey Pushkov,head of the Lower House Com-mittee for Foreign Relations, andFyodor Lukyanov, head of theRussian Council on Foreign andDefense Policy, while admittingtheir understanding of the imme-diate Russian attraction of Don-ald over Hillary, also emphasizehow the ‘system’ of Washingtonpolitics tends to bring any incom-ing President quickly to heel andthat it is impossible to truly knowwhat to expect from a Trumppresidency.I think it is possible to reliably

guess, however. For Russian-American relations to signifi-cantly change from its currentnegative status quo, the incom-ing President would have to beeager and intellectually moti-vated to instill innovative newpolitical thinking and diplomaticpathways. Hillary has clearly staked her po-sition in the ranks of the OldGuard of suspicion, skepticism,and distrust. Donald perhaps hasnot done this publicly.

But his need to be adored and ad-mired by the American public (anAmerican public constantly fed asteady stream of negative per-ception and analysis about Russiaand Russian leadership) meanshe would have to be willing toabandon the feeding of his nar-cissism for the sake of improvedRussian relations. And while there are many myster-ies in this world, one thing is mostcertainly NOT a mystery: the per-son Donald has always lovedmost of all is…..the Donald.

Thus, Russia needs to be carefulas it approaches the coming 2016American presidential elections.Some loose assumptions andfalse connections are driving ap-parent loyalty to a candidate thatis unlikely to offer anything closeto what is hoped for. Indeed, itmay just be the sad news that2016 goes down simply as theAmerican election that offers Rus-sia option ‘C’ as the best choice:None of the above.


Alice through theLooking Glass

CENTRAL ASIA’S ETERNAL PRESIDENCIES

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

holpon Orozobekova’s article for TheDiplomat on CentralAsia’s autocratic

rulers is a fascinating look at themen who helped take the central‘stans, particularly Tajikistan,Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, fromcommunism to “democracy.” Justas fascinating is the prospect, foreach of these countries, of whowill finally succeed the commu-nist relics/reborn ‘democrats’ stillhoarding power. The president of Tajikistan, Emo-mali Rahman, is 63 and his cur-rent term ends in 2020. PresidentIslam Karimov of Uzbekistan is 77but was just reelected in 2015 foranother seven-year term. Finally,Kazakhstan’s sitting president,Nursultan Nazarbayev, is 75 andwas also just reelected in 2015,but to a five-year term in his case.These men, and their absolutecontrol over the political, eco-nomic, and military facets of theircountries, will have significant im-pact on the future of the GreaterCaspian Region.

Tajikistan

As mentioned in the article, Pres-ident Emomali is the autocratwith the best plan for his eventualreplacement. The Tajik constitu-tion was recently amended tolower the minimum age of thepresidency to 30 from 35. Not socoincidently, Rahmon’s son Rus-tam will be 32 when his father’scurrent term ends in 2020.

This foresight is not surprising,however, as Tajikistan has beencalled profoundly risk aversewhen it comes to politicalchange. Who better to replacethe current ruler than his ownson, groomed for most of hisadult life to succeed his father asthe Tajik president? In addition toall but ensuring his son’s ascen-dance after he leaves office, Rah-mon was also able to get a lawpassed by the Tajik parliament toname him “Leader of the Nation,”an honorific that also comes withthe ability to run for unlimitedterms if he so chooses.

C

HEATH ALExANDER

Heath Alexander is a retired Air Force Meteorologist and Analyst with fiveyears in Special Operations and another two as a Military Attaché in WestAfrica. He is currently pursuing a Bachelors of Science degree in Interna-tional Security and Intelligence Studies at Bellevue University in Omaha,NE, USA.


Whether Rahmon steps down in2020 or not, it can be assumedthat Rustam will enjoy the samekind of ‘electoral support’ his fa-ther has for the last twenty years.Rahmon carried the previousthree elections with 97%, 79%,and 83%, respectively. These re-sults are unsurprising, however,given the repeated calls by inter-national organizations about alack of pluralism and genuinechoice and fairness in Tajik elec-tions. Whatever the next decadeholds, it seems that Tajikistan hassteadily worked to ensure its ownwarped sense of political stabilityso that there will be limited resist-ance to the transition to the nextRahmon president.

Uzbekistan

The issue of Uzbek successionand stability is one of great con-cern in the region. President Kari-mov is 78 years old with twodaughters, one of whom is underde facto house arrest after beingtied to over a billion dollars inbribes from international telecomcompanies. This detainment hap-pened to coincide with a Swedishmoney laundering investigationinto businesses owned by the Ka-rimov family in general. Corrup-tion is an overarching theme inCentral Asia, but in Uzbek politicsparticularly, especially where theFirst Family is concerned. WhileKarimov wields tremendous po-litical power, the overt nepotismand ostentatious displays of

corruption-fueled wealth are thestuff popular uprisings are madeof theoretically. With Karimov’smortality rapidly approaching,dissent within the family, and notraditional or obvious chosenmale ‘political heir,’ Uzbekistanseems ripe, at least potentially, fora true regime disruption in thecoming decade as succession is-sues likely become forced to cen-ter stage.

Kazakhstan

President Nazarbayev appearsless concerned with finding hissuccessor than he is with usingscience to extend his own rule.He ordered the establishment ofa research institute in 2010 thatwould study the "rejuvenation ofthe organism," partially in an ef-fort to extend his own life and, byextension, his reign. How muchstock Nazarbayev puts in findinga modern-day scientific fountainof youth is debatable. However,the stock he puts in family culti-vation and grooming is undeni-able.

Much like President Emomali ofTajikistan, Nazarbayev is activelygrooming one of his offspring toeventually succeed him. In thiscase though Nazarbayev’s daugh-ter Dariga is the chosen succes-sor. She has already ascended tothe Deputy Prime Minister’s chair,effectively one step from co-rul-ing with her father when he’sready to share power.

HAVING THREE

COUNTRIES, ALL

CURRENTLY RULED bY

SEPTUAGENARIANS,

THAT bORDER EACH

OTHER AND HAVE

TO ExPECT REGIME

TRANSITIONS IN THE

NExT DECADE

SIMPLY bECAUSE Of

bIOLOGY IS THE STUff

REGIONAL NIGHTMARES

ARE MADE Of

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

Assuming that day comes, recentlegislation grants Nazarbayev ef-fective veto power over any polit-ical decisions, even after he hasstepped down from office, as wellas immunity from prosecution.How this will impact the effec-tiveness of his eventual succes-sor’s ability to rule remains to beseen. While it should ease thetransition, given that it seemslikely Nazarbayev will spend sev-eral years only ‘semi-retired’ fromthe presidency at first, it couldalso backfire by undermining anysense of legitimacy and inde-pendence in his daughter’s sub-sequent rule.

The Future of Central AsianSecurity

A transition from autocratic ruleis often dangerous, violent, anddestabilizing to an entire region.Having three countries, all cur-rently ruled by septuagenarians,that border each other and haveto expect regime transitions inthe next decade simply becauseof biology is the stuff regionalnightmares are made of. CentralAsia is also crisscrossed by naturalgas and oil pipelines feeding theRussian and Chinese economies,two states that have shown a will-ingness to diplomatically coerceand intimidate these so-calledNear Abroad countries.

Since all three countries arehighly susceptible to influencefrom Russia, and would likely bemore so in the event of a con-tested or ineffectual succession, itis not outside the realm of possi-bility that they would be used aspawns against Chinese interestsin the region as well.

China’s massively important OneBelt, One Road policy, whichheavily utilizes the Central Asianregion to bring about thistrade/communication/globaliza-tion initiative, will have no lesspassionate an interest in seeinghow succession maneuvers go.Any destabilizing influence couldnegatively affect all of thesecountries agendas, as well as thegreater Caspian region writ large.Whatever the outcome, CentralAsia is not exactly known forpeaceful, bloodless power transi-tions that uphold the principlesand hopes of consolidated ma-ture democracy. Unfortunately, there is no reasonto think this might change in thecoming decade.


he exceptional geo-graphical situationmakes Pakistan a realgateway between

South Asia and East Asia, and theactual hub of business activitiesin the region. The fact this posi-tion not merely confined with theCPEC but already extant, how-ever, together with the Corridorproject it will further facilitate thesmooth connectivity betweenSouth and East Asia. This geo-graphical situation gives Pakistana central position in terms of in-creased regional connectivity.

The economic development inmodern times is mainly depend-ent on the better infrastructuralconditions essential for the tradeand transport activities.

China’s active investment in agri-business and telecommunication,natural resource extractions in-cluding oil, gas, and uranium,gold and copper enhance the ex-ports greatly help the boost ofthe Central Asia economy. How-ever, such immense natural rich-ness of resources will hardlycontribute to the national devel-opment and the enhancement ofthe living standards if CentralAsian States obstruct and the facelimitations in terms of their tradeand export activities.

China has been a major player forthe infrastructural and economicdevelopment by building roads,tunnels, railway tracks, powerlines and oil refineries in CentralAsian states.

