Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18463             October 4, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.GREGORIO PERFECTOR, defendant-appellant.

Alfonso E. Mendoza and the appellant in behalf of the latter. Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.

 

MALCOLM, J.:

The important question is here squarely presented of whether article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code, punishing "Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority . . .," is still in force.

About August 20, 1920, the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando M. Guerrero, discovered that certain documents which constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the investigation of oil companies, had disappeared from his office. Shortly thereafter, the Philippine Senate, having been called into special session by the Governor-General, the Secretary for the Senate informed that body of the loss of the documents and of the steps taken by him to discover the guilty party. The day following the convening of the Senate, September 7, 1920, the newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article reading as follows:

Half a month has elapsed since the discovery, for the first time, of the scandalous robbery of records which were kept and preserved in the iron safe of the Senate, yet up to this time there is not the slightest indication that the author or authors of the crime will ever be discovered.

To find them, it would not, perhaps, be necessary to go out of the Sente itself, and the persons in charge of the investigation of the case would not have to display great skill in order to succeed in their undertaking, unless they should encounter the insuperable obstacle of offical concealment.

In that case, every investigation to be made would be but a mere comedy and nothing more.

After all, the perpetration of the robbery, especially under the circumstances that have surrounded it, does not surprise us at all.

The execution of the crime was but the natural effect of the environment of the place in which it was committed.

How many of the present Senators can say without remorse in their conscience and with serenity of mind, that they do not owe their victory to electoral robbery? How may?

The author or authors of the robbery of the records from the said iron safe of the Senate have, perhaps, but followed the example of certain Senators who secured their election through fraud and robbery.

The Philippine Senate, in its session of September 9, 1920, adopted a resolution authorizing its committee on elections and privileges to report as to the action which should be taken with reference to the article published inLa Nacion. On September 15, 1920, the Senate adopted a resolution authorizing the President of the Senate to indorse to the Attorney-General, for his study and corresponding action, all the papers referring to the case of the newspaper La Nacion and its editor, Mr. Gregorio Perfecto. As a result, an information was filed in the municipal court of the City of Manila by an assistant city fiscal, in which the editorial in question was set out and

in which it was alleged that the same constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. The defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the municipal court and again in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

During the course of the trial in the Court of First Instance, after the prosecution had rested, the defense moved for the dismissal of the case. On the subject of whether or not article 256 of the Penal Code, under which the information was presented, is in force, the trial judge, the Honorable George R. Harvey, said:

This antiquated provision was doubtless incorporated into the Penal Code of Spain for the protection of the Ministers of the Crown and other representatives of the King against free speech and action by Spanish subjects. A severe punishment was prescribed because it was doubtless considered a much more serious offense to insult the King's representative than to insult an ordinary individual. This provision, with almost all the other articles of that Code, was extended to the Philippine Islands when under the dominion of Spain because the King's subject in the Philippines might defame, abuse or insult the Ministers of the Crown or other representatives of His Majesty. We now have no Ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority in the Philippines representing the King of Spain, and said provision, with other articles of the Penal Code, had apparently passed into "innocuous desuetude," but the Supreme Corut of the Philippine Islands has, by a majority decision, held that said article 256 is the law of the land to-day. . . .

The Helbig case is a precedent which, by the rule of stare decisis, is binding upon this court until otherwise determined by proper authority.

In the decision rendered by the same judge, he concluded with the following language:

In the United States such publications are usually not punishable as criminal offense, and little importance is attached to them, because they are generally the result of political controversy and are usually regarded as more or less colored or exaggerated. Attacks of this character upon a legislative body are not punishable, under the Libel Law. Although such publications are reprehensible, yet this court feels some aversion to the application of the provision of law under which this case was filed. Our Penal Code has come to us from the Spanish regime. Article 256 of that Code prescribes punishment for persons who use insulting language about Ministers of the Crown or other "authority." The King of Spain doubtless left the need of such protection to his ministers and others in authority in the Philippines as well as in Spain. Hence, the article referred to was made applicable here. Notwithstanding the change of sovereignty, our Supreme Court, in a majority decision, has held that this provision is still in force, and that one who made an insulting remark about the President of the United States was punishable under it. (U.S. vs. Helbig, supra.) If it applicable in that case, it would appear to be applicable in this case. Hence, said article 256 must be enforced, without fear or favor, until it shall be repealed or superseded by other legislation, or until the Supreme Court shall otherwise determine.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the court finds the defendant guilty as charged in the information and under article 256 of their Penal Code sentences him to suffer two months and one day of arresto mayorand the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the costs of both instances.

The fifteen errors assigned by the defendant and appellant, reenforced by an extensive brief, and eloquent oral argument made in his own behalf and by his learned counsel, all reduce themselves to the pertinent and decisive question which was announced in the beginning of this decision.

It will be noted in the first place that the trial judge considered himself bound to follow the rule announced in the case of United States vs. Helbig (R. G. No. 14705, 1 not published). In that case, the accused was charged with having said, "To hell with the President and his proclamations, or words to that effect," in violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. He was found guilty in a judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila and again on appeal to the Supreme Court, with the writer of the instant decision dissenting on two principal grounds: (1) That the accused was deprived of the constitutional right of cross-examination, and (2) that article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is no longer in force. Subsequently, on a motion of reconsideration, the court, being of the opinion that the Court of First Instance had committed a prejudicial error in depriving the accused of his right to cross-examine a principal witness, set aside the judgment affirming the judgment appealed from and ordered the return of the record to the court of origin for the celebration of a new trial. Whether such a trial was actually had, is not known, but at least, the record in the Helbig case has never again been elevated to this court.

There may perchance exist some doubt as to the authority of the decision in the Helbig case, in view of the circumstances above described. This much, however, is certain: The facts of the Helbig case and the case before us, which we may term the Perfecto case, are different, for in the first case there was an oral defamation, while in

the second there is a written defamation. Not only this, but a new point which, under the facts, could not have been considered in the Helbig case, is, in the Perfecto case, urged upon the court. And, finally, as is apparent to all, the appellate court is not restrained, as was the trial court, by strict adherence to a former decision. We much prefer to resolve the question before us unhindered by references to the Helbig decision.

