THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY SPECIAL NUMBER JULY 1959

Political Leadership in West Bengal The Implications of Its Changing Patterns for Economic Planning

Myron Weiner

THE process by which a new leadership is emerging th rough­

out As ia provides us w i t h one key to unders tanding the dynamics of social and pol i t ica l change. W i t h the achievement of independence new leaders emerge w i t h new i n ­terests and demands. H o w wel l these fragi le democracies w i l l be able to w i t h s t a n d the pressures exercised by new leaders and new groups is one of the fundamenta l questions of our t imes. I t is the purpose of this paper to explore the changing pa t te rn of leadership in a single state in I n d i a d u r i n g the past f o r t y years and to suggest the k inds of demands l ike ly to enter I n d i a n po l i t i ca l l i fe as a result of these changes. F i n a l l y , we shal l ask w h a t effect these demands are l i ke ly to have on the freedom w i t h w h i c h economic p l ann ing m a y be pursued by the I n d i a n government in the years ahead.

Our study is based upon the following reflections:

1. Under western colonial rule the countries of As i a have experienced a quiet but profound change In the character of the i r po l i t i ca l leader­ship One could v iew the na t iona l i s t s t ruggle in Ind i a , as elsewhere, not o n l y as a s t ruggle by Ind ians to replace the i r B r i t i s h rulers, bu t as a s truggle by one group of Ind ians— a western-educated class of jour -na l i s t s , doctors, l awyers and a d m i -nistrators—to replace an older lead­

ership of maharajas , landlords, and heredi ta ry admin is t ra to rs . To un­ders tand modern Ind ia , one must unders tand th is new leadership, the social background f rom which i t derives, the groups w i t h wh ich i t is associated and whose interests i t ar t iculates , the values and ideolo­gies it propagates, and the influence wh ich i t wields.

2. This new leadership has i tself been undergoing many changes. The late 19th and early 20th century leadership w h i c h part ic ipated in the I n d i a n N a t i o n a l Congress. India ' s paramount nat ional is t orga­nizat ion, was largely d rawn f rom middle income groups in the coastal cities of Calcut ta , Bombay, Madras and the i r environs. In the 1920s ma jo r changes occurred w i t h i n the nat ional is t movement. No t only did the advent of Gandhi mean a change in style by the na t ional i s t move­ment, f rom the t w o strands of modern l ibera l i sm and violent ex­t r emism to non-violent c iv i l dis­obedience bui l t upon mass par t i c i ­pat ion, but a change occurred in the character of the leadership. The leadership wh ich arose in the 1920s d i d not come so exclusively f r o m B e n g a l Madras and Bombay, but f r o m Gujerat , Un i t ed Provinces, B iha r , A n d h r a and the Centra l Pro­vinces. The new leadership came f r o m the h in ter lands away f r o m the m a i n centers of western In t rus ion , Such changes in the geographic backgrounds o f leaders, a long w i t h

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changes in social o r ig in , are often c r i t i ca l factors in the kinds of pol i ­t ical conflicts and public policies wh ich emerge.

3. F ina l l y , it is assumed here tha t public policy in Ind i a Is not s imply made by a handful of men who at­tempt to enforce their decisions upon a static population. Between the top decision makers and the masses are an a r r a y of intermediate lead­ers, some of whom communicate governmenta l decisions to the mass­es, others of whom a t tempt to i n ­fluence policy, admin i s t ra t ion and the selection of personnel on the basis of the interests of the groups to which they belong and ident i fy . Much of the t h i n k i n g about pol i t ica l leadership) in Ind i a and elsewhere in Asia and A f r i c a focuses on the elite-mass dichotomy. This dicho­tomy finds a centra l place in the t h i n k i n g of Tareto, Mosca and Lasswell . but whi le it now plays a secondary role in the analysis of Amer ican and European pol i t ica l systems, it occupies a centra l place in popular and even scholar ly t h i n k ­ing about non-European pol i t ica l systems. This image of the pol i t ica l process fails to take Into account the great changes wh ich have oc­curred in Ind i a since the 1920s and fails to explore the l inkage between the top leadership in Ind ia—the Pr ime Minis te r , cabinet members, and State chief minis ters—and the masses.

