Shades Of Federalism - The Whole Book - 5.3.2018

SHADES OF FEDERALISM

Volume 1

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Federalism and Federation: Putting the Record Straightzuf'&,fpepfESifh zuf'a&;&Sif; - em;vnfrI vGJrSm;aeonfrsm;udk jyefvnf &Sif;vif; jyifqifjcif;

Linguistic Diversity in Plurinational StatesvlrsKd;rsm;pGm ,SOfwGJaexdkifonfh EdkifiHrsm;&Sd bmompum;qdkif&m rwluGJjym;rI

Federalism: A tool for conflict resolutionzuf'&,fpepf - y#dyu© ajz&Sif;a&; twGuf enf;vrf;wpfckavm

Federalism, Democracy and Inclusion: What about the others?zuf'&,fpepf? 'Drdkua&pDESifh tm;vHk; yg0ifapjcif; - tjcm;olrsm;twGuf rnfodkY pOf;pm;rnfenf;

Self-rule and Shared Ruleukd,fydkiftkyfcsKyfjcif;ESifh rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif; toGifuGJrsm;

ISBN 978-99971-0-464-9

Publisher © 2017, 50 Shades of Federalism

Dr. Soeren Keil

Canterbury Christ Church University, Politics and IR

North Holmes Road, Canterbury, CT1 1QU, United Kingdom

© 2017, Hanns Seidel Foundation Myanmar Office

Unit 7, Inya Lake Hotel

37 Kaba Aye Pagoda Road, Yangon

Republic of the Union of Myanmar

Tel.: +95 1 66 72 25

Email: [email protected]

Online: https://southeastasia.hss.de/myanmar

Chairwoman Prof. Ursula Männle, Minister of State (ret.)

Chief Executive Officer Dr. Peter Witterauf

Responsible for Publication Dr. Soeren Keil, Achim Munz

Main Authors Dr. Soeren Keil, Paul Anderson

Authors Prof. Dr. Michael Burgess, Dr. Sean Mueller,

Associate Prof. Allison McCulloch, Dr. Daniel Cetra

Translator U Aung Kyaw Phyo

Layout & Cover Artwork Shaine Phay, Mote Oo

Special Acknowledgement Paul Anderson, the manager of 50 Shades of Federalism

Professor Michael Burgess, who passed away during the completion of

this publication and was a great supporter of the project

Dr. David Bates, the Director of Politics and IR at Canterbury Christ Church

University, who has supported this project

Canterbury Christ Church University, who has provided QR funding to establish

50 Shades of Federalism

Achim Munz, Aung Soe Min, Leander Ketelhodt, Christopher Vollhardt, Mote Oo

All rights, including the right of reproduction, dissemination and translation, reserved. No part of this publication may be

reproduced in any form (including photocopying, recording, or otherwise) without the written permission of the Hanns Seidel

Foundation or processed using electronic systems, copied or distributed. The copyright for this publication lies with the Hanns

Seidel Foundation. The contributors by named authors do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the publisher.

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Contents Introduction

1. Federalism and Federation:

Putting the Record Straight

Michael Burgess

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2. Self-rule and Shared Rule

Sean Mueller

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3. Federalism, Democracy and Inclusion:

What about the others?

Allison McCulloch

zuf'&,fpepf? 'Drdkua&pDESifh tm;vHk; yg0ifapjcif; - tjcm;olrsm;twGuf rnfodkY pOf;pm;rnfenf;

4. Linguistic Diversity in Plurinational States

Daniel Cetra

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5. Federalism: A tool for conflict resolution

Paul Anderson & Soeren Keil

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7

24

37

50

65

2

2 I Introduction for Shades of Federalism

Discussing and debating federalism, and its many shades, forms and sub-topics, has become an essen-

tial element of the political discourse in Myanmar. Since the move to parliamentary democracy after the

first free elections in 2010, and particularly since the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA)

between eight ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) and the Tatmadaw in 2015, federalism has become an

intense debate.

The short contributions in this volume look at some of the theoretical aspects in the debate on feder-

alism. They discuss elements such as shared-rule and self-rule, the link to minority rights, linguistic rights’

protection and the potential of federalism to overcome violent conflict. Each paper takes a particular view

on an aspect of federalism, demonstrating its complexity, both in academic and in very practical terms.

In the first paper, Michael Burgess, an eminent authority in the field of federal studies, discusses the

different definitions of federalism and federation, and sheds light into some of the confusion that has

arisen in recent years. In particular, Burgess highlights that these terms have been used more often to

describe new and evolving federations (such as Spain, the United Kingdom and the European Union),

thereby blurring the lines between federalism, decentralisation and devolution. He examines what feder-

alism and federation mean in theory and practice, why the use of term has increased substantially in recent

years and why precision and clear focus are important when discussing federalism.

In the second contribution, Sean Mueller, a Swiss academic, discusses self-rule and shared-rule. These

are major principles that demonstrate the correct application of the federal principle. In short, self-rule

refers to the autonomy of federal units, while shared-rule enables the territorial units to participate in

decisions in the central institutions, usually through their representation in second chambers. There are, of

course, many ways of implementing self-rule and shared-rule, and Myanmar needs to find its own way in

applying these principles in a future federal system.

The third paper looks at the role of “Others” in federal systems. Allison McCulloch, who works as an

academic in Canada, highlights the dangers of federalism and power-sharing. While these institutional

provisions are designed to provide inclusion for certain groups, they can often lead to the exclusion of

other groups, who do not benefit from these institutional arrangements. It is therefore important to con-

sider the role of different minorities and those that might not identify with any group, when designing

federal institutions and implementing power-sharing.

Introduction for “Shades of Federalism” Volume 1

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zuf'&,fpepf? ,if;\ toGifrsm;? yHko²mefESifh u@cGJrsm;taMumif; jiif;cHkaqG;aEG;jcif;onf jrefrmhEdkifiHa&; qdkif&m pmayrsm;? pmwrf;rsm;wGif ta&;ygaom taMumif;t&mwpf&yfjzpfvmaeygonf/ 2010jynfhESpfwGif vGwfvyfaoma&G;aumufyGJrsm; yxrqHk;tBudrfusif;yNyD;aemuf ygvDref'Drdkua&pDpepfodkY ul;ajymif;csdef? txl; ojzifh wyfrawmfESifh wdkif;&if;om;vufeufudkiftzGJYtpnf; (8) zGJYwdkYMum; wpfEdkifiHvHk;ypfcwf wdkufcdkufrI&yfpJa&; oabmwlpmcsKyf(NCA)udk vufrSwfa&;xdk;cJhMuonfh 2015 ckESpfrS pí zuf'&,fpepfonf taustvnf? tjyif; txefaqG;aEG;zG,f&m taMumif;t&mwpf&yfjzpfvmcJhygonf/ þpmtkyfyg pmwrf;i,frsm;onf zuf'&,fa&;&m aqG;aEG;rIrsm;twGif; oabmw&m;a&;&m½ IaxmifhrS csOf;uyfaomwifjycsufrsm;jzpfygonf/ pmwrf;rsm;onf udk,fydkiftkyfcsKyfjcif;? rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif;? vlenf;pktcGifhta&;ESifh tquftpyf? bmompum;vGwfvyfcGifhtm; tumtuG,fjyKjcif;ESifh zuf'&,f pepftm;jzifh y#dyu©rsm;tm; ajz&Sif;ausmfvTm;EdkifzG,f&Sdjcif;paom taMumif; t&mrsm;tm; aqG;aEG;wifjyxm;ygonf/ pmwrf;wpfapmifcsif;pDonf zuf'&,fpepf\ ½Iaxmifhwpfckcsif;pDtm; aqG;aEG;xm;NyD; ,if;wdkYtoD;oD;\ em;vnf&efcufcJzG,f&Sdaomtydkif;rsm;tm; vG,fulí vufawGYusonfh a0g[m&rsm;jzifh ynm&yfqdkif&m ½IaxmifhrSwifjyaqG;aEG;xm;ygonf/

yxrqHk;pmwrf;wGif zuf'&,fa&;&mavhvmrIe,fy,fü xif&Sm;onfh Michael Burgess u zuf'&,fpepf? zuf'a&;&Sif;rsm;ESifh oufqdkifaom t"dyÜm,fzGifhqdkcsuftrsKd;rsKd;tm; wifjyaqG;aEG;xm;NyD; rMumao;rDumv rsm;uay:aygufvmcJhonfh ½IyfaxG;aom? em;vnf&cufcJaom tjcif;t&mrsm;tm; &Sif;vif;ap&ef wifjyxm;yg onf/ txl;ojzifh pma&;olu þa0g[m&rsm;tm; xGef;opfpzuf'a&;&Sif;rsm; (Oyrm - pydef? ,lau? Oa&my or*¾) wdkYtaMumif;azmfòef;&mwGif toHk;rsm;aMumif; rD;armif;xdk;jycJhygonf/ xdkzuf'a&;&Sif;rsm;wGif zuf'&,f pepf? A[dkcsKyfudkifrIavQmhcsjcif;ESifh vkyfydkifcGifhcGJa0ay;jcif;wdkYtMum;&Sd e,fedrdwfrsOf;rsm;onf rIef0g;aeqJjzpfyg onf/ zuf'&,fpepfESifh zuf'a&;&Sif;wdkY\ t"dyÜm,fudk oabmw&m;a&;&mt&a&m vufawGYt&yg qef;ppfavhvm xm;ygonf/ xdkYjyif þa0g[m&rsm;tm; rMumao;rDumvrsm;twGif; Budrfzefrsm;pGmoHk;pGJvmMujcif;taMumif; rsm;ESifh zuf'&,fpepftaMumif;aqG;aEG;onfhtcgrsm;wGif wdusrIESifh &Sif;vif;jywfom;aom OD;wnfcsufxm; &SdrIwdkY\ ta&;ygyHktaMumif;udkvnf; qef;ppfwifjyxm;ygonf/

'kwd,pmwrf;wGif qGpfynm&SifwpfOD;jzpfonfh Sean Mueller u udk,fydkiftkyfcsKyfjcif;ESifh rQa0 tkyfcsKyfjcif; rsm;taMumif;aqG;aEG;xm;ygonf/ xdktaMumif;t&m 2 ckonf zuf'&,ftajccHrlrsm;tm; rSefrSefuefuef usifhoHk; jcif;udk azmfòef;onfh t"dutcsufrsm;jzpfMuygonf/ twdkcsKyftm;jzifh udk,fydkiftkyfcsKyfjcif;onf zuf'&,f,lepf rsm;\ tcGifhtmPmydkifpdk;rItm;&nfòef;NyD; rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif;onf A[dktqifhü qHk;jzwfcsufrsm; csrSwf&mwGif zuf'&,f,lepfrsm;u yl;aygif;yg0ifEdkifcGifhudk tmrcHxm;jcif;jzpfygonf/ trsm;tm;jzifh ,if;udk txufvTwfawmf wGif udk,fpm;jyKrIrS wpfqifhaqmif&GufMuygonf/ udk,fydkiftkyfcsKyfjcif;ESifhrQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif;tm; taumiftxnf azmfEdkifonfh enf;vrf;rsm;pGm&Sdygonf/ jrefrmEdkifiHonf þtajccHrlrsm;tm; usifhoHk;NyD; tem*wf zuf'&,fEdkifiHa&; pepfwGif rdrdwdkYESifhudkufnDrnfh udk,fydkifenf;vrf;udk &SmazG&efvdktyfygonf/

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4 I Introduction for Shades of Federalism

The fourth paper focuses on linguistic diversity and is written by Daniel Cetra, a Spanish academic. It

highlights the challenge of recognising multiple languages both at central and regional levels in multina-

tional states. This can be challenging, expensive and controversial, and it often leads to conflicts between

the majority population and minorities, who quest for the recognition of their language.

This volume is concluded by a paper on federalism and conflict resolution. Anderson and Keil, two UK-

based academics with Myanmar experience, highlight how federalism has become a tool of conflict reso-

lution. However, they demonstrate that the use of federalism in post-conflict societies is often contested

and can lead to new problems. It is therefore important to consider the design of conflict-resolution mech-

anisms within a federal political system.

The papers were first published on the website www.50shadesoffederalism.com – which is a project

at Canterbury Christ Church University in the UK, providing free and precise articles and discussions on

federalism by academics, policy makers and think tank researchers. The project started in October 2017,

and the website has been a huge success – providing policy makers, students and academics alike with free

access to resources on federalism, short and crisp analysis of key issues involved in federal government,

and further information on leading researchers in the field.

The Hanns Seidel Foundation in Myanmar has worked with Canterbury Christ Church University to

translate these pieces into Myanmar language and ensure the accessibility of these papers in the country.

This collection of papers is Volume 1 – further Volumes are planned. Our overall objective is to demon-

strate what federalism is, how it works and what it can offer to Myanmar, both in terms of opportunities,

and in terms of challenges.

Soeren Keil, PhD is Reader in Politics and International Relations at Canterbury

Christ Church University in the UK.

Achim Munz is the Resident Representative of the Hanns-Seidel-Foundation in

Myanmar.

zuf'&,fpepf toGifrsm; - rdwfquf I 5

pwkw¬pmwrf;wGif bmompum;qdkif&mrwluGJjym;rItm; t"duwifjyí pydefynm&Sif Daniel Cetra \pmwrf; jzpfygonf/ vlrsKd;rsm;pGmaexdkifonfhEdkifiHrsm;wGif a'oÅ&tqifhomru A[dktqifhwGifvnf; bmompum; rsm;pGmudk todtrSwfjyKjcif;\ pdefac:rIrsm;udk t"duwifjyxm;ygonf/ þtajctaeonf pdefac:rIrsm;pGm &SdNyD; ukefusp&dwfrsm;jym;onfhtjyif tjiif;yGm;zG,fjzpf½HkrQru rdrdwdkY\ bmompum;tm; todtrSwfjyK&efBudK;pm; aeMuonfh vlenf;pkrsm;ESifh vlrsm;pkrsm;Mum; y#dyu©rsm;qDodkYyif &Hzef&HcgOD;wnfoGm;wwfygao;onf/

pmtkyfyxrwGJtm; zuf'&,fpepfESifh y#dyu©ajz&Sif;a&;qdkif&mpmwrf;jzifh tqHk;owfxm;ygonf/ jrefrm EdkifiHtaMumif;tawGYtMuHK&Sdxm;onfh ,lautajcqdkufynm&SifESpfOD;jzpfonfh Anderson and Keil wdkYu jyKpk xm;NyD; zuf'&,fpepfonf y#dyu©ajz&Sif;a&;twGuf enf;vrf;wpfckjzpfEdkifyHkudk &SmazGwifjyxm;ygonf/ odkY&mwGif y#dyu©vGefvlYtzGJYtpnf;twGif; zuf'&,fpepftm;usifhoHk;jcif;onf wpfcgwpf&HwGiftjiif;yGm;zG,f&mjzpfNyD;? jyóemtopfrsm; xyfrHjzpfyGm;Edkifajc&SdaMumif;vnf; axmufjyxm;ygonf/ odkYjzpfí zuf'&,fEdkifiHa&;pepftwGif; y#dyu©ajz&Sif;a&;,Å&m;rsm;\ yHkpHtm; xnfhoGif;pOf;pm;&efta&;BuD;vSayonf/

þpmtkyfygpmwrf;rsm;tm; ,lauEdkifiH Canterbury Christ Church wuúodkvf\ pDrHudef;wpfckjzpfonfh www.50shadesoffederalism.com wGif oD;pGmazmfjyxm;NyD;jzpfygonf/ xdk0ufbfqdkufwGif ynm&Sifrsm;? rl0g' csrSwfolrsm;ESifh okawoDrsm;\ zuf'&,fpepftay:aqG;aEG;csufrsm;? aqmif;yg;rsm;tm; tcrJh&,lEdkifygonf/ pDrHudef;tm; 2017 ckESpf atmufwdkbmvwGif pwifcJhNyD;aemuf xdk0ufbfqdkuftm; Munfh½Iol rsm;jym;vmygonf/ rl0g'csrSwfolrsm;? ausmif;om;rsm;? ynm&Sifrsm;tm; taxmuftuljzpfapcJhí zuf'&,fpepfqdkif&m tcsuf tvufrsm;tm; tcrJh&,lEdkifygonf/ xdkYjyifzuf'&,ftpdk;&wGifyg0ifaom t"dutaMumif;jcif;&mrsm;qdkif&m oHk;oyfcsufrsm;? xyfrHavhvmEdkifaom tcsuftvufrsm;udkvnf; &SmazGawGY&SdEdkifygonf/

jrefrmEdkifiHwGif þpmwrf;rsm;tm; jrefrmbmomjzifh tvG,fwul&&SdEdkifap&ef&nf&G,fí [ef;qdkif',f azmifa';&Sif;onf Canterbury Christ Church wuúodkvfESifhyl;aygif;um jrefrmbmomodkY jyefqdkxkwfa0vdkufygonf/

,ckpmtkyfonf yxrwGJomjzpfNyD; xyfrHí twGJrsm;cGJum qufvufxkwfa0rnfjzpfygonf/ zuf'&,fpepf tm; &Sif;vif;azmfjy&ef? ,if;\ vnfywfyHkESifh ,if;u jrefrmEdkifiHtwGuf rnfonfhtcGifhtvrf;ESifh pdefac:rIrsm; ay;pGrf;EdkifyHkudk azmfjy&ef&nf&G,fygonf/

Soeren Keil, PhD onf ,lauEdkifiH Canterbury Christ Church wuúodkvf?

EdkifiHwumqufqHa&;ynmXme\ wGJzufygarmu©jzpfonf/

Achim Munz onf [ef;qdkif',fazmifa';&Sif;\ jrefrmEdkifiHqdkif&m

Xmaeudk,fpm;vS,ftjzpf wm0efxrf;aqmifaeygonf/

6 I Federalism and Federation: Putting the record straight


1. Federalism and Federation:zuf'&,fpepfESifh zuf'a&;&Sif;Putting the record straightem;vnfrI vGJrSm;aeonfrsm;udk jyefvnf&Sif;vif; jyifqifjcif;


Michael Burgess (1949 - 2018)onf ,lauEdkifiH University of Kent &Sd zuf'&,f avhvmrIrsm;qdkif&m *kPfxl;aqmifygarmu© jzpfonf/ Michael onf 1970 jynfhESpf rsm;twGif; ol\ yg&*lpmwrf;udk a&;om;jyKpkcJhpOfrSpí zuf'&,fqdkif&m avhvmrIrsm;

wGif pdwf 0ifpm;cJhonf/ Michael onf acwfNydKifzuf'&,fpepfrsm;tm; EdIif;,SOfavhvm jcif;? NAdwdefEdkifiH\ zuf'&,fpepfqdkif&m usihfoHk;rItpOftvm? uae'gEdkifiH\ zGJUpnf;yHk tajccHOya'qdkif&m EdkifiHa&;ESihf Oa&myor*¾ESihf Oa&myaygif;pnf;a&; wdkYtygt0if

e,fy,ftrsm;tjym;wGif okawoersm; jyKvkyf&ef pdwf0ifpm;cJhonf/ Michael onf pmwrf;rsm;pGmudk a&;om;xkwfjyefcJholjzpfNyD; aqmif;yg;rsm;pGmESihf yl;wGJ wnf;jzwfrI rsm;tjyif pmtkyfrsm;pGmudkvnf; wpfOD;wnf; a&;om;jyKpkcJhum aemufqHk;xkwfjyef cJhonhf pmwrf;onf 2012 ckESpfwGif xkwfjyefcJhaom zuf'&,f\ oabmobm0udk &SmazGjcif; pmwrf;jzpfonf/

Michael Burgess (1949-2018) is Emeritus professor of federal studies at the

University of Kent, UK. His interest in federal studies date back to his doctoral

thesis completed in the 1970s. Michael’s research interests straddle a number

of fields, including comparative federalism, the British tradition of federalism,

Canadian constitutional politics and the European Union and European Inte-

gration. He has an extensive publication record, and as well as a number of

published articles and co-edited collections he has singled authored a number

of books, most recently In Search of the Federal Spirit published in 2012.


The study of federalism is a wide ranging subject, both empirically and concep-

tually, because in practice people have different understandings of the terms

federal, federalism and federation. In this short piece I set out the importance

of definitional clarity when discussing the abovementioned terms. Secondly, I

discuss the relationship between liberal democracy and federalism, noting that

a number of values that undergird federal political systems equally fit with

democratic principles. In the final section, I focus on the some of the misun-

derstood aspects of federalism, using the British case as an empirical example.

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Introduction

It is now commonplace to observe that about 40% of the world’s population live in states or political

systems that are designated ‘federal’. Among these are these are the United States of America (USA), Can-

ada, Australia, India, Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Belgium and Malaysia. But what does it mean to be

‘federal’? What has to exist for states to be ‘federal’?

Terminological Clarification

Federalism derives originally from the Latin term ‘foedus’ that means contract, compact, pact and

agreement which spring from the world of international relations. Today we make an important conceptu-

al distinction between the term ‘federalism’ and that of ‘federation’ (Burgess 2006; Gagnon et al 2015; King

1982). Simply put, federalism animates federation. It is the driving force of federation that is intended to

protect, preserve and promote what we call ‘the politics of difference’, that is, the formal constitutional,

legal and political recognition of and respect for diversity. ‘Diversity’, broadly speaking, refers to cultur-

al-ideological and socio-economic characteristics in societies where they have political salience or in

other words they are expressed politically. By cultural-ideological features we mean a combination of lin-

guistic, religious, nationalist, ethnic, historical, philosophical, territorial and even politico-psychological

distinctions. In contrast, the notion of socio-economic cleavages refers to the distribution and redistribu-

tion of economic resources, social and economic equality and inequality, government investment in infra-

structure, regional development, social class and the overall structure of the economy. It is important to

note that these sorts of social cleavages are present in some combination in all states but that not all of

these cleavage patterns have political salience. Equally, there are varying combinations or patterns among

those cleavages that do have political salience so that the politics of difference and diversity embraces

different differences and diverse diversities in form and content in each state. It is now received wisdom

that the former socio-cultural dimension, considered by itself, is largely to do with ‘identity’ politics and

that conflict issues are generally much less bargainable than those in the latter category of a socio-eco-

nomic nature. In practice of course these sets of cleavages overlap and intermingle to produce unique

constellations of cleavage patterns.

When we turn to look at federations, it is obvious that they are states; they are federal states. We use

the term ‘federal’ to qualify the term ‘state’. But what does the formal description ‘federal state’ mean and

what distinguishes it from formally non-federal states? The answer is both simple and complex. The fed-


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eral state is usually referred to as a state in which the politics of difference and diversity meet the politics

of recognition so that they are formally incorporated in a written constitution, the legal system and the

political system. And it is vital that these state structures work in practice and not just in theory (Burgess

2006). Some formally federal states, such as the Russian Federation, have all the institutional parapherna-

lia of federal structures but do not in practice work as a federation should work, largely because of its in-

timidation of opposition parties, human rights abuses, rampant corruption and its extremely limited form

of democratisation. In short, it has the shell of a formal federation but it lacks the substance in its opera-

tion. It is, in short, an impostor. In federal states that work, by contrast, the federalism in federation is insti-

tutionalised in such a way that difference and diversity are able to breathe and to express themselves as

a legitimate driving force in the federation.

Federations are therefore complex in seeking always to maintain their ‘federality’, that is, their capac-

ity to sustain federalism in the face of fresh challenges and constant change (Burgess 2012). Invariably it

is the ‘territorial’ principle which has typified most formal federations, like those identified above. The

building blocks of these federations are what we call ‘constituent units’ that are territorially bounded and

contain distinct political communities which together produce something – a federal union of (former)

entities or states and a single people – that is greater than the sum of its parts. But while these are integral

to the federal state, strictly speaking, they are by virtue of an original constitutional agreement sub-states

of the larger federation which may itself create further sub-states out of its own territory. In most cases it

is these constituent units or groups of units that contain the federalism that animates the federation, as

mentioned above. How, then, should we define the federal state? Consider the following simple definition:

a sovereign state distinguished from other such states by the way in which its constituent units are

firmly incorporated in the decision-making processes of the federal government on some constitutionally

entrenched basis. This is a very broad working definition that accurately conveys the sense in which the

constituent parts of the state are related to the larger whole that is the federation. These parts are not

constitutionally subordinate to the federal government but are broadly speaking an integral part of it.

Through a distinct division of powers and competences, they work with the federal government in the main

political institutions of the state while simultaneously operating their own constitutionally guaranteed

governmental systems and public policy processes at sub-state level. This facilitates a wide variety of

federal models each with their own distinctive ways of policy-making and resource allocation in some

form of intergovernmental relations (IGR) that regularly brings together all governments, civil servants and

ministers from the two (in some cases three) levels of decision-making to resolve problems (Poirier et al

2015).


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Before we move away from our principal focus upon federalism and federation, it should also be noted

that federations are not the only states in the world that preserve and protect diversity. This is why we

referred above in the opening sentence to both formal federal states and informal federal political systems

(Burgess 2012). This is a relatively recent distinction in the mainstream literature on comparative federal-

ism and it essentially highlights those formally non-federal states, such as India and Spain, that nonethe-

less still have a written constitutional commitment of sorts together with a practical approach to problems

that are ‘federal’ in everything but the name. Consequently the distinction between the state in theory and

the political system in practice is an important one. Interestingly these case studies are exactly the oppo-

site of the Russian case mentioned above. The multinational United Kingdom (UK) is yet another example

of a formally non-federal state with a proven track record of the protection, preservation and promotion of

sub-state national identity but it does not yet have a formally codified written constitution.

This brief survey of federalism and federation would not be complete without some attention paid to

the question of western liberal democracy that in a sense holds all of the above together. We must ac-

knowledge that there are many forms of democracy and that they play out differently in different contexts.

Most formally federal states have historically been created or have gradually evolved from former imperi-

al structures – as in North and South America and Australasia- or have been created in Europe as a result

of the Second World War or the end of the Cold War. The new federal models of Bosnia and Herzegovina

(BiH) in 1995, Ethiopia in 1995 and Iraq in 2005, each emerging out of traumatic post-conflict crises in-

volving international intervention of varying sorts, we may consider in many important respects to be of a

different kind. But the main point is that with only a few notable exceptions they have been and still are

liberal democracies. What must be emphasised most strongly here is that formal federations and informal

federal political systems can survive only in thriving liberal democracies. The reason for this is that it is

only in such states and systems that the politics of difference and diversity can be constitutionally, legally

and politically guaranteed. After all, this is one of the principal purposes of the formal federation and the

operating practices of federal political systems.