This is one of those cases on which a variety of opinions all leading to the same result can be had. A majority of the court are of the opinion that the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, has had the effect of repealing so much of article 256 of the Penal Code as relates to written defamation, abuse, or insult, and that under the information and the facts, the defendant is neither guilty of a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code, nor of the Libel Law. The view of the Chief Justice is that the accused should be acquitted for the reason that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute a violation of article 156 of the Penal Code. Three members of the court believe that article 256 was abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines and is inconsistent with democratic principles of government.

Without prejudice to the right of any member of the court to explain his position, we will discuss the two main points just mentioned.

1. Effect of the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, on article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code. — The Libel Law, Act No. 277, was enacted by the Philippine Commission shortly after organization of this legislative body. Section 1 defines libel as a "malicious defamation, expressed either in writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, or public theatrical exhibitions, tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish the alleged or natural deffects of one who is alive, and thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule." Section 13 provides that "All laws and parts of laws now in force, so far as the same may be in conflict herewith, are hereby repealed. . . ."

That parts of laws in force in 1901 when the Libel Law took effect, were in conflict therewith, and that the Libel Law abrogated certain portion of the Spanish Penal Code, cannot be gainsaid. Title X of Book II of the Penal Code, covering the subjects of calumny and insults, must have been particularly affected by the Libel Law. Indeed, in the early case of Pardo de Tavera vs. Garcia Valdez ([1902], 1. Phil., 468), the Supreme Court spoke of the Libel Law as "reforming the preexisting Spanish law on the subject of calumnia and injuria." Recently, specific attention was given to the effect of the Libel Law on the provisions of the Penal Code, dealing with calumny and insults, and it was found that those provisions of the Penal Code on the subject of calumny and insults in which the elements of writing an publicity entered, were abrogated by the Libel Law. (People vs. Castro [1922], p. 842, ante.)

The Libel Law must have had the same result on other provisions of the Penal Code, as for instance article 256.

The facts here are that the editor of a newspaper published an article, naturally in writing, which may have had the tendency to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation of members of the Philippine Senate, thereby possibly exposing them to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, which is exactly libel, as defined by the Libel Law. Sir J. F. Stephen is authority for the statement that a libel is indictable when defaming a "body of persons definite and small enough for individual members to be recognized as such, in or by means of anything capable of being a libel." (Digest of Criminal Law, art. 267.) But in the United States, while it may be proper to prosecute criminally the author of a libel charging a legislator with corruption, criticisms, no matter how severe, on a legislature, are within the range of the liberty of the press, unless the intention and effect be seditious. (3 Wharton's Criminal Law, p. 2131.) With these facts and legal principles in mind, recall that article 256 begins: Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority," etc.

The Libel Law is a complete and comprehensive law on the subject of libel. The well-known rule of statutory construction is, that where the later statute clearly covers the old subject-matter of antecedent acts, and it plainly appears to have been the purpose of the legislature to give expression in it to the whole law on the subject, previous laws are held to be repealed by necessary implication. (1 Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, p. 465.) For identical reasons, it is evident that Act No. 277 had the effect so much of this article as punishes defamation, abuse, or insults by writing.

Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, the Treason and Sedition Law, may also have affected article 256, but as to this point, it is not necessary to make a pronouncement.

2. Effect of the change from Spanish to Amercian sevoreignty over the Philippine son article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code. — Appellant's main proposition in the lower court and again energetically pressed in the appellate court was that article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is not now in force because abrogated by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines and because inconsistent with

democratic principles of government. This view was indirectly favored by the trial judge, and, as before stated, is the opinion of three members of this court.

Article 256 is found in Chapter V of title III of Book II of the Spanish Penal Code. Title I of Book II punishes the crimes of treason, crimes that endanger the peace or independence of the state, crimes against international law, and the crime of piracy. Title II of the same book punishes the crimes of lese majeste, crimes against the Cortesand its members and against the council of ministers, crimes against the form of government, and crimes committed on the occasion of the exercise of rights guaranteed by the fundamental laws of the state, including crime against religion and worship. Title III of the same Book, in which article 256 is found, punishes the crimes of rebellion, sedition, assaults upon persons in authority, and their agents, and contempts, insults, injurias, and threats against persons in authority, and insults, injurias, and threats against their agents and other public officers, the last being the title to Chapter V. The first two articles in Chapter V define and punish the offense of contempt committed by any one who shall be word or deed defame, abuse, insult, or threathen a minister of the crown, or any person in authority. The with an article condemning challenges to fight duels intervening, comes article 256, now being weighed in the balance. It reads as follows: "Any person who, by word, deed, or writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or by reason of such performance, provided that the offensive minister or person, or the offensive writing be not addressed to him, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor," — that is, the defamation, abuse, or insult of any Minister of the Crown of the Monarchy of Spain (for there could not be a Minister of the Crown in the United States of America), or other person in authority in the Monarchy of Spain.

It cannot admit of doubt that all those provisions of the Spanish Penal Code having to do with such subjects as treason, lese majeste, religion and worship, rebellion, sedition, and contempts of ministers of the crown, are not longer in force. Our present task, therefore, is a determination of whether article 256 has met the same fate, or, more specifically stated, whether it is in the nature of a municipal law or political law, and is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the characteristics and institutions of the American Government.

It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. "Political" is here used to denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign. (American Insurance Co. vs. Canter [1828], 1 Pet., 511; Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542; Roa vs. Collector of Customs [1912], 23 Phil., 315.) Mr. Justice Field of the United States Supreme Court stated the obvious when in the course of his opinion in the case of Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. vs. McGlinn, supra, he said: "As a matter of course, all laws, ordinances and regulations in conflict with the political character, institutions and Constitution of the new government are at once displaced. Thus, upon a cession of political jurisdiction and legislative power — and the latter is involved in the former — to the United States, the laws of the country in support of an established religion or abridging the freedom of the press, or authorizing cruel and unusual punishments, and he like, would at once cease to be of obligatory force without any declaration to that effect." To quote again from the United States Supreme Court: "It cannot be admitted that the King of Spain could, by treaty or otherwise, impart to the United States any of his royal prerogatives; and much less can it be admitted that they have capacity to receive or power to exercise them. Every nation acquiring territory, by treaty or otherwise, must hold it subject to the Constitution and laws of its own government, and not according to those of the government ceding it." (Pollard vs. Hagan [1845], 3 Hos., 210.)

