The Caspian Project 14

atlas triuMphant

Russian nucleaR capability todaysaRaH noldeR

global Firepower in the Caspian

a coMpaRative analysisdR. MattHeW cRosston

Chessboard strategy

Russia and un Resolution 2117ZR

Foreign Militaries in the Caspian

taking a standlauRa gaRRido

dethroning the “dollar diCtatorship”

Russian Financial Fantasies and Misplaced geopoliticsdR. MattHeW cRosston, andy deaHn

radioaCtive

illicit MateRials-tRaFFicking acRoss tHe gReateR caspiannoRbeRto MoRales Rosa

the west should engage in a Course CorreCtion

strategy with russia

antony cleMent

an islaMiC Cold war

navigating tHe iRanian-saudi RelationsHipstepHen saRty

why azerbaijan is unhappy

leaving tHe euRonestdayna Rice

Contents

14

Dimitris GiannakopoulosModern Diplomacy, Editor-in-chief

Dr. matthew CrosstonThe Caspian Project, Director

proJeCt team

petra poseGateJa palko

luisa monteironina lavrenteva

Gabriela pasCholati Do amaralbruCe aDrianCeGreGory brewstaCey Cottone

antony ClementanDy Deahn

JareD s. eastonlaura GarriDo

amy hanlonJeanette "JJ" harperJonathan hartner

brian huGhespaula malott

meGan munoznorberto morales rosa

taylor morsesarah nolDer

Joshua pattersonDayna riCe

JessiCa reeDstephen sartyevan thomsen

Dianne a. valDezChristopher white

the Caspian projeCtbi-weeKly digital edition

www.moderndiplomacy.eu [email protected]

here has always been a love/hate relationship for analysts when itcomes to war. Whether it be the attitude that war is politics by anyother means or that war does not determine who is right, only who

is left, conflicted perspectives have been the life essence of those whostudy it. Regardless of where you may personally fall on the spectrum,one thing is certain: the ability to wage war, and wage it well, most heav-ily falls on the shoulders of a state’s military. This issue of the CaspianProject looks in great detail, both individually within states and generallyacross the region, at the war-making capability in the Caspian. It will notbe shocking to any reader to see this issue rather dominated by consid-erations of Russia and Iran: they are both regular participants on theglobal stage when it comes to conflict and often, rightly or wrongly, findthemselves the subjects of conflict discussion for many states in theWest.

Perhaps what will be a surprise, however, is just how important this issueis for the ‘lesser’ members of the Caspian region. While it is true Turk-menistan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan are not looking to actively involvethemselves in large-scale global conflicts, the reality is they all have par-ticipated in varying degrees. On top of this, all of them have issues witheach other and in the end it is indeed true that all politics is local: whatmay be ‘small’ to the United States or China can be ‘existence-threaten-ing’ to others. This issue exposes readers, therefore, to those comparativeperspectives and gives analyses that allow us to see just how seriously,and in what ways, all of the Caspian littorals are striving for peace whilestill being ready for war.

Diplomacy and politics are still the chief tools of the trade for howCaspian littorals try to remedy their problems, both with each other andwith external nations. This is a good thing. But it does not mean noCaspian state is prepared to go to war or is unwilling to wage it. This issueproves that supposition false and misleading. Thus, Modern Diplomacyoffers this edition with the expectation that better information leads togreater understanding. And it is only better understanding that can en-sure the limitation of misperception, that one eternal flaw that alwaysseems to weigh heavily on the initiation of war.

Prof. Dr. Matthew Crosston

Senior Editor, Director, The Caspian Project

t

the Military issue

atlastRiumphant

Russian nucleaR capability today

lthough the Cold War is over, and now themost prevalent threats to national securityare conventional and asymmetric in nature,nuclear weapons will always remain an inte-gral part of international security, in addition

to being a political and diplomatic tool. Aside fromthe United States, Russia has the most sophisticatednuclear capability and delivery platforms. This articlewill examine Russian nuclear capabilities, the evolu-tion of nuclear doctrine in Russia, comparing it toother nuclear-capable states, and make predictions asto the role of nuclear weapons in Russia in the nearfuture.Russia is an officially recognized nuclear weaponstate, as identified by the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera-tion of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Russian Federa-tion has several types of warheads and multiple typesof delivery systems capable of transporting them.

a

THE CASPIAN PROJECT | ISSUE 14

SARAH NOLDER

Sarah Nolder is a Master’s student in the International Securityand Intelligence Studies Program at Bellevue University

in Omaha, Nebraska. She works for the United States Air Forceas an Intelligence Analyst and is stationed in Tuscon, Arizona.

The Russian government “has been a strongsupporter of nuclear nonproliferationtreaties and regimes, and bilateral arms con-trol treaties and initiatives with the UnitedStates have helped reduce the Russian arse-nal substantially from its Soviet-era peak ofabout 40,000 warheads to approximately4,300 according to a March 2013 estimate.”(Profile for Russia, 2015) Russia has a nucleartriad similar to that of the United States.

A nuclear triad refers to the delivery systemsof strategic nuclear weapons, typicallylaunched by air, land and sea. In the case ofRussia (and the United States), they have anduse strategic bombers, intercontinental bal-listic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) as thethree pieces of their nuclear triad.

According to the most recent data exchangein March 2015 as part of the New STARTtreaty, Russia “deploys 1,582 strategic war-heads on 515 intercontinental ballistic mis-siles, submarine-launched ballistic missilesand heavy bombers. The actual number ofdeployed Russian warheads is likely highersince the treaty counts one strategic bomberas one operational deployed warhead, eventhough, for example, the TU-95 MS16bomber can carry up to sixteen weapons.

One open-source estimate from January2015 put the actual number of operationalRussian warheads at 1,900.” (Profile for Rus-sia, 2015) Russia also has 305 ICBMs of fivedifferent variants. Collectively, their ICBMfleet could field 1,166 warheads. Three oftheir Soviet-era variants are being decom-missioned, however, including the SS-18, SS-19 and SS-25, with replacements cominginto service by 2022. These replacements in-clude the creation of road-mobile ICBMlaunchers and an ICBM that contains multi-ple, independently targeted reentry vehicles(MIRVs). (Profile for Russia, 2015) ICBMs canbe launched quickly: a mission time of 30minutes or less for an ICBM to be launchedfrom Russia to the United States is realistic.(Nuclear Weapons, 2008)While strategic rocket forces play the pri-mary strategic role in the nuclear triad, thesea-based platform takes a less obvious, butno less important, role. In January 2015 Rus-sia reported that its active strategic ballisticmissile submarine fleet consisted of twoDelta III subs in the Pacific Fleet, five Delta IVsubs in the Northern Fleet, and one 995Borey-class sub in the Northern Fleet. TheDelta III submarines carry 16 SLBMs, eachwith three warheads. These subs are alsobeing slowly being phased out in favor ofthe newer Delta IV-class subs. The Delta IV-class carries 16 SLBMs, each with the capa-bility of carrying four warheads. The newestsubs, the Borey-class subs, will have the abil-ity to house sixteen SLBMs, with each SLBMable to carry up to six warheads. (Profile forRussia, 2015) SLBMs can be launched evenmore quickly: depending on their locations,SLBMs can reach their target in 15 minutesor less. (Nuclear Weapons, 2008)The last arm of the strategic nuclear triad isair-based assets. In Russia, they have twoheavy bombers that are capable of carryingout a nuclear mission: the Tu-95 Bear and theTu-160 Blackjack.

Russia has maintainedits tRadition of being

a Responsible membeRof the nucleaR club,

even if always being Readyto veRbally Remind

the global communityof its capabilities


. The Bear has two variants, the MS6 and theMS16. It is uncertain as to the number andoperational status of their nuclear bomberfleet, as Russia does not declare this informa-tion under arms-control agreements. Anopen-source estimate made in January 2015estimates that Russia has 55 Tu-95s and 11Tu-160s. These assets can launch long-rangemissiles (air-launched cruise missiles, orALCMs), short-range missiles, and gravitybombs. (Profile for Russia, 2015)

Tactical (non-strategic) nuclear weapons alsomake up a significant portion of the nucleararsenal. However, Russia has never disclosedthe amount and types of weapons they pos-sess in this category. A March 2014 estimateputs the amount of Russian tactical nuclearweapons at 2,000. Scholars believe thatthese warheads are stored at facilities scat-tered about the country and are not matedto delivery systems.

