The Caspian Project .10

www.moderndiplomacy.eu

EDITORIAL

SNAKE EYESROLLING THE DICE WITH IRAN

SINS OF GENERATIONS PASTWHY THE IRAN ACCORD MAKES SENSE

THE IRONY OF REVOLUTIONJCPOA AS YOUTH COERCION TOOL IN IRAN

A LEGAL & CYBER MINEFIELDAN OVERVIEW OF THE CASPIAN REGION

FOR MEMBERS ONLYTHE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CASPIAN SUMMIT’S FOREIGN MILITARY BAN

A CASPIAN QUASI-KHANATEDAESH, WAHHABISM, AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF DISTRACTION

AZERI JANUSBAKU BALANCING BOTH EAST AND WEST

POPPIES AND POWERFIGHTING DRUG ADDICTION IN A POST-NUCLEAR IRAN

KURIL ISLANDSRESOLVING TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN THE FAR EAST

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10 [email protected]

PROJECT TEAM

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THE CASPIAN PROJECT

A WEEKLY EDITIONFROM THE MODERN DIPLOMACY

he Caspian Project has already hit its tenth issue. This mile-stone is marked by a deep and probing analysis of not justthe Iran nuclear accord but the subsequent chaotic reac-tions to it and the possible geopolitical trajectories thatmay play out moving forward into the future. If anything,The Caspian Project shows how the world really is still try-ing to work what to ultimately think about the accord andhow Iran proceeds from here with it. For every hopefulvoice that wishes to see the accord lead to a reintegrationof Iran into the global community (and thus setting the

process for a changed and perhaps even democratically developing coun-try) there are several more that are fearful and worried, intent on viewingIran only through diplomatic glasses tinged by suspicion and mistrust.

What the contributors to the present issue show are that there are intrigu-ing and compelling arguments fueling both perspectives. Indeed, this isthe nature of global affairs and geopolitics: the angles and agendas are al-ways multiple, sometimes counter-intuitive, and in unfortunate cases ut-terly contradictory. It seems the way the accord is so far being interpretedaround the world gives credence to all three possibilities. Which of coursemeans the immediate future in the great Persian kingdom is going to getjust that much more interesting. For if The Caspian Project stands for any-thing at all, it is to open up to the world the understanding that interna-tional relations often likes to talk boldly in black and white terms, inassigning ‘good’ and ‘bad’ designations to this side or that, while the truereality of the global stage is much more complex, nuanced, and difficultto attain certainty. In such a cloudy and ambiguous environment the onetrue need is a reliable source for information. Not something trying to ca-jole or coerce, but simply expose and reveal. The contributors in this spe-cial issue, even when taking a side, have tried to remain faithful to thislarger objective.

I sincerely hope this issue proves as thought-provoking and positively sur-prising to all of our devoted readers as previous editions have been, if notmore so. This region of the world, given the players sitting around thisCaspian table, is always going to remain critically important far beyond itsgeographical borders. It is why we all here at Modern Diplomacy find it sofascinating and why it was so important to create The Caspian Project tobegin with. One thing is certain: when studying this region of the worldyou will never ever be bored.

T

Prof. Dr. Matthew Crosston

ProjeCt DireCtor

Bellevue university, oMaha, ne, usa

WWW.MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU THE CASPIAN PROJECT

editorial

The purpose of this paper is to critically an-alyze this position, proposing the notionthat the world should take great concernover Iran’s ultimate possible entry into the“Nuclear Weapons Club.” This will be accom-plished through a diverse review of topics,specifically the notion of Iranian proxiesand their affect in the world, that an Iranianbomb would not spark an arms race in theMiddle East, and finally the belief that theworld could live with a nuclear-armed Iranas well as it has lived with a nuclear-armedPakistan. (Conca 2014)Iran totes that its program is for peacefulenergy and that no nuclear weapons pro-gram ever came out of a legitimate nuclearenergy program. It is theoretically possible,but not practical. Nations have tried, buteven Argentina and Pakistan realized that ifyou want weapons, then you develop aweapons program and pick one of the twotraditional paths to the bomb.

And no one is fooled by an en-ergy front anyway. However, thechoice to develop a bomb willclearly require dedication andmoney, something to whichIran will soon have access be-cause of the new accord. (Sagan2010) So, to highlight this point,regardless of the deals struckbetween Iran and other coun-tries regarding nuclear non-pro-liferation, Iran will be financiallyand scientifically able to createa weapon and use it to gain aclear upper-hand in any futurenegotiations. Then the worldwill have to also worry aboutother uses Iran might have for anuclear weapon, specificallyproxies.Mr. Pillalamarri notes that “whilesome Iranian proxies have com-mitted terrorist attacks, thoseare few and far between, espe-cially as the zealous phase ofthe Iranian revolution fades tomore realistic concerns.

In lIght of the Recent nucleaR accoRd with Iran it isworthwhile to consider how some have always argued there is noreal inherent problem with Iran ultimately possessing a nuclearweapon.

SNAkE EYESROLLINg THE DICE WITH IRAN

ZR

ZR is a full-timeanalyst who has

worked with nationalsecurity issues for

almost 12 years. He iscurrently completing

his Bachelors ofScience degree with

the prestigious Inter-national Security and

Intelligence StudiesProgram at Bellevue

University. Upongraduation, he will

continue to provideprofessional support

to national securityissues and policies.


Compared to its neighbor, Pakistan, whichactually has nuclear weapons, Iran’s proxieshave engaged in many more stabilizing ac-tivities rather than random terrorist attacksthat accomplish nothing geopolitically.” (Pil-lalamarri 2015) I would argue that Iran’s prox-ies have been responsible for as much, if notmore, negative impacts geopolitically thanmost nations that have sponsored terrorism.This global reach should cause deep concernover the possible development, down theroad, of nuclear weapons.

The U.S. State Department’s current concernscould not be made more obvious despite thecurrent agreement:Iran has increased its presence in Africa andattempted to smuggle arms to Houthi sepa-ratists in Yemen and Shia oppositionists inBahrain. Additionally, Iran used the IslamicRevolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force(IRGC-QF) and its regional proxy groups toimplement foreign policy goals, providecover for intelligence operations, and createinstability in the Middle East. The IRGC-QF isthe regime’s primary mechanism for cultivat-ing and supporting terrorists abroad.

Iran has historically provided weapons, train-ing, and funding to Hamas and other Pales-tinian terrorist groups, including thePalestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the PopularFront for the Liberation of Palestine-GeneralCommand (PFLP-GC), although Hamas’ tiesto Tehran have been strained due to the Syr-ian civil war. Iran has provided hundreds ofmillions of dollars in support of Hezbollah inLebanon and has trained thousands of itsfighters at camps in Iran.

Furthermore, the IRGC-QF, in concert withHezbollah, provided training outside of Iraqas well as advisors inside Iraq for Shia mili-tants in the construction and use of sophis-ticated improvised explosive devicetechnology and other advanced weaponry

On January 23, 2013, Yemeni authoritiesseized an Iranian dhow, the Jihan, off thecoast of Yemen. The dhow was carrying so-phisticated Chinese antiaircraft missiles, C-4explosives, rocket-propelled grenades, and anumber of other weapons and explosives.The shipment of lethal aid was likely headedto Houthi separatists in Northern Yemen. Iranactively supports members of the Houthimovement, including activities intended tobuild military capabilities, which could posea greater threat to security and stability inYemen and the surrounding region. (U.S.State Department 2013) With such a sullied past and proven ties toterrorist activities on a global scale, the worldshould worry greatly over the developmentof an Iranian nuclear weapon and evenworse, Iran’s geopolitical motivation in sup-plying proxies with such weapons.