On American occupation of the Philippines, by instructions of the President to the Military Commander dated May 28, 1898, and by proclamation of the latter, the municipal laws of the conquered territory affecting private rights of person and property and providing for the punishment of crime were nominally continued in force in so far as they were compatible with the new order of things. But President McKinley, in his instructions to General Merritt, was careful to say: "The first effect of the military occupation of the enemy's territory is the severance of the former political relation of the inhabitants and the establishment of a new political power." From that day to this, the ordinarily it has been taken for granted that the provisions under consideration were still effective. To paraphrase the language of the United States Supreme Court in Weems vs. United States ([1910], 217 U. S., 349), there was not and could not be, except as precise questions were presented, a careful consideration of the codal provisions and a determination of the extent to which they accorded with or were repugnant to the "'great principles of liberty and law' which had been 'made the basis of our governmental system.' " But when the question has been squarely raised, the appellate court has been forced on occasion to hold certain portions of the Spanish codes repugnant t democratic institutions and American constitutional principles. (U.S. vs. Sweet [1901], 1 Phil., 18; U.S. vs. Balcorta [1913], 25 Phil., 273; U.S. vs. Balcorta [1913], 25 Phil., 533; Weems vs. U.S., supra.)

The nature of the government which has been set up in the Philippines under American sovereignty was outlined by President McKinley in that Magna Charta of Philippine liberty, his instructions to the Commission, of April 7, 1900. In part, the President said:

In all the forms of government and administrative provisions which they are authorized to prescribe, the Commission should bear in mind that he government which they are establishing is designed not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands, and the measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective government. At the same time the Commission should bear in mind, and the people of the Islands should be made plainly to understand, that there are certain great principles of government which have been made the basis of our governmental system, which we deem essential to the rule of law and the maintenance of individual freedom, and of which they have, unfortunately, been denied the experience possessed by us; that there are also certain practical rules of government which we have found to be essential to the preservation of these great principles of liberty and law, and that these principles and these rules of government must be established and maintained in their islands for the sake of their liberty and happiness, however much they may conflict with the customs or laws of procedure with which they are familiar. It is evident that the most enligthened thought of the Philippine Islands fully appreciates the importance of these principles and rules, and they will inevitably within a short time command universal assent.

The courts have naturally taken the same view. Mr. Justice Elliott, speaking for our Supreme Court, in the case of United States vs. Bull ([1910], 15 Phil., 7), said: "The President and Congress framed the government on the model with which American are familiar, and which has proven best adapted for the advancement of the public interests and the protection of individual rights and privileges."

Therefore, it has come with somewhat of a shock to hear the statement made that the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands and their customs, habits, and prejudices, to follow the language of President McKinley, demand obeisance to authority, and royal protection for that authority.

According to our view, article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials who were the representatives of the King. With the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of government, as set up in the Philippines. It was in no sense a continuation of the old, although merely for convenience certain of the existing institutions and laws were continued. The demands which the new government made, and makes, on the individual citizen are likewise different. No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. "In the eye of our Constitution and laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freeman, and has equal rights with every other man. We have no rank or station, except that of respectability and intelligence as opposed to indecency and ignorance, and the door to this rank stands open to every man to freely enter and abide therein, if he is qualified, and whether he is qualified or not depends upon the life and character and attainments and conduct of each person for himself. Every man may lawfully do what he will, so long as it is not malum in se ormalum prohibitum or does not infringe upon the qually sacred rights of others." (State vs. Shepherd [1903], 177 Mo., 205; 99 A. S. R., 624.)

It is true that in England, from which so many of the laws and institutions of the United States are derived, there were once statutes of scandalum magnatum, under which words which would not be actionable if spoken of an ordinary subject were made actionable if spoken of a peer of the realm or of any of the great officers of the Crown, without proof of any special damage. The Crown of England, unfortunately, took a view less tolerant that that of other sovereigns, as for instance, the Emperors Augustus, Caesar, and Tiberius. These English statutes have, however, long since, become obsolete, while in the United States, the offense of scandalum magnatum is not known. In the early days of the American Republic, a sedition law was enacted, making it an offense to libel the Government, the Congress, or the President of the United States, but the law met with so much popular disapproval, that it was soon repealed. "In this country no distinction as to persons is recognized, and in practice a person holding a high office is regarded as a target at whom any person may let fly his poisonous words. High official position, instead of affording immunity from slanderous and libelous charges, seems rather to be regarded as making his character free plunder for any one who desires to create a senation by attacking it." (Newell, Slander and Libel, 3d ed., p. 245; Sillars vs. Collier [1890], 151 Mass., 50; 6 L.R.A., 680.)

Article 256 of the Penal Code is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the American character and system of government. The gulf which separates this article from the spirit which inspires all penal legislation of American origin, is as wide as that which separates a monarchy from a democratic Republic like that of the United States. This article was crowded out by implication as soon as the United States established its authority in the Philippine Islands. Penalties out of all proportion to the gravity of the offense, grounded in a distorted monarchical conception of the nature of political authority, as opposed to the American conception of the protection of the interests of the public, have been obliterated by the present system of government in the Islands. 1awph!l.net

From an entirely different point of view, it must be noted that this article punishes contempts against executive officials, although its terms are broad enough to cover the entire official class. Punishment for contempt of non-judicial officers has no place in a government based upon American principles. Our official class is not, as in monarchies, an agent of some authority greater than the people but it is an agent and servant of the people themselves. These officials are only entitled to respect and obedience when they are acting within the scope of their authority and jurisdiction. The American system of government is calculated to enforce respect and obedience where such respect and obedience is due, but never does it place around the individual who happens to occupy an official position by mandate of the people any official halo, which calls for drastic punishment for contemptuous remarks.

The crime of lese majeste disappeared in the Philippines with the ratification of the Treaty of Paris. Ministers of the Crown have no place under the American flag.

To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the court are of the opinion, although for different reasons, that the judgment should be reversed and the defendant and appellant acquitted, with costs de officio. So ordered.

Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.

People v. Perfecto

G.R. No. L-18463, October 4, 1922

"The important question is here squarely presented of whether article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code, punishing "Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority . . .," is still in force."

public law: It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated -- "political" being used to denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign.

