Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive
-
Upload
defconrussia -
Category
Technology
-
view
1.079 -
download
2
description
Transcript of Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive
![Page 1: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
How to Hack a Telecommunication Company
And Stay Alive
Sergey Gordeychik
Positive Technologies
CTO
![Page 2: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
Ic Beo
Sergey Gordeychik, Positive Technologies, CTO
A “script writer” and a “director” of the Positive Hack Days forum
Science editor of the SecurityLab.Ru portal
Author of the Web Application Security course, and a book titled A Wireless Network Security and a namesake course
A participant of WASC, RISSPA
http://sgordey.blogspot.com
![Page 3: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
What Is It All About?
What is so peculiar about telecoms?
Attacks against subscribers/Attacks by subscribers
Perimeter… Just a perimeter
Partners and contractors
Technology networks
![Page 4: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
What’s So Peculiar?
![Page 5: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
Specific Features of Telecommunication Companies
Large, large networks
Unification of various services (broadband access, Wi-Fi, hosting, mobile communication)
Great number of applications and systems on the perimeter
Exotics inside and outside
Lots of perimeters
Most networks belong to third parties
Forensics nightmare
![Page 6: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
Subscribers
Partners
How many perimeters do telecoms have?
Office
Technology
network
Internet
![Page 7: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
…and a bit more…
Mobile
communications
Wired broadband access
Wireless broadband access
VOIP
Hosting
...
Broadband
access
Technological
network
Internet TV
Hosting
![Page 8: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
…and a bit more…
Vladivostok
Moscow
Roma
Phnom Penh
![Page 9: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
Attack AGAINST Subscribers
![Page 10: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
Why Subscribers?
Subscribers’ $ = telecoms’ $
DOS = - $$ - reputation - $$
PWN (100 000 PC) = Botnet
Personal data!
![Page 11: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
Broadband Access
Huge non-segmented networks
Great number of end devices:
•Various SOHO devices
• Installed and unattended
•Standard bugs configurations
A manual on insecurity of network appliances SNMP/Telnet/HTTP/UPnP control protocols in the Internet
Insecure/empty passwords
Web attacks on Client’s side (Pinning, CSRF)
Huge number of users • 1 out of1000, for 10 000 000 = 10 000
• Trivial passwords
![Page 12: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/12.jpg)
Broadband Access. Attack
Collecting information
•Network scanning
•Access layer error (BRAS)
•Collecting information from internal forums and other resources
•Self-service platform errors Invalid login or password
vs
Invalid username
Preparing scenarios • Capturing devices
• Guessing passwords
$profit$
![Page 13: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
Well…yes, it happens
![Page 14: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/14.jpg)
Pick a Task…
![Page 15: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
Examples of Risks
Gaining access to a self-service portal
• Cashout guessing password or stealing the router cfg files
(vpn/pppoe)
transferring money from a broadband access to a cell phone (integration!)
Cashing out via PRS
• It drives me NUTS!!! Guessing password or stealing the router cfg files (vpn/ppoe)
Purchasing the available
Balance =0
Performing a mass hacking of a router/PC
Performing a mass changing of configurations
![Page 16: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/16.jpg)
Attacks against Clients of Mobile Networks
Faking Caller ID
•self-service portal/USSD
•voice mailbox
•cash-out via PRS
•direct money withdrawal
SS7 Internet Taget
GSM
SIP-GW Tech
Systems FAKE ID unauthorized access
![Page 17: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/17.jpg)
Attacks against Clients of Mobile Networks
Malware for mobile devices;
Intercepting GSM –
Not a ROCKET SCIENCE!
•attacking A5/1
•MITM, switch to A5/0
•downgrading UMTS -> GSM
Traffic, SMS, one-time passwords...
•Self-service portals/USSD
•Cash-out via PRS
•Voice mailbox
![Page 18: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/18.jpg)
Hosting
Local network for collocated/dedicated servers
•Attacks of a network/data link layer, attacks against network infrastructure
•ARP Spoofing, IP Spoofing… old school
•Intrasegment IPv6 attacks
Attack against infrastructure (DNS…)
Shared hosting (once having intruded into one of the sites…)
![Page 19: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/19.jpg)
Pentester Tips & Tricks
|| ||
![Page 20: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/20.jpg)
Pentester Tips & Tricks
We are only searching for vulnerabilities
We use only our own resources for demonstration
We avoid information protected by the law
A fickle client…
C: Prove it! Enter the portal!
P: No, thank you. Here is a password – enter it yourself…
![Page 21: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/21.jpg)
Attacks BY Subscribers
![Page 22: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/22.jpg)
Why Subscribers? AGAIN?
Subscribers are WITHIN one of the perimeters
Many attacks are easier if performed on subscriber’s side
The number of subscribers of modern telecoms is quite large
![Page 23: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/23.jpg)
General Problems
Network access control weakness
Intrasegment attacks
Protection of the end equipment
Web applications for subscribers
![Page 24: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/24.jpg)
Network Access Control Errors
C:\>tracert -d www.ru
Tracing route to www.ru [194.87.0.50] over a maximum of 30 hops:
1 * * * Request timed out.