CPEC The Real Game Changer

for Central Asia

NASURULLAH bROHI

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

T

Nasurullah Brohi works as a Senior Research Associate at theStrategic Vision Institute, Islamabad

China has also been instrumentalin development of the two mostimportant Central Asian roadconnections of Osh-Sarytash-Irkeshtam and Bishkek-Naryn-Torugart in Kyrgyzstan andTajikistan respectively. The Irkesh-tam Pass crosses through theOsh–Sary Tash of Kyrgyzstan tothe Kashgar in China. Whereas,the Bishkek-Naryn-Torugart roadis the other most significanttransportation link route con-necting the Kyrgyzstan with partsof Europe-East Asia and the Cen-tral Asia Regional Economic Co-operation (CAREC) TransportCorridor and serves as key re-gional economic hub by connect-ing the landlocked CARECcountries with the Eurasian andglobal markets.

The road essentially links threeadministrative regions of the for-mer Soviet Union, i.e. Chui, Narynand Issyk-Kul and connect theterritories of Kyrgyzstan andChina across the Tian Shan moun-tain ranges of Torugart Pass andthe northern settlements of Kor-dai.

Ultimately, this important transittraffic route between Kyrgyzstanand China connects with theKarakorum highway of Pakistanproviding access to Russia andKazakhstan to access the ports ofIndian Ocean.

The CPEC is situated at the cross-roads of the Silk Road EconomicBelt and the 21st Century Mar-itime Silk Road.


The planned road and railwaynetworks of CPEC link China’s Xin-jiang Uygur Autonomous Regionwith the Southwest Pakistan'sdeepwater port of Gwadar. The CPEC is also an importantpart of the Belt and Road Initia-tive holding huge economic po-tential and businessopportunities for the whole re-gion. Realizing the importance ofCPEC for Central Asian region, thePresident of Turkmenistan Gur-banguly Berdimuhamedov vis-ited Pakistan in March focusingon strengthened bilateral rela-tionship with Pakistan coveringbroad areas of cooperation rang-ing from trade, energy sharing,and tourism.

To explore the viable economicoptions it was decided to speedup the linking Dushanbe throughthe China Pakistan Economic Cor-ridor (CPEC) and establishing air,road and railway links betweenboth countries having excep-tional geostrategic and geo-eco-nomic significance in the region.

The Silk Road Economic Belt net-work brings together China withCentral Asia, Russia and Europethrough an overland link with theregions of Persian Gulf and theMediterranean Sea.

The Central and West Asian re-gion connects with the SouthEast Asia, South Asia and the In-dian Ocean. Whereas, the 21stCentury Maritime Silk Road linksChina's coast with the Europethrough South China Sea with In-dian Ocean and the South Pacificand serves as an internationaltrade route. The Gwadar, BinQasim and Karachi ports of Pak-istan are the only intersection ofthe both Silk Road Economic Beltand the 21st Century MaritimeSilk Road.

Moreover, after fully functioningof the Gwadar Port, it will becomea central point of connection forthe landlocked countries ofAfghanistan, Uzbekistan andTajikistan and exceptionally facil-itate their cargo transportationdestinations towards Sri Lanka,Bangladesh, Iran, and Iraq. TheCPEC will eventually boost up re-gional economies and impact thelives of over three billion peopleof Asia through immense tradeand businesses opportunities.

CHINA HAS bEEN

A MAJOR PLAYER

fOR THE

INfRASTRUCTURAL

AND ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT bY

bUILDING ROADS,

TUNNELS, RAILwAY

TRACkS, POwER LINES

AND OIL REfINERIES

IN CENTRAL ASIAN

STATES

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU


The Greatnessof a ‘Normal’ Iran

THE REAL CHALLENGES fOR A POST-JCPOA

Stephen Sarty is a graduatestudent in the InternationalSecurity and IntelligenceStudies program at Belle-vue University in Omaha,NE, USA. He is a former U.S.Marine and has lived andworked in the Middle Eastfor the last 23 years.

STEPHEN SARTY

he recent Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action(JCPOA) agreements between Iran and the in-ternational community will, no doubt, have amajor impact on Iranian domestic politics.

The agreements open the door to an increased opportu-nity for improved foreign relations and international busi-ness agreements that will be needed to help Iran emergefrom years of economic hardship created by internationalsanctions.

The question will be whether Iran will itself walk throughthis doorway to a more inclusive future in the interna-tional community or whether it will slowly close the door,untrusting of those waiting on the other side.

One thing is sure, however, and that is that whether ornot Iran chooses the path of better international engage-ment, it will be done at Iran’s pace, and given the currentstructure of its ruling elite, that pace will be slow moving.The Iranian ideological structure is built to retain the sta-tus quo and given the level of distrust of the internationalcommunity any amount of cooperation will be hotly con-tested.

T

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

With conservatives firmly in con-trol of the real sources of power,any foreign investment and in-volvement in the country goesagainst the grain of their coreprinciples as was recently echoedwhen Ayatollah Khamenei re-cently said, the JCPOA is “just anexcuse and a tool for penetration”and “an instrument for imposingtheir demands”. The push, how-ever, will come from working andmiddle class Iranians who havesuffered from years of recessionand high inflation and are keen tosee the economic inequality be-tween themselves and those thathave continued to prosper duringthe sanctions reduced.

Ideally a potential path for Iranwould be one similar to thattaken by China, starting in thelate 1970s. Overcoming the tra-jectory set in place by Mao Ze-dong, reformers, led by DengXiaoping, moved the nation awayfrom the communist ideology ofthe past and towards a morewestern capitalist approach. Thiswould, however, be a difficultpath for Iran. In Iran, unlike China,the Ayatollah inherits his powerthrough Islamic ideology andwithout it his place at the top ofthe ruling structure would be injeopardy.

It is this resistance to relinquishany semblance of control that hashighlighted Ayatollah Khamenei’stenure to date. Since gainingpower in 1989 AyatollahKhamenei has not hesitated touse violence against his own peo-ple, as we saw in the Green Revoltof 2009, in order to retain firmcontrol of the nation and to en-sure alignment with the directionset forth in the 1979 Revolution.This violence, however, has alsosevered the delicate bondneeded between the greater so-ciety and its ruling elite and is fur-ther exacerbated by the extremeeconomic hardships being suf-fered by the common Iranian.

Given the unlikelihood of anymeaningful reform to the leader-ship structure of Iran there are,however, steps that can be takento bring some measure of pros-perity back into the commonIranian’s life without the whole-sale changes that would requirenothing short of another revolu-tion.

The first step would be to pro-duce a more stable environmentthrough which business andtrade can be conducted withinthe private sector.

THE UNELECTED

POLITICAL ELITE

DO NOT SHARE

ROUHANI’S VISION

fOR AN INCREASE IN

THESE fREEDOMS

AND CIVIL LIbERTIES,

AS THEY COME

INTO DIRECT CONfLICT

wITH THEIR

CONSERVATIVE

IDEOLOGIES

The government would need torelinquish some of the controlthat it pulled from the privatesector and tone down, some-what, the anti-foreign rhetoric, al-lowing the internationalcommunity greater access to in-vestment opportunities through-out Iran. The JCPOA has gone along way towards beginning theprocess of improving Iran’s stand-ing within the international com-munity and the governmentshould work to not lose that mo-mentum. Some forces inside Iranfavor a stricter Iran that is resist-ant to interaction with outsidenations and more isolationist, notunlike North Korea.

It will be up to leaders likeRouhani to counter these groupsand move Iran towards a more in-clusive role in the global commu-nity.The state should also ensure thatit not fall into the trap of relyingsimply on the easy money that aneasing of sanctions and a returnof its oil and gas exports willbring. Wealth brought on by theexport of oil and gas and used topurchase foreign-made productswill not have the desired effect inreducing the state’s crippling un-employment problem,so empha-sis should be given to thepromotion of building a largerbreadth of industry, such as

manufacturing and agriculture,that could begin to support jobgrowth among the largely unem-ployed youth of the nation. This isan important distinction to bemade with a nation that has therich cultural diversity and historyof Iran.The national economy is cur-rently faced with at least fivemajor imbalances that must alsobe addressed: (1) An internationalpayments imbalance due to ahighly over-valued exchangerate, increasing reliance of im-ports, lagging genuine non-oil-based exports, and a precariousand uncertain future oil-exportmarket;


(2) A budget imbalance causedby rising expenditures in the faceof stagnant and doubtful rev-enues; (3) A resource imbalance due toartificially low prices for water,power, and fuels that encourageever-expanding demand; (4) A monetary and financial im-balance resulting from govern-ment-directed low interest rates,non-performing banking assets,rising defaults, and an increasingflow of savings into the informalmarket and capital flight; (5) Finally, a labor imbalance re-sulting from the rising work force,inadequate in housing and indus-try, and an anti-business laborcode. (Amuzegar, 2014)

Another key element going for-ward, and particularly in the caseof President Rouhani, as his cam-paign platform is focused on suchitems, is progress in levels of free-doms, civil liberties, and politicalrights. Since his election Rouhani has fo-cused mainly on the nuclear talksand to this point he has gotten apass on some of these campaignpromises not being addressedbut as the JCPOA grows more dis-tant in the rear view mirror he willbe held more and more account-able for his inaction on theseitems. If Rouhani is to retain thelevel of support from the Iranianpublic that brought him into of-fice then he will need to makesignificant progress into theseareas.