It is popularly believed in Calcutta, especially by the intellectuals of that city, that as Calcutta goes so goes all of West Bengal. Since Calcutta turned against the Congress Party in the 1957 elections, many Cal­cutta intellectuals believe that rural Bengal will follow suit in the 1962 elections.

The data provided here concerning the rise of a rural elite into political positions suggests that the influence of Calcutta and of her politicians upon rural areas is decreasing.

Built upon this outdated image of the political process is another view that India's parliamentary system is simply the "plaything" of urban intellectuals. But the legislature is already under rural control, rural representation m Parliament is increasing and it is likely that rural influence will continue to increase,

What effect will this increase in rural leadership have upon the freedom with which economic planning may be pursued? So long it has been possible for India's planners to plan on a highly rational and relatively non-political basis. To the extent that rural areas increasingly articulate their interests, it will be-come more and more difficult for planners not to take these demands into account.

If political demands increasingly enter into economic planning, what effects might this have upon the democratic structure? Planners will be faced with some hard choice. They may have to modify what they conceive to be highly rational plans based solely upon economic considerations, or alternatively, adopt authoritarian measures to minimize the influence of these political pressures. The urban industrial emphasis of planning may indeed undergo great changes.

THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY SPECIAL NUMBER JULY 1959

Middle Strata of Leadership This study, therefore, is an at­

tempt to explore the social and geographic o r g i n s of this in terme­diate leadership, and the ways In w h i c h th is leadership has been and Is changing, By intermediate lead­ership we refer to those leaders who serve as a l i n k between the social system and the governmenta l struc­ture . W h a t characterizes thin lead­ership is tha t it has a "const i tu­ency," not s imply an electoral con­sti tuency, but some group aff i l ia t ion

a t rade un ion ; a peasant, refugee, caste or t r i b a l o rgan iza t ion ; a busi­ness chamber; or a civic association.

Our i nqu i ry in to th is middle s t r a t a of leadership in I n d i a has led us to focus our a t t en t ion on a single state, West Bengal . West Bengal is by no means a " t y p i c a l " state, but for t ha t ma t t e r one can find unique as wel l as " t y p i c a l " features to every I n d i a n state. But the most salient fact about the uniqueness of West Bengal for our study; however, is the extent and du ra t ion of the Western impact . The East I n d i a Company establish­ed Itself in Bengal in the la t te r part of the 18th century. B r i t i s h policy d u r i n g the 18th and early 10th cen­turies resulted in the e l imina t ion of M o g h u l rule, the establishment of a new landlord class, the in t roduc t ion of Eng l i sh in a newly created sys­t em of Ang lo - Ind i an schools and a major univers i ty in Calcut ta , and the rise of new westernized occupa­t ions associated w i t h act ivi t ies of the Br i t i sh -admin i s t r a t i on , medi­cine, law, and journa l i sm. Bengal was perhaps the most active of the earliest nat ional is t centers. Ben­galis were among the leading moderates who led the Ind ian Na­t i o n a l Congress in the la t t e r par t of the 19th century, and they were also among the leading ter ror is ts who t h r ew bombs at the B r i t i s h in the first decade of the 20th century. Not u n t i l the early 1920s, when Gandhi and a new na t iona l leader­ship arose, d id the posit ion of Ben­ga l in the na t iona l movement recede. Bengal was fu r the r weakened by the p a r t i t i o n of 1947 when some 40 mi l l i ons of people in East Bengal became pa r t of Pak i s t an whi le some 27 mi l l i ons of people in West Ben­g a l remained par t o f I nd i a . But even w i t h pa r t i t i on , West Ben­g a l continues to remain one of the most po l i t i ca l ly active states in I n d i a . I t i s possible t ha t Bengal 's

ear ly access to western ideas, her higher degree of pol i t ica l organiza­t ion , and her re la t ive ly h igh level of indus t r i a l i za t ion m a y foreshadow developments elsewhere. Bu t this is speculation. I t is enough at this stage to indicate the pa t te rn of de­velopment in one state and leave to other researchers the task of deve­lop ing comparat ive data.

