Refugees, Statecraft, and Legitimacy:Forced Migration and Foreign Policy after the First Persian Gulf War

Professor Matthew KocherSenior Essay: One-Semester Independent Study

George Bogden

4/25/2011

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In March 1991, a sickening image threatened to taint the success celebrated by the victors

of the First Persian Gulf War. As the United States (US) and its coalition of allies remarked on

their decisive defeat of the villanized leader of Iraq,1 a news-hungry press corps converted the

afterglow of their victory into a spotlight on some half a million Kurdish civilians who had

sought refuge in the mountains straddling the Iraqi-Turkish border. Cold, hungry, and trapped on

rugged terrain, these refugees paid the price for confronting their oppressive government. They

had fled their homes in northern Iraq after answering the call of President George H. W. Bush—

the architect of Operation Desert Storm—to “take matters into their own hands and force

Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside.”2 Just weeks after the cease-fire of 22 February, the

Iraqi Army brutally put down uprisings in Kirkuk, Dohuk, and Tuz Khurmatu. In the wake of

this campaign, 350,000-500,000 ethnic Kurds fled north,3 toward Turkey (Gibney and Hansen

2005, 312).

Several disputes erupted over the treatment of these refugees in the months that followed,

ultimately resulting in an unprecedented humanitarian intervention that returned the Kurds to

their homes in northern Iraq. The few chroniclers who have followed this winding diplomatic

and military story to its conclusion have tended to analyze the displacement and return of ethnic

Kurds in 1991 through the conventional paradigms of refugee crises. In his description of events,

Gordon Rudd, a former officer in the US Army, ascribes almost purely humanitarian motives to

the states that answered the Kurdish refugee crisis (Rudd 2004, 42). He never addresses the

1 This exuberance was perhaps most vividly conveyed in a message from the Cabinet Office of the United Kingdom, sent to then National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft stating “[The Gulf War has been] one of the most remarkable military campaigns of all time. It is a historic achievement…Wellington eat your heart out: Napoleon, go grow roses!” in “Message from Cabinet Office London to the White House,” February 1991, George H.W. Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, Richard N. Haass Files, working file: Iraq – February 1991 [3].2 “War in the Gulf: Bush Statement; Excerpts From 2 Statements by Bush on Iraq's Proposal for Ending Conflict,” February 16, 1991, Reuters, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/1991/02/16/world/war-gulf-bush-statement-excerpts-2-statements-bush-iraq-s-proposal-for-ending.html (viewed on January 22, 2011).3 There exists little to no consensus on the number of refugees who fled their homes intending to go to the Turkish border. The number of refugees who actually arrived at the border is also disputed.

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common estimation that western states intervened in 1991 as they often do in an attempt to

preempt the reputational costs associated with ignoring humanitarian emergencies. Underlying

narratives like Rudd’s are baseline assumptions about the nature of refugee flows. In the eyes of

commentators and academicians, refugees remain predominantly imagined as byproducts of

conflict, rarely if ever central to strategies of war and foreign policy, seldom deserving analysis

through the lens of statecraft (Greenhill 2010, 3-5).

However, even a cursory review of the Kurdish forced migration of 1991 and its

aftermath bears out the many foreign policy interests at play in the initiation and resolution of the

crisis. Developing a broader understanding of the intersection of forced migration and foreign

policy requires an examination of the actions of the three primary states that wielded the forced

migration of the Kurds to achieve political ends: Iraq, Turkey, and the US. Given the limited

existing explanations of the use of refugee flows to pursue foreign policy interests, a discussion

of this case must incorporate the yet unexamined strategies on the part of Iraq and the US.4 A

review of the patterns of violence employed against Kurdish civilians by the Iraqi government,

as well as analyses of a diverse array of primary documents5 exchanged by the American

officials and world leaders who coordinated a response to this incidence of forced migration

illustrate the need for a new account. This evidence highlights the strategic motives behind the

decision-making of the major state-actors involved in the refugee crisis.

In order to address the wide range of foreign policy ends sought through the actions of

Iraq, Turkey, and the US in the 1991 Kurdish refugee crisis, this paper will discuss three distinct

strategies:

4 In her book, Weapons of Mass Migration, Kelly Greenhill offers a three-quarter-page analysis of a strategy she identifies which was employed by the Turkish government (Greenhill 2010, 316). This strategy is discussed below.5 Archival research for this essay was conducted at the George H. W. Bush Presidential Library and in the Yale University Library's Government Documents & Information Center.

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1. Iraq’s engineered migration of Kurds over the Iraqi-Turkish border. The tactics employed by the Iraqi army under the direction of Saddam Hussein suggest his intentional displacement of Kurds over the Iraqi-Turkish border. This policy constituted an act of retaliation against a state predisposed to perceive an influx of refugees from that particular ethnic group as a violation of its security.

2. Turkey’s preclusion of the resettlement of Kurdish refugees within its territory by isolating them on its mountainous border with Iraq. The Turkish government provided a calculated response to the refugee crisis. It justified its forceful isolation of the Kurds in the mountains bordering Iraq—outside the reach of assistance—while appealing to the humanitarian principles of the US. In this way, it guided the international community to return the refugees to northern Iraq.

3. The US’s establishment of “safe havens” that politically and economically disempowered the post-war Iraqi government. President Bush and his circle of advisers deftly crafted their answer to the crisis to fit long-term American foreign policy objectives toward Iraq. The establishment of “safe havens” against the will of the Iraqi government represented an intermediate step to disempower the government under Saddam Hussein without assuming responsibilities to resolve the worsening internal conflicts within Iraq.

Analyzing this group of strategies together provides a full strategic account of the refugee crisis

that occurred on the Iraqi-Turkish border. This analysis will illustrate that the 1991 crisis

represents an instance in which states used forced migration for the purposes of statecraft.

However, this three-part examination of the crisis does not constitute a full explanation of the use

of refugees to achieve foreign policy ends within the 1991 episode of Kurdish forced migration.

The unique fate of the Kurds who fled over the Iraqi-Iranian border would require an entirely

separate study. This study focuses on the exchange of refugees over the Iraqi-Turkish border.

This limited scope provides a cross-section of the diverse foreign policy objectives of three

specific actors—Iraq, Turkey, and the US. Thus we can examine their particular interests closely.

This analysis supports two arguments which expand the existing theoretical

understanding of the use of forced migrants for the purposes of statecraft. First, the three

strategies show how forced migration may be wielded as an implement of foreign policy by a

wide diversity of states. Specifically, the account will illustrate that the phenomenon is not

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confined to smaller weaker states. The strategy behind American intervention illustrates how

larger, more powerful, liberal democracies may use a refugee crisis to achieve political ends.

Second, the analysis also suggests a relationship between the use of refugees to achieve foreign

policy ends and the shaping of legitimacy by hegemonic powers. The use of forced migration by

the US illustrates how a hegemonic power may mold legitimacy and international institutions to

serve its interests in refugee crises.

Theoretical and Policy Significance

Before providing individual accounts of each of the strategies described above, a

discussion of the theoretical significance of the study will illuminate the rationale behind its

structure, which aims to illustrate the diverse foreign policy objectives of the states involved.

Much of the justification for this structure lies in the lack of existing theoretical explanations for

how states use refugee crises to suit their diplomatic goals. Very little theory has been produced

that follows on the arguments made by Myron Weiner over two and a half decades ago. Weiner

describes sending states as asserting considerable control over out-migration, often envisioning

refugees as a “‘natural resource’ to be managed like any other” (Weiner 1983, 39ff). Noting this

lack of attention paid to the strategic use of migration by governments, refugee expert Michael

Teitelbaum stated in 2001 that:

The most striking weakness in migration theories drawn from social sciences is their failure to deal in a serious way with government action in initiating, selecting, restraining, and ending international migration movements. (Teitelbaum 2001, 26)

Indeed, few commentators have addressed the use of forced migration for the purposes of

statecraft (Loescher 1992; Coles 1983; Dowty 1987), and until recently testable theories

regarding engineered forced migration have not emerged; analysts have instead focused on

typologies and examinations of empirical examples (Keely 1996; Weiner and Teitelbaum, 2001).

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In her recent book, Weapons of Mass Migration, Kelly Greenhill attempts to answer these

gaps in the theoretical discourses on forced migration. She makes innovative claims that

migration and refugee crises can serve as instruments of persuasion in foreign policy,

representing a “nonmilitary method of applying coercive pressure” (Greenhill 2010, 12).

Greenhill examines the tension between the fear generated by engineered cross-border

population movements and the obligations accepted by governments under the modern human

rights regime. She locates several examples within a coercion-by-punishment strategy, 6 whereby

states engineer migration in order to influence neighboring governments by varying the costs and

risks imposed on their civilian populations through the use of “human demographic bombs”

(Greenhill 2010, 3). In addition to “straightforward threats to overwhelm the physical or political

capacity of a target state to accommodate an influx [of refugees],” Greenhill focuses on another

method of imposing costs on target states through migration. She describes this phenomenon as

“norms-enhanced political blackmail predicated on exploitation of the heterogeneity of interests

that frequently exists within polities” (Greenhill 2010, 3). Perhaps this concept relates to the

original logic of an earlier manuscript of her text, where she describes the central mechanism

involved in coercive engineered migration as “political jujitsu.” For Greenhill, this term explains

actions whereby weaker states “turn the virtues of liberal (and liberalizing) states on their heads

and use these virtues against them,” ultimately affecting their behavior by accruing asymmetric

bargaining power via the exploitation of refugees (Greenhill 2003, 12-13).