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zuf'&,fpepfESifh zuf'a&;&Sif;qdkif&m þtESpfcsKyftcsuftvufrsm;onf txufwGif azmfjycJhonfh tcsuf rsm; tm;vHk;udk twlwuG ydkifqdkifonfh taemufwdkif; vpfb&,f'Drdkua&pDqdkif&mar;cGef;udk *½ kjyKjcif;r&Sdygu jynhfpHkrI&Sdrnf r[kwfyg/ uREkfyfwdkYtaejzifh 'Drdkua&pDwGif yHkpHrsm;pGm&SdNyD; ,if;wdkYtm; rwlnDonfh tajctaersm;wGif rwlnDonfh enf;vrf;rsm;jzifh azmfaqmifaMumif;udk todtrSwfjyK&ayrnf/ zuf'&,fEdkifiH trsm;pkonf ordkif; aMumif;t& ajrmuftar&du? awmiftar&duESifh MopaMw;vs - tm&SwdkYwGifuJhodkY ,cifu ya'o&mZfzGJUpnf;yHkrsm;rS zefwD;wnfaxmifcJhjcif; odkYr[kwf wjznf;jznf;csif; wdk;wufajymif;vJvmcJhjcif; odkYr[kwf 'kwd,uÇmppf\ &v'faMumifh odkYr[kwf ppfat;umvNyD; aemufwGif Oa&myü zefwD;wnfaxmifcJhjcif; jzpfonf/ 1995 ckESpf

abmhpeD;,m;ESifh [mZD*dkAD;em; (BiH)? 1995 ckESpf tDoD,dk;yD;,m;ESifh 2005 ckESpf tD&wf wdkY&Sd zuf'&,fyHkpHopfrsm;onf EdkifiHwumrS trsKd;tpm;trsKd;rsKd;jzifh Mum;0ifpGufzufrIrsm; yg0ifNyD; tqdkyg zuf'&,fyHkpHwpfckcsif;pDonf y#dyu© jzpfpOfrsm; jzpfyGm;NyD;aemuf pdwfxdcdkufzG,fjyóemrsm;rS ay:aygufvmjcif;jzpfNyD; uREkfyfwdkYtaejzifh ta&;BuD;onfh tajctaersm;pGmwGif ,if;wdkYtm; tjcm;trsKd;tpm;wpfcktjzpf ,lqEdkifonf/ odkY&mwGif t"dutcsufrSm - ,if; wdkYonf tcsKdUaom odomonfh >cif;csufrsm;rSvGJí ,if;wdkYonf vpfb&,f'Drdkua&pDpepfrsm; jzpfcJhMuNyD; vpfb&,f 'Drdkua&pDpepfrsm; jzpfaeMuqJjzpfonf/ þae&mwGif ta&;tBuD;qHk; tav;ay; azmfjy&rnfhtcsufrSm - w&m;0if zuf'a&;&Sif;rsm;ESifh w&m;0ifr[kwfonfh zuf'&,fEdkifiHa&; pepfrsm;onf vpfb&,f'Drdkua&pDpepfrsm; xGef;um; aeonfh tajctaewGifom &SifoefEdkifonf[laom tcsufyifjzpfonf/ ,if;odkY jzpf&jcif;taMumif;t&if;rSm uGJjym;jcm;em;NyD; rwluGJjym;onfh EdkifiHa&;tm; tqdkygEdkifiHrsm;ESifh pepfrsm;wGifom zGJUpnf;yHktajccHOya'? Oya' aMumif;ESifh EdkifiHa&;t& tmrcHcsufay;EdkifaomaMumifh jzpfonf/ aemufqHk;taejzifh ,if;onf w&m;0ifzuf'a&; &Sif;ESifh zuf'&,fEdkifiHa&;pepfrsm;wGif usifhoHk;aeaom tavhtxrsm;\ t"dutajccH&nf&G,fcsufrsm;teuf wpfcktygt0if jzpfonf/


Federalism and Democracy

So what is it about liberal democracy that chimes so well with federal states and political systems?

The answer lies in democratic theory but for our purposes here we can identify an assortment of values

and principles that are indispensable to the functioning of a healthy liberal democracy. Consider the fol-

lowing: the rule of law; the independence of the judiciary; regular elections of all the main offices of state

by secret ballot embracing all citizens above 18 or 16 years old on the published electoral register; a

competitive political party system; a legitimate opposition to government with the right to replace it; a

viable, functioning local or communal government; and a series of human rights codified in law as a bill or

charter of rights. These liberal democratic principles are of course underpinned by a set of basic human

values which include the unrelenting protection and pursuit of liberty, a public commitment to different

forms of equality and the provision by the state of security and welfare of the person in general.

If we think back to the twin cultural-ideological and socio-economic streams of federalism introduced

above, it takes little thought to appreciate just how far these liberal democratic values and principles allow

the claims of identity politics in particular to breathe and express themselves freely and usually (but not

always) without fear. The basic values inherent in federalism such as human dignity, equality, toleration,

respect, recognition, reciprocity and empathy dovetail neatly with liberal democratic values as do the fed-

eral principles of equal partnership, contract, comity (loyalty), self-rule and shared rule, and autonomy

(Burgess 2012). Pondering this, it is clearly easy to dismiss the historical federal models of the Soviet Union

(USSR), Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia as genuine federations, despite what some American scholars have

argued, because even if they paid lip-service to the federal idea they were not liberal democracies. The

USSR had a so-called ‘Council of Nationalities’ and the Yugoslav federal model of 1974 did nod its head

toward recognition of its six constituent national republics but in practical reality they were authoritarian

military regimes where all the lines of political communication went through the single central party or-

ganisation controlled by a tiny elite.


zuf'&,fpepfESifh 'Drdkua&pDodkYqdkvQif vpfb&,f'Drdkua&pDonf zuf'&,fEdkifiHrsm;? zuf'&,fEdkifiHa&;pepfrsm;ESifh tb,hfaMumifh tvGef

o[Zmw jzpfae&oenf;/ tajzonf 'Drdku&ufwpfoDtdk&DwGif &Sdaomfvnf; þpmwrf;twGif;&Sd uREkfyfwdkY\ &nf&G,fcsufrsm;twGufrl aumif;rGefonfh vpfb&,f'Drdkua&pDwpfck vnfywfEdkifa&;twGuf ta&;ygonfh wefzdk; rsm;ESifh tajccHoabmw&m;rsm; pkpnf;rIwpfckudk uREkfyfwdkYtaejzifh cGJjcm;owfrSwfEdkifonf/ atmufygwdkYudk xnfh oGif;pOf;pm;yg - w&m;Oya'pdk;rdk;a&;? w&m;pD&ifa&;wGif vGwfvyfrI&Sda&;? xkwfjyefaMunmxm;onfh rJqE´&Sif rSwfyHkwifpm&if;wGif yg0ifaom touf 18 ESpf odkYr[kwf 16 ESpf txuf&Sdol EdkifiHom;wdkif; EdkifiH\ t"dutpdk;& Xmersm;tm;vHk;udk vQdKU0SufqErJay;jcif;jzifh yHkrSefa&G;aumufwifajr§mufjcif;? tNydKiftqdkif EdkifiHa&;ygwDpepfwpfck? tpdk;&tm; tpm;xdk;Edkifonfh tcGifhta&;&Sdaom w&m;Oya'ESifh nDñGwfonfh twdkuftcH? vkyfief;rsm; azmfaqmif EdkifNyD; vnfywfaeonfh a'oÅ&tpdk;& odkYr[kwf vlrItodkif;t0kdif;qdkif&mtpdk;&wpf&yfESifh Oya'Murf;tjzpf odkYr[kwf tcGifhta&;rsm;qdkif&my#dnmOfpmcsKyftjzpf Oya'jy|mef;xm;onfh vlYtcGifhta&;rsm;/ tqdkyg vpfb&,f 'Drdkua&pD tajccHoabmw&m;rsm;onf vGwfvyfrItm; tpOfumuG,fapmifha&Smufjcif;ESifh azmfaqmifjcif;? wef;wlnDrQrIyHkpHtrsKd;rsKd;twGuf trsm;jynfol\ uwdu0wfESifh a,bk,s tm;jzifh yk*¾dKvfwpfOD;csif;pD\ vHkNcHKa&; ESifh oufomacsmifcsda&;twGuf tpdk;&rS axmufyHhay;jcif;wdkYtygt0if tajccHvlYwefzdk;rsm;jzifh axmufyHhay; xm;onf/

tu,fí uREkfyfwdkYtaejzifh txufwGif rdwfqufazmfjycJhonfh zuf'&,fpepf\ ,Ofaus;rIqdkif&m t,ltq ESifh vlrIpD;yGm;a&;qdkif&m vrf;aMumif;ESpfckudk jyefvnfpOf;pm;Munfhygu vpfb&,f'Drdkua&pDwefzdk;rsm;ESifh tajccH oabmw&m;rsm; onf txl;ojzifh vGwfvyfNyD; trsm;tm;jzifh (odkY&mwGif tNrJwrf;r[kwfbJ) taMumufw&m; uif;pGm touf&Sifaexdkifum xkwfazmfajymqdkEdkif&eftwGuf 0daoovu©Pmqdkif&m EdkifiHa&; awmif;qdkcsufrsm; tm; rnfrQtxd &&SdapcJhonfudk tenf;i,fpOf;pm½HkrQjzifh od&SdEdkifayonf/ vlY*kPfodu©m? wef;wlnDrQrI? onf;cH cGifhvTwfrI? av;pm;rI? todtrSwfjyKrI? tjyeftvSef ,HkMunfrIESifh pmemrIwdkYuJhodkYaom zuf'&,fpepfwGif yg0ifonfh tajccHwefzdk;rsm;onf vpfb&,f'Drdku&ufwpfwefzdk;rsm;ESifh pepfwus csdwfqufaeMuNyD; wef;wlrdwfzuf aqmif&GufrI? oabmwlnDrI? tjyeftvSef o[ZmwjzpfrI (opömapmifhodrI)? udk,fydkiftkyfcsKyfrI? rQa0tkyfcsKyfrIESifh udk,fydkiftkyfcsKyfcGifh [lonfh zuf'&,ftajccHoabmw&m;rsm;onfvnf; vpfb&,f'Drdku&ufwpf tajccHoabm

w&m;rsm;ESifh pepfwusqufpyfaeonf (Burgess 2012 ckESpf)/ ,if;udk tav;teufxm; pOf;pm;ygu qdkAD,uf

jynfaxmifpk (USSR)? ,l*dkqvm;AD;,m;ESifh csufudkqvdkAufuD;,m;wdkY\ tpOftvm zuf'&,fyHkpHrsm;onf zuf'&,ft,ltqudk tay:,HrQ xkwfazmfajymqdkaomfvnf; ,if;wdkYonf vpfb&,f'Drdkua&pDrsm; r[kwfojzifh tcsKdUaom tar&duefynm&Sifrsm;rS ajymqdkcJhonfrsm;&Sdaomfjim; ,if;wdkYtm; ppfrSefaomzuf'a&;&Sif;rsm;tjzpfrS

&Sif;vif;vG,fulpGm z,fxkwfEdkifonf/ USSR wGif trnfcHrQomjzpfaom ]vlrsKd;pkrsm;qdkif&m aumifpD} &SdcJhNyD; 1974 ckESpf ,l*dkqvm;AD;,m;EdkifiH\ zuf'&,fyHkpHonf ,if;\ tpdwftydkif; trsKd;om;or®wEdkifiH 6 ckudk tod trSwfjyK&ef oabmwlnDcJhaomfvnf; vufawGUtppftrSefwGifrl ,if;wdkYonf ppftmPm&SiftkyfcsKyfrIrsm;om jzpfNyD; EdkifiHa&;qdkif&m owif;tcsuftvufazmfjyrIudk vlenf;pkwpfpkrS xdef;csKyfonfh A[dkygwD tzGJUtpnf;wpfck uom vkyfaqmifonf/


Federalism: A History of Misunderstandings?

Having looked briefly at federalism, federation and liberal democracy, it is useful to our larger purpose

to consider very briefly some of the widely misunderstood aspects of federalism (as most people know it)

and to engage with some familiar criticisms of it that we often read in the British daily press or in the

minds of many politicians who should know better but do not. One way to process these misunderstand-

ings and criticisms is to look at the context in which they are made and at who is making them. In the UK,

federalism as a viable idea and a practical proposition has been woefully overlooked and even scornfully

dismissed as the ‘f’- word. This irrational emotive reaction is not the end-product of a carefully considered

and researched judgement; rather it is the ramblings of a confused and largely politically illiterate media

and population. It is as if this rather silly act of shaving away the letters of the term is an intelligent way

of removing it from the public discourse as somehow unworthy. If we locate the context to the UK state

and to the European Union (EU), it will not surprise us to learn that it has generated much more heat than

light even if we dignify what has passed in the media as some sort of a continuing public debate with an

informed and educated audience. It is rather like saying ‘I do not understand it but I am opposed to it’. The

vast majority of the British population and their politicians do not know their own history. For nearly 150

years the federal idea, federal movements and a genuine albeit elite federal political discourse over the

reorganisation of the British Empire, the Irish Question and membership of the EU has been present in the

British House of Commons, the House of Lords, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and in some wider

government circles (Burgess 1995; Kendle 1989).

Today it is ironic that supporters of the federal idea for the UK have been criticised for wanting to

break up the union while British federalists who advocate a federal Europe are condemned for wanting to

go too far with economic and political integration. But this is really about the point of departure. The fed-

eral idea can be both centralist and decentralist depending upon different circumstances so that what

would be construed as a movement essentially in a decentralising direction for a federal UK would be cast

as a centralist movement in BiH and in the EU. Consequently we can understand why some people find this

confusing. The irony is extended when we recognise that a federal Europe is not about creating a state, let

alone a unitary state, but on the contrary a decentralized union that in current political parlance is neither

fish nor fowl. It is a composite and compound union that contains strong federal, confederal, supranational

and intergovernmental elements. In other words it is centralising in order to recalibrate itself into a more

mature and advanced but decentralised form of union.


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onfh enf;vrf;wpfckozG,f jzpfaeonf/ ,lauEdkifiHESifh Oa&myor*¾ (EU) wdkY&Sd tajctaeudk od&Sdygu ,if;udpöudk owif;tcsuftvuf jynfh0pGm&&Sdxm;onfh ynmwwfy&dowfrsm;tMum; trsm;jynfolqdkif&m tjiif;yGm;ae&qJ udpö&yfyHkpHwpfrsKd;tjzpf rD'D,mrsm;wGif azmfjycJhMuonfrsm;udk qifajcay;í umuG,fajymqdkvQifyif ,if;onf jyóem\ tajzray:bJ a'goxGufzG,fom jzpfcJhaMumif; awGU&Sd&onfrSm tHhtm;oifhzG,f r[kwfay/ ,if;onf ]uREkfyftaejzifh xdkudpöudk em;rvnfaomfvnf; uefYuGufygonf/} [lí ajymqdkouJhodkY jzpfaeonf/ NAdwdoQvlxkESifh ,if;wdkY\ EdkifiHa&;orm;rsm;onf ,if;wdkY\ udk,fydkifordkif;aMumif;udk rod&SdMuay/ NAdwdoQtifyg,mudk jyefvnf zGJUpnf;jcif;? tdkif;&pfar;cGef;ESifh Oa&myor*¾tzGJU0ifjzpfrIwdkYtay: zuf'&,ft,ltq? zuf'&,fa&;vIyf&Sm;rIrsm;? ppfrSefaomzuf'&,fESifh vlwpfpkrS xdef;csKyfonfh zuf'&,fponfh EdkifiHa&;tjiif;yGm;rIrsm;onf NAdwdoQ atmuf vTwfawmf? txufvTwfawmf? EdkifiHjcm;a&;? "eo[m,½Hk;ESifh tcsKdU aom ydkrdkus,fjyefY onfh tpdk;&todkif;t0dkif;rsm;

twGif; ESpfaygif; 150 eD;yg; &SdaecJhonf (Burgess 1995 ckESpf? Kendle 1989 ckESpf)/,aeYtcgwGif ,lau&Sd zuf'&,ft,ltqudk axmufcHolrsm;onf jynfaxmifpkudk NydKuGJapvdkolrsm;[k

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jcif;udk OD;wnfonf[k ,lqEdkifonfhvIyf&Sm;rIonf abmhpeD;,m; [mZD*dkAD;em;ESifh EU wdkYwGif A[dkcsKyfudkifrIudk jr§ifhwifonfh vIyf&Sm;rIwpfcktjzpf ½ Ijrifjcif;cH&Edkifonf/ aemufqufwGJtm;jzifh tcsKdUaomyk* ¾ dKvfrsm;taejzifh ,if;udk ½IyfaxG;onf[lí tb,fhaMumifh xifjrifMuaMumif; uREkfyfwdkYtaejzifh em;vnfoabmaygufEdkifonf/ zuf'&,fOa&myqdkonfrSm wpfjynfaxmif EdkifiHwpfckwnfaxmif&efudk rqdkxm;ESifh? EdkifiHwpfck wnfaxmif&efyif r[kwfbJ ,if;\ qefYusifbuftm;jzifh vuf&SdEdkifiHa&;t& trsKd;tpm;cGJjcm;owfrSwf&ef cufcJ onfh A[dkcsKyfudkifrI avQmhcsxm;aom jynfaxmifpkwpfck wnfaxmif&efjzpfaMumif; od&Sd&aomtcg tqDtai: rwnfhrIudk xyfrHawGU jrif&jyefonf/ ,if;onf cdkifrmonfh zuf'&,f? uGefzuf'&,f? jynfaxmifrsm; aygif;pnf;tkyfcsKyfaom? tpdk;&rsm;


The current EU is clearly the latest institutional expression of the European federal idea but it still has

much to do in terms of institutional reform and democratisation in order to bring it closer to its mass

publics who in the UK do not understand its historical origins and evolution, what it is there for today, how

it works and what public goods it provides for its citizens. Small wonder that offering a referendum to this

electorate, steeped in the slow drip-drip of misinformation and disinformation by the media for over forty

years, have produced such a negative result in June 2016 for both the British and the Europeans. The fed-

eral idea in the UK has never really been a subject of serious informed public debate. It is a political idea

that is easy to misrepresent and demonise and yet it may still be the basis of hope for future generations.


tMum;&Sd tpdwftydkif;rsm; yg0ifonfh pkaygif;xm;aom jynfaxmifpkwpfck jzpfonf/ wpfenf;qdk&ygu ,if;onf zGHU NzdK;rI ydkrdkjynfh0NyD; tqifhjrifhí A[dkcsKyfudkifrI avQmhcsxm;onfh jynfaxmifpkyHkpHwpfrsKd; jzpfvm&ef A[dkcsKyfudkif aeqJjzpfaom tajctae jzpfygonf/

vuf&Sd Oa&myor* ¾onf Oa&myzuf'&,fa&;&mt,ltq\ tifpwDusL;&Sif;yHkpH jy,k*fwpfck jzpfaeonfrSm xif&Sm;ygonf/ odkY&mwGif Oa&myor* ¾taejzifh ,if;\ ordkif;aMumif;ZmpfjrpfESifh ay:aygufvmyHk? ,aeYacwf Oa&myor* ¾jzpfwnfrI\ taMumif;&if;? rnfodkY vnfywfvkyfaqmifaMumif;ESifh jynfolrsm;twGuf rnfonfh trsm;jynfolqdkif&mxkwfukefrsm; axmufyHhay;aeaMumif;wdkYudk em;vnfoabmaygufjcif;r&Sdonfh ,lau&Sd trsm; jynfolESifh ydkrdkeD;uyfrI&&Sda&;twGuf tifpwDusL;&Sif;qdkif&m jyKjyifajymif;vJrIrsm;ESifh 'Drdkua&pDazmfaqmifrIrsm; vkyfaqmif&ef rsm;pGmvdktyfvsuf &Sdaeao;ygonf/ ,if;odkYaom rD'D,mrsm;rS ESpfaygif; av;q,fcefY tcsuf tvuf trSm;rsm;ESifh r[kwfrrSefowif;rsm; wjznf;jznf;pdrfh0ifaecJhjcif;aMumifh rJqE&Sifrsm;xHrS qEcH,lyGJ usif;y cJh&mwGif NAdwdoQEdkifiHom;rsm;ESifh wuG Oa&myom;rsm;twGufyg tEkwfoabmaqmifonfh &v'fwpfckudk 2016 ckESpf ZGefvwGif &&SdcJhonf/ ,lau&Sd zuf'&,fqdkif&m t,ltqonf owif;tcsuftvufrsm; tav;teufay; onfh trsm;jynfolqdkif&m aqG;aEG;jiif;cHkrItaMumif;t&mwpf&yf rnfonfhtcgrQ rjzpfcJhzl;acs/ ,if;onf o½kyf ouef vGJrSm;NyD; raumif;jrif&efvG,fulaeonfh EdkifiHa&;t,ltqwpf&yf jzpfaeonfhwdkif tem*wfrsKd;qufrsm; twGuf arQmfvifhcsuftajccHwpfck jzpfaeEdkifao;ygonf/


Further ReadingBurgess, M. 2013. ‘The Penumbra of Federalism: A conceptual reappraisal of federalism,

federation, confederation and federal political systems’ in J. Loughlin, J. Kincaid and W. Swenden

(eds.), Routledge Handbook of Regionalism and Federalism. London and New York: Routledge.

Burgess, M. and A. G. Gagnon. 2010. Federal Democracies. Oxon: Routledge.

Gagnon, A.G., S. Keil and S. Mueller. 2015. Understanding Federalism and Federation. London:

Routledge.


Bibliography

Burgess, M. 1985. The British Tradition of Federalism. London: Leicester University Press.

Burgess, M. 2006. Comparative Federalism Theory and Practice. London and New York:

Routledge.

Burgess, M. 2012. In Search of the Federal Spirit. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kendle, J. E. 1989. Ireland and the Federal Solution: The Debate over the United Kingdom

Constitution, 1870-1921. Kingston & WMontreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.

King, P. 1982. Federalism and Federation. Basingstoke. Croom Helm.

Poirier, J., C. Saunders and J. Kincaid. 2015. Intergovernmental Relations in Federal Systems:

Comparative Structures and Dynamics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.


2. Self-rule and Shared Ruleukd,fydkiftkyfcsKyfjcif; ESifh rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif;toGifuGJrsm;

ukd,fydkiftkyfcsKyfjcif; ESifh rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif; toGifuGJrsm; I 25

Dr. Sean Mueller onf (qGpftrsKd;om;odyÜHazmifa';&Sif;u &efyHkaiG yHhykd;aom)

Ambizione okawoDwpfOD;jzpfNyD; qGpfZmvefEkdifiH&Sd University of Berne rS EkdifiHa&; odyÜHtifpwDusKwGif uxduwpfOD;vnf; jzpfygonf/ olonf qGpfZmvefEkdifiH\

jynfe,frsm; (cantons) &Sd A[kdcsKyfukdifrI avQmhcsjcif;taMumif; pmwrf; jzifh University

of Kent rS PhD &&SdcJhonf/ ol\ t"duokawoee,fy,frsm;rSm qGpfZmvef EkdifiHESifh

EdIif;&zuf'&,fpepf (Swiss and comparative federalism)? a'oÅ&0g' (regionalism)?

a'oÅ&tpkd;&? EkdifiHa&;ygwDrsm;ESifh wkduf½dkuf'Drkdua&pDwkdY jzpfMuonf/ olonf ECPR

Press, Routledge ESifh Ashgate wkdYESifh pmtkyfrsm; xkwfa0cJhum ol\ aqmif;yg;rsm;ukd

Publius, Regional & Federal Studies, Swiss Political Science Review, Journal of

Public Policy, Government & Opposition ESifh European Political Science Review ponfwkdYwGif azmfjycJhonf/

Dr. Sean Mueller is Ambizione researcher (funded by the Swiss national Sci-

ence Foundation) and lecturer at the Institute of Political Science, University

of Berne, Switzerland. He obtained his PhD from the University of Kent with a

thesis in decentralisation in the Swiss cantons. His main areas of research are

Swiss and comparative federalism, regionalism, local government, political par-

ties and direct democracy. He has published books with ECPR Press, Routledge

as well as Ashgate, and articles of his have appeared in Publius, Regional & Fed-

eral Studies, Swiss Political Science Review, Journal of Public Policy, Government

& Opposition, and European Political Science Review, amongst others.

26 I Self-rule and Shared Rule

Introduction and Definitions

“Self-rule” and “shared rule” are two widely used notions to define, describe and classify federal

political systems. There is wide agreement in the literature that self-rule refers to autonomy and hence the

extent to which sub-national units (Länder, cantons, States, provinces, autonomous communities etc.) are

free in deciding, financing and implementing their own policies. Of course, self-rule can take various forms

as well, namely the power to make public policy decisions that deviate from or even contradict upper-level

standards; the capacity to raise revenue via specific taxation – or not, and thus fuel cross-regional tax

competition; the liberty to accept or refuse federal funding for specific projects; or the ability to implement

national rules according to regional specificities, e.g. make it even harder or easier to register property. In

all this, however, decisions always and exclusively relate to the region’s own territory, which is what the

“self” in self-rule refers to. Shared rule, by contrast, can refer to three radically different manifestations of

territorial power, depending on who exactly is meant by the “sharing with”-component – as we can only

share with someone else, who this other is defines the understanding of shared rule.

Thus, a first understanding of shared rule (e.g. Hooghe et al. 2016) defines it as the extent to which

sub-national units can participate in decisions that concern the whole political community and not just

their region. A good example of this is the German second chamber, the Bundesrat, whereby each of the 16

Land governments is directly represented and whose consent is needed on national legislation affecting

the Länder. Land governments thus have the possibility to formally veto national decisions if they feel their

interests are not sufficiently taken into account. The “other”, in this case, is the national community, and

power is shared with a simple or qualified majority of different regions.