The unelected political elite donot share Rouhani’s vision for anincrease in these freedoms andcivil liberties, as they come intodirect conflict with their conser-vative ideologies. So it is impera-tive that Rouhani work to findmeans to bridge the ideologicalgap.

Within Rouhani’s power to affectchange in a positive manner, andin keeping with his campaignpledges, include items such as in-creased freedom of speech. Cur-rently media outlets can beprosecuted for such things as crit-icizing government organizationsand it is well within Rouhani’spower to encourage more re-straint in these instances.

THE JCPOA HAS GONE

A LONG wAY TOwARDS

bEGINNING

THE PROCESS Of

IMPROVING IRAN’S

STANDING wITHIN

THE INTERNATIONAL

COMMUNITY AND

THE GOVERNMENT

SHOULD wORk

TO NOT LOSE

THAT MOMENTUM

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

A key impediment to this muchneeded privatization is the lack ofownership structures needed toensure proper transfers of entitiesto the private sector. Commit-ments to the observance of lawand transparency throughout thelegal process is also essential inestablishing even the most basicof environments necessary forthe successful integration of for-eign businesses. This is where Iran is at the mo-ment. The REAL success of theJCPOA is not so much in GrandStrategy proclamations and rein-vigorating Empire, but rather inthe small incremental successesof normalcy for the Iranian com-mon people.

Another important major plat-form promise that Rouhani willneed to address was his promiseto uphold the rights of womenand to address cases of discrimi-nation against them. The removalof restrictions on the participa-tion of females in government,and enrollment of female stu-dents in certain academic disci-plines, are all key items ofconcern.

A final matter of concern is that ofgovernmental transparency. Cur-rently there is a considerable lackof basic and reliable informationneeded to conduct basic busi-ness with regards to the nation’seconomic issues.


Syria’s ‘Competing InterventionsMUCH ADO ACCOMPLISHING NOTHING

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

Alexander S. Martin is currently pursuing a Master’s Degree in Interna-tional Intelligence and Security Studies from Bellevue University. Heearned a Bachelor’s Degree in International Intelligence and SecurityStudies also from Bellevue University in 2014.

ALExANDER S. MARTIN

Syria’s ‘Competing Interventions

he Syrian conflict hasled to the failure ofthe Syrian state,which has had conse-

quences for not only the MiddleEast, but a host of other nationswith interests in Syria. This has prompted these states tointervene in the crisis in an effortto end the violence there.

Prominent international actors inthe conflict include the US, Rus-sia, Turkey, the European Union(EU), Saudi Arabia, and Iran. I willdivide the policies of the afore-mentioned actors into two cate-gories. These categories are determinedby relative similarity between in-terests, policies, and goals. Thefirst category will be the West,which includes the US and EU.

T


The second will be termed theEast for convenience, and in-cludes Russia and Iran, as well asthe beleaguered Syrian regime. Itmust be noted that some states,such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia,as well as other inter-governmen-tal groups like the Gulf Coopera-tion Council, play a role in theSyrian conflict. However, their role is less pro-nounced and influential than theWest and East categories, and arelargely idiosyncratic and circum-stantial, placing them outside thescope of this paper.

West: Immigration Crisis,Counter Terrorism, and Human Rights

The US and the EU share a greatdeal in common in terms of inter-ests in Syria. These can be sum-marized as attempts to deal withthe refugee crisis, countering ter-rorism, in particular the IslamicState of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL),and the enforcement of humanrights. These three interests have vari-ably assumed priority among theWestern states, with enforcinghuman rights taking the primacyof place at the outset of the con-flict only to be supplanted by ad-dressing the refugee crisis andmost recently a concertedcounter-terrorism effort. Impor-tantly, the call for protection ofhuman rights has included

attempts to bring the conflict toan end by brokering a political so-lution and insisting that theAssad regime step down, placingregime change at the core of theWestern position on Syria (Olli-vant, 2013). This has also led theUS and its allies to support cer-tain opposition groups, deemedmoderate by Western govern-ments, including provisions oflethal aid (Entous, 2015). Whilethis policy officially remains, theimmediacy of the refugee crisisand the threat posed by ISIL hascaused Western states to paymore attention to these prob-lems.

The focus on countering ISIL andmanaging intra-EU squabblesover refugees has obscured theroot causes of the conflict, as wellas elements of Western policy

which is at odds with the Easterncategory involved in Syria. Therefugee crisis will persist until theSyrian state is able to functionagain, rendering all attempts bythe EU and its member states todeal with the influx of refugeesineffective. Admittedly, ISIL repre-sents a threat to the security andstability of Syria and beyond, andneutralizing it is a prerequisite forreinstating a functioning govern-ment in the country. Thus, while there has been suc-cess in countering ISIL amongWestern nations, this has notbeen oriented within a broaderpolicy approach to solving theproblem of Syrian state failure.Furthermore, the Western ap-proach, particularly the arming ofrebels and insistence on regimechange put it at odds with theEastern bloc.

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

The East: Supporting an Allyand the Triumph of Realpolitik

Like the US and the EU, Russiaand Iran share many interests inSyria. For both, the Syrian govern-ment represents a threatened allyin the region. Both pragmaticallyvalue the perceived stability ofauthoritarianism over enforcingideals like human rights; both seeWestern calls for Assad’s ouster asproviding a pretense to attemptregime change in Russia and Iran;and both seek to use the conflictto demonstrate their diplomaticand military prowess to validateclaims to global and regionalpower status. These interestshave resulted in similar policiestoward Syria, but both arealigned against Western posi-tions, with very little overlap be-tween East and West.

While both continue to supportthe Assad regime, support fromboth has also begun to wane. In2012, Iran courted a number ofopposition groups, probably per-ceiving the Assad regime’s inabil-ity to govern, but has sincedecided to continue backing theAssad regime (Goodarzi, 2013).

In Russia’s case, it was quick tocome to the ailing Assad regime’said when it was losing territory tothe various opposition groups(Ioffe, 2015). However, the rela-tionship, already downgradedfrom the one enjoyed by Basharal Assad’s father, has suffered

from the Assad regime’s inflexibil-ity in negotiating a political set-tlement (Slim, 2016). Yet despitethese difficulties, both Iran andRussia remain committed to theAssad regime.

Russia and Iran both feel threat-ened by the West’s insistence onregime change. The Kremlin haslong argued that much of whatthe West considers to be univer-sal human rights violates statesovereignty. Since the “color rev-olutions” of 2003 and 2004, Russiahas increased its emphasis onprotecting its sovereignty, seeingthose revolutions as conse-quences of the expansion ofNATO (Smith, 2013). More re-cently, Russian Foreign MinisterSergei Lavrov has accused theWest of attempting regimechange via the imposition ofsanctions due to Russia’s involve-ment in Ukrainian unrest (Devitt,2014). The Russian interpretation of pro-tecting sovereignty has extendedto accusing the West of violatingthe sovereignty of Russia’s allies,in this case Syria. In response toUS plans to increase its militaryforces in Syria, Russian DeputyForeign Minister stated that “it isimpossible for [the Russian Feder-ation] not to be worried that suchan action by the [US] is being car-ried out without the agreementof the legal government of Syria,”claiming that such actions violateSyrian sovereignty (Al Arabiya,2016).


It is clear that Russia sees in theWest’s attempt to oust the Assadregime a parallel: threats to itsally’s sovereignty are threats to itsown. Therefore, Russia has estab-lished a hardline policy of sup-port for the Assad regime.

Iran similarly fears regime changein Syria; surrounded by hostileSunnis and its arch-nemesis Is-rael, and with frequent calls in theUS for regime change, Iran isquite fearful of losing its principleregional ally. Thus, despite its re-luctance, Iran has been forced to

remain a steadfast supporter ofthe Assad regime. Iran’s alliancewith Syria is based partly on itsstrategic interests, for exampleproviding “a geographic thor-oughfare to Lebanese Shi’a militiaHizb Allah,” but also on its “deepconcerns about the compositionof a post-Assad government”(Sadjadpour, 2013). This explains Iran’s support forthe Assad regime, as well as its re-luctance: should a successor suit-able to Iran’s interests appear, it islikely that Iran would cease itssupport for Assad.

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

Conclusion

The Syrian state has failed. Theconflict has expanded beyondSyria’s borders, drawing in mem-bers of the international commu-nity. Europe is beset by massrefugee migration; the US and Eu-rope are united in the need tosubdue the threat posed by ISIL;Russia and Iran face the loss of astrategic ally should the Assadregime fall. The Assad regime has proven in-capable of governing Syria, ne-cessitating international inter-ventions.