With regard to the episode considered in this paper—one of the 50 odd cases Greenhill

includes in a large-N analysis of her thesis—she focuses on this alternate means of applying

pressure. In her brief explanation for coding the 1991 Kurdish refugee crisis as a “success” for

Turkey, which acted as an “opportunist” state, Greenhill claims that the Republic of Turkey

6 Greenhill takes this concept from Robert A. Pape’s Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Pape 1996).

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achieved its foreign policy objective of keeping hundreds of thousands of Kurds from entering

deep within its borders by calling on the US and the international community to solve the crisis

(Greenhill 2010, 316-317). Absent from her account are the specific activities of the Turkish

military in their interaction with the Kurdish refugees. More troubling is her emphasis on the

Turkish government in her search for the use of refugees to accomplish foreign policy ends in the

crisis—an emphasis that perhaps emerges from her focus on the use of forced migration by

smaller, weaker states. Beyond Greenhill’s account of the actions of the Turkish government in

the 1991 crisis, there exist important aspects of the use of refugees in the realm of international

politics. While addressing the main recurring theme of Greenhill’s text—the use of forced

migrants by smaller, weaker states—the analysis that follows attempts to take into account how

states committed to norms of the modern human rights regime can invoke and reinterpret these

commitments to justify intervention that serves their interests.

The renewal, re-evaluation, and fundamental reorganization of existing theories of forced

migration as an implement of statecraft should inform the search for policy solutions for refugee

crises. This is largely because neglecting the intersection of forced migration and foreign policy

imperils the formulation of durable solutions to future refugee crises. If sound solutions to

refugee crises are formulated for the betterment of refugees themselves, crafters of such policies

must take into account the foreign policy interests of states initiating the refugee flows as well as

of those proposing solutions to the subsequent crises. Declarations by governments of their will

to aid refugees ring hollow if their ulterior, long-term purposes run counter to the interests of the

refugees themselves. Furthermore, as this study will show, analyzing the interests of states in

initiating refugee flows—a task habitually ignored by international agencies and states

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participating in past interventions7—is not sufficient to understand the broader intersection of

foreign policy and refugee crises. As the international community continues to struggle to

fashion durable solutions to refugee crises, it must take into account that larger, wealthier states,

capable of volunteering support, often do so in order to serve motives masked by declared

humanitarian purposes.

The return of Kurdish forced migrants in 1991 also bears relevance to the study of

humanitarian intervention by the US. The country’s inconsistent record of intervention in the

major humanitarian crises of the last two decades invites suspicion of declared humanitarian

motives on the part of the American government. Since the end of the cold war, grand projects of

peace-keeping and state-building commissioned by a US-led international community have

coincided with inaction in episodes of tremendous human suffering, namely in Rwanda and the

Sudan. Before the identification of variables prompting this inconsistent action, studies must

provide the basis for analyzing decisions to intervene in terms of competing, impure, and

intertwined motives. The long American tradition of coupling political objectives with

humanitarianism, and of fashioning the latter into pretext for military, diplomatic, and economic

action that serves the interests of the US endures until today. As a reaction to a large-scale

humanitarian crisis, the US-led international response to the forced migration of Kurds over the

Iraqi-Turkish border in 1991 serves as an important instance to evaluate the web of motives that

prompts US intervention in humanitarian crises.

Iraq’s Engineered Retaliatory Migration

The intentions of the Iraqi government are the most difficult to ascertain with certainty in

the context of the 1991 Kurdish refugee crisis. Disentangling the motives of President Saddam

7 In his analysis of the forced migration in Uganda, Dr. Adam Branch discusses the enduring failure of international relief agencies to take into account the use by domestic actors of multiple strategies involving displacement of rival ethnic groups (Branch 2008).

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Hussein in his actions toward the Kurds is complicated by historical factors and the absence of

available evidence detailing his decision-making process. The long and sordid relationship

between the Iraqi government under Hussein and the Kurds residing in the country’s northern

provinces often included episodes of extreme violence and cruelty (Yildiz 2007, 51-57). Iraq’s

bloody al-Anfal campaign against the Kurds, which culminated in 1988, illustrated President

Hussein’s continuing brutality toward the Kurdish populations residing within his country’s

borders (McDowall 1996, 357-360). Given this series of violent attacks on Iraqi Kurdish

populations in the late-1980s, a crack down was the expected response from Baghdad when the

Kurds began to organize and resist control by the Iraqi government in the weeks following the

end of the First Persian Gulf War. It is difficult to assess whether the objectives of the Iraqi

government differed in this case from earlier military responses to Kurdish uprisings, when

Hussein publicly asserted his authority to maintain control over the northern provinces of Iraq

(McDowall 1996, 371). Despite the 2003 US invasion, there continues to be a dearth of

accessible records kept by the Iraqi government regarding its relations with the Kurds—few

documents have been recovered and even fewer have been released, let alone translated. These

circumstances further complicate research on Hussein’s decision-making during the Kurdish

uprisings of 1991, much less his intentions for the outcome of the crisis that followed.

Despite the inherent limits of analyses of the Iraqi government’s actions toward the

Kurds in 1991, the patterns of violence employed by the government illuminate a strategy to

expel hundreds of thousands of Kurds over the Turkish border. In March of 1991, the Iraqi Army

under the direction of Saddam Hussein responded to the widespread uprisings in the north by

expelling large segments of the Kurdish population from the lands where they had resided for

nearly two millennia. This action was followed by violence that kept the large-scale streams of

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refugees on the move toward the northern Iraqi-Turkish border. By positioning his Republican

Guard troops to cut off escape routes to Syria, Hussein further limited the paths of fleeing Kurds

to converge on the Iraqi-Turkish border. Though it is difficult to prove that this seemingly

coordinated displacement over the border with Turkey was intentional—let alone retaliatory—

the actions of the government of Iraq to strengthen Kurdish insurgencies in southeastern Turkey

after the crisis indicate Hussein’s will to use the Kurds. These actions demonstrate his repeated

exploitation of the particular security threats the Turkish government associated with the passage

of Kurds across Turkey’s border with Iraq.

The campaign against the Kurdish uprisings in northern Iraq that began after the

wholesale defeat of Iraq’s Army on 28 February 1991 was particularly gruesome, aimed at the

mass migration of Kurds from their cities of residence. Though the uprisings were preceded by a

series of attacks by Kurdish Peshmerga on the disparate units of the Iraqi Army remaining in the

north at the end of the First Persian Gulf War, the uprisings themselves assumed a popular tenor.

Hundreds of thousands of Kurdish civilians took to the streets of the major cities of northern

Iraq. Comments from leaders of Kurdish militant organizations noted that the Iraqi Kurds

themselves appeared to act en masse to demonstrate their will to throw off control by Baghdad.

As Maud Barzani confessed, “the uprising[s] came from the people themselves. We didn’t

expect it” (McDowall 1996, 371). A spokesman for the Kurdish Front, Burhan Jaf, confirmed

that members of his organization “merely followed people into the streets” (McDowall 1996,

371). As a result of this mass participation by Kurdish Iraqis, the government in Baghdad shaped

its response to target civilians.

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This graphic illustrates the early phases of the Iraqi Army’s 1991 campaign against Kurdish civilians (Rudd 2004, 31).

President Hussein’s crackdown on the Kurdish uprisings involved killings of civilians

and fighting in urban areas that led large

numbers of Kurdish civilians to flee farther

and farther from their cities of residence.

Once the simultaneous Shiite uprisings in

southern Iraq had been crushed in early

March, Hussein mobilized units from his

Republican Guard to begin assaults on

Zakho, Dahuk, Mosul, Erbil, Kirkuk, and As

Sulaymaniyah—the major cities that had

experienced large-scale Kurdish

demonstrations (Rudd 2004, 31). Using

the more developed roads within these

larger cities to their advantage, the Iraqi forces deployed tanks and heavy equipment with

relative ease (Rudd 2004, 30). Earlier on in the campaign, the Iraqi commanders had begun a

campaign to clear ethnic Kurds from the cities. Kurdish civilians in government-held areas were

rounded up and killed en masse. News of this practice spread quickly, and the Kurdish

Peshmerga attempting to coordinate the defense of urban areas began to encourage untrained

civilian fighters to flee (Rudd 2004, 31). The initial destinations of this growing number of

displaced civilians were the foothills and villages around the major cities. However, they soon

realized that the Iraqi Army intended to pursue them to these areas as well. Confirmed cases of

killings by the Iraqi forces of fleeing Kurds cropped up in proximity to Kirkuk. Here the Iraqi

Army pursued civilians into the foothill towns of Arbil, Dohuk, and Zakhu, firing on them with

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helicopters and artillery until they vacated these areas (McDowall 1996, 371-373). After the US

and the UN tolerated the first violations of the ban on the use of Iraqi helicopters by the army for

offensive action, the Iraqi government deployed gunships to expedite its policy of expelling the

Kurds who had gathered in the villages surrounding the major cities where the uprisings had

occurred (Rudd 2004, 30-31). Fighting in and around the major cities of northern Iraq resulted in

the death of some 20,000 ethnic Kurds, and episodes of torture in the villages and foothills

surrounding these major urban centers were also widely reported (McDowall 1996, 373).