A second, alternative understanding of shared rule refers to horizontal cooperation between constitu-

ent units at the exclusion of the federal government. In Switzerland, for example, there are some 800

treaties between two, several or even all 26 cantons that regulate common standards. This can go as far as

providing for inter-cantonal commissions, for example to rule on the admissibility of diplomas and certifi-

cates. Cantons are said to share their rule by cooperating and providing for common institutions although

these do not involve the federal level. Synonyms for shared rule understood as horizontal cooperation are

regionalisation (if cooperation is confined to only a handful of units) and harmonisation (if it involves all

constituent units). The “other”, in this case, refers to selected co-regions.


ed'gef;ESifh t"dyÜm,fzGifhqkdcsufrsm; ]ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfjcif;} ESifh ]rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif;} wkdYonf zuf'&,fEkdifiHa&;pepfrsm;ukd t"dyÜm,f zGifhqkd&ef? azmfjy

&efESifh trsKd;tpm;cGJjcm;&ef wGifus,fpGmtoHk;jyKMuonfh t,ltqESpfck jzpfygonf/ ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfa&; (self-

rule) onf e,fajrtvdkuf udk,fykdiftkyfcsKyfpDrHcGifh&Sdjcif; (autonomy) tm; &nfòef;NyD; a'oÅ&,lepfrsm; jzpfonfh

jynfe,f (Länder, cantons, States, provinces)? ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfcGifh& vlYtzGJUtpnf;rsm;wkdYonf ,if;wkdY\ rl0g' rsm;ESifh pyfvsOf;NyD; qHk;jzwfjcif;? aiGaMu;qdkif&mudpö&yfrsm;ESifh taumiftxnfazmfjcif;wdkY rnfonfh twkdif;twm txd vGwfvyfonfukd qkdvkdaMumif; pmayrsm;wGif us,fjyefYpGmoabmwlnDxm;Muonf/ ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfjcif;wGif yHkpHrsKd;pHk &SdEkdifygonf/ qkd&vQif txuftqifh\pHrsm;rS aoGznf okdYr[kwf qefYusifíyif jynfolYrl0g'qkdif&m qHk;jzwf csufrsm; jyKEkdifonfh tmPmESifh tcsKdUaomtcGeftaumufrsm; jy|mef;jcif;jzifh 0ifaiG&SmazGEkdifpGrf;&Sdjcif; - okdYr[kwf r&Sdjcif;ESifh a'owGif;tcGeftaumufESifhywfoufNyD; NydKifqkdifjcif;? tcsKdUaom pDrHudef;rsm; twGuf zuf'&,f tpkd;& xHrS &efyHkaiGukd vGwfvyfpGmvufcHcGifh okdYr[kwf jiif;y,fEkdifcGifh okdYr[kwf EkdifiHawmfu owfrSwf aom pnf;rsOf;rsm;ukd a'oqkdif&mtajctaersm;ESifh ukdufnDatmif taumiftxnfazmfEkdifpGrf;? Oyrm - ykdifqkdifrIrsm;ukd rSwfyHkwif&mwGif ykdrkdcufcJapjcif; okdYr[kwf ykdrkd vG,fulapjcif;wkdY jzpfMuonf/ okdYaomf ,if;wkdYtm;vHk;wGif qHk;jzwfcsufrsm;onf tNrJwrf;tm;jzifh oufqkdif&ma'o\ ukd,fykdife,fedrdwfrsm;twGif;ESifhom oD;oefYoufqkdifonf/ ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyf jcif;qkdaompmvHk;&Sd ukd,fykdifqkdonfu ,if;ukd &nfòef;onf/ tjcm; wpfzufwGif rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif;qkdonfrSm ]… ESifh a0rQ} onfqkd&mwGif rnfolYtm;qkdvkdonfukd rlwnfí a'oe,fedrdwfqkdif&m tmPm\ vHk;0uGJjym;jcm;em;aom yHkpH 3 rsKd;ukd &nfòef;onf/ uREfkyfwkdYonf wpfpHkwpfckukd a0rQygu tjcm;wpfpHkwpfOD;&Sd&rnfjzpfonf/ rQa0 tkyfcsKyfjcif;tay: em;vnfoabmaygufjcif;ukd ,if;tjcm; wpfpHk wpfOD;onf rnfoljzpfonfqkdonfu t"dyÜm,f owfrSwfonf/

okdYjzpf&m rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif;ukd yxrqHk;em;vnfoabmaygufjcif; (Oyrm - Hooghe et al. 2016) u a'oÅ& ,lepfrsm;taejzifh ,if;wkdY a'otwGufomru EkdifiHa&;tokdif;t0kdif;wpfckvHk;twGufyg ta&;ygaom qHk;jzwf csufrsm;wGif yg0ifaqmif&GufEkdifrnfhtwkdif;twm[k t"dyÜm,fzGifhqkdxm;ygonf/ ,if;twGuf Oyrmaumif; wpfck

rSm *smreDEkdifiH\ txufvTwfawmfjzpfaom the Bundesrat jzpfygonf/ ,if;onf jynfe,f (Länder) 16 ckrS

tpkd;&rsm;ukd wkduf½dkufukd,fpm;jyKNyD; Länder rsm; tay: oufa&mufrI&Sdrnfh trsKd;om;Oya'rsm;twGuf ,if;\ oabmwlnDrI&&Sd&ef vkdtyfonf/ xkdYaMumifh jynfe,ftpkd;&rsm;onf tu,fí olwkdY\ tusKd; pD;yGm;rsm;ukd vHkavmufpGm xnfhoGif;pOf;pm;xm;jcif;r&Sd[k cHpm;&vQif EkdifiHawmftqifhrS qHk;jzwfcsufrsm;ukd w&m;0ifADwkd tmPmoHk;um y,fcsEkdifonfh tcGifhtvrf;&Sdonf/ þjzpfpOfwGif ]tjcm;} qkdonfrSm EkdifiHwpf0ef;vHk;rS vlxkjzpfNyD; rwlnDaoma'orsm;\ omreftrsm;pk okdYr[kwf twkdif;twmowfrSwfxm;aom trsm;pkjzifh tmPmukd rQa0 xm;onf/

rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif;ukd 'kwd,taejzifh tjcm;em;vnfoabmaygufyHkrSm zuf'&,ftpkd;&rSvGJí jynfe,f,lepf rsm; tMum;&Sd a&jyifnDyl;aygif;aqmif&GufrI jzpfonf/ Oyrmtm;jzifh qGpfZmvefEkdifiHwGif jynfe,f 2 ck tMum;? tcsKdU tMum;ESifh 26 ckvHk; tMum;wGif bHkpHEIef;rsm;ukd xdef;ausmif;aom oabmwlnDcsufaygif; 800 cefY &Sdonf/ ,if;wGif jynfe,frsm;tMum; aumfr&Sifrsm;xm;&Sdjcif;txd yg&SdEkdifonf/ Oyrm - 'Dyvkdrmrsm;? todtrSwfjyK vufrSwfrsm; ay;tyfjcif;twGuf vkyfykdifcGifhwkdY jzpfonf/ zuf'&,ftqifh ryg0ifaomfvnf; jynfe,frsm;onf yl;aygif;aqmif&Gufjcif;ESifh bHktifpwDusL;&Sif;rsm;twGuf yHhykd;jcif;wkdYjzifh ,if;wkdY\ vkyfydkifcGifhrsm;udk rQa0Muonf/ a&jyifnDyl;aygif;aqmif&Gufjcif;taejzifh em;vnfoabmaygufMuaom rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif;twGuf tjcm; tac: ta0:wpfckrSm (tu,fí yl;aygif;aqmif&Gufjcif;onf ,lepftenf;i,ftwGif;wGifom &SdcJYvQif) a'otvkduf


A third and final meaning of shared rule, and probably the one intended by its original creator (Elazar

1987), defines it as the powers and competences of the central government. This stems from the idea that

when regions come together in a federal union, they delegate some powers to the new entity and retain

others in their exclusive jurisdiction (self-rule). Here, shared rule equates to centralisation – power is

shared in the form of a new “other”, i.e. a new, supra-regional government largely beyond the reach of indi-

vidual regions. In the United States, for example, the power to declare war was handed over by the 13

founding States in 1787 to the newly established US Congress (Section 8, paragraph 11).

The Link between these Concepts and Federal Studies

The most encompassing and rigorous study of self-rule and shared rule has been devised by

Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, Arjan Schakel and various other collaborators (Hooghe et al. 2016). They

conceive of self-rule and shared rule as the two essential dimensions of what they call the Regional

Authority Index (RAI) and propose a detailed measurement scheme (Table 1). The latest edition of their

dataset covers 81 (quasi-)democracies between 1950 and 2010 and includes all regions with an average

population of at least 150.000. Ever since the creation of the RAI, it has been possible to systematically

compare federal and non-federal systems on all or only selected dimensions of self-rule and/or shared

rule.

The main advantages of this conceptualisation are that, as it builds on formal rules defined in the

constitution or legislation, it provides an externally valid, reliable and transparent image of regional au-

thority. However, the main disadvantage is that informal mechanisms of regional influence – e.g. that ex-

ercised by political parties or exercised via adjudication – remain in the dark. Also, the extent to which

these channels are actually made use of warrants further empirical investigation. For example, given the

authority to co-determine national tax revenue distribution, what alliances are formed between which

regional representatives, and under what conditions are regions able to impose their will against the

central government – i.e. to exercise power in the Weberian sense?


vkyfykdifcGifhrsm;ay;um ykdif;jcm;vkyfukdifjcif; (regionalizaton) [líjzpfNyD; (tu,fí ,lepfrsm;tm;vHk; yg0ifcJh

vQif) nDñGwf o[ZmwjzpfatmifjyKjcif; (harmonisation) [lí jzpfonf/ þudpöwGif ]tjcm;olrsm;} qkdonfrSm a&G;cs,fxm;onfh wGJzufvkyfaqmifaom a'orsm;ukd qkdvkdonf/

rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif;\ wwd,ESifh aemufqHk;t"dyÜm,fwpfck - ,if;ukd zefwD;cJhaomol (Elazar 1987) taejzifh &nf&G,fcJhaomt"dyÜm,f jzpfaumif;jzpfEkdifonfhwpfckrSm A[kdtpkd;&\ tmPmESifh vkyfykdifcGifhrsm;[lí jzpfonf/ ,if;t"dyÜm,fonf a'orsm;aygif;pnf;vmNyD; zuf'&,fjynfaxmifpk jzpfvmaomtcgwGif ,if;wkdY\ tmPm tcsKdU ukd ay:aygufvmaom jynfaxmifpkokdY vTJajymif;ay;NyD; useftmPmrsm;ukd ,if;wkdY\ oD;oefYe,fy,f twGif; wGif csefvSyfxdef;odrf;xm;onf (ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfjcif;) [laom t,ltqrS jrpfzsm;cHonf/ þae&mwGif rQa0 tkyfcsKyfjcif;onf A[kdwGif tmPmrsm;pkpnf;jcif;ESifh nDrQaeonf - tmPmukd ]tjcm;} aemufwpfcktoGifjzifh rQa0jcif; jzpfonf/ qkdvkdonfrSm oD;jcm; a'owpfckcsif;pD\ vufvSrf;rDrIxuf ausmfvGefaom? a'otqifhxuf jrifhrm;onfh tpkd;&topfwpf&yf toGifjzifh jzpfonf/ Oyrmtm;jzifY tar&duefjynfaxmifpkwGif ppfaMunmEdkifaom tmPmukd 1787 ckESpfwGif jynfaxmifpkukd pwifxlaxmifcJhMuonfh jynfe,f 13 ck wkdYu topfjzpfay:vmaom tar&duefuGef*&ufokdY vTJajymif;ay;cJhMuonf (tykdif; 8? pmykd'f 11)/

þt,ltqrsm;ESifh zuf'&,favhvmrIrsm;tMum; tcsdwftqufukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfjcif;ESifh rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif;wkdYESifhywfoufNyD; vTrf;NcHKrIt&SdqHk;ESifh aphaphpyfpyft&SdqHk; avhvm

rIrsm;u Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, Arjan Schakel ESifh tjcm;yl;aygif;yg0ifolrsm;u vkyfaqmifcJhMuygonf

(Hooghe et al. 2016)/ olwdkYu ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfjcif;ESifh rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif;wkdYukd a'oqkdif&m tmPmykdifpkd;rI

tòef;udef; (Regional Authority Index - RAI) \ r&Sdrjzpf vkdtyfaomtpdwftykdif;ESpfck[k rSwf,lcJhMuum tao;pdwfwkdif;wmrI tpDtpOfwpfck (Z,m; 1) ukdvnf; tqkdjyKcJhMuonf/ olwkdY\ aemufqHk;tBudrfxkwf tcsuf tvufrsm;pm&if;wGif 1950 ESifh 2010 tMum; (wpfykdif;wpf0uf) 'Drkdua&pDEkdifiH 81 EkdifiHtaMumif; yg0ifNyD;

ysrf;rQtm;jzifh vlOD;a& 150,000 tenf;qHk;&Sdonfh a'orsm;tm;vHk; yg0ifonf/ RAI ukd pwifzefwD;cJhcsdefrSpí ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfjcif;ESifh^ okdYr[kwf rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif;\ tpdwftykdif;tm;vHk; okdYr[kwf tcsKdU a&G;cs,fxm;aom tpdwftykdif;rsm;ukd zuf'&,fESifh zuf'&,fr[kwfaom pepfrsm;tMum; pepfwus EdIif;,SOfvmEkdifaponf/

þt,ltq\ t"dutm;omcsufrSm ,if;onf tajccHOya' okdYr[kwf Oya'rsm;wGif jyqdkxm;aom w&m;0if yHkpHwus pnf;rsOf;rsm;tay:wGif tajcwnfxm;um a'oÅ&qkdif&mtmPmtwGufjyifyrS ckdifvHk ukd;pm; EkdifNyD; yGifhvif;jrifomaom yHk&dyfukd jzpfay:aponf/ okdYaomf t"dutm;enf;csufrSm a'oÅ& qkdif&m vTrf;rdk;rIrsm; jyK&eftwGuf Oyrmtm;jzifh EkdifiHa&;ygwDrsm;u usifhoHk;aom okdYr[kwf w&m;pD&ifa&;rSwpfqifh usifhoHk;aom ]yHkpHenf;us r[kwfonfh} ,Å&m;rsm;onf arSmif&dyftwGif;wGif &Sdaeao;jcif;yif jzpfonf/ xkdYtwl ,if;vrf;aMumif; rsm;ukd trSefwu,ftoHk;jyKonfhtwkdif;twmESifh ywfoufNyD; xyfrHvufawGU qef;ppf avhvmrIrsm;jyK&ef vkdtyf aeayonf/ Oyrmtm;jzifh EkdifiHawmftcGeftaumuf0ifaiGrsm; cGJa0jcif;ukd yl;wGJ qHk;jzwf&ef tmPmESifhywfoufí rnfonfh a'oÅ&udk,fpm;vS,frsm;tMum; r[mrdwfrsm; zGJUpnf;Muonf? rnfonfhtajctaewGif a'orsm;onf

A[kdtpkd;&ESifh qefYusifNyD; ,if;wkdY\ qE´twkdif; aqmif&GufEkdifonf - qkdvkdonfrSm Weberian yHkpHjzifh tmPmukd usifhoHk;jcif; - ponfwkdY jzpfonf/


Self-ruleThe authority exercised by a regional government over those who live in the region, from 0 to 18,

which is the sum of the following five dimensions:

Institutional depth

The extent to which a regional government is autonomous rather than deconcentrated (from 0

= no functioning general-purpose administration at regional level to 3 = non-deconcentrated,

general–purpose, administration not subject to central government veto)

Policy scope

The range of policies for which a regional government is responsible (from 0 = very weak

authoritative competence in a) economic policy; b) cultural-educational policy; c) welfare policy;

and d) one of the following: residual powers, police, own institutional set–up, local government

to 4 = authoritative competencies in d) and at least two of a), b), or c) plus authority over

immigration or citizenship)

Fiscal autonomy

The extent to which a regional government can independently tax its population (from 0 =

central government sets base and rate of all regional taxes to 4 = regional government sets

base and rate of at least one major tax)

Borrowing autonomy

The extent to which a regional government can borrow (from 0 = the regional government

does not borrow to 3 = the regional government may borrow without any centrally imposed

restrictions)

Represen-tation

The extent to which a region has an independent legislature and executive (from 0 = no

regional assembly and regional executive appointed by central government to 4 = directly

elected regional assembly and regional executive appointed by it or popularly elected)

Shared rule The authority exercised by a regional government or its representatives in the country as a whole,

from 0 to 12, which is the sum of the following five dimensions:

Law makingThe extent to which regional representatives co-determine national legislation (from 0 = no

regional representation to 2 = regional representation with veto rights over national laws

affecting their region)

Executive control

The extent to which a regional government co-determines national policy in intergovernmental

meetings (from 0 = no routine bi- or multilateral meetings between central and regional

governments to discuss national policies to 2 = routine bi- and multilateral meetings with

binding authority)

Fiscal controlThe extent to which regional representatives co-determine the distribution of national tax

revenues (from 0 = no regional consultation to 2 = consultations with veto powers)

Borrowing control

The extent to which a regional government co-determines subnational and national borrowing

constraints (from 0 to 2, equivalent to Fiscal Control)

Constitutional reform

The extent to which regional representatives co-determine constitutional change (from 0 = the

central government or national electorate can unilaterally reform the constitution to 4 = one or

several regional governments or their representatives can veto constitutional change)


ukd,fykdif tkyfcsKyfjcif;a'owGif; aexkdifolrsm;tay: a'oÅ&tpkd;& usifYoHk;aom tmPm? atmufyg twkdif;twm 5 ck ukd aygif;jcif;\ &v'frsm;jzpfNyD; 0 rS 18 txd &SdEkdifonf/

tifpwDusL;&Sif;qkdif&m euf½dIif;rI

a'oÅ&tpkd;&wpf&yftaejzifh A[kdrStmPmrsm; ,m,DvTJajymif; &&Sdxm;jcif;rsKd;xuf ukd,fykdifpDrH tkyfcsKyf ykdifcGifh rnfrQ&Sdonf qkdonfh twkdif;twm (0 = a'otqifhwGif tvkyfjzpfonfh taxGaxG tkyfcsKyfa&;r&Sd rS 3 = A[kdrS tmPmrsm; ,m,D &&Sdxm;jcif;rsKd; r[kwfbJ A[kdtpkd;&\ ADwkdvkyfykdif cGifh tay: rrSDwnfaom taxGaxGtkyfcsKyfa&;&Sd)

rl0g' twkdif;twm yrmP

a'oÅ&tpkd;&taejzifh wm0ef&Sdonfh rl0g'trsKd;tpm;rsm; (0 = (u) pD;yGm;a&;rl0g' (c) ,Ofaus;rI - ynma&;rl0g' (*) vlrIzlvHka&;rl0g'ESifh (C) atmufygwkdYteufrSwpfck - <uif;usef tmPmrsm;? jynfolY&J? tifpwDusL;&Sif;qkdif&m ukd,fykdifyHkpH? a'oÅ&tpkd;& rS 4 = (C) ESifh (u) (c) okdYr[kwf (*) wkdYteufrS tenf;qHk;ESpfck&Sd vTrf;rkd;Ekdifaom vkyfykdifcGifh tmPmrsm;tjyif vl0ifrIBuD;Muyfa&;ESifh EkdifiHom; owfrSwfrItay: vkyfykdifcGifh tmPmrsm;)

b@ma&;qkdif&m ukd,fykdif pDrHykdifcGifh

a'oÅ&tpkd;&wpf&yftaejzifh ,if;e,fedrdwftwGif; aexkdifolrsm;tay: vGwfvyfpGm tcGef aumufcHEkdifonfh twkdif;twm (0 = a'oqkdif&m tcGefrsm;tm;vHk;twGuf aumufcHrnfhEIef;ESifh taumufcH& rnfholrsm;ukd A[kdtpkd;&u owfrSwf rS 4 = tenf;qHk; t"du tcGeftrsKd;tpm; wpfck twGuf aumufcHrnfhEIef;ESifh taumufcH&rnfholrsm;ukd a'oÅ& tpkd;&u owfrSwf)

aiGacs;,ljcif;rsm;ukd vGwfvyfpGm ukd,fykdif

pDrHykdifcGifh

a'oÅ&tpkd;&taejzifY acs;,lEkdifonfh twkdif;twm (0 = a'oÅ& tpkd;&onf acs;,lEkdifjcif;r&Sd rS 3 = A[kdrS uefYowfcsuf wpfpHkwpf&mr&SdbJ a'oÅ&tpkd;&taejzifh acs;,lEkdif)

ukd,fpm;jyKrI

a'owpfckwGif oD;jcm;vGwfvyfaom vTwfawmfESifh tkyfcsKyfa&;tzGJU wnf&Sdonfh twkdif;twm (0 = a'oqkdif&m vTwfawmfr&Sd? a'oqkdif&m tkyfcsKyfa&;tBuD;tuJukd A[kdtpkd;&u cefYtyfonf rS 4 = wkduf½dkufa&G;aumuf wifajr§mufxm;aom a'oÅ&vTwfawmfESifh ,if;vTwfawmfu cefYtyf aom okdYr[kwf trsm;oabmqE´jzifY a&G;aumufaom a'oqkdif&m tkyfcsKyfa&; tBuD;tuJ)

rQa0 tkyfcsKyfjcif;a'oÅ&tpkd;& okdYr[kwf ,if;\ udk,fpm;vS,frsm;u wpfEkdifiHvHk; twkdif;twmwGif usifhoHk;aom vkyfykdifcGifhtmPm? atmufyg twdkif;twm 5 ck \ aygif;jcif;&v'frsm; jzpfNyD; 0 rS 12 txd &Sdonf/

Oya'jyKjcif;EkdifiHawmfOya'rsm;ukd a'oÅ& udk,fpm;vS,frsm; yl;wGJqHk;jzwfonfh twkdif;twm (0 = a'oÅ& ukd,fpm;jyKrIr&Sd rS 2 = rdrde,fajrrsm;tay: oufa&mufrI&Sdonfh EkdifiHawmfOya'rsm;udk ADwkd tmPmoHk;ykdifcGifh&Sdonfh a'oÅ& udk,fpm;jyKrI)

tkyfcsKyfa&;qkdif&m xdef;csKyfrI

tpdk;&tcsif;csif;tMum; aqG;aEG;yGJrsm;wGif EkdifiHawmftqifh rl0g'rsm;ukd a'oÅ&tpkd;&rsm;u yl;wGJ qHk;jzwfonfh twkdif;twm (0 = EkdifiHawmftqifh rl0g'rsm;ukd aqG;aEG;&ef A[kdESifh a'oÅ& tpkd;&rsm; tMum;wGif yHkrSef ESpfOD;ESpfzuf okdYr[kwf bufrsm;pGm yg0ifaom tpnf;ta0;rsm;r&Sd rS 2 = pnf;aESmifaom tmPm vkyfykdifcGifh yg&Sdaom ESpfOD;ESpfzuf okdYr[kwf bufrsm;pGm yg0ifaom tpnf;ta0;rsm;&dS)

b@ma&;qkdif&m xdef;csKyfrI

EkdifiHawmf tcGeftaumuf0ifaiGrsm;ukd cGJjcrf;a&;ESifh pyfvsOf;NyD; a'oÅ& ukd,fpm;vS,frsm;u yl;wGJqHk;jzwfonfh twkdif;twm (0= a'oqkdif&m wkdifyifaqG;aEG;rIrsm;r&Sd rS 2 = ADwkdtmPm usifhoHk;Ekdifaom a'oqkdif&m wkdifyifaqG;aEG;rIrsm;)

acs;,ljcif;qkdif&m xdef;csKyfrI

a'oÅ&tqifhESifh EkdifiHawmftqifh acs;,ljcif;qkdif&m tuefYtowfrsm;ukd a'oÅ& tpkd;&rsm;u yl;wGJqHk;jzwfEdkifonfh twkdif;twm (0 rS 2 txd? b@ma&;qkdif&m xdef;csKyfrIrsm;ESifh nDrQonf)

tajccHOya' jyKjyif ajymif;vJa&;

tajccHOya' jyKjyifajymif;vJrIrsm;ukd a'oÅ&tpkd;&rsm;u yl;wGJqHk;jzwfEkdifonfh twkdif;twm (0 = tajccHOya'ukd jyKjyifajymif;vJ&ef A[kdtpkd;& okdYr[kwf trsKd;om;vTwfawmfonf wpfzuf owf vkyfaqmifEkdifonf rS 4 = tajccHOya' jyifqifajymif;vJrIukd wpfzGJU okdYr[kwf wpfzGJUxuf ykdaom a'oÅ&tpkd;&rsm; okdYr[kwf ,if;wkdY\ ukd,fpm;vS,frsm;u ADwkdtmPm oHk;Ekdifonf)


Contemporary Relevance

Self-rule and shared rule capture the essence of federal political systems, namely the extent and na-

ture of vertical power distribution. In theory, four different possibilities are imaginable, namely countries

with both high self- and shared rule, those with low scores on both, and two further options with high

values on one but low scores on the other. In practice, however, only three types of systems are found:

Unitary countries where regions have neither self-rule nor shared rule (for example Cyprus, Luxembourg

or Iceland); systems with high self-rule but rather low shared rule (for example Italy, Bosnia, Canada, or

Mexico) and federations with high values on both dimensions (Germany, Spain, Belgium, the US and Swit-

zerland). It thus emerges that of the two dimensions, shared rule is more often withheld and self-rule more

readily granted. One reason for this could be that while it is one thing to decentralise power to a region

over its own territory and population (and thus hand over a certain degree of responsibility and the duty

to self-finance the new tasks), it is quite another to grant regions a say in national matters which are often

deemed too important for local idiosyncrasies (e.g. defence, macroeconomic policy, social welfare).

However, country-by-country comparisons are needed to reveal precisely why this is the case, and fu-

ture systematic research into the RAI should be able to a) tease out factors that explain cross-regional

variation in the speed and direction of change as well as b) reveal the effects of those differences across

countries, but possibly also across policy areas and/or regions of the same country. For example, it can thus

be conjectured that policy-making follows different trajectories depending on whether the area is an ex-

clusive regional competence or shared by the regional and national government alike, for example where

the national level defines the general framework and the sub-national entities are tasked to implement

these rules. Different degrees of regional authority might also be linked to democratic accountability, ad-

ministrative efficiency and the accommodation of territorially concentrated socio-cultural minorities.


rsufarSmufacwfESifh qDavsmfrIukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfjcif;ESifh rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif;wkdYonf zuf'&,fEkdifiHa&;pepfrsm;\ tESpfom&jzpfaom txuf

atmuf tmPmjzefYcGJjcif;\ oabmobm0ESifh twdkif;twm ponfukd NcHKiHkrdaom toHk;rsm;onfh t,ltq ESpfck jzpfonf/ oDtkd&Dt& jzpfEkdifajc av;rsKd;ukd pOf;pm;Ekdifygonf/ ,if;wkdYrSm ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfa&;ESifh rQa0tkyfcsKyfa&; jrifhjrifhrm;rm;&SdaomEkdifiHrsm;? ESpfrsKd;vHk; edrfhyg;aomEkdifiHrsm;? xkdYaemuf wpfrsKd;wGif jrifhrm;NyD; aemufwpfrsKd;wGif edrfhyg;aom aemufxyf trsKd;tpm;ESpfckwkdY jzpfMuonf/ okdYaomf vufawGUwGif pepfoHk;rsKd;ukdom awGU&ygonf/ a'oÅ& tqifhrsm;wGif ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfa&;? rQa0tkyfcsKyfa&; ESpfrsKd;vHk;r&Sdaom wpfjynfaxmifEkdifiHrsm; (Oyrm - qkdif;y&yfpf? vlZifbwf okdYr[kwf tkdufpfvef)? ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfa&;jrifhrm;pGm&Sdaomfvnf; rQa0tkyfcsKyfa&; enf;yg; aom pepfrsm; (Oyrm - tDwvD? abmhpeD;,m;? uae'g okdYr[kwf ruúqDukd)? ESpfrsKd;vHk;wGif wefzkd;jrifhrm;aom zuf'&,fjynfaxmifpkrsm; (*smreD? pydef? b,fvf*sD,H? tar&duefjynfaxmifpkESifh qGpfZmvef) wkdYjzpfMuonf/ okdYjzpf&m ,if;twkdif; twm ESpfrsKd;wGif ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfjcif;ukd ykdí vG,fvG,fulul ay;avh&SdNyD; rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif;ukdrl csefvSyf xm;avh&SdaMumif; awGU&onf/ ,if;twGuf taMumif;jycsufwpfckrSm A[kdrS a'owpfckokdY ,if;\ e,f edrdwfESifh vlxkrsm;tay: vkyfykdifcGifhtmPmrsm; ay;tyfjcif; (xkdrSwpfqifh tcsKdUaom vkyfief;aqmifwm topfrsm; twGuf ukd,fwkdifaiGaMu;&SmazGaxmufyHh&ef wm0ef0wå&m;rsm; twkdif;twmwpfcktxd vTJ ajymif; ay;jcif;) onf wpfrsKd;jzpfNyD; rdrda'owGif; udpörsm;uJhodkY oabmus vkyfaqmifcGifh ray;Ekdifaom wpfEkdifiHvHk;ESifh oufqkdifaom ta&;BuD;onfhudpörsm; (Oyrm - EkdifiHawmfumuG,fa&;? rufc½kd pD;yGm;a&;rl0g'? vlrIzlvHka&;ponf) wGif a'o rsm;ukd ajyma&;qkdcGifhay;jcif;rSm aemufwpfrsKd;pOf;pm;zG,f jzpfaomaMumifh jzpfonf/

okdYaomftb,faMumifh ,if;okdYjzpf&onfukd azmfxkwfEkdif&ef EkdifiHwpfEkdifiHESifh wpfEkdifiHcsif; EdIif;,SOfavhvm

rIrsm;jyK&ef vkdtyfygonf/ tem*wfwGif RAI ukd pepfwus okawoejyKrIrsm;onf (u) a'orsm;tMum; ajymif;vJrIrsm;\ tvsifESifhvm;&m uGmjcm;csufrsm;ukd &Sif;jyEkdifonfh tcsufrsm;ukd azmfxkwfjcif; (c) EkdifiHrsm; tMum;&Sd xkdYtwl rl0g'e,fy,frsm;tMum;ESifh^ okdYr[kwf EdkifiHwpfck\ a'orsm;tMum;&Sd ,if;jcm;em;rIrsm;\ oufa&mufrIrsm;ukd azmfxkwfjcif;rsm; jyKvmEkdifygonf/ Oyrmtm;jzifh oufqkdif&me,fajronf oD;oefYa'oÅ& vkyfykdifcGifhtmPmrsm;&Sdjcif; okdYr[kwf A[kdtpkd;&u taxGaxGrlabmifukd owfrSwfum ,if;pnf;rsOf;rsm;ukd taumiftxnf azmf&ef a'oÅ&tpkd;&rsm;tm; wm0efay;onfh yHkpHjzifh a'oÅ&tpkd;&ESifh A[kdtpkd;&tMum; tmPmrQa0rIrsm;&Sdjcif; ponfukd rlwnfí rl0g'csrSwfjcif;onf rwlnDaom vrf;aMumif;jzifh oGm;Ekdifonf/ a'o qkdif&m vkyfykdifcGifhtmPmtwkdif;twmtrsKd;rsKd;onf 'Drkdua&pDenf;us wm0efcHrI? pDrHtkyfcsKyfrIqkdif&m xda&mufrI ESifh e,fajrt& pkpkpnf;pnf; wnf&Sdaeonfh vlrI,Ofaus;rIt& vlenf;pkrsm;ukd vufcHum vkdufavsmnDaxG aexkdifEkdifjcif; ponfwkdYESifhvnf; qufpyfaeEkdifonf/


Conclusion

Self-rule and shared rule are two widely used concepts that capture the essence of federal

political systems, namely the extent and nature of vertical power sharing. Self-rule refers to regional

autonomy in decision-making, financing and/or implementation. Shared rule in contrast, can be understood

in three different ways: 1) Regional participation in national decision-making (e.g. Hooghe et al. 2016);

2) Horizontal cooperation between constituent units that excluded the federal government; and 3) The

powers delegated by the regions to the central government (centralisation). The Regional Authority Index

(RAI) is by now the most widely used, reliable and valid measurement of both dimensions.


ed*Hk;ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfjcif;ESifh rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif;wkdYonf zuf'&,fEkdifiHa&;pepfrsm;\ tESpfom&jzpfaom txuf

atmuftmPm jzefYcGJjcif;\ oabmobm0ESifh twkdif;twm ponfukd NcHKiHkrdaom toHk;rsm;onfh t,ltqESpfck jzpfonf/ ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfjcif;qkdonfrSm qHk;jzwfjcif;? aiGaMu;qdkif&mudpö&yfrsm;ESifh okdYr[kwf taumiftxnf azmfaqmifjcif;wkdYwGif a'otvdkuf ukd,fykdifpDrHcefYcGJ vkyfaqmifEkdifjcif;ukd qkdvkdonf/ tjcm; wpfzufwGifrl rQa0 tkyfcsKyfjcif;ukd yHkpHoHk;rsKd;jzifh em;vnfoabmaygufEkdifonf (1) EkdifiHawmftqifh tqHk;tjzwf jyKonfh vkyfief;pOf

wGif a'oÅ&tqifhrsm;taejzifh yg0ifjcif; (Oyrm - Hooghe et al. 2016)? (2) zuf'&,ftpdk;& rygbJ a'oÅ& tqifh,lepfrsm; tcsif;csif;tMum; a&jyifnDyl;aygif;aqmif&Gufjcif; (3) a'oÅ&,lepfrsm;rS A[kdtqifhokdY vTJ ajymif; ay;xm;aom vkyfykdifcGifhtmPmrsm; (A[kdwGif tmPmrsm; pkpnf;jcif;)/ ,cktcgwGif a'oqkdif&m tmPm

ykdifpkd;rI tòef;udef; (Regional Authority Index - RAI) onf ,if;tykdif; ESpfckvHk;ukd ,HkMunfukd;pm;Edkifaom ckdifrm onfh wkdif;wmrIrsm; jyKvkyf&ef toHk;trsm;qHk;t&mjzpfonf/


Bibliography

- Elazar, Daniel J. 1987. Exploring Federalism. Tuscaloosa, AL:

University of Alabamba Press.

- Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks, Arjan H. Schakel, Sandra Chapman

Osterkatz, Sara Niedzwiecki, Sarah Shair-Rosenfield. 2016.

A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance. Volume I: Measuring

Regional Authority. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Data at https://

www.arjanschakel.nl/regauth_dat.html]

- Hueglin, Thomas, and Alan Fenna. 2015. Comparative Federalism: A

Systematic Inquiry. 2nd edition, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

- Mueller, Sean. 2014. Shared Rule in Federal Political Systems:

Conceptual Lessons from Subnational Switzerland. Publius: The

Journal of Federalism 44(1), 82–108.


3 . Federalism, Democracy and Inclusionzuf'&,fpepf? 'Drdkua&pDESifh tm;vHk;yg0ifapjcif;What about the others?tjcm;olrsm;twGuf rnfodkY pOf;pm;rnfenf;

38 I Federalism, Democracy and Inclusion: What about the others?

Allison McCulloch is Associate Professor of Political Science at Bran-

don University, Canada. Her research considers the design of pow-

er-sharing institutions in deeply divided societies. She is the author

of Power-Sharing and Political Stability in Deeply Divided Societies

(Routledge, 2014) and the co-editor of Power-Sharing: Empirical and

Normative Challenges (Routledge, 2017). Her current research consid-

ers how power-sharing and constitutional design can be made more

inclusive of identities beyond the ethnonational divide, with a particu-

lar focus on gender inclusion.

Allison McCulloch onf uae'gEkdifiH b&ef'GefwuúodkvfrS EdkifiHa&;odyÜH ynm&yfqkdif&m wGJzufygarmu©wpfOD;jzpfonf/ ol\ okawoeonf euf½dIif;pGm uGJjym;rIrsm; &Sdae aom vlYtzGJUtpnf;rsm;&Sd tmPmcGJa0aom tifpwD usL;&Sif;rsm;yHkpHukd avhvmonf/ olonf ]euf½ d Iif;pGm uGJjym;rIrsm;&Sdaeaom vlYtzGJUtpnf;rsm;&Sd tmPmcGJa0rIESifh

EkdifiHa&;wnfNidrfrI (Routledge, 2014)} ukdvnf; a&;om;cJhNyD; ]tmPmcGJa0jcif; -

pHjyKESifh vufawGUpdefac: rIrsm; (Routledge, 2017)} \ wGJzufpmwnf;vnf; jzpfonf/ ol\ vuf&SdokawoerSm vlrsKd;ESifh EkdifiHom;t& ykdif;jcm;jcif;xuf ausmfvGefNyD; 0daoovu©Pmrsm; ykdrkdyg0ifvmEkdifap&ef tmPmcGJa0jcif;ESifh tajccHOya'yHkpHrsm; ukd rnfokdY rnfyHk zefwD;Ekdifrnfukd txl;ojzifh usm;^r qkdif&m yg0ifrIrsm;ukd pl;pkduf vsuf avhvmonf/

zuf'&,fpepf? 'Drdkua&pDESifh tm;vHk;yg0ifapjcif; - tjcm;olrsm;twGuf rnfodkY pOf;pm;rnfenf; I 39

uGJjym;rIrsm;&Sdaeaom vlYtzGJUtpnf;rsm;wGif zuf'&,fpepf\tcef;u@ESifh pyfvsOf; NyD; tNydKif½ IaxmifhtjrifESpfck&S dygonf/ ,if;wkd YrSm tjcm;olrsm;ukd vufcHum vkdufavsmnDaxGaexdkifjcif;ESifh aygif;pnf;jcif;wkdYjzpfonf/ vkdufavsmnDaxG aexkdif jcif; 0g'Drsm;u vlenf;pkrsm;ukd ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfcGifhay;Ekdif&ef a'oÅ&,lepfrsm;\ e,fedrdwfrsm;a&;qGJ&ef tBuHjyKMuNyD; aygif;pnf;jcif;0g'Drsm;url e,fedrdwfrsm;onf vlrsKd;tkyfpkukd ykdif;jcm;jzwfykdif; oGm;atmif yHkpHxkwfxm;&rnf[k ajymqkdMuonf/ uGJjym;rIrsm; &Sdaeaom vlYtzGJUtpnf;rsm;wGif 'Drdkua&pD ay:aygufvmapa&;twGuf ,if;½IjrifyHk ESpfckvHk; onf ta&;ygaom ½Iaxmifhtjrifrsm;ukd jyoaomfvnf; ,if;wkdY ESpfckvHk; onf ]tjcm;olrsm;} tay:wGif zuf'&,fyHkpH\ oufa&mufrIukdrl owdrrlrdbJ &Sdonf/ ]tjcm;olrsm;} qkdonfrSm EkdifiHa&;tifpwDusL;&Sif;rsm;ukd yHkpHxkwfpOfESifh y#dyu©vGef tkyfcsKyfrIvkyfief;pOfrsm;wGif yg0ifcGifhr&SdbJ z,f MuOfjcif;cH&onfh tkyfpk

rsm;ukd qkdvkdonf/ þpmwrf;wGif usm;^r qkdif&m (Gender) ESifh vdifwdrf;ñGwfrIvm;&m

(Sexuality) wkdYukd A[kdjyKum zuf'&,fpepfqkdif&m ynm&yfavhvmrIESifh uGJjym;rIrsm; &Sdaeaom vlYtzGJUtpnf;rsm;&Sd ]tjcm;olrsm;} taMumif;ukd aqG;aEG;xm;onf/

Two competing perspectives on the role of federalism in divided societies prevail:

accommodation and integration. An accommodationist reading of federalism

suggests drawing subunit boundaries to provide minority groups with self-rule

whereas integrationist forms of federalism argue that units should be designed

to cut across group lines. While these two perspectives offer important insights

on securing democracy in divided societies, they both overlook the effect of

federal design on “others,” that is, groups that face exclusion in the design of

political institutions and in post-conflict governance processes. This contribution

considers the scholarship on federalism and “others” in divided societies, focusing

on gender and sexuality.


Introduction

Divided societies are marked by three characteristics that make designing democracy particularly

challenging: they exhibit “a well-entrenched faultline” that has the potential for violence (often ethnicity,

but sometimes also language, national identity and religion) (Guelke, 2012: 29); their politics is affected

by “ethnic seepage” (Horowitz, 2001: 8), that is, political issues tend to cohere around the primary marker

of division, and; they face “a lack of consensus on the framework for the making of decisions” (Guelke, 2012:

32). Two countervailing perspectives dominate the debate over constitutional design and conflict manage-

ment in divided societies. Integration seeks “a single public identity coterminous with the state’s territory”

whereas accommodation encourages “dual or multiple public identities” as well as “equality with institu-

tional respect for differences” (McGarry, O’Leary and Simeon, 2008: 41). Both accommodation and integra-

tion see merit in federalism as a democratic mechanism for managing diversity but recommend different

institutional configurations. A federation inspired by accommodation designs subunits in such a way as to

secure self-rule for minority groups in their own units while maintaining shared rule between groups at

the centre, as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belgium, and Canada. By contrast, the subunits of integrationist

federations consist of heterogeneous units that cut across group lines where possible. This form of feder-

alism is advocated for its dispersal of power, and thus conflict, away from the ethnic divide and is inspired

by federal practice in such diverse places as the United States and Nigeria (Horowitz 2001).

Scholars continue to actively debate the ability of either form of federalism to manage diversity, to

build trust among contending groups and to create the conditions for stability and democracy in divided

societies (e.g., Hale 2004; Zahar 2013; McGarry and O’Leary 2009; Roeder 2009; Horowitz 2001). Nonethe-

less, while integration and accommodation offer different visions of federal design, they both begin with

the same reference point: ethnic divisions. Consequently, both display an institutional bias in favour of

what might be considered ‘politically relevant’ groups. Groups that do not meet the threshold for political

relevance – either because they are too small, too territorially dispersed or because they do identify with

the dominant ethno-divide – face exclusion during the constitutional design stage and, later, in the pro-

cesses of governance. That is, the inclusion of some groups in the design of institutions entails the exclu-

sion of others. While ethnicity may be the primary cleavage in a divided society, it is not the only way in

which citizens organise their lives. What gets lost when we only focus on one kind of group in the design

of institutions?


ed'gef; uGJjym;rIrsm;&Sdaeaom vlYtzGJUtpnf;rsm;wGif 'Drkdua&pDukd yHkpHazmfaqmif&mü txl;cufcJaponfh vu©Pm

3 ck&Sdonf/ ,if;wkdYwGif tMurf;zufrIrsm; (wpfcgwpf&H vlrsKd;a&;t&? wpfcgwpf&H bmompum;? EkdifiHom;0daoo vu©PmESifh bmoma&;t&) jzpfvmap&ef tvm;tvm&Sdonfh ]ckdifckdifrmrm tjrpfwG,faeNyD;jzpfaom uGJjym;rI

wpfck} ukd xifxif&Sm;&Sm;awGU jrif&onf(Guelke, 2012 : 29)/ ,if;wkdY\ EkdifiHa&; ukd ]vlrsKd;a&;t& pdrfh0ifvTrf;rkd;rI}

rsm;u oufa&mufrI&Sdonf (Horowitz, 2001 : 8) - qkdvkdonfrSm EkdifiHa&;qkdif&m udpö&yfrsm;onf uGJjym;rIrsm;ukd t"duzefwD;ol teD;w0dkufwGifom jzpfaewwfonf? ,if;wkdYonf ]tqHk;tjzwfjyK&eftwGuf rlabmifwpfck

tay:wGif oabmwlnDrIr&SdbJ jzpfaejcif;} ukd &ifqkdifaeMu&onf (Guelke, 2012 : 32)/ uGJjym;rIrsm;&Sdaeaom vlYtzGJUtpnf;rsm;&Sd tajccHOya'yHkpHESifh y#dyu©pDrHcefYcGJa&;ESifh ywfoufaom aqG;aEG;jiif;cHkrIrsm;ukd tjyeftvSef tjrifESpfcku vTrf;rkd;onf/ aygif;pnf;jcif;t,ltqu ]EkdifiHawmf\ e,fedrdwfESifh xyfwljzpfonfh wpfckwnf;aom jynfolY0daoovu©Pm} ukd &SmazGum vkdufavsmnDaxGaexdkifjcif;t,ltqu ]ESpfck okdYr[kwf xkdYxufykdaom jynfolY0daoovu©Pmrsm;} omru ]jcm;em;rIrsm;ty: tifpwDusL;&Sif;rsm;t& av;pm;rIyg&Sdonfh nDrQrI} ukdyg

tm;ay;onf (McGarry, O’Leary and Simeon, 2008 : 41)/ vkdufavsmnDaxGaexkdifjcif;ESifh aygif;pnf;jcif; ESpfck vHk;wkdYu uGJjym;jcm;em;rIrsm;ukd xdef;ausmif;Ekdifaom 'Drkdu&ufwpf,Å&m;wpfcktjzpf zuf'&,fpepf\ aumif; usKd;ukd ½IjrifMuaomfvnf; ,if;wkdYtBuHjyKaom tifpwDusL;&Sif;qkdif&m yHkpHrsm;rSm jcm;em;Muonf/ vkdufavsm nDaxGaexkdifjcif;t,ltqt& wnfaqmufxm;aom zuf'a&;&Sif;wGif abmhpeD;,m;ESifh [mZD*dk;AD;em;? b,fvf*sD,HESifh uae'gEkdifiHrsm;wGifuJhokdY rwlnDaomtkyfpkrsm;tMum; rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif;udk A[kdwGif xm;&Sdum vlenf;pkrsm; taejzifh ,if;wkdY\ oufqkdif&me,fajrrsm;wGif ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfa&; &&SdEkdifap&ef a'oqkdif&m e,fajr ,lepfrsm;udk owfrSwfxm;onf/ tjcm;wpfzufwGif aygif;pnf;a&;0g'usifhoHk;onfh zuf'a&;&Sif;rsm;\ a'o qkdif&m e,fajr,lepfrsm; zefwD;&mwGif jzpfEkdiforQ tkyfpkrsm;ukd ykdif;jzwfoGm;NyD; uGJjym;onfh tkyfpkrsm;pGm yg0ifaom e,fajrrsm; jzpfaponf/ ,if;uJhokdYaom zuf'&,fyHkpHwGif tkyfpkrsm;\ tmPmtpGrf;owådukd jyefYusJapojzifh y#dyu©enf;um? vlrsKd;a&;t& uGJjym;rIrsm;rS a0;aponf/ ,if;yHkpHukd rwluGJjym;rIrsm;pGm&Sdaom ae&mrsm;jzpf

onfh tar&duefjynfaxmifpkESifh Ekdif*sD;&D;,m;wdkYwGif toHk;jyKonf/ (Horowitz 2001)uGJjym;rIrsm;&Sdaeaom vlYtzGJUtpnf;rsm;twGif;wGif wnfNidrfrIESifh 'Drkdua&pD&Sdaprnfh tajctaersm; zefwD;

&ef? NydKifqkdifaeaom tkyfpkrsm;tMum; ,HkMunfrIwnfaqmuf&efESifh rwluGJjym;rIrsm;ukd xdef;ausmif;&eftwGuf zuf'&,fpepf yHkpHwpfrsKd;csif;pD\tpGrf;ukd ynm&Sifrsm; wuf<upGm qufvufaqG;aEG;jiif;ckHvsuf&SdMuonf (Oyrm

- Hale 2004 ; Zahar 2013 ; McGarry and O’Leary 2009 ; Roeder 2009 ; Horowitz 2001)/ aygif;pnf;jcif;ESifh vkdufavsmnDaxGaexkdifjcif; t,ltqrsm;onf zuf'&,fyHkpHESifhywfoufNyD; rwlaomtjrifrsm;ukd azmfjyaeMu aomfvnf; ,if;wkdY ESpfckvHk;onf vlrsKd;a&;t& uGJjym;rIrsm;[lonfh wlnDaom tukd;tum;wpfckrSaeí tpjyKMu onf/ aemufqufwGJtaejzifh rnfonfwkdYukd ]EkdifiHa&;t& tusKH;0ifaom} tkyfpkrsm;tjzpf owfrSwfEkdifrnf qkd onfESifh ywfoufNyD; ,if;tjrifESpfckvHk;wGif tifpwDusL;&Sif;qkdif&m bufvkdufrIrsm;ukdvnf; awGU jrif&onf/ EkdifiHa&;t& tusHK;0if&eftwGuf owfrSwfcsufjynfhrDjcif; r&Sdonfh tkyfpkrsm; - vlOD;a&enf;vGef;onfhtwGufjzpfap? e,fajrtvkduf tvGeftrif; jyefYusJpGm aexkdifaeMuaomaMumifh jzpfap? tm;aumif;aom vlrsKd;a&;ykdif;jcm;rIrsm; twkdif; rdrdwkdYukd,frdrd owfrSwfjcif;r&Sdíjzpfap - onf tajccHOya' a&;qGJonfh tqifhESifh aemufykdif; tkyfcsKyfpDrH onfh vkyfief;pOfrsm;wGif z,fMuOfjcif;cHMu&onf/ tifpwDusL;&Sif;rsm; ukd yHkpHowfrSwf&mwGif tcsKdUaomtkyfpk rsm;ukd xnfhoGif;jcif;onf tjcm;aomtkyfpkrsm; z,fMuOfcH&jcif;ukd jzpfaponf/ uGJjym;rIrsm; &Sdaeaom vlYtzGJU tpnf;wpfckwGif vlrsKd;onf t"duuGJjym;rItaMumif;w&m; jzpfae Ekdifaomfvnf; ,if;onf jynfolrsm;taejzifh


Conceptual Clarification

The design of democratic institutions, whether for integration or accommodation, displays an institu-

tional bias in favour of territorially concentrated ethnic groups that are of a significant size and which are

capable of disrupting state processes. The inclusion of these dominant groups entails the exclusion of

non-dominant groups, often labelled as “others.” This ‘exclusion amid inclusion dilemma’ (Agarin and Mc-

Culloch 2017) is experienced by at least three kinds of groups:

1. Micro-minorities, i.e., groups which constitute a small proportion of the overall population (often

in the range of 1-5%), either as a result of their relatively recent presence in the polity (such as, migrant

communities), their systemic exclusion from political participation (such as, Roma communities in Eastern

Europe), their limited engagement with the polity (such as, Mennonite and Hutterite communities in North

America), or their territorial distribution across the state (e.g. indigenous communities in settler societies);

2. Non-ethnic minorities, i.e., groups that eschew ethnic labels and seek political participation on

class-based grounds and/or outside of the ethnically defined societal frameworks and thus face entry

barriers into politics that favours predefined ethnic identities;

3. Re-aligned minorities, i.e., groups that define gender, sexuality, and/or able-bodiedness as prima-

ry identities impacting on their opportunities for engagement in political process but which are neglected

in the democratic institutions.

Why Might Others Matter for Federalism?

And How Might Federalism Affect Others?

It might be tempting to dismiss the role of others, arguing that such groups are unlikely to destabilise

state functions. For example, neither gender nor LGBTQ minorities are territorially concentrated nor do

they seek territorial solutions to the problems of exclusion amid inclusion. As Anne Phillips (1995: 15)

notes, “no one really expects women to secede.” Yet, there is an emerging body of literature that suggests

that the design of federations matters for the pursuit of gender and sexual equality. In an important article

synthesising this body of work, Jill Vickers identifies at least 17 possible hypotheses on federal effects on

gender reforms (see Vickers 2013a: 9, Table 1). While this nascent literature continues to offer differing

interpretations of federal effects on others, three questions are particularly salient:


rdrdwkdY tcsif;csif;tMum; pkpnf;Muonfh wpfckwnf;aom enf;vrf;yHkpH r[kwfay/ tifpwDusL;&Sif;rsm;ukd yHkpHxkwf &mwGif uREfkyfwkdYonf tkyfpktrsKd;tpm; wpfckwnf;ukdom tm½HkjyKcJhygu rnfonfwkdY qHk;½HI;oGm;Ekdifygoenf;/

t,ltqqkdif&m &Sif;vif;csufaygif;pnf;jcif;twGufjzpfap? vkdufavsmnDaxG aexkdifjcif;twGufjzpfap? 'Drkdu&ufwpftifpwDusL;&Sif;

rsm;\ yHkpHwGif vlOD;a&rsm;jym;um EkdifiHawmf\ vkyfief;aqmifwmrsm;ukd taESmifht,SufjyKEkdifpGrf;&Sdaom e,fajr t& pkpkpnf;pnf; wnf&Sdaeonfh vlrsKd;tkyfpkrsm;ukd rsufESmomay;onfh tifpwDusL;&Sif;qkdif&m bufvkdufrIukd awGU jrif&onf/ ,if;tm;aumif;aom tkyfpkrsm;ukd xnfhoGif;jcif;onf &Hzef&Hcg ]tjcm;olrsm;} [k ac:a0: wHqdyf uyfjcif;cH&aom tm;raumif;onfhtkyfpkrsm;tm; z,fMuOfjcif;ukd jzpfaponf/ þ ]xnfhoGif;jcif;tMum;rS

z,fMuOfjcif; tusyftwnf;} (Agarin and McCulloch 2017) ukd tenf;qHk; tkyfpktrsKd;tpm; 3 rsKd;wkdYu awGU BuHK cHpm;Mu&onf/

1/ tvGefao;i,faom vlenf;pkrsm; - vlOD;a&pkpkaygif;\ tvGefao;i,faom tpdwftykdif; jzpfonfh tkyfpk rsm; (wpfcgwpf&H 1 - 5% twGif;)? EkdifiHtwGif;okdY rMumrDumvurS a&muf&Sdvmjcif;aMumifhjzpfap (Oyrm - a&TU ajymif;vmaom vlpkvla0;rsm;)? EkdifiHa&;t& yg0ifaqmif&Gufjcif;rsm;wGif pepfwus z,fMuOf cHxm;&jcif;aMumifh jzpfap (Oyrm - ta&SU Oa&my&Sd ½dk;rm;vlrsKd;rsm;)? olwkdY\ EkdifiHa&; tkyfcsKyfa&;jzpfpOfESifh txdtawGU enf;jcif; aMumifhjzpfap (Oyrm - ajrmuftar&du&Sd refEkdEkdufESifh [wfwm½dkufvlrsKd;pkrsm;)? okdYr[kwf EkdifiHwpf0ef; jyefYusJ aexkdifjcif;aMumifhjzpfap (Oyrm - ueOD;tajccs aexkdifaom vlYtzGJUtpnf;rsm;&Sd Xmae vlrsKd;pkrsm;)/

2/ vlrsKd;tajccHr[kwfaom vlenf;pkrsm; - vlrsKd;trnfwHqdyfukd toHk;rjyKbJ? vlwef;pm; tajccHESifh^ okdYr[kwf vlrsKd;t&owfrSwfaom vlYtokdif;t0dkif; rlabmifrsm;\ jyifyrS EkdifiHa&;t& yg0ifcGifhukd awmif;qkdojzifh owfrSwfxm;NyD;jzpfaom vlrsKd;0daoorsm;ukd rsufESmomay;onfh EkdifiHa&;twGif;okdY 0ifa&muf&m wGif twm; tqD;rsm; BuHKawGUae&aom tkyfpkrsm;/

3/ jyefvnfcsdefn§dxm;aom vlenf;pkrsm; - EkdifiHa&;vkyfief;pOfwGif yg0ifEkdif&ef tcGifhtvrf;rsm; xdcdkufcH & NyD; 'Drkdu&ufwpftifpwDusL;&Sif;rsm;wGif vspfvsL½Ixm;jcif;cH&aom rdrdwkdY\ usm;^r qkdif&m? vdifwdrf;ñGwfrI qdkif&mESifh^ odkYr[kwf usef;rmoefpGrf;rI ponfwkdYukd rdrdwkdY\ yifr0daoovu©Pmtjzpf owfrSwfxm;aom tkyfpkrsm;/

tjcm;olrsm;onf zuf'&,fpepftwGuf tb,faMumifh ta&;ygEkdifygoenf;/ zuf'&,fpepfonf tjcm;olrsm;tay: rnfokdY oufa&mufEkdifygoenf;/

tjcm;olrsm;onf EkdifiHawmf\ vkyfief;aqmifwmrsm;ukd rwnfrNidrf jzpfapEkdifjcif;r&Sd[k ajymqkdum

,if;tkyfpkrsm;\ tcef;u@udk jiif;y,f&ef qGJaqmifrI &SdEkdifygonf/ Oyrmtm;jzifh usm;^r qkdif&m (Gender)

tkyfpkrsm;onf vnf;aumif;? LGBTQ vlenf;pkrsm;onfvnf;aumif; e,fedrdwftvkduf pkpnf;aexkdifMujcif; r&Sd ouJhokdY ,if;wkdYonf yl;aygif;yg0ifapjcif;rS z,fMuOfcH&jcif; jyóemrsm;twGuf e,fajre,fedrdwfqkdif&m ajz&Sif;rI rsm;ukdvnf; &SmazGaejcif; r&Sdyg/ trsKd;orD;rsm;onf oD;jcm;cGJxGufa&; vkyfaqmifrnf[k rnfol wpfOD;wpfa,muf

urQ arQmfvifhxm;Murnf r[kwfay} [k Anne Phillips (1995 : 15) ajymqkdouJhodkYyif jzpfonf/ odkYaomf usm;^r qkdif&mESifh vdifykdif;qkdif&m nDrQrIrsm; &&Sdap&ef twGuf zuf'a&;&Sif;rsm;\ yHkpHonf ta&;ygaMumif; òef;qkdaom pmayrsm;pGm ay:aygufcJhonf/ ,if;ESifh pyfvsOf;NyD; aygif;pyfpkpnf; zefwD;xm;aom ta&;ygonfh aqmif;yg;wpfckwGif

Jill Vickers u usm;^r qkdif&m jyKjyifajymif;vJrIrsm;twGuf zuf'&,f\ oufa&mufrIrsm;taMumif; tenf;qHk;


1. Does federalism constrain or enhance the mobilising potential of others? Some scholars point to

a “federalism advantage.” The claim is that federalism enhances the mobilising potential for others through

“venue shopping,” or the ability to lobby more than one level of government. That is, “if one door is locked,

a number of other doors may be unlocked” (Stockemer and Tremblay, 2015: 607). Yet, the availability of

multiple access points is contingent on federal design. In a study of women and LGBTQ mobilisation in

Belgium, Karen Celis and Petra Meier (2016) found that such advocacy work was constrained by the fact

that accommodationist designs, such as Belgium’s, provide for the exclusive division of competences be-

tween levels, thereby limiting the potential for venue shopping. Mobilisation was further limited by the

replication of the ethno-linguistic divide in civil society. In Belgium, women’s and LGBTQ groups exist pri-

marily within each linguistic community (Celis and Meier, 2016: 7), and there are few opportunities for

them to work collectively. The federalism advantage is thus not always so straightforward.