Analysis of 408 Bengali Leaders

Our inqu i ry is based upon an analysis of 408 Bengal i leaders in the West Bengal Legis la t ive Assem­b ly and Council (1957-), the I n d i a n Pa r l i amen t (1952-1957), the West Bengal State Congress Commit tee (1958), the Execut ive Commit tee of the P ra j a Socialist P a r t y (1958), the Execut ive Commit tee of the Com­munist-sponsored peasant organiza­t ion , the Al l I n d i a K i san Sabha (1958), and the Execut ive Commit tee of the M a r x i s t left peasant organi ­zation, the Uni ted Kisan Sabha (1958). Our sample thus includes members of the four major pol i t ica l groups in West Bengal : the Con­gress P a r t y (198), which controls the state government , the Commu­nists (85), the Socialists (36), and the various splinter Marx i s t left parties (42), plus independents and members of smaller parties (47). H o w involved these leaders are w i t h var ious interest groups in West Bengal is indicated by the fo l low­i n g statist ics. Ninety-nine are in­volved in civic act ivi t ies at the local l e v e l 33 are in religious and caste bodies, 83 are in peasant associa­tions, 38 are in trade unions, 14 are in credit societies and cooperatives, 35 are in cu l tu ra l and professional bodies, 11 are in business chambers. One hundred and nineteen members of the sample are also active in in ­s t i tu t ions of local government . Of the 408 individuals in our sample. 315 hold public office in Par l iament , the West Bengal Legis la t ive Assem­bly or the West Bengal Legislat ive Council . The data employed In this study* was derived f rom published

* I am indebted to the Social Science Research Council Com­mit tee on Comparat ive Poli t ics for the f inancial support wh ich made th is field w o r k possible. The da ta presented here is pa r t of a larger s tudy of po l i t i ca l leadership in West Bengal , w h i c h in t u r n is par t of a larger study of the role and func­t i on of Interest groups in I nd i an polit ics.

Who's whos and interviews conduct ed in Calcut ta in 1957 and 1958,

We shall focus on the one fun­damental Issue before us: how has this leadership been changing, and wha t effects do these changes have upon pol i t ical demands and public policy? We are faced at the outset w i t h a serious methodological pro­blem. Whi le data on the present leadership is available, direct data is not avai lable for those who were active in poli t ics in the 1920s, or 1930s, or even the 1940s, Our study would have to be te rminated even before we began were it not for the fact tha t Indians, l ike most other Asians and Afr icans , are recruited in to politics in their early 20s or younger. Those who are today in the 60s entered politics in the 1920s, those who are 50 entered in the 1930s and so on. By explor ing the differences between age groups it thus becomes possible for us to see the ways in which pol i t ical re­crui tment has been changing over a fo r ty year period.

In our sample we have the ages of 340 individuals . Of these 84 were born before 1900, 98 were born between 1900 and 1909. 101 were born between 1910 and 1919 and 57 were born after 1920.

Ruralization of Elites

As migh t be expected in a largely ag r i cu l tu ra l country , most pol i t ical leaders were born in villages How­ever, th rough the for ty years the number born in Calcut ta and other urban centers has declined, whi le the number born in villages has increased. F i f t y per cent of the sample born before 1900 came f rom villages, while 74 per cent of those born after 1920 were of vil lage or ig in . ("See Table I).

The t rend is thus t o w a r d more rura-l iza t ion of the elite ra ther than less, (The question m i g h t be raised as to

whether the rise in r u r a l born lead­ership might, not merely indicate t ha t u rban areas have more vil lage

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born leaders than earlier. Tha t this is not t rue is proven by the fact t ha t on ly 11 of the 36 members of the Legis la t ive Assembly representing urban areas were born in villages. Other cr i ter ia of " ru r a l i z a t i on , " such as occupation, parenta l occupation, and source of income, a l l tend to substantiate our conclusion. Of the 214 assembly members for w h o m occupation data was available, 12 per cent of the oldest group reports a g r i c u l t u r a l occupations compared w i t h 37 per cent of the youngest.)

