The Division of Labor in Society (1893)

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The Division of Labor in Society (1893)

[Excerpt from Robert Alun Jones.Emile Durkheim: An Introduction to Four MajorWorks. Beverly Hills, CA: Sae !ublications, "nc., #$%&. !p. '()*$.+

Outline of Topics

#. ur-eim/s !roblem'. 0e 1unction of te ivision of 2abor3. 0e Causes of te ivision of 2abor(. Abnormal 1orms of te ivision of 2abor*. Critical Remar-s

Durkheims !roblem

"n #44&, A5am Smit opene5 The Wealth of Nations6it te observation tat 7tereatest improvements in te pro5uctive po6ers of labour, an5 te reatest part of tes-ill, 5exterity, an5 8u5ement 6it 6ic it is any6ere 5irecte5, or applie5, seem to

ave been te effects of te 5ivision of labour.7#espite te numerous economica5vantaes tus 5erive5, o6ever, Smit insiste5 tat te 5ivision of labor 6as not itselfte effect of any uman 6is5om or foresit9 rater, it 6as te necessary, albeit veryslo6 an5 ra5ual, conseuence of a certain propensity in uman nature )) 7te propensity

to truc-, barter, an5 excane one tin for anoter.7'Common to all men, tispropensity coul5 be foun5 in no oter animals9 an5, subseuently encourae5 by te

reconition of in5ivi5ual self)interest, it ave rise to 5ifferences amon men moreextensive, more important, an5 ultimately more useful tan tose implie5 by teir naturalen5o6ments.

;ore tan a century later, ur-eim coul5 observe, apparently 6itout exaeration, tateconomists upel5 te 5ivision of labor not only as necessary, but as 7te supreme la6 of

uman societies an5 te con5ition of teir proress.3nli-e Smit, o6ever, ur-eim vie6e5 tis 7la67 of te 5ivision of labor as applyinnot only to uman societies, but to bioloical oranisms enerally. Citin recentspeculation in te 7pilosopy of bioloy7 ?see te 6or-s of C.1. @olff, .E. von Baer,an5 H. ;ilne)E56ar5s, ur-eim note5 te apparent correlation bet6een te functionalspeciali=ation of te parts of an oranism an5 te extent of tat oranism/s evolutionary5evelopment, suestin tat tis exten5e5 te scope of te 5ivision of labor so as toma-e its oriins contemporaneous 6it te oriins of life itself. 0is, of course,

eliminate5 any 7propensity in uman nature7 as its possible cause, an5 implie5 tat itscon5itions must be foun5 in te essential properties of all orani=e5 matter. 0e 5ivisionof labor in society 6as tus no more tan a particular form of a process of extremeenerality.

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But if the division of labor was thus a natural law, then (like all natural laws) it raisedcertain moral questions. Are we to yield to it or resist it? Is it our duty to becomethorough, comlete, self!sufficient human beings? "r are we to be but arts of a whole,organs of an organism? In other words, is this natural lawalso a moral rule? If so, why,and in what degree? In #urkheim$s oinion, the answers of modern societies to these andsimilar questions had been deely ambivalent !! i.e., on the one hand, the division oflabor seemed to be increasingly viewed as a moral rule, so that, in at least one of itsasects, the categorical imerative% of the modern conscience had become& 'ake

yourself usefully fulfill a determinate function% on the other hand, quite aside from suchma*ims endorsing seciali+ation, there were other ma*ims, no less revalent whichcalled attention to the dangers of over!seciali+ation, and encouraged all men to reali+esimilar ideals. he situation was thus one of moral conflict or antagonism, and it was thiswhich #urkheim sought first to e*lain and then to resolve.

his in turn calls for two final observations. -irst, the method of this e*lanation andresolution was to be that of the so!called %science of ethics% for #urkheim wasconvinced that moral facts like the division of labor were themselves natural henomena!! they consisted of certain rules of action imeratively imosed uon conduct, whichcould be recogni+ed, observed, described, classified, and e*lained. econd, thise*lanation itself was but a reliminary ste to the solution of ractical social roblemsfor #urkheim always conceived of societies as sub/ect to conditions of moral %health% or%illness,% and the sociologist as a kind of %hysician% who scientifically determined the

articular condition of a articular society at a articular time, and then rescribed thesocial %medicine% necessary to the maintenance or recovery of well!being.

#urkheim$s roblem thus defined, his solution fell quite naturally into three rincialarts&

0. the determination of the function of the division of labor1. the determination of the causes on which it deended and2. the determination of those forms of %illness% which it e*hibited.

The Function of the Division of Labor

he word %function,% #urkheim observed, can be used in two, quite different, senses&

0. to refer to a system of vital movements (e.g., digestion, resiration, etc.) withoutreference to the consequences of these movements or

1. to refer to the relationshi between these movements and the corresonding needsof the organism (e.g., digestion incororates food essential to relenish nutritionalresources of the body, while resiration introduces the necessary gases into the

body$s tissues etc.).

#urkheim insisted on the second usage thus, to ask %what is the $function$ of the divisionof labor?% was simly to ask for the organic need which the division of labor sulied.

But at first sight, the answer to this question seemed all too clear for, as mith hadalready observed, the division of labor imroves both the skill of the worker and the

roductive ower of society, and thus its %function% would simly be to roduce and

secure those economic, artistic. and scientific advantages subsumed under the word%civili+ation.% Against this, #urkheim resented two arguments. he first, which reveals#urkheim$s dee, if ambivalent, debt to 3ousseau, was that, if the division of labor hasno other role than to render %civili+ation% ossible, then there would be no reason to grant

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it the status of a %moral% fact !! of rules of action imeratively imosed uon conduct. "nthe contrary, if the average number of crimes and suicides is emloyed as the %standardof morality,% #urkheim argued, we must conclude that immorality increases as theeconomy arts, and sciences rogress. At its very best, therefore, civili+ation would bemorally indifferent and if its roductions were the sole function of the division of labor,then it, too, would articiate in this moral neutrality.

#urkheim$s second argument was that, if the division of labor has no other role than tomake civili+ation ossible, then it would have no reason for e*istence whatsoever forcivili+ation, by itself, has no intrinsic value rather, its value is derived entirely from itscorresondence to certain needs. But these needs, #urkheim argued, are themselves the

roduct of the division of labor. If the division of labor e*isted only to satisfy them, itsonly function would be to diminish needs which it itself had created. And this made littlesense to #urkheim, for, while it might e*lain why we have to endurethe division oflabor, it would hardly be consistent with the fact that we desireoccuationalseciali+ation and ush it forward relentlessly. -or the last to be intelligible, we mustassume that the division of labor satisfies needs which the division of labor has not itself

roduced.

:hat, then, are these %needs% satisfied by the division of labor? As a first ste toward ananswer, #urkheim osed a arado* as old as Aristotle !! that, while we like those whoresemble us, we are also drawn toward those who are different, recisely because theyaredifferent. In other words, difference can be as much a source of mutual attraction aslikeness. he key to resolving the arado*, #urkheim suggested, lies in recogni+ing thatonly certain kindsof differences attract !! secifically, those which, instead of e*cludingone another, comlement one another& %If one of two eole has what the other has not,

but desires, in that fact lies the oint of dearture for a ositive attraction.%;In otherwords, we seek in others what we lack in ourselves, and associations are formedwherever there is such a true e*change of services !! in short, wherever there is a divisionof labor.