Once nearly 1.5 million Kurdish refugees had fled their homes, Iraqi forces applied

violent coercive pressure to perpetuate their exodus, cutting off alternate pathways of escape and

forcing them to cross the Iraqi-Turkish and Iraqi-Iranian borders. In his account of the flight of

Kurdish refugees, Gordon Rudd states that “rockets and machine guns fired indiscriminately kept

the Kurds on the move” (Rudd 2004, 30). A journalist who observed the flight of Iraqi Kurds

toward Turkey noted that gunships followed the refugees and repeatedly dropped phosphorus

bombs on the fleeing civilians: “people are burned to death inside cars…Iraqi helicopters are

bombing civilians without let up” (McDowall 1996, 373). This continuous coercive pressure on

the fleeing Kurdish civilians was coupled with the Republic Guard’s swift action to cut off any

attempts by the refugees to flee to Syria. Within days of clearing hundreds of thousands of Kurds

from their cities of residence, the Iraqi Army advanced quickly to disallow exit through the Iraqi-

Syrian border (Rudd 2004, 35-36). On its face, this action serves as clear indication of the Iraqi

Army’s will to force the fleeing Kurdish civilians to the Iraqi-Turkish border.

The final steps of the Iraqi Army in its campaign against the Kurds in 1991 demand an

examination of a potential alternate, less complex strategy on the part of the government under

President Hussein: to ethnically cleanse a problematic population during its greatest moment of

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popular uprising. It could be the case that, rather than intending to force the Kurdish refugees

over the Iraqi-Turkish border, the army under Hussein merely intended to remove the Kurds

from major Iraqi cities and to inflict mass casualties and deaths on the population. This

explanation fits with the initial actions of the Iraqi Army to remove the Kurds from their cities of

residence. The rugged terrain of escape routes over the Iraqi-Turkish and Iraqi-Iranian borders

might have represented an opportunity to force the Kurds into a series of dangerous journeys,

thereby ensuring higher rates of casualties and death. Whatever the true intentions of the army

under the control of Saddam Hussein, it seems clear that the government intended at least in part

to force the Kurds to flee into the mountains toward Iraq’s border with Turkey. The absence of

evidence that the Iraqi Army pursued Kurdish civilians once they reached the mountains

indicates that their campaign was not intended solely to incur deaths. It also discredits the

potential alternate Iraqi strategy of incorporating the mountain passes as arenas in which to

inflict further deaths and casualties. If either of these motives had been the case, the Iraqi Army

would have pursued the fleeing Kurds into the mountains, using the gunships employed earlier in

the campaign to attack the refugee streams during their moment of greatest vulnerability and

least mobility.

Observations by Turkish troops during the final days of the Iraqi campaign against the

Kurds provides further evidence that the Iraqi government intended to send the Kurds over the

borders of its non-Arab neighbors. In an article that covered the beginning of the exodus, Clyde

Haberman of The New York Times noted the argument made by a Turkish soldier that the

pursuing Iraqi troops “could have encircled the Kurds in the early stages of the refugees' flight

north at the end of March,” long before they arrived at the Turkish border. Instead, the soldier

retorted: “[Hussein] is not doing it…he is pushing them toward us” (Haberman 1991, 2).

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In light of the Iraqi government’s operations in southeastern Turkey after the First

Persian Gulf War, the forced migration of the Kurds over the Iraqi-Turkish border appears to

have been an act of retaliation against Turkey. The most direct evidence of the retributive

outlook of Iraq toward Turkey, and of the Iraqi government’s willingness to use ethnic Kurds to

undermine the security of its northern neighbor came in October 1991. Six months after the

conclusion of the refugee crisis, a western reporter observed the increasing evidence that the

Iraqi government was supporting Kurdish militant groups in southeastern Turkey. Citing

interviews with Kurdish militant leaders and Turkish officials, Chris Hedges traced the Iraqi

government’s development of the military wing of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) through the

summer and fall of 1991. In a few short months, Hussein had transformed what was once a

“nuisance” into a high-priority “security threat” for the Turkish state. Under the sub-head

“Baghdad is seen as retaliating for Ankara’s support of the Allies in the Gulf War,” Hedges

noted that the Iraqi government had allowed the PKK to “honeycomb the razor-backed Cudi

Mountains with bases and camps,” providing heavy weaponry, 120 mortars, and antiaircraft guns

(Hedges 1991, 1). These enhanced capabilities allowed the military factions of the PKK to

conduct roadside executions of suspected government collaborators, civil servants, and soldiers

traveling along the major roads of Turkey’s southeastern provinces. The Turkish government

responded to these increasing attacks with napalm canister bombings on the Cudi Mountains. In

the seven months following the Kurdish refugee crisis, some 500 Kurdish civilians died in the

intensified counterinsurgency campaign conducted by Turkish police and security forces

(Hedges 1991, 12). What Hedges describes as the “harshly calculated expediency of the Iraqi

President” (Hedges 1991, 13) in these events echoes in Hussein’s seemingly deliberate forced

migration of Kurds over the Iraqi-Turkish border. Much as Hussein used rebel Kurds in the year

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after the First Persian Gulf War, he appears to have incorporated the wider human geography of

the ethnic group to engineer a retaliatory wave of forced migration in the weeks following the

War.

Turkey’s Ecological Logic

It has long been said that the Kurds have “no friends but the mountains” (Bulloch and

Morris 1992, 3). During the 1991 refugee crisis, it would seem that then Turkish President,

Turgut Özal, turned their sole ally against them. By isolating the Kurdish forced migrants

expelled by Saddam Hussein in the mountains straddling the Iraqi-Turkish border, outside the

reach of aid and assistance, the Turkish government successfully guided the international

community toward the return of the Kurds to their homes on the flat plains of northern Iraq.

Relying on the international press, the Turkish government waited patiently as the daily casualty

rates rose, while simultaneously advocating publicly that the Gulf War coalition play a larger

role in answering the refugee crisis. This strategy stemmed from Turkey’s longstanding policy

during the First Persian Gulf War to avoid hosting Kurdish refugees whenever possible. The

government in Ankara saw good reason to pursue this objective. It perceived an influx of Kurds

into its southeastern provinces as a security threat that would enhance the PKK-led insurgency

that had engaged in escalating attacks on government institutions throughout the country since

1983.

Historical context sheds light on the brutal Turkish decision to isolate Kurdish refugees in

the mountains during the 1991 crisis. Since the founding of the Republic in 1923, the Turkish

state has long maintained tenuous relationships with ethnic minorities throughout its territory. In

an attempt to forge a “Turkish” identity from the confederation of ethnicities surviving the

Ottoman Empire in Anatolia, the government established policies following on Mustafa Kemal’s

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“National Pact” that aimed to incorporate groups of self-ascribed unique ethnic origin. With

regard to the Kurds, these policies intermittently entailed violent action by the state to suppress

their distinct ethnic identity (Kirisci and Winrow 1997, 92). The 1983 Language Act touched off

a period of greater suppression. It criminalized many aspects of Kurdish cultural life, renewing

and enhancing bans on Kurdish language instruction (Gunter 1983, 10). Throughout the mid- to

late-1980s, militant Kurdish movements responded to these measures by escalating their attacks

on the Turkish government. Understanding the outlook of the Turkish government toward the

Kurds in 1991 is complicated by the Presidency of Turgut Özal, who was of partial Kurdish

descent. Özal embodied the seeming duality of the relationship between the Turkish government

and ethnic Kurds. This relationship is not characterized by an apartheid-like scheme of

segregation. Instead, the relationship during Özal’s Presidency represented the continuance of

the Turkish state project to construct a unitary Turkish ethnic identity by denying the existence

of Muslim non-Arab ethnic minorities in Anatolia (Grigoriadis 2008, 136).

Throughout the First Persian Gulf War and especially during the refugee crisis, the

Turkish state perceived an influx of Iraqi Kurds as a serious threat to the security of the country’s

southeastern provinces. This concern went beyond the enormous humanitarian burden and the

sheer increase in size of the Kurdish ethnic population that would result from a policy of

accepting the hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees fleeing over the border from Iraq. In

addition to these concerns, the Turkish government had long recognized that Iraqi Kurds

maintained a strong sense of Kurdish ethnic identity as a result of Baghdad’s combination of

violence and unsuccessful policies aimed at forcing Kurdish leaders to submit to the Iraqi

political system (Yildiz 2007, 41). Decision-makers in Ankara imagined that an influx of Kurds

from Iraq would result in an intensification of the existing PKK-led insurgency; it would also

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lead to emboldened demands by the Kurds for autonomy and even independence. The Turkish

government further recognized that the stakes of these potential outcomes were high: wherever

the Kurds settled, their demands would be heard while evidence of their enduring persecution

was fresh in the minds of potential advocates for their cause (Yildiz 2007, 41-43).

To avoid these consequences, Turkey acted throughout the First Persian Gulf War to

avoid accepting refugees. The 20,000 Kurdish refugees remaining in its territory from the Iran-

Iraq War caused the Turkish government to advocate that any new refugees from the coalition

invasion of Iraq be relocated outside of Turkey (Rudd 2004, 36). The strictness with which the

Turkish government pursued this policy was evident early on, when the Turkish Foreign

Ministry forced the United Nations Disaster Relief Organization to establish its base for assisting

potential refugees fleeing to Turkey outside the country, in Larnaca, Cyrpus (Rudd 2004, 34).