2. Does federalism produce differential policy impacts for others based on their geographical posi-

tion? The concern here is that as powers are divided and allocated, federations might assign “issues that

are significant to women (such as welfare programs and social policies) to the less powerful and less

well-resourced sub-national governments” (Stockemer and Tremblay 2015). While some federations have

equalisation strategies to minimise differences in outcomes, others do not. Women in Bosnia and Herze-

govina, for example, have very different levels of access to maternal health benefits depending upon which

Entity and which canton they reside in (Women’s Network BiH 2015). The resolution of family law matters,

including custody, child support and protection order enforcement, can also be quite variable depending

on the nature of the federal design (Vickers, 2013b: 58).

3. Does federalism promote or limit the legislative representation of others? Another important line

of inquiry investigates whether federations have greater levels of representation of others than do unitary

states. Either federalism’s multiple access points serve women well by creating a greater number of elect-

ed positions to fill and more opportunities to lobby for gender equality or federalism hinders their access,

relegating women and others to “less important levels of the decision-making process” (Stockemer and

Tremblay, 2015: 609). Stockemer and Tremblay (2015) find that federalism has a moderate effect on repre-

sentation, returning 3-4% more female representatives than unitary states. Here too, results may be con-

tingent on the form federalism takes, with the relationship between federalism and representation not

always clear-cut.


taejzifh jzpfEkdifajc&Sdonfh tEkrme rSef;qcsuf 17 ck ukd azmfjyxm;onf (Vickers 2013 u ; 9, Z,m; 1 ukd Munfh yg)/ þtajcwnfp pmayrsm;onf tjcm;olrsm;tay:wGif zuf'&,fpepf\ oufa&mufrIrsm;ukd uGJjym; jcm;em; aom t"dyÜm,fzGifhqkdcsufrsm; ay;&mwGif ar;cGef;oHk;ckrSm txl;owdjyKzG,fjzpfonf/

1/ ]zuf'&,fpepfonf tjcm;olrsm;\ a&GUvsm;oGm;vmEkdifrI tpGrf;udk ydkrkdaumif;rGefapoavm? uefYowf xdef;csKyfoavm/} tcsKdUynm&Sifrsm;u ]zuf'&,fpepf\ tm;omcsuf} ukd axmufjyMuonf/ zuf'&,f pepf onf ]ae&ma&G;cs,fjcif;} rSwpfqifh tjcm;olrsm;\ a&GUvsm;oGm;vmEkdifpGrf;ukd odkYr[kwf tpkd;&tqifh wpfqifhxuf ydkrkdí wkdufwGef;awmif;qkdEkdifpGrf;ukd ykdrkdaumif;rGefaponf[k qkdMuonf/ qkdvkdonfrSm ]wHcg;wpfcsyf onf ydwfaeyg

u tjcm;wHcg;rsm;pGmwkdYonf yGifhaeEkdifonf} [lí jzpfonf (Stockemer ESifh Tremblay, 2015 : 607)/ okdYaomf xdawGUtoHk;jyKEkdifaom ae&mrsm;pGm&Sdjcif; r&Sdjcif;onf zuf'&,fyHkpHay:wGif rlwnfonf/ tqifhrsm; twGif; oD;jcm;cGJjcm;xm;aom vkyfykdifcGifhtmPmrsm; owfrSwfay;xm;onfh b,fvf*sD,HEkdifiHuJhokdYaom ae&may; vkdufavsmnDaxGaexkdifjcif;yHkpHu ,if;okdY rl0g'a&;&m wkdufwGef;rIvkyfief;rsm;ukd uefYowfxm;NyD; ae&m a&G;cs,f

jcif;twGuf tvm;tvmukd enf;yg;apaMumif; b,fvf*sD,HEkdifiHwGif trsKd;orD;rsm;ESifh LGBTQ rsm;\ a&GUvsm;oGm;

vmrIukd avhvmcJhonhf Karen Celis ESifh Petra Meier (2016) wkdYu awGU&SdcJhonf/ t&yfbuf vlrItokdif;t0dkif; rsm;twGif;wGif vlrsKd; - bmompum;tajccHykdif;jcm;rIrsm;ukd xyfrHtoHk;jyKjcif;aMumifh a&GUvsm; oGm;vmrIrsm;onf

xyfrH uefYowfjcif;cH&jyefonf/ b,fvf*sD,HEkdifiHwGif trsKd;orD;rsm;ESifh LGBTQ tkyfpkrsm;onf bmompum;tkyfpk

wpfckcsif;pDwGif t"dutm;jzifh&SdMuum (Celis ESifh Meier, 2016 : 7) ,if;wkdYtaejzifh wpfpkwpfpnf;wnf; vkyfaqmifEkdif&ef tcGifhtvrf; enf;yg;vGef;onf/ xkdYaMumifh zuf'&,fpepf\ tm;omcsufqkdonfrSm tNrJwap &Sif;&Sif;vif;vif; &&SdEkdifonf r[kwfay/

2/ ]zuf'&,fpepfonf yx0Dtaetxm;t& wnf&Sdonfhae&mtay: rlwnfNyD; tjcm;olrsm; twGuf uGJjym; jcm;em;aom rl0g'qkdif&m oufa&mufrIrsm; jzpfapygovm;/} zuf'a&;&Sif;rsm;wGif tmPmrsm;ukd ykdif;jcm;NyD; cGJjcrf;ay;xm;&m ]trsKd;orD;rsm;twGuf ta&;ygaom udpö&yfrsm; (vlrIzlvHka&;ESifh vlrIa&;qkdif&m rl0g'rsm;ponf) ukd tmPmenf;yg;NyD; t&if;tjrpfenf;yg;onfh a'oÅ&tpkd;&rsm;} xHokdY ay;tyfxm;rdrnfukd pdk;&drfylyefjcif;jzpfonf

(Stockemer ESifh Tremblay 2015)/ &v'ft& jcm;em;jcif;rsm; enf;yg;ap&eftwGuf nDrQapa&; AsL[mrsm;ukd tcsKdU aomzuf'a&;&Sif;rsm;wGif xm;&SdMuum tcsKdU aomzuf'a&;&Sif;rsm;wGifrl rxm;&Sd Muay/ Oyrmtm;jzifh

abmhpeD;,m;ESifh [mZD*dk;AD;em;&Sd trsKd;orD;rsm;wGif rnfonfhjynfe,f (canton)? rnfonfhtzGJUtpnf;wGif aexkdif onf qkdonfh tcsuftay: rlwnfNyD; rdcifusef;rma&;qkdif&m cHpm;cGifhrsm;&&SdrI twkdif;twm rsm;pGmuGmjcm;Muonf

(Women’s Network BiH 2015)/ uav;xdef;odrf;cGifh? uav;yHhykd;axmufyHhrIESifh umuG,fapmifha&SmufrI trdefY tmPmouf0ifrI ponfwkdYtygt0if rdom;pkqkdif&m Oya'tqHk;tjzwfrsm;onf zuf'&,fyHkpH\ oabmobm0

tay: rlwnfNyD; rsm;pGmajymif;vJrI &Sdonf (Vickers, 2013 c : 58)/3/ ]zuf'&,fpepfonf tjcm;olrsm;\ Oya'jyKa&;qkdif&m ukd,fpm;jyKrIukd jr§ifhwifygovm; okdYr[kwf

uefYowfygovm;/} tjcm;olrsm;ukd ukd,fpm;jyKrI twkdif;twmonf wpfjynfaxmifpepf EkdifiHrsm;xuf zuf'a&; &Sif;rsm;wGif ydkrkdrsm;jym;jcif;&Sd? r&Sdukd aemufxyfta&;BuD;aom avhvmrIwpfcku qef;ppfygonf/ a&G;aumufcH ae&mrsm;pGmESifh usm;^r qkdif&m nDrQrItwGuf wkdufwGef;rIjyK&ef ydkrdkrsm;jym;aom tcGifhta&;rsm;ukd zefwD;ay; xm;jcif;jzifh zuf'&,fpepf\ wHcg;aygufrsm;pGmwkdYonf trsKd;orD;rsm;twGuf tusKd;aus;Zl; jzpfxGef;apjcif;ESifh zuf'&,fpepfonf trsKd;orD;rsm;ESifh tjcm;olrsm;ukd ]tqHk;tjzwfjyK&mwGif ta&;ygrIenf;yg;aom tqifhrsm; okdY} avQmhcsjcif;jzifh ,if;wkdYtaejzifh xdawGU&,ltoHk;jyKEkdifcGifhukd wm;qD;jcif;ESpfckteuf wpfckckudk jzpfapygonf

(Stockemer ESifh Tremblay, 2015 : 609 ) / wpfjynfaxmifEkdifiHrsm;ESifh EdIif;,SOfvQif zuf'&,fEkdifiHrsm;wGif trsKd;


While further empirical inquiry is still needed, it is clear that institutional designs that only focus on

ethnicity – whether to reinforce it or cut across it – tend to obscure the complex ways in which citizens

organise their lives, thereby calling into question their long-term democratic legitimacy.

Conclusion

The design of democratic institutions is often a contentious process and it remains an on-going chal-

lenge to cultivate institutional legitimacy. As Donald Horowitz (1993: 18) has remarked, divided societies

exhibit a “tendency to conflate inclusion in the government with inclusion in the community and exclusion

from government with exclusion from the community.” For this reason, it is important to design institutions

that support democracy for dominant groups, including ethnic minorities. Yet, non-dominant groups – the

others – also deserve recognition, representation and access to democratic decision-making channels.

Even if a federation’s origins are ethnic-specific, this should not preclude bringing gender, sexuality, class

and other non-ethnic identities into the design process. Doing so acknowledges that citizens’ identities are

complex and multi-layered. Reflecting the varied ways in which citizens organise their lives in governing

institutions is likely to enhance institutional legitimacy and stability, qualities that are often in short supply

in divided societies.


orD;ukd,fpm;jyKrI 3-4% ykdrkdrsm;jym;um ukd,fpm;jyKrItay:wGif toifhtwifh oufa&mufrI&SdaMumif; StockemerESifh

Tremblay (2015) wkdYu awGU&dScJhygonf/ þae&mwGifvnf; &v'frsm;onf toHk;jyKonfh zuf'&,fpepf\ yHkpHtay: rlwnfaeum zuf'&,fpepfESifh udk,fpm;jyKrItMum;&Sd qufoG,frIrSm tNrJwrf; &Sif;vif;pGmwnf&Sdaeonf r[kwfyg/

vufawGUavhvmrIrsm; xyfrHvkdtyfaeao;aomfvnf; vlrsKd;wpfckwnf;tay:wGif pl;pkdufonfh tifpwDusL; &Sif; qkdif&m yHkpHrsm; (xyfrHtm;jznfhonfjzpfap? ykdif;jzwf&ef vkyfonfjzpfap) onf EkdifiHom;rsm;\ ½IyfaxG;aom b0aexkdif pkpnf;yHkrsm;ukd rsufuG,fjyKaernfomjzpfNyD; ,if;wkdY\ a&&Snf'Drkdua&pDenf;us w&m;0ifrItay: ar;cGef;xkwfzG,f jzpfvmaprnfom jzpfonf/

ed*Hk;'Drkdu&ufwpf tifpwDusL;&Sif;rsm;ukd yHkpHowfrSwfjcif;onf &Hzef&HcgwGif tjiif;yGm;zG,f vkyfief;pOfwpf&yf

jzpfNyD; tifpwDusL;&Sif;qkdif&m w&m;0ifrIukd ysKd;axmif&eftwGuf qufvuf pdefac:rIrsm; &SdaeqJyif jzpfonf/

Donald Horowitz (1993 : 18) rSwfcsufjyKouJhokdYyif uGJjym;rIrsm;&Sdaeaom vlYtzGJUtpnf;rsm;wGif ]vlYtzGJU tpnf; twGif;okdY xnfhoGif;jcif;ESifh pDrHtkyfcsKyfrItwGif;okdY xnfhoGif;jcif;ukd wpfckwnf; aygif;pyfxm;ouJhokdY vlYtzGJU tpnf;twGif;rS xkwfy,fjcif;ESifh pDrHtkyfcsKyfrItwGif;rS xkwfy,fjcif;wkdYukdvnf; wpfckwnf; aygif;pyfxm;vkdonfh qE´} rsm;ukd awGU jrif&onf/ xkdYaMumifhyif vlenf;pk vlrsKd;rsm;tygt0if tm;aumif;aomtkyfpkrsm;twGuf 'Drkdua&pDukd yHhykd;rnhf tifpwDusL;&Sif;rsm;ukd yHkpHowfrSwf&ef ta&;BuD;ygonf/ okdYaomf tiftm;enf;aomtkyfpkrsm; - tjcm;olrsm; - onfvnf; todtrSwfjyKjcif;? ukd,fpm;jyKjcif;? 'Drkdua&pDenf;us tqHk;tjzwfjyKjcif; tcGifhta&; rsm; ukd &&Sdoifhygonf/ tu,fí zuf'a&;&Sif;wpfck\ rlvrSm vlrsKd;tajccHjzpfcJhvQifyif ,if;tcsufonf usm;^ r? vdif? vlwef;pm;tvTmESifh tjcm;aomvlrsKd;r[kwfonfh 0daoovu©Pmrsm;ukd tifpwDusL;&Sif;yHkpHrsm; owfrSwfonfh vkyfief;pOftwGif;odkY xnfhoGif;pOf;pm;jcif;udk rwm;qD;oifhay/ ,if;okdY jyKjcif;jzifh EkdifiHom;rsm;\ 0daoovu©Pmrsm;onf ½IyfaxG;um tvTmrsm;pGm yg0ifEkdifonfukd todtrSwfjyK&m a&mufygonf/ tkyfcsKyfrI qkdif&m tifpwDusL;&Sif;rsm;wGif EkdifiHom;rsm; ,if;wkdY\ b0rsm;ukd pkpnf;onfh enf;vrf;rsKd;pHkukd jyefvnfoHk;oyf jcif; onf uGJjym;jcm;em;rIrsm; &Sdaeaom vlYtzGJUtpnf;rsm;wGif &Hzef&Hcg awGU&avh r&Sdonfh t&nftaoG;rsm;jzpfaom tifpwDusL;&Sif;qkdif&m w&m;0ifrIESifh wnfNidrfrIwkdYukd ykdrkdaumif;rGefapygonf/


Further Reading

- Choudhry, Sujit. ed. 2008. Constitutional Design in Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation? Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Haussmann Melissa, Marian Sawer and Jill Vickers, eds. 2010. Federalism, Feminism and Multilevel Governance. Surrey: Ashgate.

- Skogstad, Grace, Martin Pappillon, Keith Banting, and David Cameron, eds. 2013. The Global Promise of Federalism, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.


BibliographyAgarin, Timofey and Allison McCulloch. 2017. Exclusion amid Inclusion: Power-Sharing and Non-Dominant Minorities. Paper presented at the Joint IPSA Colloquium on Democratization and Constitutional Design in Divided Societies, Nicosia, Cyprus.

Celis, Karen and Petra Meier. 2016. Other Identities in Ethnofederations: Women’s and Sexual Minorities’ Advocacy in Belgium. National Identities. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14608944.2016.1206068

Guelke, Adrian. 2012. Politics in Divided Societies. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hale, Henry. 2004. Divided We Stand: Institutional Sources of Ethnofederal State Survival and Collapse. World Politics 56, 2: 165-193.

Horowitz, Donald. L. 1993. Democracy in Divided Societies. Journal of Democracy 4, 4: 18-38.

Horowitz, Donald. L. 2001. Ethnic Groups in Conflict 2nd edition. Berkeley: University of California Press.

McGarry, John and Brendan O’Leary. 2009. Must Pluri-National Federations Fail? Ethnopolitics 8, 1: 5-25.

McGarry, John, Brendan O’Leary, and Richard Simeon. 2008. Integration or Accommodation? The Enduring Debate in Conflict Regulation. In Constitutional Design in Divided Societies, ed. Sujit Choudhry. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Phillips, Anne. 1995. The Politics of Presence: Political Representation of Gender, Race and Ethnicity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Roeder, Philip. 2009. Ethnofederalism and the Mismanagement of Conflicting Nationalisms. Regional and Federal Studies 19, 2: 203-219.

Stockemer, Daniel and Manon Tremblay. 2015. Federalism and Women’s Representation: Do Federations have more Women Legislators than Centralized States? Publius: The Journal of Federalism 45, 4: 605-625.

Women’s Network BiH, Annual Report on the State of Women’s Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2014, Human Rights Paper 7.

Vickers, Jill. 2013a. Is Federalism Gendered? Incorporating Gender into Studies of Federalism. Publius: The Journal of Federalism 43, 1: 1-23.

Vickers, Jill. 2013b. Territorial Pluralism and Family-Law Reform: Conflicts between Gender and Culture Rights in Federations, North and South. Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies 40, 1: 57-82.

Zahar, Marie-Joelle. 2013. A Problem of Trust: Can Federalism Silence the Guns? In The Global Promise of Federalism, eds. Grace Skogstad, Martin Pappillon, Keith Banting, and David Cameron. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

50 I Linguistic Diversity in Pluranational States

4. Linguistic Diversity In Plurinational States

vlrsKd;rsm;pGm ,SOfwGJ aexdkifonfh EdkifiHrsm;&Sd bmompum;qdkif&m rwluGJjym;rI

vlrsKd;rsm;pGm ,SOfwGJaexdkifonfh EdkifiHrsm;&Sd bmompum;qdkif&m rwluGJjym;rI I 51

This article examines the politics of language in plurinational states. First, I

argue that the relationship between language and nationhood is politically

constructed through two broad processes: state nation-building and ‘peripheral’

activism. Second, I present three broad strategies of territorial management to

accommodate the normative and practical issues derived from the politicisation

of languages: self-rule, shared rule, and symbolic recognition. Third, I illustrate

the discussion drawing on the paradigmatic cases of Catalonia and Flanders.

þaqmif;yg;wGif vlrsKd;rsm;pGm ,SOfwGJaexdkifonfh EdkifiHrsm;&Sd bmompum;qdkif&m EdkifiHa&;udk qef;ppfazmfjyxm;onf/ yxrOD;pGm bmompum;ESifh trsKd;om;oGifjyif vu©Pm jzpfwnfrIwdkY\ qufpyfrItm; us,fjyefYonfh vkyfief;pOf (2) &yfrSwpfqifh EdkifiHa&;t& zGJUpnf;xm;jcif;jzpfaMumif; uREkfyftaejzifh ajymMum;vdkygonf/ ,if; wdkYrSm EdkifiH\ trsKd;om;oGifjyifvu©Pm wnfaqmufjcif;ESifh ]rxifr&Sm;} wuf<u vIyf&Sm;rIwdkYjzpfonf/ 'kwd,taejzifh bmompum;rsm;tm; EdkifiHa&;qdkif&m vu©Pmwpf&yf tjzpf owfrSwfjcif;rS ay:xGufvmonfh pHwefzdk;qdkif&m udpö&yfrsm;? vufawGUydkif;qdkif&m udpö&yfrsm;wdkYESifh udkufnDap&eftwGuf e,fajra'oqdkif&m pDrH cefYcGJrIESifh oufqdkifaom us,fjyefYonfh AsL[m 3 &yfudk wifjyxm;yg onf/ ,if;wdkYrSm - udk,fydkiftkyfcsKyfjcif;? rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif;ESifh vu©Pm&yf qdkif&m todtrSwfjyKrIwdkY jzpfonf/ wwd,taejzifh umwmvdk;eD;,m;ESifh zvef;'g;pfa'orsm;&Sd tjyeftvSef ajymif;vJoHk;pGJEdkifaom bmompum;qdkif&m taMumif;t&mrsm;Mum;&Sd qufET,f aom jzpfpOfrsm;udk tajccHum aqG;aEG;rItwGuf Oyrmay;xm;ygonf/

Daniel Cetrà is a Research Fellow at the Centre on Constitutional Change, Uni-

versity of Edinburgh. His research focuses on nationalism, the politics of lan-

guage, and comparative territorial politics.

Daniel Cetrà onf tD'ifbwfwuúodkvf? zGJUpnf;yHkajymif;vJrIqkdif&m A[dkXme&Sd okawoeynm&SifwpfOD;jzpfonf/ ol\ okawoersm;onf trsKd;om;a&;0g'? bmompum;qdkif&mEdkifiHa&;ESifh e,fajra'oqdkif&m acwfNydKifEdkifiHa&;wdkYwGif tm½Hk pl;pdkufonf/


Introduction

Language policy choices are particularly relevant in linguistically diverse plurinational states. Plurina-

tional states are characterised by the presence of at least two territorially distinct communities with a

shared understanding of being a separate political community. Institutionally, states may regulate linguis-

tic diversity in different ways, reinforcing or diffusing disputes between and within groups. Symbolically,

language policies affect the relative status of the different languages within the state and that of their

respective speakers, which is especially important for minority nations built upon linguistic distinctiveness.

This article is structured as follows. First, I argue that the link between language and nationhood is a

relatively recent political construction. I distinguish between two broad processes: state nation-building,

with its functional integration of societies and homogenisation of linguistic diversity; and the subsequent

reaction of ‘peripheral’ cultural and political activists. Second, I present ways in which language policies

can become strategies of territorial management through self-rule, shared rule, and symbolic recognition.

Third, I draw on the cases of Catalonia and Flanders to illustrate that language and nation are linked

through political action, thus showing contrasting ways of regulating linguistic diversity, and comparing

their respective linguistic disputes.

The Politics of Language and Nationalism

The relationship between language and nationhood is politically constructed. Cultural and political

activists mobilise and politicise the ‘raw material’ or linguistic differences available (Harguindéguy and

Cole 2013; Zabaltza 2006). We can identify two broad processes. On the one hand, state nation-building in

Europe has generally sought, with varying degrees of success, to achieve linguistic homogeneity as the

background condition of political integration. Some languages, such as Castilian in Spain and French in

Belgium, were turned into state national language, while others did not. This had normative consequences

for the new state languages came to be associated with modernity and progress while others with anach-

ronism and backwardness (May 2001). The British liberal John Stuart Mill famously invoked this notion of

hierarchy in his defence of the nation-state as the right setting for a representative government: ‘Nobody

can suppose that it is not beneficial to a Breton, or a Basque of French Navarre, to be brought into the

current of the ideas and feelings of a highly civilised and cultivated people – to be a member of the French

nationality, admitted on equal terms to all the privileges of French citizenship ... than to sulk on his own

rocks, the half-savage relic of past times, revolving in his own mental orbit, without participation or inter-


ed'gef;bmompum;qdkif&m rl0g'a&G;cs,frIrsm;tm; bmompum;tm;jzifh rwluGJjym;rIrsm;&Sdonfh vlrsKd;rsm;pGm ,SOfwGJ

aexdkifaomEdkifiHrsm;wGif txl;ojzifh toHk;csEdkifonf/ vlrsKd;rsm;pGm ,SOfwGJaexdkifaomEdkifiHrsm;\ vu©Pm&yf tm; - oD;jcm;EdkifiHa&;todkif;t0dkif;wpfck jzpfaejcif;udk wlnDpGmem;vnfoabmaygufonfh e,fajrtm;jzifh uGJjym; onfh vlYtzGJUtpnf; tenf;qHk; 2 ck &Sdaejcif;[k owfrSwfxm;onf/ tifpwDusL;&Sif; tm;jzifh EdkifiHrsm;onf bmom pum;qdkif&m rwluGJjym;rItm; enf;vrf;trsKd;rsKd;jzifh xdef;n§dEdkifNyD; tkyfpkrsm;Mum;ESifh tkyfpkrsm;twGif; tjiif;yGm; rIrsm;tm; cdkifrmtm;aumif;ap odkYr[kwf ydkrdk us,fjyefYoGm;aponf/ vu©Pm&yftm;jzifh bmompum;qdkif&m rl0g'rsm;onf EdkifiHwpfEdkifiHtwGif;&Sd rwlnDaom bmompum;rsm;ESifh ,if;bmompum;rsm; toD;oD;udk ajymqdk Muolrsm;\ qufET,frItajctaetay: oufa&mufrI&SdonfhtwGuf bmompum;qdkif&muGJjym;rIudk tajccH wnfaqmufxm;onfh vlenf;pkEdkifiHrsm;twGuf txl;ojzifh ta&;ygonf/

þaqmif;yg;udk atmufygtwdkif; zGJUpnf;xm;ygonf/ yxrOD;pGm uREkfyftaejzifh bmompum;ESifh EdkifiHjzpf wnfrIwdkY Mum;&Sd qufpyfrIonf rMumao;rDurS ay:aygufvmonfh EdkifiHa&;qdkif&m zGJUpnf;wnfaqmufrIwpfck jzpf aMumif; ajymMum;vdkygonf/ uREkfyfonf us,fjyefYonfh vkyfief;pOf 2 &yfMum;wGif cGJjcm;owfrSwfxm;ygonf - EdkifiH\ trsKd;om;a&;oGifjyifvu©Pm wnfaqmufrI? vlYtzGJUtpnf;rsm;tm; vkyfaqmifcsuftm;jzifh aygif;pnf; xnfhoGif;jcif;ESifh bmompum;qdkif&m rwluGJjym;rItm; wpfom;wnf;jzpfapjcif;ESifh tvGeftrif; xif&Sm;jcif; r&Sdonfh ,Ofaus;rIESifh EdkifiHa&;qdkif&mwuf<uvIyf&Sm;olrsm;\ aemufqufwGJwkHYjyefrIrsm; jzpfonf/ 'kwd,taejzifh uREkfyfonf udk,fwdkiftkyfcsKyfrI? rQa0tkyfcsKyfrIESifh vu©Pm&yfqdkif&m todtrSwfjyKrIwdkYrSwpfqifh bmompum; qkdif&m rl0g'rsm;tm; e,fajra'oqdkif&m pDrHcefYcGJa&;AsL[mrsm; jzpfvmEdkifaponfh enf;vrf;rsm;udk wifjyxm; onf/ wwd,taejzifh bmompum;ESifh EdkifiHwdkYonf EdkifiHa&;qdkif&m vkyfief;rsm;rSwpfqifh qufpyfaeMuaMumif;udk Oyrmay;&eftwGuf umwmvdk;eD;,m;ESifh zvef;'g;pfa'orsm;\ jzpfpOfrsm;udk tajccHxm;ygonf/ ,if;odkY jyKvkyf jcif;jzifh bmompum;qdkif&m rwluGJjym;rIudk xdef;csKyf&ef rwlnDonfh enf;vrf;rsm;udk jyoNyD; ,if;wdkY\ oufqdkif &m bmompum;qdkif&m tjiif;yGm;rIrsm;udk EdIif;,SOfxm;ygonf/

bmompum;qdkif&m EdkifiHa&;ESifh trsKd;om;a&;0g'bmompum;ESifh EdkifiHjzpfwnfrIMum;&Sd qufET,frItm; EdkifiHa&;t& wnfaqmufxm;jcif;jzpfonf/ ,Ofaus;rI

ESifh EdkifiHa&;qdkif&m wuf<uvIyf&Sm;olrsm;onf ]ukefMurf;ypönf;rsm;} odkYr[kwf bmompum;qdkif&m uGJjym;rIrsm;udk

jyifqifum EdkifiHa&;qdkif&mvu©Pmwpf&yftjzpf owfrSwfonf (Harguindéguy ESifh Cole 2013 ckESpf? Zabaltza 2006 ckESpf)/ uREkfyfwdkYtaejzifh us,fjyefYonfhvkyfief;pOf ESpfckudk cGJjcm;owfrSwfEdkifygonf/ wpfzufwGif Oa&my&Sd EdkifiHqdkif&m trsKd;om;oGifjyifvu©Pm wnfaqmufjcif;onf EdkifiHa&;qdkif&m aygif;pnf;rI\ aemufcHtajctae tjzpf bmompum;qdkif&m wpfom;wnf;jzpfwnfrIudk azmfaqmif&ef a,bk,stm;jzifh vkyfaqmifavh&SdNyD; atmifjrifrItwdkif;twm trsKd;rsKd;&SdcJhonf/ pydefEdkifiH&Sd uufpwDvsHESifh b,fvf*sD,H&Sd jyifopfbmompum; uJhodkYaom tcsKdUaom bmompum;rsm;tm; EdkifiH\ trsKd;om;bmompum;rsm;tjzpf ajymif;vJowfrSwfcJhaomf vnf; tjcm;bmompum;rsm;udkrl ajymif;vJowfrSwfcJhjcif; r&Sday/ ,if;onf acwfrDrI? wdk;wufrIwdkYESifh qufpyf aeonfh EdkifiHawmfbmompum;topfrsm;twGuf pHwefzdk;qdkif&m aemufqufwGJrsm; ay:aygufvmapNyD; tjcm; bmompum;rsm;onf rzGHU NzdK;rIESifh acwfaemufusrIwdkYESifh qufpyfaeonf (2011 ckESpf arv)/ NAdwdoQvpfb&,f

wpfOD;jzpfaom John Stuart Mill u trsKd;om;EdkifiHonf udk,fpm;jyKtpdk;&wpfcktwGuf rSefuefonfh tcif;tusif; jzpfaMumif; ckcHajymqdk&mwGif þ,lqcsuftqifhqifhudk ajymMum;cJh onfrSm xif&Sm;onf/ - ]b&ufwefvlrsKd;wpfOD;


est in the general movement of the world. The same remark applies to the Welshman or the Scottish

Highlander as members of the British nation’ (J.S. Mill 2008: 431).