But if this is the case, we are led to see the division of labor in a new light < !! theeconomic services it renders are trivial by comarison with the moral effect it roduces.Its true function, the real need to which it corresonds, is that feeling of solidarity in twoor more ersons which it creates. hus, the role of the division of labor is not simly toembellish already e*isting societies, but to render ossible societies which, without it,would not even e*ist and the societies thus created, #urkheim added, cannot resemblethose determined by the attraction of like for like. 3ather, they must bear the mark oftheir secial origin.

he last oint laid the immediate foundations for the ne*t ste in #urkheim$s argument.hus far, he had shown only that, in advanced societies, there is a social solidarityderived from the division of labor, something already obvious from two facts& that thedivision of labor does roduce a kind of solidarity, and that the division of labor is highlydeveloed in advanced societies. he question which remained was both more imortantand more difficult to answer& To what degreedoes the solidarity roduced by the divisionof labor contribute to the general integration of society? his question was imortant

because only by answering it could #urkheim determine whether this form of solidaritywas essential to the stability of advanced societies, or was merely an accessory andsecondary condition of that stability and it was difficult because an answer required thesystematic comarison of this form of solidarity with others, in order to determine how

much credit, in the total effect, was due to each. uch a comarison in turn required aclassification of the various tyes of solidarity to be comared, and here #urkheim facedone of the most formidable obstacles to his science of ethics& the fact that, as a%comletely moral henomenon,% social solidarity did not lend itself to e*act observation

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or measurement.

#urkheim$s way of surmounting this obstacle was to substitute for this internal, moralfact an %e*ternal inde*% which symboli+ed it, and then to study the fact in light of thesymbol. his e*ternal symbol was law !! i.e., where social life e*ists, it tends to assume adefinite, organi+ed form, and law is simly the most stable and recise e*ression of thisorgani+ation. 5aw reroduces the rincial forms of solidarity and thus we have only toclassify the different tyes of law in order to discover the different tyes of solidaritycorresonding to them.

his roosal encountered two immediate difficulties. he first was that some socialrelations are regulated not by law, but by custom moreover, custom is frequently at oddswith law, and thus may e*ress an altogether different form of social solidarity. =ere#urkheim resorted to one of his favorite (and least convincing) defenses !! i.e., thedistinction between the normal and the athological. he conflict between law andcustom arises where the former no longer corresonds to e*isting social relations, butmaintains itself by habit, while the latter corresonds to these new relations, but is denied

/uridical e*ression. But such conflict, #urkheim insisted, is both rare and athological

the normal condition is one in which custom is the very basis of law, in which customalone can manifest only secondary forms of social solidarity, and thus in which law alonetells us which forms of social solidarity are essential. his urely arbitrary distinction,incidentally, reveals not only a rofound discomfort with the ethnograhic study of

rimitive societies, but a concerted effort to rationali+e this discomfort as well.

he second ob/ection was that social solidarity does not comletely manifest itself in anyercetible form whatsoever, for law (and even custom) are but the artial, imerfectmanifestations of internal sychological states which are thus the more aroriate focusfor our investigations. #urkheim$s resonse contained three interrelated arguments first,that we can determine the nature of social solidarity scientifically only by studying its

most ob/ective and easily measurable effects (such as law) second, that, while solidarity%deends on% such internal states, these are not equivalent to social solidarity itself and,finally, that these states themselves deend on social conditions for their e*lanation, afact which e*lains why at least some sociological roositions find their way into the

urest analyses of sychological facts.>

=ow, then, do we classify the different tyes of law? If the classification is to bescientific, #urkheim argued, we must do so according to some characteristic which bothis essential to laws and varies as they vary. his characteristic is thesanction !! i.e.,%very recet of law can be defined as a rule of sanctioned conduct. 'oreover, it isevident that sanctions change with the gravity attributed to recets, the lace they hold

in the ublic conscience the role they lay in society.%6hese sanctions, #urkheim thenobserved, fall into two classes& reressivesanctions (characteristic of enal laws), whichconsist in some loss or suffering inflicted on the agent, making %demands on his fortune,or on his honor, or on his life, or on his liberty, and derive him of something he

en/oys.%7 and restitutivesanctions (characteristic of civil, commercial, rocedural,administrative, and constitutional laws), which consist %only of the return of things as

the! were, in the re!establishment of troubled relations to their normal state.%08

he two tyes of law thus classified according to their characteristic sanctions, #urkheimwas now in a osition to determine the tyes of solidarity corresonding to each. he first

of these #urkheim called mechanical solidarit! !! that tye of solidarity characteri+ed byreressive sanctions. And since acts calling forth such sanctions are (by definition)%crimes,% then the inquiry into the nature of mechanical solidarity became an inquiry intothe nature of crime.

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What, then, is "crime"? While acknowledging that there are many kinds of crime,Durkheim was convinced that they all contained a common element; for otherwise theuniversally identical reaction to crimes (repressive sanctions) would itself beunintelligible !onetheless, the enormous variety of crimes suggested that this commonelement could not be found among the intrinsic properties of criminal acts themselves;rather, it had to be found in the relations which these acts sustain with certain eternalconditions #ut which relations? $fter some characteristic annihilations of competing

proposals, Durkheim concluded that the only common element in all crimes is that theyshock sentiments which, "for a given social system, are found in all healthy

consciences"%%$nd this also eplains why penal (as opposed to civil) law is "diffused"throughout the whole society rather than centrali&ed in a special magistrate '' the

sentiments to which penal law corresponds are immanent in all consciousnesses%

#ut what about acts like incest '' acts which provoke widespread aversion, but are merely"immoral" rather than "criminal"? Durkheim replied that "crimes" properly so'calledhave an additional distinctive property not shared by simply "immoral" acts thesentiments they offend must have a certain average intensit! $nd again, this greater

intensity of sentiments responsive to crime as opposed to immoral acts is reflected in thefiity of penal law over time, by contrast with the great plasticity of moral rules *inally,the sentiments responsive to criminal acts are also more well'defined than those nebuloussentiments evoked by immorality

Durkheim+s definition of crime thus led directly to his notion of the conscience collective'' "the totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the average citi&ens of the same

society"% '' which Durkheim then endowed with -uite distinctive characteristics itforms a determinate system with its own life; it is "diffuse" in each society and lacks a"specific organ"; it is independent of the particular conditions in which individuals findthemselves; it is the same in different locations, classes, and occupations; it connects

successive generations rather than changing from one to another; and it is different fromindividual consciences, despite the fact that it can be reali&ed only through them $"crime," therefore, is simply an act which offends intense and well'defined states of thisconscience collective, a proposition which describes not simply the "conse-uences" ofcrime, but its essential roert! "We do not reprove it because it is a crime, but it is a

crime because we reprove it"%.