THE CHOICE TODEvELOP A bOMb

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SOMETHINg TO WHICHIRAN WILL SOON

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Additionally, Mr. Pillalamarri notes that it ishighly unlikely that the Middle East would gonuclear in response to an Iranian bomb. NoArab state has the industrial or technical ca-pacity to build its own weapons. (Pillalamarri2015) This idea can be easily argued againstby looking at recent reporting out of SaudiArabia. Saudi officials have issued explicitwarnings about Riyadh's intention to acquirenuclear weapons in the event Iran does.However, many analysts argue that such pro-nouncements are simply bluster aimed atdrawing U.S. attention towards Saudi Ara-bia's concerns about Iran's nuclear programin the hopes of securing additional securityassurances from the United States. (NuclearThreat Initiative 2015)

So basically, if for no other reason, the U.S.should care about Iran getting a nuclearweapon because of the potential nucleararms race it will spark, something the worldshould always fear.

Lastly I would like to comment on Mr. Pillala-marri’s thoughts on how it “would not be abig deal if Iran acquired nuclear weapons.Like Pakistan, it would quickly come to termswith the limitations of such weapons. In fact,by bringing countries closer to the abyss, nu-clear weapons make them more aware of theconsequences of foolish actions. Pakistan, amore unstable and dangerous state thanIran, has nuclear weapons and the worlddoes not do much about this.


That suggests that we can also live with a nu-clear Iran if that comes to pass in the future.”(Pillalamarri. 2015) Mr. Pillalamarri hung partof his argument on the fact that, “…Pakistan,a more unstable and dangerous state thanIran, has nuclear weapons and the worlddoes not do much about this.” This feels sim-ilar to someone saying, well, “we let the otherguy do it and it hasn’t turned out so bad sowe really cannot protest someone else doingthe same thing.” This is a rather reckless posi-tion on which to balance the lives of the mil-lions of people residing across the MiddleEast that would likely be directly affected invery real ways by a nuclear Iran.

The development of a nuclear weapon byIran would spark a nuclear arms race in theMiddle East, specifically with Saudi Arabia, aswell as put Israel on an extremely height-ened and agitated state of military readiness.For those who still believe the nuclear accorddoes not go far enough to ensure Iran’s com-mitment to exclusively peaceful nuclear en-ergy uses, this geopolitical concern does notseem like paranoia but more like logical real-ism given Iran’s track record on the diplo-matic global stage. The accord is a risky rollof the dice by the West. Let us hope it doesn’tcome up snake eyes.

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It gives Iran approval to enrich uranium forcivilian uses, while keeping in check its usefor weapons development. The agreementalso lifts several sanctions off of Iran thatwere arguably not having the desired ef-fects, while leaving more vital ones in place.Given the shaky recent history of Iranian re-lations with the UN, the agreement is a cal-culated and smart plan of action towardsoverall peace. Through this plan, Iran is noteconomically crippled under sanctions andinternational tensions with Iran across therest of the international community areeased as well. In recent years Iran has been under con-stant pressure from the international com-munity over its enrichment of uranium andattempted development of nuclear capa-bilities. It’s possible that under such inter-national pressure Iran could eventuallyhave felt compelled to continue with its en-richment in secret.

Thus, while the JCPOA is ar-guably not a complete non-pro-liferation agreement, it doesn’tneed to be in order to be effec-tive and ultimately ease ten-sions on all sides long-term.Over the past thirty years, forexample, the U.S. has been con-cerned mainly with stoppingIran’s support for terrorism andenthusiasm for nuclear power.Negotiations were always lessthan successful one-on-one,leading to the U.S. imposingcrippling sanctions, with sup-port from the internationalcommunity coming later. Butconcern still remained onwhether or not Iran was at-tempting to develop nuclear ca-pabilities. Iran, for its part, wasstruggling under economicsanctions and nearly paranoidof possible U.S. attack or directintervention. After all, one only needed tolook on a map and see that theU.S. had attacked the country tothe left of Iran (Iraq) and had at-tacked the country to the rightof Iran (Afghanistan).

the Joint ComPrehensive Plan of aCtion (JCPOA) is astep in the right direction. The agreement takes place betweenIran and six other nations, including the United States.

sIns of GeneratIons Past

JoshuaPatterson

WWW.ModerndIPLoMacy.eU the casPIan ProJect

Why the Iran accord Makes sense

Thinking Iran would be the final piece in athree-piece jigsaw puzzle of hard powergeopolitics was not an entirely illogical con-cern for Iranian authorities. It was part ofPresident Bush’s ‘Axis of Evil’ lest we forget.Any sort of military intervention, however,could have given Iran the legitimacy itneeded for developing nuclear weapons insecret. Israel’s attack on an Iraqi nuclear reac-tor and supposed involvement in theStuxnet attack in Iran is an example of this.The bombing led directly to Iraq developingweapons further and Iran becoming moreconvinced than ever it needed the strengthof nuclear deterrence in its corner. The smartemphasis should have been on diplomaticengagement and negotiations, however, noton covert military actions alone. And sanc-tions, quite frankly, only postponed dealingwith the real problems and poisoned thediplomatic space. Thus, the consequential si-lence between Iran and the U.S. was drawnout by decades and Iran’s nuclear situationremained at best murky and uneasy. Withthis agreement, both sides can work awayfrom violence, mistrust, and suspicion andtowards engaged diplomacy instead.

Although the sanctions imposed were an at-tempt by the U.S. to hamper Iran’s economy,and thereby hampering its nuclear and mili-tary capability, it only seemed to hamper theformer while igniting the latter. Iran’s econ-omy indeed suffered greatly, but its supplyof arms to Syria and terror factions all acrossthe Middle East were not stymied at all. Iran’snuclear aspirations seemed not to have beengreatly affected by sanctions either: OnMarch 16, 2014, Principal Deputy AssistantSecretary of State for International Securityand Non-Proliferation Vann Van Diepen saidIran was still ‘very actively’ creating frontcompanies and engaging in other activity toconceal procurements and that Iran's activi-ties had not changed since the old Joint Planof Action (JPA) was agreed to. This impliedthat Iran had internal capabilities not de-pendent on trade that could continue nu-clear research as well as developconventional weapons and arm externalgroups, regardless of how severe sanctionsbecame. In this way, the sanctions were notonly NOT achieving their goal but perhapseven doing the reverse: hurting the peoplewhile giving them reason to support theirown government instead of oppose it.Bijan Khajehpour, a political and economicanalyst who was imprisoned in Iran, noted in2009 how the nation was disappointed thatin previous P5+1 negotiations the sanctionsagainst it were not eased. However thesesanctions were imposed partly because ofIran’s unwillingness to cooperate and openlylimit its nuclear development. Now thosetwo problems seem alleviated. Another pos-itive upswing of the JCPOA is that the U.S. isnot required to abandon its current sanc-tions against Iran in total. This includes sanc-tions for alleged human rights violations andterrorism support.

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Iran the LeGItIMacyIt needed for

deveLoPInG nUcLearWeaPons In secret

These sanctions will remain in place whilevarious other sanctions regarding economyand trade will be lifted. Due to the oil em-bargo and banking sanctions, inflation inIran rose nearly 50% in 2013. Unrest due toIran’s rising food prices have also been on therise. Across the board it has been the civiliansector which bore the brunt of the effects ofsuch sanctions. And they are hard to justifywith the lack of any evidence actually show-ing the intended goals of deterring nuclearand military capability, and ultimately depos-ing the theocratic regime, were even comingclose to being accomplished.Thus, the JCPOA lifts the sanctions that werehaving ill effects that outweighed any al-leged positive results, while implementing aprogram that will more effectively allow theinternational community to monitor Iran’scivilian nuclear development and keep it incheck. Also built into the plan is a ‘snap back’measure: if Iran is found in violation of theagreement, then the previous sanctionswould fall back into effect.

This mechanism will last for ten years withthe option to reinstate it for another five. If itis determined that Iran has violated its agree-ment, the five nations can take a vote to liftthe resolution and Iran’s sanctions will ‘snapback’ within 30 days. It’s an effective deterrence measure, as it is inIran’s best interest to not allow these sanc-tions to fall back into place. Its economyneeds a chance to grow again. That is a fargreater national security goal than trying toforce its way clumsily into the global nuclearclub. Thus, Iran’s cooperation is a chance forit to demonstrate compliance and a positiveattitude towards the international commu-nity while being a fully responsible and en-gaged member of said community. Thispotentiality alone makes the JCPOA causefor buoyed optimism. It is a chance to createa new diplomatic space and conversationwhere the sins of generations past, on BOTHsides, don’t continue to constantly haunt thearena. And absolution of these sins wassomething long ago needed.