3 10 ms 13 ms 5 ms 192.168.5.4
4 7 ms 6 ms 5 ms 192.168.4.6
A direct way does not
always mean the most
interesting one :)
![Page 25: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/25.jpg)
Per Aspera Ad…level 15
#sh run
Using 10994 out of 155640 bytes
!
version 12.3
...
!
username test1 password 7 <removed>
username antipov password 7 <removed>
username gordey password 7 <removed>
username anisimov password 7 <removed>
username petkov password 7 <removed>
username mitnik password 7 <removed>
username jeremiah password 7 <removed>
![Page 26: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/26.jpg)
Network Access Control Errors
GPRS/EDGE/3G, which traditionally stick to NAT
Other clients are “invisible”
This is not always true…
GPRS: payment kiosks, ATMs, and etc., which can have: • A missing firewall;
• Missing updates;
• misconfigurations.
![Page 27: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/27.jpg)
A Joke
SNMP ‘private’ on a GGSN
![Page 28: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/28.jpg)
A Joke
Captive portal
“Your balance is low”
•Linux
•Apache
•MySQL
•PHP
![Page 29: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/29.jpg)
Intrasegment Attacks
Subscribers of broadcast access and hosting
![Page 30: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/30.jpg)
Web Portals and Services for Subscribers
A good few of resources
•forums, dating sites, video convertors, online games, statistics, online shopping, photo hosting, file hosting, online radio…
A good few of loopholes
•Old versions of applications and CMS, SQLi, LFI and so on…
Single-Sign-On or the same passwords…
Are often placed into the DMZ together
with “ordinary” servers
![Page 31: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/31.jpg)
Web Portals and Servers for Subscribers
Games server*
Proxima CMS, path traversal
+ SQLi + configuration error= root
About 20 more sites on the host
•Online broadcasting
•Branded desktop applications
•…
![Page 32: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/32.jpg)
Pentester Tips & Tricks
Resources on the subscriber networks are often SUBSCRIBER’s resources
Getting approvals for every step of your work
Many systems operate on a wing and a prayer
They collapse all the time, but if you are online anyway…
Avoiding (!) information protected by the law
A fickle client…
![Page 33: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/33.jpg)
Perimeter… Just a Perimeter
![Page 34: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/34.jpg)
Perimeter?
Large, large networks!
•Use clouds
Great number of “third-party” resources
Get ready for rarities
Corporate web applications
The Lord of The Net
![Page 35: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/35.jpg)
Great Number of Third-Party Resources
Quite a large number of perimeter hosts belong to partners/subscribers
Quite often these hosts are “mixed” with those of the client
Yet, they should not be disregarded
•Imagine that you are already a level 15/root/admin on the host and you just entered the segment
![Page 36: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/36.jpg)
Great Number of Third-Party Resources
SQLi on the mobile content portal (Oracle, sys)
private at the VoIP gateway
Maintained by partners
No hacking
Are actually located at a flat DMZ together with client’s servers
Enabling the billing Front-End
![Page 37: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/37.jpg)
Rarities
So many different things can be found on the perimeter
•Technology “hardware”
•VoIP
•Old-school firewalls
•Web cameras
•Unusual control systems: ELOM, conditioners (!), UPS (!), etc.
Keep in mind the momentous attacks (X-mas scan, UNIX RPC, Finger, and etc.)
Don’t underrate the rarities
![Page 38: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/38.jpg)
Rarities
nc –P 20 xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx 8080
Wireless Access Point • Insecure password for web
•Enabling Telnet
•Compiling tcpdump/nc and others for the platform
•Using them for traffic/tunnel interception
Web camera •LFI via a web interface
•Obtaining configuration files
•Gaining an access password for the control system
•Gaining access to the control system
![Page 39: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/39.jpg)
Journey to Gattaca
![Page 40: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/40.jpg)
Watching the Video
![Page 41: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/41.jpg)
Cobweb
Lots of Web. For real.
Enterprise web applications are often accessible
•Terminal services (Citrix)
•Email systems
•Helpdesk systems
•Ill-equipped for operating on the
“wild web”
![Page 42: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/42.jpg)
Support system
We found and applied Path Traversal ManageEngine ServiceDesk Plus
Gained the “encrypted” password for integration with AD
The password fitted for VPN
The password fitted for AD (Enterprise Admin)
The password fitted for Cisco ACS
So we finally got lucky!
![Page 43: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/43.jpg)
VPN
Lots of VPN, good and not so good
Passwords, IPSec Aggressive Mode…
![Page 44: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/44.jpg)
The Lords of the Net
Administrator, the Lord of the Net
A large network means many administrators
Feudalism •Rules are for wimps
•Enterprise IT infrastructure
VS “my infrastructure”
•Remote access systems
•Amusing web servers and trail
apps
![Page 45: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/45.jpg)
“All animals are equal but…”
![Page 46: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/46.jpg)
The Lords of the Rings
TCP:1337 (SSL) – a web server of the system administration department
Radio broadcasting (ShoutCast Server with a default password)
Location: an administrator workstation
With all the consequences…
![Page 47: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/47.jpg)
Pentester Tips & Tricks
Try not to miss a thing on the perimeter
Keep in mind third-party hosts
Get approvals for every step of your work
Don’t disregard network rarities. Sometimes a web camera can pave the way to the network core!