On the other hand, ‘peripheral’ cultural and political activists reacted to this functional integration by

mobilising in favour of their minority languages and cultures. This is not to say that political entrepreneurs

could build anything they like, since there is an interplay between political agency, functional systems, and

popular response. We can identify two key stages: the nineteenth century, when activists first mobilised as

a result of the German romantic notion that language is the defining factor of the nation; and the second

half of the twentieth century, when demands re-emerged with new impetus and within the broader frame

of territorial claims to self-government and processes of decentralisation.

The salience of politics means that the link between language and nationhood is contingent. Nations

and their link with languages are historically situated human constructions. This challenges the Herderian

view that nations are natural, organic language-based entities. The link between language and nationhood

is complex and dynamic (Safran 1999). In fact, the role of language within nationalist projects varies

through space and time. Language may be the national marker and the central goal of collective national-

ist mobilisation. Catalonia provides an example of this at least until recently, when the central goal of

mobilisation has become self-determination. Language may also be the symbol of nationhood without

requiring proficiency in the language, as in the cases of Wales and Ireland. Yet there may be national move-

ments not built around linguistic distinctiveness. This is the case of Scotland, where notions of egalitari-

anism and community are more salient in making the case for national distinctiveness.

Managing Linguistic Diversity in Plurinational States

Politics is not only important in forging and sustaining a link between language and nation, but also

in regulating linguistic diversity. Language policy choices may vary in terms of the degree of institutional-

isation (e.g. which official language(s), if any); the level of policy responsibility (e.g. central government, or

devolved administration, or both); and type of regulation (e.g. accommodationist or integrationist). In lin-

guistically diverse plurinational states, language policies may become strategies of territorial management


odkYr[kwf jyifopfemAm;rS bufpuDvlrsKd;wpfOD;wdkYtm; jyifopf EdkifiHom;jzpfjcif;\ tcGifhxl;rsm;tm;vHk;udk nDrQpGm cHpm;&NyD; jyifopfvlrsKd; jzpfvm&ef? ,Ofaus;rI rsm;pGm xGef;um;í tqifhjrifhonfh yk*¾dKvfrsm;tjzpf awG;jrifcHpm;& aprnfh vrf;aMumif;twGif;odkU ac: aqmifjcif;onf ,if;wdkYtaejzifh twdwfumvrsm;&Sd t½dkif;wpf0ufjzpfonfh a&S;a[mif;ypönf;jzpfaom ,if;wdkY\ ajrtay:wGif pdwfysufvufysuf aexdkif&NyD; uÇmay:&Sd a,bk,sa&GUvsm;rIwGif yg0ifjcif; odkYr[kwf pdwfyg0ifpm;jcif;r&SdbJ rdrd\ pdwftwGif;wGifom vnfywfae&jcif;avmuf tusKd;aus;Zl; r&Sd[k rnfolurQ qdkvdrfhrnf r[kwfyg/ a0;vfvlrsKd; odkYr[kwf paumhwvefukef;jrifha'owGif aexdkifolrsm;taejzifh

NAdwdoQvlrsKd; jzpfvm&eftwGufvnf; tqkdygrSwfcsuftwdkif;yif jzpfonf/ ( J.S. Mill 2008 - 431)

tjcm;wpfzufwGif tvGeftrif; xif&Sm;jcif;r&Sdaom ,Ofaus;rIESifh EdkifiHa&;wuf<uvIyf&Sm;olrsm;onf ,if; wdkY\ vlenf;pkbmompum;rsm;ESifh ,Ofaus;rIrsm;twGuf pnf;½Hk;vHIYaqmfjcif;jzifh tqdkyg vkyfaqmifcsufqdkif&m aygif;pnf;rIudk wkHYjyefcJhonf/ EdkifiHa&;qdkif&m Xmersm;? vnfywfrIpepfrsm;ESifh vlxk\ wkHYjyefrIwdkYonf tjyeftvSef qufpyfaeMuojzifh ,if;onf EdkifiHa&;qdkif&m pGefYOD;wDxGifolrsm;taejzifh ,if;wdkY BudKufESpfoufonfht&mudk yHkazmfEdkifonf[k qdkvdkjcif; r[kwfay/ uREkfyfwdkYtaejzifh t"dutqifh (2) qifhudk cGJjcm;owfrSwfEdkifygonf/ ,if; wdkYrSm - bmompum;onf vlrsKd;wpf&yf\ t&nftaoG;udk tqHk;tjzwfay;onfh tcsufwpfcsuf jzpfonf [lonfh *smref½dkreft,ltqaMumifh wuf<uvIyf&Sm;olrsm; yxrqHk;tBudrf pnf;½Hk;vIyf&Sm;cJhonfh 19 &mpk ESifh udk,fydkif tkyfcsKyfrIESifh A[dkcsKyfudkifrIavQmhcsa&; jzpfpOfrsm;&Sd e,fajra'oqdkif&m awmif;qdkrIrsm;\ ydkrdkus,fjyefYonfh e,fy,ftwGif; wGef;tm;opfrsm;jzifh ta&;qdkrIrsm; jyefvnfay:aygufvmonfh 20 &mpk 'kwd, xuf0uftwGif;wdkY jzpfonf/

EdkifiHa&;\ ta&;ygrI qdkonfrSm bmompum;ESifh trsKd;om;jzpfwnfrIMum;&Sd csdwfqufrIwdkY\ tajctae ay: rlwnfonf/ vlrsKd;rsm;ESifh ,if;wdkY\ bmompum;rsm;ESifh qufpyfaerIwdkYonf ordkif;aMumif;t& wnf&SdcJhonfh vlom;rsm;\ wnfaqmufrIrsm; jzpfMuonf/ ,if;onf vlrsKd;rsm;onf obm0tavsmuf ouf&Sdbmompum; tajcjyK tzGJUtpnf;rsm; jzpfMuonf[laom awG;ac:ynm&Sif [m'g\ tjrifESifh qefYusifaeonf/ bmompum;ESifh

trsKd;om; oGifjyifvu©Pm jzpfwnfrIMum;&Sd qufpyfrIonf ½IyfaxG;NyD; ajymif;vJaeonf (Safran 1999 ckESpf)/ trSefpifppf? trsKd;om;a&; pDrHudef;rsm;twGif;&Sd bmompum;rsm;\ tcef;u@onf ae&mESifh tcsdefay: rlwnfí trsKd;rsKd;uGJjym;Edkifonf/ bmompum;onf trsKd;om;a&;pnf;½ H k;vIHYaqmfrIwpfckvHk;\ trsKd;om;a&; trSwf tom;ESifh A[dk&nfrSef;csuf jzpfEdkifonf/ umwmvdk;eD;,m;onf rMumao;rDu pnf;½Hk;vIyf&Sm;rI\ A[dk&nfrSef;csuf onf udk,fydkifjy|mef;cGifh jzpfrvmrDtxd txufyg jzpfpOf\ Oyrmwpf&yf jzpfcJhonf/ a0;vfESifh tdkif,mvefwdkY&Sd jzpfpOfrsm;wGifuJhodkY bmompum;wGif uRrf;usifrI&Sd&efrvdkbJ bmompum;onf trsKd;om; jzpfwnfrI\ vu©Pm wpf&yf jzpfEdkifonf/ odkYwdkif bmompum;qdkif&m xl;jcm;xif&Sm;rItay: tajccHxm;jcif; r[kwfonfh trsKd;om; a&;vIyf&Sm;rIrsm; &SdaeEdkifonf/ paumhwvefEdkifiHonf ,if;jzpfpOfrsKd;jzpfNyD; omwlnDrQ&SdrIESifh vlxkwdkYonf trsKd;om;a&;qdkif&m xl;jcm;xif&Sm;csuftay: ydkrdk ta&;ygonf/

vlrsKd;rsm;pGm ,SOfwGJaexdkifonfh EdkifiHrsm;&Sd bmompum;qdkif&m rwluGJjym;rItm; pDrHcefYcGJjcif;EdkifiHa&;onf bmompum;ESifh vlrsKd;wdkYMum;&Sd csdwfqufrIudk wnfaqmuf&efESifh xdef;odrf;&efwdkYwGifom

ta&;BuD; onf r[kwfbJ bmompum;qdkif&m rwluGJjym;rIudk xdef;csKyf&mwGifvnf; ta&;BuD;onf/ bmompum; rl0g'qdkif&m a&G;cs,frIrsm;onf pHtavhtxrsm; (Oyrm - tu,fí &Sdygu? ½Hk;oHk;bmompum;rsm;) owfrSwfonfh twdkif;twm rsm;? EdkifiHa&;qdkif&mwm0ef (Oyrm - A[dktpdk;& odkYr[kwf vkyfydkifcGifh vTJajymif;ay;xm;onfh tkyfcsKyf a&;Xme? odkYr[kwf ESpfckpvHk;) tqifhESifh xdef;csKyfrI trsKd;tpm; (Oyrm - aphpyfn§dEdIif;a&; odkYr[kwf aygif;pnf;a&;)


to appease the demands of minority nations (Swenden 2013).

There are at least three important components to territorial strategies for managing plurinational

states: self-rule, shared rule, and symbolic recognition (Keating 2001). The first and the third are especial-

ly important when it comes to linguistic diversity. For example, self-rule on cultural and education matters

allows sub-state governments to set up measures to protect their minority languages. As minority nation-

alist parties are usual incumbents in regional offices, they may engage in the linguistic promotion of mi-

nority languages as part of their wider sub-state nation-building initiatives. Shared rule gives minority

nations the capacity to influence key policy decisions that affect their interests on linguistic matters. Sym-

bolic recognition may include different features around two broad aspects: projecting a state image of

diversity (e.g. by recognising more than one national or state language) and recognising the distinctiveness

of the various nations comprising the state (e.g. through asymmetric constitutional arrangements).

The Protection of Minority Languages in the EU

What is the role of the European Union in the management of linguistic diversity? Loughlin and Wil-

liams (2007) suggest that European integration had the potential to benefit minority languages because it

reduced the hegemony of states and their languages and provided new institutional avenues for sub-state

activists. Indeed, the EU discourse emphasises linguistic diversity as a core value of the European project;

the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights offers a legal protection to minority languages (article 22); and

European funding supports initiatives of linguistic revitalisation. Minority language groups also benefit

from the protection of the Council of Europe’s Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and the Frame-

work Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. However, the potential for linguistic protection

has not fully materialised as the issue remains essentially within the competence area of the Member

States (Kraus 2008). The Charter and the Framework Convention are relevant and legally binding docu-

ments, but they leave the parties a considerable measure of discretion on the implementation of its provi-

sions. Thus, it is still in domestic politics where we should look for key language policies and political de-

bates on language.


wdkYESifh pyfvsOf;í trsKd;rsKd;ajymif;vJrI &SdEdkifonf/ bmompum;tm;jzifh uGJjym;onfh EdkifiHrsm;wGif bmompum;qdkif&m rl0g'rsm;onf vlenf;pk vlrsKd;rsm;\ awmif;qdkrIrsm;udk OD;pm;ay;&eftwGuf e,fajra'oqdkif&m pDrHcefYcGJrIAsL[mrsm;

jzpfvmEdkifonf (Swenden 2013 ckESpf)/vlrsKd;rsm;pGm ,SOfwGJaexkdifonfh EdkifiHrsm;tm; pDrHcefYcGJ&mwGif ta&;ygonfhtpdwftydkif; tenf;qHk; 3ck &Sdonf/

,if;wdkYrSm - ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfrI? rQa0tkyfcsKyfrIESifh vu©Pm&yfqdkif&m todtrSwfjyKrIwdkY jzpfMuonf (Keating 2001 ckESpf)/ bmompum;qdkif&m rwluGJjym;rIESifh pyfvsOf;í yxrqHk;tcsufESifh aemufqHk;tcsuf wdkYonf txl; ojzifh ta&;BuD;Muonf/ Oyrmtm;jzifh ,Ofaus;rIESifh ynma&;qdkif&mudpö&yfrsm;tay:wGif udk,fydkiftkyfcsKyfrI onf a'oÅ&tpdk;&rsm;taejzifh ,if;wdkY\ vlenf;pkbmompum;rsm;udk umuG,fEdkifonfh tpDtrHrsm; aqmif&Guf Edkifaponf/ vlenf;pktrsKd;om;a&;ygwDrsm;onf trsm;tm;jzifh a'owGif;tpdk;&Xmersm;wGif tmPm&&SdMuojzifh ,if;wdkYtaejzifh ,if;wdkY\ ydkrdkus,fjyefYaom a'oÅ&trsKd;om;oGifjyifvu©Pm wnfaqmufjcif;vkyfief;rsm;\ tpdwftydkif;taejzifh vlenf;pkbmompum;rsm; jr§ifhwifa&;udk vkyfaqmifEdkifonf/ rQa0tkyfcsKyfrIonf vlenf;pk vlrsKd;rsm;tm; bmompum;qdkif&m udpö&yfrsm;ESifh pyfvsOf;í ,if;wdkY\ tusdK;pD;yGm;rsm;tay: tusKd;oufa&muf rI&Sdonfh t"durl0g'qHk;jzwfcsufrsm;udk vTrf;rdk;Edkifonfh pGrf;&nfay;onf/ vu©Pm&yfqdkif&m todtrSwfjyKjcif;wGif us,fjyefYonfh ½Iaxmifh (2) ckESifh qufpyfaeonfh rwlnDaom oGifjyifvu©Pm&yfrsm; yg0ifEdkifonf/ ,if;wdkYrSm EdkifiH\ rwluGJjym;onfh ½kyfyHkudk ay:vGifapjcif; (Oyrm / / jynfe,f odkYr[kwf EdkifiHawmf bmompum; wpfckxuf ydkí todtrSwfjyKjcif;jzifh)? ESifh EdkifiHwGif yg0ifonfh trsKd;rsKd;aomvlrsKd;rsm;\ xl;jcm;xif&Sm;rIudk todtrSwf jyKjcif; (Oyrm/ / tcsdK;rnD tajccHOya'qdkif&m tpDtpOfrsm;rSwpfqifh) wdkYjzpfonf/

EU &Sd vlenf;pk bmompum;rsm;tm; umuG,fapmifha&Smufjcif;bmompum;qdkif&m rwluGJjym;rIudk pDrHcefYcGJ&mwGif Oa&myor*¾onf rnfonfhtcef;u@wGif yg0ifoenf;/

Loughlin ESifh Williams (2007 ckESpf) wdkYu Oa&myaygif;pnf;rIonf EdkifiHrsm;ESifh ,if;wdkY\ bmompum;rsm;udk vlrsKd;wpfrsKd;rS vTrf;rdk;tkyfcsKyfrIudk avsmhusapojzifh vlenf;pk bmompum;rsm;udk tusKd;jzpfxGef;aprnfh tvm; tvm&SdNyD; a'oÅ&wuf<uvIyf&Sm;olrsm;twGuf tifpwDusL;&Sif;qdkif&m enf;vrf;opfrsm; axmufyHhay; onf/

trSefpifppfwGif EU \ azmfjycsufonf bmompum;qdkif&m rwluGJjym;rItm; Oa&mypDrHudef;\ t"duwefzdk;

wpf&yftjzpf tav;ay;azmfjyonf/ EU\ tajccHtcGifhta&;rsm;qdkif&m y#dnmOfpmcsKyfwGif vlenf;pkbmom pum;rsm;tm; Oya't& tumtuG,fay;&ef azmfjyxm;NyD; (yk'fr 22) ESifh bmompum; jyefvnf&Sifoefa&; twGuf pwifaqmif&Guf&ef Oa&my&efyHkaiGrsm;u axmufyHhay;onf/ vlenf;pkbmompum; tkyfpkrsm;onf Oa&my aumifpD\ ]a'owGif; odkYr[kwf vlenf;pkbmompum;rsm;qdkif&m y#dnmOfpmcsKyfESifh vlenf;pkrsm;tm; umuG,f apmifha&Smufa&;rlabmifoabmwlpmcsKyf} wdkY\ tumtuG,frSvnf; tusKd;aus;Zl; &&SdEdkifonf/ odkY&mwGif bmom pum;qdkif&m umuG,fapmifha&Smufa&; udpö&yfonf tzGJU0ifEdkifiHrsm;\ vkyfydkifcGifh e,fy,ftwGif; &Sdaeao;onfh

twGuf bmompum;qdkif&m umuG,fapmifha&Smufa&; tvm;tvmudk tjynfht0 razmfaqmif&ao;ay (Kraus 2008 ckESpf)/ y#dnmOfpmcsKyfESifh rlabmifoabmwlpmcsKyfwdkYonf qDavsmfrI&SdMuNyD; w&m;Oya't& vdkufem&ef wm0ef&Sdonfh pm&Gufpmwrf;rsm; jzpfaomfvnf; ,if;\ jy|mef;csufrsm;udk taumiftxnf azmf&mwGif tzGJU0ifrsm; taejzifh rdrdqEtavsmuf tawmftoifh vkyfudkifEdkifaponf/ xdkYaMumifh uREkfyfwdkYtaejzifh t"duusaom bmom pum;qdkif&mrl0g'rsm;ESifh bmompum;taMumif; EdkifiHa&;qdkif&m aqG;aEG;jiif;cHkrIwdkYtwGuf jynfwGif;EdkifiHa&;wGif om Munfh½Ioifhayonf/


Language and Nationalism in Catalonia and Flanders

The cases of Catalonia in Spain and Flanders in Belgium are paradigmatic examples of the politics of

language and nationalism in plurinational states and illustrate the key points made above.

Origins

The Catalan and Flemish nationalist movements have been historically built upon language. Cultural

activists in the nineteenth century (but also earlier) led cultural and literary movements influenced by

Romanticism which expressed consciousness and pride for the Catalan and Flemish languages and cul-

tures. The romantic ‘discovery’ of the past and the use of the vernacular constituted a solid base upon

which both political nationalisms would draw their legitimacy. The language issue featured prominently in

the first political demands of the two movements. For example, the report of the ‘Commission of Grievanc-

es’ (1856), the great manifesto of the Flemish Movement, demanded strict equality of French and Dutch,

advocating a future in which every Belgian would be bilingual.

The Catalan and Flemish national movements emerged as responses to (incomplete) state na-

tion-building. The liberals in Spain and Belgium were constructing states that promoted processes of cul-

tural uniformity and chose one language (French in Belgium, Castilian in Spain) to be sponsored and pro-

moted by the state. This fostered a pre-existing diglossia, which meant that there was an unequal

distribution of tasks between the languages. Diglossia is grounded in an unequal conception of the lan-

guages. This is especially noteworthy in Belgium, where Dutch was (and still is) the majority language. Yet,

the liberal French-speaking elite situated French as the high-status language and Dutch was considered a

mere vulgar dialect and identified with poverty and deprivation.

Linguistic Regulation

Catalonia has two main official languages, Catalan and Castilian, while Aranese (a variety of the Occi-

tan language) is also official in the Vall d’Aran area. At the state level, the Spanish linguistic constitutional

design of 1978 gives a prevalent role to the Castilian language as the only state language and the only

language which all Spanish citizens are required to know. The constitution kept the centre monolingual in

Castilian and the Autonomous communities with languages different from Castilian were made officially

bilingual.


umwmvdk;eD;,m;ESifh zvef;'g;pfa'orsm;&Sd bmompum;ESifh trsKd;om;a&;0g'pydef&Sd umwmvdk;eD;,m;ESifh b,fvf*sD,H&Sd zvef;'g;pfwdkY\ jzpfpOfonfvnf; vlrsKd;rsm;pGm ,SOfwGJaexdkifonfh

EdkifiHrsm;&Sd bmompum;qdkif&m EdkifiHa&;ESifh trsKd;om;a&;0g'udk azmfjyonfh yHkrSefOyrmrsm; jzpfMuNyD; txuf wGif azmfjycJhonfh t"dutcsuftvufrsm;udk Oyrm jyoonf/

rlvZmpfjrpfrsm;umwmvefESifh zvef;rpf trsKd;om;a&;vIyf&Sm;rIrsm;onf ordkif;aMumif;tpOftvmt& bmompum;

tay:wGif tajccHcJhMuonf/ 19 &mpktwGif; (ESifh tapmydkif;umvrsm; twGif;&Sd) ,Ofaus;rIqdkif&m wuf<uvIyf&Sm; olrsm;onf umwmvefESifh zvef;rpfbmompum;rsm;ESifh ,Ofaus;rIrsm;tay: todtrSwfjyKrIESifh *kPf,lrIwdkYudk

azmfjyonfh Romanticism 0g'\ vTrf;rdk;MoZmoufa&mufaeonfh ,Ofaus;rIESifh pmayqdkif&mvIyf&Sm;rIrsm;udk OD;aqmifcJhMu onf/ twdwfumv&Sd tqdkygvIyf&Sm;rIrS ]&SmazGawGU&Sdcsuf} ESifh rdcifbmompum; toHk;jyKrIonf EdkifiHa&;qdkif&m trsKd;om;a&;0g'rsm;twGuf ,if;wdkY\ w&m;0ifrIwdkYudk azmfjyrnfh cdkifrmonfhtajcwpfckudk owf rSwfxm;ygonf/ bmompum;qdkif&mudpö&yfudk vIyf&Sm;rIESpfcktwGif;&Sd yxrqHk;aom EdkifiHa&;qdkif&m awmif;qdk rIrsm;wGif xif&Sm;pGm azmfjyxm;ygonf/ Oyrmtm;jzifh zvef;rpfvIyf&Sm;rI\ BuD;rm;onfh aMunmpmwrf;wpfck jzpfaom ]tjiif;yGm;rI ajz&Sif;a&;aumfr&Sif} \ tpD&ifcHpm (1856 ckESpf) wGif jyifopfESifh 'wfcsfbmompum;wdkYtm; wef;wlnDrQ owfrSwfa&;udk awmif;qdkxm;NyD; b,fvf*sD,HEdkifiHom;wdkif; bmompum;ESpfrsKd; ajymqdkMuolrsm; jzpfvmrnfh tem*wfudk tBuHjyKaeonf/

umwmvefESifh zvef;rpftrsKd;om;a&;vIyf&Sm;rIrsm;onf (rjynfhpHkonfh) EdkifiH\ trsKd;om;oGifjyifvu©Pm wnfaqmufjcif;ukd wkHYjyefrIrsm;tjzpf ay:aygufvmcJhMuonf/ pydefESifh b,fvf*sD,HwdkY&Sd vpfb&,frsm;onf ,Ofaus;rIwpfrsKd;wpfpm;wnf;jzpfa&; vkyfief;pOfrsm;udk tm;ay;onfhEdkifiHrsm; wnfaqmufcJhMuNyD; EdkifiHrS aiGaMu; yHhydk;axmufcH&rnfh bmompum;wpfrsKd; (b,fvf*sD,HwGif jyifopfbmompum;ESifh pydefwGif uufpwDvsH bmompum;) udk a&G;cs,fcJhMuonf/ ,if;onf e*dk&SdaeNyD;om;jzpfaom bmompum;tm; ESpfrsKd; cGJjcm; owfrSwf oHk;pGJrIudk tm;ay;cJhonf/ qdkvdkonfrSm bmompum;rsm;Mum;wGif wm0efcGJa0rIrSm rQwrI r&Sday/ bmompum; ESpfrsKd;udk cGJjcm;oHk;pGJjcif;tm; bmompum;rsm;tay: wef;wlnDrQrIr&Sdonfh t,ltqwGif tajcwnfcJhjcif;jzpf onf/ ,if;udk txl;ojzifh b,fvf*sD,HEdkifiHwGif txift&Sm;awGUEdkifNyD; tqdkyg EdkifiHwGif 'wfcsfbmompum; onf vltrsm;pk oHk;pGJajymqdkonfh bmompum;jzpfcJhonf (jzpfaeqJ jzpfonf)/ odkYwdkif jyifopfbmompum; ajymqdk onfh vpfb&,ftxufwef;vTmvlenf;pku jyifopfbmompum;udk tqifhtwef; jrifhonfh bmompum;[k owfrSwfNyD; 'wfcsfbmompum;tm; tqifhtwef; edrfhusonfh a'ooHk;pum;wpfcktjzpf owfrSwfum qif;&J EGrf;yg;rI? csKdUwJhrIwdkYESifh qufpyfí cGJjcm;owfrSwfxm;onf/

bmompum;qdkif&m pnf;rsOf; pnf;urf;rsm;umwmvdk;eD;,m;wGif umwmvefESifh uufpwDvsH[lonfh t"du½ H k;oHk;bmompum; 2 ck&SdNyD; Vall d’Aran

a'owGif (atmfpDwef bmompum;rsKd;uGJwpfck jzpfonfh) Aranese onfvnf; ½ H k;oHk;bmompum;jzpfonf/ EdkifiHawmftqifhwGif pydefbmompum;qdkif&m tajccHOya'yHkpH 1978 t& uufpwDvsH bmompum;tm; wpfck wnf;aom EdkifiHawmfbmompum;ESifh pydefEdkifiHom;rsm;taejzifh od&Sd&ef vdktyfonfh wpfckwnf;aom bmom pum;tjzpf us,fjyefYonfh tcef;u@udk ay;tyfxm;ygonf/ tajccHOya't& A[kdwGif uufpwDvsHbmom pum;wpfckwnf;udkom owfrSwfxm;NyD; uufpwDvsH bmompum;r[kwfonfh tjcm;bmompum;rsm; ajymqdk


In contrast, Flanders is officially monolingual (Dutch is the official language) and language was the

main federating criteria in Belgium in 1993. The legislator distinguished in Article 2 between the Flemish,

French, and German-speaking communities. There is no single state language, but rather three official

languages (Dutch, French and German) which are official in different areas of the state. This is usually la-

belled the territoriality principle, according to which only one language group is officially recognised in

each particular territorial unit. The territoriality principle is typically contrasted with the personality prin-

ciple, which defends that territories should endorse institutional bi- or multilingualism (see De Schutter

2008). I tend to find these labels problematic because all rights are territorial in absence of global justice

and because the personality principle is also necessarily instantiated in a particular territory. In practice,

the debate is between official monolingualism and official bilingualism, both implemented territorially.