This t rend nans counter to the increas ing urban iza t ion of West Bengal , and l ikewise runs counter to the increasing urbaniza t ion of pol i ­t i ca l leadership in indust r ia l ized countries of the west. In Ind ia , r u r a l powers- princes and landlords

—were so protected by the colonial power tha t they d id not par t ic ipate in na t ional i s t poli t ics. Na t iona l i s t leadership arose in u rban centers where western ideas of democracy and representat ion were introduced, and where the new universi t ies created a class of lawyers , doctors, clerks and other middle class occu­pations. No t u n t i l the 1920s when the nat ional is t movement t r ied to w i n support for independence from the r u r a l populat ion did more r u r a l leaders enter poli t ics. But the t rend t o w a r d the emergence of a new r u r a l leadership had begun even earl ier w i t h the g radua l emergence of a new r u r a l middle class only par­t i a l l y involved in l and ownership. The smaller landlords or their sons who became r u r a l lawyers, teachers and shopkeepers soon became as intensely pa t r io t ic as the i r u rban brothers .

Most of the r u r a l seats in the legislat ive assembly are now repre­sented by ru ra l -born members. Only 33 out of 168 r u r a l seats in the Leg i ­s la t ive Assembly have urban-born members. By contrast , 14 out of 29 r u r a l M P seats are s t i l l held by urban members. The t rend in both the Assembly and in Par l iament , however, is for more and more or the younger members to be r u r a l born . Whi le only 56 per cent of the M L A s born before 1900 came f r o m r u r a l areas, 79 per cent of those bo rn after 1920 are r u r a l . Since 77 per cent of the Assembly seats are f r o m r u r a l constituencies, i t is possible to conclude t ha t the r u r a l areas are now produc ing enough of the i r own leaders to t i l l their seats in the Legis la t ive Assembly. This

is yet to be reflected in the selection of members of Pa r l i amen t where 78 per cent of the seats are ru r a l , bu t only 41 per cent of the seats are held by r u r a l born members. On the basis of wha t has a l ready hap­pened in the West Bengal Assembly (where 68 per cent are r u r a l bo rn ) , one could predict tha t ru ra l -bo rn representation in the Par l i ament m New Delhi f r o m West Bengal is l ike ly to increase.

Rural-Urban Separation W h a t does this g r o w i n g self-suffi­

ciency in r u r a l leadership indicate? I t suggests t h a t urban discontent may not so easily overf low in to r u r a l areas. W i t h r u r a l areas i n ­creasingly p rov id ing their own lead­ers, bo th r u r a l leaders and r u r a l voters are more l ike ly to be condi­t ioned by wha t is go ing on in r u r a l areas t h a n by discontent in the cities. B a d urban condit ions may, of course, affect r u r a l condit ions as wel l . The absence of indus t r ia l g r o w t h m a y lessen job oppor tuni ­ties, increase r u r a l overcrowding, and lower r u r a l l i v i n g standards. But the mere fact of u rban discon­tent by i t se l f may not affect r u r a l leadership o r v o t i n g behaviour. I t was possible, for example, for Cal ­cu t ta to elect a m a j o r i t y of i ts Assembly representatives f rom the Communis t P a r t y in 1957, but. for the r u r a l areas to elect Congress­men. A n d i t is possible too t ha t this ru ra l -u rban pol i t ica l spl i t in West Bengal m a y persist for some t ime, precisely because of the self-sus ta in ing nature of both r u r a l and u rban po l i t i ca l leadership.

To the extent t h a t r u r a l and urban areas of West Bengal separate pol i ­t i ca l ly , each w i t h the i r own leader­ship, the i r o w n interests, and their own v o t i n g pat terns, then West Bengal w i l l s imply be f o l l o w i n g a pa t te rn a l ready established in other g r o w i n g indus t r i a l areas of the w o r l d . Democra t ic Chicago versus Republican "downsta te ," and Demo­crat ic N e w Y o r k versus Republican "upstate" s imply Indicate t h a t r u r a l and urban areas often have con­f l ic t ing interests, outlooks, and' lead-ship. The la ter development of r u r a l interests in Ind ia , w h i c h runs counter to the t i m i n g of such deve­lopments in the west, is the conse­quence of a complex series of factors related to western domina t i on ; but equalizat ion of r u r a l -u rban interests in West Benga l does seem to be occur r ing and m a y por tend a pat-

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t e rn l i k e l y to develop in other par t s o f I n d i a .