WWW.ModerndIPLoMacy.eU the casPIan ProJect

As can be expected, much of the conversa-tion since the announcement has been fo-cused on Iran's nuclear program andwhether this plan can prevent it from ac-quiring a nuclear weapon in the future. For-mally speaking, the JCPOA leaves Iranenough capacity to still attain a nuclearweapon in the future should it decide topull out of the agreement. But the questionthat must be asked, that we must keep inmind when discussing JCPOA, is this: Whatdoes Iran gain by signing the JCPOA?

When one considers that Iran has ex-pended a great deal of resources over pre-vious decades on building up its nuclearprogram, there has to be a serious reasonfor it to give up its nuclear aspirations now.Iran has spent billions of dollars on buildinginfrastructure: nuclear reactors, centrifuges,and facilities; attaining nuclear materials;and thousands of man-hours expended onuranium enrichment. So why after all thatmaterial, time, and man-power investmentdoes Iran reverse course and agree to curbits nuclear aspirations?

The most obvious gain to theIranian government and itspartners in the JCPOA is theeconomic and geopolitical cas-cade effects of full Iranian rein-tegration into the globaleconomy. Iran's economy hastaken hits related to drops inthe price of crude oil the lastcouple of years from over$100.00 a barrel to just above$50.00, as well as chronic strainson economic output because ofsanctions imposed by the UN,the EU and the US. Prior to theimposition of sanctions, Iranwas OPEC's second largest oilproducer with the fourth largestoil reserves and second largestnatural gas reserves. Indeed,80% of Iran's economy wasbased on its petroleum indus-try. Iran's economy was grow-ing before the sanctions and itenjoyed a relatively low unem-ployment rate.

the reCently signeD Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) betweenIran, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and China wasbarely completed and announced to the world when debates about its impactbegan.

the irOnY Of revOlutiOn

Paula Malott

WWW.MODernDiPlOMACY.eu the CAsPiAn PrOJeCt

JCPOA As YOuth COerCiOn tOOl in irAn

Dr. MatthewCrosston

As intended, these sanctions have had a dev-astating effect on the Iranian people over thelast decade since their imposition. Iran's un-employment rates now hover in the lowteens and 20% of its population lives belowthe poverty line. Iran would greatly benefitby a return to its pre-sanction economic out-put. For the European Union, Iran's return tothe global market would offer it a welcomealternative to obtaining its natural gas sup-plies from someone other than Russia. Russiahas used threats to shut off natural gas sup-plies to Europe to gain leverage in negotia-tions on the situation in the Ukraine. Whilemuch of Western Europe isn't 100% depend-ent on Russia for its natural gas supplies, itnevertheless must be very attractive to re-move that threat leverage from future nego-tiations with Russia. So on this level theJCPOA has very little to do with joining orbeing prevented from joining the global nu-clear club and much more about a return towhat must be seen in Iran as its proper eco-nomic birthright on the global market and inthe EU as a wonderful chip to work againstthe Russian Federation as concerns its ownenergy needs.

But as we continue to ponder the questionof what Iran gains by signing the JCPOA, wemust begin to look also at a less obvious and,at least in our opinion, more compelling rea-son for its sudden agreement to capitulateon a nuclear program now. It is Iran's demo-graphics and the potential for political unrestrelated to its large youth population that canno longer be simply dismissed by the gov-erning authority. Since the Ayatollah’s revo-lution Iran's population has doubled andnearly 50% of the population is now under35 years old. Unlike previous generations,this youth population is well-educated, sinceearning a college degree was highly encour-aged by the Iranian government since therevolution. Despite their education levels, the bruteforce and displacement of the economic fall-out caused by sanctions has fallen squarelyon this young and talented generation.Youth unemployment remains at nearly 25%,double the rate of other generations. The lasttime Iran had youth unemployment ratesthis high was in the decade prior to the rev-olution. The current regime is largely domi-nated by leaders who were youth membersof that revolution. We find it hard to believethey themselves fail to recognize the strangesimilarities between the current situationand the 1970s, especially if they continue toignore youth dissatisfaction. The Iranian Is-lamic Revolution was largely born within arestive youth population suffering from highunemployment rates that then partneredwith other marginalized groups to overthrowthe Shah and his US-backed government,which almost all sides had come to view ascorrupt and ineffectual.

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While the current youth dissatisfaction hasno religious underpinning or charismatic sin-gle leader to powerfully unite them all, it isnot illogical to think current progressivethinkers within Iranian authority see concernwith all this displaced anger and wastedyoung talent. For recognizing that dangerand trying to counteract it through theJCPOA, Iran has proven itself to be diplomat-ically cunning and adept. Keep in mind Iran had already experiencedcivil unrest from this demographic group.Following the 2009 presidential elections theGreen Movement, which supported reformpoliticians in the elections, organized and ledsome of the largest protests seen in Iransince the revolution itself.

Hundreds of thousands of Iran's youth werein the streets protesting for political reformin the weeks following President MahmoudAhmedinejad's reelection. While the government ultimately quelled theprotestors, the sentiments expressed by themovement did not just melt away. On thecontrary, the Green Movement has alwaysbeen working below the surface of Iran's po-litical scene, pushing for democratic and so-cial reform. As the 2011 Arab Spring spreadthrough neighboring nations, Iran's leadershad to notice the similarities to the GreenMovement protests of 2009. They mighthave even worried that the base source forthe Arab Spring may have been its ownquashed Green Revolution.

WWW.MODernDiPlOMACY.eu the CAsPiAn PrOJeCt

There had to be concern that the Arab Springcould create a ‘full circle’ effect, bringing rev-olution back to the place it all almost startedthree years before. In addition, the countries that had the largestprotests and ultimately largest reforms werethe countries that had similar demographicsto Iran: high youth populations and highyouth unemployment rates. During the Arabspring, leaders of the Green Movement or-ganized street demonstrations that hadnearly a million protesters on the streets ofTehran. The candidates selected by theGuardian Council in the 2013 election cyclealso show that while the Green Movement isnot as openly active they are still clearly onthe minds of the ruling class: the eventualwinner, while a conservative leader, hasshown more willingness to enact reformsand engage the broader population acrossthe country. The ultimate goal for Iran to join the JCPOAis rebuilding economic opportunities for itslarge youth population and hopefully redi-recting it energies into building careers, rais-ing families, and achieving stability and

prosperity. Prior to the JCPOA, with sanctionsstill firmly in place, those goals had to seemlargely out of reach for many of the youngmembers of Iran’s society. Again, the truediplomatic talent with the nuclear accord isin Iran recognizing what could be a boilingpoint for political dissent and with one deftstroke has attempted to turn that energy intoan economic aspiration for the entire coun-try. Once it gains economic prosperity for itsyouth population, while still trying to ensurepolitical stability for its ruling class no doubt,it will be interesting to see if Iran will con-tinue to follow the mandates set out for itunder the agreement. Or will it choose to pullout of the agreement (as it has a right to dolet’s not forget) and return to its quest for anuclear weapon, only now with the stabilityand prosperity and LEVERAGE of being a fullyintegrated and quite possibly valuable pieceof the global energy economic puzzle for theWestern world.Who says global affairs isn’t full of irony in themodern day? The Iran accord proves this cyn-icism false.

Matthew Crosston is Professor of Politi-cal Science, Director of the International Secu-rity and Intelligence Studies Program, and theMiller Chair at Bellevue University

Paula Malott is a 2012 graduate with aBachelor of Science degree from Bellevue Uni-versity's International Security and IntelligenceStudies program. She is currently employed asa Department of Defense contractor (BoozAllen) instructing Intelligence Analysts for theU.S. Air Force. She has also worked as an Arabicand Russian linguist and Intelligence Analystfor the USAF.