Yet the very countries best pos-tured for these interventionshave competing interests andthus competing policies for howbest to end the chaos in Syria. Onthe one hand, the West seeksregime change, seeing the Assadregime as illegitimate due to itsviolations of human rights and in-ability to govern. This is unac-ceptable to the East, who bothvalue the Assad regime as astrategic ally. Furthermore, Russiaand Iran are concerned that West-ern-led regime change in Syriamay be a precursor to similar at-tempts elsewhere.


To this end they continue to em-phasize state sovereignty. Insome ways, the bloc politics tak-ing place now inside of Syria havealmost very little to do with theactual end game IN Syria and ismuch more about the politicsand consequences that mighthappen OUTSIDE of Syria. Unfortunately, what these ‘com-peting interventions’ have shownfirst and foremost (and seemslikely not to end or change any-time soon) is that the Syrian civil-ian population is only going tosuffer more for the foreseeablefuture.

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

Strategic HatredHOw PUTIN MANEUVERS wITH RADICAL ISLAM

his case study pro-vides an analyticalcommentary on thearticle written by Mr.

David Bukay in ‘Modern Diplo-macy’ on the issue of why Islamhates the West. Mr. Bukay pres-ents the issue that ‘the Westernworld is ignorant, unacquainted,and in fact stupid concerningIslam. For so many years and so many Is-lamic attacks, its leaders still reit-erate the Pavlovian question:"why do they hate us?"” (Bukay,2016, April 22). Mr. Bukay com-pares the West to a batteredspouse that is the victim of do-mestic violence. Instead of seeingthe situation clearly like a bat-tered spouse, the West tries to

rationalize Islamic violenceagainst the West through exami-nation of the actions the West didto invite the violence.

In essence, continually asking thequestion what has the West donewrong to invite this treatmentfrom Islam. Instead Mr. Bukay ar-gues that the West should viewIslam as a culturally differentthreat based upon a political reli-gion. Mr. Bukay’s presentationwas supported with evidencetaken directly from Islamic scrip-ture which states: “the Qur’ān re-iterates the commandment thatit is forbidden to associate othergods with Allah, and Islam shouldbe adhered to as the only legiti-mate religion on earth.

TJeffery Fishel is a combatleader that was wounded inaction and retired from themilitary after 27 years and cur-rently is still a Department ofDefense employee. His aca-demic credentials include aMaster of Science in SecurityManagement from BellevueUniversity and a Bachelor ofScience from Excelsior Col-lege. He is a current student inthe Bellevue University Inter-national Security and Intelli-gence Studies Program.

JEffERY fISHEL


It is followed by the swear-beliefthat Muhammad is his messen-ger” (Bukay, 2016, April 22). Con-trary to the Western view, somecritics feel Russia has chosen toview Islam as a politicalreligion/security threat in an in-tensified way so as to off-set do-mestic flaws.

Russia under Vladimir Putin haseffectively maneuvered to utilizeIslam as a political religion inorder to retain power against po-tential oppositional forces withinthe home scene. The followingexplains this criticizing mentality.

The main critique goes thusly:Putin, faced with a failing econ-omy, weakened military, and in-ternal security issues, hasmanaged to redirect attention forRussia’s troubles. Putin executedthis plan of redirection throughinfluence in the transnationalweapons market throughout theCaucasus, Central Asia and theMiddle East.

Putin has solidified his power athome by embarking on a warwith Islamic extremism. Putin hasfinanced his ambitions in the warwith Islamic extremists throughselling military hardware, assist-ing nations that are in pursuit ofnuclear ambitions, and makingalliances with Iran and Syria. Putinmasked his actions by using theRussian security issues posed byIslamic extremists.

Putin has been on a clear missionto regain new world legitimacyboth at home and abroad whilecombating the threat to Russia’ssecurity posed by Islam.

Putin, in maintaining his powerbase at home, understands heneeds to “blame either unpopularminorities within the country orforeign governments for all Rus-sia’s problems. The politics of ha-tred has a long and, electorallyspeaking, pretty successful pedi-gree” (Collier, 2009, September30). Putin understands that ac-tion must be taken to keep powerand inaction can lead to destruc-tion of the state. One key to exe-cute this plan is to influence thetransnational weapons market toease economic pressure at homewhile ensuring Russia’s stabilityby fighting Islam.

As part of Putin’s plan to curb thethreat from Islamic extremists,Russia opened Kant Air Base inKyrgyzstan in October 2003. Thisbase provided Russia a forwardoperating base to enforce inter-ests and a security zone in CentralAsia. As detailed:Security remains the first drivershaping Russia’s involvement inCentral Asia. The challenges aremultiple, as any [destabilization] inthe weakest (Kyrgyzstan, Tajik-istan), or the most unpredictable(Uzbekistan), of the countries couldhave immediate repercussions inRussia.

RUSSIA UNDER

VLADIMIR PUTIN

HAS EffECTIVELY

MANEUVERED TO

UTILIzE ISLAM

AS A POLITICAL

RELIGION IN ORDER

TO RETAIN POwER

AGAINST POTENTIAL

OPPOSITIONAL fORCES

wITHIN THE HOME

SCENE

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

This could include an Islamist infil-tration; an increase in the inflow ofdrugs reaching the Russian popu-lation, which is already widely tar-geted by drug traffickers; a loss ofcontrol over the export networks ofhydrocarbons, uranium mines,strategic sites in the military indus-trial complex and electrical powerstations; a drop in trade… (Pey-rouse, Boonstra, and Laruelle,2012, May, p. 8)

Putin’s actions in Kyrgyzstan fitinto his plan to blame unpopularIslamic extremist movements tojustify military expansion to pro-tect transnational trade routeswhile ensuring security at home.For Putin the “Russian-CentralAsian multilateral framework, theCollective Security Treaty Organ-isation (CSTO), makes provisionsfor the sale of military materiel to

member countries at Russian do-mestic market prices, and has re-vived cooperation between theRussian and Central Asian mili-tary-industrial complexes” (Pey-rouse, Boonstra, and Laruelle,2012, May, p. 8). In addition to se-curity agreements to quell anypotential extremist threats and tosupport the transnational armstrade; Putin is willing to becomeinvolved in questionable militaryalliances in the Middle East underthe guise of fighting Islamic ex-tremists.Iran gives Putin a unique religiouspartner in the Caucasus and gate-way to influence Middle East pol-icy and weapons markets. UnderPutin’s direction, Russia has as-sisted Iran’s nuclear ambitionsthrough technology coupledwith military hardware and advi-sors.


The relationship with Iran is evenmore dangerous to the interna-tional community when in “lateJuly [2015] Quds Force commandMajor General Qasem Soleimaniflew to Moscow aboard a com-mercial Iranian airliner for a week-end visit filled with meetingsmixed with R&R—in clear viola-tion of a U.N.-imposed travel ban”(Weiss, 2015, September 1).Shortly after the meeting Putinexpanded Russia’s relationshipwith Iran to direct military actionin Syria. Putin has used Russiananimosity to Islamic extremism,which is quite intense at home, tojustify military adventurism. Putinreally entered Syria to reassert it-self to the top of the world stageand protect his transnationalweapons markets.

This examination of a very stri-dent criticism of Russian foreignpolicy intended to expand uponMr. Bukay’s theory to demon-strate that Islam is a political reli-gion based on a warrior cult fromthe seventh century. Contrary tothe Western view as a victim withIslam, Russia has chosen to viewIslam as a political religion/secu-rity threat that can be manipu-lated for power interests.

Russia under Vladimir Putin haseffectively maneuvered to utilizethe threat from Islam as tool toprotect transnational weaponsmarkets and to retain power, os-tensibly intensifying domestic so-ciety’s innate fear of the ‘other’ inorder to push certain power an-gles important to the Presidentialadministration. While some of this criticism ispurposely given to hyperbole, toexacerbate tense relations be-tween Russia and the West (thiscriticism is born and fosteredfrom within anti-Russian Westernthink tanks), the atrocities andtransgressions that occurred onboth sides of the Chechen con-flicts make Russian animus to rad-ical Islam very real andwell-founded.

While Russia is not blameless orpure when it comes to its initia-tives toward the Islamic world, itis not possible to argue that West-ern approaches have been vastlysuperior. At the very least, Putin’s honestyin staking a brazen positionagainst Islam as a political forceand radicalist movement is re-freshingly fascinating for analystsaround the world.

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

CONTRARY TO

THE wESTERN VIEw

AS A VICTIM

wITH ISLAM,

RUSSIA HAS CHOSEN

TO VIEw ISLAM

AS A POLITICAL

RELIGION/SECURITY

THREAT THAT CAN bE

MANIPULATED

fOR POwER INTERESTS


Russia and Israelimproving relations

Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italianeconomist and businessman. He holds prestigious ac-ademic distinctions and national orders. Mr Valori haslectured on international affairs and economics at theworld’s leading universities such as Peking University,the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the YeshivaUniversity in New York.