The United States and Russia have the great-est involvement and greatest concern by farfor the safekeeping and responsible holdingof nuclear weapons. They have also had boththe greatest rivalry and, paradoxically, themost cooperation concerning nuclearweapon matters.

Through international treaties, internationalorganizations, and several summit confer-ences, the United States and Russia haveslowly cooperated on matters of nuclear se-curity. Both countries have advocated for nu-clear non-proliferation and have reduced thenumber of their strategic nuclear weapons.The other nuclear weapon states as recog-nized by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are the UnitedKingdom, France and China. Four otherstates known or believed to have nuclearweapons are India, Pakistan, North Koreaand Israel.

Both countries, the US and Russia, recognizethe seriousness of the prospect of nuclearwar, whether between each other or second-arily via some form of proxy war, and haveagreed in the past that nuclear war is unac-ceptable. (Profile for Russia, 2015) And whileboth countries have always exhibited re-markable restraint in terms of honoring thatcommitment, the fact remains that both nu-clear doctrines for these two countries con-tain stipulations and conditions upon whicheither may employ and feel justified to usenuclear weapons.

As one of the most powerful nuclear coun-tries in the world, Russia will always carry anenormous potential problem to Americannational interests. Russia’s nuclear triad con-sists of sophisticated and capable deliverysystems for all three legs: land, air and sea-based operations. It has a significant numberof non-strategic nuclear weapons, as well,which are unaffected by the Strategic ArmsReduction Treaties made with the UnitedStates. Depending on how and where theseassets are utilized the Russian Federationmay have a nuclear capability even more dis-concerting to the international communitythan its formal triad. To date, Russia has maintained its traditionof being a responsible member of the nu-clear club, even if always being ready to ver-bally remind the global community of itscapabilities. What remains to be seen is howmight new conflicts and tensions on theglobal stage – Ukraine, Crimea, Syria, DAESH,Iran – put new dynamics into play betweenthe world’s two nuclear superpowers. As thisarticle shows, Russia is still a force to be reck-oned with on the nuclear front. Forgettingthat could be extremely hazardous to theglobal community’s health.

GlobAl Firepowerin the CAspiAn

DR. MATTHEW CROSSTON

Senior Editor, Caspian Project Director

Matthew Crosston is Professor of Political Science,Director of the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program,

and the Miller Chair at Bellevue University

he following compilation, piggy-backing on theoverwhelming positive response given from the lastedition of the Caspian Project where Caspian lit-torals were compared within various cross-indexescovering corruption, utilizes the hard work done by

GlobalFirepower.com to analyze and rank the world’s mili-taries today. Using unique databases that allow for compar-ison and stand-alone analyses, Global Firepower tried toascertain a country’s potential conventional war-making ca-pabilities across the traditional tri-ad of land, air, and sea.Nuclear capability was wisely taken out of the accountingas it would clearly skew any opportunity for real comparisonand objective war-making analysis. Peripheral, but no less important, factors like financial sta-bility, natural resources, foreign debt, oil reserves, and ge-ography were also taken into account. In all, over fiftyfactors were compiled and measured in order to arrive at afinal ‘Power Index’ in which a specific nation would receiveits overall ranking. As the below data will show, the Caspianregion holds quite a diversity in terms of military power andwar-making capacity. A baseline rival is given for compari-son by using the United States.

t

A CompArAtive AnAlysis

Overall Firepower Rankings Index (out of126 countries total):

1. United States (0.1661)2. Russia (0.1865)23. Iran (0.7619)63. Azerbaijan (1.5211)66. Kazakhstan (1.6197)90. Turkmenistan (2.3069)

MANPOWER RANKINGS

Active Military Manpower (out of 126countries total):

Active military personnel are those units thatare ‘ready-to-fight.’ These forces will naturallybe the first to be committed to an actualcombat situation.

2. United States (1,400,000)4. Russia (766,055)8. Iran (545,000)49. Kazakhstan (49,000)61. Azerbaijan (67,000)89. Turkmenistan (22,000)

Manpower ‘Fit’ for Military Service (outof 126 countries total):

Wars come down to manpower, a popula-tion’s ability to be ‘fit for duty’ and actuallyassist in the warmaking effort. This statisticis used to further refine a country’s ability todo battle.

3. United States (120,022,084)9. Russia (46,812,553)14. Iran (39,566,497)58. Kazakhstan (6,438,168)76. Azerbaijan (3, 740,000)100. Turkmenistan (2,252,187)

Active Reserve Military Personnel (out of126 countries total):

War time resources dictate the need for re-serve personnel. These numbers often favorcountries that have a large base population,large defense budget, and fairly ‘adventurist’approach to foreign policy.

4. Russia (2,485,000)8. Iran (1,800,000)11. United States (1,100,000)24. Kazakhstan (378,000)27. Azerbaijan (300,000)72. Turkmenistan (35,000)

LAND SYSTEMSTanks1. Russia (15,398)3. United States (8,848)17. Iran (1658)27. Turkmenistan (712)47. Azerbaijan (314)48. Kazakhstan (300)

Armored Fighting Vehicles1. United States (41,062)2. Russia (31,298)40. Turkmenistan (1,941)44. Kazakhstan (1,613)45. Azerbaijan (1,590)53. Iran (1,315)

Multiple Launch Rocket SystemsThe MLRS is a tracked or wheeled vehiclemounting a rocket launching system atop itshull. The MLRS offers a devastating physicaland psychological effect on the enemy in awar-time situation. 1. Russia (3,793)5. Iran (1,474)6. United States (1,331)12. Kazakhstan (393)18. Azerbaijan (191)30. Turkmenistan (110)


AIR SYSTEMS

Total Aircraft Strength1. United States (13,892)2. Russia (3,429)24. Iran (471)41. Kazakhstan (233)63. Azerbaijan (121)82. Turkmenistan (72)

Fighter/Interceptor Strength1. United States (2,207)3. Russia (769)18. Iran (137)25. Kazakhstan (96)59. Turkmenistan (24)63. Azerbaijan (18)

Serviceable Airports/Infrastructure 1. United States (13,513)5. Russia (1,218)21. Iran (319)56. Kazakhstan (96)97. Azerbaijan (37)108. Turkmenistan (26)

SEA SYSTEMS

Total Naval Power

The listing below includes battleforce shipsmade up of aircraft carriers, frigates, destroy-ers, corvettes, torpedo boats, patrol boats,amphibious support craft, landing craft. Aux-iliary vessels are included, but landlocked na-tions were not penalized and excluded fromthe listing overall.

3. United States (473)4. Iran (397)5. Russia (352)55. Azerbaijan (47)87. Kazakhstan (15)102. Turkmenistan (4)

Destroyers1. United States (62)4. Russia (12)Iran (0)Kazakhstan (0)Azerbaijan (0)Turkmenistan (0)

Submarines1. United States (72)4. Russia (55)5. Iran (32)27. Azerbaijan (4)Turkmeinsta (0)Kazakhstan (0)

Mine Warfare1. Russia (34)13. United States (11)22. Iran (7)23. Azerbaijan (7)Turkmenistan (0)Kazakhstan (0)

WAR FINANCIALS

Annual Defense Budget 1. United States ($577,100,000,000)3. Russia ($60,400,000,000)33. Iran ($6,300,000,000)54. Azerbaijan ($3,185,000,000)59. Kazakhstan ($2,435,000,000)103. Turkmenistan ($200,000,000)

External Debt (weighted as a negativefactor on the Power Index)

1. United States ($15,680,000,000,000)17. Russia ($714,200,000,000)24. Turkmenistan ($428,900,000,000)39. Kazakhstan ($131,300,000,000)77. Iran ($15,640,000,000)88. Azerbaijan ($9,552,000,000)

Reserves of Foreign Exchange and Gold5. Russia ($515,600,000,000)17. United States ($150,200,000,000)30. Iran ($68,060,000,000)51. Kazakhstan ($29,340,000,000)54. Turkmenistan ($22,350,000,000)67. Azerbaijan ($13,080,000,000)

What the above compilations show is bothanticipated and surprising: Russia and theUnited States regularly compete with eachother for supremacy at the top of many in-dexes. However, the United States does notcapture the top spot in every category andof course has the damning praise of havingfar more external debt than any other globalrival. While it will be a very long time beforeanyone can even hope to challenge Americain air power, there was far greater competi-tion seen in this Caspian analysis than onewould expect within both land and navalsystems for war-making.