FACTS:

This is a case relating to the loss of some documents which constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the Senate investigation of oil companies. The newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article about it to the effect that "the author or authors of the robbery of the records from the iron safe of the Senate have, perhaps, but followed the example of certain Senators who secured their election through fraud and robbery."

Consequently, the Attorney-General, through a resolution adopted by the Philippine Senate, filed an information alleging that the editorial constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code.

The defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the municipal court and again in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

ISSUES:

Whether or not article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was abrogated with the change from Spanish to American sovereignty

Whether or not Perfecto is guilty of libel

HELD:

It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated -- "political" being used to denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign.

On American occupation of the Philippines, by instructions of the President to the Military Commander, and by proclamation of the latter, the municipal laws of the conquered territory affecting private rights of person and property and providing for the punishment of crime (e.g. the Spanish Penal Code) were nominally continued in

force in so far as they were compatible with the new order of things.

Article 256 was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials who were the representatives of the King. But with the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of government, was set up in the Philippines. No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. Said article is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the American character and system ofgovernment. It was crowded out by implication as soon as the United States established its authority in the Philippine Islands.

"From an entirely different point of view, it must be noted that this article punishes contempts against executive officials, although its terms are broad enough to cover the entire official class. Punishment for contempt of non-judicial officers has no place in a government based upon American principles. Our official class is not, as in monarchies, an agent of some authority greater than the people but it is an agent and servant of the people themselves. These officials are only entitled to respect and obedience when they are acting within the scope of their authority and jurisdiction. The American system of government is calculated to enforce respect and obedience where such respect and obedience is due, but never does it place around the individual who happens to occupy an official position by mandate of the people any official halo, which calls for drastic punishment for contemptuous remarks."

DECISION:

To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the court are of the opinion, although for different reasons, that the judgment should be reversed and the defendant and appellant acquitted, with costs de officio. So ordered.

MACARIOLA VS ASUNCION

Political Law – AbrogationOn 6 Aug 1968, Macariola filed a complaint against Judge Asuncion with “acts unbecoming a judge”. The judge apparently bought a property (formerly owned by Macariola) which was involved in a civil case decided by him; and on 31 Aug 1966, the Asuncion couples conveyed their share and interest in the said property to The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. The act of Asuncion engaging in commerce is said to be a violation of pars 1 & 5, Art 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges in active service (among others) to do so within the limits of the place where they discharge their duties.

HELD: Art 14 (Anti  Graft  and Corrupt Practices Act, effective Aug 1888)  of the Code of Commerce, prohibiting judges from engaging in commerce was political in nature and so was automatically abrogated with the end of Spanish rule in the country (Change of Sovereignty to the US by virtue of cession, 1898).

MACARIOLA VS. ASUNCION114 SCRA 77

FACTS:1. Judge Elias Asuncion was the presiding Judge in Civil Case No. 3010 for partition.2. Among the parties thereto was Bernardita R. Macariola.3. On June 8, 1863 respondent Judge rendered a decision, which became final for lack of an appeal.4. On October 16, 1963 a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which he approved in an Order dated October 23, 1963, later amended on November 11, 1963.5. On March 6, 1965, a portion of lot 1184-E, one of the properties subject to partition under Civil Case No. 3010, was acquired by purchase by respondent Macariola and his wife, who were major stockholders of Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc.,6. Bernardita Macariola thus charged Judge Asuncion of the CFI of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals “with acts unbecoming of a judge.”7. Macariola alleged that Asuncion violated , among others, Art. 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code and Article 14 of the Code of Commerce.

ISSUE:Is the actuation of Judge Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of property in a Civil Case previously handled by him an act unbecoming of a Judge?

HELD:Article 1491 , par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. The Supreme Court held that for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property.

In the case at bar, when respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties filed an appeal within the reglementary period hence, the lot in question was no longer subject of litigation. Moreover at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965, respondent’s order date October 23, 1963 and the amended order dated November 11, 1963 approving the October 16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963 decision, had long been final for there was no appeal from said orders.

Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the plaintiffs after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010.

Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge having taken place over one year after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders approving the project of partition, and not during the pendency of the litigation, there was no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code.

Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is a change of sovereignty , the political laws of the former sovereign , whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.

301 SCRA 298; G.R. NO. 12809620 JAN 1999]

LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Facts: 

Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included in the ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation Command, that what actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desiertoformed a panel of investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel found the incident as a legitimate police operation. However, a review board modified the panel’s finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner, charged as principal, and herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a

reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an accessory.

The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the “principal accused” are government officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal” from the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.

Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which provides that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.

Issues: 

(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners’ right to due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been introduced for the Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case.

(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute.

(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the determination whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial Court’s jurisdiction.

RULING:

Petitioner and intervenors’ posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law is too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant such a declaration. Every classification made by the law is presumed reasonable and the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class; all of which are present in this case.

Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply “to all cases involving” certain public officials and under the transitory provision in Section 7, to “all cases pending in any court.” Contrary to petitioner and intervenors’ argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.”

There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally, provides retroactive effect of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not apenal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are

those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations or those that define crimes and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.

In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is essential in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the amended information, there was no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. The stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was not established.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.

“Equal Protection” – KBG – Cases Before the Sandiganbayan

On 18 May 1995, alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang were shot to death. The incident was later sensationalized as a rub out. This implicated Lacson among others as guilty for multiple murder. The case was raised before the Sandiganbayan. In 1996, Lacson et al  filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Sec 2 (par a and c) of RA 7975 “An Act To Strengthen The Functional And Structural Organization Of The Sandiganbayan, Amending For That Purpose Presidential Decree 1606, As Amended. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the “principal accused” are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27. In 1997, RA 8249 was passed which basically expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The law was authored by Lagman and Neptali Gonzales. Lacson assailed the law as it  was introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioner’s cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereover to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months the resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioner’s vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975).

ISSUE: Whether or not the right to equal protection by Lacson et al has been violated with the passage of RA 8249.