GIANCARLO ELIA VALORIAdvisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa

uring the meetingheld on June 7,2016, the RussianPresident Vladimir

Putin and the Israeli Prime Minis-ter Netanyahu decided to startmilitary cooperation between thetwo countries. It is a historic deci-sion which breaks the traditionallink existing between the Israeliand the US Forces.A change of strategic perspectiveby both countries, which signifi-cantly modifies the old, tradi-tional postures inherited from theCold War.

It marks the end of the Russianunivocal support to the Arabcountries, inherited from the XXCPSU Congress of 1956, tostrengthen the "national middleclasses" of the Islamic world. Italso marks the end of the uniquerelationship between Israel andthe United States, designed tooppose the USSR allies in theMiddle East.

On the one hand, the relationshipwith the United States strength-ened Israel at technological levelbut, on the other hand, it forcedit into a strategic horizon typicalof a small regional power, whichis currently no longer reasonable.

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

The meeting held on June 7 wasalso attended by the Head of themilitary intelligence services,General Hertzi Halevi, and theHead of the Mossad, Yossi Cohen.Moreover, next summer jointRussian-Israeli naval and air oper-ations will take place, with Russ-ian aircraft and ships comingfrom the Syrian bases.An economic and energy factormust also be considered: theRussian companies can partici-pate in the development and ex-ploitation of the Israeli Tamar andLeviathan fields.

Nevertheless, there is also astrategic factor to be considered:the Russian presence will preventthe fields and pipelines from be-coming the target of attacks byIran, the Hezbollah and Syria.

Obviously the naval and air coop-eration is such as to protect bothIsrael and Russia from an inadver-tent mix of military intelligence.At operational level, the mecha-nism for exchanging informationbetween Russia and Israel duringthe aerial warfare in Syria will befurther strengthened and ex-panded. The strategic links atnaval level will be established ata later stage.

D

Russia is a "traditional" greatnaval power, while Israel has aNavy characterized by light andfast response vessels.An ideal mix.Currently President Putin's pri-mary interest is to strengthen theties between Israel and Turkeywhile, for Prime Minister Netan-hyahu, Russia could be an opti-mal power brokers to negotiateand finally achieve stable andlasting peace between the JewishState and the Palestinian uni-verse.Furthermore, Russia did not lift afinger when the Israeli air force at-tacked the convoys which wentto supply the Shiite militias in theSyrian war.Hence an alliance between Israel,Greece and Cyprus - also at geoe-conomic and energy level - canbe foreshadowed, which couldchange much in the EU financialand political scenario.


A European Union which, due toignorance and foolishness, findsitself faced with an economic andgeopolitical system in the South-East it cannot control.

If the European Union still main-tains the sanctions against Russia,the strategically smart countries(indeed very rare now) will try toreplace the old and naïve Euro-pean Union, as Israel is currentlydoing. The sanctions againstMoscow are supposed to end onJuly 31, 2016, but the economicdamage to European countrieshas been dramatic.

Russia is the third largest marketfor the European Union in termsof exports, while the trade bal-ance between the EU and Russiahas fallen from 326 to 285 billioneuro. Furthermore, harsh coun-termeasures have been taken byRussia: the extension of the

internal market closure and theEU net loss are worth 11 billioneuro approximately, which couldreach 55 billion euro if sanctionscontinued.

Here is the strategic equation wewere looking for: the Europeaneconomy, which is already undercrisis, becomes a useful test for aparticularly strict US version ofTTIP; Russia suffers a technologi-cal retreat in machine tools and inoil drilling machinery and equip-ment; the United States can startagain the old game of the ColdWar along the new borders be-tween Europe and the RussianFederation.

It is a naive and shrewd geopolit-ical project at the same time.

However, what does Italy orFrance get in starting a confronta-tion in Ukraine?

RUSSIA IS A "TRADITIONAL" GREAT NAVAL POwER,

wHILE ISRAEL HAS A NAVY CHARACTERIzED

bY LIGHT AND fAST RESPONSE VESSELS.

AN IDEAL MIx.

From time immemorial it is mostly aRussian or russified country and, forRussia, it is the strategic guaranteeof the regular crossing of itspipelines from the Caucasus to theMediterranean. Finally it is a pointfor projecting the Russian interestsbetween the Sea of Azov and theBlack Sea which, for Russia, cannotcertainly be left to a generic "inter-national force."

It is also worth recalling that on Jan-uary 1, 2016 Ukraine signed theDeep and Comprehensive FreeTrade Agreement with the Euro-pean Union.

According to the latest data avail-able, the trade between Ukraineand the European Union is equal to20.4 billion euro. Hence, once again,this reveals the underlying strategicequation: Ukraine becomes a "re-placement market" in lieu of theRussian Federation.

Moreover, currently China uses thischannel to European markets verywell. Hence we have another pieceof Ukraine's current geopoliticalequation: if Russia takes no action, itwill become the large hub betweenCentral Asia and the EuropeanUnion, thus bypassing Russia andmaking it marginal in world trade.It was the great dream of JeffreySachs from the World Bank, whohad been called upon to solve thepost-Soviet economic disaster. Butis it a realistic project? We think it isnot and, indeed, we believe that Is-rael has been right in "replacing",

at least initially, the US Forces’ sup-port with the Russian military sup-port. The United Sates aredisengaging from the Middle East.Israel knows this all too well and istaking appropriate measures in thisrespect.

Nevertheless, apart from the TTIPissue, the United States are also re-treating from Europe. Moreover, asfar as we know, the TTIP issue re-minds of the old Year of Europe, de-vised by Henry Kissinger in 1973.The underling idea was that theUnited States opened part of theirmarkets to European products, butpaid them with commercial paperto be discounted.

On the other hand, the Brexit issueis looming large. If, as the latest pollssuggest, the Leave option is suc-cessful, the whole EU geopoliticalstructure will change.We have al-ready long elaborated on the Brexitimpact, but there is a strategic factorto consider: if Britain leaves the EU,its ties with the United States will in-evitably strengthen, and if GreatBritain walks out of the EuropeanUnion, before renegotiating thecommercial treaties, it will be in aposition to operate with aggressivepolicies on the markets.

Finally, if Great Britain leaves the Eu-ropean Union, we will have a muchmore markedly German-led Euro-pean Union.In short, any solution must be care-fully considered – for the time beingnothing is certain.

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

A CHANGE Of

STRATEGIC

PERSPECTIVE

bY bOTH COUNTRIES,

wHICH

SIGNIfICANTLY

MODIfIES THE OLD,

TRADITIONAL

POSTURES INHERITED

fROM THE COLD wAR

NEWSSTANDnever miss an issue

newsstand.moderndiplomacy.eu

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

Multiple Choice:The SCO Finds Its Way

he Shanghai Cooper-ation Organizationhas intensified itsfocus on regional

economic initiatives like theChina-led Silk Road EconomicBelt and the Russia-lead EurasianEconomic Union. At the Ufa sum-mit in Russia, the member statesadopted the SCO DevelopmentStrategy, which included bolster-ing finance, investment, andtrade cooperation as a priority inthe next ten years.While Russia remains sensitive toChina’s expanding influence intothe former Soviet satellite states,the Central Asian member statesare in need of infrastructure andenergy investment and havebeen receptive to Beijing’s pro-posal to focus on economic coop-eration through proposals suchas launching a development fundand a free-trade zone. Russia isacutely aware that it cannot andwill not try to compete withChina’s growing global economicinfluence, even if it is pushinginto Russia’s traditional sphere of

influence in Central Asia. Kaza-khstan, Russia, and Turkmenistanhave proposed expanding theenergy cooperation amongmembers, establishing a unifiedenergy market for oil and gas ex-ports. While some experts say theorganization has emerged as ananti-U.S. bulwark in Central Asia,others believe frictions among itsmembers effectively preclude astrong and unified SCO.

This may be true, specifically asIndia and Pakistan, long-time ri-vals, join the membership roster,because the SCO adopts decisionmade by consensus and all mem-ber states must uphold the coreprinciple of non-aggression andnon-interference in internal af-fairs. Crosston points out that apenchant for China and Russiapursuing micro-agendas is alsolikely to undermine group cohe-sion and sow mistrust.However, a recent study con-ducted on the SCO’s votingrecord has shown that the foreignpolicy of the SCO is mixed.


T

Anonymous is currently a graduate student in Interna-tional Security and Intelligence Studies at Bellevue Uni-versity and works within the US governmental system.The opinions expressed are strictly personal and do notreflect a formal endorsement of or by the United States’government and/or Intelligence Community.

ANONYMOUS

On one hand, the overall memberand observer states have been in-creasingly voting in similar waysacross all voting forums since1992, when the post-Sovietmember states were all admittedto the United Nations. As the vot-ing patterns become increasinglysimilar, the risk for an individualstate of committing itself tocloser cooperation is reduced; itis simply less likely to find itself ina vulnerable outlier position or beforced to compromise on impor-tant policy preferences.