Main Debates

The fundamental tension in the Catalan and Flemish linguistic disputes is between the willingness of

Catalan and Flemish authorities to integrate newcomers, on the one hand, and the accusation that integra-

tionist policies are discriminatory for the rights of Castilian- and French-speakers, which are the dominant

languages in the rest of the state.

The federalisation of Belgium and other compromises among Belgian political elites have contributed

to reduce the intensity of linguistic conflicts in Belgium, which reached its peak in the 1960s and 1970s.

The place where the linguistic dispute is alive, although attenuated, is the Flemish Periphery of Brussels,

the only place where French-speakers outnumber Dutch-speakers. De jure, some towns around Brussels

are officially monolingual in Dutch with linguistic facilities for French-speakers in administration and ed-

ucation. De facto, they are multilingual and essentially French-speaking. Some French-speaking political

actors, chief among which is the political party DéFI (formerly FDF), argue that this situation discriminates

against their linguistic rights. For them, Flemish authorities, which have full legislative powers on the

linguistic regime of the area, are infringing rights in their efforts to protect Dutch in the area.

In Catalonia, the dispute focuses on education. Aimed at social cohesion and immigrant integration,

the Catalan education system uses Catalan as the only language of instruction in publically funded schools,

while Castilian is taught as a subject. Some political actors, chief among which are the political parties,

Citizens (C’s) and the Popular Party (PP), see this as an illiberal, nationalist imposition that infringes the


aom udk,fydkiftkyfcsKyfcGifh& vlYtzGJUtpnf;rsm;twGuf ½Hk;oHk;bmompum;ESpfrsKd; owfrSwfxm;onf/qefYusifbuftm;jzifh zvef;'g;pfonf bmompum;wpfckwnf;om toHk;jyKonfha'ojzpfNyD; ('wfcsf

bmompum; onf ½Hk;oHk;bmompum; jzpfonf) 1993 ckESpf b,fvf*sD,HEdkifiHwGif bmompum;onf zuf'&,f qdkif&m t"dupHEIef;jzpfonf/ Oya'jy|mef;olonf yk'fr 2 wGif zvef;rpf? jyifopfESifh *smrefpum;ajymqdkaom todkif;t0dkif;rsm;udk cGJjcm;xm;onf/ wpfckwnf;aom EdkifiHawmfbmompum; [lí r&SdbJ ½Hk;oHk;bmompum; 3 rsKd; ('wfcsf? jyifopfESifh *smref) wdkY&SdNyD; ,if;wdkYonf EdkifiH\ rwlnDonfha'orsm;wGif ½Hk;oHk;bmompum;rsm; jzpf Muonf/ ,if;udk yHkrSeftm;jzifh ]e,fajra'oqdkif&m tajccH oabmw&m;} [k ac:a0: NyD; tqdkyg tajccHoabmw&m; t& oufqdkif&m e,fajra'oqdkif&m ,lepfwpfck pDwGif ½Hk;oHk;bmompum;wpfckpDudkom todtrSwfjyKxm;onf/ e,fajra'oqdkif&m tajccHoabmw&m;\ qefYusifbufrSm udk,f&nfudk,faoG;qdkif&m tajccHoabmw&m;jzpfNyD; tqdkyg tajccHoabmw&m;wGif e,fajra'orsm;onf tifpwDusL;&Sif;qdkif&m bmompum;ESpfck toHk;jyKonfhpepf odkYr[kwf bmompum;trsm;tjym; toHk;jyKonfhpepfudk axmufcHusifhoHk;oifhaMumif; umuG,fazmfjyxm;onf

(De Schutter 2008 ckESpfudk Munfh½ Iyg)/ wpfuÇmvHk;qdkif&m w&m;pD&ifrI r&Sdonfhae&mwGif tcGifhta&;rsm; tm;vHk;onf e,fajra'oESifh oufqdkifNyD; udk,f&nfudk,faoG;qdkif&m tajccHoabmw&m;onf oufqdkif&me,fajr a'owpfcktwGif;wGifvnf; udk,fpm;jyKNyD;jzpfaomaMumifh uREkfyftaejzifh tqdkygowfrSwfcsufrsm;onf ½IyfaxG; rIrsm; jzpfay:aponf[k xifjrifygonf/ vufawGUwGif jiif;cHkrIonf ½Hk;oHk;bmompum; wpfrsKd;wnf; owfrSwf a&;ESifh ½ H k;oHk;bmompum;rsm;pGm owfrSwfa&;wdkYMum;wGif jzpfNyD; ,if;wdkYESpfckpvHk;udk e,fajra'otvdkuf taumiftxnf azmfygonf/

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ESifh zvef;rpftmPmydkifrsm;\ vlopfrsm;udk aygif;pnf;xnfhoGif;&ef qEESifh aygif;pnf;a&;rl0g'rsm;onf EdkifiH\ usefae&mrsm;&Sd t"dubmompum;rsm; jzpfMuonfh uufpwDvsHESifh jyifopfpum;ajymqdkolrsm;\ tcGifhta&; rsm;udk cGJjcm;qufqHonf[laom pGyfpGJajymqdkcsuf jzpfonf/

b,fvf*sD,HEdkifiH&Sd zuf'&,fazmfaqmifa&;ESifh EdkifiHa&;qdkif&m xdyfoD;vlenf;pkrsm;Mum;&Sd tjcm;aom n§dEdIif; rIrsm;onf 1960 jynfhESpfrsm;ESifh 1970 jynfhESpfrsm;wGif tjyif;xefqHk; jzpfcJhonfh b,fvf*sD,HEdkifiH&Sd bmompum; qdkif&m y#dyu©rsm;\ jyif;xefrIudk avQmhcs&ef taxmuftuljyKcJhonf/ bmompum;qdkif&m tjiif;yGm;rIrsm; enf;yg;oGm;aomfvnf; touf0ifaeao;onfhae&monf b&yfqJNrdKU\ zvef;rpftpGeftzsm;a'ojzpfNyD; ,if; ae&monf 'wfcsfpum;ajymqkdol ta&twGufxuf jyifopfpum;ajymqdkol ta&twGufu ydkrdkrsm;jym;aom wpfckwnf;aomae&m jzpfonf/ Oya't& b&yfqJNrdKU 0ef;usif&Sd tcsKdUaomNrdKUrsm;wGif ½Hk;oHk;bmompum;tjzpf 'wfcsfbmompum; wpfrsKd;wnf;om toHk;jyKNyD; tkyfcsKyfa&;ESifh ynma&;wdkYwGif jyifopfpum; ajymqdkolrsm;twGuf bmompum;qdkif&m taxmuftuljyK ud&d,mrsm; &SdMuonf/ trSefpifppfwGif ,if;wdkYonf bmompum;rsm;pGm ajymqdkMuol rsm;jzpfNyD; tajccHtm;jzifh jyifopfbmompum; ajymqdkMuonf/ jyifopfbmompum; ajymqdkonfh EdkifiHa&;orm;rsm;u tqdkyg tajctaeonf ,if;wdkY\ bmompum;qdkif&m tcGifhta&;rsm;udk cGJjcm;qufqHonf

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right of those students wishing to be educated in Castilian. Education is a mostly devolved but partly

shared with the Spanish government, and tensions arose recently around the ruling 31/2010 of the Span-

ish Constitutional Court on the 2006 Catalan Statute of Autonomy and the 2013 Spanish Education Law,

which made the case that Castilian should not only be object of teaching in Catalonia but also a language

of instruction.

Concluding Remarks

In plurinational states characterised by linguistic diversity, strategies of territorial management can

help to accommodate the normative and practical issues derived from the politicisation of languages. The

link between language and nation is endogenous to contingent processes of state nation-building, but

once created it may turn languages into powerful markers of national distinctiveness in different ways.

Devolution processes in the second half of the twentieth century have contributed to strengthening mi-

nority nations’ languages, while the European trend towards minority protection is noteworthy in moving

away from monolingual frames but less significant in its implications.


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Citizens (C’s) ESifh Popular Party (PP) wdkYjzpfMuonf/ ynma&;wGif vkyfydkifcGifhtmPmtrsm;qHk; vTJajymif;ay; xm;aomfvnf; vkyfydkifcGifhtmPmrsm;udk pydeftpdk;&ESifh cGJa0xm;NyD; vwfwavmwGif 2006 umwmvef udk,fydkif tkyfcsKyfcGifhOya'ESifh 2013 pydef ynma&;Oya'wdkYtay: pydeftajccHOya'qdkif&mw&m;½Hk;\ qHk;jzwfcsuf 31^ 2010 ESifh pyfvsOf;í wif;rmrIrsm; ay:aygufvmonf/ tqdkyg qHk;jzwfcsufwGif umwmvdk;eD;,m;wGif umpwDvsH bmompum;tm; oifMum;rI taMumif;t&mwpfcktjzpf omrubJ oifMum;ydkYcsonfh bmompum;wpfckvnf; jzpfoifhaMumif; qHk;jzwfxm;onf/

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a'oqdkif&m pDrHcefYcGJrIonf EdkifiHa&;wGif bmompum;rsm; yg0ifywfouf&mrS ay:aygufvmonfh pHEIef;qdkif&mESifh usifhoHk;rIqdkif&m jyóemrsm;udk ajz&Sif;&ef taxmuftuljyKEdkifonf/ bmompum;ESifh EdkifiHwdkY\Mum;&Sd qufpyfrI onf EdkifiH\ trsKd;om;oGifjyifvu©Pm&yfrsm; wnfaqmufjcif;twGuf twGif;usonfh taMumif;&if; wpfcsuf jzpfonf/ odkY&mwGif tqdkygqufpyfrIudk ay:aygufapNyD;onfESifh wpfNydKifeuf ,if;onf bmompum;rsm;tm; trsKd;om;a&;qdkif&m xl;jcm;xif&Sm;rI\ tm;aumif;aomoauFwrsm;tjzpfodkY enf;trsKd;rsKd;jzifh ajymif;vJEdkif onf/ ESpfq,f&mpk\ 'kwd,xuf0uf umvtwGif;&Sd vkyfydkifcGifhtmPm vTJajymif;ay; onfh jzpfpOfrsm;onf vlenf;pkvlrsKd;rsm;\ bmom pum;rsm;udk cdkifrmtm;aumif;ap&ef taxmuftuljyKcJhNyD; Oa&my\ vlenf;pk tumtuG,fay;a&;odkY OD;wnfonfh a&GUvsm;rIonf bmompum;wpfckwnf;om toHk;jyKonfhabmifrsm;twGif; rS xGufcGm&mwGif *½kjyKavmufaomfvnf; ,if;\ oufa&mufrIrsm;onf xdkrQavmuf ta&;rygay/

64 I Linguistic Diversity in Pluranational StatesFurther Reading

- Cardinal, L. and Sonntag, S.K. (eds.) (2015) State Traditions and Language Regimes, McGill-Queen’s University Press.

- Kymlicka, W. and Patten, A. (eds.) (2003) Language Rights and Political Theory, Oxford University Press.

- Laitin, D. (1992) Language Repertoires and State Construction in Africa, Cambridge University Press.

-Liu, A. H. (2011) ‘Linguistic Effects of Political Institutions’, The Journal of Politics, 73:1, pp. 125-139.

- Van Parijs, P. (2011) Linguistic Justice for Europe and for the World, Oxford University Press

BibliographyDe Schutter, H. (2008) ‘The Linguistic

Territoriality Principle—A Critique’, Journal of

Applied Philosophy, 25:2, pp. 105-120.

Harguindéguy, J.B.P., and Cole, A.

‘Ethnolinguistic Mobilizations in Europe. An

Introduction’, Regional and Federal Studies,

23:1, 1-6.

Keating, M. (2001) Plurinational Democracy:

Stateless Nations in a Post-Sovereignty Era,

Oxford University Press.

Kraus, P. A. (2008) A Union of Diversity:

Language, Identity and Polity-Building in

Europe, Cambridge University Press.

Loughlin, J. and C.H. Williams (2007)

‘Governance and Language: The Intellectual

Foundations’, in C.H. Williams (ed.) Language

and Governance, University of Wales Press, pp. 57-

103.

May, S. (2001) Language and Minority Rights:

Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of Language,

Routledge.

Mill, J.S. (2008) ‘Of nationality, as connected with

representative government’, in J.S. Mill On Liberty and

Other Essays, Oxford University Press, pp. 427-434.

Safran, W. (1999) ‘Nationalism’, in Fishman, J. (ed.)

Handbook of language & ethnic identity, Oxford

University Press, pp. 77-93.

Swenden, W. (2013) ‘Territorial strategies for

managing plurinational states’, in Routledge

Handbook of Regionalism and Federalism, Abingdon–

New York: Routledge.

Zabaltza, X. (2006) Historia de las Lenguas y los

Nacionalismos, Gedisa Editorial.

66 I Federalism: A tool for conflict resolution

Paul Anderson is a PhD Candidate and sessional lecturer in Politics and

International Relations at Canterbury Christ Church University. His main

research interests include: federalism, conflict resolution, nationalism and

the constitutional politics of plurinational states.

Soeren Keil is Reader in Politics and International Relations at Canterbury

Christ Church University. His research focuses on territorial autonomy, the

Western Balkans, EU enlargement and new federal models. He currently

serves as an advisor to the peace processes in Myanmar and Syria.

aygvftif'gqefonf PhD Candidate wpfOD;jzpfNyD; Canterbury Christ Church wuúokdvfwGif EkdifiHa&;ESifh EkdifiHwumqufqHa&; bmom&yfukd ykdYcsol uxduwpfOD; vnf; jzpfygonf/ ol\ okawoeqkdif&m e,fy,frsm;rSm z,f'&,fpepf? y#dyu© ajz&Sif;jcif;? trsKd;om;a&;0g'ESifh vlrsKd;rsm;pGm pkaygif;aexkdifaom EkdifiHrsm;\ tajccHOya'qkdif&m EkdifiHa&;wkdY jzpfygonf/

Zdk&efukdif;vfonf Canterbury Christ Church wuúokdvfwGif EkdifiHa&;ESifh EkdifiHwum qufqHa&; bmom&yfrsm;ukd ydkYcsol wGJzufygarmu©wpfOD; jzpfygonf/ ol\ okaw oeqkdif&mwGif pl;pkdufonfh e,fy,frsm;rSm e,fajrqkdif&m ukd,fykdif tkyfcsKyfcGifh? taemufabmfvfuefa'orsm;? Oa&myor* ¾csJUxGifjcif;ESifh zuf'&,fyHkpHopfrsm;wkdY jzpfMuygonf/ vuf&SdwGif olonf jrefrmEkdifiHESifh qD;&D;,m;EkdifiHwkdY&Sd Nidrf;csrf;a&; vkyfief;pOfrsm;wGif tBuHay;yk*¾dKvftjzpf aqmif&Gufvsuf &Sdygonf/

zuf'&,fpepf - y#dyu© ajz&Sif;a&;twGuf enf;vrf;wpfckavm I 67

Federalism has become increasingly used as a tool of conflict resolution

in the post-Cold War era. This contribution discusses the rationale in

using federalism as a tool of peace-building, conflict resolution and

democratisation in deeply divided, ethnically heterogeneous and post-

conflict societies. In doing so, it is highlighted how federalism can serve

as an acceptable and viable solution for different ethnic groups because

of its emphasis on autonomy and territorial integrity. The contribution also

demonstrates that federalism is not able to solve all problems in ethnically

heterogeneous societies and that further research is needed in order to

understand the conditions in which federalism can be used to end conflict

and bring peace and democracy to divided countries.

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Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an increased use in federalism as a tool of con-

flict resolution. In recent years, the nature of conflict has changed, as evidenced by the prolifera-

tion of civil wars and conflicts rooted in ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity (Kaldor 2012).

These ‘new wars’ have thus necessitated the development of new tools for managing and resolving

ethnocultural conflicts. Federalism is one such tool, able to satisfy the aspirations and demands of

both minority and majority groups: giving minority groups (limited) control over their own eco-

nomic, political and social affairs, while also sustaining the territorial integrity of the extant state.

As most violent conflicts are intrastate conflicts — fought between different groups within one

country (rather than between different countries) — the potential of federalism to facilitate the

accommodation of differences, protect minority groups, prevent territorial disintegration and

maintain political stability, has rendered it one of the international community’s preferred conflict

ameliorating strategies (Monteux, 2006: 164).

This paper will outline why federalism has become an important tool of conflict resolution. We

will begin by defining federalism and giving a brief overview of the rationale behind its use in

post-conflict societies. Second, we will draw upon some concrete examples to illustrate the prom-

inence of federalism in bringing peace and stability to war-torn countries. In the penultimate

section, we will examine some of the limitations of approaching federalism as a tool of conflict

resolution. The conclusion will demonstrate that further empirical and theoretical research is

needed in order to fully understand the conditions in which federalism can contribute to

peace-building and conflict resolution.

Conceptual Clarification

Federalism, in the words of Ronald Watts (2008: 8) ‘refers to the advocacy of multi-tiered gov-

ernment combining elements of shared rule and regional self-rule’. Watts, in the same vein as

Preston King (1982) and Michael Burgess (2006), interprets federalism as a normative term, a

philosophical and ideological principle to be differentiated from federation which denotes the

‘tangible institutional reality’ of a federal state (Burgess, 2006: 285). Moreover, Watts, following

Daniel Elazar (1987), places emphasis on both the shared and self-rule elements of federations.

Self-rule refers to the (territorial) autonomy granted to the regions, Länder, states, provinces or

cantons. Shared-rule, on the other hand, denotes the ability of the sub-national governments to

participate in, influence and make decisions at the centre.

The rationale behind federalism is manifold. According to William Livingston (1956: 1), ‘feder-


ed'gef;ppfat;acwf NyD;qHk;csdefrSpí zuf'&,fpepfukd y#dyu©ajz&Sif;a&;enf;vrf;wpfcktjzpf ykdrkdtoHk;jyKvmMu

onf/ y#dyu©rsm;\ oabmobm0 ajymif;vJvmcJYonfukd rMumrDESpfrsm;twGif;u jynfwGif;ppfrsm;? vlrsKd;a&;? bmoma&;ESifh bmompum;qkdif&m rwluGJjym;rIrsm;wGif tajccHonfh y#dyu©rsm; jyefYyGm;vmonfh taxmuftxm;

rsm; t& awGU jrif&onf (Kaldor 2012)/ vlrsKd;a&;ESifh ,Ofaus;rIqkdif&m y#dyu©rsm;ukd xdef;odrf;ajz&Sif;Ekdifa&; enf;vrf;opfrsm; wDxGif&SmazG&ef ,if; ]ppfyGJopfrsm;} u vkdtyfvmaponf/ zuf'&,fpepfonf vuf&Sd EdkifiHawmf \ e,fajrqkdif&m aygif;pnf;nDñGwfrIukd wnfwHhapNyD; vlenf;pkrsm;ukd ¤if;wkdY\ pD;yGm;a&;? EkdifiHa&;ESifh vlrIa&; qkdif&m udpörsm;wGif (tuefYtowfjzifh) pDrHykdifcGifhrsm;ay;onfh? vlenf;pkomru vlrsm;pkrsm;\ arQmfvifhcsufrsm;? vkdvm;rIrsm;ukd jznfhqnf;ay;Ekdifonfh enf;vrf;wpfck jzpfonf/ tjyif;xefqHk;aom y#dyu©trsm;pkonf jynfwGif; y#dyu©rsm; - (EdkifiHrsm;tMum; wkdufcdkufMujcif;xuf) EkdifiHwpfEkdifiHtwGif;&Sd rwlnDaom tkyfpkrsm;tMum; wkdufckduf Mujcif; - jzpfMuojzifh rwljcm;em;rIrsm;ukd vufcHum vkdufavsmnDaxGaeEkdifjcif;? vlenf;pk tkyfpkrsm;ukd umuG,fjcif;? e,fajrrsm;NydKuGJjcif;ukd umuG,fjcif;? EkdifiHa&;t& wnfNidrfrIudk xdef;odrf;jcif; ponfwkdYtwGuf taxmuftuljyKEdkifrnfh tvm;tvm&Sdonfh zuf'&,fpepfonf EkdifiHwumvlYtzGJUtpnf;\ ykdrkdESpfoufaom

y#dyu©avQmhcsa&;AsL[mrsm;teuf wpfckjzpfvmcJhonf (Monteux, 2006 : 164)/zuf'&,fpepfonf tb,faMumifh y#dyu©ajz&Sif;a&;twGuf ta&;ygaom enf;vrf;wpfck jzpfvmcJhonfukd

,ckpmwrf;wGif tusOf;azmfjyxm;onf/ þpmwrf;wGif zuf'&,fpepfudk t"dyÜm,fzGifhqkdjcif;ESifh y#dyu©vGef vlYtzGJUtpnf;rsm;wGif zuf'&,fpepfukd toHk;jyKMuonfh aemufuG,frStaMumif;&if;ukd tusOf;tm;jzifh NcHKiHk &Sif;vif;jcif;wkdYjzifh pwifygrnf/ xkdYaemuf ppfab;'PfoifhNyD; EkdifiHrsm;wGif Nidrf;csrf;a&;ESifh wnfNidrfrIukd azmf aqmif&mü zuf'&,fpepf\ ta&;ygyHkukd jyo&ef ckdifvHk aom Oyrmrsm;ukd toHk;jyKygrnf/ 'kwd,aemufqHk;ykdif;wGif y#dyu©ajz&Sif;a&;enf;vrf;wpfcktjzpf zuf'&,fpepfukdtoHk;jyK&mü awGU BuHK&aom tuefYtowftcsKdUukd avhvmygrnf/ ed*Hk;wGif Nidrf;csrf;a&;wnfaqmufjcif;ESifh y#dyu©ajz&Sif;jcif;ukd zuf'&,fpepftaejzifh yHhykd;ay; Ekdifonfh tajctaersm;ukd jynfh0pGm em;vnfoabmayguf&ef vufawGUt&ESifh oDtkd&Dt& okawoeavhvm rIrsm; xyfrHjyKvkyf&ef vkdtyfaMumif; azmfjyxm;ygonf/

oabmw&m;a&;&m &Sif;vif;csufRonald Watts (2008 ; 8) \ tqkdt& zuf'&,fpepfqkdonfrSm rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif;ESifh a'otvdkuf ukd,fykdif

tkyfcsKyfjcif; wkdY\ tpdwftykdif;rsm;ukd aygif;pyfxm;aom tqifhrsm;pGm yg&Sdonfh tpkd;&yHkpHukd qkdvkdygonf/ Preston

King (1982) ESifh Michael Burgess (2006) wkdYESifh tvm;wl Watts uvnf; zuf'&,fjynfaxmifpk\ ]vufqkyf

vufukdif jyoEkdifaom tifpwDusL;&Sif;qkdif&m vufawGUtajctae} ukd ukd,fpm;jyKonfh zuf'a&;&Sif; (Burgess,

2006 ; 285) qkdonfESifh jcm;em;ap&eftwGuf zuf'&,fpepfukd pHESifhqkdifaom tac:ta0:wpfck? 'óeduaA'

qkdif&mESifh t,ltqqkdif&mrlwpfcktjzpf t"dyÜm,fzGifhqkdxm;ygonf/ xkdYtjyif Daniel Elazar (1987) uJhokdYyif

Watts onfvnf; zuf'a&;&Sif;rsm;\ rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif;ESifh ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfjcif; tpdwftykdif;rsm;tay: txl;jyK cJhygonf/ ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfjcif;qkdonfrSm a'orsm;? jynfe,frsm;? c½dkifrsm;okdY ay;tyfxm;aom (e,f ajrqkdif&m) ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfcGifhukd qkdvkdonf/ tjcm;wpfzufwGifrl rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif;qdkonfrSm jynfe,f? a'otpkd;&rsm; taejzifh A[kdwGif yg0ifaqmif&GufEkdifpGrf;? vTrf;rkd;EkdifpGrf;ESifh tqHk;tjzwfrsm; jyKEkdifpGrf;wkdYukd &nfòeff;onf/

zuf'&,fpepfukd toHk;jyKMuonfhtaMumif;&if;rsm;rSm rsm;jym;ygonf/ William Livingston (1956 ; 1) \


alism, like most institutional forms, is a solution of, or an attempt to solve, a certain kind of prob-

lem of political organization’. In some states, federalism is chosen as an instrument of good gov-

ernance, an organising principle where sovereign polities rescind some of their sovereignty in

order to pool resources and become part of a larger network. These countries, predominantly

mononational states such as Australia, Germany and the USA, are, according to Alfred Stepan

(1999), ‘coming together’ federations. The second category of federations put forward by Stepan is

‘holding together’ federations; the heading under which most plurinational states fall, including,

inter alia, Belgium, Ethiopia, Bosnia, Iraq, and Nepal. This category also includes states that have

used elements of federalism such as the provision of autonomy in order to manage pre-existing

diversity (such as Spain and the United Kingdom). It is these ‘holding together’ federations, which

often face ethnic conflict (and in some cases violence) and hence employ federalism as a tool of

conflict resolution.

Nancy Bermeo (2002) writes of the ‘peace preserving’ characteristics of federalism, underlining

that it isolates conflicts, peacefully accommodates minority groups and ensures a democratic re-

sponse to ethnocultural tensions. In the absence of such democratic institutions, the alternatives

would be either inhumane responses such as genocide and ethnic cleansing, or secession, parti-

tion or further conflict, and as McGarry and O’Leary (2009) point out, these options serve only to

further worsen ethnic tensions.