I t i s popular ly believed in Ca l ­cut ta , especially by the intel lectuals of t h a t c i ty , t h a t as Calcu t ta goes so goes a l l of West Bengal . Since Ca lcu t t a t u rned against the Con­gress P a r t y in the 1957 elections, m a n y Calcut ta intel lectuals believe t ha t r u r a l Bengal w i l l f o l l ow suit i n the 1962 elections. The data pro­vided here concerning the rise of a r u r a l elite in to po l i t i ca l positions suggests t ha t the influence of Cal ­cu t ta and of her pol i t ic ians upon r u r a l areas is decreasing. M a n y Bengalis are l i v i n g w i t h an image of the pol i t ica l process of an earl ier era when in te l lec tual ferment in Calcut ta overflowed in to the r u r a l areas as u rban nat ional is ts j ou r ­neyed to the r u r a l areas to orga­nize the peasantry on behalf of the na t iona l movement . Calcutta 's i n ­fluence on r u r a l areas is s t i l l great . Her newspapers are read by m a n y of the l i terate leaders of the r u r a l areas. R u r a l elites have often studied in and have fr iendship ties w i t h Calcut ta . But today, Ca lcu t ta provides influence, not leadership, for r u r a l West Bengal .

B u i l t upon this outdated image of the pol i t ica l process is another view tha t India ' s pa r l i amen ta ry sys­t em is s imply the " p l a y t h i n g " of u rban intellectuals. I t i s t rue t h a t ha l f of the West Bengal Cabinet ?s urban-born , that 17 out of 22 mem­bers of the Execut ive Commit tee of the Pra ja Socialist P a r t y in West Bengal are u rban and on ly one out of four Bengal i Minis ters in New Delh i is r u r a l , but the legislature is a l ready under r u r a l cont ro l , r u r a l representat ion in P a r l i a m e n t i s i n ­creasing and i t i s l i k e l y t h a t r u r a l influence w i l l continue to increase.

Characteristics of Rural Leaders W h o are those r u r a l pol i t ic ians

and wha t interests do they repre­sent? By a l l measurements, Con­gress is the most r u r a l pa r ty in West Bengal . (See Table I I , p 929.) In our t o t a l sample of 192 Con­gressmen for w h o m place of b i r t h was available, 119 were born in vil lages, 39 in towns a n d 34 in Ca l ­cut ta . The v i l lage bias is heaviest in the Legis la t ive Assembly (95 out of 133) a n d least in Pa r l i amen t (only 15 out of 39). These r u r a l -born Congressmen i n v a r i a b l y repre­sent r u r a l constituencies. One h u n ­dred and sixteen of the Congress M L A constituencies (86 per cent) are

THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY SPECIAL NUMBER JULY 1950

r u r a l a n d a lmost a l l the 116 Con­gressmen f r o m r u r a l constituencies give r u r a l addresses as thei r per­manent address. In short, the vast m a j o r i t y of Congressmen in the Assembly were born in villages, re­present the consti tuency in wh ich they were born, and continue to re­side w i t h i n the i r consti tuency and, in some instances, even in the vi l lage of their b i r t h .

Place of b i r t h of Communists was only avai lable for the 43 Commu­nist M L A s and MPs. Of these, one h a l f were vi l lage born, one-fourth f rom towns and another four th f rom Calcut ta . Of the 38 Commu­nists in the West Bengal Legis la t ive Assembly, only 19 are f r o m r u r a l constituencies. A m o n g the seven Communis t MPs, only two are vi l lage born. Da ta on the exact birthplaces of Communis t workers in the A i l I n d i a K i s a n Sabha was not available, but i t is in teres t ing to note t ha t as many as 12 of the 44 for w h o m dis t r ic t of b i r t h was k n o w n were born outside of West Bengal (mos t ly in East Benga l ) . A ra ther large number of Communis t workers among peasants apparent ly come f rom outside of the areas in which they w o r k , in contrast to the Congressmen who are i nva r i ab ly par t of the local r u r a l gent ry .