Hansen points out that continuedconvergence in this way sug-gests, all things being equal, thatthe SCO will find it still easier towiden and deepen its foreign pol-icy cooperation and even to allowobserver states to join the groupas full members. On the otherhand, the slowing down of theprocess of convergence indicatesthat the member and observerstates have reached a line that aleast some of them will be reluc-tant to cross. This includes a mixed pool of corepreferences on human rights, nu-clear development, or weaponstechnology. This will likely con-tinue to evolve and possibly be-come contentious with theaddition of Pakistan and India,whose membership seems tohave been driven by China’s fearof a new wave of terrorist attacksby Uighur separatists or ISIL fight-ers in Zinjiang or elsewhere inChina .

Russia remains a leading outlier:the growing influence of Chinamay cause Russian policy makersto hesitate before committing toa closer cooperation or to futureSCO enlargement, as what isgood for China is not necessarilygood for Russia.

Through the SCO, China haslargely benefited from offeringthe Central Asian states an alter-native to Russia. As Grieger pointsout, China has significantly ex-panded its trade with, and invest-ment in, the Central states. It hasestablished a diplomatic andstrategic foothold in the region,which allows it to gradually diluteWestern influence. It has beenable to pursue resource securityinterests but has been cautiousnot to enter into energy or min-ing competition with Russia. Inenergy matters, Chinese andRussian interests are often com-plementary as Russia relies on oilexports and China’s economygreatly depends on external en-ergy sources.

China and Russia will continue tobe skeptical bedfellows in thecoming years despite opportuni-ties. While their interests mayoverlap economically and in thesecurity of their overlapping re-gions, neither is known for beingparticularly trustworthy of eachother. This hurdle will be hard toovercome. China will continue toneed trade agreements with theUnited States.

THE CONTINUED

RISE Of CHINA

AND RESULTING

DILEMMA IN

RELATIONS bETwEEN

RUSSIA, CHINA,

AND THE CENTRAL

ASIAN STATES

wITHIN THE SCO

COULD CAUSE

REGIONAL SCHISMS

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

This could leave Russia as the oddman out with increasing Westernsanctions. China’s alliance withRussia could prove contentiousfor Western investment, so Russiawill need to play well with Chinain a true partnership over thenext decade or else it will riskbeing squeezed out of any globalpower economically.

The continued rise of China andresulting dilemma in relations be-tween Russia, China, and the Cen-tral Asian states within the SCOcould cause regional schisms.China’s economic rise couldthreaten to move Russia out ofthe seat of power while sanctionsare increasingly piled on. China’sinfluence in areas like Pakistan,India, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and

others continues to growthrough investments and indus-try. If SCO membership becomesweighted in China’s favor throughthis increasing influence, Russiacould find themselves out in thecold and their agendas out offavor in the SCO.What about the rest of the mem-bership of the SCO? According toBeaten Eschment, an analyst atthe Research Center of East Euro-pean Studies at the University ofBremen, there is no unified Cen-tral Asian perspective. The coun-tries’ interests are all pointedlydifferent: Kyrgyzstan and Tajik-istan are economically and mili-tarily dependent on Russia;Turkmenistan, while not a mem-ber of the SCO, is trying to stay asneutral as possible like Mongolia.


MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

Uzbekistan is pursuing its ownpolicy that bounces betweenRussia and China at the sametime, while Kazakhstan, thebiggest and militarily and eco-nomically strongest country inCentral Asia is a complete Rus-sophile, but is afraid that Russiawill try to annex their northernterritories after the situation withCrimea in Ukraine. These smallconcerns may give China the ad-vantage in setting the SCO’s pri-orities so that the smallermembers seek to limit Russia’s in-fluence on their borders.

What links all of the SCO mem-bers is the rejection of Western-dominated institutions, whetherit is the United States, United Na-tions, World Bank, NATO or otherstructures. The SCO see itself as aforum against the US-globalorder. Its approach tends to becomprehensive and not basedonly on military power, but also inChina’s belief of economic tiesand soft power.

The SCO’s non-interference prin-ciple could establish a newmodus operandi for internationalorganizations. Unlike the UnitedNations or NATO, the members ofthe SCO have chosen to stay outof violent conflicts within itsmember states, such as when vi-olent conflict between ethnicKyrgyz and Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstanbroke out in 2010. The members of the SCO stayedlargely passive despite their abil-ity to pull joint forces togetherthat could intervene. This allowsmember states to avoid gettingpulled into costly wars that couldbe to the detriment of all mem-ber states and to the organizationas a whole.

While it will likely remain semi-ig-nored by Western media, the SCOwill continue to make greatstrides in its development andgrowth. Alignment of Pakistan,India, Iran, Russia, and China cre-ates the largest block of anti-Western sentiment in history.

UNLIkE THE UNITED NATIONS OR NATO, THE MEMbERS

Of THE SCO HAVE CHOSEN TO STAY OUT

Of VIOLENT CONfLICTS wITHIN ITS MEMbER STATES,

SUCH AS wHEN VIOLENT CONfLICT

bETwEEN ETHNIC kYRGYz AND UzbEkS

IN kYRGYzSTAN bROkE OUT IN 2010

Prospects are good that Russiaand China will continue to priori-tize working on large multilateralprojects in transportation, en-ergy, innovative research andtechnology, agriculture, and thepeaceful use of outer space. If theSCO can expand its membershipand momentum on these priori-ties, Western organizations maysoon find themselves facing anunexpected competitor with theresources and intent to box themout of markets and containUnited States influence on theglobal stage.

It could provide a counter bal-ance to Western organizations’ in-fluence not only in the CentralAsian region but even from theedges of Europe all the way to thePacific. China views this expan-sion as absolutely necessary tocompete in a global market. If theSCO is to have real weight in theinternational arena and becomea truly prestigious organizationthat is able to rival NATO, it re-quires additional members andrevenue streams. President Putinsuggested that China and Russiashould “enhance coordination ininternational and regional affairs[so as to counter Western influ-ence].”


Suicidal Nuclear Gambit on Caucasus

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

uclear security isseemingly in thevanguard of globalattention, but the

large framework of internationalprovisions is increasingly per-ceived as a toothless tiger. In thecontemporary age where asym-metric threats to security are oneof the most dangerous ones, thetime is high to mitigate the risk ofrouge actors having potential ac-cess to materials, necessary to de-velop nuclear weapons.Nowhere is this urgency morepivotal than in already turbulentareas, such as the South Cauca-sus. With many turmoil instabili-ties, lasting for decades with nocompletely bulletproof conflictresolution process installed,adding a threat of nuclearweapons potential means creat-ing a house of cards that cancause complete collapse of re-gional peace and stability.

tHE GREAtER CAsPIAN PROJECt 25

That is precisely why recently un-covered and reoccurring actionsof Armenia towards the goal ofbuilding its own nuclear capacitymust be addressed more seri-ously. They should also attractbolder response to ensure safetyof the region is sustained.

According to the report by Vi-enna-based nuclear watch-dog,International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA), Armenia has es-tablished quite a record of illegaltrafficking of nuclear and otherradioactive materials.

There have been a couple of seri-ous incidents spanning from1999 onward. A large number ofreported incidents has occurredon the country`s border withGeorgia, tempting the IAEA toconclude there is high probabilitythat the so called Armenian routedoes in fact exist.

There is a further evidence tosupport this assertion. There werean unusually high number of Ar-menians caught in nuclear traf-ficking activities.

Additionally, some of the re-ported incidents that made theirway to the official reports sug-gested that the main focus of traf-ficking activities is in factsmuggling of nuclear materialthat could be used for nuclearweapons capabilities.

There were also reports suggest-ing the trafficking of other ra-dioactive material that could beutilized for alternate purposes,such as the building of a so calleddirty bomb. Since the stakes withnuclear weaponry are alwayshigh to the extreme, the recogni-tion of this threat must not be un-derrated and dismissed easily.

N

Petra Posega is a Security Studies candidate, with a Degree in Political Sci-ence. She prolifically writes for platforms and magazines on four conti-nents (including the Canadian (Geopolitics of Energy, the US Addleton,and Far-Eastern Journal of Asia- Europe Relation).

PEtRA POsEGA

Only days henceforth the latest il-legal activities have been uncov-ered by border control in April,2016, former Armenian PrimeMinister Bagratyan shocked theinternational public with theclaim that Armenia indeed hasnuclear capabilities and the abil-ity to further develop them. Themain reason for the possession isto deter neighbors such as Turkeyand Azerbaijan.

More specifically, to discouragethem from resorting to aggres-sive foreign policy measures andmitigate potential threats to Ar-menian territorial integrity, espe-cially in the disputed regions.Even though Turkey and its intel-ligence network was quick to dis-miss these claims and labeledthem as a failed attempt to in-crease the geopolitical impor-tance of Armenia, as well as todeter its much more militarily ca-pable neighboring countries,such claims should not be takenlightly, either. Thus, there is nocause for alarm yet.