As Hannum (2004: 395) points out, federalism is often considered the optimal choice in het-

erogeneous and post-conflict societies because it appeases both the majority and minority com-

munity. The self-rule and shared rule aspects of federalism ensure that sub-national groups have

significant, and in some cases extensive, sovereign control over specific policy areas, such as lan-

guage and education policy, while also ensuring that such groups are, through the shared rule

mechanisms, able to influence and participate in the decision making processes at the centre. For

the central government, the institutionalisation of a federal system can help curtail the secession-

ist demands of regional separatists. Modern history is testament to the growing challenge of se-

cessionism in modern politics, yet the use of federalism, while it has been unsuccessful in com-

pletely removing secessionist challenges from plurinational states, has succeeded in preventing

territorial disintegration. In short, the ability of federalism to divide power among different people

while sustaining the external borders of the extant state make it an attractive tool of conflict res-

olution.


tqkdt& ]zuf'&,fpepfonf tjcm;tifpwDusL;&Sif;yHkpHrsm;uJhokdYyif EkdifiHa&;tzGJUtpnf;\ jyóemtrsKd;tpm; wpfckukd ajz&Sif;onfh enf;vrf;wpfck okdYr[kwf ajz&Sif;&ef tm;xkwfrIwpf&yf} jzpfygonf/ t&if;tjrpfrsm;ukd pkpnf;Ekdif&efESifh ykdrkdBuD;rm;aom uGef&ufwpfck\ tpdwftykdif;jzpfvmap&eftwGuf tcsKdUEkdifiHrsm;wGif tcsKyf tjcmtmPm ykdifpkd;aom tpkd;&rsm;onf ,if;wkdY\ tcsKyftjcmtmPmukd y,fzsufvkyfaqmifonfh zGJUpnf;rIqkdif&m rlwpfckjzpfaom zuf'&,fpepfudk aumif;rGefaom tkyfcsKyfrI\ enf;vrf;wpfcktjzpf a&G;cs,fMuygonf/ ,if;EkdifiH rsm;? trsm;tm;jzifh MopaMw;vs? *smreDESifh tar&duefjynfaxmifpkwdkY uJhokdYaom vlrsKd;wpfckwnf;&Sdonfh EdkifiHrsm;

onf Alfred Stepan (1999) \ tqkdt& ]rdrdqEt& vma&mufaygif;pnf;xm;Muaom} zuf'a&;&Sif;rsm; jzpfMu

ygonf/ Stepan wifjyvmaom zuf'a&;&Sif;'kwd,tkyfpkrSm ]pnf;aESmifxdef;xm;aom} zuf'a&;&Sif;rsm;jzpfNyD; ,if;tkyfpkxJwGif b,fvf*sD,H? tDoD,kd;yD;,m;? abmhpeD;,m;? tD&wfESifh eDaygponfh vlrsKd;trsm;tjym;&Sdaom EkdifiHrsm; yg0ifMu onf/ þtkyfpktwGif;wGif BudKwif&SdaeESifhonfh uGJjym;jcm;em;rIrsm;ukd xdef;odrf;udkifwG,f&ef twGuf (pydefESifh ,lEkdufwufuif;'rf;uJYokdY) ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfcGifhay;jcif; ponfh zuf'&,fpepf\ tpdwftykdif;rsm;udk toHk;jyKxm;onfh EkdifiHrsm;vnf; yg0ifonf/ þ ]pnf;aESmifxdef;xm;aom} zuf'a&;&Sif;rsm;wGif vlrsKd;a&;y#dyu© (ESifh wpfcgwpf&H tMurf;zufrIrsm;) ukd BuHKawGU MuNyD; y#dyu©rsm;ukd ajz&Sif;&eftwGuf zuf'&,fpepfukd enf;vrf; wpfcktjzpf toHk;jyKMuonf/

Nancy Bermeo (2002) uvnf; zuf'&,fpepf\ ]Nidrf;csrf;a&;ukd xdef;odrf;Ekdifaom} *kPf&nfrsm;taMumif; a&;om;cJhNyD; txl;ojzifh zuf'&,fpepfonf y#dyu©rsm;rS a0;apjcif;? vlenf;pkrsm;ukd Nidrf;csrf;pGmvufcHum vkdufavsmnDaxG aexkdifEkdifjcif;? vlrsKd;ESifh ,Ofaus;rIqkdif&mwif;rmrIrsm;ukd 'Drkdua&pDenf;us wHkYjyefrI aocsm apjcif; ponfwkdYudk jzpfapaMumif; azmfjycJYonf/ ,if;okdYaom 'Drkdua&pDtifpwDusL;&Sif;rsm; r&SdcJYygu tjcm; jzpfEkdifzG,frSm vlom;rqefaom wkHYjyefrIrsm;jzpfonfh vlrsKd;wHk;owfjzwfrIrsm;ESifh vlrsKd;&Sif;vif;rIrsm;jzpfap? EkdifiHawmfrS cGJxGufjcif;? oD;jcm;ykdif;jcm; &yfwnfjcif; odkYr[kwf aemufxyf y#dyu©rsm;jzpfap jzpfvmEkdifonf/

McGarry ESifh O’Leary (2009) wkdY axmufjyonfh twkdif;yif ,if;jzpfpOfrsm;onf vlrsKd;a&;wif;rmrIrsm;ukdom xyfqifh wkd;yGm;apayvdrfYrnf/

Hannum (2004 ; 395) axmufjyonfh twkdif;yif zuf'&,fpepfonf vlrsm;pkudkomru vlenf;pkukdyg auseyfapaomaMumifh uGJjym;jcm;em;rIrsm;&Sdaom y#dyu©vGef vlYtzGJUtpnf;rsm;twGuf taumif;qHk; a&G;cs,frI[k owfrSwfMuonf/ bmompum;ESifh ynma&;qkdif&m rl0g'ponfh tcsKdUaom rl0g'qdkif&m e,fy,frsm;wGif a'o qkdif&mtkyfpkrsm;taejzifh ododomom us,fjyefYaom tcsKyftjcmtmPmjzifh vkyfukdifEdkifcGifh&Sdap&ef zuf'&,f pepf\ ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfjcif;ESifh rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif; tpdwftykdif;rsm;u aocsmaponf/ wpfcsdefwnf;rSmyif ,if; tkyfpkrsm;onf A[kdwGif jyKvkyfaom tqHk;tjzwfjyKonfh vkyfief;pOfwGif yg0ifaqmif&GufEkdif&efESifh vTrf;rkd;Ekdif&ef twGuf rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif; ,Å&m;rSwpfqifY vkyfaqmifEdkifonf/ zuf'&,fpepfwpfcktwGuf tifpwDusL;&Sif;rsm; wnfaqmufjcif;onf a'otvkduf cGJxGufa&;orm;rsm;\ cGJxGufa&;awmif;qkdrIrsm;ukd wm;qD;&mwGif A[kdtpkd;& twGuf taxmuftul jzpfapEkdifonf/ acwfopfEkdifiHa&;wGif cGJxGufa&;0g'\ BuD;xGm;vm aom pdefac:rItwGuf acwfopf orkdif;onf oufaoyif jzpfonf/ okdYaomf zuf'&,fpepfukd usifhoHk;jcif; onf vlrsKd;rsm;pGm&Sdaom EkdifiH rsm;ü cGJxGufa&;qkdif&m pdefac:rIrsm;ukd t<uif;rJhz,f&Sm;Ekdifjcif; r&SdcJhaomfvnf; e,fy,frsm;NydKuGJrnfhta&; umuG,fwm;qD;&mwGif atmifjrifrIrsm; &SdcJYonf/ twkdqkd&vQif zuf'&,fpepfonf vuf&Sdwnf&Sdaeaom EkdifiH wpfEkdifiH\ e,fedrdwfrsm;ukd xdef;odrf;vsuf rwlnDaomolrsm;tMum;wGif tmPmukd cGJjcrf;Ekdifonfh tpGrf;&Sdojzifh ,if;ukd y#dyu©ajz&Sif;a&;twGuf qGJaqmifrI&Sdaom enf;vrf;wpfck jzpfaponf/


Case Studies

In the post-Cold War era, a number of countries have adopted federal features in their consti-

tutional frameworks in order to deal with diversity and the resulting conflicts. These include Bel-

gium (1993), Russia (1993), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), Ethiopia (1995), South Africa (1996),

the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2001), Iraq (2005) and Nepal (2015), amongst others.

Furthermore, ongoing debates about federalism, decentralization and the provision of territorial

autonomy for certain ethnic groups in countries as diverse as Ukraine, Syria, Myanmar and Libya

highlight the contemporary relevance of the federal idea. While not all of these countries have

faced violent conflict, what they all have in common is deep-rooted diversity, i.e. the existence of

multiple ethnic groups on the territory of the state, and a resulting need to manage this diversity

that goes beyond the traditional model of liberal democracy. Hence, federalism as an idea that

ensures self-rule (i.e. autonomy for territorially concentrated ethnic groups) and shared-rule (the

inclusion of different ethnic groups in the decision-making processes of the country) has featured

prominently as a mechanism of diversity management. What is more, the provision of autonomy

has been a key demand of groups that have previously fought for independence and secession,

such as the Serbs in Bosnia, the Albanians in Macedonia or the Chin and Karen in Myanmar.

In some of these countries international actors (such as the UN, NATO or the EU) have played

an important role in the introduction of federal institutional mechanisms. For example, Bosnia and

Herzegovina has been described as a country in which federalism has been “imposed” (Keil 2013),

while Iraq, too can be considered as a case in which international actors provided important input

into the federal debate (Danilovich 2014). Likewise, as a result of international involvement, the

arrangements for the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (2003) and Sudan (2005) included

secession provisions which delineated institutional procedures, including a specific time limit, for

the constituent parts of the states to become independent.

Various countries around the world have used federalism or elements of decentralisation in

order to deal with ethnic conflicts. In some of these countries, the use of federalism has contrib-

uted to peace-building and brought an end to violent conflict (for example in Bosnia, South Africa,

Macedonia and Nepal). In other cases, federalism has been less successful. The ongoing violence

and increased competition among ethnic groups over territory and natural resources in Ethiopia,

Nigeria and Iraq have intensified because of the introduction of decentralised structures that have

resulted in new distribution conflicts (Erk, 2014: 546). Some federal arrangements have included

secession clauses, such as in Sudan and Serbia-Montenegro. While not always a success, what


jzpfpOfavYvmrIrsm;ppfat;acwfvGefumvwGif EkdifiHtcsKdUwkdYonf rwluGJjym;rIrsm;ESifh ,if;wkdY\ aemufqufwGJy#dyu©rsm;ukd

ukdifwG,fajz&Sif;Ekdif&eftwGuf zGJUpnf;yHktajccHOya'qkdif&m rlabmifrsm;wGif zuf'&,f0daoovu©Pmrsm;ukd xnfhoGif; toHk;jyKcJhMuonf/ ,if;EkdifiHrsm;wGif b,fvf*sD,H (1993)? ½k&Sm; (1993)? abmhpeD;,m;ESifh [mZD*dk; bD;em; (1995)? tDoD,dk;yD;,m; (1995)? awmiftmz&du (1996)? ,cif ,l*dkqvyf jzpfcJhaom rufqD'kd;eD;,m; or®wEkdifiH (2001)? tD&wf (2005) ESifh eDayg (2015) wkdY yg0ifonf/ xkdYtjyif rwlnDonfh tajctaersm;&Sdonfh ,lu&def;? qD;&D;,m;? jrefrmESifh vpfAsm;wdkYuJhodkYaom EkdifiHrsm;wGif zuf'&,fpepf? A[kdcsKyfukdifrI avQmhcsjcif;ESifh tcsKdU aom vlrsKd;pkrsm;twGuf e,fajrtvkduf ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfcGifh ponfwdkYtay: qufvufjiif;cHk aqG;aEG;rIrsm; &Sdaejcif;wkdYonf rsufarSmufacwftajctaewGif zuf'&,ft,ltq\ qDavsmfrIukd xif&Sm;ay:vGifaponf/ ,if;EkdifiHrsm;tm;vHk;wkdYwGif jyif;xefaom y#dyu©rsm; BuHKawGUcJh&onf r[kwfaomfvnf; ,if;wkdYtm;vHk;wGif &Sd onfh wlnDaomtcsufwpfckrSm euf½dIif;pGmtjrpfwG,faeaom uGJjym;jcm;em;rIrsm;yifjzpfonf/ qkdvkdonfrSm EkdifiH \ e,fajr e,fedrdwftwGif;wGif vlrsKd;tkyfpkrsm;pGm wnf&SdaerIESifh &v'ftjzpf ,if;uGJjym;jcm;em;rIrsm;ukd udkifwG,f Ekdif&eftwGuf vpfb&,f'Drkdua&pD\ tpOftvmykHpHxuf ausmfvGefaom wpfpHkwpf&mukd vkdtyfcsufyif jzpfonf/ xkdYaMumifh zuf'&,fpepfonf ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfjcif; (qkdvkdonfrSm e,fajrt& pkpkpnf;pnf; wnf&Sdaeaom vlrsKd; tkyfpkrsm;twGuf udk,fykdiftkyfcsKyfcGifh) ESifh rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif; (rwlnDaom vlrsKd;tkyfpkrsm;ukd wkdif;jynf\ qHk;jzwf csufjyKonfh vkyfief;pOfwGif yg0ifatmif xnfhoGif;jcif;) udk aocsmaponfh t,ltqwpfcktaejzifh rwluGJjym; rIrsm;ukd pDrHcefYcGJjcif;qkdif&m ,Å&m;wpfcktjzpf xif&Sm;onf/ xkdYtjyif ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfcGifhonf abmhpeD;,m;&Sd qmhbfrsm;? rufqD'dk;eD;,m;&Sd t,fvfab;eD;,ef;rsm; okdYr[kwf jrefrmEkdifiH&Sd csif;ESifh u&ifrsm;ponfh ,cifu vGwfvyfa&;ESifh cGJxGufcGifhrsm;twGuf wkdufyGJ0ifcJhaom tkyfpkrsm;\ t"duawmif;qdkcsuf jzpfcJhonf/

,if;wkdYteuf tcsKdUaomEkdifiHrsm;wGif zuf'&,ftifpwDusL;&Sif;,Å&m;rsm;ukd rdwfquf&mwGif (ukvor*¾? aewkd; okdYr[kwf Oa&myor*¾ponfh) EkdifiHwumZmwfaumifrsm;onf ta&;ygaom tcef;u@rS yg0ifaeonf/ Oyrmtm;jzifh abmhpeD;,m;ESifh [mZD*dk;bD;em;onf zuf'&,fpepfukd ]jyifyrS jy|mef;} ay;cJYonfh EdkifiHwpfcktjzpf

owfrSwfcH&NyD; (Keil 2013)? tvm;wlyif tD&wfEkdifiHjzpfpOfonfvnf; zuf'&,fqdkif&m aqG;aEG;jiif;cHkrIrsm;wGif EkdifiHwumZmwfaumifrsm;u ta&;ygaom taxmuftyHhrsm; jyKcJhonfh jzpfpOfwpfcktjzpf owfrSwfEkdifonf

(Danilovich 2014)/ xkdYtwlyif EkdifiHwum\ yg0ifywfoufrIaMumifh qmbD;,m;ESifh rGefwDeD*½ d k;jynfaxmifpk (2003) ESifh ql'ef (2005) wkdY\ EkdifiHawmf zGJUpnf;yHkrsm;wGif EkdifiHawmf\tpdwftykdif;rsm;taejzifh oD;jcm; vGwfvyf a&;&,lEkdif&ef vkdtyfonfh wdusaomtcsdeftykdif;tjcm;tygt0if tifpwDusL;&Sif;qkdif&mvkyfief;pOfrsm; ukd wdus pGm azmfjyxm;onfh cGJxGufcGifh jy|mef;csufrsm; yg0ifvmcJYonf/

uÇmwpf0ef;&Sd EkdifiHrsKd;pHkwkdYwGif vlrsKd;pky#dyu©rsm;ukd ajz&Sif;&eftwGuf zuf'&,fpepfudk okdYr[kwf A[kd csKyfukdifrIavQmhcsjcif;\ tpdwftykdif;rsm;udk toHk;jyKaecJhMuonf/ ,if;wkdYteuf EkdifiHtcsKdU wGif zuf'&,fpepfukd toHk;jyKjcif;onf Nidrf;csrf;a&;wnfaqmufjcif;ESifh jyif;xefMurf;wrf;aom y#dyu©rsm;ukd tqHk;owfa&;wkdYudk taxmuftyHh jzpfapcJhonf (Oyrm - abmhpeD;,m;? awmiftmz&du? rufqD 'dk;eD;,m;ESifh eDayg)/ tcsKdUaom jzpfpOf rsm;wGifrl zuf'&,fpepfonf atmifjrifrI enf;yg;cJhonf/ tDoD,dk;yD;,m;? Ekdif*sD;&D;,m;ESifh tD&wfwkdYwGif vuf&Sd jzpfyGm;aeaom tMurf;zufrIrsm;ESifh vlrsKd;pkrsm;tMum; e,fajrESifh obm0o,HZmwrsm; ykdifqkdifcGifhtay: tm;NydKifrIrsm; ydkrdktm;aumif;vmcJhonf/ taMumif;rSm A[kdcsKyfukdifrIavQmhcsxm;aom zGJUpnf;yHkrsm; pwiftoHk;jyKcJh

ojzifh cGJa0jcif;qkdif&m y#dyu©opfrsm; ay:aygufvmcJhaomaMumifh jzpfonf (Erk, 2014 ; 546)/ tcsKdUaom zuf'&,f qkdif&m tpDtrHrsm;wGif - Oyrmtm;jzifh ql'efESifh qmbD;,m; - rGefwDeD*½dk; ponfwkdYwGif - cGJxGufa&; jy|mef;csufrsm;


ongoing debates about federalism in post-conflict societies highlight, is the strong link between

the introduction of democratic governance and the potential to overcome legacies of large scale

violence. The current debate in Myanmar, which resulted in a peace agreement and a commitment

to the introduction of federalism in August 2016, demonstrates this point.

The Limits of Federalism

It is an illusion to assume that federalism will be able to solve all problems in deeply divided

societies, especially those that have endured violent ethnic conflict. Challenges to territorial in-

tegrity and calls for secession will not disappear despite commitments to federalism, as demon-

strated in well-established democracies such as Canada, Spain and the United Kingdom as well as

in new federations in post-conflict societies, including Bosnia, Ethiopia and Iraq. This is because in

post-conflict countries mutual trust, willingness to cooperate and the political motivation for

compromise are relatively low amongst political elites representing different ethnic groups. As

Burgess (2012) has argued, the key to successful federal democracy in these countries lie in the

evolution of a federal political culture. In addition, notwithstanding the commitment of federalism

to deepening democratic procedures in divided societies, the consolidation of democracy has been

difficult to achieve. Bosnia and Iraq are examples where federal power-sharing has been imple-

mented, but the consolidation of democracy has hitherto been unsuccessful. Furthermore, post-

war societies face additional reform needs in order to deal with the results of long-term conflict.

These include dealing with reconciliation, economic reconstruction, refugee return, demilitarisa-

tion and societal reintegration. Finally, what has become evident in recent years is that in order for

federal, democratic structures to take root and function in deeply divided post-conflict states,

these institutional arrangements need to be flexible and be able to adapt to shifting policy de-

mands and preferences amongst the different groups. The abovementioned time limits in Sudan

and Serbia-Montenegro regarding secession, as well as asymmetrical arrangements in Iraq and

Bosnia, to name only two, can be seen as examples of this need for inbuilt flexibility. Contemporary

debates in Libya, Syria and Ukraine underline this need for flexible solutions in a world of ever

more complex conflict; there can be no ‘one size fits all’ approach to federalism in post-conflict

societies.


xnfhoGif;xm;onf/ tNrJwrf;atmifjrifrI &&Sdonf r[kwfaomfvnf; 'Drkdua&pDenf;us tkyfcsKyfrIukd pwiftoHk;jyK jcif;ESifh yrmPBuD;rm;aom tMurf;zufrIrsm;\tarGukd ausmfvTm;Ekdifrnfh tvm;tvmrsm;tMum;wGif tm; aumif;aom tcsdwftquf&Sdonfukd y#dyu©vGef vlYtzGJUtpnf;rsm;&Sd zuf'&,fpepfqdkif&m vuf&Sd aqG;aEG;jiif;ckHrI rsm;u xif&Sm;jyqkdaeonf/ Nidrf;csrf;a&; oabmwlnDcsufESifh zuf'&,fpepfukd pwiftoHk;jyK&ef uwdu0wf &v'frsm;ukd 2016 ckESpf Mo*kwfvwGif ay:xGef;apcJhonfh jrefrmEkdifiH&Sd vuf&Sd aqG;aEG;rIrsm;onf ,if;tcsufukd azmfjyaeygonf/

zuf'&,fpepf\ tuefYtowfrsm;euf½ d Iif;pGm uGJjym;aeaom vlYtzGJUtpnf;rsm;? txl;ojzifh jyif;xefaomvlrsKd;a&;y#dyu©rsm;ukd umv

Mum&Snf awGU BuHKcHpm;cJh&aom vlYtzGJUtpnf;rsm;&Sd jyóemrsm;tm;vHk;ukd zuf'&,fpepfu ajz&Sif;ay;Ekdifrnf[k ,lqjcif;rSm vufawGUrqefaom txifrSm; tjrifrSm;om jzpfonf/ aumif;pGmtajcusNyD;aom 'Drkdua&pDEkdifiH rsm;jzpfonfh uae'g? pydefESifh ,lEkdufwufuif;'rf;wkdYtjyif abmhpeD;,m;? tDoD,kd;yD;,m;ESifh tD&wfwkdY tygt0if y#dyu©vGefvlYtzGJUtpnf;rsm;&Sd zuf'a&;&Sif;topfrsm;wGif awGU jrif&onfhtwdkif; zuf'&,fpepftay: uwdu0wf rsm; &Sdae½HkrQjzifh e,fajrrsm; wpfpkwpfpnf;wnf; wnf&SdEkdifrIukd pdefac:rIrsm;ESifh cGJxGufa&; awmif;qkdrIrsm;wkdYonf aysmufuG,foGm;rnf r[kwfay/ ,if;okdY jzpf&jcif;rSm y#dyu©vGefEkdifiHrsm;&Sd rwlnDaom vlrsKd;tkyfpkrsm;ukd ukd,fpm; jyKonfh EkdifiHa&;xdyfoD;rsm;tMum;wGif tjyeftvSef,HkMunfrI? yl;aygif;aqmif&GufvkdaomqE´ESifh tay;t,l

tavQmhtwif; jyKvkyf&ef EkdifiHa&;qEwkdYonf twkdif;twmwpfcktxd enf;yg;aeaomaMumifh jzpfonf/ Burgess (2012) ajymqkdouJhokdYyif ,if;EkdifiHrsm;wGif atmifjrifaom zuf'&,f'Drkdua&pD ay:aygufvma&;twGuf t"du usaom aomhcsufrSm zuf'&,fEkdifiHa&;,Ofaus;rI jzpfay:ajymif;vJwkd;wufvmrIyif jzpfonf/ xkdYtjyif uGJjym; aeaom vlYtokdif;t0dkif;rsm;twGif; 'Drkdua&pD vkyfxHk;vkyfenf;rsm; tjrpfwG,fapa&; zuf'&,fpepftay: uwd u0wfrsm; &Sdaeaomfvnf; 'Drkdua&pDckdifrmatmifjyKjcif; ponfwdkYrSm atmifjrif&ef cufcJaeqJyif jzpfonf/ abmh peD;,m;ESifh tD&wfwkdYonf zuf'&,ftmPmcGJjcrf;a&;ukd taumiftxnfazmfEkdifcJYaomfvnf; 'Drkdua&pD ckdifrm apa&; ,ckwkdifatmif ratmifjrifao;onfh om"ursm; jzpfMuonf/ xkdYtjyif ppfyGJumvvGef vlYtzGJUtpnf;rsm; onf umv&Snfy#dyu©rsm;\ &v'frsm;ukd ajz&Sif;Edkif&eftwGuf aemufxyf jyKjyifajymif;vJa&; vkyfaqmif&ef vkdtyfcsufrsm;ESifhvnf; &ifqkdifMu&onf/ ,if;wkdYwGif jyefvnfaygif;pnf;a&;? pD;yGm;a&;qkdif&m jyefvnf wnf aqmufjcif;? 'ku©onfrsm; jyefvnf0ifa&mufvmjcif;? ppfwyfjzKwfodrf;jcif;ESifh vlYtokdif;t0dkif; twGif;odkY jyefvnf aygif;pnf;jcif; ponfwkdYukd ukdifwG,fvkyfaqmifjcif;rsm; yg0ifonf/ aemufqHk;taejzifhqkd&vQif rMumrD ESpfrsm; twGif;u oufaoxif&Sm;cJhonfrSm euf½dIif;pGm uGJjym;aeaom y#dyu©vGefEkdifiHrsm;wGif zuf'&,f? 'Drkdua&pDqkdif&m wnfaqmufyHkrsm; tjrpfwG,fNyD; ouf0ifvIyf&Sm;Ekdif&efrSm ,if;tifpwDusL;&Sif;qkdif&m pDpOfxm;&SdrIrsm;onf jyKvG,fjyifvG,f&SdNyD; rwlnDaom tkyfpkrsm;tMum;wGif ajymif;vJaeaomrl0g'qkdif&m awmif;qkdcsufrsm;? ESpfouf vkdvm;csufrsm;ESifh vkdufavsmnDaxG ajymif;vJEkdifpGrf;&Sd&ef vkdtyfaMumif;yif jzpfygonf/ txufwGif azmfjyxm; cJhaom cGJxGufjcif;ESifh ywfoufNyD; ql'efEkdifiHESifh qm;bD;,m; - rGefwDeD*½dk;wkdYwGif xm;&Sdonfh tcsdeftuefYtowf rsm;? EkdifiHESpfcka&G;NyD; azmfjy&vQif tD&wfESifh abmhpeD;,m;wkdY&Sd xyfwlrnDaom pDrHxm;&SdrIrsm;ukd jyKvG,f ajymif; vG,f&SdrI xnfhoGif;wnfaqmufxm;&ef vkdtyfcsuf\ Oyrmrsm;tjzpf ½IjrifEkdifygonf/ ykdrkd½IyfaxG;vmaeaom y#dyu©rsm;jzifh jynfhESufaeonfh uÇmBuD;wGif jyKvG,fjyifvG,f&Sdaom ajz&Sif;yHkenf;vrf;rsm; vkdtyfvmyHkESifh y#dyu©vGefEkdifiHrsm;twGuf zuf'&,fpepfukd csOf;uyf&mwGif tajctaeaygif;pHkukd enf;vrf; wpfrsKd;wnf;jzifh csOf;uyfEkdifonfhyHkpH[lí r&SdaMumif;ukd vpfAsm;? qD;&D;,m;ESifh ,lu&def;wkdY&Sd rsufarSmufacwf aqG;aEG;jiif;cHkrIrsm;u jyoaeygonf/


Conclusion

The contemporary debates on federalism as a tool of conflict resolution have ensued from the

changing pattern of conflict in the post-Cold War era. The modern world is composed of a medley

of ethnoculturally diverse states and the need for recognition and inclusion of the ineradicable

fact of diversity has become ever more prevalent. The ability of federalism to satisfy, at least to

some extent, the demands of both minority and majority groups has increased the popularity of

federalism as a method to manage diversity and competing nation-building projects within a

democratic framework. Federalism has become increasingly more important in resolving violent

conflicts, contributing to peace building and promoting democratic governance. However, as we

have seen, federalism is not a panacea to the many intractable challenges that deeply divided,

ethnically heterogeneous and post-conflict countries encounter. As federalism becomes an ev-

er-more prominent tool of conflict resolution, it is imperative to enhance the extant theoretical

and empirical research on the contemporary federal idea. The proliferation of these new federal

models to deal with the complex challenges of the twenty first century, underlines the need for

originality and flexibility in our approach to conflict resolution.


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Further Reading

- Anderson, L. (2013), Federal Solutions to Ethnic Problems:

Accommodating Diversity. Oxon and New York: Routledge.

- Brancati, D. (2009), Peace by Design. Managing Intrastate Conflict

through Decentralization, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Burgess, M. (2012), In Search of the Federal Spirit - New Theoretical

and Empirical Perspectives in Comparative Federalism, Oxford and

New York: Oxford University Press.

- Burgess, M. and J. Pinder (Eds.) (2007), Multinational Federations.

Abingdon and New York: Routledge.

- Keil, S. and P. Anderson (forthcoming), ‘Decentralization as a Tool of

Conflict Resolution ‘in E. Hepburn and K. Detterbeck (eds.) Handbook of

Territorial Politics. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.


Bibliography

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McGarry, J and B. O’Leary (2009), ‘Must Pluri-national

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