American GovernmentMr. Bekemeyer

Due Process of Law: The Warren Court

(1953-1969)

The Fourth Amendment: Searches and Seizures, Warrants

Mapp v. Ohio (1961)

In the case of Weeks v. United States (1914), the Supreme Court ruled that evidence that was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s restrictions on “unreasonable searches and seizures” could not be used in court, even if it proved that a person was guilty. This came to be known as the exclusionary rule. According to the Supreme Court, however, the rule only applied to the federal government, not to the states.

In 1957, when the Cleveland Police Department received a tip that Dollree Mapp and her daughter were harboring a suspected bombing fugitive, they immediately went to her house and demanded entrance. Mapp called her attorney and under his advice she refused to give them entry because they did not have a warrant. Several hours later, more officers came to her door and demanded that they be permitted to enter her house. After Mapp refused, they forcibly opened a door to the house and proceeded in. Mapp confronted them and demanded to see the search warrant. The police waved a piece of paper in the air

Chief Justice Earl Warren

Above: A critical view of the exclusionary rule

(claiming it was the warrant) and Mapp grabbed it and put it down her shirt. The police eventually got the "warrant" back from Mapp. The officers then cuffed her feet and went on to search her entire house for the fugitive. When they reached her basement they found a trunk containing "lewd and lascivious" books, pictures, and photographs. Mapp said she was holding the trunk for a friend and was not aware of its contents. The officers arrested Mapp for violating an Ohio law which prohibited the possession of obscene material. No fugitive or any evidence of one was ever found at the house. At her trial in the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, Mapp was convicted based on the evidence that was presented by the police. Mapp's attorney questioned the police about the warrant but they could not show one.

Constitutional Question: The police did not have a valid warrant to search Dollree Mapp’s home. Can evidence obtained through a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment be admitted in a state criminal trial?

Conclusion: The Supreme Court declared that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by [the Fourth Amendment], inadmissible in a state court." Mapp had been convicted on the basis of illegally obtained evidence and therefore had to be retried without that evidence. This was an historic – and controversial – decision. It meant that state and local governments were also subject to the exclusionary rule established by Weeks.

Written responseThe exclusionary rule prohibits prosecutors from presenting evidence obtained illegally (i.e. without a warrant) in a criminal trial. Do you believe that juries should be prevented from examining evidence like that obtained in the arrest of Dollree Mapp, even if it means a guilty person might go free? Explain.

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Katz v. United States (1967)

Acting on a suspicion that Katz was transmitting gambling information over the phone to clients in other states, Federal agents attached an eavesdropping device to the outside of a public phone booth used by Katz. Based on recordings of his end of the conversations, Katz was convicted for the illegal transmission of bets from Los Angeles to Boston and Miami. On appeal, Katz challenged his conviction arguing that the recordings could not be used as evidence against him. The Court of Appeals rejected this point, noting that the police didn’t physically intrude into the phone booth but rather merely listened in on the phone line.

Constitutional Question: Does the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures require the police to obtain a search warrant in order to wiretap a public pay phone?

Conclusion: Yes. In a ruling that overturned a 40-year old decision allowing wiretapping without a warrant (Olmstead v. United States, 1928), the Court ruled that Katz was entitled to Fourth Amendment protection for his conversations and that a physical intrusion into the area he occupied was unnecessary to bring the Amendment into play. “The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,” wrote Justice Potter Stewart for the Court. The Court established a two-pronged Katz test . In order to determine whether an action by government authorities without a warrant results in a violation of a person’s Fourth Amendment rights, the Court must ask whether (1) that person had a subjective expectation of privacy in the place where the search took place, and (2) whether society is ready to accept this expectation as reasonable. In this case, Katz expected that his conversation in a closed telephone booth would remain private, and society would agree.

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Written responseThe society that ratified the Fourth Amendment could not have imagined how it might apply to telephone technology. Did the Warren Court read the Constitution too loosely when it asserted that the constitutional protection against “unreasonable searches and seizures” applied to any situation that society today deems as “private”? Should police really need a warrant to listen to your phone conversations? How about your e-mails? Facebook status updates? Web browser history? Conversations with friends in a public park?

Chimel v. California (1968)

Local police officers went to Chimel's home with a warrant authorizing his arrest for burglary. Upon serving him with the arrest warrant, the officers conducted a comprehensive search – without a search warrant – of Chimel's entire residence. The search uncovered a number of items that were later used to convict Chimel. State courts upheld the conviction.

Constitutional question: Did the warrantless search of Chimel's home violate the Fourth Amendment?

Conclusion: Yes. The Court held that the search of Chimel's house was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. While the Court asserted the right of police officers to search an arrestee and the surrounding area, it reasoned that these searches “incident to arrest” are limited to the area within the immediate control of the suspect. They argued that a suspect might attempt to

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hide or destroy easily accessible evidence upon their arrest and that police were therefore justified in searching that person and their immediate surroundings. But police could not justifiably rummage through areas beyond the suspect’s control without a warrant.

Terry v. Ohio (1968)

On October 31, 1963, a Cleveland police detective saw two men, John W. Terry and Richard Chilton, standing on a street corner, acting in a way the officer thought was suspicious. He observed the two men walk alternately back and forth along an identical route, pausing to stare in the same store window. Each completion of the route was followed by a conference between the two on a corner. Suspecting the two men of “casing a job, a stick-up,” the detective followed them as they walked away, joined by a third person. The officer approached the three, identified himself as a policeman, and asked their names. The men “mumbled something,” whereupon McFadden spun Terry around, patted down his outside clothing, and felt a pistol in his overcoat pocket. He reached inside the overcoat pocket, but was unable to remove the gun. The officer ordered the three into the store. He removed Terry's overcoat, took out a revolver, and ordered the three to face the wall with their hands raised. He patted down the outer clothing of Chilton and Katz and seized a revolver from Chilton's overcoat pocket. The three were arrested.