HELD: The SC ruled that RA 8249 did not violate the right of Lacson et al to equal protection. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely:(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and(4) must apply equally to all members of the same classThe classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commenced and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences. In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witness and presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, Lacson et al cannot  claim that Secs 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from those similarly situated as them.Precisely, par A of Sec 4 provides that it shall apply to “all cases involving” certain public officials and, under the transitory provision in Sec 7, to “all cases pending in any court.” Contrary to petitioner and intervenors’ arguments, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.” It just happened that the Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Sec 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).

HERNANDEZ v ALBANO

25 January 1967

Cruz, ponente

appeal of a decision of the Court of First Instance

SHORT VERSION:

Hernandez sought to enjoin the fiscal’s investigation of charges filed against him. The courts only do so in extreme cases; Hernandez did not prove that his belonged to those exceptions.

FACTS:

Isabela Rep. Delfin Albano (respondent-appellee) filed a complaint with the Manila city fiscal against Finance Secretary & Central Bank Monetary Board Presiding Officer Jaime Hernandez (petitioner-appellant) for violating RPC Art. 216 (possession of prohibited interest by a public officer), Commonwealth Act 626 *which provides for the penalty for violations of Article VII, Section 11, subsection (2) of the Constitution) or RA 265 (Central Bank Act).

o The complaint involved Hernandez’s alleged shareholdings in University of the East, Bicol Electric Co., Rural Bank of Nueva Caceres, DMG inc., and University of Nueva Caceres and the claim that said corporations obtained dollar allocations from the Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, during Hernandez’s incumbency as presiding officer thereof.

o In total, there were five charges docketed in the fiscal’s office. After joint investigation of the charges before Second Assistant City Fiscal of Manila Carlos Gonzales

(respondent), Albano moved to exclude the alleged violation of RP Art 216 as the applicability of the statute was pending before the SC in Solidum v Hernandez (it had since been resolved adversely against Hernandez). The fiscal granted the motion.

o Hernandez sought the dismissal of the remaining charges on the grounds that (a) violation of Article VII, Section 11, subsection (2) of the Constitution, punishable under Commonwealth Act 626, should be prosecuted at the domicile of the private enterprises affected there by; and that (b) violation of Section 13 of Republic Act 265 is not criminal in nature. Dismissal and reconsideration denied.

Hernandez went to the Court of First Instance Manila on certiorari and prohibition praying for preliminary injunction to restrain the fiscal’s office from continuing the investigation.

o The CFI dismissed the petition.

ISSUE:

could the Manila fiscal be restrained from proceeding with the investigation of the charges against Hernandez?

REASONING:

By statute, the prosecuting officer of the City of Manila and his assistants are empowered to investigate crimes committed within the city's territorial jurisdiction. Not a mere privilege, it is the sworn duty of a Fiscal to conduct an investigation of a criminal charge filed with his office. The power to investigate postulates the other obligation on the part of the Fiscal to investigate promptly and file the case of as speedily.

o A rule was formulated that ordinarily criminal prosecution may not be blocked by court prohibition or injunction.

o However, in extreme cases, a relief in equity could be availed of to stop a purported enforcement of a criminal law where it was necessary: (a) for the orderly administration of justice; (b) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner; (c) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (d) to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights; and (e) in proper cases, because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional, or was "held invalid."

Commonwealth Act 626 provides the penal sanction for a violation of Constitution Art VII sec. 11(2): a fine of not than P5000 or imprisonment of not more than 2 years, or both.

o The legal mandate in Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of the Court is that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place.” Where an offense is wholly committed outside the territorial limits wherein the court operates, said court is powerless to try the case.

o Similarly, the Manila fiscal could not investigate a crime committed within the exclusive confines of another province. Otherwise, they would be overreaching the territorial limits of their jurisdiction, and unlawfully encroach upon powers and prerogatives of fiscals of the province.

o Based on the facts of the case, Possession of prohibited interests is but one of the essential components of the offense. As necessary an ingredient thereof is the fact that petitioner was head of a department: Secretary of Finance. So also, the fact that while head of department and chairman of the Monetary Board he allegedly was financially interested in the corporations aforesaid which so the dollar allocations, and that he had to act officially, in his dual capacity, not in Camarines Sur, but in Manila where he held his office.

o Since criminal action must be instituted and tried in the place where the crime or an essential ingredient thereof, took place, it stands to reason to say that the Manila under the facts obtained here, have jurisdiction to investigate the violation complained of.

Violation of RA 265 sec. 13 was criminal in nature, as the law clearly provided the penal sanction for violating its provisions.

RULING: CFI judgment affirmed

US VS TAYLOR

G.R. No. L-9726, U.S. v. Taylor

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

DECISION

December 8, 1914

G.R. No. L-9726

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

CARSON TAYLOR, defendant-appellant.

C. W. O'Brien for appellant. Office of the Solicitor General Corpus for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:

This was an action for criminal libel.

The complaint alleged:

That on the 25th day of September, 1913, the said Carson Taylor, being then and there the acting editor and

proprietor, manager, printer, and publisher in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, of a certain daily bilingual

newspaper, edited in the English and Spanish languages, and known as the 'Manila Daily Bulletin,' a paper of

large circulation throughout the Philippine Islands, as well as in the United States and other countries in all of

which both languages are spoken and written, and having as such the supervision and control of said newspaper,

did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, maliciously, and with intent to impeach the honesty, virtue,

and reputation of one Ramon Sotelo as a member of the bar of the Philippine Islands and as private individual,

and to expose him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, compose, print, edit, publish, and circulate and

procure to be composed, printed, edited, published, and circulated in said newspaper's issue of the above

mentioned date, September 25, 1913, a certain false and malicious defamation and libel in the English language

of and concerning the said Ramon Sotelo, which reads as follows:

OWNERS FIRED BUILDING TO COLLECT INSURANCE. CRIMINAL CHARGES FOLLOWS CIVIL SUIT.

'Conspiracy divulged in three sworn statements made by members of the party after a family disagreement.

Sensational statement sworn to. Mystery of Calle O'Donnell fire solved and papers served.

'Conspiracy to defraud the insurance company.'

'The building was fired to collect the amount of insurance.'

'The movable furniture of value was removed before the fire.'

'The full amount of the insurance was collected, and the conspiracy was a success.'

'The above is the gist of the sworn statements of Vicente Sotelo and Eugenio Martin in connection with the fire

that destroyed house No. 2157 Calle O'Donnell on April 4.'