This decision to avoid setting up the infrastructure for receiving potential forced migrants was

enacted long before the Kurdish refugee crisis of 1991. Only after considerable prodding by the

US did the Turkish government accept the 30,000 refugees who fled over its border during the

period of fighting that occurred in the First Persian Gulf War (Yildiz 2007, 36-37).

Following on its existing policy of avoiding the settlement of refugees within its borders,

the Turkish Army acted swiftly to preclude the entrance of the fleeing Kurds deep into their

country’s southeastern borders. Armed Turkish border guards halted Kurds who arrived over the

mountains, directing them to make-shift camps (Rudd 2004, 36). As the US and its European

allies began to respond with a plan to deliver aid, the Turkish Foreign Ministry reacted by setting

conditions that would shape any humanitarian relief delivered to the Kurds, and directed the

Turkish Army to ensure that these guidelines were met. Among the primary conditions set by the

Foreign Ministry were the maximum 30-day duration of humanitarian assistance delivered inside

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Turkish borders, as well as the directive that all Iraqi nationals fleeing as result of Baghdad’s

post-war campaign had to be “re-established in northern Iraq…” (Rudd 2004, 62). These opening

actions by the Turkish government set out the contours for its strategy to isolate the Kurds while

simultaneously demanding that greater humanitarian relief be delivered by the return of the

refugees to northern Iraq.

In the opening days of Operation Provide Comfort, the US-led humanitarian mission to

answer the suffering of the Kurds, the Turkish government acted to heighten the refugee crisis.

At first, on 29 March, Ankara directed the Turkish Red Crescent to provide a large-scale delivery

of aid, and the government publicly commanded Turkish soldiers to assist the refugees where

they could (Rudd 2004, 36). But, as the operation wore on, the unwillingness of the Turkish

government to cooperate fully in the delivery of aid became apparent. Local and national Turkish

authorities disallowed the effective delivery of aid, forced the Kurdish refugees to remain on

difficult terrain, and tolerated violence by border guards against the forced migrants. The

suggestion that the Turkish government was intentionally encumbering the day-to-day delivery

of aid was first made in only a few western newspapers.8 Despite the lack of public attention

surrounding the issue, members of President Bush’s National Security Council noted Turkey’s

obstruction of the delivery of aid. In a memo dated 6 April, Nancy Bearg Dyke, Director of

International Programs and Public Diplomacy at the National Security Council staff, noted that

“the Turks will have to cooperate more in order for aid to be delivered in a sustainable way.”9

Paul Wolfowitz, then Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, noted that the administration should

8 Without citing coherent reasons or official sources, reporters Marvin Lipton, John Cassidy, and Margaret Driscoll gestured toward the conclusion that the Turkish Army was acting to impede the delivery of aid in their articles directly following the border crossing (Lipton 199; Cassidy and Driscoll 1991).9 Nancy Bearg Dyke, April 6, 1991, “Humanitarian situation on Turkish border,” George H.W. Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, Nancy Bearg Dyke Files, Kurds – Refugees [1].

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“expect little sympathy from the Turks on aid issues. They want the Kurds out.”10 On 20 May

1991, after the refugees had been returned to Iraq, a staff report for the Subcommittee on

Immigration and Refugee Affairs of the Judiciary Committee of the US Senate provided

carefully substantiated documentary evidence that the Turkish government had hampered the

delivery of food, clothing, and medicine. While commending the early facilitation of aid delivery

by the government in Ankara, the document reported “serious concerns regarding the actions of

Turkish border guards and local officials”:

There have been unnecessarily long lines of relief trucks waiting for simple customs clearance at the Turkish border between Silopi [sic] and Zakho. Many of the relief convoys were held up by local Turkish customs officers soliciting bribes and requiring time-consuming and unnecessary searches of coalition relief convoys—often delaying the delivery of urgently needed relief supplies by as much as a day or more. During the delegation’s visit, over 200 trucks were being held up at the border at Silopi…11

The report suggested that these delays were the result of a coordinated effort from the central

government in Ankara because the border guards repeatedly cited directives from the Foreign

and Interior Ministries of Turkey to search convoys, commands that were renewed despite

appeals from US and European military officers.12

By keeping the refugees on rough terrain near the border, the Turkish government created

conditions in which aid could not be effectively delivered. In his detailed account of the opening

days of the Operation Provide Comfort, Gordon Rudd noted that early reports from aid

organizations described airdrops of supplies—the US’s initial response—as ineffective because

“many of the bundles were damaged when they hit rough terrain” (Rudd 2004, 48). Months

10 Paul Wolfowitz, April 6, 1991, Untitled note found in Nancy Bearg Dyke Files, George H.W. Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, Nancy Bearg Dyke Files, Kurds – Refugees [1].11 “Aftermath of War: the Persian Gulf Refugee Crisis,” May 20, 1991, Yale University Library's Government Documents & Information Center, A staff report prepared for the use of the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs of the Committee on Judiciary, the United States Senate, One Hundred and Second Congress, First Session, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 12.12 Ibid., 11.

19

afterward, the staff report of the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs underlined

the stubbornness of the Turkish government in keeping the Kurdish refugees in close proximity

to the border, even in the face of the rising death toll:

[The Kurdish refugees] were forced to remain on the borders’ edge in harsh conditions on mountain slopes. If the refugees had been permitted to cross the border—even by half a mile—to enter more hospitable Turkish valleys and facilities, some of the tragic loss of life could have been minimized during those desperate early days in April.13

These concerns were echoed in contemporaneous phone conversations between Presidents Bush

and Özal. After Özal spoke with President Bush about the failing humanitarian aid efforts on 8

April 1991, Bush put the question of proximity to the border to Özal:

You know, much of what’s going wrong is a result of the workers on the ground having trouble getting the supplies to the refugees. If they could move into more accessible areas away from the border, it might get better.14

The transcriber noted a pause in the conversation after this comment. Although the first sentence

of Özal’s response remains redacted,15 he goes on to state: “it is not the responsibility of Turkey

to accept these refugees—there are hundreds of thousands and we have already done what we

can…we need to look elsewhere for delivery locations…”16 These comments indicate a link

between the Turkish government’s will to keep the Kurds in the mountains and its advocacy that

the Kurds be returned to northern Iraq.

The most heavily documented means by which the Turkish government heightened the

humanitarian crisis was through its toleration of violence committed by border guards against the

Kurdish refugees. The first public account of this common occurrence came from the

13 Ibid., 12.14 “Transcribed Phone Conversation between President George H. W. Bush and President Turgut Özal,” April 8, 1991, George H.W. Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, Brent Scowcroft Files, Working File subseries, Iraq – April [1]. 15 According the Freedom of Information Act Release Form Rubric, this phrase pertains to the national security interests of the US, noted by the “B1” scrawled in the margin near the redaction.16 Ibid.

20

Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs: “among the inhumanities faced by the

refugees was the fact that most of the refugees report numerous instances of brutality at the

hands of Turkish border guards.”17 In his account of the first stages of Operation Provide

Comfort, Gordon Rudd notes that aid organizations and the US military observed harassment and

violence committed by the Turkish Army against Kurdish refugees near the border. These

incidences became so frequent that, once the US armed forces were on the ground near the

border, they resorted to acting as a buffer between the refugees and the Turkish Army (Rudd

2004, 101-102). It is difficult to identify motives for this violence apart from the possibility that

it was merely a manifestation of the cultural tensions and mistrust between Turkish soldiers and

refugees who identified themselves as Kurds. However, the Turkish government’s apparent

unwillingness to act on the recurring complaints about violence against the Kurds at the border

indicates that Ankara tolerated these activities.18

During the same period when the Turkish government was heightening the humanitarian

crisis of the refugees, its Foreign Ministry began a campaign to demand greater international

involvement to aid the Kurds. This diplomatic initiative is best understood in two chronological

phases: first, by lobbying the UN Security Council, Turkey called for intervention on behalf of

the Kurds while alluding to the threats to regional security posed by their border encampments;

and second, through public statements from high officials, the Turkish government demanded

more effective aid delivery by the return of the refugees to northern Iraq. In his letter to the

president of the Security Council on 2 April, 1991, the Permanent Representative of Turkey to

the UN joined with France to highlight the increasing humanitarian crisis and to call for action

17 “Aftermath of War: the Persian Gulf Refugee Crisis,” May 20, 1991, Yale University Library's Government Documents & Information Center, A staff report prepared for the use of the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs of the Committee on Judiciary, the United States Senate, One Hundred and Second Congress, First Session, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 12.18 Ibid.