It is estimated that there could be well over48 billion barrels of crude oil and over 292trillion cubic feet of natural gas that still re-main to be discovered. Russia, Azerbaijan,Iran, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan sur-round the Caspian Sea, each battling for theterritorial rights to the land and seabednear each country’s borders since the col-lapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Prior to 1991, only Iran and the SovietUnion controlled the Caspian Sea. The twocountries had a series of bilateral treatiesthat equally divided the Caspian. The fall ofthe Soviet Union, however, created manychallenges for both countries. For Russiathe collapse of the Soviet Union meant los-ing valuable land and seabed rights of theCaspian Sea to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan andTurkmenistan. Iran was faced with the chal-lenges of competing with and negotiatingwith these new countries as well as losingits equally-shared rights of the Caspian withRussia.

The Caspian has been called asea since its discovery in ancienttimes, but there has been muchdebate over the years whetherthe Caspian should be consid-ered a lake rather than a sea.The rationale behind this de-bate is because a lake would beequally divided while a seawould not. Bilateral treaties be-tween Iran and the SovietUnion dating back to 1921called the Caspian a lake ratherthan a sea. Calling it a lakewould specify that its watersand resources would only be di-vided by the surrounding coun-tries. As a sea the United NationsConvention on the Seas wouldregulate the Caspian’s watersand resources, making themavailable to the surroundingcountries as well as the interna-tional community. The equal di-vision of the Caspian andrenaming it a lake has been re-jected by several of the littoralstates and divisional agree-ments of the seabed still has notbeen reached. So the legal bat-tle for the Caspian continues toquietly rage.

control of the caSpian Sea has been highly sought afterdue to its abundance of natural resources. Nearly 3 billion gallonsof crude oil are produced every day and 3 trillion cubic feet of nat-ural gas are produced every year.

A LegAL & CYber MinefieLD

Stacey cottone

Stacey Cottone,a recent graduate of

Bellevue Universitywith a Master’s de-

gree in Cybersecurityand Bachelor’s de-

gree in InternationalSecurity and Intelli-gence Studies, just

completed aninternship with the

United StatesDepartment of State

in Washington, DC.

www.MODernDipLOMACY.eU the CAspiAn prOJeCt

An Overview Of the CAspiAn regiOn

Countries surrounding the Caspian Sea arenot the only ones that have great interest inthe sea’s natural resources. Individuals, inter-national communities (U.S., China, Turkey,EU) and multinational corporations all havea financial interest or desire to invest, in ad-dition to those that wish to utilize theCaspian’s natural resources, and are trying towedge their own agendas into the process,adding fuel to the fire. It would seem thatthe territorial disputes could not be morecomplex, but now the nuclear deal with Irancould cause even more legal and geopoliticalwrangling. The removal of internationalsanctions against Iran would once againallow it to export crude oil and natural gas.Iran could potentially join the Trans-Anato-lian Pipeline that would connect with theTrans-Adriatic Pipeline, allowing Western Eu-rope to receive natural gas from the Islamicrepublic and nearly bypass Russia com-pletely.The removal of sanctions could thus beviewed as both beneficial and dangerous.These potential export developments withIran could threaten the current revenue andnatural resource funding for the other statessurrounding the Caspian Sea.

Historically, during previous wars and battlesnear the Caspian, transportation problemswith oil and natural gas cascaded into theworld market. Problems included deliberatesabotage of pipelines, incidental destructionduring the course of battle, and impropermaintenance of pipelines due to fighting inthe area. So it is clear that there is no Caspianconflict that can remain a purely parochial orlocal problem. It will always be innatelytransnational. Currently Azerbaijan and Kaza-khstan produce the largest amounts of nat-ural resources from the Caspian Sea. Russiahas created a monopoly on the export of nat-ural resources, as travelling through its coun-try’s pipelines was the easiest and most costeffective way for the resources to reach theirfinal destinations. Once Iran is allowed to ex-port these natural resources again it is likelythat they will receive substantial interna-tional investment to increase their produc-tion levels as well as create new pipelines. Itis estimated that Iran possesses the secondlargest natural gas reserve in the world andcould produce up 600,000 barrels of oil daily.All of this potentially makes Iran the largestproducer of oil and gas from the Caspian, aswell as providing new transportation routesthat might massively disrupt the geopoliticalinterests of the Russian Federation.

On the surface these changes for Iran mayseem rather insignificant as the full breadthof potential power it will gain has yet to beseen. Iran could use this power to controlothers by withholding its natural resourcesor using them to influence other nations’policies against it (in short, something like amirror of the concerns presently being leviedagainst Russia by the EU).

it is nOt iMpLAUsibLethAt A CYber-AttACk

COULD DeterMinewhiCh LittOrAL stAte

COntrOLs the nAtUrALresOUrCes AnDtrAnsnAtiOnAL

AgenDAs Of the CAspiAn

Skepticism surrounds its nuclear program ascountries such as Israel and Saudi Arabiaview the program as a direct threat, no mat-ter what accord has been signed. Countrieswho view the nuclear deal with Iran nega-tively may take actions into their own handsto prevent Iran from rising to its fullest po-tential prosperity and global integration. Sothe evolution of Caspian fallout from the Irannuclear deal will likely soon show how muchInternational Political Economy bleeds intoglobal security concerns. Bilateral treaties guaranteeing physical secu-rity have been created between the littoralCaspian states. In 2007, the treaties specifi-cally included declarations of non-aggres-sion against one another. In 2014, at theCaspian Summit, the five Caspian presidentssigned a declaration to guarantee securityand stability in the region by only allowingthe Caspian littoral states to have their armedforces present in the Caspian Sea and agree-ing to not allow military forces of any othernation to enter the sea. No longer is physicalsecurity the only concern that must be takeninto consideration, however.

The littoral states of the Caspian Sea, as wellas the global oil and gas investors workingwith them, must take into account the po-tential for a cyber-attack. The emergence of a brave new dangerouscyber world with the Stuxnet attack on Iran’sfacilities several years ago shows thatCaspian security needs to move beyond ex-pectations and definitions that are exclu-sively conventional. It is not implausible thata cyber-attack could determine which littoralstate controls the natural resources andtransnational agendas of the Caspian, espe-cially if a serious attack like Stuxnet ever hap-pens again. Such an attack could havedevastating effects on the global commu-nity, not just the Caspian littoral states, as itis clear there is great hope from the UnitedStates all the way to China that the develop-ment of the Caspian region is somethingseen by all as a global economic and securitypriority. Thus is the nature of this fascinatingregion: a land full of promise and seen bymany with great hope while also being ladenwith far too many potential minefields.

www.MODernDipLOMACY.eU the CAspiAn prOJeCt

Of the greatest significance was the unani-mous vote by the “Caspian 5” (Russia, Iran,Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan)to no longer allow foreign military presencein the Caspian region and that all issuesthat were to arise would be solved betweenthe littoral states only. The political declara-tion, according to an announcement byVladimir Putin and signed by all five presi-dents “sets out a fundamental principle forguaranteeing stability and security, namely,that only the Caspian littoral states have theright to have their armed forces present onthe Caspian.” Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani echoed thissentiment stating “there is consensusamong all the Caspian Sea littoral statesthat they are capable of maintaining the se-curity of the Caspian Sea and military forcesof no foreign country must enter thesea.”The five further agreed to expand co-operation on the Caspian Sea in terms ofmeteorology, natural disasters, and envi-ronmental protection. The declaration alsorevealed clear formulations on the delimi-tation of the seabed with each country hav-ing exclusive sovereign rights to a 15 milearea.

This puts to rest an issue thathad been contested since thebreakup of the Soviet Unionand the emergence of the newindependent states. Apart frombeing a unique body of water interms of its bio and ecologicalresources, the Caspian Seacomes with a massive amountof oil and gas reserves, an esti-mated 18 billion tons withproved reserves of four billiontons. These numbers put theCaspian Sea directly behind thePersian Gulf in terms of theworld’s largest oil and gas re-serves.