The Socialists and Marx i s t leftists in the Assembly occupy propor t ion­ately more r u r a l seats than the Communists , less r u r a l seats t h a n Congress. Of the 30 M L A seats held by Socialists and Marx is t s , 20 are r u r a l . (See Table I I . )

Interest Group Affiliations W h a t are the interest group affi­

l ia t ions of r u r a l poli t icians? The interest group affil iations of M L A s indicate the extent to which r u r a l representatives tend to be wel l established in their communit ies . E igh ty- f ive of the 168 r u r a l M L A s have been active in local govern­ment, and 62 in local civic associa­

t ions. In contrast only 12 of the 38 urban M L A s have been active in local government and only nine in local civic associations. M a n y of the r u r a l representatives are also active in caste, t r i b a l and religious associations (20) and credit and b a n k i n g associations (10). Then? are few r u r a l M L A s who have not had a record of ac t iv i ty in local government , local civic associations, caste, t r i b a l and religious bodies, credit, and bank ing associations or cooperatives. In contrast, many of the 38 urban M L A s (19 of w h o m are members of the Communis t or Marx i s t left part ies) have no group affil iations other than the par ty to which they belong and the trade unions, peace fronts and other asso­ciations dominated by their par ty .

One s t r i k i n g difference between Communis ts and Marx i s t leftists on the One hand and Congressmen on the other is the extent to which one is deeply involved in various kinds of occupational interests, such as unions and peasant associations, whi le the other is more involved in local government, local civic ac t i ­vit ies, various caste, religious and t r i b a l bodies. Congressmen are active in school boards, vi l lage pan-chayats, chari table organizations, t r i b a l and scheduled caste societies, M u s l i m associations, temple boards and a host of other bodies in the local communi ty . These bodies, public and private, are the structures of power and influence in r u r a l India and it is in these tha t the Congress Pa r ty demonstrates so clearly the sources of its v o t i n g power in West Bengal . Few Assem­bly members have bui l t their electo­r a l careers on trade union and pea­sant organisat ion work , and the fact tha t so few non-Congressmen are elected f rom outside of Calcut ta is a demonstra t ion of this fact. Even opposition legislators in r u r a l areas must bu i ld themselves t h r o u g h local government and civic ac t i v i ­

ties. I f Congress wins votes in West Bengal , in large measure i t must be a t t r ibu ted to the fact t ha t Congress is better entrenched in such local activi t ies than are other parties.

Economic Conflicts In Rural Areas

A l l this suggests tha t class con­flicts w i t h i n r u r a l areas are not so great as to disrupt the un i ty of local civic bodies. Were economic con­flicts w i t h i n ru r a l areas clearly ar t iculated, then peasant organiza­tions, bodies of ag r i cu l tu ra l labour­ers, tenant associations and the l ike would be g r o w i n g sources of power and would provide the base by wh ich poli t icians could obta in power. This has not happened in West Bengal and the Congress Par ty , w i t h its commitment to har­moniz ing divergent interests, pro-tits f rom ru ra l uni ty . F o r some t ime but w i t h l i t t l e success the Com­munists and the Marx i s t left parties have endeavoured to cul t ivate class struggle. But in recent years, there have been indications t ha t these parties intend to imi ta te the Con­gress by w o r k i n g w i t h i n local bodies, credit societies, cooperatives, and vi l lage panchayats a recognit ion by the Communists of the essential character of r u r a l society in West Bengal .

The r u r a l leadership in the L e g i ­slative Assembly is made up of smal l landholders (52 out of 168), and middle class professionals (73) who hold positions as doctors, mer­chants, lawyers, teachers, jour­nalists and clerks. (See Table I I I . ) I t is this well-established group, re la t ively h igh in income, occupa­t iona l status, education, and in some instances caste f rom which pol i t ica l leadership is derived.