Proven Oil Reserves (Barrels per Day)4. Iran (154,600,000,000)8. Russia (80,000,000,000)12. United States (20,680,000,000)19. Azerbaijan (7,000,000,000)41. Turkmenistan (600,000,000)75. Kazakhstan (30,000,000)

Also an interesting side-statistic, the financialstrength indicators of foreign currency/goldand oil reserves clearly show far more globalcompetition than most people would prob-ably expect. Iran hits both high and low across the in-dexes and it will be most fascinating to seehow the impact of the JCPOA nuclear accordalters those rankings for the Islamic Republicin the coming future. The fact that Azerbai-jan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan regularlyoccupied the lower third of the Global Fire-power indexes is not a surprise, all thingsconsidered. But what should be noteworthyto researchers and analysts alike is howmuch their respective positions changedand altered within that bottom third acrossall categories. There is clearly no one Caspian ‘lesser leader’once you get past Russia and Iran. Given theancient and profound adage that ‘all politicsare local’ the above rankings show that theinternal dynamics and competition betweenthe smaller Caspian littorals should remainhotly contested and ever-changing for along time into the future. This analysis covering the Caspian in specificshows just how multi-faceted, multi-layered,and highly complex war will always be. Con-sequently, it will also always be unpre-dictable. Perhaps that alone is the greatestreason to avoid it.

ZR

ZR is a full-time analyst who has worked with national security issues for almost 12 years.He is currently completing his Bachelors of Science degree with the prestigious Interna-

tional Security and Intelligence Studies Program at Bellevue University. Upon graduation,he will continue to provide professional support to national security issues and policies.

he Russian government has made greatleaps since the collapse of the Soviet Union,“moving from a globally-isolated, centrally-planned economy towards a more market-based and globally-integrated economy.” A

large boost to its economy was the privatization ofmost industry. However two notable sectors werekept under government control: the energy and de-fense-related sectors. The purpose of this brief paperis to examine the current actions of Russian ap-proaches to influence the transnational weapons mar-ket throughout the Caucasus, Central Asia, and theMiddle East. This will be accomplished through criti-cally analyzing Russia’s actions associated with U.N.resolution 2117, where it abstained from voting andhonored instead an arms sale plan with Iran, shippinga modern-day missile-defense system, and a recentsale to Iraq that provided fighter jets for the fightagainst DAESH.

t

Chessboardstrategy

In 2013, the United Nations, “expressinggrave concern that the illicit transfer, desta-bilizing accumulation, and misuse of smallarms and light weapons continued to causesignificant loss of life around the world,” felta need to remind governments of their obli-gation to comply fully and effectively withCouncil-mandated arms embargoes.

By a vote of 14 in favor to none against, withone abstention - the Russian Federation - theCouncil adopted resolution 2117. It was thefirst-ever resolution dedicated exclusively tothe issue of small arms and light weapons.The ensuing debate marked the first time infive years that the 15-member body hadtaken up the issue, which had been previ-ously deleted from its agenda.

The choice of Russian council members toabstain from this vote was an interestingmove politically. A vote to abstain meantthat Russian officials could avoid criticism fora negative vote but also prevented themfrom being obligated to follow the treatythat prohibited sales of light weapons,something from which Russia greatly bene-fits. One such transaction, though not small-arms in nature, revolves around Russia’splans with Iran on the S-300 air-defense sys-tem.

According to U.S. officials, “Russia is movingahead with plans to sell Iran a sophisticatedmissile defense system that could undercutWashington's ability to challenge Tehran'sairspace.” This system, identified as the S-300,would result in a rather concrete air-defensesystem for Iran which would mean that “U.S.or Israeli warplanes likely couldn't sneak intoIranian airspace if they wanted to bombIran's possible nuclear facilities.” Additionally,any attempt to launch preemptive strikesand the S-300 could provide an early warn-ing for the Iranians and afford them time toshore up other defenses.Iran had already fronted Russia the moneyfor the weapons system, nearly $800 million,but there were some non-delivery disputes.In January 2015, official Russian media re-ported that the two sides had settled theirdifferences after Moscow agreed to provideolder Tor surface-to-air missiles with an un-specified date of delivery. Iran’s state mediaalso reported a settlement, but without pro-viding details. At around the same time, re-ports emerged also that Russia and Iran wereagain discussing either the S-300 system ora newer system, the Antey-2500. This Russ-ian-Iran weapons deal gives Russia a staunchfoothold in an already anti-western nationand only affords additional options for futuretransactions. Another interesting fact: thetransaction is NOT in disagreement with anycurrent international prohibitions becausethe weapons system is defensive in nature.Additionally, Secretary of State John Kerryraised U.S. concerns with the Russians di-rectly after Iranian Revolutionary GuardCommander Qasem Soleimani recently trav-eled to Moscow, a probable sign that the S-300 deal and future deals were back on thetable and being finalized.Iran is not the onlycountry garnering weapons sales from Rus-sia, however. Iraq is also benefiting from Rus-sia’s proactive capitalist strategies in theweapons market.

the russian governmenthas taken great steps

to influenCe the transnationalweapons market throughout

the CauCasus, Central asia,and the middle east


In 2014 and 2015 the Iraqi governmentstruggled to re-build its tactical Air Force.The Middle East government worked closelywith the U.S. in an effort to purchase F-16fighters, however the U.S. was not the onlyseller in the region. Due to an urgent needfor close-air support and growing delays inthe U.S. government’s provision of 36 F-16s,the Iraq government turned to Russia andBelarus to purchase used fighter jets. IraqPrime Minister Nouri al-Maliki chastised theU.S.’s slow ways. The delay in sales allowedMaliki to turn to other sources for purchaseand exacerbated an apparent bitternesswithin the Iraqi government, as it believedthat it should not have just bought U.S. jets,but also British, French and Russian ones toprovide air support and prevent the fall ofMosul. The jet purchase followed desperaterequests by Maliki to combat DAESH. Thefact that Russia was able to swoop in andprovide assets to a struggling governmentnot only created another revenue stream forRussia, but it also showed Iraq that Russiacan be a proven ally within the region andfostered greater doubts about substantiveAmerican support for the regime.

The Russian government has taken greatsteps to influence the transnational weaponsmarket throughout the Caucasus, CentralAsia, and the Middle East. Russia’s actions as-sociated with its abstention vote of U.N. res-olution 2117 was an ingenious diplomaticmove. Russia is able to pursue its own legiti-mate national security interests (only the U.S.prioritizes the fight against radical Islam asadamantly as Russia), bolsters an importanteconomic market that bypasses the severesanctions levied against it, and fosters coop-erative engagement in a geopolitically cru-cial region within which the United Stateswishes to remain dominant. While Americaclearly has criticized Russia for abstainingfrom the Resolution 2117 vote, it is a perfectexample of how conflicted and complexglobal affairs tend to be.

Although America sees Russia’s abstaining inpurely black-and-white terms, there aremany other significant players on the globalstage that do not see it so clearly. In this con-voluted fog of multiple interpretations, Rus-sia so far has proven to be the more adeptchess grandmaster.