#ut aren+t there acts which do notoffend the conscience collective, but which arenonetheless severely sanctioned by the state? $nd are there then two distinct types ofcrime? Durkheim insisted there are not, for the effects called forth by criminal acts arethe same in either case, and the same effect must have the same cause Durkheim was

thus led to argue that the state derives its authority from the conscience collective, andbecomes its directive organ and its symbol but, while the state never completely freesitself from this source of its authority, it does become an autonomous, spontaneous powerin social life /he etent of the state+s power over the number and nature of criminal actsdepends on the authority it receives from the conscience collective; and this authority can

be measured either by the power the state eerts over its citi&ens, or by the gravityattached to crime against the state $s Durkheim would show, this power was greatestand this gravity most pronounced in the lowest, most primitive societies; and it was inthese societies that the conscience collectiveen0oyed the greatest authority

1n effect, therefore, Durkheim argued that crime is characteri&ed its capacity to provoke

punishment #ut if this was the case, crime ought to eplain the various characteristics ofpunishment, and any, demonstration that it did so would augment the plausibility ofDurkheim+s initial argument What, then, are the characteristics of punishment?Disregarding the conscious intentions of those applying it, Durkheim insisted that the

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characteristics of punishment are what they have always been -- its mood is passionate;its function is vengeance, even expiation; its intensity is variable or "graduated"; itssource is society rather than the individual; its cause is the violation of a moral rule; andits form is "organized" (unlike the "diffuse" repression of merely immoral acts, itsimplementation is the act of a definitely constituted body or tribunal) !n short,

punishment is "a passionate reaction of graduated intensity that society exercises throughthe medium of a body acting upon those of its members who have violated certain rules

of conduct"#

$ow are these characteristics to be explained% &urkheim first observed that every state ofconscienceis an essential source of life, and everything that weakens such a state "wastesand corrupts" us; thus we react energetically against those ideas and sentiments whichcontradict our own 'ut the ideas and sentiments offended by crime, &urkheim argued,have particular features which in turn explain the special characteristics of punishmentie, because these sentiments are held with particular strength, the reaction is passionate;

because these sentiments transcend individual mental states, mere restitution isunacceptable, and revenge and even expiation are called for; because the vivacity of suchsentiments will nonetheless vary, the intensity of the reaction will also be variable;

because such sentiments are held collectively, the source of the reaction will be societyrather than the individual; and because these sentiments are well-defined, the reaction totheir violation will be organized

$aving begun by establishing inductively that "crime" is an act contrary to strong andwell-defined states of the conscience collective, therefore, &urkheim confirmed thisdefinition by showing that crime thus defined accounts for all the characteristic featuresof punishment; and since the whole point of &urkheims in*uiry into the nature of crimewas its promise to reveal the nature of mechanical solidarity, we might reasonably askwhat has been thus revealed &urkheims answer was that the cause of mechanicalsolidarity lies in the conformity of all individual consciencesto a common type, not only

because individuals are attracted to one another through resemblance but because each is+oined to the society that they form by their union; inversely, the society is bound to thoseideas and sentiments whereby its members resemble one another because that is acondition of its cohesion

&urkheim thus introduced an idea which would assume increasing importance in his laterwork the duality of human nature 'riefly, in each of us there are two consciences -- onecontaining states personal to each of us, representing and constituting our individual

personality; the other containing states common to all, representing society, and withoutwhich society would not exist hen our conduct is determined by the first, we act out ofself-interest; but when it is determined by the second, we act morally, in the interest of

society hus the individual, by virtue of his resemblance toother individuals, is linked tothe social order his is mechanical solidarity, which, as we have seen, is manifestedthrough repressive law; and the greater the number of repressive laws, the greater thenumber of social relations regulated by this type of solidarity

he very nature of restitutivesanctions, however, indicates that there is a totally differenttype of social solidarity which corresponds to civil law; for the restitutive sanction is not

punitive, vengeful, or expiatory at all, but consists only in a return of things to theirprevious, normal state .either do violations of civil laws evoke the milder, more diffusedisapproval of merely moral transgressions, in fact, we can imagine that the lawsthemselves might be *uite different than they are without any feeling of moral

repugnance being aroused &urkheim thus concluded that such laws, manifested inrestitutive sanctions, could not derive from any strong state of the conscience collective,

but must have some other source

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An indication of this source was afforded by an examination of the conditions underwhich such rules are established. Briefly, there are some relationships (typically, thoseinvolving contractual obligations) which the consent of the interested parties is notsufficient to create or to change; on the contrary, it is necessary to establish or modifysuch relationships juridically, by means of law. hile contracts are entered andabrogated through the efforts of individuals, therefore, they have a binding, obligatory

power only because they are supported and enforced by society. !ost important, thecontractual relations thus regulated are not "diffused" throughout the society; they do not

bind the individual to society, but rather bind special parties in the society to one another.

#he cooperative relations thus formed create what $ur%heim called organic solidarity,which is derived not from the conscience collective, but from the division of labor. &or,where mechanical solidarity presumes that individuals resemble one another, organicsolidarity presumes their difference; and again, where mechanical solidarity is possibleonly in so far as the individual personality is submerged in the collectivity, organicsolidarity becomes possible only in so far as each individual has a sphere of action

peculiar to him. &or organic solidarity to emerge, therefore, the conscience collectivemust leave untouched a part of the individual conscienceso that special functions, which

the conscience collectiveitself cannot tolerate, may be established there; and the morethis region of the individual conscienceis extended, the stronger is the cohesion whichresults from this particular %ind of solidarity.

$ur%heim had thus postulated two distinct types of social solidarity (mechanical andorganic), each with its distinctive form of juridical rules (repressive and restitutive). 'norder to determine their relative importance in any given societal type, therefore, itseemed reasonable to compare the respective extent of the two %inds of rules whichexpress or symbolie them. #he preponderance of repressive rules over their restitutivecounterparts, for example, ought to be just as great as the preponderance of theconscience collectiveover the division of labor; inversely, in so far as the individual

personality and the specialiation of tas%s is developed, then the relative proportion of thetwo types of law ought to be reversed.

'n fact, $ur%heim argued, this is precisely the case. $espite the flimsy ethnographicevidence supporting such generaliations, $ur%heim argued that the more primitivesocieties are, the more resemblances (particularly as reflected in primitive religion) there

are among the individuals who compose them*; inversely, the more civilied a people,

the more easily distinguishable its individual members.+$ur%heims discomfort with theethnographic literature was still more evident when he turned to the nature of primitivelaw. -elying on ir /ohn 0ubboc%s Origin of Civilization(1+2) and 3erbert pencers

Principles of Sociology(1+*415), he suggested that such law "appears to be entirely

repressive"1, but insisting that such observations necessarily lac% precision, $ur%heiminstead pointed to the evidence of written law. !oving from the 6entateuch to the"#welve #ables" (754752 B.8.) of the -omans to the laws of early 8hristian 9urope,therefore, $ur%heim argued that the relative proportions of repressive to restitutive laws

are precisely those which his theory would lead us to expect.:

hen we reach the present, therefore, we find that the number of relationships whichcome under repressive laws represents only a small fraction of social life; thus, we mayassume that the social bonds derived from the conscience collectiveare now much lessnumerous than those derived from the division of labor. But one might still argue that,

regardless of their number, the bonds which tie us directly to our societies through sharedbeliefs and sentiments have greater strength than those resulting from cooperation; and tothis hypothetical objection, $ur%heim had two independent answers.

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&irst, he felt that, regardless of their undeniable rigidity the bonds created by mechanicalsolidarity, even in lower societies, were inferior to those created by organic solidarity intheir more advanced counterparts. 3ere, again, $ur%heims ethnographic resources werelimited to a few passages cited from pencer, &ustel de 8oulanges, and #heodor aits

Anthropologie der Naturvlker(15:); but the source of this conviction, in any case, wasless empirical than theoretical. here, as in lower societies, the conscience collective isvirtually coextensive with the individual conscience, each individual "contains withinhimself all that social life consists of," and thus can carry "society" wherever he wishes togo; inversely, the society, given its rudimentary division of labor, can lose any number ofits members without its internal economy being disturbed. #hus, from both standpointsthe bonds connecting the individual to society based upon the conscience collectiveareless resistant to disseveration than those based upon the division of labor.