Leadership and Planning Process W h a t effect w i l l this increase in

r u r a l leadership have upon the free­dom w i t h which economic p lann ing

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m a y be pursued? At present i t i s possible fo r India ' s planners to p lan on a h i g h l y r a t i o n a l and re la t ive ly non-pol i t ica l basis. Planners assess resources, needs a n d targets, and then proceed to allocate those re­sources to best achieve those tar ­gets. The demands of var ious po l i ­t i c a l groups fo r special a t t en t ion have thus f a r been of m ino r impor­tance. Planners w o r k w i t h i n a re la t ive ly free atmosphere as fa r as po l i t i ca l pressures are concerned. W h a t pressures exist are s l ight com­pared w i t h those present in A m e r i ­can, B r i t i s h , o r Japanese polit ics, a n d slight compared to what they are l i ke ly to be a few decades hence as interests in I n d i a become more ar t icula te . We have noted t h a t r u r a l leadership is derived f r o m commu­n i t y associations w h i c h often uni te the communi ty , not class associa­t ions w h i c h divide. In t e rmed ia ry landholders, large peasants and non-ag r i cu l tu ra l middle classes are sources of local leadership. Poorer tenants and sharecroppers m i g h t oppose this leadership, but have yet to show any disposit ion to do so a n d a t tempts by Communis t and M a r x i s t lef t peasant associations to w i n thei r support have been w i t h ­out success. R u r a l demands are l i k e l y to be directed at w i n n i n g gov­ernment assistance, ra ther t h a n ex­pressions of po l i t i ca l conflict w i t h i n the r u r a l communi ty . Th i s pa t te rn m a y change, in w h i c h event the pre­dict ions w h i c h fo l low w i l l have no v a l i d i t y . B u t a t th is t ime there is

no evidence t h a t conflicts w i t h i n the r u r a l communi ty are of any magni tude.

Demands upon government have focussed on t w o issues: government t axa t ion , and al locations of govern­ment revenue. A t t emp t s by govern-ment to increase r u r a l taxes (such as i r r i g a t i o n taxes) are l i ke ly to meet w i t h Increased opposition. De­mands f r o m r u r a l areas for more government expenditures for ag r i ­cu l tu ra l development, i r r i g a t i o n schemes, roads, r u r a l industries, medicaj and public heal th pro­grammes, credi t facil i t ies and the l i ke are already present and are sure to increase. Al ready , cr i t ic isms w i t h i n the I n d i a n Pa r l i amen t have been made tha t the Second Five Year P l an has had an indus t r ia l u rban bias and t h a t increased at­tent ion, i e, expenditure, mus t be given to r u r a l areas in subsequent plans. To the extent tha t r u r a l areas increasingly ar t icula te thei r interests, i t w i l l become more and more difficult for planners not to t ake these demands in to account. D u r i n g the past few years planners have had and perhaps for a few years longer m a y continue to have opportunit ies for r a t iona l p lanning wh ich m a y r ap id ly d iminish .

Demands within Congress Party

Were r u r a l demands r i s i ng outside the Congress Pa r ty fold, i t m i g h t be possible for the government to re­sist pressures as it has so success­

f u l l y resisted pressures f r o m many r urban groups. B u t demands w i t h ­

in the Congress Pa r ty are more-difficult to resist. In some states, such as in Rajasthan, rura l -urban conflicts have taken the f o r m of Congress Par ty-government con­flicts. In other states, such as in West Bengal, g rowing r u r a l and urban demands have forced the state government to exert pressure on New Delhi fo r more f inancial support. The g r o w t h of r u r a l pol i­t ica l power has the effect of s t ra in­i n g center-state relations. Fo r West Bengal , l ike other states, has the const i tu t ional au tho r i t y to t ax ag r i ­culture, but agr icul ture is poor and po l i t i ca l ly powerful . On the other hand, West Bengal 's indus t r ia l sec­tor is re la t ively weal thy, but only the center has the au thor i ty to t a x indus t ry and income. The State government thus increasingly tu rns to the Center for f inancial help. The result is tha t g r o w i n g r u r a l demands on the state are deflected in to state-center conflicts.

Congress governments have thus far resisted urban demands for lower food prices, higher wages, more consumer goods and more em­ployment, a factor not unrelated to the growing weakness of Congress in India ' s major u rban centers. To resist r u r a l demands is more diff i ­cult, for Congress depends so hea­v i l y upon the r u r a l areas for votes. The r u r a l leadership and par t icu-

l a r l y the r u r a l gent ry have thus fa r effectively delayed or th rough influence on local adminis t ra ­t ion effectively negated legisla­t i on crea t ing ceilings on land hold­ings. In both l and r e fo rm a n d tax policy the r u r a l leadership has demonstrated i ts capacity to pre­vent or inval idate government act ion. The possibi l i ty now exists t ha t the r i s ing number of r u r a l Congress leaders combined w i t h the decreasing number of urban Con­gress leaders may result in a si tua­t ion in wh ich th is r u r a l leadership could do more t h a n negate policies, but m a y make more demands on government. A l ready there are re* ports of increasing pressures f r o m r u r a l M L A s o n the departments o f Public Works , Fisheries, Agr icu l tu re , and Communi ty Development. So­c ia l service expenditures for heal th programmes, schools, fisheries, ag r i ­culture, etc. per capita are even now higher in West Bengal t han any other state (Rs 6.12 in West Ben-