Foreign MiliTarieSin The CaSpian

Taking a STand

t has been almost one year since the IV CaspianSummit in Astrakhan, Russia, where the presi-dents of the five Caspian states signed a politicaldeclaration that denied any foreign military pres-ence in the Caspian Sea. This means that possible

future deployment of NATO forces in the area will notbe allowed. According to Russian President VladimirPutin, this declaration “sets out a fundamental principlefor guaranteeing stability and security, namely, thatonly the Caspian littoral states have the right to havetheir armed forces present on the Caspian.” TheCaspian Sea has been a relative strategic backwater formost of history, which begs the question: why are Rus-sia and Iran, in particular, so interested in protecting thesovereignty of Caspian waters now?In 1722, Tsar Peter the Great created Russia’s CaspianFlotilla. At the Flotilla’s headquarters shines a plaquestill today with a quote from him that says, “Our inter-ests will never allow any other nation to claim theCaspian Sea.” This has been the case for centuries as nostate dared to challenge Russia over the Caspian.

i


LAURA GARRIDO

Laura Garrido is currently finishing her Master’s degreein the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program

at Bellevue University in Omaha, Nebraska, USA. Her primary researchinterests cover the post-Soviet space and the fight against radical Islamism.

However, after the collapse of the SovietUnion and formal recognition of Azerbaijan,Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan as sovereignindependent states, things in the Caspianhave begun to take a more interesting turn.

The Caspian Sea holds about 40 billion bar-rels of oil and is second to the Persian Gulf inregards to the size of oil and gas reserves.When Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turk-menistan gained sovereignty after the col-lapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, theycontracted with Western oil majors to ex-

plore the Caspian’s untapped potential.However, figuring out which state controlswhat in the area has remained an extremelyfickle endeavor. Even though some of thestates have settled with bilateral treaties todivide the sea, many boundaries remain un-certain. A project called the “Trans-CaspianPipeline” is one of the issues that the stateshave difficulty agreeing on. Turkmenistanwould like this project to begin in order forthem to ship natural gas to Azerbaijan andthen on to Europe but Russia and Iran do notagree.

This tension has led to slight conflicts be-tween the Caspian littorals. In 2001, Iranused jets and a warship to threaten a BP re-search vessel prospecting on behalf of Azer-baijan in an area that each country thoughtwas their own.

In 2008, there was another case of uncertainboundaries when Azerbaijan used gunboatsto threaten oil rigs operated by Malaysianand Canadian companies who were workingfor Turkmenistan because these companieswere operating in an area close to the waterborder between Azerbaijan and Turk-menistan. In 2009, an Iranian oil rig acciden-tally entered waters that belonged toAzerbaijan. Rather than the show of strengthit performed in 2008 with Turkmenistan,Azerbaijan instead did nothing and com-plained about being powerless against anaggressive Iran.

So, back to the original question, why doRussia and Iran care so much about keepingforeign militaries, especially the UnitedStates and United Nations, out of theCaspian? Do they share the same ideas andreasoning? Looking at the Trans-CaspianPipeline, this project would allow Turk-menistan to sell natural gas in a way that ex-clusively benefits itself and those they sell to.If this happened Russia might see a decreasein its energy sales, since it would be availableelsewhere, but the real heart of the matterwould be the loss of Russian strategic softpower. It is not interested in seeing any state,Caspian or Western, compromise its abilityto dictate power through natural resources.This has always been an important aspect ofCaspian control for Russia.

In 2013, Russia’s crude oil, petroleum, andnatural gas exports made up 68% of theirtotal export revenue for that year. 14% ofthis was natural gas sold to Europe. Accord-ing to Dmitry Shlapentokh, professor of So-viet and post-Soviet history, “Russia isstrongly against the project for a trans-Caspian pipeline carrying gas from Turk-menistan to Azerbaijan and may threaten touse military force should the two former So-viet republics decide to go ahead regardless.”

why do ruSSia and iranCare So MuCh abouT keeping

Foreign MiliTarieS,eSpeCially The u.S and u.n.

ouT oF The CaSpian?do They Share The SaMe ideaS

and reaSoning?


This is a problem not only for Turkmenistan,but also carries over to the current issue ofRussia and Iran preventing a UN or US mili-tary base in the area. If there was a Westernbase in the Caspian region, then Russia’s ex-pectation of being able to ‘persuade’ Caspianlittoral states when needed could becomemuch more complicated.

So not only could Russia be worried aboutthe financial and strategic implications offoreign militaries in the Caspian, there mightalso be another factor: namely, the relation-ship between Russia and the United States.After Russia decided to get involved in theongoing conflict in Ukraine and allowed forthe annexation referendum in Crimea, ten-sions have been high. The sanctions thatwere implemented by the West in responserepresented the toughest action takenagainst Russia since the peak of the Cold Warwith the Soviet Union. Having a Western mil-itary forces in the Caspian area could cer-tainly deter Russia from possibly making thesame type of foreign policy decisions to itsother neighbors which, if this was an optionRussia wishes to keep, could be why Russiahas worked to prevent foreign militaries inthe Caspian.

But why would Iran care? Does Iran agreewith Russia’s foreign policies so much that itis willing to push as hard as Russia? Or isthere another factor that is driving Iran’s de-cisions? Recently, the nuclear accord struckwith Iran and which the US Congress couldnot block, has been front and center in West-ern media. The majority of Americans be-lieve that Iran will break the agreement. IfIran does have plans to break the deal, orwishes to have that option available to itstrategically, a US or UN military base or mil-itary forces in the area could stop such plansfrom becoming explicitly realistic.

The decision to block foreign militaries fromthe Caspian Sea is a threat to the strategic in-terests of America and, to a lesser extent, theEU. Potentially, it could have negative reper-cussions on energy security. By removingany Western military influence in the region,Russia will be able to maintain the regionalhegemony it considers its natural birthright.In addition to that, Iran will be able to ensuregreater strategic flexibility moving forwardwith the nuclear accord. While in the Westthese maneuvers will inevitably be por-trayed as dangerous and destabilizing, somecredence must be given to the Caspian lit-toral states, especially Iran and Russia, forhow dangerous and destabilizing theythemselves might see foreign militaries op-erating freely in their own backyards uponCaspian waters. As the old adage goes, whatyou see depends largely upon where youstand. This seems especially apropos whentrying to figure out the complexity of mili-tary life in the Caspian.

Dethroningthe “DollarDictatorship”

ussian President Vladimir Putin has loudly pro-jected that his nation and the other Caspiannations will leave the dollar behind. Mr. Putinhas exclaimed that the United States runs a“Dollar dictatorship” when it comes to global

market oil prices and affirms that his nation’s currencywill not become a victim subjected to its rule. In orderto combat this “dictatorship” attempts have been madeto enhance relations with China in order to integrateboth the ruble and the yuan into the global marketmore dominantly. His belief is that in doing so he willweaken the dollar while strengthening both nationalcurrencies. However, Mr. Putin is potentially commit-ting a mistake, as he is generally associating a strongcurrency with national strength and views the declinein the ruble’s value as an offense against Russia’sprowess.

r


DR. MATTHEW CROSSTON

Senior Editor, Caspian Project Director

Matthew Crosston is Professor of Political Science,Director of the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program,

and the Miller Chair at Bellevue University

ANDY DEAHN

Andy Deahn is a 2015 graduate with a Bachelor of Science degree fromBellevue University’s International Security and Intelligence Studies program.

He is currently employed as a Field Service Engineer at the Sierra NevadaCorporation (SNC) providing aerial surveillance and intelligence analysis for the

Department of Defense throughout various worldwide locations. He had previouslyworked as Special Tactics-Tactical Air Control Party member in the U.S. Air Force

supporting Army Special Forces ground teams as a Joint Terminal Attack Controller.

These are clearly political statements used toproject an aura of strength that disregard theeconomic realities facing the Kremlin.Rather than take meaningful counter-ac-tions so as to create positive momentum andstrong economic stimuli, Putin sometimesseems more focused on capitalizing on hiscelebrity status to ‘tweak the American eagle’as it were.

Putin’s "projection” as stated above can thusbe observed as an attempt to manufacturea sense of Russian exceptionalism that willcounter the ‘insult’ that he considers as aconstant American exceptionalism on theglobal stage. However, these geopoliticalplayground battles do not outweigh the re-alities of the world economy and how Russianeeds to create serious policies to deal withsanctions and weak oil prices.