'The case in question is a sensational one to say the least, and the court is being petitioned to set aside the ruling

and cite the parties to show cause why they should not be cited to answer charges of conspiracy to defraud.'

'On April 4, 1913, the house located at 2157 Calle O'donnell was destroyed by fire. The house was insured for

P5,000, the contents for an additional P5,000, with the West of Scotland Insurance Association, of which Lutz &

Co. are the local agents, with an additional P1,500 with Smith, Bell & Co.'

'The full amount of the insurance on the property was paid by the paid by the agents of the insurance companies

and the matter apparently dropped from the records.'

'Then there was internal trouble and information began to leak out which resulted in sensational statements to

the effect that the destruction of the property had been an act of incendiarism in order to collect the insurance.

The there was an investigation started and it resulted in sworn statements of the three persons above

mentioned.'

'Notarial returns were made yesterday by the sheriff, based on the sworn statements and the parties are cited to

appear in court and show cause.'

'The investigation also showed that the furniture, which was supposed to be in line the house at the time of the

conflagration and which was paid for by the insurance agents, sworn statements having been made that it was

destroyed in the fire, was in certain house in Montalban, where it was identified upon the sworn statements of

the above mentioned. Implicated in the charges of conspiracy and fraud is the name of the attorney for the

plaintiff who made affidavit as to the burning of the house and against whom criminal proceedings will be

brought as well as against the original owners.'

'Attorney Burke, who represents Lutz & Co. in the proceedings, was seen last night and asked for a statement as

to the case. Mr. Burke refused to talk on the case and stated that when it came to trial it would be time enough

to obtain the facts.'

'The present action came before the court on motion of Attorney Burke to set aside the judgment, which, in the

original case, given the owners of the property judgment for the amount of the insurance.'

'Attorney Burke filed the sworn statements with the court and the notarial returns to the same were made

yesterday afternoon, the sworn statements as to the burning of the house being in the hands of the sheriff.'

'It was stated yesterday that a criminal action would follow the civil proceedings instituted to recover the funds

in the case entitled on the court records, Maria Mortera de Eceiza and Manuel Eceiza versus the West o Sctoland

Association, Limited, No. 10191 on the court records.'

'It might be stated also that Eugenio Martin was one of the plaintiffs in the recent suit brought against Ex-

Governor W. Cameron Forbes for lumber supplied for his Boston home.'

That in this article is contained the following paragraph. To wit:

". . . Implicated in the charges of conspiracy and fraud is the name of the attorney for the plaintiff who made

affidavit as to the burning of the house and against whom criminal proceedings will be brought as well as against

the original owners," by which the said accused meant to refer and did refer to the said Ramon Sotelo, who then

and there was the attorney for the plaintiff in the case aforesaid, No. 10191 of the Court of First Instance of the

city of Manila, and so was understood by the public who read the same; that the statements and allegations made

in said paragraph are wholly false and untrue, thus impeaching the honesty, virtue, and reputation of the said

offended party as a member of the bar of the Philippine Islands and as private individual, and exposing him to

public hatred, contempt and ridicule. Contrary to law.

Upon said complaint the defendant was arrested, arraigned, plead not guilty, was tried, found guilty of the crime

charged, and sentenced by the Honorable George N. Hurd, judge, to pay a fine of P200. From the sentence the

defendant appealed to this court and made the following assignment of error:

First. The court erred in finding that the defendant was responsible for and guilty of the alleged libel.

Second. The court erred in finding that the defendant was the proprietor and publisher of the "Manila Daily

Bulletin."

Third. The court erred in finding that the alleged libelous articles was libelous per se.

Fourth. The court erred in holding that the article was libelous, while finding that there was no malice.

Fifth. The court erred in finding that the alleged libelous article referred to attorney Ramon Sotelo.

Sixth. The court erred in finding that Ramon Sotelo was attorney for the plaintiffs in case No. 10191, when the

alleged libel was published.

After a careful examination of the record and the arguments presented by the appellant, we deem it necessary to

discuss only the first and second assignments of error.

In the Philippine Islands there exist no crimes such as are known in the United States and England as common

law crimes. No act constitutes a crime here unless it is made so by law. Libel is made a crime here by Act No.

277 of the United States Philippine Commission. Said Act (No. 277) not only defines the crime of libel and

prescribes the particular conditions necessary to constitute it, but it also names the persons who may be guilty of

such crime. In the present case the complaint alleges that the defendant was, at the time of the publication of

said alleged article "the acting editor, proprietor, manager, printer, publisher, etc. etc. of a certain bilingual

newspaper, etc., known as the 'Manila Daily Bulletin,' a paper of large circulation throughout the Philippine

Islands, as well as in the United States and other countries."

It will be noted that the complaint charges the defendant as "the acting editor, proprietor, manager, printer, and

publisher." From an examination of said Act No. 277, we find that section 6 provides that: "Every author, editor,

or proprietor of any book, newspaper, or serial publication is chargeable with the publication of any words

contained in any part of said book or number of each newspaper or serial as fully as if he were the author of the

same."

By an examination of said article, with reference to the persons who may be liable for the publication of a libel in

a newspaper, we find that it only provides for a punishment of "the author, editor, or proprietor." It would follow,

therefore, that unless the proof shows that the defendant in the present case is the "author, editor, or proprietor"

of the newspaper in which the libel was published, he can not be held liable.