This declaration also outlinedmany other projects in theworks for this region – a majorone being the joint construc-tion of a railroad that would en-circle the Caspian Sea,connecting key Caspian portsand cutting transportation timein half.

Last septeMber brought with it major changes to the hotly contestedCaspian Sea region. These changes were revealed at the IV Caspian Summit heldon September 29th in Astrakhan, Russia.

for memBers only

Megan Munoz

Megan Munozis currently a gradu-

ate student atBellevue University,Bellevue, Nebraska

where she is earning aMaster of Science

degree in the Inter-national Security and

Intelligence StudiesProgram. She works

as an intelligenceanalyst for the state

of New Jersey, previ-ously served as an in-

telligence analyst inthe United States Air

Force for 10 years, andremains a reservist.

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The ConsequenCes of The Caspian summiT’s foreign miliTary Ban

The five states also signed an emergencyprevention and response agreement whichcalled for joint efforts in responding to emer-gencies in the region. Additionally, planswere revealed for a joint emergency re-sponse exercise to take place in 2016 thatwill test the capabilities and partnerships be-tween the nations and develop proceduresof notifying and coordinating rescue units. Disguised underneath these projects, exer-cises, cooperation, and initiatives is a veryreal threat to the United States and NATO.Russia and Iran have long felt threatened bythe possibility of a foreign military presencein the Caspian Sea and Moscow was deter-mined to find a way to ensure it would notlose any more influence in the global energysector (this in light of Europe slowly butsurely diversifying away from Russian gasafter the Ukrainian crisis began). The bestway to do this was to bring these nations intothe fold of Kremlin interests, while makingthem feel their own interests were also beingserved.

By strengthening relations in their own back-yard Russia has been able to increase influ-ence and gain back power in the region.Shutting NATO out of the region also signifi-cantly increases Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, andTurkmenistan’s dependence on Moscow inmany different aspects. Another addedbonus is that a clear alliance made up of Iran,Russia, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan,Ukraine (absent any ‘outsider presence’)would be comparatively easy to control. The effects of this agreement have alreadyresulted in major changes to relations be-tween Caspian nations and the UnitedStates. For years Azerbaijan has welcomedAmerican-Azeri relations by stepping up lo-gistical support for NATO operations inAfghanistan and even serving in Afghanistanas part of the ISAF, but relations have clearlycooled between the two nations. There werealso serious talks between Kazakhstan andthe United States for building a base on theborder in Aktau that would cater to theneeds of the United States and NATO troops,but since the signing of this declaration theproject has been halted. Finally, the geopo-litical shift in the region has resulted in theclosing of the North route for NATO militaryequipment being sent to Afghanistan. Priorto this Caspian Summit agreement theUnited States had played an active role inhelping Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kaza-khstan bolster their military defenses and de-velop their own navies. The maintaining ofclose relations in this region was of great po-litical and strategic importance to the UnitedStates, not only due to its vast oil and gasriches (originally outside of Russia’s control)but its strategic location that connects it withmany regions of Western interest.

The signingof This agreemenT

To Ban foreignmiliTaries has Been

The BiggesTgame-Changer

To Take plaCein The Caspian

over The lasT20 years

Other ways that Russia has benefited fromthis deal include: the creation of a rapid re-sponse force unfurling along the Caspian Seacoast as a means to extend influence overthe Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and itstroops in the Armenian Gyumri base; jump-starting cooperation with Giorgi Margve-lashvili, the new Georgian Prime Minister;maintaining the ability to block Georgianand Azerbaijan pipelines; improving rela-tions with Turkmenistan; beginning plans forbuilding a pipeline with Turkey (named theTurkish Stream) out to Europe, which willcompete with the Trans-Anatolia GasPipeline project (sponsored not coinciden-tally by the US, EU, and Azerbaijan).

The United States has another reason toworry about being blocked from the region– Chechnya. In Azerbaijan, jihadists from theJamaat (Community) Group are already op-erating and maintaining connections withChechen Islamists, the Caucasus Emirate, andSyria’s Islamic State: the attack on Eurovisionin 2012 and the murder of several Shiite cler-ics all carry their hallmarks. This insurgencyis threatening to turn the region into one ofthe most ungovernable locations in theworld where neither aggressive use of mili-tary/intelligence force (counterterrorism op-erations courtesy of Russia) nor engagedeconomic assistance has helped the situa-tion. With the United States not being ableto join together with forces in the region thisthreat will not just remain present but willlikely only continue to grow. Arguably, the signing of this agreement toban foreign militaries has been the biggestgame-changer to take place in the Caspianover the last 20 years.

The West not being able to be involved in theregion not only decreases energy develop-ment and security in the oil and gas-richCaspian sea basin, but also wounds in severalother respects: it reduces the ability to deteradversaries in the region against attacks; itweakens what were growing U.S. alliances; itallows Moscow to project its power over theother Caspian nations with little interference;it cuts off access to ports for deployments tothe Middle East; it does not allow for re-sponses to humanitarian crises in the region;and it does not allow for the U.S. to projectits own power and reach as easily as it oncedid. All of these make the United States andNATO much weaker than before the Summitbegan. Round One in this heavyweight prizefight has clearly gone to the Russian bear.

WWW.moDernDiplomaCy.eu The Caspian proJeCT

Throughout I will use disturbing supportiveevidence that lends itself to the explicit un-derstanding that Islamic extremism willcontinue to spread to this region, causing anew battleground to develop and likelybring Russia back more forcefully into theCaucasus with a renewed Slavic war againstterror.The region of the North Caucasus and thearea around the Caspian Sea has alwaysbeen dominated by Islam. During the timeof the Soviet Union, the extremist ideologyof radical Islam was not popular within theregion. During the reign of the SovietUnion, and towards the end of its collapse,religion renewed itself in force with thelocal population. With its downfall, the So-viet Union’s inevitable economic collapseresulted in local people looking for guid-ance and hope buoyed by religious faith,something often seen during times of mas-sive political upheaval.

However, even after returningto the Islamic faith, the regionwas not able to lift itself out ofthe poverty brought about bythe collapse of communism.Not only was there a wide ideo-logical void left by the absenceof communist thinking, povertywas not alleviated and in manyparts of the region got severelyworse. This structural desperationproved a fertile ground for thegrowth of extremist views, asseparatist Islamic sects spreadinto the region. These extrem-ists countered each negative at-tribute brought about bycommunism, such as corrup-tion and indulgence, as a pointof focus with which to channelpopulation worry and concerninto greater reliance on reli-gious faith and the wisdom ofsubjugation to radical ideolo-gies based on salvation andholy approval.

in this artiCle i Will briefly outline how the history ofthis region, with its dominant religion of Islam, as well as itspoverty and economic instability, develop and promote the pos-sible spread of DAESH and the extension of the global jihad bat-tlefield to the North Caucasus/Caspian area.

A cASpiAn QUASi-KHAnAtE

ChristopherWhite

Christopher White isan Undergraduate

in the InternationalSecurity and Intelli-

gence StudiesProgram at Bellevue

University in Omaha,NE. He currently

resides in Californiaand is a former Cadet

of the CaliforniaMaritime Academy

WWW.moDErnDiplomAcY.EU tHE cASpiAn proJEct

DAESH, WAHHAbiSm, AnD tHE GEopoliticS of DiStrAction

The resurgence of religious views in this re-gion was matched by a global phenomenon:the Pew Research Center published a studyputting into perspective how fast the spreadof Islam was/is occurring worldwide and pre-dicted that by 2050 Islam will have spreadand overtaken the majority religion of Chris-tianity by at least 1%. The projected out-come hypothesizes that Islam will double inpopulation, even making up at least 10% ofthe population in Western Europe. Takingthis information into consideration, theprobability of the spread of more radical Is-lamic sects seems to be inevitable not just forthe Caucasus region but worldwide as well,as fringe elements often piggyback onto themore moderate religious spread. (IslamicDaily Observing Media)

Saudi Arabia stands out in this regard, havingspent $89 billion in the past two decadesalone toward propaganda with the intentionof spreading Wahhabism to the region. Thisincludes the distribution of Wahhabist text-books to Islamic religious schools along withdonations to prestigious universities in ex-change for the placement of Wahhabistscholars into influential positions.