While China is Russia’s largest trading part-ner and has become the world’s largest con-sumer of fossil fuels — a vital aspect toRussian economic health — the Chinese fi-nancial crisis that occurred in August 2015has weakened the Yuan, consequently plac-ing increased pressure on the Russian econ-omy as well. The Chinese economicmeltdown and the resultant devaluation ofthe Yuan held global implications.

From Wall Street to Venezuela to Saudi Ara-bia, economic downturns were observed.On Wall Street the drop in the stock marketcreated panic among brokers/investors andin Saudi Arabia and Venezuela a drop in oilprices impacted their economies rather se-verely, given both have bet some of their fi-nancial futures on China’s continual thirst forcommodity imports.

Russia, however, which exports approxi-mately 14 percent of its annual oil produc-tion to China, has a lot more to lose from theChinese economic decline. This is because oiland natural gas are at the heart of the Russ-ian economy. These commodities accountfor over 75 percent of export revenues andover 50 percent of government budgetaryresources. The Russian ruble, which is di-rectly linked to global oil prices, has beensteadily decreasing in value throughout thelast 12 months. This direct link is identifiedthrough the correlating data of the marketprice for oil and the value of the ruble to theU.S. dollar. For example, the market price foroil dropped from $104 USD per barrel toaround $50 USD per barrel from September2014 to September 2015. At the same timethe value of the ruble, which in the begin-ning of September 2014 was 36 RUB to 1USD, had slipped by September 2015 to 68RUB to 1 USD—a steep devaluation rate notseen since the 1997 global financial reces-sion. In addition to having the value of its cur-rency decline, for every dollar that global oilprices drop Russia loses an estimated $2 bil-lion a year in revenues. When combinedwith other harmful realities like Westernsanctions, Russia’s relative dependence upona singular commodity market, and lavishspending rather than modernizing its energysector during high oil prices, it is clear thatRussia pontificating about a ‘dollar dictator-ship’ should not be its focus.

the longer Moscow assuMesthis is a geostrategic

iMpossibility anD thatits only concern is battling

the ‘Dollar Dictatorship,’then the KreMlin only creates

More Danger for itself


Indeed, there is something of a flawed logicin the premise: why does President Putin be-lieve he can leave the dollar behind by tyingthe punished ruble with the declining Chi-nese yuan? In the near-term at least thisstrategy is destined to fail. One regional influence Russia is also some-what disregarding (or making too many pos-itive assumptions) in this endeavor and thatwill potentially become of greater geopolit-ical importance is the Islamic Republic ofIran, now that the new nuclear accord hasbeen struck and many sanctions lifted. Byhedging their bets too heavily on China anddisregarding up-to-the-minute regional eco-nomic shifts, Russia is possibly inflicting itsown monetary wounds while uselesslyblame-shifting on America for its economicwoes.

The lifting of Iranian sanctions would meanthat Russia could face a newly invigorated,oil-producing, heavyweight regional com-petitor, one that could reshape the powerbalance in the Caspian Sea Region and maynot necessarily be willing to be as close anally to Russia as Russia assumes it will be.

A more economically and politically inde-pendent Iran, and its ability to influence re-gional power shifts, would allow for theother Caspian states to modernize and diver-sify their economies. This would mean thatTurkmenistan and Azerbaijan may finally beable to break free of the Russian influencethat has basically engulfed them since theSoviet era by building the Trans-Caspianpipeline.

Likewise Kazakhstan, a nation whose econ-omy is also built upon the same commoditymarket as Russia, may finally be able tolessen the havoc that the Russian currencydecline is playing within its own borders.Right now there are few analysts seriouslyconsidering these potentialities, both here inthe West and within Russia. This is an error.Russia clearly thinks the new nuclear accordwill lead only to improved ties and deepereconomic prosperity for both itself and Iran.But there is ample historical evidence to con-sider that an emboldened and newly stabi-lized Iran simply might not need Russia asmuch as Russia needs it. This future realitycould signal a dramatic change in the Russ-ian-Iranian relationship, and not to Russia’sfavor.The longer Moscow assumes this is ageostrategic impossibility and that its onlyconcern is battling the ‘dollar dictatorship,’then the Kremlin only creates more dangerfor itself.

We already know that a devalued yuan is fur-ther assisting oil prices to drop on a globalscale, placing great strain on the Russianeconomy as well as on some borderingCaspian states. Historically, when the Krem-lin feels threatened, it shifts blame to otherscapegoats rather than seriously tackling itsproblems. The current sharp slowdown ofChinese economic growth has already im-pacted multiple Russian economic sectors,including energy, metallurgy, timber, andagriculture. The future alliance with Iran is not an auto-matic guarantee. Western sanctions stillgrind along. The Caspian littorals may seeopportunities to loosen Russia’s economicgrip over their local economic standings.Clearly, plenty of ‘real’ problems exist. So itwould behoove Russia to stop spendingtime on economic fantasies of ‘dethroningthe dollar dictatorship.’ That seems to be theleast of its real problems.

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aN iSlamiccold War

NavigatiNg the iraNiaN-Saudi relatioNShip

ould Iran and Saudi Arabia’s willingness to usefellow Middle Eastern nations, like Syria andYemen, as proxies in their conflicts against oneanother threaten to move the world closer tothe brink of an Islamic Cold War? In their efforts

to win the battle to be the dominant regional powerwithin the Gulf and to control the world’s oil markets, thehistory of the Saudi Arabian and Iranian relationship hastaken many forms. With the Saudis claiming the culturalhigh-ground based on it being the birthplace of Islam andthe Arabic language, and the Iranians feeling a culturalsupremacy based on civilizational and historical legacy,the animosity each side feels toward the other does notappear destined to wane any time soon. The windingroad of the relationship, and the security approachestaken by the two nations, seem to be largely based onArabic tribal tendencies:A disposition to appease rather than resist a powerfulopponent if at all possible, and to avoid irreparable con-frontation if a clash is inevitable.A tendency to wait for events to unfold before reacting,rather than seek to anticipate them.A propensity to give priority to immediate, clear de-mands rather than to long-term strategic considerationswhen the two come into conflict. (Safran)

c


STEPHEN SARTY

Stephen Sarty is a graduate studentin the International Security and Intelligence Studies program

at Bellevue University in Omaha, NE, USA.He is a former U.S. Marine and has lived and worked

in the Middle East for the last 23 years.

Further complicating this relationship in themodern day have been the roles that theUnited States and Russia play. Both theUnited States and Russia have played politicswithin Iran and the surrounding region, sup-plying many of the weapons and money thathave been used in various conflicts.

The United States has also been pushingSaudi Arabia for years to strengthen mutualmilitary ties in an effort to gain a biggerfoothold in the Middle East. It is the US ‘med-dling’ in this way that Iran has repeatedlyused as a rallying call for many of the Shiafundamentalists rising up within the region,trying to push out the “Great Satan” and notcoincidentally point to Saudi Arabia’s com-plicity in facilitating this ‘evil’ as an equaltransgression.

It is the Syrian conflict, however, that appearsto be the key crisis with the biggest globalimpact. When the Arab Spring moved intoSyria the Assad regime came under siegefrom the majority Sunni community. Seen asan opportunity by Saudi Arabia to weakenthe Iranian sphere of influence, it was quickto back Syrian rebels. Iran could not affordthe loss of the Assad regime and so it en-gaged on his behalf.

The intervention of both Iran and Saudi Ara-bia, however, has now seen this civil uprisingbecome a war based on opposing Islamicideologies and has ultimately fostered theunintentional rise of the Islamo-fascistgroup, DAESH. Meanwhile, the United Statesstill sits with the ‘original rebels,’ desperatelytrying to convince everyone to keep the con-flict as a purely civil insurrection against theAssad regime. The stakes could not be higherfor all sides.