$ur%heims second answer was that, as society evolves from a lower to a higher type, thebonds created by mechanical solidarity become still wea%er. #he strength of mechanicalsolidarity, $ur%heim argued, depends on three conditions>

. the relation between the volume of the conscience collectiverelative to the

individual conscience;. the average intensity of the states of the conscience collective; and


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protection of the individuals person and rights. And this $ur%heim (in effect) suggested,is indeed an exception which proves the rule; for it could become possible only if theindividual personality had become far more important in the society, and thus only if the

personal conscienceof each individual had grown considerably more than the consciencecollectiveitself. #o this other proofs were added> the decline of religion (which, at thistime $ur%heim literally defined as strong, commonly held beliefs) and the disappearance

of those proverbs and adages whereby "collective thought condenses itself."

Allconspired to ma%e the same point> that the conscience collectivehad progressed less thanthe individual conscience, becoming less intense and distinct, and more abstract andindecisive.

ill the conscience collectivethen disappear@ $ur%heim thought not, at least in partbecause of the "notable exception" mentioned above 44 it not only survives, but becomesmore intense and well4defined, in so far as its object is the individual> "As all the other

beliefs and all the other practices ta%e on a character less and less religious, the individualbecomes the object of a sort of religion. e erect a cult on behalf of personal dignity

which, as every strong cult already has its superstitions." rather than being merely

juxtaposed or mingled, they are coordinated and subordinated to one another around acentral organ, which exercises a regulative action on the entire organism. &inally, theplace of each individual in such societies is determined not by his name or %in4group, butby the particular occupation or social function to which he is committed.

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#his is what $ur%heim called the organizedsocietal type which, because of its sharpdifferences from thesegmentaltype, can advance only in so far as the latter is graduallyeffaced. But $ur%heim was also aware of the considerable complexity of the transitionfrom one to the other, and provided a particularly subtle account of the almost parasiticalmanner in which the new occupational "organs" at first utilie the old familial system (aswhen 0evites became priests), the subse?uent process whereby consanguineous ties giveway to less resistant bonds based upon territorial allegiances, and, finally, the completetriumph of the fully "organied" societal type over the structural constraints of its earlier,"segmental," counterpart. As with the primitive horde, $ur%heim admitted that thisorganied type was nowhere presently observable in its purest form; but he added that "aday will come when our whole social and political organiation will have a base

exclusively, or almost exclusively, occupational."+

#hus far, $ur%heims argument would have appeared relatively familiar to hiscontemporaries, for it bore an unmista%able similarity to that found in pencers

Principles of Sociology(1+*4115), particularly in its emphasis on the growth ofindividuality with the advance of civiliation. #his similarity was sufficiently upsetting to$ur%heim to provo%e a more detailed account of his differences with pencer. &or thelatter, for example, the submersion of the individual in lower societies was the result offorce, an artificial suppression re?uired by the essentially despotic, "military" type oforganiation appropriate to an early stage of social evolution. &or $ur%heim, by contrast,the effacement of the individual was the product of a societal type characteried by thecomplete absence of all centralied authority; military personality in lower societies wasa conse?uence not of suppression, but of the fact that, in those societies, the "individual,"as such, did not exist. -eversing pencers argument, therefore, $ur%heim saw theemergence of despotic authority not as a step toward the effacement of the individual, butas the first step toward individualism itself, the chief being the first personality to emergefrom the previously homogeneous social mass.

But there was more to this than a typical $ur%heimian annihilation of an intellectuallyinferior opponent; for $ur%heim sought to establish two important propositions. #he firstof these was hinted at in our earlier discussion of $ur%heims view of the state 44 thatwhen we find a governmental system of great authority. we must see% its cause not in the

particular situation of the governing, but in the nature of the societies governed. #hesecond was that altruism, far from being a recent advance over mans selfish, egoistictendencies, is found in the earliest societies; for, as we have seen, $ur%heim had adualistic conception of human nature, and thus both egoism and altruism were naturalexpressions of the human conscienceat all stages of social evolution.

hat, then, is the essential difference between lower societies and our own@ $ur%heims

answer was again wor%ed out in opposition to pencer, whose own answer againappeared ?uite similar. pencer had observed, li%e $ur%heim, that in industrial societies acooperative form of solidarity is produced automatically as a conse?uence of the divisionof labor. But if pencer thus recognied the true cause of social solidarity in advancedsocieties, $ur%heim argued, he had not understood the way in which it produced itseffect; and, misunderstanding this, pencer had misunderstood the nature of the effect(i.e., social solidarity) itself.

8onsider only two features of pencers conception of social solidarity> because industrialsolidarity is produced automatically, it does not re?uire the regulation or intervention ofthe state in order to produce or maintain it; and because the sphere of societal action is

thus drastically reduced, the only surviving lin% between men is the relationship ofcontracts, freely entered and freely abrogated, according to the self4interest of the partiesinvolved. $ur%heims initial response was that, if this is truly the character of societieswhose solidarity is produced by the division of labor, we might with justice doubt their

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stability; for "self-interest" creates only the most ephemeral, superficial sort of socialbond, and in fact disguises a more fundamental, albeit latent and deferred, conflict. Thelarge and increasing volume of restitutive law, moreover, hardly suggested to Durkheimthat the regulative intervention of the state in contractual relations was decreasing; on thecontrary, it suggested that unregulated contracts alone were insufficient to secure equal

ustice for their contending parties -- particularly the worker in contractual relationsbetween labor and management. !hile pencer was right to point to the increase in thenumber of social relationships governed by contract, he ignored the parallel increase inthe number of non -contractual relations; but most important, he ignored the fact that,even withinthe contract, "everything is not contractual" -- i.e., a contract assumes the

predetermination of the rights and obligations of the contracting parties, a functionperformed not only by state-regulated contract law, but also through the less formal butnonetheless imperative structures of custom.

#n short, pencer did not understand the nature of social solidarity nor did he understandthe function of the division of labor. !hatever its economic advantages, the function ofthe division of labor was pre-eminently moral. #n fact, contrasting the solidarity created

by occupational speciali$ation with the "inferior" bonds forged by its mechanical

counterpart, Durkheim insisted that the moral character of society is more pronounced inthe "organi$ed" type. %recisely because the modern individual is not sufficient untohimself, for e&ample, it is from society that he receives all that is necessary to life; thus iscreated his strong sentiment of personal dependence which inspires those mundanesacrifices we call "moral acts" and, in occasional, e&treme cases, those acts of completeself-renunciation which Durkheim would take up in Suicide'()*+. n its side, societylearns to regard its members not as indistinguishable units that could be lost withoutserious disruption to its internal economy, but as irreplaceable organic parts which itcannot neglect, and towards which it has important obligations. #t was the perfection ofthis moral function toward which all social evolution tended.