The money spent by the Saudis is put intostark perspective when you consider the So-viet Union only spent $7 billion TOTAL pro-moting communism across seven decades.(Winsor 2007) The majority of the Saudipropaganda money spent towards spread-ing Wahhabist ideals has not only been usedin regions that are predominantly Muslimbut have also been used in countries wherepoverty and political instability is prevalent.Converts, with few financial holdings, arebeing encouraged to send their children toSaudi Arabia to be educated free of charge. Seemingly, the North Caucasus region hashad a political shift with the influx of suchWahhabist ideology as current militantgroups seem bent on creating a second pos-sible battlefield in the greater Caspian/Mid-dle East region for global jihad. Ironically, thegroup benefiting the most from this emer-gence of Wahhabism in the Caucasus isDAESH. The possibility that the extremism of DAESHcould spread throughout the Caspian Sea re-gion makes it so that Russia would lose someof its most important trade and energyroutes. However, Russia has so far been laxin taking preemptive steps to combat DAESHin the region or even in tracking Russian na-tionals who leave the area for the sole pur-pose of joining the DAESH cause in Syria andIraq and ultimately the spread of global jihadbeyond the Levant. Perhaps the crisis inUkraine has blinded Russia to the possibilitythat a new DAESH war could be developingin the ashes just south of where the Chechenwars used to be. This geopolitical shortsight-edness could cause grave problems for Rus-sia’s Southern flank in the relatively nearfuture.

tHE poSSibilitY tHAttHE ExtrEmiSm of DAESH

coUlD SprEADtHroUGHoUt tHE

cASpiAn SEA rEGionmAKES it So tHAt

rUSSiA WoUlD loSESomE of itS moStimportAnt trADE

AnD EnErGY roUtES

Since the international community clearlydoes not support Russia's role and agenda inthe Ukrainian crisis, it might be in the best in-terest of Russia to withdraw and refocus itsattention to the Caucasus/Caspian region.The presence of DAESH and its slow growthin the region is a concern the internationalcommunity would support Russia in fighting.It would be a unique potential opportunityfor Russia to reorient its current bad standingwith the West and find common ground withwhich all rational parties seem to agree: thespread of groups like DAESH has to be con-tained within the Levant currently and ulti-mately defeated. The international community is well aware ofthe actions and abilities of DAESH but hasbeen reluctant so far to tie it explicitly to theSaudi form of Wahhabism. Regardless of thedebate of whether DAESH Wahhabism is thesame or a twisted subset of Saudi Wah-habism, the reality of its potential encroach-ment into the Caucasus/Caspian regionshould be a global security priority of thehighest order.

The notion that the global jihad battlefield isjust emerging might be playing down thetrue facts, which some can at least argue hasalready been established in the region. Whileit cannot be argued that it has taken root inthe political power institutions of the region,the potential for just such a political devel-opment exists. Unfortunately, DAESH activityin the Levant has made the West largely missthis Caspian development, while continuedcrisis in Ukraine has made Russia also rela-tively oblivious to the threat. Hopefully in the near future, if the aforemen-tioned crises cannot be resolved and con-tained, the West and Russia learn to starteffectively multi-tasking their counterintelli-gence and anti-terror capabilities. Failure todo so could ultimately signal a failure to keepthe Caspian region from becoming radical-ized. A Caspian quasi-Khanate is a develop-ment that stands against all rationalstandards of civilization and modernity.

WWW.moDErnDiplomAcY.EU tHE cASpiAn proJEct

“Under the constitution, persons have theright to choose and change religious affili-ation and beliefs (including atheism), to joinor establish the religious group of theirchoice, and engage in religious practice.”(Religious Freedom Report, 2013) However,like other Middle Eastern countries, Azer-baijan’s laws targeting religion lead to fines,closures mandated by court decisions, po-lice harassment, and the restriction of im-porting some religious literature (Ibid).Azerbaijan has used these laws to imprisonand restrict the activities of religious groupsthat it considered ‘non-traditional’. Azerbai-jan’s human rights record, at least as con-cerns real religious freedom, is thustarnished. Several times this year theUnited States has called upon Azerbaijan’sgovernment to respect the universal rightsof all its citizens. (Daily Press Briefings, 2015)Yet Azerbaijan has continued to restrict re-ligious freedom, freedom to assemble, andrestrict and punish peaceful dissent.(Human Rights Report, 2015)

Previously, Western countries,while concerned about Azerbai-jan’s human rights record, fo-cused on the energy sector andAzerbaijan’s strategic locationand willingness to provideNATO and U.S. forces a supplyroute to Afghanistan to fightthe war on terror. Potentially akey transport hub from the re-gion to Europe, Azerbaijanwants to peacefully promote oilimports away from Russian gas,hoping to double the flow toEurope and potentially transfergas from Turkmenistan and/orIran as well. (Farchy, 2015) How-ever, with the potential for newgas now able to come from Irandirectly (on account of the newaccord) and with the Americanmilitary drawdown in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan’s strategicimportance for the West has ar-guably waned. Investing in itsSouthern Gas Corridor project,Azerbaijan’s focus will shift inthe immediate future to theslightly less grand need oftransporting regional oil to theMediterranean.

Since itS trAnSition to independence, Azerbaijan haslooked both east and west for its place on the world stage. Pre-dominantly Muslim, Azerbaijan has no formal state faith and itsconstitution allows for freedom of religion.

azERi Janus

Amy HAnlon

Amy Hanlonis currently finishing her

degree in the Interna-tional Security and Intelli-gence Studies Program at

Bellevue University andhas been employed as agovernment contractor

for the U.S. State Depart-ment since 2010. All views

expressed within thispiece are hers and hers

alone and do not repre-sent an official statementor policy from the United

States government.

WWW.ModERndiPloMacY.Eu thE casPian PRoJEct

Baku Balancing Both East and WEst

Yet with declining oil prices and the expen-sive funding of the pipeline, Azerbaijan willincreasingly need to be looking for externalinvestors. This has led to some increasing friction be-tween Azerbaijan and Western nations onthe promoting democracy and human rightsfronts. (Kauzlarich, 2015) This is at least par-tially explained because of the following:Azerbaijan’s rightful belief in its own invio-lable sovereignty; the conviction that it is fol-lowing international law already; thesuspicion that there is a double standard inhow the West applies international law re-lated to human rights and sovereignty (forexample, the West’s support for Ukraine’s de-mand to return Crimea while refusing to sup-port Azerbaijan’s plea to return Nagorno-Karabakh). In the midst of these changes,Azerbaijan participated in the IV CaspianSummit held in Astrakhan, Russia, on Sep-tember 29, 2014. After this meeting bothRussia and Iran spoke to the unanimous de-cision by the Caspian States on the inadmis-sibility of any foreign military presence. BothRussia and Iran have long sought to restrictWestern influence in the region and high-lighted in the agreement that regional mili-taries are fully capable of independentlymaintaining the security of the Caspian Sea.