21

by the Council on behalf of the refugees.19 In debate, Turkey also followed the logic of the

Islamic Republic of Iran20 in pointing out the implications of a humanitarian disaster for regional

security:

The threat posed by [the Kurdish refugee crisis] to the security of the region needs no elaboration. In the chaotic conditions prevailing in northern Iraq, it is conceivable that a million people might be forced to move from that country to Turkey. No country can cope with such a massive influx of destitute people fleeing for their lives.21

After linking intervention to the preservation of wider regional security, the Turkish

Representative stated firmly: “Turkey will not allow its border provinces to be overwhelmed by

such a flood of displaced persons.”22 This first stage of Turkey’s public campaign to demand

greater aid for the Kurds contributed to the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 688 on 5

April, 1991. The Resolution condemned Iraq’s repression of its civilian population and stated

that its most recent actions against the Kurds had “led to…cross border incursions, which

threaten international peace and security.”23 The document demanded that Iraq end its repression

of civilians and allow international relief organizations immediate access to those in need, while

calling for an open dialogue to “ensure that the human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens are

respected.” The Resolution also called on the Secretary-General to use his good offices to

ameliorate the suffering the Kurds, finally urging member states “to contribute to these

humanitarian relief efforts.”24 The resolution did not mention military intervention in Iraq nor did

it explicitly call for the return of Iraqi refugees to their homes.

19 Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations, April 2, 1991, “Letter to the president of the Security Council,” U.N. Doc. S/22435; and Chargé d’Affaires of the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations, April 4, 1991, “Letter to the president of the Security Council,” U.N. Doc.S/22442.20 Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations, April 4, 1991, “Letter to the Secretary-General,” U.N. Doc. S/22447; and Permanent Representative of Iran to the Secretary-General, April 3, 1991, U.N. Doc. S/22436.21 UN SCOR. 1991. 46trh Session, 2982 meeting at 6, UN Doc S/PV.2982.22 “United Nations Security Council Resolution 688,” 1991, Adopted by the Security Council at its 2982nd meeting on 5 April 1991, available at: http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres0688.htm, accessed on: 20 January 2011.23 Ibid.24 Ibid.

22

On the same day Resolution 688 passed the Security Council, President Bush responded

with a message about the planned American and European response to the crisis. Though Bush

asserted in his first public statement regarding the crisis that “[the US’s] long-term objective

remains the same for Iraqi Kurds…to return home [emphasis added],” (Rudd 2004, 42) the

President did not repeat this goal in his longer statement that was broadcast on 5 April.25 In his

drafts of this statement, Special Assistant to President Bush, Richard Haas,26 included

characterizations of the crisis that the President would repeat when answering questions about

his first policy toward the crisis—describing it as an “internal struggle,” the product of a “civil

war.”27 After his statement on 5 April, President Bush stated explicitly that “I feel frustrated any

time innocent civilians are being slaughtered...But the United States and…this coalition did not

go there to settle all the internal affairs of Iraq” (Johnson 2011, 46). On 6 April, General Richard

Potter elaborated President Bush’s statement by announcing a plan to send American Special

Forces to help organize the border camps and to direct the delivery of supplies for medical care,

hygiene, and shelter. Under the General’s plan, after 30 days, the Special Forces would turn

these tasks over to international relief agencies (Rudd 2004, 63). Potter made no mention of the

return of the refugees to northern Iraq.

Realizing the American-led response did not incorporate the repatriation of the Kurds in

its immediate plan of action, the Turkish government began the second phase of its campaign to

advocate for greater humanitarian aid for the Kurds—their return to northern Iraq remaining

Turkey’s ulterior motive. Acting quickly, the Turkish government explicitly linked greater

25 Richard Haas, April 5, 1991, “(final) Statement by the President,” George H. W. Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, H-Files: NSC/DC Meetings Files, Meeting re: Persian Gulf Humanitarian Assistance via SVTS.26 Richard Haas served concurrently as senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the staff of the National Security Council.27 Richard Haas, April 5, 1991, “Latest Version: Statement by the President,” George H. W. Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, H-Files: NSC/DC Meetings Files, Meeting re: Persian Gulf Humanitarian Assistance via SVTS.

23

humanitarian aid for the Kurds and a favorable outcome to the crisis with the return of the

refugees to northern Iraq. In a speech on 7 April, President Özal stated “we have to get [the

Kurds] better land under UN control to put those people in the Iraqi territory and take care of

them” (Rear 2008, 199). These remarks coincided with the visit of US Secretary of State James

Baker. It is hard to imagine that coincidence explains his first destination on the trip: the Uzumlu

refugee camp—one of the few locations entirely under Turkish control, where the Kurds suffered

some of the worst conditions (Rudd 2004, 77-79). Baker was so shocked by the scenes he

witnessed—which included Kurdish parents attempting to throw their infants into departing air-

convoys—that he made the first comment which suggested a change in the recently announced

American policy of solely providing assistance via air drops. He stated: “these people must be

free from the threats, persecution and harassment that they have been subjected to by that brutal

regime in Baghdad” (Freedman and Boren 1992, 52). Yet the Secretary reiterated what would

remain the American government’s cause for delay in intervening—that the US would not

become involved in a “civil war” (Freedman and Boren 1992, 52-53).

While the death toll on the border rose ever higher, Turkey’s two-part strategy guided

Western leaders toward the formulation of a policy to return the refugees to northern Iraq. As the

proceeding section will illustrate, the decision-making process of the US on this issue was

fraught with complex strategic motives. However, the actions of then UK Prime Minister John

Major illustrate the influence of Turkey’s policy toward the Kurdish refugees. Although Major

would turn out to be the first Western leader to advocate for the return of the Kurds with

coalition military support, he originally took the same line as the American government toward

the forced migrants. In the opening weeks of the crisis, Major remained steadfast to his position

of non-intervention in Iraq (Wheeler 2000, 148). He made a sarcastic statement the likes of

24

which had been untenable for President Bush who had urged the Kurds to rise up against

Hussein. Major stated that he did not “recall asking the Kurds to mount this particular

insurrection” (Fisk 1991, 2). Martin Shaw notes that the British press responded by airing

footage of the humanitarian crisis “overlaid…with an unremitting commentary pinning

responsibility simply and directly on western leaders, especially Bush and Major” (Shaw 1999,

229). Douglas Hurd, Major’s Foreign Secretary at the time, answered this criticism by asserting

that the UK had no legal mandate to intervene within Iraq on behalf of the refugees (Wintour

1991, 4). The Prime Minister’s predecessor, Margaret Thatcher, publicly criticized this new basis

for non-intervention on 3 April, when she stated “it is not a question of standing on legal

niceties…The people need help and they need it now” (Cassidy, Hughes, and Adams 1991, 7).

Major capitulated. On 8 April, he decided to present the European Community (EC) with

a policy to coax the Kurds to come down from the mountains by creating “safe enclaves” in Iraq.

Though it is difficult to ascertain the true totality of motives behind his change of heart, Major’s

decision to propose the idea without consulting the US sheds light on the purpose of his

proposal. Major meant to respond immediately to the public outcry in the UK over the plight of

the refugees. He knew that the US would remain opposed to intervention, and that by forgoing

consultation with President Bush, he could quickly convince French President François

Mitterrand to support what could be framed as a European initiative. The European leaders

present at the EC’s April summit endorsed Major’s plan (Wheeler 2000, 149). In a news

conference held after the summit, Major described the plan as involving two steps: “the

immediate aim will be to get the Kurds and the other refugees actually down from the mountains

and into a safe area. The second stage is to get them back home.”28

28 “UK Urges Kurdish Enclave.” April 9, 1991. Financial Times.

25

Turkey took a final step in advocating for this proposal. Immediately after Major

announced his plan, controversy sparked over the idea of creating “enclaves” for the refugees.

Sir David Hannay, then Permanent Representative from the UK to the UN, claimed in a 1999

interview that the controversy had much to do with the word “enclave.” Hannay pointed out to

Major that using this “geographical term” strongly suggested the violation of Iraq’s territorial

integrity, and he advised Major to adopt a terminology that did not “[imply] some support for the

splitting-up of Iraq.”29 Recognizing the need for a slightly altered characterization of the

proposal, President Özal of Turkey made a statement endorsing the policy, but referring to its

goal as the creation of “safe havens” rather than “safe enclaves” (Rudd 2004, 108). The UK

government appears to have noted the subtle yet crucial distinction, and it converted the name of

its military operation to help in the delivery of aid to “Operation Safe Havens” (Rudd 2004, 108).

Though it would take several more days for the US to alter its policy toward the refugees

on the Iraqi-Turkish border, Major’s course of action demonstrates the influence of Turkey’s

strategy. By simultaneously heightening the humanitarian crisis surrounding the refugees and

appealing to the US and the international community to aid the Kurds, the Turkish government

guided the discussion of refugee assistance toward the fruition of its goal. Though this policy

cannot entirely explain the transition amongst Western leaders to intervene within Iraqi borders,

the influence of the Turkish strategy is clear in the historical record.

Disempowering Iraq through Safe Havens

When President Bush announced his decision on 16 April to establish encampments in

Iraq for the refugees gathered around the country’s border with Turkey, he acted in part with

strategic motives. During the days between 5 April, when he stated his initial plan to deliver aid

29 Hannay also claimed to have come up with the term “safe havens,” but this seems unlikely given that Turkish President Özal was the first to use the phrase in public, with the UK adopting the language after his statement (Wheeler 2000, 149).

26

through air drops, and 16 April, when he made his announcement regarding safe havens,

President Bush’s staff crafted a strategy to use protected refugee encampments to politically and

economically disempower the Iraqi government. President Bush and his circle of advisors came

to see the establishment of “safe havens” as an intermediate step to weaken and to isolate the

government under Saddam Hussein. They imagined the return of the refugees could accomplish

their post-war goals without the US assuming responsibilities to resolve the worsening internal

conflicts within Iraq. These strategic motives bring into question the long-standing ascription of

purely humanitarian purposes for American intervention.