Currently the mass exodus of people fromSyria trying to escape the violence threatensboth the United States and all nations thatare taking in the massive influx of refugees.Lacking even basic infrastructure to properlyvet the tens of thousands of refugees flow-ing across borders, this represents a majorthreat not only to the immediate region butalso to host nations as the oblivious import-ing of terrorist agents hidden within therefugee population is highly plausible. Cur-rently the Sunni Gulf states have not ac-cepted any of the refugees for just thesereasons. With the instability that many ofthose countries already have at home, theyare not keen to now import potentially evenmore security problems.Also in January of 2015 Russia and Iransigned a military cooperation deal. Accord-ing to the Associated Press, Iranian defenseminister Hossein Dehghan emphasized that,“Iran and Russia are able to confront the ex-pansionist intervention and greed of theUnited States through cooperation, synergyand activating strategic potential capacities.… As two neighbors, Iran and Russia havecommon viewpoints toward political, re-gional and global issues.” With Russia nowmoving military capabilities into Syria underthe auspices of “fighting DAESH,” this nowputs the United States and Russia firmly atodds and potentially face-to-face on the bat-tlefield.

Both the uNited StateSaNd ruSSia have played

politicS WithiN iraNaNd the SurrouNdiNg regioN,

SupplyiNg maNyof the WeapoNS aNd moNey

that have BeeN uSediN variouS coNflictS


Russia, however, does not find itself in quitethe quandary that the United States does.Keen to continue its support of Saudi Arabiaand not lose control of its relations with theother Gulf States, the United States mustcontinue to engage in the fight againstDAESH while still needing to support the Syr-ian rebels attempting to overthrow theAssad regime. This is the same regime, how-ever, that Russia has declared support forand whom Iran also supports. America andRussia might find themselves in the very sit-uation that they spent decades trying toavoid during the Cold War: direct military en-gagement against one another.Aside from the obvious military threat thatAmerica now finds itself in, it also finds itselfboth target and victim of an artificial sup-pression of oil prices by Saudi Arabia.

In a direct assault on American shale oil andnatural gas producers, the Saudis haveworked to keep production high and priceslow. “When the price per barrel remains solow, these ‘alternative’ industries in Amer-ica…have no choice but to cash in on theopportunity and refocus on its traditional in-dustrial models. This slows down advancement in alternativefuels and repositions the Saudi-American en-ergy juggernaut back into a place of pri-macy.” (Crosston) Additionally thissuppression of oil prices also works to ad-versely affect Iran. As Dr. Matthew Crosstonfurther states, “There is no doubt that SaudiArabia enjoys keeping Iran in check and doesnot wish to see the wanna-be regional hege-mon ever truly compete for supremacy inthe region.

Keeping world oil prices low does this quitesuccinctly and efficiently, without even hav-ing to engage in any verbal or diplomatic an-imosity with the Shiite Republic.” Additionally, the recent Iranian nuclear ac-cord (JCPOA) is clearly seen by Saudi Arabiaas the biggest threat going forward. The dealpaves the way for Iran to aspire to the role asdominant player in the region, leaving SaudiArabia to feel backed into a corner. The dealalso opens up Iran’s pipelines for the sale ofoil and the added revenues would allowTehran to flow even more money into Syria,Hezbollah, and possibly entertain new initia-tives in the Gulf (many in Saudi Arabia feelthe Houthi rebellion in Yemen is exactly whatthis kind of initiative could look like). Thereis almost no scenario where the nuclearagreement and an easing of the strife be-tween the U.S. and Iran can be seen as agood thing for Saudi Arabia.

And with many of the negotiations havinghappened behind closed doors the Saudishave long felt a sense of betrayal. If the situ-ation within the Saudi monarchy worsens interms of its own internal dissension and un-rest, then America could find the royal fingerpointed straight at it.For Tehran the deal with the Americans is apolitical tightrope. It has an aging militaryand its economy has been hard hit. So therewas tremendous internal pressure to make adeal. With the Russian agreement firmly inhand, Russian troops on their way to shoreup Assad, and the nuclear deal struck, Tehranhas to at least feel like maybe some breath-ing room is finally available. What remains tobe seen is whether this breathing room is anew opportunity for global assimilation andresponsible behavior or simply a respite be-fore beginning in earnest an Islamic ColdWar with its hated Wahhabist rival.

Why azerbaijanis unhappy

he European Union may have found itselfdeeper into a conflict than it had originallyplanned when it invited both Armenia andAzerbaijan into the Euronest. Recently, Azer-baijan has felt as though it was dealing with

unfair persecution from a select group of members inthe Euronest Parliamentary Assembly and decided toformally withdraw from the union. According to theresolution that was drafted on 10 September of thisyear, the Milli Mejlis (the Azeri Congress) cited:

They [Euronest members] slander Azerbaijan, trying todamage the image of our country and isolate it. Sincelast September when this institution began to operatewith a new staff, Azerbaijan hasn’t managed to begin adialogue with it due to the fault of several European Par-liament members, including its President.

Many of the members of the Euronest have beenplaguing Azerbaijan with accusations of human rightsviolations. These violations stem from the treatmentof prisoners that are being held in Azeri prisons. Theaccusations came soon after Azerbaijan refused toparticipate in the session that was held in March 2015.

t

DAYNA RICE

Dayna Rice is a recent graduateof the International Security

and Intelligence Studies Programat Bellevue University in Omaha, NE, USA.

She is also a veteranof the United States Army.

Leaving the euronest

Azerbaijan claimed that the reason for non-participation in the session held in Yerevan,Armenia stemmed from the continuing con-flict between Armenia and Azerbaijan overthe Nagorno-Karabakh region, the horren-dous state of the Sarsang Reservoir, and thecontinued blockade of Nakhchivan. Azerbai-jan has continued to voice concerns overthese three regions over the years, butseems to be especially irritated that littleprogress has been made through Euronestin obtaining any type of satisfactory solutionor even substantive progress.

The Nagorno-Karabakh region is a part ofAzerbaijan that is run by the ethnic Armen-ian population. In the summer of 2014,clashes between the Armenians and the Az-eris rose to the highest levels since 1994. Thearea is still prone to frequent commandoraids and sniper fire, which makes the livesof residents there difficult to say the least.Russian President Vladimir Putin attemptedto reign in the leaders by calling them bothto Sochi. Putin was able to stop the risingtension, but was not able to bring eitherparty closer to a resolution. When the Euron-est decided to hold the 2015 session in Ar-menia, it left Azerbaijan feeling like it had noplace within the assembly.

Azerbaijan did not understand how the Eu-ronest would claim such atrocities commit-ted by the Azeris while turning a blind eyetoward the Armenians’ bad behavior andeven giving them a great honor by holdingthe next session in their state.

Azeris also felt slighted when Russia per-suaded Armenia to join Putin’s EurasianUnion. It is this alliance, where Russia is pro-viding a security backing to Armenia, whichhas increased the Azeri feeling of insecurity.In response, Azerbaijan has been utilizing itshydrocarbon revenues to increase the sizeand strength of its military. Combine thiswith a new more nationalist defense ministerand diplomatic problems are arising in allareas. The Azeris have lost trust in the Westto deal fairly with its issues with Armenia.The reason for this can be attributed to howthe West has dealt with President Putin overCrimea: Azeris do not seem to understandhow the West can try to punish Putin for that,but continue to ignore the alleged illegalitiesand immoralities committed by the Armeni-ans against them.

The second reason that Azerbaijan decidednot to attend the session in Yerevan is the in-creasingly dilapidated status of the SarsangReservoir. Since 2013 it has been known thatthe dam at the reservoir was in an emer-gency condition. Since the dam was seizedover 20 years ago, it has been under the con-trol of Armenia. The problem is that if—more likely when—there will be a failure atthe dam, it will threaten the lives of over400,000 people that live downstream, whoare predominantly Azeri. The AzerbaijaniGovernment continues to make evacuationplans in the event the dam fails, but the esti-mates of engineers give less than one hourfrom the catastrophic collapse of the dam tothe whole area being submerged underwa-ter.

azerbaijan did not understandhoW the euronest WouLd cLaim

such atrocities committedby the azeris WhiLe turning

a bLind eye toWard the armenians’bad behavior and even giving them

a great honor by hoLdingthe next session in their state


The other issue that revolves around theSarsang Reservoir is that the Armenians con-tinue to use the reservoir as a way tothreaten the livelihood of the inhabitants onthe Azeri side. Since the dam is controlledby Armenia, it can decide when to turn thewater and power generation features on andoff. It uses this control to leverage threatsagainst the Azeris. This is serious enoughthat the Chairman of the Azerbaijani Delega-tion to the Euronest PA, Elkhan Suleymanov,forwarded his concerns about the physicalstatus of the dam as well as the way Armeniauses the dam against Azerbaijan not just toEuronest but to the Parliamentary Assemblyof the Council of Europe (PACE).