According to a statement issued by RussianPresident Putin, “only the Caspian littoralstates have the right to have their armedforces present on the Caspian”. His Iraniancounterpart, Hassan Rouhani, added that“there is consensus among all the CaspianSea littoral states that they are capable ofmaintaining the security of the Caspian Seaand military forces of no foreign countrymust enter the sea.” (Ibid)Yet, paradoxically and nearly immediatelyafter the meeting, the United States andAzerbaijan reaffirmed their commitment toeach other. First, on September 30, 2014,one day after the Caspian Summit, State De-partment spokeswoman Jen Psaki said, "Wemaintain a strong security cooperation rela-tionship with Azerbaijan, focusing on bordersecurity, counterterrorism, NATO interoper-ability, and its capacity to contribute peace-keepers to international missions. We do notanticipate the Caspian Five joint statementwill change that.” (Daily Press Briefings, 2014) Additionally, in an interview to Bloomberg inDecember 2014, the Azerbaijani President`sAide for Public and Political Affairs, AliHasanov, highlighted U.S.-Azeri bilateral re-lations: "The ties between Azerbaijan and the USAcoincide both in terms of national interestsand from the point of view of global interna-tional aspect, and are partner relations in na-ture. Today the relations between the twocountries continue on main issues of mutualconcern, including the global transnationalaspect of cooperation and partnership.These are intensive mutual contacts. I believethat these factors will define the future trendof the ties between our countries.” (Alibayli,2015)

With thE PotEntial foRnEW gas noW aBlE to

coME fRoM iRan diREctlYand With thE aMERican

MilitaRY dRaWdoWnin afghanistan,

azERBaiJan’s stRatEgiciMPoRtancE foR thE WEst

has aRguaBlY WanEd

However, Azerbaijan still strongly disagreeswith the Western view that it has suppressedhuman rights and ignored international law.To Russia and Iran’s benefit, Azerbaijan there-fore has a love-hate relationship with theWest. While it plans to continue its focus onenergy production and gas exports to Eu-rope’s markets, Azerbaijan hates the afore-mentioned double standard. Yet that mainenergy focus on Europe also somewhat in-jures its positions with Russia, who is themain exporter of oil to Europe, and Iran, whowill enter the market quickly with the ap-proval of the nuclear deal and removal ofsome of the West’s sanctions. Currently,Azerbaijan is also dependent on Russia andIran for grain. Vugar Bayramov, Chairman ofthe Center for Economic and Social Develop-ment, states, “given the fact that Azerbaijan’spopulation consumes more bread, productslike grain and bread became strategic itemsfor Azerbaijani government. Although Azer-baijan produced 2.4 million tons of grain in2014, the quality of major part of the grainwas not appropriate for baking industry.”

He noted only a few parts of the grain are ap-propriate for use in the baking industry, soAzerbaijan must purchase grain from neigh-boring countries, in particular Russia, Kaza-khstan and Iran. “Although Azerbaijan hasincreased its grain production, the countrypractically depends on import in ensuring itsdomestic demand.” (Karimova, 2015)

Thus Azerbaijan must look to the East and tothe West, both as ally and adversary. Azer-baijan depends on Western energy marketsand NATO training and coooperation. Yet,Azerbaijan similarly depends on regional co-operation to build it’s pipeline, transport gas,and provide security to the region. Thus, likethe Roman diety Janus, Azerbaijan is a coun-try of transitions – facing both east and west,to and from conflict, from its past with Russiaand Armenia to its future with the West andIran, its desire for a heightened place on theworld stage remains constant. It is a delicateand ever-changing balance indeed thatshows no sign in the near future of becomingless so.

WWW.ModERndiPloMacY.Eu thE casPian PRoJEct

However, with increased tax revenue fromthe sale of oil, Iran will finally be able totackle one of the most prevalent problemsin Iranian society today, largely hidden fromthe outside world: a deep and troubling ad-diction to illegal narcotics.

Iran has slowly become one of the most ad-dicted nations in the world. Although Iran’sofficial stance on usage rate is just over 2%,many studies have put that number closerto 6%, with nine out of ten being male. Ay-atollah Revolutionaries once blamed thePahlavi-era influences of Western culturefor high usage rates, but with an ever-in-creasing rate of addiction in the new mille-nium, the addiction problem is nowacknowledged as an issue of geographyand geopolitics: close proximity to thepoppy fields of Afghanistan and a painfullyisolated economy. However, as sanctionsgradually lift, the once small glimmer ofhope for addiction prevention is now shin-ing more brightly before the government.

President Rouhani will not onlyhave to stand behind his formalanti-narcotic doctrine, but inno-vatively tackle a problem fewcountries in the region havesuccessfully solved.The single most debilitating ob-stacle in Iran’s drug battle is the936 km-long border sharedwith Afghanistan. On the otherside of the border is a desolateand war-scarred landscape dot-ted with the pink and red sea ofpoppy flowers. Since the 2001invasion of Afghanistan, poppyproduction has nearly tripled,leaving Iran to singlehandedlydefend its borders from thestaggering amount of illegalnarcotics that spill across it.Each year hundreds of Iranianborder guard conscripts die inconfrontations with drug smug-gling operatives. With Iranianprices for opium six timeshigher than in Afghanistan,those clashes will not quicklyconclude and the seductionand temptation economicallyspeaking to keep bringing nar-cotics into the country will re-main high.

WitH tHe sloW lifting of iranian sanctions, the gov-ernment will have opportunity to utilize the benefits of a burgeon-ing economy. With its target of doubling oil exports in six months,it will expectedly expand energy infrastructure and further sup-port international commerce.

PoPPies AnD PoWer

Brian HugHes

Brian Hughesis currently a student

in the InternationalSecurity and Intelli-

gence Studiesprogram at Bellevue

University in Omaha,NE, USA.

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Fighting Drug ADDiction in A Post-nucleAr irAn

The official Iranian stance toward drug smug-glers detained at the border is one of severepunishment. Amnesty International has fore-cast that Iran will execute well over 1000people in 2015, with over 80% of those fordrug-trafficking convictions. Almost all arepublic hangings. While this method has notshown any effectiveness as a deterrent indrug use or trafficking, it has remained theonly real policy for years. Iran accounts for75% of the world’s opium seizures and 25%of heroin seizures. With a large conscriptionborder guard force, Iran has been able to ac-complish this while only spending 7% annu-ally on drug prevention compared to whatthe United States spends. While poppy deriv-atives have skyrocketed since the beginningof the US invasion of Afghanistan, metham-phetamine (known as ‘Shisheh’ in Farsi, or‘glass’) has rapidly become a popular drug aswell in the last several years. Thus, while Iranapprehends and seizes more drug traffickersand illegal narcotics than any other country,and rather brutally dispatches most of them,this has only led to an increase in ampheta-mine-type stimulants, which carry less riskthan Afghan opium trafficking.

All of this is to the obvious suffering anddetriment of Iranian youth and the unem-ployed. Over 20% of drug addicts in Iranhave undergraduate college degrees, butmany do not work. In the wake of repeatedlyharsher sanctions the Iranians have repeat-edly turned to illegal narcotics as a form ofescapism in an economy that could nolonger support them. While the governmenthas tried desperately to end the drug flowinto Iran, its attempts have ultimately failedand those that are addicted have little re-course. In this languished space of addiction,Iran has begun to establish hundreds ofmethadone maintenance treatment (MMT)programs in prisons and charities. However,these programs have also been irregularlyfunded as sanctions cut into essential budg-ets and those that were treated were re-leased too quickly and therefore oftenrelapse. Iranian MMT success rates havedipped to 25-30%, while developed pro-grams around the world generally experi-ence 60-90% success.

While the population struggles with stagger-ing addiction rates, the government has fi-nally negotiated a lifeline for its economy.Not only will the lifting of sanctions eventu-ally put youth and the unemployed back towork (albeit slowly and cautiously), the gov-ernment will finally have the capital to im-prove its social works projects. This shouldbegin with the immediate funding of addi-tional MMTs and increased funding for thoseoperating with extremely tight budgets.While additional border guards will certainlyresult with more seizures, the flow of drugsis ever-constant and nightmarishly difficultto contain. In addition, increased economicgrowth may come with increased disposableincome. If Iran does not act more holisticallyto its problem, then the demand for moredrugs could explode into the country withthis nuclear accord.

iF irAnDoes not Act

More holisticAllYto its ProbleM,

then the DeMAnDFor More Drugs

coulD exPloDeinto the countrY

With thisnucleAr AccorD

Over half of the poppy produced inAfghanistan is grown in Helmand province,a region devastated by war and tribalism. Inorder for Iran to curb poppy growth, it mustcultivate economic participation in this areawhen possible. While Iran may have little au-thority over Afghanistan at the present time,a power vacuum will be left in the wake ofUS forces’ continued long withdrawal. This could create a vacuum Iran might exertinfluence on to the benefit of its own na-tional security. Iran should encourage theAfghanistan market for saffron, a productthat can replace poppy fields and brings3,000 to 6,000 USD per kilogram. If Iran canencourage, educate, and create a saffron ex-port marketplace within Afghanistan, the po-tential is large for poppy replacement andreduced trafficking. Iran has been investingheavily in Afghanistan and, with newfoundeconomic power because of reduced or re-moved sanctions, Iran can provide a marketfor legal Afghan products while continuingtheir draconian tactics toward drug traffick-ing. If Iran truly wants this development andinfluence, and it should, then it will need toattach stipulations to economic aid in thetragically corrupt Afghanistan. Thus, with theinternational spotlight now on Iran, it shoulduse this as a fascinating side opportunity toshow how it can engage and integrate intothe global community on more than just ananti-nuclear platform.