One motive has dominated accounts of the US’s eventual intervention in northern Iraq

following the First Persian Gulf War: humanitarianism. In addition to Gordon Rudd’s exhaustive

account of the military minutiae of Operation Provide Comfort, analysts from several disciplines

have drawn on the 1991 refugee crisis to advance the causative primacy of humanitarian norms

in military action on behalf of persecuted minorities after the cold war (DiPrizio 2002; Stromseth

1993; Wheeler 2000). These authors note the waves of public criticism leveled against the

President during the weeks of late March, when the refugee crisis began, through mid-April

1991, when the suffering of the refugees in the mountains on the Iraqi-Turkish border reached its

peak. They cite President Bush’s unequivocal statement on 16 April that “all we are doing is

motivated by humanitarian concerns.”30 The personal papers of members of Bush’s National

Security Council confirm that humanitarian intentions lay behind the decision to create protected

refugee encampments in northern Iraq. Thousands of pages of data, analysis, and correspondence

30 President George H. W. Bush, April 16, 1991, “Remarks on Assistance for Iraqi Refugees and a News Conference,” George H. W. Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, H-Files: NSC/DC Meetings Files, Persian Gulf Humanitarian Crisis.

27

between these officials demonstrate the attention and care paid to the humanitarian aspects of the

safe haven policy.31

However, there is reason to suspect that humanitarian relief was not the sole objective

behind American intervention. Such a monocausal explanation contradicts the everyday wisdom

that decision-makers are complicated, occasionally thinking for themselves, while often being

driven by impure and complex motives cleverly masked behind politically expedient pretexts.

Primary documents from the period shed light on the multiple motives behind American

intervention. Documents detailing the planned post-war American foreign policy toward Iraq

illustrate how the US eventually fashioned intervention to serve its several objectives for the

post-war government under Saddam Hussein. Exchanges amongst President Bush’s national

security staff during the crucial period in April, when President Bush changed his policy on

intervention, also elucidate strategic motives. Humanitarianism need not conflict with the

strategic reasons for American intervention. Indeed, these differing motives appear to have

complemented each other.

Understanding the shift in American policy toward the refugees on the Iraqi-Turkish

border requires laying President Bush’s decisions in the context of his administration’s planned

post-war foreign policy toward Iraq. In the final weeks of Operation Desert Storm, President

Bush’s advisers formulated long-term goals for dealing with Iraq once the First Gulf War had

concluded. They recognized the need to politically and economically weaken Iraq without

publicly articulating an overarching plan for the Middle East and while avoiding a long-term

military presence in the country. In the eyes of the Bush administration, Iraq had to be deprived

of political influence because it remained under the rule of Saddam Hussein. They recognized

31 The documents of Brent Scowcroft, Nancy Bearg Dyle, and Richard Haas include countless folders of memos and reports detailing ongoing problems with humanitarian aid as well as detailed analysis of how to solve these problems.

28

that he would use his remaining power to undermine American goals in the region.32 After

driving Hussein out of Kuwait, repudiating and humiliating him before the international

community, members of the National Security Council understood that Hussein would do

whatever he could to undermine American interests in the Middle East.33

In the final weeks of the First Persian Gulf War, President Bush’s administration also saw

several reasons to disempower Iraq economically after the War. This goal was connected to their

hope that President Hussein “[would] be deposed as his economic networks fail.”34 They also

directly linked his inability to rebuild Iraq with the likelihood of his removal from power by

popular domestic forces.35 Finally, they identified the economic weakening of Iraq as an essential

step in avoiding future buildups of the country’s military forces,36 including its capacity to pursue

“weapons of mass destruction.”37 Despite these several reasons for attempting to weaken post-

war Iraq economically, the administration appeared to dismiss the one proposal it considered

thoroughly—Iraqi payment of war compensation. Haass wrote on 7 March “it is impossible…to

demand Iraqi payment…we want to avoid anything too demanding (à la Versailles).”38

The Bush administration recognized the need to pursue its goals for post-war Iraq without

articulating an overarching plan for the Middle East and while avoiding a long-term military

presence in the country. Noting that American interests in ensuring the “security and stability [in 32 “The Middle East in the Post-War Period: Political Stability and Openness,” Februrary 21, 1991. George H. W. Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, Richard N. Haass Files, Working File, Iraq – February 1991 [1].33 Ibid.34 “(draft) American Aid and Hussein’s Reconstruction Plans,” February 3, 1991, George H. W. Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, Brent Scowcroft Files: NSC/DC Meetings Files, Working File, Iraq – February 1991 [1].35 Ibid.36 Brent Scowcroft, February 5, 1991, “Beyond the Gulf War,” George H. W. Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, (found in the) Richard N. Haass H-Files: NSC/DC Meetings Files, Working File, Iraq – February 1991 [2].37 Richard N. Haass, Februrary 8, 1991, “Arms Control after the War,” George H. W. Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, Richard N. Haass Files, Working File, Iraq – February 1991 [6].38 Richard N. Haass, March 7, 1991, “Moving Beyond Security Council Resolution 686,” George H. W. Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, Richard N. Haass H-Files: NSC/DC Meetings Files, Working File, Iraq - March 1991 [1].

29

the Middle East]” would “remain and possibly increase over time,”39 Richard Haass advocated

that the US avoid “imposing or even presenting a made-in-America blueprint.”40 “We must be

careful,” Haass wrote in a memo to the President, “to avoid being charged with promoting the

1990s version of the Baghdad Pact or CENTO.”41 He suggested that the US search for other

means to achieve its diplomatic goals involving post-war Iraq. The worst solution, according to

Brent Scowcroft, then National Security Advisor, would have been a “permanent military

presence in Iraq.”42 Scowcroft noted that several factors—including “competing demands on

U.S. military forces, nationalism, and perceptions that would crop up around the region”—made

a permanent US military presence inside Iraq untenable.43

Documents from the crucial 11 days in which President Bush reformulated his policy

illustrate how strategists in his administration brought intervention to fit their long-term interests

for post-war Iraq. Although the official minutes from the many meetings that occurred within the

administration between 5 and 16 April remain unreleased or heavily redacted, the handwritten

notes of Nancy Bearg Dyke, a member of the National Security Council staff, elucidate the

strategic thinking behind the transformation in President Bush’s policy toward the Kurdish

refugees. Under the heading “Baker: Kurds can be Key,”44 Dyke wrote down what appear to be

salient points from meetings led by the Secretary of State which occurred on 11 and 13 April.

She scrawls the phrase “Iraq disempowered by action in it’s [sic] territory.”45 She records the

39 Richard N. Haass, February 10, 1991, “Security Choices After the Gulf War,” George H. W. Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, Richard N. Haass H-Files: NSC/DC Meetings Files, Working File, Iraq – February 1991 [2].40 Ibid.41 Ibid.42 Brent Scowcroft, February 5, 1991, “Beyond the Gulf War,” George H. W. Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, (found in the) Richard N. Haass H-Files: NSC/DC Meetings Files, Working File, Iraq – February 1991 [2].43 Ibid.44 Nancy Bearg Dyke, April 11, 1991, Untitled notes from National Security Council meeting “with [Secretary of State] Baker,” George H.W. Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, Nancy Bearg Dyke Files, Kurds – Refugees [3].45 Ibid.

30

consideration that Iraq would only be further ostracized because its “credibility and military

control [would be] shot if west intervenees [sic]” by the “siphoning [of] control of Kurd [sic]

provinces to US—ultimate semi-permanent UN presence.”46 The President of Iraq also appeared

in references to the effect of US intervention: “close proximity, keep eye on Hussein and internal

forces,” she also notes “Hussein himself could be blamed for continuing US military presence.”

She further wrote that “international action inside [Iraq’s] borders can discredit later demands to

sell oil—open up pipelines.” Beneath this line, she wrote “particularly when Kirkuik [sic] falls

under coalition control.”47 These notes appear to illustrate how the US came to imagine

intervention in northern Iraq as serving its longstanding strategic goals toward the country after

the War. By intervening in Iraqi territory for declared humanitarian reasons, the US government

perceived the opportunity to further ostracize the Iraqi state. Intervention within the country was

also imagined as a means for negating potential humanitarian pretexts for Hussein to sell oil. He

could not claim any need for oil-revenue to aid the refugees. Dyke’s notes also illustrate how the

National Security Council staff imagined the establishment of protected refugee encampments as

means of maintaining a limited military presence to monitor Iraq’s post-war activities without

establishing a permanent US presence.

The American strategic motives behind intervention were confirmed in a meeting

between Richard Haass and President Özal on 12 June, after the Kurdish refugees had returned to

their homes. In a report to Scowcroft, Haass described how he conveyed to Özal the necessity “to

build a diplomatic web around Iraq,” drawing on Saddam Hussein’s evident “brutality and

ineptness,” which had prompted the international community to intervene to stop the

46 Nancy Bearg Dyke, April 13, 1991, Untitled notes from National Security Council meeting “with [Secretary of State] Baker” (continued in next folder), George H.W. Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, Nancy Bearg Dyke Files, Kurds – Refugees [4].47 Ibid.