In the present case the Solicitor-General in his brief said that - "No person is represented to be either the 'author,

editor, or proprietor.'" That statement of the Solicitor-General is fully sustained by the record. There is not a

word of proof in the record showing that the defendant was either the "author, the editor, or the proprietor." The

proof shows that the defendant was the "manager." He must, therefore, be acquitted of the crime charged

against him, unless it is shown by the proof that he, as "manager" of the newspaper, was in some way directly

responsible for the writing, editing, or publishing of the matter contained in said alleged libelous article. The

prosecution presented the newspaper, the "Manila Daily Bulletin," for the purpose of showing the relation which

the defendant had to it. That was the only proof presented by the prosecution to show the relation which the

defendant had to the publication of the libel in question. From an examination of the editorial page of said

exhibit, we find that it shows that the "Manila Daily Bulletin" is owned by the "Bulletin Publishing Company," and

that the defendant was its manager. There is not a word of proof in the record which shows what relation the

manager had to the publication of said newspaper. We might, by series of presumptions and assumptions,

conclude that the manager of a newspaper has some direct responsibility with its publication. We believe,

however, that such presumptions and assumptions, in the absence of a single letter of proof relating thereto,

would be unwarranted and unjustified. The prosecuting attorney had an opportunity to present proof or because

no such proof was obtainable, he presented none. It certainly is not difficult matter to ascertain who is the real

person responsible for the publication of a newspaper which is published daily and has a wide circulation in a

particular community. No question was asked the defendant concerning his particular relation to the publication

of the newspaper in question. We do not desire to be understood in our conclusions here as holding that the

"manager" or the "printer" may not, under certain conditions and proper proof, he held to be the "author, editor,

or proprietor" of a newspaper. He may nominate himself as "manager" or "printer" simply, and be at the same

time the "author, editor, or proprietor" of the newspaper. He cannot avoid responsibility by using some other

term or word, indicating his relation to the newspaper or the publication, when, as a matter of fact, he is the

"author, the editor, or the proprietor" of the same. His real relation to the said publication is a matter of proof.

The Solicitor-General, in his with the hope of evading legal responsibility, as the Libel Law places the

responsibility for publishing a libel, on "every author, editor, or proprietor of any book, etc." Had the prosecuting

attorney in the trial of the cause believed that the defendant, even though he called himself the "manager" was,

in fact, the "author, editor, or proprietor" of said publication, he should have presented some proof supporting

that contention. Neither do we desire to be understood as holding that simply because a person connected with

the publication of a newspaper who calls himself the "manager" or "printer" may not, in fact and at the same

time, be the "author, editor, or proprietor." The "author, editor, or proprietor" can not avoid responsibility for the

writing and publication of a libelous article, by simply calling himself the "manager" or the "printer" of a

newspaper. That, however, is a question of proof. The burden is upon the prosecution to show that the defendant

is, by whatever name he may call himself, in truth and in fact, the "author, editor, or proprietor" of a newspaper.

The courts cannot assume, in the absence of proof, that one who called himself "manager" was in fact the

"author, editor, or proprietor." We might assume, perhaps, that the "manager" of a newspaper plays an important

part in the publication of the same by virtue of the general signification of the word "manager." Men can not,

however, be sentenced upon the basis of a mere assumption. There must be some proof. The word "manage" has

been defined by Webster to mean "to have under control and direction; to conduct; to guide; to administer; to

treat; to handle." Webster defines "manager" to be "one who manages; a conductor or director; as, the manager

of a theater." A manager, as that word is generally understood, we do not believe includes the idea of ownership.

Generally speaking it means one who is representing another as an agent. That being true, his power and duties

and obligations are generally defined by contract. He may have expressed as well as implied powers, but

whatever his powers and duties are they must be defendant upon the nature of the business and the terms of his

contract. There is no fixed rule which indicates particularly and definitely his duties, powers and obligations. An

examination into the character of the business and the contract of his employment must be made for the purpose

of ascertaining definitely what his duties and obligations are. His exact relation is always a matter of proof. It is

incumbent upon the prosecution is a case like the present, to show that whatever title, name or designation the

defendant may bear, he was, in fact, the "author, the editor, or the proprietor" of the newspaper. If he was in fact

the "author, editor, or proprietor," he can not escape responsibility by calling the "manager" or "printer." It is the

relation which he bears to the publication and not the name or title he has assumed, which is important in an

investigation. He can not wear the toga of author of editor and hide his responsibility by giving himself some

other name. While the terms "author, editor, and proprietor" of a newspaper are terms well defined, the

particular words "author, editor, or proprietor" are not material or important, further than that they are words

which are intended to show the relation of the responsible party to the publication. That relation may as well

exist under some other name or denomination.

For the foregoing reasons, therefore, there being no proof whatever in the record showing that the defendant

was the "author, the editor, or the proprietor" of the newspaper in question, the sentence of the lower court must

be reversed, the complaint dismissed and the defendant discharged from the custody of the law, with costs de

officio. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Moreland, Trent and Araullo., JJ., concur.

NO COMMON LAW CRIMES IN THE PHILIPPINES

– Common law crimes are bodies of legal rules and principles which are not based on statute but on usages and traditions.

– There are no common law crimes in the Philippines. No act shall constitute as a crime unless it is made so by law (U.S. vs. Taylor, 28 Phil 599).

– nullum crimen, nulla poena, sine lege

– Art 5 RPC: if there is no law punishing the act or omission, the court must dismiss the case no matter how wicked the act may seem.

CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rules 1 – 71

 

I.      GENERAL PRINCIPLES

 

Concept of Remedial Law

Remedial Law is that branch of law which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion

Substantive Law as Distinguished from Remedial LawSubstantive law creates, defines and regulates rights and duties regarding life, liberty or property which when violated gives rise to a cause of action (Bustos v. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640).

Remedial law prescribes the methods of enforcing those rights and obligations created by substantive law by providing a procedural system for obtaining redress for the invasion of rights and violations of duties and by prescribing rules as to how suits are filed, tried and decided by the courts.

As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing them, as distinguished from remedial law which provides or regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished.

REMEDIAL LAW is that branch of law which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion [Bustos vs. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640]. It is also known as Adjective Law. 

B. Substantive Law as Distinguished from Remedial Law

SUBSTANTIVE LAW is one which creates, defines, and regulates rights concerning life, liberty, or property, or the power of agencies or instrumentalities for the administration of public affairs. 

PROCEDURAL LAW is the method of conducting a judicial proceeding.  It includes whatever is embraced in the technical terms, pleadings, practice, and evidence.  It is the means by which the power or authority of a court to hear and decide a class of cases is put to action [Manila Railroad vs. Atty. General, 20 Phil. 523]. 

JURISDICTION is the power to hear and decide cases [Herrera vs. Baretto & Joaquin, 25 Phil. 245].  It is the power with which courts are invested with the power of administering justice, that is, for hearing and deciding cases. In order for the court to have authority to dispose of a case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties [Republic Planters Bank vs. Molina, 166 SCRA 39]. 