However, there should be in-creased interest of the interna-tional community to investigatethese serious claims. If docu-mented, they would pose a gravedesta-bilization factor for the al-ready turbulent region.

They would also trigger deepen-ing of hostilities and mistrust inextremely delicate regionalframework of peace.

The prospects and dangers of po-tential acquisition of a dirty bombby rouge actors are rising on theinternational agenda. The re-cently detected activities inSouth Caucasus showed thatthere were substantial effortsmade in order to smuggle and il-legally sell Uranium 238, which ishighly radioactive. At the begin-ning of 2016, a different groupwas trying to smuggle a highly ra-dioactive Cesium isotope thatusually forms as a waste productin nuclear reactors.

What is also worrying is that themajority of the activities are oc-curring in highly instable and un-monitored territories ofAzerbaijan and Georgia that areunder the control of separatists,such as Nagorno- Karabakh andSouth Ossetia. The mere organi-zation of the Armenian routeproves to show that illegal activi-ties can flourish in the securityblind spots of the region.

There is also the Iranian connec-tion. Armenia borders this MiddleEastern country that found itselfin the centre of global attentionuntil the ratification of The JointComprehensive plan of Action in2015. The international agree-ment supposedly effectively mit-igated the risk of Teherandeveloping its own nuclear capa-bilities and established a properinternational regime to monitorcompliance to the installed provi-sions.

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

tHE MAIN REAsON

fOR tHE

POssEssION

Is tO DEtER

NEIGHbORs

sUCH As tURkEY

AND AzERbAIJAN

However, fears remain over futuredevelopments of this issue. Theunusually high number of trucktraffic between Armenia and Iranfurther fuels suspicion on whatexactly goes down under thecloak of darkness.Iran is not the only powerful allyof Armenia that holds knowledgeon all things nuclear. Yerevan isextremely close with Russia eversince the breakup of the formerSoviet Union, and fully relies onMoscow when it comes to up-holding its security, territorial in-tegrity and political autonomy.Russia is of course a member ofthe elite nuclear club, and besidesthe US holds one of the largeststockpiles of nuclear capabilitiesin the world.

This is of course a leftover of theCold war era and fears of the East-ern or the Western devil, dependson which side of the wall thethreat was being perceived.

It is worrying to note that some ofthe nuclear material that was try-ing to find its way into Armeniathrough South Ossetia has been,at least according to some re-ports, traced back to Russian nu-clear facilities.

This is of course of small wonder,since Russia is an official supplierof nuclear fuel for the only nu-clear power plant in Armenia, theMetsamor nuclear plant that sup-plies roughly 40 % of electricity tothe country`s population.


Any outdated systems, like theone at the Metsamor nuclearplant, should be either closeddown until repaired and adjustedto proper security standards, orshut down completely if the plantis unable to follow necessarylegal provisions. To make the fu-ture prospects even grimmer, thearea where the Metsamor plant islocated is being said to have veryvibrant seismic activities.

Thus, not only is the plant dan-gerous due to outdated securitysystems and technology, but alsodue to naturally occurring phe-nomenon that is highly likely tocause significant damage on theplant itself.

Armenian officials should protecttheir own population and not riska nuclear holocaust. Instead, theycontinue to stubbornly extendtheir self-entrapment grand am-bitions.

Reviewing the manifold dangerthat Armenia represent in nuclearterms, there are no simple an-swers, although there are a fewclear conclusions. The Metsamorpower plant should be consid-ered as an imminent and seriousthreat to millions of people inAsia, Middle East and Europe, andshut down. Additionally, thisissue should not be shielded any-more for the sake of pure Machtpolitik.

But the reactor itself falls into an-other aspect of nuclear threatsposed by Armenia, specificallynuclear safety threats. The reactoris extremely outdated, and thereare no proper safeguard andsafety mechanism installed thatwould ensure adequate monitor-ing of its operations and recogni-tion of potential faults in thesystem.

The world just marked the thirti-eth anniversary of the devastat-ing Chernobyl accident, and it isunsettling to know there is highrisk of a similar disaster in the ad-jacent area. Nuclear safety, likenuclear security, should be takenextremely seriously.

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

Macht prefers secrecy and coer-cion and we already well knowhow it always ends up. After Cher-nobyl, Three Mile Island andFukushima disaster, the last thingthe world needs is another nu-clear catastrophe. Additionally,there are clear ambitions presentin the country to develop and ac-quire nuclear capabilities. Formore than one reason that is anextremely dangerous endeavorto pursue. Not just for the regionitself and adjacent countries butalso for the world which shouldbe evolving towards the futurenuclear free world instead.

Consequently, we have to do allwe can to prevent yet anotherblow to an already shaking NPT(Non-Proliferation Treaty).Conclusively, Caucasus is full offrozen yet unsolved, highly polar-izing, toxic and potentially inflam-mable conflicts. We also have tobe aware that the raging flamesof instability from Syria and Iraqare not far away. We do not needanother nuclear meltdown in-ferno. It is high time to localizethe overheated blaze of MiddleEast. It would be a good start bystabilizing Caucasus in a just, fairand sustainable way.


The connection between TAPI-CPEC

and Afghanistan

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

fter the collapse ofthe Soviet Unionand the formation ofthe Central Asia Re-

publics (CARs), the countries withtheir huge economic potentialhave been less explored foreignpolicy options of Pakistan. De-spite the fact that being locatedin the same region and excep-tionally sharing common charac-teristics, the geo-political andgeo-economic importance ofPakistan and CARs could naturallystimulate the two sides to reachout to each though.

Pakistan has always sustained ahope to become a gateway to theCentral Asia but the occasional ef-forts, the two sides have not beenso successful to forge closer polit-ical and economic relations andeven after a period of threedecades, Pakistan is yet to makeany breakthrough into the Cen-tral Asian region.

Even though their immense rich-ness in term of energy and othernatural resources, Pakistan couldnot benefit at the required levelsat least to address its energy is-sues through the bilateral rela-tions with these countries. Thegas fields of the Uzbekistan arealso overlooked whereas if theTurk menistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) connectedwith the CPEC, the region canlinkup the natural gas resourcesof Uzbekistan that could easilyovercome the Pakistan’s energycrisis and would help boostingthe ties of the country with all thestates in Central Asian region. TheCentral Asian region vastly rich inuntapped natural resources andbeing landlocked-having no sail-ing route and sea connectionwith the rest of the world is actu-ally one of the foremost draw-backs that also decrease thechances of the trade and exportsthe resources from this region.

A

NAsURULLAH bROHI

Nasurullah Brohi works as a Senior Research Associate at theStrategic Vision Institute, Islamabad and can be reached atnasurullahsvi(at)outlook.com


Even located at the immediateneighborhood, the South Asianregion is colossally energy-starved.However, together with theGwadar Port of Pakistan and theChina-Pakistan Economic Corri-dor (CPEC) project there is incom-parable potential to spectacularlymake over the regional dynamicsin terms of trade and investmentand the development. It wouldbe without any exaggeration toactually call it a game changerthat would of course uplift thelives of about 3 billion peopleacross China, Central Asia, SouthAsia and the Middle East. TheGwadar and the CPEC have out-standingly brought the strategicand economic moments in favorof Pakistan and has twisted awide range of opportunities forthe country where it has assumedthe position of economic pivotfor the whole region.

The Central Asian States also utterenthusiasm of a regional linkageand eagerly are desirous to ben-efit from the projects that will re-markably assist in connecting theCentral Asian countries for trad-ing and exporting their energyresources to the European mar-kets. Moreover, with the adventof China-Pakistan Economic Cor-ridor (CPEC), the regional geopol-itics has also assumed newcharacteristics where the regionand their people are going to bebetter connected than ever be-fore.

Notably, during the recent visit ofTurkmenistan’s President Gurban-guly Berdimuhamedov in March2016, the two sides keenly agreedto overcome their detachmentand explore the options on en-hancing trade, economic rela-tions, energy sharing, people-to-people contacts and thetourism.

The particular focus also re-mained on the timely completionof the projects of extraordinaryimportance ranging from theTurk menistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline toDushanbe’s potential linkup withthe CPEC. Moreover, the unique geo-eco-nomic and geo-political signifi-cance of both sides, Pakistan andTurkmenistan decided to payspecial attention to establishingair, road and rail links on a prioritybasis.

The greater interests of the twosides link with the TAPI and theCPEC that would further moveforward to improve the regionalconnectivity and serve the eco-nomic activity.

The emergence of the CPEC is un-usually an incomparable traderoute to discover the potential orthe region besides; Pakistan’s ac-cession to the TIR (internationalroad transport) convention is an-other surplus opportunitywhereas; the TAPI could providecrucial linkage to CPEC.