Pay special attention to Web
Remember admins
![Page 48: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/48.jpg)
Partners and Contractors
![Page 49: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/49.jpg)
Contractors?
Requirements for system access (VPN)
Standard accounts (in order to remember)
No update management
Employees
![Page 50: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/50.jpg)
Contractors…
Contractor in the technology network
•Wireless interface on a laptop
•Everyone, a shared folder
•The folder contains an installer of a control system for xDSL modems/end routers
•With an in-built SA password in DBMS
•Who also has the same system?
Applications for agents, sale and activation of communication services package
•Fat-client application
•Build-in access password for DBMS
•… as SYSDBA
![Page 51: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/51.jpg)
There Are Different Contractors...
OMG?! HAVE I PWND THAT?
![Page 52: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/52.jpg)
Pentester Tips & Tricks
Contractors are never to be hacked
Get approvals for every step of your work
Many scenarios can be efficiently demonstrated by a “white box” method
Suppose, I were a contractor
But you are not a contractor
…A fickle client…
![Page 53: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/53.jpg)
Technology Networks
![Page 54: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/54.jpg)
Something special?
Changes are highly dynamic in the network
• New gadgets keep emerging
• Contractors keep working
• Configuration keeps changing
Implemented components and protocols are standard
• Threats typical for IP
• Configuration errors
• Platform vulnerabilities
Some errors can cause failures and facilitate frauds
![Page 55: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/55.jpg)
Technology Networks Are Networks First of All!
Equipment vulnerabilities
Test systems, contractors’ systems
FORGOTTEN(!) systems
Network management systems
![Page 56: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/56.jpg)
Forgotten Systems
Non-configured switch
Uptime: 2 years!
![Page 57: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/57.jpg)
Network Management Systems
Such treasure
•Network topology
•Device configuration
•Passwords and keys for
VPN/Wi-Fi/SNMP/RADIUS/VPN…
“They are behind the firewall”
+ Web password
- OS, DBMS, Web updates
+ Standard passwords for DBMS
+ File(!) shares
![Page 58: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/58.jpg)
That’s Tough!
WPA-PSK for AP is found
Where are the points located?!!
![Page 59: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/59.jpg)
Backup Is Quite a Useful Thing!
Especially on the Net!
![Page 60: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/60.jpg)
VoIP Is a Honey Pie
VoIP
Access to the
enterprise network
Call management
(fraud)
Fraud or fraudulent
mispresentation
Wiretapping
Identity theft
And more…
Attack against…
infrastructure
gateways
protocols
i[P]Phone
![Page 61: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/61.jpg)
VoIP
PSTN
IP PBX
Компания «А»
ТОПТОП
Вне офиса
Компании «А»
Компьютер
нарушителя
WEP
КЛВС
SQL injection
CVE-2008-0026
2
3
1. VoIP Wi-Fi access (No WPA, so “slow”)
2. The nearest CISCO Call Manager
a) SQLi, CVE-2008-0026
b) Collecting hash
c) Restoring passwords from the hash
3. Level 15 for the whole network
runsql select user,password from applicationuser
https://www.example.org/ccmuser/personaladdressbookEdit.do?key='+UNION+ALL+SELECT+'','','',user,'',password+from+app
licationuser;--
1
![Page 62: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/62.jpg)
Mobile Networks – It’s So Banal
Only the perimeter is secure
Some weird hardware?
• 3G SoftSwitch – Solaris 10 с CVE-2007-0882 (telnet -f)
• …
![Page 63: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/63.jpg)
Self-Service Platform
WEB/USSD/WAP
Interface with payment systems
A possibility of money withdrawal
No authentication (Caller ID)
Weak authentication (PIN-код?)
Vulnerable applications (Web, SQL Injection, XSS)
![Page 64: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/64.jpg)
VAS platforms
Someone’s application on the operator’s network
Malicious content, WAP-provisioning
Rich access via mobile stations (WAP/HTTP):
• Web application vulnerabilities
• Platform vulnerabilities
Platforms for service development
![Page 65: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/65.jpg)
Instead of a Conclusion
![Page 66: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/66.jpg)
Forensic Nightmare
Large networks make it extremely difficult to investigate incidents
Lots of vectors, tons of hardware, a great deal of administrators
A couple of hops on the internal network, and no one will make head or tail of it
![Page 67: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/67.jpg)
Who is there?
![Page 68: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/68.jpg)
Trying To Make Head or Tail…
![Page 69: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/69.jpg)
Some Are Concerned…
![Page 70: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/70.jpg)
Others Are Happy
![Page 71: Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022060117/55871fced8b42a57118b472f/html5/thumbnails/71.jpg)
Thank you for your attention! Sergey Gordeychik [email protected] http://sgordey.blogspot.com http://ptresearch.blogspot.com http://phdays.com