31

humanitarian disaster.48 Haass also noted in his cable that he had expressed to Özal that Turkey

had no reason to open the Yumurtalk oil pipeline that had been closed since the beginning of

hostilities. After all, he asserted, the refugees were under the care of the international

community.49 Later that summer, the US successfully opposed Iraq’s first and second

applications to lift sanctions against the sale of Iraqi oil, despite Hussein’s declared humanitarian

purposes. The American statement opposing the Iraqi government’s applications, from the

Permanent Representative of the US to the UN, drew entirely from the premise that Iraq did not

need to sell oil, given that the major humanitarian crisis in the north was under international

control.50

Though it is difficult to identify strategic motives as the key factor in President Bush’s

eventual decision to intervene in Iraq, the evidence above illustrates that the administration saw

the establishment of safe havens as a means to politically and economically disempower the

post-war Iraqi government. The administration weathered weeks of criticism for avoiding

intervention. It openly dismissed the initial “safe enclaves” policy proposed by the UK, one of its

closest allies.51 President Bush’s Department of Defense also strongly advised against

intervention on the grounds that it “had Vietnam-style quagmire written all over it” (Wheeler

2000, 149). Given the early willingness of the administration to suffer the costs of non-

intervention, as well as the dire strategic concerns expressed by officials at the Pentagon, the

motives beyond humanitarianism appear to have played a central role in the administration’s

eventual decision to create protected refugee encampments.

48 “National Security Council Sr. Director Haass’ Meeting with President Özal,” June 12, 1991. George H.W. Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, Richard N. Haass Files, Iraq – June 1991 [2].49 Ibid.50 “Conclusion of Iraqi applications to sell oil,” August 2, 1991, George H.W. Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, Nancy Bearg Dyke Files, Kurds – June 1991 [14].51 In response to Major’s policy, White House Spokesman Marlin Fitzwater stated only that it had “some merits in terms of a possible solution,” while asserting that the administration was not actively considering action on the proposal (Wheeler 2000, 149).

32

Powerful Democracies and the Use of Forced Migration

It is difficult to derive broad theoretical conclusions from this study. The three strategies

detailed above pertain to one specific refugee crisis. They illustrate how a largely homogenous

group of forced migrants was used by three states to achieve their respective foreign policy

objectives. Given this limited scope, the 1991 Kurdish refugee crisis could represent an outlier

from larger trends in the interaction between governments and forced migrants. The episode

could also constitute an irregular case among instances in which states used forced migrants for

the purposes of statecraft. Hurst Hannum’s observation regarding the place of the Kurds in the

interstate politics of the Middle East sheds light on the potential peculiarity of the case. Hannum

notes “in the Middle Eastern world of oil and geopolitics, the interests of the Kurds have been at

the bottom of everyone’s list, except insofar as they promoted the strategic goals of weakening

one another of the states in the region” (Hannum 1990, 196). Perhaps the use of forced migration

by Iraq, Turkey, and the US in the 1991 refugee crisis had more to do with the outlook of states

toward ethnic Kurds in general, rather than in their role as forced migrants after the First Persian

Gulf War.

Despite its limited scope, the analysis above does support two arguments which expand

the existing theoretical understanding of the use of forced migrants for the purposes of statecraft.

First, the three strategies show how forced migration may be wielded as an implement of foreign

policy by a wide diversity of states. Contrary to the assertions of Kelly Greenhill, the strategy

behind American intervention illustrates how larger, more powerful, liberal democracies may use

a refugee crisis to achieve political ends. Second, the analysis also suggests a relationship

between the use of refugees to achieve foreign policy ends and the shaping of legitimacy by

33

hegemonic powers. The use of forced migration by the US illustrates how a hegemonic power

may mold legitimacy and international institutions to serve its interests in refugee crises.

The strategies employed by Iraq, Turkey, and the US illustrate how the use of refugee

crises to achieve political ends is not confined to smaller, weaker states. At the end of Weapons

of Mass Migration, Kelly Greenhill restates one of the overarching conclusions of her text:

“coercive engineered migration tends to be most often attempted (and most often successful)

against generally more powerful, liberal, democratic targets” (Greenhill 2010, 263). She goes on

to argue that powerful, liberal, democratic states are less likely to use forced migration to achieve

political ends because they

…are also most likely to be (quite transparently) constrained in international bargaining arenas by domestic political checks and balances. Thus, their attempts to credibly commit to policy actions that are likely to engender negative and concentrated costs domestically are less likely to be taken seriously internationally. Such targets are further constrained by the potential imposition of hypocrisy costs, a special class of reputational costs that can be imposed when targets claim to espouse migration-related human rights norms, but (attempt to) engage in behavior that abrogates those norms. (Greenhill 2010, 263-264)

She uses this reasoning to suggest that powerful, liberal democracies do not tend to use forced

migration to achieve political ends. She also suggests that they are constrained, if not “hobbled”

by refugee crises engineered by smaller, weaker states (Greenhill 2010, 264-265). These

conclusions conflict with the data collected and analyzed in this study. Though it sought different

ends and employed different means, the US government used the 1991 Kurdish refugee crisis to

achieve political objectives. It targeted Iraq, and wielded intervention on behalf of forced

migrants to politically and economically weaken the government under Saddam Hussein. The

Bush administration used the crisis to pursue its interests in post-war Iraq, recognizing the

unique opportunity to act without assuming responsibilities to resolve the worsening internal

conflicts within the country. Though it is possible that the Kurdish refugee crisis of 1991

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constitutes an outlier in the trends Greenhill observes in her far broader study, this case suggests

that powerful, liberal democracies also use forced migration to achieve their foreign policy ends.

The three strategies analyzed in this study also demonstrate the need to investigate the

means employed by powerful liberal democracies in their use of forced migration as an

implement of foreign policy. The strategic use of forced migrants by the American government

suggests that additional mechanisms exist outside the coercion-by-punishment strategy identified

by Greenhill. US action toward the Kurdish refugees in 1991 cannot be classified as a “[threat] to

overwhelm the physical and political capacity of [a target]” nor as “norms-enhanced political

blackmail.” Greenhill’s identification of these mechanisms rests on assumptions about the use of

forced migration to achieve foreign policy ends. Underlying Greenhill’s account is a static

conception of international norms, and an assumption that the use of forced migrants inherently

involves the violation of norms. The actions of the Bush administration in 1991 suggest

otherwise. The political and historical context of American intervention in Iraq provides for an

examination of how hegemonic powers mold legitimacy when acting to use forced migrants for

the purposes of statecraft.

Refugees, Hegemons, and Legitimacy

The US government’s actions to ensure the passage of UN Security Council Resolution

688 and to reinterpret the document once the Bush administration decided to intervene in Iraq

illustrate how a hegemonic power may shape legitimacy to justify its actions when using forced

migrants to achieve foreign policy ends. Both the passage of Resolution 688 and its invocation

by the US to validate its intervention in northern Iraq inspired much controversy. As Jane

Stromseth notes “the debate preceding passage of Resolution 688 was…a wide-ranging

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philosophical discussion of the purposes and limits of the Security Council” (Stromseth 1993,

86). The exchange centered on the authority of the Council under Article 39 of the UN Charter to

respond to threats to international peace. Permanent Representatives in attendance also argued

about the meaning and relevance of Article 2(7), which asserts that the Charter does not

authorize UN intervention “in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of

any state.”52 Three developing countries serving on the Security Council—Zimbabwe, Yemen,

and Cuba—opposed Resolution 688 on the grounds that it went beyond the body’s authority

because the crisis pertained to a “domestic conflict.” They later characterized the crisis as part of

an “internal struggle.”53 The Representative from Yemen summed up their arguments by stating

that Resolution 688 “sets a dangerous precedent that could open the way to diverting the Council

away from its basic functions and responsibilities and…towards addressing the internal affairs of

countries.”54 The widespread realization that Resolution 688 proposed unprecedented measures

was evident in the statement of the French government, the most strident supporter of

intervention. Then French Foreign Minister, Roland Dumas, said with regard to the resolution:

“justice can evolve” (Wheeler 2000, 141). Despite what Stromseth describes as the

“precedential” nature of the resolution, US Ambassador Thomas Pickering ensured its passage

by asserting its legitimacy on the grounds that it dealt with a refugee flow across international

borders.55 The resolution passed with ten votes in favor, three against, and two abstentions.

52 United Nations, 24 October 1945, “Charter of the United Nations,” 1 UNTS XVI, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3930.html, accessed 25 April 2011.53 “Remarks of Mr. Zenega, Permanent Representative from Zimbabwe to the UN,” April 5, 1991, S/PV. 2982, 27-31.54 “Statement of Mr. Al-Ashtal, Permanent Representative from Yemen to the UN,” April 5, 1991, S/PV. 2982, 44-5055 “Remarks of Mr. Pickering, Permanent Representative from the US the UN,” April 5, 1991, S/PV. 2982, 58. Other arguments were articulated by the Permanent Representatives from France and the UK, but neither dealt with the issues of the objecting members of the Security Council.

36

China, a permanent member of the Security Council, and India cited their desire to preserve

principles of nonintervention as the reason for their abstentions.