The defense attorneys of the individuals moved to suppress the use of the seized weapons as evidence on grounds that the search and subsequent seizure were a violation of the Fourth Amendment, but the trial judge refused. Terry and Chilton were found guilty.

Constitutional question: Was the search of Terry and the other men in violation of the Fourth Amendment?

Conclusion: No. Police officers can “stop and frisk” people on the street through a “pat-down” of the outer garments of their clothing if the police have “reasonable suspicion” to believe the individuals may be armed and dangerous.

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Written responseDo the Chimel and Terry cases expand or restrict the rights of the accused? Of police? Do you agree with these decisions? Why or why not?

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The Fifth Amendment: Protection against Self-Incrimination

Miranda v. Arizona (1966)

Ernesto Arturo Miranda was arrested based on evidence linking him to the kidnapping and rape of an 18-year-old woman 10 days earlier. After two hours of interrogation by police officers, Miranda signed a confession to the rape charge on forms that included the typed statement “I do hereby swear that I make this statement voluntarily and of my own free will, with no threats, coercion, or promises of immunity, and with full knowledge of my legal rights, understanding any statement I make may be used against me.” However, at no time was Miranda told of his right to a defense attorney, and he was not advised of his right to say nothing to police interrogators, or that his statements could be used as evidence in a trial. At trial, when prosecutors offered Miranda's written confession as evidence, his court-appointed lawyer, Alvin Moore, objected that because of these facts, the confession was not truly voluntary and should be excluded. Moore's objection was overruled and based on this confession and other evidence, Miranda was convicted of rape and kidnapping and sentenced to 20 to 30 years imprisonment on each charge.

Constitutional Question: The Firth Amendment states that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” The Sixth Amendment provides suspects in a criminal case with the right to legal counsel. Does the police practice of interrogating individuals without notifying them of their right to counsel and their protection against self-incrimination violate the Constitution?

Conclusion: The Court held that prosecutors could not use statements – either oral or written – produced during an interrogation of defendants unless they demonstrated that these defendants were aware of their right against self-incrimination. The Court insisted that police were required to inform suspects of their right to due process, including warnings of the right to remain silent and the

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right to have an attorney present during interrogations. The Miranda warning is familiar to viewers of police dramas: “You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. . . .” Like the exclusionary rule, the Miranda ruling could and did result in criminals going free even though the evidence existed to convict them.

Written responseDo you agree with the Warren Court that confessions, legally speaking, “don’t count” if a defendant is not formally told of his or her due process rights? What might be some positive and negative consequences of this rule?

The Sixth Amendment: Right to Counsel

Gideon v. Wainwright (1963)

Between midnight and 8:00 am on June 3, 1961, a burglary occurred at the Bay Harbor Pool Room in Panama City, Florida. Someone broke a window, smashed the cigarette machine and jukebox, and stole money from both. Later that day, a witness reported that he had seen Clarence Earl Gideon in the poolroom at around 5:30 that morning. When Gideon was found nearby with a pint of wine and some change in his pockets, the police arrested him and charged him with breaking and entering.

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Gideon was a semi-literate drifter who could not afford a lawyer, so at the trial, he asked the judge to appoint one for him. Gideon argued that the Court should do so because the Sixth Amendment says that everyone is entitled to a lawyer. The judge denied his request, ruling that the state did not have to pay a poor person's legal defense unless he was charged with a capital crime or "special circumstances" existed. Gideon was left to represent himself.

As might be expected, Gideon did a poor job of defending himself. He had done no preparation work before his trial; his choice of witnesses was unusual—for instance, he called police officers who arrested him to testify on his behalf, not having any reason to believe they would help his case. He had no experience in cross-examining a witness in order to impeach that person's credibility, so his line of questioning was not as productive as a lawyer's would have been.

Gideon was found guilty of breaking and entering and petty larceny, which was a felony. He was sentenced to five years in a Florida state prison, partly because of his prior criminal record. While in prison, he began studying law in the prison library, believing that his Sixth Amendment rights had been violated when he was denied a defense lawyer paid for by the State. His study of the law led him to file a petition for habeas corpus with the Supreme Court of Florida, which asked that he be freed because he had been imprisoned illegally. After the Supreme Court of Florida rejected his petition, he handwrote a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, asking that it hear his case. The Court allowed him to file it in forma pauperis, which meant that the Court would waive the fees generally associated with such a petition. Generally, the Court dismisses most of these petitions; Gideon's was among those that it did not dismiss.

Constitutional question: The Sixth Amendment states, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” Did the state court's failure to provide a lawyer for Gideon violate his right to a fair trial and due process of law as protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion: In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that Gideon had a right to be represented by a court-appointed attorney. The Court found that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel was a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial, which should be made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Black called it an "obvious truth"

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that a fair trial for a poor defendant could not be guaranteed without the assistance of an attorney. Those familiar with the American system of justice, commented Black, recognized that “lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.”

Written responseThe Sixth Amendment says that the accused are entitled to the right to an attorney. Do you agree that this amendment ought to be interpreted to mean that the government must use tax dollars to pay for legal representation for poor defendants?

Written responseGenerally, were the Warren Court decisions on the rights of persons suspected or accused of having committed a crime liberal or conservative? Explain.

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Written responseBased on the evidence, would you characterize the Warren Court as having practiced judicial “activism” or “restraint”? Why?

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