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Finally, to make the long cher-ished dreams resounding suc-cess, the reality lies with the factsof regional peace and stability.Nevertheless, the chaotic securitysituation in Afghanistan is purelya factor that could seriously un-dermine and hinge the linkagebetween Pakistan and the CentralAsian States. The instable politicaland security situation inAfghanistan has gloomy reper-cussions for the rest of the regionand the main reason for the delayin timely execution TAPI projectconceived since 1990s.

Aware of its importance Pakistanconsiders the TAPI project a ‘trail-blazing project’ that enables theregion to become an energy huband source of diplomatic net-working but however, all possibleefforts should be made to ad-dress the Afghan issue at prioritybasis. The region’s economic de-velopment mainly depends onthe fact that TAPI will only work ifthere is peace and stability inAfghanistan since the pipelinewill pass through northeasternpart of the Afghanistan.


s already well-known,since Soviet days,Russia has pursued apragmatic policy

aimed at enhancing multidimen-sional ties with the countries ofthe continent on the bilateral andmultilateral basis. Experts saywhile building mutually benefi-cial cooperation remains one ofthe main priorities of Russia, itseconomic cooperation withAfrica has hit stumbling blocks,for example, trade turnover withthe countries of sub-SaharanAfrica for the period from Januaryto December 2015 was estimatedat US$ 3.3 billion.

Ahead of the St. Petersburg inter-national economic forum sched-uled from June 16 to 18, policyexperts have offered their views

on the current Russia-Africa rela-tions in separate interviews. Overthe last decade, forum has be-come a leading internationalplatform for the discussion of thekey economic issues facing Rus-sia, emerging markets and theworld as a whole.It attracts over 10,000 foreign andRussian participants, includinggovernment and business lead-ers from the emerging economicpowers, as well as leading globalvoices from academia, the media,and civil society. Under the topic"Russia-Africa: Advancing NewFrontiers" for this year, the pan-elists at the business round tablewill attempt answering the ques-tion: How can Russia accelerateits economic ties with the conti-nent and what sectors are likelyto be successful first movers?

Russia-Africa The Realities

And The TruthskEstER kENN kLOMEGAH

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A

Kester Kenn Klomegah is an independent researcher andwriter on African affairs in the EurAsian region and formerSoviet republics.

Here are some views from policyexperts: Nataliya Zaiser, who is aPublic Policy Advisor at SquirePatton Boggs Moscow office cov-ering Russia, the Eurasian Unionand Africa, and also the Head ofthe Africa Business Initiativeunder the Institute for AfricanStudies explained in an interviewthat over the past few years, Rus-sia's efforts have achieved littlesuccess because "times havechanged significantly, for exam-ple, new economic and politicalenvironment, new challenges,new competitive conditions, newbases for cooperation."She added that "people are differ-ent, minds are different, tech-nologies are different. In all that,you have to find absolutely differ-ent approaches to building busi-ness relationships and strategy.

What remains the same is a will, avery loyal mutual attitude be-tween Russia and African coun-tries and strong desire to pushforward these mutual efforts."

She explained further that ad-vancing new frontiers in the rela-tions is a very good sign that firsttime in the history of the Forum"Africa-Russia" round table is offi-cially included into the main pro-gram. This Forum is international thataims at getting together businesscommunity, government officialsand others to bring on board anddiscuss the most up-to-date top-ics, to find solutions within the in-ternational community circle.Each country in the world hassomething to bring on theagenda.


New frontiers here should beread as "new opportunities", "newapproaches" and "new perspec-tives".

"To my mind – future in any casestands for international coopera-tion that should be based on avery strong and transparent legal,economic and social background.On the one hand it will help tojoin efforts on working withAfrica and develop the continent;on another hand it will allow todiversify economic and geopolit-ical presence on the continent soas to avoid monopolies and pos-session attempts," Zaiser added.She concluded that "this is amuch more beneficial approachfor everybody both for Africancountries as well as for their inter-national partners.

Professional sophisticated part-nership - is a good phrase whichmay be used to describe our way."Since March 2016, Zaiser hasbeen the Head of Africa BusinessInitiative, created with the sup-port of the business as a platformfor the humanitarian, economicand legal expertise, aimed at thereconstruction and strengthen-ing of relations between Russiaand Africa.

The main goal of this organiza-tion - to unite the efforts in pro-moting and supporting theinterests of Russian business inthe framework of broader inter-national cooperation on the terri-tory of the African continent.

The Institute for African Studies(IAS) is one of the founders of theAfrica Business Initiative (ABI). It isa direct challenge - to move fromdeclarations (Memorandum ofUnderstanding) to deeds bybringing together government,diplomatic, scientific, economicand financial resources in order topromote Russian business on thecontinent.

Quite recently, Russian authori-ties have made relentless effortstoward raising Russia's politicalinfluence and economic cooper-ation in some African countries.Thus, discussions at the forth-coming forum will undoubtedlyfocus on reviewing the past andthe present as well as proposingpractical ways to facilitate

investment activities and thatmight include promising areassuch as infrastructure, energy andmany other sectors in Africa.

Professor Irina Abramova, newly-appointed Director of the Insti-tute for African Studies under theRussian Academy of Sciences, hasacknowledged that "as before,we cannot deny the insufficientknowledge of the Russian busi-ness structures specificity ofAfrica, its requirements, and otherparameters.

On the other hand, Africans arepoorly informed about the possi-bilities of Russian partnership."

On her part, AlexandraArkhangelskaya, a Senior Re-searcher at the Institute of AfricanStudies under the Russian Acad-emy of Sciences and a Staff Lec-turer at the Moscow High Schoolof Economics said in an interviewthat Russia and Africa neededeach other – "Russia is a vast mar-ket not only for African minerals,but for various other goods andproducts produced by Africancountries."

The signs for Russian-African rela-tions are impressive – declara-tions of intentions have beenmade, important bilateral agree-ments signed – now it remains tobe seen how these intentions andagreements will be implementedin practice, she pointed out in theinterview.

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

wHAt REMAINs tHE sAME Is A wILL, A vERY LOYAL

MUtUAL AttItUDE bEtwEEN RUssIA AND AfRICAN

COUNtRIEs AND stRONG DEsIRE tO PUsH fORwARD

tHEsE MUtUAL EffORts


The revival of Russia-Africa rela-tions should be enhanced in allfields. Obstacles to the broaden-ing of Russian-Africa relationsshould be addressed. These in-clude in particular the lack ofknowledge in Russia about thesituation in Africa, and vice versa,suggested Arkhangelskaya.

Russia and Africa are gearing upefforts in raising the level of tradeand business, Andrey Efimenko,an Expert at the Russian Chamberof Commerce and Industry (CCI)said in an exclusive interviewwith me, emphasizing unre-servedly the importance of in-creasing business and economiccooperation with the Africancountries."Unfortunately," Efimenko regret-tably pointed out, "some largeRussian companies operating onthe African market, has managedto establish itself negatively in anumber of countries.

This is primarily due to ignoranceof cultural peculiarities of the re-gion, the lack of social responsi-bility, failure to fulfill contractualobligations. These cases damage the image ofRussia and Russian companieswith further entering the Africanmarket."

In conditions of high competitionon the African market from China,European Union and the UnitedStates, Efimenko suggested thatforming public-private partner-ship with the coordinating andsteering role of the state is at thisstage the key to success and thebest form of development of co-operation of Russia with Africancountries.

"What seems to irk the Russians,in particular, is that very few ini-tiatives go beyond the symbol-ism, pomp and circumstance ofhigh level opening moves.

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It is also still not clear how SouthAfrica sees Russia's willingness(and intention) to step up its rolein Africa, especially with Chinabecoming more visible and as-sertive on the continent," saidProfessor Gerrit Olivier from theDepartment of Political Sciences,University of Pretoria in SouthAfrica.

Today Russian influence in Africa,despite efforts towards resuscita-tion, remains marginal. While,given its global status, it ought tobe active in Africa as Western Eu-rope, the European Union, Amer-ica and China are, it is all butabsent, playing a negligible role,according to the views of the re-tired diplomat who served previ-ously as South AfricanAmbassador to the Russian Fed-eration,

"Russia, of course, is not satisfiedwith this state of affairs. At pres-ent diplomacy dominates its ap-proach: a plethora of agreementsare being entered into with SouthAfrica and various other states inAfrica, official visits from Moscowproliferate apace, but the out-comes remain hardly discernible.Be that as it may, the Kremlin hasrevived its interest in the Africancontinent and it will be realistic toexpect that the spade work it isputting in now will at some stageshow more tangible results." Pro-fessor Olivier wrote from Pretoria.

Both Russian and African policyexperts, however, suggested thatthe existing Memorandum of Un-derstanding (MoUs) Russia hassigned with many African coun-tries and together with variouseconomic agreements reachedby the joint business councilsover the past few years providesolid framework for raising vigor-ously its economic influence aswell as strengthening relations toan appreciable levels betweenRussia and Africa.

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The Greater Caspian Project 25

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