The Causes of the Division of Labor

Durkheim was always concerned to distinguish the causes of a social fact from itsfunctions, and the division of labor was no e&ception. #ndeed, he insisted, the causes ofthe division of labor could not possibly consist in some anticipation of its moral effects;for, as we have seen, those effects became evident only after a lengthy process of socialevolution, and could hardly be foreseen. #n a different sense, however, Durkheimsinquiry into causes rehearsed his earlier analysis of functions; for, ust as the earlierdiscussion began with Durkheims reection of /dam miths argument that the function

of the division of labor was the advancement of civili$ation, so the later discussion beganwith a negative assessment of that "classic" e&planation, attributed to political economyin general, whereby the cause of the division of labor would be "mans unceasing desire

to increase his happiness."0)

/gainst this e&planation, which would reduce the division of labor to purely individualand psychological causes, Durkheim launched a three-pronged attack. 1irst, hechallenged the a&iom on which the e&planation rests -- namely, the assumption that mansdesire to increase his happiness is indeed unceasing. 2ere Durkheims early e&perience in!undts psychological laboratory served him well, for he was able to cite the famous lawof the 3erman e&perimental psychologist 4.2. !eber 'later quantified by 3ustav

1echner to the effect that the smallest increment in a stimulus required to produce a,difference in the sensation e&perienced is not an absolute amount, but is rather relative tothe magnitude of the stimulus in question. /s a corollary to this law, Durkheim insistedthat the intensity of any agreeable stimulus can increase usefully 'i.e., contribute to

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increased pleasure) only between two extremes. An increase in monetary wealth, forexample, must be of a certain size if pleasure is to be its result; inversely, a personthoroughly accustomed to large increases in wealth estimates the value of such increasesaccordingly, and is equally denied pleasure proportionate to the stimulus received. Theincrease in income experienced by the man of average wealth is thus the one most apt to

produce a degree of pleasure proportionate to its cause. f the cause of the division oflabor were the desire for happiness, therefore, social evolution would surely have come toa stop long ago; for the maximum happiness of which men are capable would have beenachieved through a relatively moderate development of social differentiation and its

resulting stimuli.!"This insistence that the human capacity for happiness is very limited,a #ind of Aristotelian ethics augmented by $undt%s Grunzuge der physiologische

Psychologie&'(*), remained one of +ur#heim%s most constant and characteristic ideas.

econd, +ur#heim regarded it as very doubtful that the advance of civilization increaseshuman happiness in any case. -ere +ur#heim initially sounds li#e ousseau/ while headmitted that we en0oy pleasures un#nown to earlier societies, he observed also that weexperience forms of suffering that they were spared, and added that it is not at all certainthat the balance is in our favor. 1ut it soon becomes clear that, again. +ur#heim%s morefundamental source was Aristotle. 2ven if social progress did produce more pleasure than

pain, +ur#heim thus insisted, this would not necessarily bring more happiness; for3pleasure3 describes the local, limited, momentary state of a particular function, while3happiness3 describes the health of the physical and moral species in its entirety, theextent to which that species has realized its true nature. Thus, the normal savage is 0ust ashappy as the normal civilized man, an argument supported not only by $aitz%s

Anthropologie der Naturvlker&'(4"), but also by the rapid rise in the suicide ratecommensurate with the advance in civilization, a phenomenon in which +ur#heimalready had a powerful interest.

+ur#heim%s third argument dealt with a revised version of the 3happiness hypothesis3which might have met the ob0ections of his first two 55 that pleasure &which is at least anelement in happiness) loses its intensity with repetition, and can be recaptured onlythrough new stimuli, meaning more productive wor# &and hence, through the division oflabor). 6rogress would thus be, quite literally, an effect of boredom. 1ut to this +ur#heimhad several ob0ections. 7irst, such a 3law3 would apply to all societies, and thus it could

provide no account of why the division of labor advances in some societies and not inothers. econd, +ur#heim denied the assumption on which the argument is based/namely, that repetition alone reduces the intensity of pleasure. o long as our pleasureshave a certain variety, he argued, they can be repeated endlessly; only if the pleasure iscontinuous and uninterrupted does its intensity wane. 1ut even if continuity thus doeswhat repetition cannot, +ur#heim continued, it could not inspire us with a need for new

stimuli; for if continuity eliminates our consciousness of the agreeable state, we couldhardly perceive that the pleasure attached to it has also vanished. 2ven novelty itself is

but a secondary, accessory quality of pleasure, without which our ordinary pleasures, ifsufficiently varied, can survive very well. n short, boredom is an insufficient cause to so

painful and laborious an effect as the development of the division of labor.

-aving thus dismissed individualistic, psychologistic causes, +ur#heim argued that wemust see# the explanation of the division of labor in some variation within the socialcontext, and added that his earlier discussion of its function already pointed in thedirection of an answer. +ur#heim had shown how the organized structure &and thus thedivision of labor) had developed as the segmental structure had disappeared; thus, either

the disappearance of the segmental structure is the cause of the division of labor, or viceversa. ince, as we have seen, the segmental structure is an insurmountable obstacle tothe division of labor, the latter hypothesis is clearly false; the division of labor can thusappear only in proportion as the segmental structure has already begun to disappear.

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How does this occur? Briefly, Durkheim suggested that, instead of social life beingconcentrated in a number of small, identical individual segments, these parts begin toextend beyond their limits, exchange movements, and act and react upon one another.Durkheim called this dynamicor moral density, and suggested that it increases in directratio to the progress of the division of labor. But what produces this "moral density"?Durkheim pointed to two causes. irst, the real, material distance between members of asociety must be reduced both spatially !e.g., the growth of cities and technologically!e.g., advances in communications and transportation, for such "material density"multiplies the number of intra#societal relations. $econd, this effect is reinforced by thesheer "social volume" of a society !the total number of its members. %hus, Durkheimargued that the division of labor varies in direct ratio to the dynamic or moral density of

society, which is itself an effect of both material density and social volume.&'

But how does this double cause !material density and social volume produce its ultimateeffect !the division of labor? Here again, Durkheim had to confront the competingexplanation of Herbert $pencer. (nFirst Principles!)*+, $pencer had argued that allhomogeneous masses are inherently unstable and thus tend toward differentiation, andthat they differentiate more rapidly and completely as their extension is greater. But in$pencer-s theory, such extension produces differentiation, not by itself, but only in so faras it exposes parts of the social mass to diverse physical environments, thus encouragingdiverse aptitudes and institutional specialiation. Durkheim in fact agreed that a diversityof external circumstances has this differentiating effect/ but he denied that this diversitywas sufficient to cause!rather than merely accelerate an effect so dramatic as thedivision of labor.

or his own explanation, Durkheim turned to Darwin-s Origin of Species!)*01, arguingthat an increased material density and social volume cause the division of labor, not

because they increase exposure to diverse external circumstances, but because theyrender the struggle for existence more acute. 2ccording to Darwin, so long as resourcesare plentiful and population sie is limited, similar organisms can live side by side inrelative peace/ but where population increases and resources become scarce, conflict andcompetition ensue, and this conflict is 3ust as active as the organisms are similar and

pursue similar needs. 4here organisms are different and pursue different needs, on theother hand, what is useful to one organism will be of no value to another, and conflictwill diminish.

Human populations, Durkheim argued, adhere to the same law. (n so far as a socialstructure is "segmental" in character, each segment has its own organs, kept apart fromlike organs by the divisions between segments. 4ith the growth in the "material density"and "social volume" of the society, these divisions disappear, the similar organs are put

into contact with one another, and competition between them ensues. %hose groupswhich triumph then have a larger task, which can be discharged only through a greaterinternal division of labor/ those organs which are van5uished can henceforth maintainthemselves only by specialiing on a fraction of the social function they previously

performed/ but in either case, the division of labor is advanced.

%hus, the conflict and competition resulting from an increase in social volume anddensity produces advances in the division of labor 3ust as the latter mitigates against thenegative conse5uences of the former. (n the modern city, for example, large and highlycondensed populations can coexist peacefully as a conse5uence of occupationaldifferentiation6 "%he soldier seeks military glory, the priest moral authority, the statesman

power, the businessman riches, the scholar scientific renown. 7ach of them can attain hisend without preventing the others from obtaining theirs."&)8othing in this process,Durkheim added, implies an increase in happiness, or that the pursuit of happiness might

be its goal6 on the contrary, "everything takes place mechanically" as the result of an

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inexorable law of social progress.