Suleymanov included in his reports that dur-ing the summer months Armenia wouldshut the dam down, depriving the peopledownstream of the commodity of water.During the winter months Armenia wouldopen the floodgates, causing agriculturallands to flood and roads to wash out. The last reason that Azerbaijan protested at-tending the last session of Euronest in Yere-van is because of the blockades that havebeen in effect against Azerbaijan’s au-tonomous province of Nakhchivan. Theblockades proved severely detrimental:Azerbaijan was unable to supply food andfuel and the gas, rail, electrical, and radiolines were all cut to the province.

During the harsh winter there was notenough fuel and some of the people re-sorted to burning their furniture in order tostay warm. The only lifeline in the early daysof the blockade that sustained Nakhchivanwere the two small bridges that were builtby Heydar Aliev. It is a testament to theprovince and the people of Azerbaijan thatthe province is now a growing, self-sustain-ing region.

The increasing hydrocarbon wealth of Azer-baijan has also helped significantly to revi-talize and supply the area. The futureendeavors of the province include spiritualand ecological tourism. Therefore the accu-sations that have been made against Azer-baijan in the recent past by Euronestmembers threaten the continued prosperityof the region.

These newest claims by Euronest againstAzerbaijan only further ignite the fury of theAzeris. Unfortunately, some of that anger hasfueled a Baku crackdown that has led tomany anti-government activists’ arrests andnon-governmental organizations findingtheir accounts suddenly frozen. The growthof Azerbaijan’s wealth has rebuilt its confi-dence so that it no longer wants to be con-trolled by any organization, whether that isEuropean or Russian. But Europe choosingto ignore the faults on the Armenian sideand continuing to prosecute those on theAzerbaijan side relatively exclusively, whileRussia provides additional economic oppor-tunity to the Armenians, is taking a negativesituation and fanning into a full-on future in-ferno of hostility. Consequently, in this in-stance, the ‘Euronest’ is something the Azeribird is eager and happy to leave.

NORBERTO MORALES ROSA

Norberto Morales Rosa is an undergraduate studentin the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program

at Bellevue University in Omaha, Nebraska. He currently serves as a member of the United States Air Force,

stationed at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

he global impact of transnational crimehas risen to unprecedented levels. Crim-inal groups have appropriated new tech-nologies, adapted horizontal networkstructures that are difficult to trace and

stop, and diversified their activities. The result hasbeen an unparalleled rise in international crime. Asmany as fifty-two activities fall under the umbrellaof transnational crime, from arms smuggling tohuman trafficking to environmental crime. Thesecrimes undermine states' abilities to provide citi-zens with basic services, fuel violent conflicts, andsubject people to intolerable suffering. (CFR) TheRussian government is known to benefit from tiesto the transnational weapons market. In this paperwe will discuss the Russian approach to theweapons market throughout the Greater Caspianregion.

t

radIoactIveIllIcIt MaterIals-traffIckIng across the greater caspIan

After September 11, 2001 it became moredifficult to express precisely what was meantby the term "weapon". That event forced a re-examination of the traditional definition ofweapons and, with it, a new concept of whatconstitutes a weapon. Illegal commerce inweapons, by whatever definition, is wide-spread throughout Eastern Europe and theformer USSR. (Bowers)

The conventional illegal arms trade acrossthe Greater Caspian is one of the most sig-nificant in the world. The airports of the Cau-casus are also among the most vulnerable inthe world and may, at some future date, con-stitute an equally threatening factor in thisnew environment. There is one basic factabout weapons traffic in this region: theCaspian has always been armed and there-fore was always destined to be a hub of con-cern, post-Communism, for the internationalweapons trade market. Therefore, the effortsof the greater Caspian states to remedy thisproblem will always be paramount to the se-curity of the global community.

Illicit nuclear materials have been interdictedon numerous occasions in Russia, the Cauca-sus, and Central Asia. If seizures are an accu-rate indication, most material on the nuclearblack market has been of FSU or Eastern Eu-ropean origin.

The region's porous borders, government in-stability, and endemic corruption providefertile ground for trafficking of WMD materi-als. This may be partly due to the heavy drugtrafficking across the region, which providesa smuggling infrastructure useful for otherillicit items. (NTI) Central Asia's extensivesmuggling network arises from the twomajor smuggling paths that pass fromAfghanistan through Eurasia to Western Eu-rope – known as the "Northern route" andthe "Balkan route." (NTI) Though an explicitconnection between the drug trade andWMD material trafficking has not been madeexplicitly apparent by academia, two of themajor consequences of this trade are thecriminalization of state structures and thenormalization of smuggling practices.

The facilitation of freer trade of goods acrossborders and the creation of a customs unionand common economic space between Be-larus, Kazakhstan, and Russia have also pro-vided opportunities for criminal traffickingactivities. The Deputy Head of Russia's bor-der service, Yevgeny Inchin, has asserted that43 percent of smuggled goods in Russia firstenter through Kazakhstan. Border post re-movals between Belarus, Kazakhstan, andRussia have allowed smuggled and piratedgoods flowing into Kazakhstan from Chinato disperse more easily throughout Europevia Russia.(NTI) The main WMD material traf-ficking routes in the region flow in threemain ways: north-south from Russia throughthe Caucasus toward Iran; east-west fromCentral Asia through the Caucasus and outthrough Turkey after crossing the Black Sea;and west-east entering the Caucasus fromTurkey and continuing on to Central Asia.Trafficking takes place in all of the countriesof the Caspian region, but the critical pointsalong the primary trafficking routes are Tajik-istan, Turkmenistan (particularly Caspianports), and Georgia. (NTI)

the regIon's porous borders,governMent InstabIlIty,

and endeMIc corruptIonprovIde fertIle ground

for traffIckIngof WMd MaterIals


Russia has well-established and extensivestrategic trade control legislation and regu-lation: Russian implementation of UNSCR1540 ranks ‘above average’ in the NTI's Nu-clear Materials Security Index. However,there are also ongoing implementation chal-lenges stemming from a weak export controlculture and underdeveloped internal com-pliance programs. While most states have asingle body to license the export of both mil-itary and dual-use goods, Russia's exportcontrol system consists of two agencies: theFederal Service for Technical and Export Con-trol (FSTEC) licenses the export of dual-useitems, and the Federal Service on Military-Technical Cooperation (FSMTC) authorizestransfers of other defense items. Russia'sFSTEC maintains six lists of dual-use items tobe regulated. (NTI)

Several states in the greater Caspian region,including Kazakhstan, which also ranks‘above average’ in implementation of UNSCR1540, created control lists modeled on thelists of the European Union and Russia. Otherstates, such as Georgia, adopted the estab-lished control lists of multilateral export con-trol regimes such as the Nuclear SupplierGroup. Under the provisions of the CentralAsian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty,member states should require IAEA Addi-tional Protocol safeguards agreements as acondition for nuclear supply.

In 2012, Georgia and Armenia ratified the2005 Amended CPPNM and passed nuclearsecurity and safety-related regulations, en-abling them to strengthen the physical pro-tection of radioactive materials.

Azerbaijan reinforced its system to preventillicit trafficking of nuclear materials by cre-ating a national registry of all radioactivesources. Kazakhstan also made significantprogress in physical security by upgradingprotection at the former nuclear test site inSemipalatinsk, converting a research reactorto use of LEU fuels and relocating the equiv-alent of several weapons' worth of spent nu-clear fuel to a more secure facility.