The US’s reinterpretation of Resolution 688, which did not authorize intervention within

Iraq, also represented a point of considerable controversy. In his announcement regarding the

change in American policy on intervention, President Bush stated that “consistent with United

Nations Security Council Resolution 688…I have directed the U.S. military to begin

immediately to establish several encampments in northern Iraq.” Secretary-General Javier Pérez

de Cuéllar responded by publicly insisting that the President would have to seek a new resolution

to authorize this action, which could only occur with permission from the Iraqi government

(Stromseth 1993, 100). In a phone call with Pérez de Cuéllar the day after his statement

regarding intervention, Bush stated “we won’t be able to have a new resolution. It’s about China.

It’s about the sovereignty issue.”56 Iraq hastily denounced the planned American action and

demanded that any humanitarian relief be conducted by the UN (Stromseth 1993, 101). Despite

these points of controversy, President Bush was able to bear the costs of directly contradicting

norms established by the UN Charter and to secure broad international support for his new policy

(Wheeler 2000, 148-152).

These two events—the passage and reinterpretation of Resolution 688—illustrate that

norms do not solely constrain powerful states in instances involving the use of forced migration

to achieve foreign policy ends. They demonstrate how the US government was able to mold

existing standards of legitimacy as a means of using forced migrants to achieve foreign policy

ends. The political and historical context of the US’s actions connect them to the discourse

regarding the relationship between hegemonic states and legitimacy. In 1991, the US was

56 “Transcribed phone conversation: The President and the Secretary-General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar,” April 17, 1991, George H.W. Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, Nancy Bearg Dyke Files, Kurds – April 1991 [2].

37

arguably at the height of its international power. The Soviet Union was in the final stages of its

decline, and the American government maintained peerless influence in global affairs. If there

were a period in which the American government could be described as a hegemonic power, it

would necessarily overlap with 1991. Yet during this same period, precisely at the end of the

First Persian Gulf War, the Bush administration strongly elaborated the institutional order that

the US helped to construct after World War II. In his address to Congress regarding the cessation

of war against Iraq, President Bush declared that a “new world order” had begun, in which

“respect for human rights [would] find a home among all nations.”57

Given this historical context, the use of forced migrants by the US bears relevance to the

arguments advanced by Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth regarding the capacity of

hegemonic powers to shape legitimacy. In World out of Balance, these authors advance a critique

of constructivist assertions that the US’s need for international legitimacy results in a strong

constraint on its security policy. They argue against two dominant characterizations of this

constraint. The authors suggest it is neither “structurally induced by the contradiction between

unipolar power and the international system’s constitutive norms of equilibrium” nor “strongly

conditional upon U.S. actions seen to violate core rules” (Brooks and Wohlforth 2008, 206).

Instead, they identify “strategies of hegemonic rule revision,” and conclude that hegemons may

mold legitimacy and shape rules to achieve their foreign policy goals (Brooks and Wohlforth

2008, 207). These observations convey the steps taken by the US to use the 1991 Kurdish

refugee crisis to achieve political ends. Facing several obstacles in the shape of norms regarding

international intervention, the Bush administration acted to mold existing shared conceptions of

international legitimacy to justify the passage of Resolution 688 and to go well beyond its

57 “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Cessation of the Persian Gulf Conflict,” March 6, 1991, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, March 11, 1991, vol. 27. no. 10, 259.

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parameters. This connection between US action in the 1991 Kurdish refugee crisis and theory

regarding the shaping of international legitimacy by hegemonic powers suggests a fundamentally

different strategy employed by hegemons in the use of forced migrants to achieve foreign policy

goals. Rather than using norms to “blackmail” other states, hegemonic powers may alter existing

norms of legitimacy to act in refugee crises for the purposes of statecraft.

President Barack Obama’s recent statement regarding intervention in Libya speaks to a

potentially broader scope for the connection between the molding of legitimacy and the use of

forced migrants. In his message on 28 March 2011, Obama stated that the US had “an important

strategic interest in preventing Gadhafi from overrunning those who oppose him.” Directly

following this assertion, he argued that

A massacre would have driven thousands of additional refugees across Libya’s borders, putting enormous strains on the peaceful—yet fragile—transitions in Egypt and Tunisia. I am convinced that a failure to act in Libya would have carried a far greater price for America.58

Here the President invoked the threat of a refugee crisis, rather than an already existing instance

of forced migration, to defend the legitimacy of US intervention in Libya. His comments suggest

that powerful states like the US will continue to expand and apply the connection between the

shaping of legitimacy and the use of forced migrants to achieve foreign policy ends.

58 President Barack Obama, March 28, 2011, “Obama’s Remarks on Libya,” text provided by The New York Times, available at: http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/usnews/foreign-policy/6891-obamas-statements-on-libya-are-misleading; accessed on April 5, 2011.

39

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Archival Documents

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Chargé d’Affaires of the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations. April 4, 1991. “Letter to the president of the Security Council.” S/22442.

“Conclusion of Iraqi applications to sell oil.” August 2, 1991. George H.W. Bush Presidential Records. National Security Council. Nancy Bearg Dyke Files. Kurds – June 1991 [14].

“(draft) American Aid and Hussein’s Reconstruction Plans.” February 3, 1991. George H. W. Bush Presidential Records. National Security Council. Brent Scowcroft Files: NSC/DC Meetings Files. Working File. Iraq – February 1991 [1].

Dyke, Nancy Bearg. April 6, 1991. “Humanitarian situation on Turkish border.” George H.W. Bush Presidential Records. National Security Council. Nancy Bearg Dyke Files. Kurds – Refugees [1].

Dyke, Nancy Bearg. April 11, 1991. Untitled notes from National Security Council meeting “with [Secretary of State] Baker.” George H.W. Bush Presidential Records. National Security Council. Nancy Bearg Dyke Files. Kurds – Refugees [3].

Dyke, Nancy Bearg. April 13, 1991. Untitled notes from National Security Council meeting “with [Secretary of State] Baker” (continued in next folder). George H.W. Bush Presidential Records. National Security Council. Nancy Bearg Dyke Files, Kurds – Refugees [4].

Haass, Richard N. Februrary 8, 1991. “Arms Control after the War.” George H. W. Bush Presidential Records. National Security Council, Richard N. Haass Files. Working File. Iraq – February 1991 [6].

Haass, Richard. April 5, 1991. “(final) Statement by the President.” George H. W. Bush Presidential Records. National Security Council. H-Files: NSC/DC Meetings Files. Meeting re: Persian Gulf Humanitarian Assistance via SVTS.

Haass, Richard. April 5, 1991. “Latest Version: Statement by the President.” George H. W. Bush Presidential Records. National Security Council. H-Files: NSC/DC Meetings Files. Meeting re: Persian Gulf Humanitarian Assistance via SVTS.

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Haass, Richard. March 7, 1991. “Moving Beyond Security Council Resolution 686.” George H. W. Bush Presidential Records. National Security Council. Richard N. Haass H-Files: NSC/DC Meetings Files. Working File. Iraq - March 1991 [1].

Haass, Richard. February 10, 1991. “Security Choices After the Gulf War.” George H. W. Bush Presidential Records. National Security Council. Richard N. Haass H-Files: NSC/DC Meetings Files. Working File, Iraq – February 1991 [2].

“Message from Cabinet Office London to the White House.” February 1991. George H.W. Bush Presidential Records. National Security Council. Richard N. Haass Files. Working file: Iraq – February 1991 [3].

“National Security Council Sr. Director Haass’ Meeting with President Özal.” June 12, 1991. George H.W. Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council. Richard N. Haass Files. Iraq – June 1991 [2].

Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations. April 2, 1991. “Letter to the president of the Security Council.” S/22435.

Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations. April 4, 1991. “Letter to the Secretary-General.” U.N. Doc. S/22447.

Permanent Representative of Iran to the Secretary-General. April 3, 1991. “Statement before the Council.” U.N. Doc. S/22436.

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Remarks of Mr. Zenega, Permanent Representative from Zimbabwe to the UN.” April 5, 1991. S/PV. 2982, 27-31.

Scowcroft, Brent. February 5, 1991. “Beyond the Gulf War.” George H. W. Bush Presidential Records. National Security Council. (found in the) Richard N. Haass H-Files: NSC/DC Meetings Files. Working File, Iraq – February 1991 [2].

“Statement of Mr. Al-Ashtal, Permanent Representative from Yemen to the UN.” April 5, 1991. S/PV. 2982.

“Transcribed Phone Conversation between President George H. W. Bush and President Turgut Özal.” April 8, 1991. George H.W. Bush Presidential Records. National Security Council. Brent Scowcroft Files. working file subseries. Iraq – April [1].

“Transcribed Phone Conversation: The President and the Secretary-General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar.” April 17, 1991. George H.W. Bush Presidential Records. National Security Council. Nancy Bearg Dyke Files. Kurds – April 1991 [2].

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“The Middle East in the Post-War Period: Political Stability and Openness.” Februrary 21, 1991. George H. W. Bush Presidential Records. National Security Council. Richard N. Haass Files. Working File Compendium. Iraq – February 1991 [1].

“United Nations Security Council Resolution 688.” 1991. Adopted by the Security Council at its 2982nd meeting on 5 April 1991. available at: http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres0 6 88.htm, accessed on: 20 January 2011.

UN SCOR. 1991. 46trh Session, 2982 meeting at 6, UN Doc S/PV.2982.

Wolfowitz, Paul. April 6, 1991. Untitled note found in Nancy Bearg Dyke Files. George H.W. Bush Presidential Records. National Security Council. Nancy Bearg Dyke Files. Kurds – Refugees [1].

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