RULE MAKING POWER

Bustos v. Lucero

Facts Bustos is charged with a criminal offense and he wanted to confront his accusers during the preliminary investigation. The prosecutor objected invoking Ruloe 108, Section II of the Rules of Court which provide the rights of a defendant after arrest.

It is contended that Section 11 of Rule 108 infringes section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution which says that the Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concering pleading practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. These rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.

It is said that the rule in question impairs substantive rights of the accused.

Held Rule 108, Section II is an adjective law and not a substantive law or substantive right. Applied to criminal law, substantive law declares what acts are crimes and procedural law provides and procedural law provides or regulates the steps by which the the guilty party is punished.

Preliminary Investigations are eminently and essentially remedial, as it is the first step in a criminal prosecution.

While Section 11, Rule 108 denies to a defendant his right to cross-examine during a preliminary investigation, his right to present witnesses remains unaffected and his constitutional rights to be informed of the charges against him both at such investigation and at the trial are unchanged.

It is difficult to draw a line in any particular case beyond which legislative power over remedy and procedure can pass without touching upon the substantive rights of parties affected, as it is impossible to fix that boundary by general condition.

It is inevitable that the Supreme Court, in making rules should step on substantive rights and the Constitution must be presumed to tolerate it if not to expect such incursion as does not affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary manner or deprive him of a defense, but operates only ina limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage.

The motion is denied.

BOOK FIVELABOR RELATIONS

Title IPOLICY AND DEFINITIONS

Chapter IPOLICY

Art. 211. Declaration of Policy.A. It is the policy of the State:

a. To promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as modes of settling labor or industrial disputes;

b. To promote free trade unionism as an instrument for the enhancement of democracy and the promotion of social justice and development; c. To foster the free and voluntary organization of a strong and united labor movement; d. To promote the enlightenment of workers concerning their rights and obligations as union members and as employees; e. To provide an adequate administrative machinery for the expeditious settlement of labor or industrial disputes; f. To ensure a stable but dynamic and just industrial peace; and g. To ensure the participation of workers in decision and policy-making processes affecting their rights, duties and welfare.

B. To encourage a truly democratic method of regulating the relations between the employers and employees by means of agreements freely entered into through collective bargaining, no court or administrative agency or official shall have the power to set or fix wages, rates of pay, hours of work or other terms and conditions of employment, except as otherwise provided under this Code. (As amended by Section 3, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)

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1. OVERVIEW AND VIEWPOINT

“Labor Standards” refers to the minimum terms and conditions of employment which employees are legally entitled to and employers must comply with.

“Labor Relations” refers to the interactions between employer and employees or their representatives and the mechanism by which the standards and other terms and conditions of employment are negotiated, adjusted and enforced.

The government labor relations policy is declared in Art. 211 which is a focused elaboration of the basic labor policy announced in Art.3 which, in turn, echoes the constitutional mandates. The policy intends to attain social justice through industrial peace and progress. The latter is founded on employee participation and collective interactions between employer and employees. In Management parlance, the input is the parties’ rights and duties, the process is worker’s organization and collective bargaining, and the output is industrial peace and progress towards social justice as the end goal.

Work stoppage—known as “strike” by employees or “lockout” by the employer—is not favoured in law. It is recognized as a legal right but regulated as to the purpose and manner of doing it. Deviation from the mandatory requirements has adverse consequences to the violators. Work stoppage, because it is counter-productive, is and has to be considered a measure of last resort.

The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law. Relations between private employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the unionized private sector are settled through the process of collective bargaining.

Because labor relations are primarily “domestic,” third parties, even the Government, shy away from meddling, as much as it can be helped. This is why an in-house problem solving structure, called grievance machinery, is a requirement in CBAs. If this machinery fails, the parties themselves are free to select any third party, called voluntary arbitrator, to resolve their differences.

The laws, as a force that balances the parties’ rights and obligations, are admittedly necessary in the industrial setting.1

2. WORKERS’ ORGANIZATION

A labor or trade union is a combination of workmen organized for the ultimate purpose of securing through united action the most favourable conditions as regards wages, hours of labor, conditions of employment, etc., for its members.

In the popular sense a labor union is understood to be a completely organized body of dues-paying members, operating through elected officers and constituting a militant, vital and functioning organ. It may be said that while every labor union is a labor organization, not every labor organization is a labor union. The difference is one of organization, composition and operation.

3. WHY WORKERS ORGANIZE

Self-help through economic action necessarily requires increasing the bargaining power of employees; hence one of the basic purposes of a labor union is to eliminate competition among employees in the labor market.

1 Art. 1700. The relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good.

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Three other human desires should be noted among the forces that led workers to organize:

(1) One is the desire for job security.

(2) Employees wished to substitute what we should term “the rule of law” for the arbitrary and often capricious exercise of power by the boss.

(3) Finally, unions helped to give employees a sense of participation in the business enterprises of which they are part—a function of labor unions which became important as organizations spread into mass production industries.

The union is the recognized instrumentality and mouthpiece of the laborers.

4. ILO CONVENTION NO. 87________

Chapter IIDEFINITIONS

Art. 212. Definitions.a. "Commission" means the National Labor Relations Commission or any of its divisions, as the case may be, as provided under this Code. b. "Bureau" means the Bureau of Labor Relations and/or the Labor Relations Divisions in the regional offices established under Presidential Decree No. 1, in the Department of Labor. c. "Board" means the National Conciliation and Mediation Board established under Executive Order No. 126. d. "Council" means the Tripartite Voluntary Arbitration Advisory Council established under Executive Order No. 126, as amended. e. "Employer" includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly. The term shall not include any labor organization or any of its officers or agents except when acting as employer. f. "Employee" includes any person in the employ of an employer. The term shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the Code so explicitly states. It shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a result of or in connection with any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice if he has not obtained any other substantially equivalent and regular employment. g. "Labor organization" means any union or association of employees which exists in whole or in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment.

h. "Legitimate labor organization" means any labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment, and includes any branch or local thereof. i. "Company union" means any labor organization whose formation, function or administration has been assisted by any act defined as unfair labor practice by this Code. j. "Bargaining representative" means a legitimate labor organization whether or not employed by the employer. k. "Unfair labor practice" means any unfair labor practice as expressly defined by the Code. l. "Labor dispute" includes any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.