So there are contradictory forces in play onthis issue across the Caspian region: on theone hand, all states are actively trying to im-prove regulations and security protocols toprevent the illicit trafficking of weapons and,especially, nuclear materials; on the otherhand, weapons and materials are still beingfound on the black market and the dark net.Are there opportunities for the global com-munity, the United States in particular, to in-tervene or ‘positively pressure’ said states togreater vigilance? According to DanielCohen the U.S. government should lead theglobal community in doing the following:Reexamine the “reset” policy with Russia onMiddle East issues. The U.S., in cooperationwith Western European allies and the ArabLeague, should pressure Moscow to supportU.N. Security Council sanctions on Damascusand Tehran.

The President should suspend the reset pol-icy and direct the National Security Councilto form a task force to conduct a bottom-upreassessment of U.S. policy toward Russia inview of Moscow’s counter-policies towardIran and Syria. Pressure Middle Eastern states to stop theirnationals from funding and training terror-ists. The U.S. needs to apply significant pres-sure to Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, andother Middle Eastern states, whose nationalsare funding and training insurgents in theNorth Caucasus, bankrupt the North Cau-casian insurgency, and prevent its integra-tion into the worldwide Islamic extremistmovement.

Intervene with the governments of Turkeyand Italy to boost support of the Nabuccogas pipeline and gas interconnectors toGreece and Italy. Italy is a main stakeholderin the South Stream pipeline project. The U.S.should seek to postpone the deal on SouthStream between Gazprom and Turkey’sstate-owned Botash. The prohibitively costlyand economically ineffective deal will onlyincrease EU and Turkish energy dependencyon Russia and deny revenues to the pro-American states of the Southern Caucasus.The global impact of transnational crime hasrisen to unprecedented levels. The directionof Russia’s armament policy and regulationprotocols will significantly affect not onlyRussia and its deeply rooted bilateral rela-tions with countries in the Caspian region,but will also significantly engage U.S. inter-ests and policies from Tangier to Tehran.Whether that engagement is positive or neg-ative on the illicit transnational weaponsmarket is something still remains to be seen.Hopefully, the individual geopolitical inter-ests of all the parties involved will not con-flict so stridently as to make the only truewinners those who profit from death and de-struction.

The WesT should engageIn a course correcTIon

sTraTegy WITh russIa

ANTONY CLEMENT

Antony Clement is currently a studentof the International Relations program

at the University of Aberdeen, Scotland, UK

n the aftermath of the disintegration of the So-viet Union, the Russian Federation felt vulnerablebecause of the cooperation between the formerSoviet states and Europe. The US has initiated ex-pansion towards Eastern Europe, through its

backyard NATO, by assuring security which has causedgrave concern in Russia.This expansion has finally tried to absorb Ukraine butthis has been met with a crisis. This crisis has beenburning like a flame of fire since the time of theCrimean referendum. Russia felt that the ‘enemy wouldsoon be at the gate’ in the form of NATO in Ukraine,given that Ukraine shares a 1576km long border withRussia. Its response to this perceived threat has led tothe deaths of more than 5400 lives, according to BBC.However, Russia failed to comprehend that the replace-ment of Ukraine President Viktor Yanukovych sin 2014primarily occurred because of an increasing pro-EUoutlook in the minds of the majority of Ukrainians.

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Russia’s strategic perception was that ifUkraine became part of NATO, the next log-ical step would be for it to join the EU, whichcould be a permanent threat to Russia.

President Vladimir Putin’s stance on Russia’scompliance with international law on the an-nexation of Crimea did not help Russia butinstead it led to sanctions from the US andEU.However, there was no support for the sanc-tions from the largest emerging markets likeChina and India. India’s stance with Russia onthe Crimea issue is possibly a ratification oftheir long standing friendship. Further, theglobal economic power house China has notdirectly condemned the issue, because theChinese are the largest beneficiary of theUkrainian crisis. This demonstrates that pres-ent international system is moving towardsa more contested topic. The rationale behinddecisions in international relations are not soeasy to ascertain. According to Bloomberg,the sanctions gave more advantage to theChinese which has gained$400 billion worthof natural gas deal agreements from Russiasince the sanctions were imposed. Contro-versially, India received Russian PresidentPutin, who accompanied the Crimean leaderSergei Aksyonov to India.

Many commentators were emotionally sur-prised by India’s diplomacy, since theCrimean issue is a hot topic. While the sanc-tions have closed the door to the flow of cap-ital to Russia from the west, the traditionalAsian channels remain open to Russia.

The present US led international system triesto isolate Russia but this is not a winnablestrategic doctrine. Moreover, isolation is nota strategy but instead it is a trajectory forcountries like China in this multipolar worldto thrive from the isolated country. Multipo-lar demonstrates that sanctions have nogenuine influence. When the sanctions arenot working, it is true that the internationalsystem is in multipolar world disorder. Thebest example would be India’s relations withIran during the western sanctions on Iran’snuclear issue. As with India’s relations with Iran during thesanctions, the Chinese doing the same withRussiaon its sanctions. Moreover, the sanc-tions have pushed Russia closer to the Chi-nese and these new relations would pull theworld order towards the East. This trajectoryis dangerous for the future world order. Withincreasing instability in the Middle East, themajor powers must reach a consensus onhow to maintain peace and security in theregion. Otherwise there would be a pro-longed setback for western diplomacy inglobal governance.

If the west believes that the cold war waswon by and for its own values, then the USand its allies have the considerable respon-sibility to give Russia the space which it de-serves in the world.With regards to theUkraine crisis, the debate as to the winnersand losers cannot be answered now. The ma-terial consideration at present is the extentto which the setback will further damage thecredibility of the US and the EU’s diplomacy.

The sancTIons gavemore advanTage To The chIneseWhIch has gaIned $400 bIllIon

WorTh of naTural gas dealagreemenTs from russIa

sInce The sancTIonsWere Imposed


NATO’s attempt to expand further into East-ern Europe is the root cause of the Ukrainecrisis. If Russia had been invited to join NATOthis crisis would have been avoided. Further,this would have been a chance for negotia-tion between the US, EU and Russia on theNATO framework of collective security. How-ever,Russia absorbed Crimea to protect itselfagainst NATO expansion towards the east.For Crimea, it has no meaningful remedy inthe international system. Once Crimea ac-ceded to Russia by the artificial memoran-dum, the debate over Crimea’s remediesinevitably ended. There will be no realchance for any reunification of Crimea withthe Ukraine in future. This will be a constantimpediment in future US–Russia relations.

Without an answer to the Ukraine’s member-ship of NATO and EU membership there willbe no solution to the crisis. Russia is restlessbecause of this unanswered question. Forthe time being the NATO expansion towardsthe east should be postponed. Meanwhile,Moscow can try to better understand Kiev’spublic opinion. German Chancellor AngelaMerkel, who is the leading power in the EU,can influence this decision, especially giventhat the UK is currently undergoing an iden-tity crisis over its EU membership. As a chiefcommunicator with Putin, Merkel has artic-ulated that any consensus with the Russianleadership is a question of choice.The Westshould engage in a course correction strat-egy with Russia. This change in policy mustoccur given the present complex security en-vironment. An opportunity was missed butit is now a good time for the west to retrievea productive relationship with Russia.

The best channel for conducting this re-newal would be through NATO. If this coop-eration is actualized then it will affect China'spotential accumulation of power in the com-ing years. Perhaps it is the right time to inviteRussia to join NATO. However, can the westand Russia cooperate? If so, on what terms?These are big questions and the answers arenot at all visible. The conflicting strategic ap-proaches of the US and Russia is most evi-dent in how they have flexed their musclesin the Middle East. Syria is moving towardsdevastation, as experienced by Iraq andLibya. If this continues, critics will contendthat the US is a declining power because itcan no longer fulfill its responsibility to main-tain peace and security in the world. Finally,the pledge of Ukraine President PetroPoroshenko to apply for membership of theEU in 2020 is a future point of tension forEurasia.

The Caspian Project 14

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