Finally, Durkheim argued, it is a corollary of this law that the division of labor can beestablished only among the members of an already constituted society. For the effect ofthese same forces (e.g., opposition, conflict, competition, etc.) upon a number ofindependent individuals could only be further diversification without the development of

compensatory social bonds

3

, while Durkheim had already shown that the division oflabor creates moral linkages even as it differentiates. Durkheim thus argued that theindividuals among whom the struggle for existence is waged must already belong to thesame, mechanically solidary society. !n opposition to "pencer#s view that a society is the

product of cooperation, therefore, Durkheim supported $omte#s argument that

cooperation already presupposes the spontaneous existence of society.33%his, in turn,became the basis for Durkheim#s reply to &runeti're at the height of the Dreyfus ffair.Far from being destructive of the social order, individualism is itself the product ofsociety, and expresses a particular stage in its ongoing, structural evolution.

Durkheim had thus argued forcefully that the division of labor is caused by changes in

the volume and density of societies. &ut this was not yet a complete explanation, forDurkheim recognied that such specialiation was not the only possible solution to thestruggle for existence which then ensued. *thers included emigration, coloniation,resignation to a precarious existence, and even suicide. %he division of labor was thus acontingent rather than a necessary conse+uence of changes in the social environment, andfor it rather than its alternatives to result, it was essential that the influence of at least twosecondary factors the conscience collectiveand heredity be significantly reduced.

Durkheim#s argument concerning the -progressive indetermination- of the consciencecollectivehas already been described but now Durkheim attempted to explain it,focusing e+ually on the growth of rationality and the decline of tradition. !n early

societies, Durkheim began, everyone is related to specific ob/ects of their environment(e.g., animals, trees, plants, etc.) in roughly the same way, and the states of consciencerepresenting this environment take on a parallel similarity the fusion of these individualconsciencesthus results in a conscience collectivewhich is sharp, decisive, and welldefined. s these societies become more voluminous and their populations morediversely situated, however, common ob/ects can no longer create common experiencesand representations in so far as it is to remain -common,- therefore, the consciencecollectivemust necessarily become less concrete and welldefined, and more general andabstract. %he -animal- becomes the -species,- the -tree- becomes -trees in general and inastracto,- the -0reek- and the -1oman- become the concept of -man- and a similar

process of progressive abstraction up to the level of universaliable concepts persists inlaw, religion. and morality. %his explains the difficulty we have in understanding

primitive societies. *ur own minds, dominated by the logic and rationality thisevolutionary process has produced, see in earlier societies only biarre, fortuitouscombinations of heterogeneous elements but in fact, these are simply societies

dominated by concrete sensations and representations rather than abstract concepts.32

&ut in so far as the conscience collectivethus becomes less concrete and decisive, itnecessarily has less of an impact on individual thought and behavior. recise states ofconscienceact in a manner analogous to instinctive reflexes more general principlesaffect behavior only through the intervening reflections of intelligence. %hus,-deliberated movements have not the spontaneity of involuntary movements. &ecause it

becomes more rational, the 4conscience collective5 becomes less imperative, and for this

very reason, it wields less restraint over the free development of individuals.-36&ut thecause of this growth of rationality, again, is the increase in the volume of the society#s

population and the environmental diversity thus implied.

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Still more important than the "progressive indetermination" of the conscience collective,however, is the decline of tradition; for the strength of the conscienceis due to the factnot only that its states are shared, but also that they are the legacy of previousgenerations. This authority of tradition is well supported in societies of the segmentaltype, which, as we have seen, have a familial as well as a political base; but as thesegmental organization is undermined, individuals no longer feel bound to their kin-group or even their place of origin; migration ensues, and the authority of traditionweakens commensurately. ut here, again, the decline of tradition is the conse!uence ofthose factors -- social volume and density -- which gradually dissipate the segmentalform of social organization. n other words, #ust as it is purely mechanical causes whichlead to the individual$s submersion in the conscience collective, it is similarly mechanicalcauses %notthe "utility" of emancipation& which subvert that conscienceand lead toindividual freedom.

ut don$t the occupational specialities of more organized societies simply reproduce theconscienceof the primitive segment, and e'ercise the same regulative function. (or atleast three reasons, )urkheim$s answer was an emphatic no* first, the occupationalconscienceaffects only the occupational life, beyond which the individual en#oys much

greater freedom; second, the occupational conscienceis shared by fewer individualminds, has commensurately less authority, and thus offers less resistance to individualtransgressions than its collective counterpart; and third, the same causes %i.e., increasedvolume and density& which progressively undermine the conscience collectivehave asimilar, if less dramatic, effect within the occupational group. Thus, "not only doesoccupational regulation, because of its very nature, hinder less than any other the play of

individual variation, but it also tends to do so less and less."+

The other "secondary factor" whose influence had to be reduced in order for the divisionof labor to emerge was the role of heredity. )urkheim was particularly concerned withthis because, according to ohn Stuart ill$sPrinciples of Political !conomy%/010&, thefirst condition of the division of labor was that "diversity of natures" whose principalfunction was to classify individuals according to their capacities. f this were the case,)urkheim argued, heredity would, constitute an even more insurmountable obstacle toindividual variability than the conscience collective; for, where the latter chained us onlyto the moral authority of our familial group, the former would bind us to our race, andthus to an utterly impersonal, congenital past, totally oblivious to our individual interestsand aspirations. Thus, the greater the role of heredity in a society$s distribution of tasks%as, for e'ample, in the caste system, or in rigidly stratified societies&, the more invariablethat distribution, and the more difficult it is for the division of labor to make headway. twas )urkheim$s goal, however, to show that, for at least two reasons, the role played byheredity in the distribution of tasks has declined in the course of social evolution.

(irst, )urkheim observed, aptitudes appear to be less transmissible by heredity preciselyto the degree that they are more specialized; in so far as a society has a more comple'division of labor, therefore, the relative role played by heredity in determining individualcapacities will have been reduced. n short, social evolution produces new modes ofactivity re!uiring capacities that heredity simply cannot transmit. Second, )urkheiminsisted, even those capacities that heredity cantransmit %e.g., instincts& decline both in

number and strength with social evolution.+23hether conceived relatively or absolutely,therefore. the contribution of heredity to the determination of individual tasks has been

progressively reduced, and has thus presented few obstacles to the continuing growth ofthe division of labor.

This led )urkheim to some general conclusions about the distinction between thedivision of physiological labor and its social counterpart. 4recisely because it is imposed

by birth, )urkheim argued, the function of the biological cell is immutably fi'ed; but in

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society, hereditary dispositions are not predestinary, and the individual's specializedfunction is largely self-determined. Durkheim thus denied the view of Comte andSpencer that "sustitution" !i.e., one part of an aggregate echanging function with

another# was a characteristic of lower rather than higher evolutionary forms$%& on thecontrary, in social evolution, function ecomes independent of structure in direct

proportion to the increasing compleity of society. his in turn eplains the origin and

development of "civilization"& for as social volume and density increase, men canmaintain themselves only through harder work and the intensification of their faculties,which inevitaly produces a higher state of culture.