If economic participation explodes and Ira-nians go back to work, the government willbe wholly pressured to continue its move to-ward progression and Western cooperation.Similarly, if Iran breaks the nuclear accordand sanctions return, the population may fi-nally experience its ‘Arab Spring’ momentand demand a regime change as it nearly didfollowing the 2009 elections. In thistightrope act, Iran must strategically seizethe present opportunity. While economic participation will put peopleback to work and Iranian oil will once againflow to levels that have not been seen sincethe Pahlavi-era, Iran must address this under-ground and pernicious societal problem. Irancarries the world’s attention at the moment.Unlike in years past, the attention is almostunanimously positive (aside from Israel,Saudi Arabia, and American Republicans, butthat is another story for another day). Iranmust not let this opportunity pass, for thecycle of drug use will only increase if it failsto be addressed. The nuclear deal, therefore,is about a lot more than just energy andpower projection.

WWW.MoDernDiPloMAcY.eu the cAsPiAn ProJect

The Kuril Islands lie north of Japan, andtheir status has been unresolved since1945. Importance of Kuril Islands lies instrategic importance and access to Pacificfor Russia. Importance of the Northern Ter-ritories lies also in its rich marine life, min-eral deposits, gold, silver, titanium, iron andpossibly offshore oil and gas reserves. Na-tional pride also plays an important role.

Russia’s view is that Kuril Islands, called byJapan the Northern territories are legallypart of Russia as a result of the World War II.The Yalta Agreement, signed by the UnitedStates of America, Great Britain and the So-viet Union in 1945 stated the Kuril Islandsshall be handed over to the Soviet Unionand since Russia is its legal successor is-lands are Russian.

Russian official stance is that Japans territo-rial claim over Kuril Islands is not historicalnor geographical supported. Russian offi-cials have expressed their preparedness tonegotiations and resolving the territorialdispute.

Kremlin considers the Northernterritories to be the price Japanpayed for Second World War.Russia also points to the Treatyof San Francisco as justificationof ownership, which gave themright of occupation not annex-ation.Japan’s view on four disputedislands Iturup, Kunashir,Shikotan, Habomai islandswhich also have two names,one Russian and the otherJapanese, differs from Russian.Disputed islands were annexedby the Soviet Union at the endof the WW II. Japan points outthe Treaty of Shimoda – theTreaty of Commerce and Navi-gation from 1855, which de-fines the border betweencountries as a line runningthrough the Vries Strait, be-tween the islands of Iturup andUrup is a keystone in Japan’sclaim of ownership.

a disPuTe over kuril islands is the reason why Russia and Japan still aftermore than 70 years have not signed a peace treaty to end the World War II. Couldcompromise about so long stagnating conflict which was so far discussed byGorbachev, Yeltsin and also by Putin, be found this year during Russian plannedvisit in Japan?

KuRil islands

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Resolving teRRitoRial disputes in the FaR east

Teja PalkoDefense Editor

Teja Palkois a Slovenian writer.She finished studieson Master’s Degree

programme inDefense Science at

the Faculty of SocialScience at University

in Ljubljana.

The Treaty of Saint Petersburg signed in 1875gave Japan sovereignty over the entire KurilIslands in exchange of relinquishing its claimto Sakhalin Islands. Japan and United Stateclaimed that the Yalta agreement did notapply to the Northern territories becausethey are not a part of the Kuril Islands. Pots-dam Declaration from the same year doesnot explicitly include the Northern territories,but in the phrase that Japanese sovereigntyshall be limited to the four major islands and“such minor islands as we determine” istoday used to justify the Japan sovereigntyover the islands. In 1951 Japan signed TheSan Francisco Peace Treaty, which states thatJapan must give up all claims to the Kuril Is-lands, but these four islands were not men-tioned since by Japan opinion has neverbeen part of the Kurile chain. The peacetreaty, however, did not grant a non-signa-tory country – Russia any rights. Since the1960s country claimed all four islands to beJapanese territory. Japanese authorities op-pose to any trips by Russian officials to theseislands. We have seen many protests and notonly on the Northern Territories Day.

In 2010 when Dimitri Medvedev, as a firstRussian leader to visit the islands, visited dis-puted islands sharp criticism from Japanbegan and temporary called its ambassadorback from Russia. Their official stance is thatRussia should return all four islands to Japan.In 2009 Japanese parliament adopted a lawstating the Southern Kuril Islands are Japan-ese territory unlawfully occupied by Rus-sians. All agree that territorial issues shouldbe settled by a peace treaty.

With many international agreements andpeace treaties between the Japan and Russiaand before Soviet Union Robert A. Collins hasin his paper in 2013 examined The Russo-Japanese Dispute over the Ownership of theSouthern Kuril Island and concluded that sci-entific evidence and legal evidence justifyRussia’s claim to all of the Kuril Island chain,including the islands of Kunashir and Iturup.He has summoned up that Japan in highlyunlikely to sign a peace treaty with Russia. Ishe right?

Broader region is also changing as a result ofregional competition. Military Balance by In-ternational Institute for Strategic Studies re-vealed that Russia ranked third on scale oftop defence budgets (in billions of US dollarsspend for defence) for the year 2013 andwhat is surprising is that Japan is very highon the scale on seventh place. Regional com-petition and rival are seen among nations inAsia.

KReMlinConsideRs

the noRtheRnteRRitoRies

to be the pRiCeJapan paYedFoR seCondWoRld WaR

China has raised concerns about Japan de-fense budget and questioned if Japan wasabandoning it’s exclusively defence policybased on peace constitution that was signedat the end of the World War II with whichcountry, gave up the right to wage war andwas forbidden of use of force to settle inter-national disputes.

Japan plans for defense spending for fiscal2015 was set to 42.1 billion dollars or about329 dollars per capita, which is the highestlargest military budget since WWII and threetimes larger compered to China. Reason isalso territorial disputes in the East China Sea.Based on the World Bank Russia military ex-penditure as a % of GDP are 4.5 and risingand Japan 1% stagnating.

Recent events regarding the relationship be-tween countries are Russia’s prime ministersDmitry Medvedev intentions to visit archipel-ago that includes Japanese claimed islands.A senior official in Japan’s Ministry of ForeignAffairs made a statement “If Russia wants toimprove relations with Japan, it should re-strain its actions”. Japan’s Foreign MinisterFumio Kishida has also sent a request to can-cel the visit. The date of the visit is unknown,but the purpose, official Russian statement,is to bolster border security and installationof military and civil infrastructure on the is-lands. Russian government revealed a pro-gram to develop southern Kuril Islands orNorthern Territories called by the Japanese.

Japan and Russia are trying to build andstrengthen their relationship with economiccooperation. We have seen many statementsand intentions made publicly which are nothelping to reach the goal of cooperation andsolution of so long lasting territorial disputethat is not going to solve itself over time. Itlooks like backward solutions are not work-ing so new narrative should be found. The territorial dispute should not be resolvedseparately but within the broader concept.Maybe some guaranties should be made be-cause Japan is afraid the scenario that hap-pened in the Crimea could also happen inthe Kuril Islands. We are still waiting for theright solution that could solve the territorialdispute between Russia and Japan and couldlead to increased cooperation between thecountries. Agreement and solution betweenMoscow and Tokyo has yet to be reachedand question of the rightful owner has to beanswered.

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