931

SPECIAL NUMBER JULY 1959 T H E E C O N O M I C W E E K L Y

gal , Rs 5.94 In Bombay, Rs 4.19 in Madras and Rs 2.37 In U P ) .

Hard Choice We are admi t t ed ly now enter ing

speculative realms, but is i t f a r fetched to assume t h a t the g r o w i n g numbers o f r u r a l M L A s , MPs and po l i t i ca l workers w i l l affect the re la t ive freedom w i t h wh ich policy makers now operate? I f po l i t i ca l demands increasingly enter in to eco­nomic p lanning , wha t effects m i g h t th i s have upon the democratic struc­ture? Government planners w i l l be faced w i t h some h a r d choices. They are l i k e l y to be under pressure f r o m g r o w i n g r u r a l interests to modi fy the i r plans. At this point they must ei ther mod i fy w h a t they conceive to be h i g h l y ra t iona l plans based solely upon economic considerations, or a l t e rna t ive ly they must adopt a u t h o r i t a r i a n measures to minimize the influence of these pol i t i ca l pres­sures. In short, there is l ike ly to be a price for democracy w h i c h planners have not yet had to pay, I n d i a n government officials r i g h t l y pride themselves on their eagerness to p lan fo r economic g r o w t h w i t h ­in a democrat ic f r amework , but thus f a r these t w o values have ha rd ly come in to conflict w i t h one another. So long as m a n y government offi­cials look upon democracy as a w a y in w h i c h the populat ion is exhorted to freely par t ic ipate in act ivi t ies leading t o w a r d the goals of na t iona l un i ty , economic development and r u r a l reconstruct ion, then demo­cracy appears to harmonize w i t h a h i g h l y economic and r a t iona l view of the p l ann ing process. B u t as organized demands increase and pol i t ic ians begin to v iew democracy as a th rea t to this h igh ly r a t i o n a l and w h a t in the i r minds is a "res­ponsible" v iew of p lann ing and the country 's long t e r m needs, many a pol i t i c ian in the higher echelons of government may consider sacr if ic ing democrat ic ins t i tu t ions ,

Bu t the d i lemma m a y very we l l never t ake th i s f o r m . A t the mo­ment con t ro l of the centra l and state governments is la rge ly in the hands of those who come f r o m urban areas and have an urban out look and an u rban c o m m i t t a l t o g i v i n g p r i o r i t y to i ndus t r i a l deve­lopment . The rise of r u r a l leader­ship in the Assembly and in p o l i t i ­cal parties has yet to be reflected in ac tual con t ro l of the govern­men ta l machinery on the state and na t iona l level. The demands of

r u r a l areas for greater al locat ions of government expenditures, and the demands of r u r a l leaders for greater access to power w i l l be diff icult to reject, not only because of the g r o w i n g importance of r u r a l lead­ers in a system in which universal suffrage flourishes, but also because of the r u r a l populist ideology of m a n y urban leaders who, steeped in Gandhian lore, look upon vil lages as the " rea l" Ind ia , and as the repo­s i tory of India ' s na t iona l heritage.

Few urban pol i t ic ians w o u l d be w i l l i n g to argue the case fo r i n ­creasing r u r a l taxes, in spite of the low taxes now paid. N o r can the urban pol i t ic ian mod i fy the system to d imin i sh the role of r u r a l repre­s e n t a t i v e , since the electoral sys­t em is bu i l t in to the cons t i tu t ion . The u rban pol i t ic ians ' con t ro l over na t iona l and Ma te governments , and the u rban indus t r i a l emphasis of p l ann ing m a y indeed undergo great changes,