(ut Durkheim's theory of social evolution was not )uite so mechanistic as the accountaove implies& for, while he urged that civilization was thus the effect of necessarycauses, and denied that it was the result of the desire for happiness, he nonetheless argued

that it was also "an end, an o*ect of desire, in short, an ideal." $+his paradoical )ualityof civilization was ased, once again, on Durkheim's distinction etween the normal andthe pathological. t each stage in the history of a given society, he suggested, there is a"certain intensity" of the collective life which is "normal"& and if everything in the society

happens "normally," this state is realized automatically. (ut, in fact, everything does nothappen normally& societies, like individual organisms. are su*ect to disease, and thisprevents them from realizing their natural, ideal condition. nder these circumstances,Durkheim argued, it is not only legitimate ut also essential that the sociologist intervene,ascertain the degree of collective activity appropriate to eisting conditions, and attempt

to realize this ideal state of health !or "golden mean"# y the proper means./ndprecisely ecause the "conditions" here referred to would constantly change, the socialideal would always e definitewithout ever ecoming definitive0 "hus, not only does amechanistic theory of progress not deprive us of an ideal, ut it permits us to elieve that

we shall never lack for one."1

2inally, these oservations led Durkheim to a sociological reformulation of the mind-ody prolem posed in Descartes'Meditations!131#. he progress of the individualconscience, as we have seen, is in inverse ratio to that of instinct, not ecause thatconscience"reaks up" instinct, ut ecause it "invades" the territory that instinct hasceased to occupy. 4nstinct, of course, has regressed ecause of the increasing importanceof sociaility& thus, the rational superiority of human eings over lower animals is aconse)uence of their superior sociaility. Durkheim thus agreed with the oservation of

the "spiritualist" philosophers5that modern "psycho-physiology" would never e ale toeplain more than a small fraction of psychic phenomena through reference to organiccauses& for psychic life, in its highest manifestations, is simply much too free andcomple to e understood as a mere etension of physical life. (ut this is not to say that

psychic life cannot e eplained y natural causes& for society, no less than organicprocesses, is a part of nature. here is thus a vast region of the individual consciencewhich is oth unintelligile to "psycho-physiology" and yet perfectly amenale toscientific investigation. Durkheim thus called for a "socio-psychology" which wouldinvestigate those psychic facts which have social causes. 2ar from deriving social factsfrom the essential features of human nature, such a positive science,paceSpencer, wouldderive human nature from society.

Abnormal Forms of the Division of Labor

he normal function of the division of laor, as we have seen, is to produce a form ofsocial solidarity& ut, like all social !as well as iological# facts, the division of laor may

present "pathological" forms which produce different and even contrary results.

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Durkheim was especially concerned to study these forms for two reasons: first, if it couldnot be proved that they were deviant and exceptional, the division of labor might beaccused of "logically implying" them; and second, the study of such deviant forms mighthelp us better to understand those conditions supportive of the normal state. EventuallyDurkheim focused on three types of such pathological forms, not because they exhaustedthe range of deviant cases, but because they seemed the most general and most serious.

he first type, already identified by !omte#, is found where individuals, increasinglyisolated by their more speciali$ed tasks, lose any sense of being integral parts of somelarger whole. his reflects a lack of mutual ad%ustment among the parts of the socialorganism which Durkheim called the anomic division of labor, citing certain commercialand industrial crises, the conflict between capital and labor, and the "scholastic"speciali$ation of scientific investigation among its examples. &nd what was particularlyalarming, again, was that this form of social disintegration increased with the growth ofthe division of labor, and thus appeared to be its natural rather than pathologicalconse'uence.

(ow was such a conse'uence to be avoided) !omte*s answer, based on his acceptance ofthe view that social integration is not a spontaneous product of the division of labor, wasthat an independent, governmental organ +i.e., the state, as informed by the positive

philosophy was necessary to reali$e and maintain social unity. Durkheim, by contrast,was extremely skeptical of the efficacy of government regulation of the economy; for the

problems afflicting economic institutions arose from a multiplicity of particularcircumstances of which only those closest to those problems have any knowledge. &nd,in any case, he re%ected !omte*s premise as well; as with all organisms the unity of

society was to be obtained by the "spontaneous consensus of parts."

o overcome the anomic division of labor. therefore, we must first determine the

conditions essential to the normal state of organic solidarity. hese conditions include notonly a system of organs necessary to one another, but also the predetermination of theway in which these mutually necessary organs and their functions are to be related. his

predetermination is the critical role of rules of conduct, which are themselves the productof habit and tradition. -ery briefly, certain groups of people +organs engage in definiteforms of action +functions which are repeated because they cling to the constantconditions of social life; when the division of labor brings these different organs and theirfunctions together, the relations thus formed partake of the same degree of fixity andregularity; and these relations, being repeated, become habitual, and, when collectiveforce is added, are transformed into rules of conduct.

he difficulty with the anomic division of labor, of course, is that such rules either do notexist or are not in accord with the degree of development of the division of labor. (owcan such a situation arise) ypically, something is interposed between otherwisecontiguous organs so that the mutual stimulation created by their functions becomes lessfre'uent, less intense, and less determined; the organs lose the sense of mutualdependence that mutual stimulation would normally create, and, as a conse'uence, therules reflecting those relations remain vague, illdefined, and fail to perform their properintegrative function. /n commercial and industrial crises, for example, the growth andseparation of producers and their markets has proceeded to the extent that the formercannot rationally predict the behavior of the latter; in the conflict between labor andcapital, the development of largescale industry and the factory system has separated theworker both from his family and from his employer; and in the speciali$ation of scientific

investigation, the moral and social sciences in particular have not yet understood theirrelationship to one another and to the older sciences, and have thus ignored thecollaborative nature of the work in which they are engaged. 0ut in each case, anomie isthe conse'uence not of the division of labor itself, but of those exceptional and abnormal

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circumstances under which otherwise contiguous organs become separated, thuspreventing the adequate development of rules of conduct.

But it is not sufficient simply that there be rules, for sometimes the rules themselves arethe source of the problems. Where the lower classes become dissatisfied with the positiongranted them by custom or law, for example, we find a strictly regulated form oforganization which Durkheim called theforced division of labor, which is nonetheless a

potential source of dissension and civil war. he causes of this pathological form areclear. !n society, as we have seen, there is a great distance between the hereditarydispositions of the individual and the social function he will fill" and the #space# thus leftopen to striving and deliberation is also vulnerable to influences which deflect theindividual from the role most consistent with his tastes, aptitudes, and capacities. But forthe division of labor to produce solidarity, it is not sufficient that each individual have hisspecialized task" it is still necessary that this task be appropriate to him. he #forceddivision of labor# is thus the consequence of that structural condition in which thedistribution of social functions does not correspond to the distribution of natural talents.

$gain, Durkheim insisted that this condition was not a necessary consequence of the

division of labor, but rather the product of particular circumstances. #%ormally# thedivision of labor arises spontaneously, and the harmony between individual natures andsocial functions is the inevitable consequence of each individual&s unimpeded pursuit ofthose tasks for which he is best suited. But here the difficulty arises. 'or socialinequalities thus to express no more than naturalinequalities requires a social context inwhich the latter can be neither increased nor decreased by any external cause" in otherwords, it requires absolute equality of external conditions, and Durkheim was well awarethat no such society had ever existed.

Durkheim was thus in the seemingly awkward position of defining as #normal# a featurewhich the division of labor had never presented in its pure state. %onetheless, as always,

he was optimistic. (ointing to the progressive decline of the caste system, the increasingaccessibility of public office to the average citizen, and the growth of social assistancewhereby the disadvantages of birth could b overcome, Durkheim argued not simply that

progress toward social )ustice had been made or that it was a good to be pursued, but thatthe elimination of external inequalities and realization of the ideal of structuralspontaneity was essential ** indeed, indispensable ** to that form of solidarity upon which#organized# societies themselves depend. +ocial )ustice would emerge, quite literally,

because it had toif advanced societies were to exist at all.

quality of external conditions was thus necessary if each individual was to find hisproper function in society" but it was also necessary if these functions were to be linked

to one another. his was particularly evident in contractual relations, which are the)uridical expression of those exchanges necessary to the division of labor. (reciselybecause such exchanges between functions in advanced societies are necessary, contractsmust be kept" but unless contractual relations were to remain precarious, they must bekept not )ust through fear of force, but spontaneously. $nd it is to fulfill this condition ofspontaneity that we say contracts must involve #free consent.#

But what does #free consent# mean- !n order to answer this question, Durkheim first hadto define his notion of the #social value# of an ob)ect of exchange. +uch a value,Durkheim insisted, is equivalent not pace/icardo0 to the labor the ob)ect might havecost, but to the amount of energy capable of producing #useful social effects# which the

ob)ect contains" this, in turn, varies according to the sum of efforts necessary to producethe ob)ect, the intensity of the needs which it satisfies, and the extent of the satisfaction it

brings. hepriceof an ob)ect deviates from this value, Durkheim argued, only under#abnormal# conditions" thus, the public finds #un)ust# every exchange where the price of

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the ob)ect bears no relation to the trouble it cost and the social service it renders.$ccording to Durkheim, therefore, a contract is #freely consented to# only if the servicesexchanged have an equivalent social value, expressing an equilibrium of wills which isconsecrated by a contract" and because this equilibrium is produced and maintained byitself, and expresses the nature of things, it is truly spontaneous.

'or the obligatory force of a contract to be complete, therefore, expressed consent aloneis not sufficient" the contract must also be )ust. +ocial value, however, cannot bedetermined a priori, but only in the process of exchange itself" thus, for )ustice to be therule of contracts, it is necessary, once again, for the entreating parties labor andmanagement0 to be placed in conditions that are externally equal. $nd here again,Durkheim revealed his evolutionary optimism: the emphasis on #consent# and especially#free# consent0 appears as a very recent development, and contractual law increasinglydetracts value from those contracts entered under unequal conditions. !f a strongconscience collectivewas the preemptive need of all lower societies, the requirement andideal goal of modern societies is social )ustice.

Durkheim&s third pathological form of the division of labor arose from his observation

that the functions of an organism can become more active only on the condition that theyalso become more continuous one organ can do more only if the other organs do more,and vice versa. Where this continuity is lacking, the functional activity of the specialized

parts decreases, resulting in wasted effort and loss of productive capacity" but, as always,Durkheim was less concerned with the economic than with the moral consequences ofsuch an abnormal condition. Where the functional activity of the parts languishes,Durkheim thus warned, the solidarity of the whole is undermined.

'or precisely this reason, the first concern of intelligent, scientific management will be tosuppress useless tasks, to distribute work so that each worker is sufficiently occupied, andthus to maximize the functional activity of each social organ. !ncreased activity in turn

produces greater continuity, an augmented sense of the mutual dependence of the partson one another, and a stronger bond of solidarity. But where mismanagement prevails,the activity of each worker is reduced, functions become discontinuous, and solidarity isundermined.

But again, Durkheim insisted that such mismanagement and inactivity is the exceptionrather than the rule, a )udgment for which he gave at least four reasons. 'irst, the samefactors that cause us to specialize the increase in social volume and density0 also causeus to work harder, for the competition withineach speciality increases as the specialitiesthemselves become more numerous and divided. +econd, the division of labor itself, bysaving time otherwise wasted in passing from one function to another, increases the

efficiency of the individual worker. hird, functional activity grows with the talent andcompetence of the individual worker, and both are naturally increased by the repetition ofsimilar tasks. $nd finally, as labor becomes divided, work becomes a permanentoccupation, then a habit, and ultimately a need ** a progression which increases thefunctional activity of all workers sub)ect to it.

What, then, is the #first principle# of ethics- $nd what is the relation of ethics to society-$mong the most incontestable of moral rules, Durkheim observed, is that which orders usto internalize the conscience collectiveof the groups to which we belong" and the #moral#quality of this rule is derived from the essential function it serves in preventing socialdisintegration. But the contrary rule, which orders us to specialize, is no less imperative"

and it too is #moral# because obedience to it, after a certain stage in social evolution, isessential to social cohesion. $n initial answer to both questions above, therefore, is thatmoral rules render #society# possible: #verything which is a source of solidarity ismoral, everything which forces man to take account of other men is moral, everything

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which forces him to regulate his conduct through something other than the striving of his

ego is moral, and morality is as solid as these ties are numerous and strong."45

Durkheim thus opposed the more Kantian tradition which removed moral consciousnessfrom its societal context and defined it through freedom of the will. On the contrary,morality consists in a state of social dependence, and thus deprives the individual of some

freedom of movement and society, far from consisting of external threats to theautonomy of the will, provides the sole foundation upon which that will can act! "et allsocial life disappear," Durkheim argued, "and moral life will disappear with it, since it

would no longer have any o#$ective."4%&ven Kant's "duties of the individual towardshimself" are properly understood as duties toward society, for they are the product ofcollective sentiments which the individual must not offend. (he "categorical imperative"of modern society, therefore, is to concentrate and speciali)e our activities, contract ourhori)ons, choose a definite task, and immerse ourselves in it completely.

(he predicta#le o#$ection to this in$unction, of course, was that such speciali)ationimplies a narrowing of the individual personality, rendering each of us an "incomplete"

human #eing. *ut why, Durkheim asked, is it more natural to develop superficially ratherthan profoundly+ hy is there more dignity in #eing "complete" and mediocre ratherthan in living a more speciali)ed, #ut intense, existence+ Durkheim, in other words, wasre-invoking the ristotelian principle that man ought to reali)e his nature as man, thoughwith the added caveat that this nature is not historically constant, #ut rather variesaccording to the needs of the societal type in /uestion. 0oreover, to #e a "person" meansto #e an autonomous source of action, to possess something empirical and concretewhich is ours and ours alone and this condition, #y sharp contrast with the "apparent"li#erty and "#orrowed" personality of individuals in lower societies, is the product of thedivision of la#or.

hile Durkheim thus shared the sense of some contemporaries that theirs was an age ofprofound crisis, he denied that the crisis was intellectual or spiritual" in its causes. On thecontrary, it was the conse/uence of far-reaching structural changes undergone #y societyin a very short time thus, while the morality corresponding to the segmental societal typehad regressed, the "new" morality of the organi)ed type had not advanced rapidly enoughto fill the void there#y left in our consciences. (he corrective for this crisis, therefore,was not to resuscitate the outworn dogmas of the past, #ut to reduce external ine/ualityand increase $ustice, and thus to render the new, still discordant organs and functionsharmonious. (his was an enterprise, Durkheim concluded, in which social structure setthe terms, while social theory set the goals!

1n short, our first duty is to make a moral code for ourselves. 2uch a work cannot #eimprovised in the silence of the study it can arise only through itself, little #y little, underthe pressure of internal causes which make it necessary. *ut the service that thought can

and must render is in fixing the goal that we must attain.43

Critical Remarks

The Division of Labor in Societywas a seminal contri#ution to the sociology of law andmorality, and remains a sociological "classic" #y any standards. *y the same standards,

however, it also contains undenia#le shortcomings which have limited its appeal tomodern sociologists. n immediate difficulty, for example, is Durkheim's insistence thatsocial solidarity is an exclusively "moral" phenomenon, of which law is the "externallyvisi#le sym#ol," an insistence which ignores the fre/uent conflict of some moral

age 6 of 7(he Division of a#or in 2ociety 89:;7

The Division of Labor in Society (1893)

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